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## Appendix 1 – Pilot study (Chapter 3)

### Appendix 1.1: Write-up

#### Abstract

Social norms are crucial in understanding public behaviour, but often they are misperceived. We extended existing research on the influence of socio-political events and argue that voter group differences in social norm (mis) perception could be connected to the outcome of the UK General Election 2019: We found pluralistic ignorance effects for comfort with violence amongst Labour voters and non-xenophobes; however, for Conservative voters, this was only the case for two kinds of comfort with violence, and we did not find effects amongst highly xenophobic individuals. In turn, we found false consensus effects for xenophobia amongst Conservative voters and those strongly endorsing xenophobic statements, with higher agreement estimation from the public for their opinion on xenophobia. For harsh immigration treatment, agreement estimation was predicted by own approval of the harsh immigration treatment. Our findings may explain why Conservative Party voters and highly xenophobic individuals expressed higher collective empowerment and collective narcissism in our study. We argue that while a xenophobic sentiment might be empowered by the impression that “the wider public” is hostile to foreigners, resistance might be undermined. Practical implications are discussed.

*Keywords:* social norm misperception, pluralistic ignorance, false consensus, election, collective empowerment, collective narcissism, xenophobia

## Introduction

After the Brexit referendum in June 2016, authorities reported an increase in racially and religiously aggravated crimes against immigrants (Home Office, 2017) and individuals presumed to be not “truly British” (Clarke et al., 2019). In 2019, the Conservative Party sought to “get Brexit done” in their campaign for the UK General Election. After the party’s overwhelming victory in the election, immigrants not only saw themselves confronted with the threat of stricter immigration policies but also with increased verbal abuse (anecdotal evidence, e.g., on Twitter).

Trends, however, show that attitudes towards immigration are fairly stable and relatively positive (e.g., BBC News, 2019; Ipsos, 2019). The answer to how hateful attacks are motivated might be found in examining social norms, which are crucial in understanding public behaviour (Cialdini et al., 1991). Following the 2016 US election, for example, Crandall et al. (2018) examined whether Trump’s unexpected 2016 US presidential victory evoked a norm shift towards prejudice. They found that the acceptability of prejudice had indeed increased towards targeted groups, with no effect on untargeted groups. This suggests that social norm perception may be selective and vulnerable to external events.

In the study reported in this paper, we build on previous research and examine social norms *misperception* (Berkowitz, 2004; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Perkins, 2002; Prentice & Miller, 1993). Specifically, we examined whether, in the context in which immigration was at the foreground (indicated by the victory of the Conservative Party in the UK General Election 2019), there is evidence of both pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects amongst voters of the two biggest parties, the Conservative and Labour Party, as well as amongst those expressing a “xenophobic White British identity”. The latter provides the pool from which, in Western countries, the minority of

individuals that commit hate crimes derive. Thus, to approach the question “what drives hate perpetrators”, we examined underlying meta-perceptual mechanisms that can eventually influence behavioural intention building.

### **Theoretical background**

Social norm perception is crucial in understanding public behaviour since it determines what is socially acknowledged and punished (Cialdini et al., 1991) so that social and political behaviour is influenced by people's beliefs about other people's beliefs (Elcheroth et al., 2011). Social cognition scholars have argued that people can *misperceive* social norms (Berkowitz, 2004; Cialdini & Goldstein, 2004; Perkins, 2002; Prentice & Miller, 1993). Common misperceptions are pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects. Pluralistic ignorance describes a mismatch between actual (averaged attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of group members) and perceived in-group norms (averaged assumption of extremity in attitudes, beliefs, and behaviours of other group members)<sup>1</sup> (e.g., Prentice & Miller, 1993). Pluralistic Ignorance has been demonstrated concerning risky health and anti-social behaviour. For example, Prentice and Miller Field (1993) found that while college students privately rejected extensive alcohol consumption, they publicly supported the norm of binge drinking, believing that this was the view of their peers. Such misperceptions can be highly consequential (Berkowitz, 2004): “Overestimations of anti-social descriptive and injunctive norms (e.g., violence) and underestimations of pro-social descriptive and injunctive norms can increase and decrease such behaviours, respectively” (Ganz et al., 2020, p.3 ). While pluralistic ignorance effects can be found amongst individuals that not necessarily hold

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<sup>1</sup> We think that basing our study on “actual” norms is problematic since the focus was on the *perception* of norms. We therefore assessed “own comfort” (instead of actual norms) and ‘perceived comfort’ (instead of perceived norms) in this study.

extreme opinions (cf. “rational agents”; Bjerring et al., 2014, p. 2446), false consensus, in turn, often occurs in controversial topics (van der Pligt et al., 1982) and amongst people holding minority opinions, engaged in less socially desirable behaviour (Sanders & Mullen, 1983). It marks the process in which people wrongly perceive others to share their attitudes and beliefs and therefore support their actions (Ross et al., 1977). Social cognition scholars initially suggested that estimation errors motivated these effects. However, the effects also overlap with social psychological processes in that they can be motivated by the need to belong and are connected to group membership itself (Bauman & Geher, 2002; Spears & Manstead, 1990). Contextual factors, such as social knowledge about one’s in-group, might influence one’s opinion, resulting in subsequently higher (or lower) support expectations. Information about the in-group, which is a “believable representation of group opinions” (Tankard & Paluck, 2016, p. 197) and is perceived as strong, can shape norm perception. This effect has, for example, been observed in an experimental study after Trump had been nominated US president: Individuals were more willing to donate to anti-immigration organisations than before the election outcome (Bursztyjn et al., 2017). However, the researchers argued that “[the outcome] did not casually make [...] participants more xenophobic, but instead made the already more-intolerant ones more comfortable about publicly expressing their views” (p.3).

### **Why misperception matters – socio-political events and public opinion**

Social knowledge seems to play a crucial role in social norm misperception. We witnessed that in the year 2016 in the UK, the unexpected outcome in favour of the xenophobic Brexit campaign manifesto (Leave.EU; Internet Archive, n.d.), among others strongly supported by the Euroskeptic UKIP Party, was followed by a spike in

RRHC (Home Office, 2017). After the electoral victory of the Conservative Party in the UK General Election 2019, promising to “get Brexit done”, anecdotal evidence illustrated increased verbal abuse towards immigrants. Yet, the overall evidence of hate was weaker in 2019. The latter could be due to a higher expectedness of the outcome and/ or the focus being on political negotiations with the EU instead of on immigration control per se. Nonetheless, we can assume that an external event might be connected to the perception that xenophobic norms are supported, which might have led to the empowerment of hate perpetration.

### **Social norm misperception and collective empowerment**

Traditionally, collective empowerment is defined as the power to improve a situation in its favour (Drury et al., 2014). It comprises the realisation of a consensus for a shared goal and, thus, the expectation that other in-group members will support each other (Drury & Reicher, 2009).

Commonly, the perception of social norms affects corresponding behaviour only if the source is a meaningful reference group. The social identity approach, comprising social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and self-categorisation theory (SCT; Turner et al., 1987; Turner & Reynolds, 2012) explain how members of a disadvantaged group come to understand and act collectively upon this disadvantage, and that for a group to become meaningful, an individual’s social identity needs to be salient and the individual needs to categorise themselves to that (*in*) group. For a social identity to be shared, others need to be seen as fellow in-group members, and this shared social identity is the basis for any possible collective empowerment. Finally, if group action is successful in a way that an individual’s social identity is realised over an opponent, this can lead to a feeling of joy at success (see also: Becker et al., 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2005).

We think that after the UK electoral events in 2016 and 2019, a minority of individuals became empowered to engage in hate crimes and speech through the social norm misperception that the wider white British public supported their xenophobic actions. We argue that hate crime perpetrators' perception that hate is socially acceptable is based on the assumption that the wider white British public shares their xenophobic views, which resulted in an extended in-group of xenophobic white British and an outgroup of everyone not (perceived as) "truly British". In this way, the outcomes in 2016 and 2019 realised xenophobes' social identity, which was accompanied by a joyful feeling and, in turn, increased the likelihood of further hate.

Contrarily to the traditional approach of collective empowerment (i.e., referring to socially disadvantaged groups), the 2016 and 2019 UK electoral victories were not just supported but also initiated by people that belong to the (white British) elite and, therefore, far away from being socially disadvantaged. This creates an in-group identity of *perceiving* themselves to be disadvantaged. In line with this, although support for xenophobia has long been linked to deprivation theories only, injustice and deprivation have also been found to be anticipatory. Jetten (2019) argues that a v-curve function of wealth better predicts xenophobia support. While groups with low socio-economic status (SES) groups may fear losing their occupations due to immigration, high SES groups may fear losing their prestigious positions, resulting in xenophobia support from both ends of the spectrum. This is known as the "wealth paradox" (Mols & Jetten, 2017). Not surprising then that the victors presented the 2016 referendum and 2019 election outcomes as the "will of the people" (e.g., Lewis et al., 2019).

Yet only a minority of xenophobes commit hate crimes. The impact of group norms and values is influenced by the degree to which an individual identifies with the group (Ellemers et al., 2002). High-identifiers might be particularly prone to rhetoric

stressing “that [...] the in-group is exceptional and entitled to special recognition and privileged treatment but not sufficiently recognised by others” (Golec de Zavala et al., 2019, p. 37), also referred to as collective narcissism. Collective narcissism has indeed been established as a predictor for the Leave vote, for intergroup aggression, violence, and prejudice, over and above right-wing authoritarianism and social dominance orientation (Golec de Zavala et al., 2017; Marchlewska et al., 2018). Collective narcissism is, furthermore, associated with feelings of injustice and deprivation and might account for participation in white collective action (Sternisko et al., 2020). Thus, in our study, we expected that:

H1: We find a mismatch between own comfort and perceived comfort with violence amongst “the British people”, with higher reported perceived violence than one’s own (pluralistic ignorance effect for violence).

H2: We find that high approval for xenophobic statements results in higher agreement perception for this approval from “the British people” compared to low approval (false consensus effect for xenophobia).

H2a: We find that approval for xenophobic statements positively predicts agreement estimation for this approval.

H3: We find group differences in pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects between Conservative and Labour voters and between highly xenophobic individuals and non-xenophobes.

H4: We find that Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals report higher collective empowerment (joy at success and group efficacy) than Labour voters and non-xenophobes.

H5: We find that Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals report higher collective narcissism than Labour voters and non-xenophobes.

## The current study

We surveyed eligible UK voters who had voted either for the Conservative or Labour Party in the UK General Election 2019. We examined group differences in social norm misperception between those voter groups and between highly xenophobic individuals and non-xenophobes that were expected to be amongst those groups. We aimed to further the understanding of hate empowerment in the context of a socio-political event. Hate was thereby approached through its behavioural and cognitive counterparts by querying approval for norms of hostility (violence) and prejudice (xenophobia). We assumed that even pacifists could experience pluralistic ignorance effects for violence and that individuals with extreme attitudes might show false consensus effects when social knowledge recalls a picture of a nation seemingly approving violence and xenophobia.

## Method

### Participants

Since Crandall et al. (2018) dependent variable was similar to ours; we took their effect size as a guide and aimed for a sample size of  $N = 200^2$ . A priori *G\*Power* analysis for 2 (vote: Conservative vs Labour party) x 2 (identity: highly xenophobic vs non-xenophobic) ANOVA with medium effect size resulted in  $N = 210$ . Two hundred and two participants were eventually recruited through Prolific (Prolific, 2023). Four participants were excluded from the data analysis<sup>3</sup>, so our sample consisted of a hundred Conservative and ninety-eight Labour Party voters. Participants were between

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<sup>2</sup> The study was conducted with  $N = 400$ . Given the similarities, while considering that our study only took place at one time, we aimed for  $N = 200$ . The researchers were able to establish a medium effect size (cf. election effect on prejudice; Crandall et al., 2018).

<sup>3</sup> One participant did not finish the study, three participants voted for different parties other than the Conservative or Labour party.

18 and 75 years old ( $M = 35.2$ ,  $SD = 14$ ). Most participants identified as “British White” (85.86%), were women (60.61%) and were employed (62.63%). Twenty-nine-point eighty per cent stated they earned less than £10,000 p.a., while 3.54% of the participants stated that they earned more than £50,000 p.a. The educational level was split half between low (A-Level or less) and moderately high (bachelor’s or master’s degree).

## Measures

### *Independent variables*

**In-group identification and xenophobic identity.** Two single items assessed in-group identification (‘I identify as British’; cf. Postmes et al., 2013) and xenophobia (“Being British means being White”, the item was made up for the study) and were meant to jointly measure a “xenophobic white British identity”. The interitem correlation was, however, low ( $r = .08$ .)

