Being a beast machine: the somatic basis of selfhood
Modern psychology has long focused on the body as the basis of the self. Recently, predictive processing accounts of interoception (perception of the body ‘from within’) have become influential in accounting for experiences of body ownership and emotion. Here, we describe embodied selfhood in terms of ‘instrumental interoceptive inference’, which emphasises allostatic regulation and physiological integrity. We apply this approach to the distinctive phenomenology of embodied selfhood, accounting for its non-object-like character and subjective stability over time. Our perspective has implications for the development of selfhood, and illuminates longstanding debates about relations between life and mind, implying – contrary to Descartes – that experiences of embodied selfhood arise because of, and not in spite of, our nature as ‘beast machines’.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Trends in Cognitive SciencesISSN
1364-6613Publisher
ElsevierExternal DOI
Issue
11Volume
22Page range
969-981Department affiliated with
- Informatics Publications
Research groups affiliated with
- Centre for Computational Neuroscience and Robotics Publications
- Sackler Centre for Consciousness Science Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2018-08-29First Open Access (FOA) Date
2019-09-14First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2018-08-28Usage metrics
Categories
No categories selectedKeywords
Licence
Exports
RefWorks
BibTeX
Ref. manager
Endnote
DataCite
NLM
DC