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COIN is Dead—Long Live Transformation

MATTHEW FORD, PATRICK ROSE, AND HOWARD BODY

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Donald Rumsfeld was right. Force transformation works. The techniques that led to the initial victories in Afghanistan in 2001 were precisely those that produced success in Libya in 2011.¹ Small-scale deployments of special forces backed by precision strike and deep attack capabilities used to support an allied indigenous armed group proved an effective military tool for achieving specific strategic outcomes. In contrast, the results of large-scale troop deployments as part of counterinsurgency (COIN), stabilization and nation-building activities over the past 10 years in Iraq and Afghanistan have been less definitive. Despite intensive investment in blood, treasure, and military effort, the precise long-term outcomes of these two campaigns remain unclear and will be open to debate for years to come. This challenging operational experience has, however, highlighted some necessary and enduring truths about the use of military force. Despite great advances in military technology and the increasing sophistication with which organized violence can be applied in a range of situations, all warfare remains characterized by uncertainty; there exists no silver bullet that can guarantee enduring political success from the barrel of a gun.²

The approaching end of the combat mission in Afghanistan in 2014 presents a potential watershed for the way in which the United States and her coalition partners, including Great Britain, seek to apply military power considering what has been learned in the first decade of twenty-first century conflict. This moment is significant in two respects. First, it provides a full stop (temporary or otherwise) to the recent western experience of large-scale, effort-intensive, counterinsurgency operations. Second, it brings with it the potential

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to reshape and reinvest military power through new concepts of operation, national strategies and priorities, and force structures to better meet ongoing and emerging global security challenges.

Against the backdrop of operational experience spanning the toppling of the Taliban to the removal of Gaddafi, British policymakers, defense professionals, and academic commentators and their contemporaries in western nations need to confront this defining moment in an attempt to reassess the limits of national power, influence, and endurance, and identify how the “military lever” can be optimized to deliver future strategic and political effect.³ For Britain, a nation that retains global interests, a key question in this reposturing is whether the country should employ a revised and revisited “Western Way of War,” emphasizing stand-off warfare, limited goals, and short-term intervention;⁴ or seek instead to further enhance the tools and techniques to undertake complex warfare among the people.

If the former option is selected, then orienting the levers of British military power toward a model centered on intelligence, surveillance, target acquisition, and reconnaissance (ISTAR), special forces, deep strike capabilities, and limited intervention might be appropriate.⁵ However, considering the emphasis in the 2010 *Strategic Defence and Security Review* (SDSR) on early (upstream) intervention intended to prevent rather than cure conflict, it does not at first glance look like a path the United Kingdom (UK) is seeking.⁶ UK Defence appears instead to be cutting a new path between several schools of thought. On the one hand, experience suggests that British armed forces need to orient toward effectively engaging in conflicts that look like those it has fought over the past 10 years.⁷ On the other hand, a challenging financial context and new cross-government policy guidance, enshrined in the recently released Building Stability Overseas Strategy, emphasizes the ability to influence human security to increase UK security and interests at home and abroad. This requires improving how one conducts various types of defensive engagement, undertakes stability operations, postconflict reconstruction, and, if necessary, activities by proxy (with another nation’s forces), creating a new paradigm for the application of military power overseas.⁸

Accepting that existing experience, policy, and capabilities all appear to be stretching British defense thinking in a number of directions, this article seeks a different approach to the perspectives previously outlined. Instead of focusing exclusively on aspects of military strategy that emphasize ends and means, the objective is to examine the ways in which the two might be linked. The proposition made is that only by comprehending the ways in which military capabilities are used, can an understanding be generated that informs and delivers future policy by linking specific resources to achievable goals through the tangible implementation plans that are the fundamentals of strategy.⁹ Having achieved this, it becomes easier to avoid the trap of reapplying transformation or COIN-like solutions to every new scenario, and opens the possibility that new situations should be dealt with on individual terms. The intention of this article is, therefore, to analyze recent British military experience and current

policy requirements and to offer a framework for considering the ways in which future interventions might be more adequately understood and undertaken by military means.

