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Realism beyond correspondence
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posted on 2023-06-08, 13:38 authored by Michael MorrisThis paper argues that correspondence theories of truth, despite claiming to be realist, are in fact best understood as idealist. They take propositions to be made true by states of affairs or tropes, things which have to be understood in terms of sentential structure. I argue that the only defensible explanation of the view that propositions and the world share sentential structure is that the world has this structure because it is the structure of language, which is idealist. I argue that a realist should abandon correspondence theories, and I defend the idea of a non-correspondence realism from some objections
History
Publication status
- Published
Publisher
Oxford University PressPage range
49-65Pages
16.0Book title
Truthmakers: the contemporary debatePlace of publication
Oxford and New YorkISBN
9780199283569Series
Mind Association Occasional SeriesDepartment affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Editors
Julian Dodd, Helen BeebeeLegacy Posted Date
2012-11-14Usage metrics
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