**Vote.** A single item queried participants’ vote in the UK General Election 2019 (“Which party did you vote for in the UK General Election 2019?”). A variety of possible answers served to hide the fact that participants were pre-selected.

### *Dependent Variables*

**Collective empowerment.** Joy at success and group efficacy deriving from the outcome of the election served as proxy measures for collective empowerment. Three items assessed joy at success, with one reversed item. The item construction was based on those items used in Drury et al. (2018), study 1 and 2, e.g., “The outcome of the UK General Election 2019 makes me feel joyful”,  $\alpha = .79$ ). Three items assessed group efficacy based on those items used in Drury et al. (2018, study 1) and (van Zomeren et al., 2004), e.g., “I think, the British people can change our own laws following the UK General Election 2019”,  $\alpha = .89$ ).

**Pluralistic ignorance.** Four item sets paired individuals' own comfort with violence to perceived comfort with violence amongst the "British people". The item construction was based on Funk et al. (2003), Prentice and Miller (1993), and Ganz et al. (2020) (e.g., "How comfortable do you feel with violent behaviour by British people against people that are different?"/ "How comfortable does the average British person feel with violent behaviour by British people against people that are different?".)

**False consensus.** Five items (one item was reversed) each grouped participants' own approval for a xenophobic statement and an agreement estimation from "the wider public" for this approval. Robbins and Krueger (2005) tested for order effects (estimation given before vs after own approval) on individuals' own approval. To consider the possibility of such effects in our study, we randomly assigned participants to one of two conditions<sup>4</sup>: Participants either reported their own approval with a xenophobic statement before estimating agreement for this approval (e.g.,

"People who live in the UK and don't speak English should go back to where they came from.". This was then followed by a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree. And finally, with a judgement about others' (dis)agreement.

"I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me."

"I think that ... % of the wider public do not agree with me.")

or after estimating the percentage of people that would agree/ disagree with a xenophobic statement (e.g.,

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<sup>4</sup> However, throughout the study, and after the data had already been collected, it occurred to us that agreement estimations referred to different anchors (own approval vs statement), and we, therefore, only used data from participants that provided (dis)agreement estimations *after* they had already provided their own approval (in the above, the first version). This was done despite witnessing a non-significant order effect.

“People who live in the UK and don’t speak English should go back to where they came from.”

“I think that ... % of the wider public agree.”

“I think that ... % of the wider public do not agree.”. This was then followed by a 7-point Likert scale from 1 = Strongly disagree to 7 = Strongly agree regarding one’s own approval of the statement)

The item construction was based on Watt and Larkin (2010). The wording was inspired by Twitter posts occurring after the UK General Election 2019, which were found to be coined xenophobic.

**Collective narcissism.** Collective narcissism was measured with the short *Collective Narcissism Scale* (Golec de Zavala et al., 2009, 2013), e.g., “My group deserves special treatment”,  $\alpha = .83$ ).

### ***Additional measures***

A single item asked participants how (un) expected the outcome of the UK General Election 2019 was for them (“To me, the outcome of the UK General Election 2019 was....”). Demographics contained age, gender, ethnicity, education, income, and employment status. To prevent social desirably answering, we added the following text to the consent button: “[...] my answers will be as honest and accurate as possible [...]” (Buccioli & Montinari, 2019, p. 327), along with using eight items measuring impression management taken from the BIDR-16 (Hart et al., 2015), e.g., “I never cover up my mistakes.”,  $\alpha = .78$ .) and filler items (modern sexism; Swim et al., 1995; and gay and lesbian support; Wood & Bartkowski, 2004). Moreover, we asked participants how

satisfied they were with the UK government's response to COVID-19<sup>5</sup>. All measures (except for demographics, agreement estimation, and social desirability) were measured on a 7-point Likert scale with higher values showing strong approval for in-group identification, xenophobia, collective narcissism, joy at success, group efficacy, comfort with violence, and approval for xenophobic statements (see Appendix 1.2 for all items).

### ***Ethical approval***

The study was approved by Sciences & Technology C-REC, University of Sussex, under review no. ER/CH527/4 and ER/CH527/5 (see Appendix 1.3, Figure App. 1.3: 1 and 2 for the certificates of ethical approval).

### ***Procedure***

The survey was created using the online survey construction tool Qualtrics (Qualtrics XM, 2023). Data was collected on the 26<sup>th</sup> of March 2020. Before participation, participants were provided with an information and a consent sheet. Anonymity was granted since no identifying data was collected, and participants were informed that the study gathers special category personal information (vote and ethnicity). Once participants decided to participate, they were asked to indicate so explicitly. Participants were provided with a summary of the outcome of the UK General Election 2019. The priming served to make the outcome salient. Subsequently, in-group identification, xenophobia, participants' vote in the UK General Election 2019, and (un) expectancy of the result were assessed. To avoid any order effects, collective

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<sup>5</sup> While data for the survey was collected, the outbreak of the COVID-19 virus caused a global pandemic. Internationally, governments responded differently towards the threat: While the majority reacted with strict restrictions to free movement and isolation measures, the UK government first followed a controversial approach of "herd immunity" and restricted free movement relatively late. In order to control for a potential influence of this factor, we controlled for individuals' satisfaction with the UK government's response to the COVID-19.

narcissism, social desirability, collective empowerment, pluralistic ignorance, and false consensus were presented in random order. Participants were rewarded with £1.25 each.

## Results

### Preparatory analysis

The analysis was conducted with Stata/IC 16.1(2023). In-group identification and xenophobia showed a low inter-item correlation (see above). Consequently, we were unable to create a measure of the “xenophobic White British identity”. Instead, we investigated trends amongst those individuals that scored high on both scales. Vote and gender were dummy coded with 1 = Conservative Party/ 2 = Labour Party, and 1 = women/ 2 = men. In line with Hart et al., (2015), we transformed the social desirability measure so that the sum of the eight items of the BIDR-16 (0 to 8) was assessed and dummy coded to 0 = 5 and below, and 1 = 6 and above. All reversed worded items were re-coded before the analysis. We applied sensitive, robust, or non-parametric.

### Overview

To test for pluralistic ignorance, we conducted t-tests for each item pair comparing own and perceived comfort with violence. For false consensus, we tested for order effects. However, since agreement estimations referred to different anchors (own approval vs statement), we split the dataset and followed the traditional false consensus approach and used participants’ agreement estimations given *after* their own approval for further analyses tests where necessary to deal with potential violations to test assumptions (Ross et al., 1977; Watt & Larkin, 2010). Following this approach, we also grouped individuals to low vs high in approval<sup>6</sup> for xenophobic statements and

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<sup>6</sup> A median split separated those that scored low (1-3) from those that scored high (5-7), individuals with neutral scores (4) were excluded from this analysis.

examined whether the agreement estimation significantly differed. We conducted linear regressions to test whether the level of approval positively predicted agreement estimation. We conducted t-tests to examine group differences regarding collective empowerment and narcissism.

### **Descriptive statistics**

On average, participants highly identified as “British”, whilst they rejected that being white was mandatory for a British identity. They further had somewhat expected the outcome of the UK General Election 2019. Joy at success and group efficacy were moderately high. On average, participants expressed low collective narcissism. Own comfort with violence was low, while comfort with violence for self-protection was higher. Perceived comfort with violence was consistently estimated as higher than one’s own. On average, approval with xenophobic statements was low, whilst harsh treatment towards immigrants was rated slightly higher. Participants consistently perceived the “wider public” to agree with them. On average, participants perceived the population to be dismissive of xenophobic statements. Social desirability was low, which indicates that, on average, participants answered the questions honestly (see Table App.1.1: 1; see also Appendix 1.4, Table App. 1.4: 1).

**Table App. 1.1: 1**

*Descriptive statistic for variables and individual items of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus (own approval given before agreement estimation)*

	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
In-group identification	198	6.13	1.41
Xenophobia	198	1.90	1.46
(Un) Expectedness of UK GE 2019 Outcome	198	5.05	1.64
Collective Narcissism	198	3.13	1.26
Social Desirability	198	2.76	2.08
Collective Empowerment			

	Joy at Success of Collective Action	198	4.00	1.81
	Group Efficacy of Collective Action	198	4.29	1.61
<hr/>				
Own Comfort with Violence				
	Goal Achievement	198	1.58	1.29
	Difference	198	1.32	0.85
	Diverse Neighbourhood	198	1.35	0.96
	Self-Protection	198	3.50	1.76
Perceived Comfort with Violence				
	Goal Achievement	198	2.17	1.26
	Difference	198	2.18	1.21
	Diverse Neighbourhood	198	1.82	1.22
	Self-Protection	198	4.17	1.54
<hr/>				
Approval for				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	3.49	2.11
	Using the N-Word is Wrong <sup>i</sup>	99	1.68	1.50
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	1.67	1.12
	Mandatory English Language	99	2.61	1.78
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	1.56	1.28
Perceived Public Agreement with Opinion				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	56.72	19.67
	Using the N-Word is Wrong	99	77.65	26.68
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	75.76	18.77
	Mandatory English Language	99	59.69	21.10
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	77.15	22.76
Perceived Public Disagreement with Opinion				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	43.28	19.67
	Using the N-Word is Wrong	99	22.23	26.34
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	24.24	18.77
	Mandatory English Language	99	40.31	21.10
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	22.85	22.76

*Note.* *N* = Number of Participants; *M* = Mean; *SD* = Standard Deviation; <sup>i</sup>the scale was reversed so that higher values represent higher approval for using the N-word

**Intercorrelations**

Variables correlated as expected (see Table App.1.1: 2). Interestingly, the more the outcome was expected, the higher the collective empowerment, and the higher the age, the more socially acceptable participants answered. Lower in-group identification and having voted for the Labour, compared to the Conservative Party, were associated with higher perceived comfort with violence. Social desirability was negatively associated with personal and perceived comfort with violence, except for violence as a means of self-protection (see Appendix 1.4, Table App.1.4:2). Approval for harsh immigration treatment was positively associated with consensus perception of it. Against the hypothesis, there was no significant association between approval for mandatory English and consensus perception for it (see Appendix 1.4, Table App.1.4: 3).

**Table App.1.1: 2**

### Intercorrelation variables

[illegible]

## **H1: Mismatch between own and perceived comfort with violence (pluralistic ignorance effect for violence)**

We found a significant mismatch between own and perceived comfort with violence, with participants perceiving “the British people” as significantly more comfortable with violence (see Table App.1.1: 3).

**Table App.1.1: 3**

*Descriptive statistics and t-test for own vs perceived comfort with violence*

Item Pair 1						Item Pair 2					
Own				Perceived		Own			Perceived		
<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
198	1.58	1.29	$t(197) = -6.29, p < .001$	2.17	1.26	1.32	0.85	$t(197) = -9.76, p < .001$	2.18	1.21	
Item Pair 3						Item Pair 4					
Own				Perceived		Own			Perceived		
<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	
198	1.35	0.96	$t(197) = -5.32, p < .001$	1.81	1.22	3.50	1.76	$t(197) = -6.17, p < .001$	4.17	1.54	

## **H2: High approval for xenophobic statements results in higher agreement perception for this approval, compared to low approval (false consensus effect for xenophobia)**

### ***(False) Consensus Perception***

When comparing low and high levels for approval, overall, both groups estimated more people to agree with them than disagree<sup>7</sup>. However, for the government

<sup>7</sup> Item 2, 3, and 5 showed extreme sample size differences so that interpretations and statistics might not be accurate. Consequently, we focused on items 1 and 4 in further analyses.

treating immigrants harshly and speaking English as mandatory for staying in the country, individuals high in own approval for these statements estimated significantly (respectively marginally significant) more consensus compared to those low in approval (see Table App.1.1: 4).

**Table App.1.1: 4**

*Descriptive statistics for agreement and estimated disagreement for own approval, split by approval for xenophobic statements (low vs high)*

Item		Estimated Agreement				Estimated Disagreement	
		<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
1. Harsh Immigration Treatment	Low	55	50.62	19.61	$t(90) = -3.78$	49.38	19.61
	High	37	65.78	17.70	$p < .001$	34.22	17.69
2. Using the N-Word	Low	90	81.50	21.29	$t(7.37) = 2.68$	18.48	21.83
	High	8	42.75	40.30	$p = .03$	56.00	38.86
3. Jews not Being Part of Community	Low	91	76.96	18.25	$t(92) = 1.08$	23.04	18.25
	High	3	65.33	21.22	$p = .28$	34.67	21.22
4. Mandatory English Language	Low	75	57.57	21.59	$t(93) = -1.81$	42.43	21.59
	High	20	67.20	18.94	$p = .07$	32.80	18.94
5. Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	Low	89	79.94	20.87	$t(92) = 2.54$	20.06	20.87
	High	5	54.80	32.45	$p = .01$	45.20	32.45

**H2a: Approval for xenophobic statements positively predicts agreement estimation for this approval**

Individuals' approval of harsh immigration treatment was a significant predictor for agreement estimation ( $\beta = 2.95$ ,  $SD = .92$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Against the hypothesis, agreement estimation for speaking English as mandatory to stay in the UK was not significantly correlated with own approval for it (see above).