Accepting the guidelines of the Building Stability Overseas Strategy as a starting point, it can be anticipated that British military power post-2015 will still be required to address a broad set of challenges related to state weakness, political instability, and human insecurity. These threats will require a wide-ranging set of responses appropriately applied to the specific cases involved. Against this requirement, it is important to recontextualize discussions regarding COIN and transformation. In particular, it is necessary to get away from associating transformation purely with high intensity operations against a peer adversary, and relating the underlying principle of the modern evocations of COIN with a state-building agenda focused on human security. While the recent short-term success achieved by NATO forces in Libya during the summer of 2011 points to a potential reemphasis on a light ground footprint, short duration interventions, using high technology platforms to support local actors in the prosecution of mutually convenient strategic aims, this article seeks to develop a broader perspective and cautions against any simplistic pendulum swing in military conceptual thinking on both sides of the Atlantic. Many lessons of the difficult wars in Iraq and Afghanistan retain relevance beyond the confines of effort-intensive COIN campaigning for Britain and her key allies. Defense organizations and armed forces will need to reflect deeply on both approaches in framing a new set of responses to future threats.

The starting place for tackling this assessment is the development of insight into how the conflicts of the past decade have been understood in terms of a “liberal peace” and how this notion influences and constrains the ways in which military force can legitimately be employed by the United Kingdom and her allies. We then consider the vulnerabilities, shortcomings, and opportunities related to the ways in which military power might be applied in the future given the lessons of the last 10 years. Finally, we explain implications for the refinement of the manner in which British military power can be applied in a contemporary operating environment, within the context of current British policy.

The Liberal Peace

In the introduction to the 1998 *Strategic Defence Review*, the Secretary of State for Defence, George Robertson, described the British as an “internationalist people” who “want to give a lead.”¹⁰ Repeated in the sentiments of Tony Blair’s 1999 Chicago speech, the United Kingdom has, in the intervening 10 years, tended to describe its foreign policy and armed forces as constituting a “force for good.”¹¹ Following the wars in Afghanistan and Iraq, however, the military intervention for cosmopolitan purposes has come under sustained attack. This is especially the case for those scholars who take a critical perspective and argue the goal of emancipating large numbers of the world’s disenfranchised has been subverted by a Western ideological agenda.¹²

Depending on how the involvement of the intervening power is interpreted, interventions aimed at the production of a liberal peace may be seen either as a benign effort to protect human rights and security, or appear neo-colonial, exploitative, and focused on asserting the interests of the intervener. It is against this background that the recent UK emphasis on upstream intervention and postconflict stabilization needs to be understood, and the question that ought to be asked is to whom do the advantages of stability accrue?¹³ For critical academic scholars, imbalances in wealth and unequal access to international institutions such as the UN Security Council produce an international order that favours the interests of the developed world. This permits Western powers to impose alien forms of governance and liberal capitalist economics on indigent populations resulting in the exploitation of local inhabitants.

Within the context of national strategy, however, the moral content of a policy can be separated from the cost/benefit calculations required when deciding to intervene abroad.¹⁴ If the UK chooses to pursue morally worthwhile outcomes such as human security, then the issue becomes whether the means employed are commensurate with the objectives sought. For those who advocate an emancipatory policy of human security, the ends do not justify the means. It is perfectly legitimate, according to this view, to adopt an altruistic foreign policy, but the indigenous population cannot be used as a means to an end in order to achieve the desired outcome. Deploying military capability for the purposes of producing stability is, therefore, only acceptable within such a conceptual framework if the ways and means are kept subservient to the ends pursued.

