Recasting the threat of chemical terrorism in the EU: the issue of returnees from the Syrian conflict

Chemical terrorist attacks by non-state actors have traditionally been characterised as low probability events; however the apparent normalisation of chemical weapons use, including by terrorists, in the ongoing conflict in Syria is causing some in the international security community to question whether it will remain low probability. For Europe there is an additional potential concern, namely the numbers of EU citizens who are ‘foreign fighters’ and whose return from the conflict zone might also result in ‘importing’ chemical weapons use. This paper examines the rise of the ‘chemical weapons-returning foreign fighter’ narrative and considers aspects of the European response. These responses predate the current concerns and include important efforts to create a robust public health response, such as early alert and communication systems, so that this might reduce the attractiveness of these weapons being used within a European context. Although there are limitations as to how far one can transfer what happens in a Syrian context to Europe, the suggestion is made that some of the framing assumptions within this response architecture may be now inadvertently limiting the potential to identify and respond to chemical attacks.