### H3: Group differences in pluralistic ignorance and false consensus effects between Conservative and Labour voters and between highly xenophobic individuals and non-xenophobes

#### *Conservative Party vs Labour Party voters.*

**Pluralistic Ignorance.** For two item pairs (goal achievement, self-protection), there was no pluralistic ignorance effect evident for Conservative voters (but for Labour voters); for the remaining item pairs (violence against people that are 'different' and carrying a knife), both groups showed pluralistic ignorance effects (see Table App.1.1: 5).

**Table App.1.1: 5**

*Own vs perceived comfort with violence split by vote*

Violence as a means for goal-achievement							Violence against people that are "different"				
Own				Perceived			Own			Perceived	
Party	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Conservative Party	100	1.67	1.50	$t(99) = -1.79$ , $p = .08$	1.89	1.21	1.37	0.86	$t(99) = -4.21$ , $p = .008$	1.88	1.10
Labour Party	98	1.48	1.48	$t(97) = -7.28$ , $p < .001$	2.46	1.25	1.27	0.84	$t(97) = -10.29$ , $p < .001$	2.48	1.25
Carrying a knife in diverse neighbourhood							Violence as a means for self-protection				
Own				Perceived			Own			Perceived	
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Conservative Party	100	1.40	1.07	$t(99) = -2.29$ , $p = .04$	1.67	1.08	4.07	1.75	$t(99) = -1.86$ , $p = .07$	4.30	1.53

Labour Party	98	1.31	0.83	$t(97) = -5.25,$ $p < .001$	1.97	1.34	2.92	1.57	$t(97) = -6.65,$ $p < .001$	4.03	1.55
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**False Consensus.** Conservative Party voters (own approval:  $M = 4.82$ ,  $SD = 1.85$ ), compared to Labour Party voters (own approval:  $M = 2.39$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ), perceived significantly more agreement for their stance on harsh immigration treatment ( $M_{Conservative} = 64.18$ ,  $SD_{Conservative} = 17.29$ ;  $M_{Labour} = 50.50$ ,  $SD_{Labour} = 19.52$ ;  $t(97) = 3.65$ ,  $p < .001$ ). Conservative Party voters (own approval:  $M = 3.60$ ,  $SD = 1.86$ ), compared to Labour Party voters (own approval:  $M = 1.78$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ), perceived marginal significantly more agreement for their stance on speaking English as mandatory for staying in the UK ( $M_{Conservative} = 64.07$ ,  $SD_{Conservative} = 21.06$ ;  $M_{Labour} = 56.04$ ,  $SD_{Labour} = 20.63$ ;  $t(97) = 1.91$ ,  $p = .06$ ).

**Identification/ Xenophobia.** We investigated a subgroup of eighteen individuals that were classified as holding a “xenophobic white British identity”<sup>8</sup>. While 72.22% earned between “less than £10,000” and £30,000 p.a., 27.78% had an annual income of “up to £50,000” and above. Two-thirds (66.67%) of the sample held an A-Level degree or less, while one-third held academic degrees (bachelor’s and master’s degrees). Two-thirds (66.66%) were working as paid employee or self-employed, while one-third was looking for a job or retired. The average age was slightly higher compared to the total sample ( $M = 38.83$ ,  $SD = 14.78$ ). Considering its distribution, we found that the group was split half regarding age (aged 21 to 33, and aged 42 to 69). Overall, this illustrates a relatively polarised distribution in all domains, with the

<sup>8</sup> “High scorers” were classified by at least scoring 5 on the in-group identification and xenophobia scale. Ten individuals that scored 4 were excluded from further analysis, resulting in a sample difference of 18 vs 170.

majority being male (61.11%), identifying as “white British” (88.89%) and having had voted for the Conservative Party (83.33%).

**Pluralistic Ignorance.** While there was a consistent significant mismatch between own and perceived comfort with violence for non-xenophobes, we found no such mismatches in highly xenophobic individuals (see Table App. 1.1: 6).

**Table App.1.1: 6**

*Pluralistic ignorance items split by level of xenophobia*

Item Pair 1							Item Pair 2				
Own					Perceived		Own			Perceived	
Xenophobia	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Low	170	1.55	1.21	$t(169) = -7.17, p < .001$	2.22	1.29	1.25	0.76	$t(169) = -10.06, p < .001$	2.18	1.21
High	18	1.78	1.63	$t(17) = -0.16, p = .88$	1.83	1.10	1.78	1.17	$t(17) = -0.36, p = .73$	1.89	0.96

Item Pair 3						Item Pair 4					
Own			Perceived			Own			Perceived		
	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	<i>p</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Low	170	1.25	0.75	$t(169) = -6.35, p < .001$	1.81	1.21	3.43	1.72	$t(169) = -6.66, p < .001$	4.20	1.54
High	18	2.22	1.80	$t(17) = 0.49, p = .63$	2.00	1.46	4.22	2.10	$t(17) = 0.52, p = .61$	4.00	1.53

**False Consensus.** Highly xenophobic individuals (own Approval:  $M = 5.86$ ,  $SD = 2.27$ ) did not perceive significantly higher agreement from “the wider public” for their approval for harsh immigration treatment, compared to non-xenophobes (own Approval:  $M = 3.26$ ,  $SD = 1.97$ ;  $M_{\text{xenophobes}} = 57.14$ ,  $SD_{\text{xenophobes}} = 22.55$ ,  $M_{\text{non-xenophobes}} = 56.64$ ,  $SD_{\text{non-xenophobes}} = 19.75$ ;  $t(95) = -0.06$ ,  $p = .95$ ). Similarly, highly xenophobic individuals (own Approval:  $M = 5.00$ ,  $SD = 1.91$ ) did not perceive significantly higher agreement for their approval for speaking English as mandatory for staying in the UK,

compared to non-xenophobes (own Approval:  $M = 2.38$ ,  $SD = 1.61$ ;  $M_{xenophobes} = 71.57$ ,  $SD_{xenophobes} = 14.09$ ,  $M_{non-xenophobes} = 58.64$ ,  $SD_{non-xenophobes} = 21.43$ ;  $t(95) = -1.57$ ,  $p = .12$ ).

**H4: Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals report higher collective empowerment (joy at success and group efficacy) than Labour voters and non-xenophobes**

***Conservative Party vs Labour Party voters***

Conservative Party voters ( $M = 5.56$ ,  $SD = .09$ ) expressed significantly more joy at success of collective action than Labour Party voters ( $M = 2.42$ ,  $SD = .09$ ),  $t(196) = 24.66$ ,  $p < .001$ . Similarly, Conservative Party voters ( $M = 5.16$ ,  $SD = .13$ ) perceived significantly more group efficacy than Labour Party voters ( $M = 3.41$ ,  $SD = .15$ ),  $t(196) = 9.10$ ,  $p < .001$ )<sup>9</sup>.

***Identification/ Xenophobia***

Highly xenophobic individuals ( $M = 5.27$ ,  $SD .41$ ) reported significantly more joy at success than non-xenophobes ( $M = 3.82$ ,  $SD = .13$ ),  $t(186) = -3.37$ ,  $p = .007$ , and marginally significant more group efficacy (High:  $M = 4.94$ ,  $SD = .32$ ; Low:  $M = 4.21$ ,  $SD = .12$ ),  $t(186) = 1.86$ ,  $p = .07$ ).

**H5: Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals report higher collective narcissism than Labour voters and non-xenophobes**

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<sup>9</sup> Satisfaction with the UK government's response to COVID-19 had a significant predictive influence on collective empowerment (for joy at success:  $b = .18$ ,  $SD = .03$ ,  $p < .001$ ; for group efficacy:  $b = .19$ ,  $SD = .05$ ,  $p < .001$ ). This is in line with additional analyses that revealed that Conservative Party voters were significantly more satisfied with the UK government's response to COVID-19, with 77% of Conservative Party and only 38% of Labour Party voters being slightly to highly satisfied.

### ***Conservative Party vs Labour Party voters***

*T*-tests revealed that Conservative Party voters ( $M = 3.57$ ,  $SD = .12$ ) showed significantly more collective narcissism than Labour voters ( $M = 2.68$ ,  $SD = .12$ ),  $t(196) = 5.30$ ,  $p < .001$ .

### ***Identification/Xenophobia***

Highly xenophobic individuals ( $M = 4.24$ ,  $SD = .32$ ) expressed significantly more collective narcissism than non-xenophobes ( $M = 3.03$ ,  $SD = .10$ ),  $t(186) = -4.10$ ,  $p < .01$ .

## **Discussion**

In our study, we examined group differences in social norm misperception between voter groups of the two biggest parties in the UK General Election 2019 (Conservative and Labour Party), as well as amongst individuals that expressed a xenophobic white British identity and non-xenophobes, that were expected to be amongst those groups. We were able to confirm hypotheses 1, 3, 4, and 5, while we could only partially confirm hypotheses 2 and 2a.

Overall, we witnessed a floor effect for xenophobia and violence approval, as well as that the “wider public” was perceived as rather dismissive of xenophobic statements. This is in line with trends that show rather enduring, welcoming, and appreciative sentiments towards immigrants and that attitudes are fairly stable (BBC News, 2019; Ipsos, 2019). However, we also witnessed that the “British people” were perceived as significantly more comfortable with violence towards people that are “different”, when living in diverse neighbourhoods, and as a means for goal achievement and self-protection than oneself (H1) and that in two (out of five) cases (namely, harsh treatment of immigrants by the government, and speaking English as

mandatory to stay in the UK) individuals high in approval for xenophobic statements, estimated significantly (respectively marginally significant) higher agreement from the “wider public” for their approval (H2, partially confirmed). Similarly, own approval for xenophobic statements positively predicted agreement estimation, but only in the case of harsh immigration treatment (H2a, partially confirmed).

Among the mainstream, Conservative Party voters, in two cases, did not perceive other “British people” to be significantly different from their own norms towards violence, whereas Labour Party voters consistently did. Along with greater in-group identification as British amongst the Conservative voters, this might indicate that Conservative Party voters in our study saw themselves as more similar to “the British people” than Labour Party voters do. Rocha and Reicher (2020) found that the social identity of “British” reduced the willingness to help refugees when people assumed that anti-immigrant norms are intrinsic to the British identity. The researchers argued that in-group identification can be perceived differently, depending on the group, and that in the corresponding case, this led to less prosocial behavioural intention<sup>10</sup>. In our study, this could help explain why we witnessed Conservative voters to express higher approval for harsh immigrant treatment and speaking English as mandatory to stay in the UK than Labour voters, and subsequently estimated significantly (respectively marginal significant) higher agreement for this approval from “the wider public”. For speaking English as mandatory to stay in the UK, though, the approval was low, so that higher agreement estimation reflects people’s perception of an overall dismissal of this statement.

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<sup>10</sup> Crucially, an experimental intervention (showing British participants opinion polls conveying that most people in the UK had expressed positive opinions about helping refugees) countered unwillingness. The researcher concluded that among high identifiers the belief that solidarity was a prototypical trait of the (British) ingroup helped overcome unwillingness to help.

At the extreme fringe of the mainstream, we found that those individuals with a racialised in-group identification – a xenophobic white British identity, did not perceive other “British people” to be significantly different from their own norms towards violence, while non-xenophobes did. Although not significant, there was also a trend for highly xenophobic individuals to perceive greater consensus for their stance compared to non-xenophobes.

