Contrastive_Self-Knowledge_Social_Epistemology_Final_version.pdf (295.07 kB)
journal contributionposted on 2023-06-08, 13:27 authored by Sarah SawyerSarah Sawyer
In this paper, I draw on a recent account of perceptual knowledge according to which knowledge is contrastive. I extend the contrastive account of perceptual knowledge to yield a contrastive account of self-knowledge. Along the way, I develop a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes (beliefs, desires, regrets and so on) and suggest that a contrastive account of the propositional attitudes implies an anti-individualist account of propositional attitude concepts (the concepts of belief, desire, regret, and so on).
- Accepted version
PublisherTaylor & Francis
Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
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