IPOWaiting_Feb2011_Final_Version.pdf (602.11 kB)
Strategic waiting in the IPO markets
The paper analyzes the strategic waiting tendencies of IPO firms. Our game theoretic model shows why some high-quality firms may strategically delay their initial public offering until a favorable signal about the economic conditions is generated by other issuing firms. Survival analysis suggests that IPOs in the highest quality decile have significantly higher median waiting days (since the start of a rising IPO cycle) than the IPOs in the lowest decile. During the early stages of an expanding IPO cycle the average firm quality is lower than in its later stages. We find supporting evidence also from the IPOs of future S&P 500 firms.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
Journal of Corporate FinanceISSN
0929-1199Publisher
ElsevierExternal DOI
Issue
3Volume
17Page range
555-583Department affiliated with
- Accounting and Finance Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes
Legacy Posted Date
2022-02-22First Open Access (FOA) Date
2022-02-22First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date
2022-02-22Usage metrics
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