Thus, in our study, we found a clear group-based pattern in differences in pluralistic ignorance and false consensus (H3). In line with the occurrence of social norm misperception in the context of a socio-political event (e.g., Crandall et al., 2018; Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016), we argue that these group differences are not random. In fact, we noticed that they are based on participants’ votes in UK General Election, on their (non-) xenophobic identity, and that false consensus effects occurred in statements that captured topics which were highly present or heatedly debated beforehand: The rightward shift of the Conservative Party attracted voters beyond designated longstanding Conservatives, namely members and sympathiser of the far-right (e.g., Townsend, 2019). Indeed, among our subsample of highly xenophobic individuals, 83.33% voted for the Conservative Party. Moreover, the party had provided a manifesto that covered harsh immigration control, and after its electoral victory, it proposed a controversial “points-based immigration system” that sought to keep “lower-skilled workers” and “migrants” that do not speak English out (Home Office, 2020). Thus, it might be that through the successful election outcome, support expectations and consensus perceptions for the agenda of the Conservative Party were enhanced. Similarly, through the election success of the Conservative Party, voters’ social identity and values were realised against the opposing stance and Labour Party. While this can feel empowering for the victorious party, it can be *disempowering* for the defeated party

voters (Drury & Reicher, 2005). Since collective empowerment can be accompanied by the perception that change (i.e., Brexit) is now possible and a joyful feeling (cf. Becker et al., 2011; Drury & Reicher, 2005) it is not too surprising that Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals in our study, indeed seemed to feel empowered whilst Labour voters and non-xenophobes did not (H4).

After the unexpected political outcomes in the UK and US in 2016, white xenophobes conducted increased hate-motivated attacks on immigrants or targeted groups. However, in our study, xenophobia and collective empowerment were positively associated with having *expected* the outcome of the election. This seems to be at odds with the processes in 2016. At this stage, we argue that we need to, first, consider the fact that, in the current study, we did neither measure behavioural intentions nor behaviour and, second, that we can only assume that the empowerment in 2016 might have simply been even stronger, evident in the stark spikes in hate crime, opposed to no such strong increases observed after the election outcome 2019. Nonetheless, the fact that we *still* measured collective empowerment, even after almost four years since the referendum to leave the EU took place, might support the notion that endurance of empowerment depends on the realisation and maintenance of an aspired change in social relations (cf. Drury & Reicher, 2005). The Conservative's manifesto to finally "get Brexit done" and the overwhelming electoral win could, therefore, be understood as unobstructedly finalising a long-expected outcome. The endurance effect is further supported by the fact that the data for our study was collected over three months after the election took place.

Interestingly, while group efficacy seems to be the stronger factor that underlies collective empowerment (Drury et al., 2018), for highly xenophobic individuals, it was

particularly joy at success which was reported as experienced to a greater extent.

Although we need to consider the potential impact on accuracy due to the small sample size in our subsample, the finding is in line with the repeated finding that collective narcissism is connected to schadenfreude (Golec de Zavala et al., 2016). The latter could be connected to, partially, outright xenophobic celebrations of Brexit (cf. “Happy Brexit Day”; BBC News, 2020).

Although on average, both Conservative Party voters and highly xenophobic individuals expressed significantly higher collective narcissism (H5), Conservative Party voters (compared to highly xenophobic individuals) rather rejected that speaking English was mandatory to stay in the UK. Thus, although we witnessed that in our study, Conservative voters and those individuals with a racialised social identity shared several values, the groups do not entirely overlap. This is also evident in the fact that while Conservative Party voters were associated with higher income, highly xenophobic individuals showed a polarised income level. The latter, in turn, might serve as a further indicator that wealth predicts support for xenophobia in a v-curve function (Jetten, 2019).

A common explanation for hostility is that people dehumanise target groups in order to justify their stance and to reduce cognitive dissonance (Levin & Rabrenovic, 2009, p. 47). One might ask the question whether, for Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals, such cognitive dissonance reduction led to the denial that there was extremity amongst other in-group members, evident in overall rather low reported comfort for violence. This would explain why in three out of four cases, low own comfort with violence was positively associated with social desirability. The match between own and perceived comfort for violence, however, might be even better

explained by the fact that others were perceived as similar and sharing their values (see above), resulting in no significant difference between own and perceived comfort. In contrast, Labour voters and non-xenophobes could have perceived themselves as excluded and different from the “British people”, which is supported by the fact that they expressed lower in-group identification. They showed consistently lower own and higher perceived comfort with violence. Given that the perceived comfort was nonetheless low, there is no reason to assume that Labour voters and non-xenophobes would publicly support violence due to a perception of violent norms (cf. Prentice & Miller, 1993). Nonetheless, given the consistent pattern that emerged across groups, we can assume that they may feel more distant from “the British people”. In line with minority influence, beliefs, in turn, can have behavioural consequences, for example, reducing the willingness to speak out against hostility (Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016).

### **Limitations**

While we believe that our study contributes valuable insights that can aid in furthering the understanding of underlying social norm (mis) perception and hate empowerment, there are, of course, limitations. For false consensus, agreement estimations referred to different anchors (own approval vs statement). Consequently, we split the dataset for the analysis. This could have affected statistical power, and in fact, we were not able to make reliable interpretations about three items, nor could we establish significant predictions based on own approval for speaking English. Further studies should, therefore, work with one direction only to keep statistical power high. Pluralistic ignorance items captured different kinds of violence. This was particularly obvious in the case of violence as a means for self-protection: Individuals expressed significantly higher actual and perceived violence norms when it was to protect

themselves. Higher acceptance for this kind of violence was also mirrored in the fact that social desirability was not significantly associated with that item. Thus, people found it socially acceptable to respond with violence in case of danger, compared to all other forms of violence. Future studies might, therefore, want to choose a more coherent measure of violence. While we witnessed a floor effect for violent group norms and xenophobic statements approval, we do not think that this is at odds with the interpretations of the underlying processes since we examined the possibility of a mismatch between own and perceived comfort and higher consensus perceptions amongst those higher in approval, which we did.

### **Practical implications**

Our study has important wider implications: We can confirm that, in our study overall, approval for violence and xenophobic statements seemed to be low, which is a promising sign considering that we have been witnessing an increasing number of hate-related attacks on immigrants. However, we also found group differences in social norm misperception skewed towards perceiving greater consensus for harsh immigration treatment and mandatory English for staying in the UK amongst highly xenophobic individuals that had mainly voted for the Conservative Party. On the other hand, Labour voters and non-xenophobes might seem to perceive a greater gap between themselves and “the British people”. Since the Conservative Party had previously won an overwhelming majority in the UK General Election with their main goal to “get Brexit done”, and since we found that Conservative voters and highly xenophobic individuals sought strength from this outcome, it gives us some confidence to assume that these group differences are not random and connected to this socio-political event. In this way, we not only witness the detrimental consequences of a hostile public discourse, but

we know from previous research that socio-political events can also increase activity and improve the cohesion amongst hate groups online (Bliuc et al., 2019, 2020). An increase in online hate can lead to an increase in hate crimes offline (Müller & Schwarz, 2020). Our study indicates that meta-perceptual processes could foster this. In contrast, disempowerment and greater disconnection, as seen amongst Labour voters and non-xenophobes, might evoke the “false belief that relevant others sympathise with or tolerate a (radical) political minority can become real in its consequences by affecting people’s behaviour in the form of public outspokenness regarding the minority” (Louis et al., 2010; Portelinha & Elcheroth, 2016), so that bystander anti-racism might be undermined.

### **Future studies**

To get a better understanding of meta-perceptual processes, future studies should go beyond a correlational design and consider pre-/post designs, for example, using quasi-experimental approaches or longitudinal designs capturing the time before and after an election. To go beyond social norm misperception alone, behavioural intention should be considered. Furthermore, to monitor the impact of public events on the experience of empowerment, online hate groups could be examined regarding online and offline activity (cf. Bliuc et al., 2019, 2020).

### **Conclusion**

Our study illustrates that the (mis)perception of social norms depends on group membership and could, thereby, be connected to ingroup-relevant socio-political events. We found false consensus effects in topics that were salient and connected to the UK General Election 2019: Those expressing approval for xenophobic statements (Conservative Party voters and highly xenophobic individuals) saw themselves

supported by a majority in their approval. We also found pluralistic ignorance effects amongst Labour voters and non-xenophobes, showing a consistent mismatch between own and perceived comfort with violence. Considering its predictive influence on behavioural intention building, these social misperception effects could, on the one hand, strengthen Conservative Party voters and highly xenophobic individuals' consensus perception and empower them in their xenophobic stance, and, on the other, undermine opponents' (here, Labour Party voters and non-xenophobic individuals) counteractions and resistance.

## Appendix 1.2: Survey

**Please enter your Prolific ID here.**

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### Information

#### Study

Attitudes and beliefs in light of the UK General Election 2019.

#### Invitation

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take time to read the following information carefully.

#### What is the purpose of the study?

This study is conducted by Prof John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk) and PhD student Carina Hoerst (c.hoerst@sussex.ac.uk), University of Sussex. It examines attitudes and beliefs in light of the UK General Election 2019.

We are interested in your true evaluations of - and answers to - the questions presented to you. In order to gain a reliable and authentic picture, we ask you to answer these questions honestly. You will be presented with questions assessing demographic data, your political affiliations, as well as your attitudes and beliefs.

You might find some statements provocative. Please do not think too much about your answer, there is no right or wrong answer. Please give a spontaneous answer without overthinking it.

#### Why have I been invited to participate?

You have been invited to take part in this study based on the information that you voted

in the UK General Election 2019.

Please note: You are welcome to take part if you are: Aged 18 or above.

### **Do I have to take part?**

It is up to you to decide whether or not to take part. You can withdraw from the study until the completion of the questionnaire.

Please note: Due to the study being conducted anonymously, it is not possible to have your data deleted once you have taken part in this study.

### **What will happen to me if I take part?**

Once you have decided to take part in the study and indicated so, you will be automatically forwarded to an online questionnaire. You will be asked to complete questions about your vote in the UK General Election 2019, your attitudes and beliefs towards specific topics provided for you, and demographic information. Participation in the study shall take approx. 15-20 minutes.

Please note: We ask you to answer the questions presented to you as quickly as it is possible for you, and preferably in one go. If you have to interrupt the study, you will be able to return to the questionnaire where you left it. After a maximum time of 56 minutes without being active on the questionnaire, your session will be timed out and you won't be able to return to it.

If you exceed the time limit but are still active on the questionnaire, and have not been replaced by another participant yet, you can still complete your submission.

### **What are the possible benefits of taking part?**

Your participation helps us to gain an authentic and reliable picture of attitudes and beliefs in light of the UK General Election 2019 and contributes to bringing the knowledge in this area forward.

You will be also compensated with £ 1,25 for your participation.

### **Will my information in this study be kept confidential?**

Your Prolific ID was automatically collected using automatic recording. Please be

assured that the ID cannot be used to trace your identity. Special category personal data (e.g., race, political affiliation) will be obtained (and will be kept until the study is completed); however, this questionnaire is completely anonymous and you will NOT be personally identifiable. Confidentiality is ensured via anonymous data collection and password encrypted data storage.

**What should I do if I want to take part?**

If you want to take part in this study, please indicate so by following the instructions in the attached consent sheet.

**What will happen to the results of the research study?**

The results of this study may be used in presentations, at conferences, in a doctoral thesis, and in publications.

**Who has approved this study?**

This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (C-REC) process with the ethical review application number of the study ER/CH527/4.

**Contact for Further Information**

For further information about this research, please contact PhD student Carina Hoerst (c.hoerst@sussex.ac.uk). If you have any ethical concerns, please contact the ethics chair (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk).

**Insurance**

The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities with respect to this study.

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet.

26th of March, 2020

## **Consent**

### **Title of Project**

Attitudes and beliefs in the light of the UK General Election 2019

### **Name of researchers and school**

Prof John Drury & PhD student Carina Horst, School of Psychology, University of Sussex

### **c-rec-ref no**

ER/CH527/4

I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I have read the information sheet and I understand the principles, procedures and possible risks involved.

I consent to the processing of my personal information and data for the purposes of this research study. I understand that such information will be treated as strictly confidential and handled in accordance with the General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) 2018.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw up until the completion of the questionnaire without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project.

---

Please indicate that you want to take part in this study by clicking on

- ☐ I have read and understood the information and consent sheet, my answers will be as honest and accurate as possible, and i want to take part in this study.

### **The UK General Election 2019**

The United Kingdom General Election was held on Thursday, the 12th of December 2019. The Conservative Party won 365 seats (48 more than in 2017) and 43.6% of the vote (up from 42.3% in 2017), and therefore was the majority party and winner, forming the new government. The Labour party won 202 seats (down from 262 in 2017) and 31.1% of the vote (down from 40% in 2017). The turnout was 67.3%.

**Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.**

-----

I identify as British.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

Being British means being White.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

Which party did you vote for in the UK General Election 2019?

- ☐ Conservative Party (1)
- ☐ Labour Party (2)
- ☐ Scottish National Party (3)
- ☐ Liberal Democrats (4)
- ☐ Green Party (5)
- ☐ Brexit Party (6)
- ☐ Other (7)

Please select the statement that best represents your opinion:

To me, the outcome of the UK General Election 2019 was ...

