Teece's complementary asset framework explains how firms use assets to appropriate the benefits of innovation. This paper extends Teece's framework to show how firms also use complementary assets to disappropriate the risks of technical change. Based on case studies of the commercialisation of genetic testing in the UK the paper shows how firms can strategically alter the social distribution of risk to their advantage by managing distinct types of risk using different institutions with diverse risk management capabilities. We highlight the specific risk management capabilities of the state that are not available to either firms or markets, and their role in supporting technical change. Implications for policy and the academic understanding of technical change are discussed.
This paper makes a connection between Teeces 1986 propositions about the role of complementary assets in innovation and the case of genetics, where companies may (contradicting the usual problem) wish to dis-appropriate their risk burdens. Dr Hopkins did 50% of the writing and all of the research, on the dimensions of risk management and the empirical application to UK genetic testing.