In this respect some elements of British military doctrine clearly resonate with the ambitions of the human security scholars who advocate a moral outcome.¹⁵ For example, the existing British approach to stabilization and COIN, as described in JDP 3-40 *Security and Stabilization* and AFM Volume 1 Part 10, *Countering Insurgency*, takes some of its language from human security discourse.¹⁶ The overriding goal can be seen as a security model where the military act as guarantors for the process of political and socio-economic reconstruction with the intention of defending the “other” rather than defending “against the ‘other.’”¹⁷

The problem is that even though the language of British policy and doctrine highlight the protection of the people from the insurgent, operational realities have required military forces in Iraq and Afghanistan to progressively rely on a suite of more coercive techniques, kinetic and nonkinetic, in their efforts to suppress local resistance and achieve strategic outcomes satisfactory to Western powers.¹⁸ Recent experiences of nation building under fire have severely exposed the practical limitations of embedding human security perspectives in the rationale for, and approach taken to, overseas military operations. As Adam Roberts has noted, “the very ideas of rebuilding the world in the Western image, and of major Western states having an obligation to achieve these tasks in distant lands—whether by unilateral or multilateral approaches—may come to be viewed as optimistic.”¹⁹

Consequently, even as coalition operations in Afghanistan start to transition to partnership and security force assistance, the extent to which it will be possible to talk about human security while executing coercive measures is open to doubt. The rhetorical tensions between the goal of building a liberal peace and the use of military force in efforts to achieve this outcome have not gone unnoticed in other parts of the world. Brazil and India, for example, have recently voiced their concerns about the way Western powers have, in their view, applied force selectively. In the case of Libya, Ambassador Hardeep Singh Puri, the Indian High Representative to the United Nations, observed, “Libya has given Responsibility to Protect a bad name.”²⁰ This in turn has influenced the politics of the UN Security Council, reflected by the manner Brazil, Russia, India, China, and South Africa voted in relation to the recent uprisings in Syria. It might not have been a surprise that Russia and China vetoed a resolution on Syria in October last year.²¹ That Brazil, India, and South Africa abstained from supporting an intervention is, however, indicative that a multipolar moment in international relations has arrived that may not be sympathetic to the kind of contradictions that occur when coercion forms a necessary part of the methods used to produce human security.

Military Vulnerabilities

Even as the strategic context in which intervention might take place now appears to have changed, Britain’s armed forces have become more sophisticated in applying the techniques of COIN and stabilization at the tactical level.²² In this respect, part of the ambition has been to reconcile the need to engage local insurgents, but do so in a manner that does not unhinge the campaign by producing counterproductive moral, psychological, and collateral effects on the population. As a result, a key lesson that emerged from recent British operational experience is the acceptance that, in interventions intimately concerned with shaping local conditions and actors, understanding local context is critical.²³ This is an issue of obvious importance when considering the conduct of operations among the people, such as the British campaign in Helmand Province in Afghanistan. But the challenges associated with adequate contextual understanding have equally impacted the outcomes and consequences of recent operations conducted in the form of military transformation.

For example, in the invasion of Iraq in 2003 were required to fight for the intelligence and associated information necessary to prosecute offensive operations, despite possessing total air superiority. No respite from the friction and chaos of warfare was found in substantial technological advantage, liberally applied, during the overthrow of Saddam Hussein; an understanding of the local conditions required to determine long-term strategic success eluded foreign forces operating in strength on the ground for a number of years.²⁴ Emerging coalition strategy did not, initially, take into account the complexity of post-Saddam society, and many early decisions only served to encourage an escalating cycle of violence.²⁵ From a doctrinal point of view, this revealed the critical weaknesses in the arguments made by those who believed it was

possible to map military cause to political effect in an Effects Based Approach.²⁶ Indeed, the inherent flaws in subsequent attempts to adapt this approach to the ambiguous social, political, and military dynamics of the twenty-first century by infusing traditional military planning and decisionmaking approaches with the conventions of complex adaptive systems were ruthlessly exposed by the Israeli experience in Lebanon in 2006.²⁷

In light of these experiences, it is widely appreciated that generating the understanding necessary to optimize military power relies on far more than access to a greater number of intelligence assets and surveillance capabilities. Collectively, the aims of British defense policy and the arms of its delivery are richer and stronger as a result. But to quote the nuclear strategist Bernard Brodie, the problem remains that to deliver success, “good strategy presumes good anthropology and good sociology.”²⁸ Acknowledging and addressing the need for local understanding, itself a demanding requirement, is a crucial factor in shaping an effective application of military power. Equally, however, any lack of understanding may be viewed as a key vulnerability.