- ☐ Completely unexpected (1)
- ☐ Moderately unexpected (2)
- ☐ Slightly unexpected (3)
- ☐ Neither unexpected nor expected (4)
- ☐ Slightly expected (5)
- ☐ Moderately expected (6)
- ☐ Completely expected (7)

Please think about British people as your group when you respond to the statements below. Please indicate to what extent you agree or disagree with these statements using the following scale: "Strongly disagree" to "Strongly agree".

---

My group deserves special treatment.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

I will never be satisfied until my group gets all it deserves.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

---

It really makes me angry when others criticize my group.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

If my group had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of my group.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

Please answer the following questions with respect to yourself.

I sometimes tell lies if I have to.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
  - ☐ Disagree (6)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
  - ☐ Agree (2)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (1)
-

I never cover up my mistakes.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

There have been occasions when I have taken advantages of someone.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
  - ☐ Disagree (6)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
  - ☐ Agree (2)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (1)
-

I sometimes try to get even rather than to forgive and forget.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
  - ☐ Disagree (6)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
  - ☐ Agree (2)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (1)
-

I have said something bad about a friend behind his or her back.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
  - ☐ Disagree (6)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
  - ☐ Agree (2)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (1)
- 

When I hear people talking privately, I avoid listening.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

I never take things that don't belong to me.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

I don't gossip about other people's business.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly disagree” to “Strongly agree”.

---

The outcome of the UK General Election 2019 made me feel joyful.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

I feel good about UK politicians.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

Imagining a Labour victory as the outcome of the UK General Election 2019 makes me feel very happy.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
  - ☐ Disagree (6)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
  - ☐ Agree (2)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (1)
-

I felt excited about witnessing the UK General Election 2019.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

I think that we, the British people, can change our own laws following the UK General Election 2019.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

I believe that we, the British people, can make a difference on policies in this country.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

After the UK General Election 2019, I think that we, the British people, can have an impact on society.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

I think that the outcome of the UK General Election 2019 has an impact on the people having stood as candidates in the election campaign.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Extremely uncomfortable” to “Extremely comfortable”.

How comfortable do **you** feel with violent behaviour by British people to achieve their goals?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable does **the average British person** feel with violent behaviour by British people to achieve their goals?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable do **you** feel with the consumer habits of British people?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable does **the average British person** feel with the consumer habits of British people?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable do **you** feel with violent behaviour by British people against people who are different?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable does **the average British person** feel with violent behaviour by British people against people who are different?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable do **you** feel with British people carrying a knife if they lived in a diverse neighbourhood?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable does **the average British person** feel with British people carrying a knife if they lived in a diverse neighbourhood?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable do **you** feel with the drinking habits of British people?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable does **the average British person** feel with the drinking habits of British people?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable do **you** feel with British people doing whatever it takes to protect themselves?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
  - ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
  - ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
  - ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
  - ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
  - ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
  - ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)
-

How comfortable does **the average British person** feel with British people doing whatever it takes to protect themselves?

- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable (1)
- ☐ Moderately uncomfortable (2)
- ☐ Slightly uncomfortable (3)
- ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable (4)
- ☐ Slightly comfortable (5)
- ☐ Moderately comfortable (6)
- ☐ Extremely comfortable (7)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I am ok with the government taking severe measures against immigrants.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I am fine with gays and lesbians teaching at primary schools

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I think referring to Black people by the "N-word" is wrong.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
- ☐ Disagree (6)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
- ☐ Agree (2)
- ☐ Strongly agree (1)

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

-----

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I really think that society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievements.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I think that Jewish people will never really belong to our British communities.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I am not ok with gays and lesbians serving in the military.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

People who live in the UK and don't speak English should go back to where they come from.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I think immigrants need to make space for British people on public transport.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

-----

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with you.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me. (2)

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

It's ok that the government is taking severe measures against immigrants.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

-----

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I am ok with the government taking severe measures against immigrants.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

It's fine that gays and lesbians are teaching at primary schools

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I am fine with gays and lesbians teaching at primary schools

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

---

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

Referring to Black people by the "N-word" is wrong.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I think referring to Black people by the "N-word" is wrong.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (7)
- ☐ Disagree (6)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (5)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (3)
- ☐ Agree (2)
- ☐ Strongly agree (1)

---

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

Society really has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievements.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I really think that society has reached the point where women and men have equal opportunities for achievements.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
-

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

Jewish people will never really belong to our British communities.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

-----

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I think that Jewish people will never really belong to our British communities.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
  - ☐ Disagree (2)
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
  - ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
  - ☐ Agree (6)
  - ☐ Strongly agree (7)
- 

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

It's not ok that gays and lesbians are serving in the military.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I am not ok with gays and lesbians serving in the military.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

-----

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

People who live in the UK and don't speak English should go back to where they come from.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

-----

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

People who live in the UK and don’t speak English should go back to where they come from.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

---

Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider public that agree/ disagree with the following:

Immigrants need to make space for British people on public transport.

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree. (1)

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree. (2)

---

Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly Disagree” to “Strongly Agree”.

I think immigrants need to make space for British people on public transport.

- ☐ Strongly disagree (1)
- ☐ Disagree (2)
- ☐ Somewhat disagree (3)
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree (4)
- ☐ Somewhat agree (5)
- ☐ Agree (6)
- ☐ Strongly agree (7)

How satisfied are you with the English government's response to Covid-19 ("Corona-Virus")?

- ☐ Extremely dissatisfied (1)
- ☐ Moderately dissatisfied (2)
- ☐ Slightly dissatisfied (3)
- ☐ Neither satisfied nor dissatisfied (4)
- ☐ Slightly satisfied (5)
- ☐ Moderately satisfied (6)
- ☐ Extremely satisfied (7)

What age are you?

---

What best describes your gender?

- ☐ Female (1)
- ☐ Male (2)
- ☐ Other (3)
- ☐ Rather not say (4)

---

What best describes your ethnicity?

- ☐ Asian (1)
  - ☐ Black (2)
  - ☐ Mixed (3)
  - ☐ Other (4)
  - ☐ White British (5)
  - ☐ White Other (6)
- 

What best describes your highest achieved level of school or profession?

- ☐ Some college, but no degree (1)
  - ☐ A-level degree (2)
  - ☐ Bachelor's degree (3)
  - ☐ Master's degree (4)
  - ☐ Doctoral degree (5)
  - ☐ Professional degree (6)
  - ☐ Other - please indicate (7)
-

---

What best describes your current employment status?

- ☐ Working - paid employee (1)
  - ☐ Working - self employed (2)
  - ☐ Not working - temporary layoff from a job (3)
  - ☐ Not working - looking for a job (4)
  - ☐ Not working - retired (5)
  - ☐ Not working - disabled (6)
  - ☐ Not working - student (7)
  - ☐ Other - please indicate (8)
-

What best describes your current income before taxes?

- ☐ less than £10,000 p.a. (1)
- ☐ £10,000 to 19,000 p.a. (2)
- ☐ £20,000 to £30,000 p.a. (3)
- ☐ £30,000 to £50,000 p.a. (4)
- ☐ above £50,000 p.a. (5)

Thank you very much for your participation. Your answers have been submitted. For further information about this research, please contact PhD student Carina Hoerst ([c.hoerst@sussex.ac.uk](mailto:c.hoerst@sussex.ac.uk)). If you have any ethical concerns, please contact the ethics chair ([crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk](mailto:crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk)).

## Appendix 1.3: Certificate of ethical approval

Figure App. 1.3: 1

*Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/4 pilot study Chapter 3*



Sciences & Technology C-REC  
crecsctec@admin.susx.ac.uk

Certificate of Approval	
Reference Number	ER/CH527/4
Title Of Project	Examination of meta-perception effects following the UK General Election 2019
Principal Investigator (PI):	John Drury
Student	Carina Hoerst
Collaborators	
Duration Of Approval	4 months
Expected Start Date	09-Mar-2020
Date Of Approval	09-Mar-2020
Approval Expiry Date	16-Jul-2020
Approved By	Karen Long
Name of Authorised Signatory	Lauren Shukru
Date	09-Mar-2020

‘NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:

**Amendments to protocol**

- Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-REC for authorisation prior to implementation.

**Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects**

- Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the C-REC.

**Feedback regarding any adverse(1) and unexpected events(2)**

- Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Science and Technology C-REC. In the event of a serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.

**Monitoring of Approved studies**

The University may undertake periodic monitoring of approved studies. Researchers will be requested to report on the outcomes of research activity in relation to approvals that were granted (full applications and amendments).

**Research Standards**

Failure to conduct University research in alignment with the Code of Practice for Research may be investigated under the Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research or other appropriate internal mechanisms (3). Any queries can be addressed to the Research Governance Office: [rgoffice@sussex.ac.uk](mailto:rgoffice@sussex.ac.uk)

(1) An "adverse event" is one that occurs during the course of a research protocol that either causes physical or psychological harm, or increases the risk of physical or psychological harm, or results in a loss of privacy and/or confidentiality to research participant or others.

(2) An "unexpected event" is an occurrence or situation during the course of a research project that was a) harmful to a participant taking part in the research, or b) increased the probability of harm to participants taking part in the research.

(3) <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rql/policy/research-policy>

Figure App. 1.3: 2

Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/5 pilot study Chapter 3



Sciences & Technology C-REC  
crecscitec@admin.susx.ac.uk

Certificate of Approval	
Reference Number	ER/CH527/5
Title Of Project	MINOR AMENDMENTS_Examination of meta-perception effects following the UK General Election 2019 (COPY)
Principal Investigator (PI):	John Drury
Student	Carina Hoerst
Collaborators	
Duration Of Approval	4 months
Expected Start Date	25-Mar-2020
Date Of Approval	25-Mar-2020
Approval Expiry Date	16-Jul-2020
Approved By	Karen Long
Name of Authorised Signatory	Lauren Shukru
Date	25-Mar-2020
<p><sup>1</sup>NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.</p> <p>Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:</p> <p><b>Amendments to protocol</b></p> <p><sup>1</sup> Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-REC for authorisation prior to implementation.</p> <p><b>Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects</b></p> <p><sup>1</sup> Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the C-REC.</p> <p><b>Feedback regarding any adverse<sup>(1)</sup> and unexpected events<sup>(2)</sup></b></p> <p><sup>1</sup> Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Science and Technology C-REC. In the event of a serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.</p> <p><b>Monitoring of Approved studies</b></p> <p>The University may undertake periodic monitoring of approved studies. Researchers will be requested to report on the outcomes of research activity in relation to approvals that were granted (full applications and amendments).</p> <p><b>Research Standards</b></p> <p>Failure to conduct University research in alignment with the Code of Practice for Research may be investigated under the Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research or other appropriate internal mechanisms (3). Any queries can be addressed to the Research Governance Office: <a href="mailto:rgoffice@sussex.ac.uk">rgoffice@sussex.ac.uk</a></p> <p>(1) An "adverse event" is one that occurs during the course of a research protocol that either causes physical or psychological harm, or increases the risk of physical or psychological harm, or results in a loss of privacy and/or confidentiality to research participant or others.</p> <p>(2) An "unexpected event" is an occurrence or situation during the course of a research project that was a) harmful to a participant taking part in the research, or b) increased the probability of harm to participants taking part in the research.</p> <p>(3) <a href="http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rg/policy/research-policy">http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rg/policy/research-policy</a></p>	

#### Appendix 1.4: Supplementary material

In four out of five times, when participants were asked for their own approval after having had to estimate the ‘wider population’s agreement first, their approval with xenophobic statements was slightly higher (respectively lower in question two) than being asked prior to the estimation. On average, participants perceived the population to be dismissive of xenophobic statements.

