Contrastive_Self-Knowledge_Social_Epistemology_Final_version.pdf (295.07 kB)
Download fileContrastive self-knowledge
In this paper, I draw on a recent account of perceptual knowledge according to which knowledge is contrastive. I extend the contrastive account of perceptual knowledge to yield a contrastive account of self-knowledge. Along the way, I develop a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, regrets and so on) and suggest that a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes implies an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on).
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Social EpistemologyISSN
0269-1728Publisher
Taylor & FrancisExternal DOI
Issue
2Volume
28Page range
139-152Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes