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The emergence of pacts: analyzing negotiation processes and bargaining outcomes
This chapter presents the book's central analytical framework and examines more closely the politics of pact making, moving away from countries as units of analysis to individual negotiation episodes. The aim is to understand the outcomes of negotiations. The chapter presents a heuristic model of pact creation that incorporates the concepts of bounded rationality and unstable preferences within a standard bargaining framework. Its central argument is that the outcome of pact negotiations depends primarily on actors' perceptions of their relative power. The chapter identifies key indicators influencing these perceptions, and it outlines the main predictions of negotiation outcomes. The model suggests that where power disparities are visible but not excessively large, negotiations are likely to result in pacts. By contrast, where both leading negotiating parties believe that their respective position is strong (or alternatively weak), negotiations have a higher chance of failure.
History
Publication status
- Published
Publisher
Oxford University PressPage range
45-60Pages
312.0Book title
Social pacts in Europe: emergence, evolution, and institutionalizationPlace of publication
Oxford and New YorkISBN
9780199590742Department affiliated with
- Politics Publications
Notes
This paper develops the central analytical framework of the book, which is then applied and evaluated by the authors of the case-study chapters, and again in a comparative analysis in the book's conclusions.Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes