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Contrastive self-knowledge and the McKinsey paradox
In this paper I argue first, that a contrastive account of self-knowledge and the propositional attitudes entails an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on), second, that the final account provides a solution to the McKinsey paradox, and third, that the account has the resources to explain why certain anti-skeptical arguments fail.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Other
Publisher
Cambridge University PressPage range
75-93Pages
276.0Book title
Externalism, Self-Knowledge, and Skepticism New EssaysPlace of publication
CambridgeISBN
9781107063501Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes