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Truth and objectivity in conceptual engineering

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journal contribution
posted on 2023-06-09, 19:29 authored by Sarah SawyerSarah Sawyer
Conceptual engineering is to be explained by appeal to the externalist distinction between concepts and conceptions. If concepts are determined by non-conceptual relations to objective properties rather than by associated conceptions (whether individual or communal), then topic preservation through semantic change will be possible. The requisite level of objectivity is guaranteed by the possibility of collective error and does not depend on a stronger level of objectivity, such as mind-independence or independence from linguistic or social practice more generally. This means that the requisite level of objectivity is exhibited not only by natural kinds, but also by a wide range of philosophical kinds, social kinds and artefactual kinds. The alternative externalist accounts of conceptual engineering offered by Herman Cappelen and Derek Ball fall back into a kind of descriptivism which is antithetical to externalism and fails to recognise this basic level of objectivity.

History

Publication status

  • Published

File Version

  • Accepted version

Journal

Inquiry

ISSN

0020-174X

Publisher

Taylor & Francis

Issue

9-10

Volume

63

Page range

1001-1022

Department affiliated with

  • Philosophy Publications

Full text available

  • Yes

Peer reviewed?

  • Yes

Legacy Posted Date

2019-10-31

First Open Access (FOA) Date

2022-03-07

First Compliant Deposit (FCD) Date

2019-10-31

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