Subjective Externalism Theoria ID THEO-OA-2107-023 REVISED November FINAL.pdf (304.1 kB)
Subjective externalism
In this article I argue for a novel theory of representational content, which I call ‘subjective externalism’. The view combines an internal, subjective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins internalist theories of thought, and an external, objective constraint on the attribution of thought content which traditionally underpins externalist theories of thought. While internalism and externalism are mutually inconsistent, the constraints to which each theory is committed are not. It is this realization that opens up the conceptual space for subjective externalism, according to which the correct attribution of thought content to an individual is essentially constrained by her nonrepresentational relations to objective manifest properties in her wider reality.
History
Publication status
- Published
File Version
- Accepted version
Journal
TheoriaISSN
1755-2567Publisher
WileyExternal DOI
Issue
1Volume
84Page range
4-22Department affiliated with
- Philosophy Publications
Full text available
- Yes
Peer reviewed?
- Yes