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Are we pre-theoretically committed to doxastic voluntarism?

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posted on 2023-06-10, 02:50 authored by Nikolaj Nottelmann, Anthony BoothAnthony Booth, Rune Lomholt
Much of the force behind doxastic involuntarism comes from our pre-theoretical judgement that any effort to form a belief simply by intending to form it must remain unsuccessful. However, despite this, ordinary language use of locutions like “chose to believe” are common. In this article, we present new experimental data that shows that the prevalence of ordinary language talk of “chosen beliefs” is no obstacle to doxastic involuntarism in a standard sense (pace Turri et al. 2018). While we employ the methods of experimental philosophy, our argument also concerns the fundamental question as to what those methods can achieve: as is typical of philosophical debates, the debate over doxastic voluntarism involves a refined theoretical concept, specifically a refined concept of voluntary belief. In such debates, we cannot determine our pre-theoretical position by conducting surveys on those who may not yet own the requisite theoretical concepts.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Review of Philosophy and Psychology

ISSN

1878-5158

Publisher

Springer

Page range

1-22

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2022-03-07

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2023-03-05

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2022-03-07

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