In any number of respects, the ongoing campaign in Helmand Province demonstrates the British military since 2006 has shown considerable adaptability in responding to the need for integrating local contextual input, constraints, and structures into the planning and execution of military activities among the people of Afghanistan. Organization, doctrine, and mindset have been reshaped by the requirement to merge political acumen, cultural appreciation, and human understanding with the traditional application of military power.²⁹ A note of caution is, however, required. British involvement in Afghanistan now surpasses a decade, and the intensive military campaign in this particular province is in its sixth year. Even after extensive British and coalition efforts to improve the collection, fusion, and assessment of a wide range of intelligence and information sources, the linkages between actors at the strategic and tactical level, between the Taliban, al Qaeda, local communities and national governments such as Pakistan have proven hard to identify, and their impact on local outcomes in Helmand have proven difficult to influence.³⁰ Even in late 2011, the former International Security Assistance Force commander General Stanley McChrystal noted a frighteningly simplistic view of the country remained and was crippling the NATO war effort.³¹

In reviewing the implications of this imperfect picture of Afghanistan, there comes a realization in terms of the ability to gain and leverage local understanding, British defense has never had it so good and perhaps never will it have it so good again. Developing a range of opportunities in which to apply military power selectively and effectively at the local level and in a strategic context where restraint is necessary and information and understanding may be (at least initially) scarce will prove critical to ensuring UK military actors do not merely constitute another source of insecurity, despite efforts to the contrary. This reality holds a range of implications for the manner in which policy goals are externalized, and the process in which military means must be

shaped and applied to achieve them in the human-centric operational environment of the future.

Military Power Post-Afghanistan

Bearing in mind the strategic and tactical limitations previously outlined, how might military power be applied post-Afghanistan? One indication may lie with Operation Ellamy. Initially, at least, NATO's efforts in Libya were successful. On further analysis, however, the operation reveals the limitations and vulnerabilities previously elaborated. From a military perspective, human security considerations slowed down the tempo of rebel operations as NATO forces sought to avoid unnecessary collateral damage. At the same time, a proliferation of Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition, and Reconnaissance (ISTAR) assets did not necessarily prevent the unintended use of precision munitions to strike targets that were inappropriately identified.³² Finally, as a recent UN report reveals, from the perspective of human security, NATO involvement did not stop either the Gaddafi or opposing Misratah (rebel) forces from engaging in arbitrary killing, detention, torture, and sexual violence.³³

Given the strategic context, the lessons from the last 10 years and the challenges outlined, it would appear the most pressing requirement is for a sufficiently granular appreciation for what is happening on the ground so that an appropriate intervention can be made at a suitable time. In this respect, what 10 years of COIN operations have demonstrated is that larger deployments of forces can be used to saturate a locality and greatly assist the process of gathering a rich baseline of information through framework operations. This can then be corroborated against intelligence provided by ISTAR assets and, in turn, lead to the targeting of insurgents, or engagement with specific local leaders and power brokers. At the same time, these operations serve to protect and persuade the civilian population that COIN forces can effectively manage their security. Such an approach is, however, financially costly and resource intensive, and if the twin elements of framework and targeted operations are not properly integrated, the result can be a counterproductive use of force.³⁴

At the opposite end of the spectrum, light footprint strike operations, or those mounted at short notice in response to a particular crisis, do not have the luxury of evaluating the richness of local understanding that intensive deployments have the potential to provide. Remote surveillance capabilities simply cannot provide the detailed knowledge associated with the basic motivations and agenda of local actors, information that is critical to shaping success: why they fight and whether they might be willing to work with the intervening forces. In such circumstances, and as the recent deployment of British intelligence, special forces, and ultimately a stabilization response team to Libya suggest, there is a recognized need to get people on the ground to find out what is happening.³⁵ If after 10 years of intervention in Afghanistan, however, the understanding of the local context remains problematic, as a result, developing the kind of contextual understanding necessary to shape and influence indigenous events

and actors over the course of operations presents an even greater challenge. Alternative methods in which appropriate local and specific understanding can be developed and leveraged in a range of interventions should be considered in an effort to optimize the application of military power in future operations.