**Table App. 1.4: 1**

*Descriptive statistic for variables and individual items of pluralistic ignorance and false consensus*

	<i>N</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
In-group identification	198	6.13	1.41
Xenophobia	198	1.90	1.46
(Un) Expectedness of UK GE 2019 Outcome	198	5.05	1.64
Collective Narcissism	198	3.13	1.26
Social Desirability	198	2.76	2.08
Collective Empowerment			
Joy at Success of Collective Action	198	4.00	1.81
Group Efficacy of Collective Action	198	4.29	1.61
Own Comfort with Violence			
Goal Achievement	198	1.58	1.29
Difference	198	1.32	0.85
Diverse Neighbourhood	198	1.35	0.96
Protection	198	3.50	1.76
Perceived Comfort with Violence			
Goal Achievement	198	2.17	1.26
Difference	198	2.18	1.21
Diverse Neighbourhood	198	1.82	1.22
Protection	198	4.17	1.54
Approval for			
Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	3.49	2.11
Using the N-Word	99	1.68	1.50
Jews not Being Part of Community	99	1.67	1.12
Mandatory English Language	99	2.61	1.78

	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	1.56	1.28
Perceived Agreement with Opinion				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	56.72	19.67
	Using the N-Word is Wrong <sup>1</sup>	99	77.65	26.68
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	75.76	18.77
	Mandatory English Language	99	59.69	21.10
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	77.15	22.76
Perceived Disagreement with Opinion				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	43.28	19.67
	Using the N-Word is Wrong	99	22.23	26.34
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	24.24	18.77
	Mandatory English Language	99	40.31	21.10
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	22.85	22.76
Perceived Agreement with Statement				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	57.49	19.63
	Using the N-Word	99	81.93	22.90
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	25.45	26.70
	Mandatory English Language	99	43.63	24.68
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	20.09	24.38
Perceived Disagreement with Statement				
	Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	42.89	19.63
	Using the N-Word is Wrong	99	18.07	22.90
	Jews not Being Part of Community	99	74.51	26.81
	Mandatory English Language	99	56.37	24.68
	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	79.91	24.38

## Approval for

Harsh Immigration Treatment	99	3.73	1.95
Using the N-Word	99	1.38	1.02
Jews not Being Part of Community	99	1.71	1.35
Mandatory English Language	99	2.54	1.75
Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	99	1.73	1.46

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*Note.* N = Number of Participants; M = Mean; SD = Standard Deviation; <sup>1</sup>the Scale was Reversed so that Higher Values Represent Higher Approval for Using the N-Word

**Table App. 1.4: 2***Intercorrelation variables with pluralistic ignorance items*

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20
1	In-group identification	1.00																			
2	Xenophobia	0.12	1.00																		
3	Party support	-0.19**	-0.38***	1.00																	
4	Expectedness	0.02	0.19**	-0.27***	1.00																
5	Social Desirability	0.07	0.05	-0.05	0.12	1.00															
6	Collective narcissism	0.22**	0.29***	-0.36***	0.04	-0.10	1.00														
7	Joy at Success	0.26***	0.42***	-0.85***	0.27***	0.06	0.43***	1.00													
8	Group Efficacy	0.28***	0.25***	-0.55***	0.26***	-0.03	0.41***	0.65***	1.00												
	Personal Comfort with Violence																				
9	Goal Achievement	0.01	-0.02	-0.01	0.04	-0.23**	0.21**	0.06	0.06	1.00											
10	Difference	-0.10	0.14*	-0.12	0.03	-0.30***	0.24***	0.14*	0.16*	0.44***	1.00										
11	Diverse Neighbourhood	-0.09	0.22*	-0.01	0.06	-0.18**	0.14*	0.03	0.03	0.29***	0.29***	1.00									
	Perceived Comfort with Violence																				
12	Protection	0.09	-0.25***	-0.33***	0.16	-0.04	0.34***	0.36***	0.21**	0.20**	0.19**	0.20*	1.00								
	Perceived Comfort with Violence																				
13	Goal Achievement	-0.15*	-0.23*	0.28***	-0.07	-0.33***	-0.08	-0.25**	-0.17*	0.39***	0.26***	0.13	0.01	1.00							
14	Difference	-0.28**	-0.15*	0.27***	-0.10	-0.33***	-0.10	-0.24***	-0.15*	0.20***	0.33***	0.29***	-0.04	0.62***	1.00						
15	Diverse Neighbourhood	-0.14*	0.01	0.12	-0.01	-0.21**	-0.01	-0.11	-0.03	0.11	0.15*	0.41***	0.02	0.34***	0.40***	1.00					
	Perceived Comfort with Violence																				
16	Protection	-0.07	0.06	-0.10	0.04	-0.03	0.03	0.10	0.03	0.01	-0.6	-0.05	0.56***	0.24***	0.24***	0.22**	1.00				
17	Age	0.05	.26**	-0.31***	0.11	0.24**	0.06	0.31***	0.12	-0.28**	-0.05	-0.07	0.04	-0.37***	-0.29***	-0.22**	-0.11	1.00			
18	Gender	-0.05	0.05	-.23**	0.16*	-0.10	0.09	0.31***	0.27**	.15*	0.18*	0.07	0.40***	0.02	0.05	-0.03	0.27**	-0.11	1.00		
19	Income	-0.09	0.06	-.14*	-0.02	-0.04	0.05	0.08	-0.03	0.05	0.23**	0.08	0.04	0.04	0.05	0.03	-0.10	0.26**	0.03	1.00	
20	Degree	-0.29***	-0.23*	0.13	-0.10	0.01	-0.13	-0.20*	-0.18*	-0.04	0.04	0.00	-0.19**	0.11	0.10	0.06	-0.11	-0.02	-0.05	0.26**	1.00

*Note.* \*p < .05, \*\*p < .01, \*\*\*p < .001

**Table App. 1.4: 3***Intercorrelation variables with false consensus items (opinion given prior to consensus estimation)*

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14	15	16	17	18	19	20	21	22
1	In-group identification	1.00																					
2	Xenophobia	0.10	1.00																				
3	Party support	-0.16	-0.46***	1.00																			
4	Expectedness	0.08	.24*	-0.33**	1.00														4				
5	Social Desirability	0.12	0.08	-0.05	0.09	1.00																	
6	Collective narcissism	0.09	.27**	-0.40***	0.13	-0.15	1.00																
7	Joy at Success	.20*	.57***	-0.86***	0.34**	0.09	.42***	1.00															
8	Group Efficacy	.25*	.38**	-0.60***	0.28**	-0.03	0.40**	.70***	1.00														
	Approval with																						
9	Harsh Immigration Treatment	.32**	0.49***	-0.58***	0.32**	0.05	0.38**	0.56***	0.40***	1.00													
10	Using the N-Word	-0.00	0.28**	-0.22*	0.23*	-0.15	0.22*	0.26**	0.26**	0.31**	1.00												
11	Jews not Being Part of Community	0.02	0.38**	-0.12	0.09	0.07	0.24*	0.14	0.16	0.33**	0.19	1.00											
12	Mandatory English Language	.28**	0.51***	-0.54***	0.27**	0.01	0.40**	0.51***	0.35**	0.70***	0.34**	0.40***	1.00										
13	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	0.16	0.46***	-0.39**	0.20*	0.03	0.38**	0.35**	0.30**	0.50***	0.18	0.50***	0.49***	1.00									
	Perceived Consensus (Agreement)																						
14	Harsh Immigration Treatment	0.15	0.22*	-0.37**	0.24*	-0.00	0.23*	0.40***	0.38**	0.39**	0.13	0.08	0.33**	0.16	1.00								
15	Using the N-Word	0.03	0.16	-0.27**	0.07	0.01	0.22*	0.23*	0.17	0.19	-0.23*	-0.10	0.01	-0.01	0.27**	1.00							
16	Jews not Being Part of Community	0.02	-0.12	0.01	-0.10	-0.10	0.03	-0.03	0.09	-0.08	0.08	-0.41***	-0.24*	-0.19	0.13	0.30**	1.00						
17	Mandatory English Language	.08	0.38**	-0.18	0.11	0.05	0.13	0.27**	0.17	0.20*	0.14	0.04	0.13	0.13	0.34**	0.17	0.11	1.00					
18	Immigrants Subservience on Public Transport	-.01	0.04	-0.05	-0.01	-0.22*	0.16	0.11	0.19	0.02	0.04	-.22*	-0.11	-0.34**	0.16	0.31**	0.40***	0.26**	1.00				
19	Age	-0.01	0.32**	-0.26**	0.07	0.37**	0.05	0.23*	0.06	0.32**	-0.15	0.20*	0.28**	0.16	0.26**	0.12	-0.02	0.32**	0.04	1.00			
20	Gender	-0.02	0.10	-0.29**	0.17	-0.03	0.08	0.37**	0.34**	0.14	0.24*	-0.01	0.22*	-0.03	0.14	0.03	-0.12	0.03	0.14	-0.10	1.00		
21	Income	0.01	0.07	.17	-0.06	0.16	0.01	0.05	0.05	0.16	0.04	0.24*	0.25*	0.17	0.02	-0.06	-0.13	0.10	-0.14	0.23*	0.06	1.00	

22	Degree	-0.23*	-0.24*	0.15	-0.19	0.02	-0.09	-0.20*	-0.19	-0.30**	-0.15	-0.00	-0.27**	-0.16	-0.16	-0.17	0.00	-0.13	-0.02	0.03	-0.03	0.24**	1.00
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## Appendix 2 – Supplementary material Chapter 3

### Appendix 2.1: Certificate of ethical approval

Figure App. 2.1: 1

*Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/9 corresponding paper Chapter 3*



Sciences & Technology C-REC  
crecsitec@admin.susx.ac.uk

Certificate of Approval	
Reference Number	ER/CH527/9
Title Of Project	Two waves study of the Impact of the 2020 US presidential election outcome on consensus perception, collective empowerment and behavioural Intentions amongst voter groups
Principal Investigator (PI):	John Durry
Student	Carina Hoerst
Collaborators	
Duration Of Approval	3 months
Expected Start Date	30-Sep-2020
Date Of Approval	26-Aug-2020
Approval Expiry Date	31-Dec-2020
Approved By	Karen Long
Name of Authorised Signatory	Karen Long
Date	26-Aug-2020

‘NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

**Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:**

**Amendments to protocol**

Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-REC for authorisation prior to implementation.

**Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects**

Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the C-REC.

**Feedback regarding any adverse(1) and unexpected events(2)**

Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Science and Technology C-REC. In the event of a serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.

**Monitoring of Approved studies**

The University may undertake periodic monitoring of approved studies. Researchers will be requested to report on the outcomes of research activity in relation to approvals that were granted (full applications and amendments).

**Research Standards**

Failure to conduct University research in alignment with the Code of Practice for Research may be investigated under the Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research or other appropriate internal mechanisms (3). Any queries can be addressed to the Research Governance Office: rgoffice@sussex.ac.uk

(1) An "adverse event" is one that occurs during the course of a research protocol that either causes physical or psychological harm, or increases the risk of physical or psychological harm, or results in a loss of privacy and/or confidentiality to research participant or others.

(2) An "unexpected event" is an occurrence or situation during the course of a research project that was a) harmful to a participant taking part in the research, or b) increased the probability of harm to participants taking part in the research.

(3) <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rqi/policy/research-policy>

## Appendix 2.2: Sensitivity analysis

We have conducted sensitivity analyses, namely for H1 - H3 and the additional analyses conducted under H7 and H7a using G\*Power. For H1, with an input of  $N$  group 1 = 52,  $N$  group 2 = 87,  $\alpha = .05$ ,  $1-\beta = .80$ , we determined a minimum effect size of  $d = 0.44$  to yield a significant result. The results of both t-tests in H1 reached effect sizes ( $r = .68$  and  $r = .21$ , respectively) which, converted ( $d = 1.85$  and  $d = 0.43$ , respectively), partially fell below this value.

For group 1 in H2, with an input of  $N$  group 1 = 87,  $\alpha = .05$ ,  $1-\beta = .80$ , we determined a minimum effect size of  $d = 0.27$ . The results from the paired t-test (group 1) reached effect sizes ( $r = .67$  and  $r = .57$  respectively) which, converted ( $d = 1.81$  and  $d = 1.39$  respectively), did not fall below this value. For group 2 in H2, with an input of  $N$  group 2 = 52,  $\alpha = .05$ ,  $1-\beta = .80$ , we determined a minimum effect size of  $d = 0.35$ . The results from the paired t-test (group 2) reached effect sizes ( $r = .21$  and  $r = .27$  respectively) which, converted ( $d = 0.43$  and  $d = 0.56$  respectively), did not fall below this value.

For H3, with an input of  $N$  group = 44,  $\alpha = .05$ ,  $1-\beta = .80$ , we determined a minimum effect size of  $d = 0.38$ . The results from the paired t-test reached effect sizes ( $r = .15$  and  $r = .02$  respectively) which, converted ( $d = 0.30$  and  $d = 0.04$  respectively), fell below this value.

For the additional analyses under H7 and H7a (effects of collective narcissism on either agreement estimation and petition signing), with an input of  $N$  group = 52,  $\alpha = .05$ ,  $1-\beta = .80$ , we determined a minimum effect size of  $d = 0.40$ . The results from the repeated measures ANOVA yielded effect sizes ( $\eta^2_p = 0.004$ ,  $\eta^2_p = 0.003$ , and  $\eta^2_p = 0.27$ , respectively) which corresponded to effect sizes ( $d = 0.13$ ,  $d = 0.12$ , and  $d = 1.23$ ) that partially fell below this value.

