Sawyer_Semantic Externalism and Proof_Final Accepted Version.pdf (230.46 kB)
Is there a deductive argument for semantic externalism? Reply to Yli-Vakkuri
Juhani Yli-Vakkuri (2017) has recently argued that the Twin Earth thought experiments offered in favour of semantic externalism can be replaced by a straightforward deductive argument from premises widely accepted by both internalists and externalists alike. The deductive argument Yli-Vakkuri offers, however, depends on premises which are such that, on standard formulations of internalism, they cannot be satisfied by a single belief simultaneously; it does not therefore, constitute a proof of externalism. The aim of this paper is to explain why.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
AnalysisISSN
0003-2638Publisher
Oxford University PressExternal DOI
Issue
4Volume
78Page range
675-681Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes