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Knowledge of logical generality and the possibility of deductive reasoning
I address a type of circularity threat that arises for the view that we employ general basic logical principles in deductive reasoning. This type of threat has been used to argue that whatever knowing such principles is, it cannot be a fully cognitive or propositional state, otherwise deductive reasoning would not be possible. I look at two versions of the circularity threat and answer them in a way that both challenges the view that we need to apply general logical principles in deductive reasoning and defuses the threat to a cognitivist account of knowing basic logical principles.
Funding
The Foundations of Epistemic Normativity; G2568; RIKSBANKENS JUBILEUMSFOND; P17-0487:1
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Publisher
RoutledgeExternal DOI
Pages
280.0Book title
Inference and consciousnessPlace of publication
LondonISBN
9781138557178Series
Routledge Studies in Contemporary PhilosophyDepartment affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- No