In this regard, and keeping in mind the restructuring of UK military capability as part of the ongoing defense reform, it may be necessary to develop options that will aid the British military in building, mentoring, and operating alongside indigenous forces. It will be necessary to generate a mutual understanding of US concepts and doctrine, such as Foreign Internal Defence (FID) and Security Force Assistance (SFA), for which there currently are no UK equivalent, is key.³⁶ As well as providing indigenous resources for operations, these approaches have the potential to develop additional sources of situational awareness that can offset shortcomings in local understanding within the intervening forces. In any number of circumstances, a natural advantage can be accrued by simply working through, rather than against (or in the abstract of), local organizations and actors. There are, however, reputational, legal, and potentially moral challenges that arise from adopting these approaches. Given recent changes in the permissiveness of the broader international community toward western military interventions, considerable care needs to be exercised to ensure policymakers understand the various forms of assistance for local security forces and organizations may well be explicitly interpreted as using the local population for one's own objectives rather than developing a moral and humanitarian response.

Emerging UK policy and the characteristics of the contemporary operating environment suggest British military power will need to be applied with or through local actors to achieve national aims and objectives at the international level. It should be clearly understood that local agendas and the rationale for such interventions may not always combine harmoniously. The language used to describe British foreign policy needs to be consistent with the actions taken on the ground. Balancing explicitly stated goals with the various methods in which the levers of power are applied in conjunction with local actors will become increasingly important if national defense strategy is to be successful. In this respect, using the language of "Responsibility to Protect" and human security may make it possible to gain the necessary international approval to support such interventions. But a failure to relate the language of these international objectives to the military strategy may prove counterproductive and harmful in the long term for British influence overseas.

Conclusion

This article has taken a different approach to previous studies that investigated the options for applying military power in the complex human-centric conflict environment that UK forces and their allies are likely to face in the post-Afghanistan era. Instead of focusing exclusively on strategic ends and means, the objective has been to consider the ways in which Britain's armed forces have been utilized during the past 10 years, with the goal of assessing

insights impacting future strategic options. Combining this assessment with the emerging implications of the recent UK defense review provides a range of potential options in which Britain's military power might be applied to meet national policy aims, while identifying implications impacting the United Kingdom's ability to achieve future strategic effect.

First, if the United Kingdom's national objective in being a "force for good" is to have any validity, the rhetoric associated with this policy needs to be closely aligned with the available means, the adopted ways, and the achievable strategic ends. The ends and means of strategy, whether through inappropriate application of force or unsound political rhetoric, should never be allowed to become discordant. Second, Britain's ability to apply military power selectively in a wide range of contexts within the future operating environment needs to be carefully reviewed and developed. Transformation and modern evocations of counterinsurgency represent an attempt to apply military power as effectively as possible within the context of specific policy objectives and operational circumstances. Transformation has opened strategic possibilities in specific operational contexts, most notably in Afghanistan in 2001 and Libya in 2011. COIN, when properly resourced and applied, has the ability to provide an effective tactical response in addressing population-centric challenges associated with instability and state weakness. But its inability to deliver tangible political objectives at the strategic level within the bounds of a human security agenda has, however, been exposed by recent experience. As such, neither approach can provide a panacea for future strategic challenges.

It is in this context the reexamination and expansion of the ways in which British power is applied is both timely and necessary if British military forces are to be successfully postured to meet the requirements of future operations and international policy. The selective application of a wide range of military "ways" across the spectrum of requirements, ranging from "coercion" to the "provision of human security," will be greatly improved by the deliberate integration of country-specific knowledge in decisions related to interventions. This is critical if the future exercise of British military power within the full range of operations is to be optimized and justified to the indigenous and international communities that have influence over the parameters and outcomes of overseas interventions. Lastly, against this backdrop, ongoing attempts to define a coherent British strategy to employ military power, in conjunction with other levers of powers, in an attempt to achieve national objectives through greater engagement on a global scale are to be encouraged. The experience of exercising military power in the first part of the twenty-first century suggests, however, that "context" and "consequence" should be the watchwords.

NOTES

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