Minimalism versus constructionism: A false dichotomy in theories of inference during reading

McKoon and Ratcliff (1992) argue for a "minimalist" theory of inference in reading, contrasting it with "constructionist" theories, including theories based on mental or situation models. Minimal inferences are those required for local (not global) coherence and those based on readily available knowledge. This target article argues that minimalism is a hedged and less testable version of an older theory. More important, McKoon and Ratcliff mischaracterize constructionism, failing to notice that local coherence often depends on constructionist processes. When people do not have the knowledge required to establish local coherence, they do not do so during reading. The only unhedged prediction of the minimalist theory is hence incorrect. Although a theory of inference making should be both constructionist and approximately minimalist, a distinction must be made between a computational theory of inference making and a description of the mechanisms underlying our inferential abilities.