Concept pluralism in conceptual engineering.pdf (1.96 MB)
Concept pluralism in conceptual engineering
In this paper, I argue that an adequate meta-semantic framework capable of accommodating the range of projects currently identified as projects in conceptual engineering must be sensitive to the fact that concepts (and hence projects relating to them) fall into distinct kinds. Concepts can vary, I will argue, with respect to their direction of determination, their modal range, and their temporal range. Acknowledging such variations yields a preliminary taxonomy of concepts and generates a meta-semantic framework that allows us both to accommodate the full range of cases and to identify a proper subset of concepts for special ameliorative consideration. Ignoring such variations, in contrast, leads to a restricted meta-semantic framework that accommodates only a subset of the particular projects while generating implausible accounts of others.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Published version
Journal
InquiryISSN
0020-174XPublisher
Taylor & FrancisExternal DOI
Page range
1-26Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes