This article explores the role of ulterior intention (and ulterior mens rea more generally) within the criminal law. Divided into three Parts, we first question the role and location of ulterior mens rea within the offence elements of acts, circumstances and results. Concluding that such accommodation is conceptually unsound, we highlight the problems this has caused in the context of inchoate liability where the separation of elements is now essential to the application of the law. Central to this discussion is the problematic attempts case of AG Ref (No.3 of 1992) [1994] 1 WLR. 409. We contend that best way forward is to recognise a new ulterior mens rea element. Such an element has the potential to maintain conceptual coherence between offence elements, resolve substantive problems arising in the context of inchoate liability, as well as creating a new method for limiting inchoate liability (and infinite inchoate liability) from the potential for over-criminalisation.