This indicates that our study was partially underpowered.

### Appendix 2.3: Exclusion criteria

We first inspected time 1 data to ensure that data which had to be excluded at time 1 did not carry over to time 2. In total, 205 people participated at time 1. Five people did not finish the survey, one person stated that they supported someone else than the Republican or Democratic Party, and one participant suggested that we should not use their data. Since the duration was with 03:43 minutes, just above the set threshold of a minimum of three minutes to complete the study, we decided to exclude the data entry from the data analysis. This resulted in  $N_{t1} = 198$ . We then de-identified participants' Prolific (2023) identity codes by converting them into a continuous participant number (e.g., "p001") and compared time 1 participation with time 2 participation based on these IDs. In total, 150 people participated again. Two people did not finish the survey, one person stated that they voted for someone else than the Republican or Democratic Party, and two participants suggested that we should not use their data. These participants were also under the threshold of three minutes of survey participation, so we decided to exclude them. One further participant (although the survey participation exceeded 26 minutes) suggested that we should not use their data, and we decided not to do so. Subsequently, both data sets were cross-checked to ensure that excluded data in one set was also excluded in the other. Five people showed mismatching party support and were excluded from the data analyses. This resulted in  $N_{t2\_and\_total} = 139$ . Table App. 2.3: 1 provides an overview of the distribution of party support of all final participants.

**Table App. 2.3: 1**

*Party support of  $N = 139$  participants in absolute numbers as expressed on Prolific, at time 1, and at time 2.*

	Identified party affiliation on Prolific Academic	Support t1	Support t2
Republicans	63	52	50 (+ 2 non-voter)
Democrats	76	87	80 (+ 7 non-voter)
Sum	139	139	139

## Appendix 2.4: Further scale information

### *Dependent variables – Wording of collective empowerment items and construct validity*

Drury et al. (2018) elaborated that empowerment is multidimensional and consists of cognitive (group efficacy and perceived instability) as well as affective components (joy at success). The affective component's item wording in study 1 (Drury et al., 2018: "Imagining this event made me feel happy.",  $\lambda = 0.94$ ; and "Imagining this event made me feel joyful.",  $\lambda = 0.97$ ) inspired the item wording for the "joy at success" measure. The combined cognitive component's item wording in study 2 (Drury et al., 2018; "Collective action can change the current system of power and privilege.",  $\lambda = 0.66$ ; and "After thinking of this event, I can imagine the financial system changing.",  $\lambda = 0.87$ ) inspired the item wording for the group efficacy items in the current study.

Due to a two-item construction for each concept, we could not assess the comparative fit index.

### *Moderator – Items and construct validity of support for xenophobia scale*

Since we wanted to capture ongoing issues as timely as possible, we included one item measuring individuals' engagement in an activist movement (here, support for the BLM movement). However, this item (5: "*When I think about the Black Lives Matter movement, I think that all lives matter*") was not considered in calculating construct validity. The CFI, when included, was 0.84 and so below the acceptable threshold of 0.90. Inspecting individual data, we noticed that more participants than expected showed an ambiguous response pattern (i.e., they agreed with both items 5 and 6, see below). We assumed that this was due to unclear item wording, and the CFA confirmed this (see above). We think that the item could be misunderstood and therefore threaten construct validity. Item 6 ("*I support the Black Lives Matter movement*") was consequently also excluded since local fit showed residuals  $> 2$  when included. Both items were excluded in the Cronbach's alpha calculation.

Generally, the scale showed violations of the normality assumption. Since we did not expect the variable to show normality, we calculated the CFI based on robust ML estimation.

### *Other measures – Acquiescent responding*

Additionally, we correlated four items of two item pairs that were opposingly worded to test for acquiescent responding. Considering reverse item wording, a negative correlation would have indicated an inconsistent response pattern, however, both correlations were positive ( $r_{\text{item3\&4}} = .25$ ;  $r_{\text{item5\&6}} = .49$ ). We could therefore exclude the possibility of inconsistent responding.

### Appendix 2.5a: Main measures with items

Party support time 1: *Which party are you planning to support in the US presidential election 2020?*

- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Other

Party support time 2: *Which party did you vote for in the US presidential election 2020?*

- Democratic Party
- Republican Party
- Other
- I did not vote.

Assessing (un)expectedness: *How likely is it that the party you are voting for will win the election?*

- Extremely likely
- Moderately likely
- Slightly likely
- Neither likely nor unlikely
- Slightly unlikely
- Moderately unlikely
- Extremely unlikely

Collective narcissism: *Please think about **the American people** as your group when you respond to the statements below. Please indicate to what extent you agree or*

*disagree with these statements using the following scale: "Strongly agree" to "Strongly disagree".*

*American people deserve special treatment.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*I will never be satisfied until American people get all they deserve.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*It really makes me angry when others criticize American people.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*If American people had a major say in the world, the world would be a much better place.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*Not many people seem to fully understand the importance of American people.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

Assessing support for xenophobia: *Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly Disagree”.*

*It would be ok for me if my child married a person of color.*

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

*It would be ok for me if my child married a person that immigrated to America.*

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

*To be truly American you have to be White.*

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

*America has benefited from diversity.*

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

*When I think about the Black Lives Matter movement, I think that all lives matter.* (not used for analyses, see Appendix 2)

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

*I support the Black Lives Matter movement.* (not used for analyses, see Appendix 2)

- Strongly agree
- Tend to agree
- Tend to disagree
- Strongly disagree

Secure ingroup identification: Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.

*I feel a bond with Americans.*

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

*I feel solidarity with Americans.*

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

*I feel committed to Americans.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*I am glad to be American.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*I think that Americans have a lot to be proud of.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*It is pleasant to be American.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*Being American gives me a good feeling.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*I often think about the fact that I am American.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*The fact that I am American is an important part of my identity.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*Being American is an important part of how I see myself.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

Collective empowerment: *Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.*

*The US presidential election 2020 makes me feel joyful.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*The US presidential election 2020 makes me feel excited.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*Thinking about the US presidential election 2020, I believe that we Americans can change society.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

*Thinking about the US presidential election 2020, I believe that we Americans can realize our values.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree

Pluralistic ignorance: Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Extremely comfortable” to “Extremely uncomfortable”.

*How comfortable do **you** feel with carrying a weapon if you lived in a diverse neighborhood?*

- ☐ Extremely comfortable
- ☐ Moderately comfortable
- ☐ Slightly comfortable
- ☐ Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
- ☐ Slightly uncomfortable
- ☐ Moderately uncomfortable
- ☐ Extremely uncomfortable

*How comfortable does **the average American** feel with carrying a weapon if they lived in a diverse neighborhood?*

- Extremely comfortable
- Moderately comfortable
- Slightly comfortable
- Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
- Slightly uncomfortable
- Moderately uncomfortable
- Extremely uncomfortable

*How comfortable do **you** feel with doing whatever it takes to protect yourself and other Americans?*

- Extremely comfortable
- Moderately comfortable
- Slightly comfortable
- Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
- Slightly uncomfortable
- Moderately uncomfortable
- Extremely uncomfortable

*How comfortable does **the average American** feel with doing whatever it takes to protect themselves and other Americans?*

- Extremely comfortable
- Moderately comfortable
- Slightly comfortable
- Neither comfortable nor uncomfortable
- Slightly uncomfortable
- Moderately uncomfortable
- Extremely uncomfortable

False consensus: Please select the statement that best represents your agreement with the following questions from “Strongly agree” to “Strongly disagree”.

*Harsh measures against immigrants and refugees are necessary.*

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

*Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider American public that agree/ disagree with you.*

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider American public agree with me.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider American public disagree with me.

*Social policies such as affirmative action discriminate unfairly against White people.*

- Strongly agree
- Agree
- Somewhat agree
- Neither agree nor disagree
- Somewhat disagree
- Disagree
- Strongly disagree

*Please estimate the percentage of people in the wider American public that agree/ disagree with you.*

\_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public agree with me.  
 \_\_\_\_\_ I think that ... % of the wider public disagree with me.

Behavioural measures: *Would you sign this petition?* (see Appendix 4a)

- Yes
- No

*How much of your participation reward (£0.84) would you donate to support this petition? **Please note that the answer option is displayed IN CENT (= 0 to 84 Cent).***

I would donate € \_\_\_\_\_ of my reward to support this petition.  
of my reward to support this petition.


*I would publicly share that I support this petition, for example on Facebook.*

- ☐ Strongly agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Strongly disagree


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# Mass immigration. Special protection. Guilt-tripping. Enough is enough!



Source: Thomas Photography/Getty Images

 Freedom for White America started this petition to Americans, Whites

Freedom for White America is a non-profit activist organization founded on September 21, 2019, by concerned White American citizens.

Our agenda is determined by representing the political and societal interests of honorable White Americans and by our striving to make America our land again. We believe that we have waited long enough in line to rightfully get what we deserve.


But why have we been waiting for so long? Because we have been cheated on!

Immigrants colonize our country and cut in line, affirmative action takes place at our expense, and on top of that, we are told to accept everyone's pride except ours. These are just a few examples of the injustice that the honorable White American has to face.

Enough is enough. It is time to fight back! We want an America that is recognizable to us again. Make America our land again!

If you share our vision for a better America, we strongly encourage you to sign our petition and support us. Only as a strong base, we can collectively fight back!

*Freedom for White America*

 Mass immigration. Special protection. Guilt-tripping. Enough...

Share on Facebook

Send a Facebook message

Send an email to friends

Tweet to your followers

Copy link

☐ Display my name and comment on this petition

Sign this petition

## **Appendix 2.6: Procedure**

### ***Procedure: Time of data collection***

Millions of eligible voters changed their voting habits due to COVID-19, which resulted in a significant number of votes that had not been counted yet on the day after election day (e.g., Mayes & Rabinowitz, 2020). Therefore, we decided to wait with wave 2 data collection until it became clearer who would become president-elect. On Friday, November 13, Biden won the majority of counts in Georgia, which was a crucial step towards winning the election. We decided to start data collection for wave 2 the following week (November 17). On Friday, November 20, it was confirmed that Biden would keep the majority after the recount of votes (Francisco & Singh, 2020). We decided to end the data collection the following week. On November 23, after 74% of wave 1 participants had participated in wave 2, we closed the poll.

### ***Procedure: Information and consent***

All participants in both surveys were provided with an information and consent form explicitly explaining the recruitment, procedures, and the occurrence of potentially provocative questions before taking part. Participants were assured that we did not expect their well-being to be negatively affected, however, they could contact the researchers beforehand in case of any concerns. We informed participants that although personal special category information (ethnicity, political affiliation) would be collected, no information was obtained that could personally identify them (we assumed that participants could have been reluctant to take part if they were personally identifiable due to the sensitive topics the survey touches on). Participants furthermore took part in the survey with their unique Prolific ID, which does not allow for obtaining any identifiable information. They were informed about this, along with the information that the study will be conducted according to GDPR 2018, as well as voluntary study participation. Once completed, participants were compensated with £0.84/ (which equalled \$1.09)/ survey for their participation (based on £5.04/ hour, which is the minimum requirement for compensations on Prolific Academic). Participants were paid for their participation in survey one even if they did not participate in survey 2. After they had explicitly declared that they understood the instructions, they were presented with an online questionnaire assessing the variables described above. Participants were fully debriefed about the fictionality of the petition after survey 2 (or in case the participant dropped out, individually using Prolific's anonymous messaging platform) together with the information that whether they indicated to sign, donate or share, had no consequences.

**Appendix 2.7: Preparatory steps*****Coding non-voters***

Since voting is only one measure to assess a party supporter's identity, we treated nine people who reported not having voted at t2 as party supporters according to their stated t1 party support.

## **Appendix 2.8: Collective narcissism, secure ingroup identification, and empowerment**

We noticed that the relationships between collective narcissism and the collective empowerment concepts, and the relationship between secure ingroup identification and the collective empowerment concepts, were asymmetric: Collective narcissism significantly correlated with joy at success but not with group efficacy when secure ingroup identification was accounted for, and secure ingroup identification significantly correlated with group efficacy but not with joy at success when collective narcissism was accounted for. We believe this is worth investigating further in future studies since it might reveal an important link between collective narcissism and schadenfreude in the context of collective empowerment and between a secure ingroup identification and the belief in the group's efficacy.

