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If Nelson and Winter are only half right about tacit knowledge, which half? A Searlean critique of 'codification'
The paper explores the inherent tensions in the relationships between different theories of knowledge. The paper shows how Polanyi's rather nebulous concept of tacit knowledge can be given a rigorous foundation in recent biological treatments that link neurological causal processes, subjective mental states and speech acts. Drawing on the work of John Searle, the paper shows how information-processing approaches relate to these cause and effect relationships in order to critique the binary distinction between tacit and codified knowledge. The utility of the framework and the problems with this binary distinction are illustrated by showing the confusions behind recent theories that propose that information technologies allow the codification of tacit knowledge. Errors inherent in the idea of codification are traced back to Newell and Simon's abstract programme level of explanation. Implications for science policy, technical learning, management and innovation are discussed.
History
Publication status
- Published
Journal
Industrial and Corporate ChangeISSN
0960-6491External DOI
Issue
2Volume
12Page range
149-183Pages
35.0Department affiliated with
- SPRU - Science Policy Research Unit Publications
Notes
This analytical study probes what the author refers to as the usually overlooked `dark matter of tacit knowledge, on the road to which he criticises most experts in the field, including his mentor Searle. The paper gives practical ways of tackling rather than avoiding the issue of tacit knowledge.Full text available
- No
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2012-02-06Usage metrics
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