## Appendix 2.9: Further information on hypotheses testing and exploratory analyses.

### *Hypothesis 1 – Harsh treatment of immigrants and refugees*

The tests were repeated without outliers and resulted in (i: Approval) Republicans ( $M = 3.90$ ,  $SD = 1.55$ ) vs Democrats ( $M = 1.72$ ,  $SD = 1.01$ ). The difference was significant with  $t(69.95) = -8.76$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .72$ ; (ii: Agreement perception) Republicans ( $M = 61.56$ ,  $SD = 13.54$ ) vs Democrats ( $M = 57.19$ ,  $SD = 14.10$ ). The difference was marginally significant  $t(111.15) = -1.81$ ,  $p = .07$ ,  $r = .17$ .

We based all analyses in the H1 examination on a two-tailed independent  $t$ -test.

### *Hypothesis 3*

Removing one outlier which was detected in prior analyses did not alter this result.

### *Exploratory: Hypothesis 6*

**Table App. 2.9: 1**

*Descriptive statistics for DV petition sharing and donation among Republicans to whom the election outcome came unexpectedly, grouped by time*

DV	Time	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Share petition	1	1	7	5.00	2.28
	2	2	6	3.86	1.68
Donation	1	0	84	23.00	32.74
	2	0	69	26.14	27.76

### *Exploratory: PI amongst those that expected a victory for the Democratic Party*

We inspected the data of a subset of Democrat supporters that had expected an electoral victory. We did so to examine whether their perception of violence comfort in others after the election would be equally high or less compared to their perception before. We assumed that the perception of others' comfort with violence amongst these supporters was lower to start with (i.e., before the election) compared to Democrat supporters that had not expected a victory. We assumed that, therefore, there would be no significant difference between perceived and own comfort at time 1. However, on average, these supporters still perceived others' comfort with carrying a weapon if living in a diverse neighbourhood ( $M = 4.21$ ,  $SD = 1.59$ ) as significantly greater than their own ( $M = 2.59$ ,  $SD = 1.83$ ),  $t(72) = -8.37$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .70$ . Subsequently, we compared the comfort perception before the election ( $M = 4.21$ ,  $SD = 1.59$ ) with the one after the election ( $M = 4.55$ ,  $SD = 1.42$ ) which resulted in a non-significant effect,  $t(72) = -1.68$ ,  $p = .10$ ,  $r = .19$ . Similarly, these supporters also still perceived others to be significantly more comfortable with doing whatever it takes to protect oneself and other

Americans ( $M = 5.03$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ) than themselves ( $M = 3.68$ ,  $SD = 1.82$ ),  $t(72) = -11.18$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $r = .80$  at time 1. When compared to after the election, others' perceived comfort before the election ( $M = 5.03$ ,  $SD = 1.36$ ) was, again, not significantly different to the perceived comfort after the election ( $M = 4.95$ ,  $SD = 1.49$ ),  $t(72) = 0.48$ ,  $p = .63$ ,  $r = .06$ . Thus, the pattern for PI for violence amongst Democrats remained unchanged since we found it even amongst those Democrats that had expected a victory.

## References (Appendix 2)

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## Appendix 3 – Supplementary Material Chapter 4

### Appendix 3.1: Certificate of ethical approval

Figure App. 3.1: 1

*Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/10 of corresponding paper Chapter 4*



Sciences & Technology C-REC  
crecsitec@admin.susx.ac.uk

Certificate of Approval	
<b>Reference Number</b>	ER/CH527/10
<b>Title Of Project</b>	The Role of Collective Empowerment Experience in Right-Wing Collective Action
<b>Principal Investigator (PI):</b>	John Drury
<b>Student</b>	Carina Hoerst
<b>Collaborators</b>	
<b>Duration Of Approval</b>	8 months
<b>Expected Start Date</b>	10-Jun-2021
<b>Date Of Approval</b>	10-Jun-2021
<b>Approval Expiry Date</b>	31-Jan-2022
<b>Approved By</b>	Karen Long
<b>Name of Authorised Signatory</b>	Lauren Shukru
<b>Date</b>	10-Jun-2021

\*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

**Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:**

**Amendments to protocol**

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**Monitoring of Approved studies**

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(1) An "adverse event" is one that occurs during the course of a research protocol that either causes physical or psychological harm, or increases the risk of physical or psychological harm, or results in a loss of privacy and/or confidentiality to research participant or others.

(2) An "unexpected event" is an occurrence or situation during the course of a research project that was a) harmful to a participant taking part in the research, or b) increased the probability of harm to participants taking part in the research.

(3) <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rqi/policy/research-policy>

### **Appendix 3.2: Codebook (empowerment)**

#### ***Consensus***

- Definition: The speaker's statement that there is widespread or universal agreement with their opinion (Drury & Reicher, 1999; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000)
- FALSE consensus definition: the process by which people (mis)perceive others to share their own (extreme or controversial) attitudes, beliefs, and actions (Ross et al., 1977)
- Examples:
  - "Everyone thinks the same"
  - "We are on the same side"
  - Sharing the same opinion/ beliefs/ interests
  - Agreement, acceptance
  - Supporting the same people and institutions
  - Observational: nodding, clapping, thumbs up, hand shaking

#### ***Unity***

- Definition: A sense of togetherness (Drury et al., 2003, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2009; Reicher, 1996; Stott & Drury, 2000)
- Examples:
  - "There was a strong sense of togetherness, we felt as one"
  - "The whole crowd was with each other"
  - "We were a united force".
  - "We are acting collectively".
  - "We are all the same."
  - Having a common cause
  - Feelings of solidarity
  - Acting or feeling "together"
  - Agreeing on the same targets
  - Observational: Using the same verbal expressions, moving in the same direction, doing the same gestures, wearing the same clothes, signs and flags showing the same or similar expressions/ pictures

#### ***Expected support***

- Definition: "the expectation that helping behaviours or other forms of support (e.g. emotional/ moral, informational) would be provided when needed" (Drury et al., 2016, p. 211, see also: 2005; Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005, 2009)
- Examples (always linked to unity):
  - "If I needed back up, others would be there."
  - "I felt that others were on my side."
  - "People were cheering us on" (see Reicher, 1996 Westminster Bridge; Stott & Drury, 2000)

- “You are sure that you have enough people that are also doing it.”
- “I knew they were supporting me/ the action because they cheered/ chanted.”
- Increase in feeling supported for action taking
- Speaking in terms of “everyone else is doing it”
- Increased likelihood that people join activity
- Others are cooperative
- Support has become the norm
- Observational: Increase in “bold” action taking (observed or perceived), e.g., breaking barriers, speaking out and/ or aloud, fighting, facing/provoking, “collective condemnation [...] and chanting”

### ***Group efficacy***

- Definition: “the belief that the group is able to improve their situation through collective effort” (van Zomeren et al., 2004, p. 651; see also: Drury & Reicher, 2009; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019)
- Examples:
  - “I felt we could make a difference.”
  - “I felt we could take back control.”
  - “I felt we could change this society.”
  - “I felt we could make foreigners leave the country.”
  - Feeling able to change/ challenge/ influence/ confront/ resist existing relations
  - Coining action successful (even if is not objectively)
  - “The protests of this social movement can generate social change.”
  - “... are effective to build an oppositional movement.”
  - “... can help to generate solidarity among people.”
  - (External response: Increased seriousness of situation, leading to enhanced means to counter protestors/ perpetrators during or afterwards)
  - Observational: Claiming territory, (physically) marking the “common” space

### ***Emotions***

- Excitement, pride, joy, exhilaration (Drury & Reicher, 1999, 2005; Stott & Drury, 2000)
- Examples:
  - Joy at support; e.g ‘it felt great that people were behind me’
  - Joy at participation: “It felt great to actually try to do something.”
  - Joy at outcomes: “I felt great when I saw the broken window.”
  - Feeling joyful, uplifted, excited, inspired, experiencing as life-enhancing
  - Observational: Laughing, cheering, playing music, singing, dancing

### ***Perceived instability***

- Definition: When one perceives that the system or social relations are changeable. (Tajfel & Turner, 1979; see also: Drury & Reicher, 1999; Drury et al., 2020; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019)
- Examples:
  - “I think there was a certain amount of vulnerability there”
  - “After this, I believed that the liberal elite won’t rule for ever. The system might change.”
  - “I think changing society is possible.”
  -

***Collective self-objectification (CSO)***

- Definition: “When one’s action serves to change the world to reflect one’s identity in this way [...] that one’s group is indeed an active and powerful subject.” (Drury & Reicher, 2009, p. 718)
- Examples:
  - “Our success in being in control of the streets was an expression of our values and identity.”
  - Being in control
  - Turn existing world ‘upside down’
  - Disrupt or at least disturb existing relations
  - Resisting existing relations

### Appendix 3.3: Codebook (collective grievances)

#### *Group-based grievances*

- Definition: “People’s subjective experience of injustice in terms of group-based inequality or deprivation” (van Zomeren et al., 2008, p. 506)
- Examples (van Zomeren et al., 2004, p. 652, 2008, p. 513)
  - “I think the way we are treated by [out-group] is unfair”
  - “I feel angry/ irritated/ displeased because ...”

#### *Anger*

- Examples (Becker et al., 2011)
  - “I feel angry/ irritated/ displeased because ...” (see above)
  - “I am mad at...” (p. 1590)
  - “I am in rage towards...” (p. 1590)

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## Appendix 4 – Supplementary Material Chapter 5

### Appendix 4.1: Certificate of ethical approval

Figure App. 4.1: 1

*Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/12 pilot study Chapter 5*



Sciences & Technology C-REC  
crecscitec@admin.susx.ac.uk

Certificate of Approval	
<b>Reference Number</b>	ER/CH527/12
<b>Title Of Project</b>	A pilot study: Does mockery discourage support intentions among those undecided via decreased perceived efficacy?
<b>Principal Investigator (PI):</b>	John Drury
<b>Student</b>	Carina Hoerst
<b>Collaborators</b>	
<b>Duration Of Approval</b>	12 months
<b>Expected Start Date</b>	20-Jan-2022
<b>Date Of Approval</b>	20-Jan-2022
<b>Approval Expiry Date</b>	31-Dec-2022
<b>Approved By</b>	Karen Long
<b>Name of Authorised Signatory</b>	Lauren Shukru
<b>Date</b>	20-Jan-2022

\*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

**Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:**

**Amendments to protocol**

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**Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects**

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**Monitoring of Approved studies**

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(2) An "unexpected event" is an occurrence or situation during the course of a research project that was a) harmful to a participant taking part in the research, or b) increased the probability of harm to participants taking part in the research.

(3) <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rqi/policy/research-policy>

**Figure App. 4.1: 2***Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/13 Experiment 2 Chapter 5*

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Certificate of Approval	
<b>Reference Number</b>	ER/CH527/13
<b>Title Of Project</b>	Main study 1: Does mockery of a group discourage those undecided and those highly aligned to support it via decreased perceived efficacy and legitimacy?
<b>Principal Investigator (PI):</b>	John Drury
<b>Student</b>	Carina Hoerst
<b>Collaborators</b>	
<b>Duration Of Approval</b>	11 months
<b>Expected Start Date</b>	06-May-2022
<b>Date Of Approval</b>	06-May-2022
<b>Approval Expiry Date</b>	31-Mar-2023
<b>Approved By</b>	Karen Long
<b>Name of Authorised Signatory</b>	Lauren Shukru
<b>Date</b>	06-May-2022

\*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

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(3) <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rqi/policy/research-policy>

**Figure App. 4.1: 3***Certificate of ethical approval ER/CH527/14 Experiment 1 Chapter 5*

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Certificate of Approval	
<b>Reference Number</b>	ER/CH527/14
<b>Title Of Project</b>	Main study 2: Does mockery of a group discourage those undecided and those highly aligned to support it via decreased perceived efficacy and legitimacy?
<b>Principal Investigator (PI):</b>	John Drury
<b>Student</b>	Carina Hoerst
<b>Collaborators</b>	
<b>Duration Of Approval</b>	12 months
<b>Expected Start Date</b>	24-Aug-2022
<b>Date Of Approval</b>	24-Aug-2022
<b>Approval Expiry Date</b>	31-Jul-2023
<b>Approved By</b>	Vacancy
<b>Name of Authorised Signatory</b>	Lauren Shukru (approved by Bryan Singer)
<b>Date</b>	24-Aug-2022

\*NB. If the actual project start date is delayed beyond 12 months of the expected start date, this Certificate of Approval will lapse and the project will need to be reviewed again to take account of changed circumstances such as legislation, sponsor requirements and University procedures.

**Please note and follow the requirements for approved submissions:**

**Amendments to protocol**

- \* Any changes or amendments to approved protocols must be submitted to the C-REC for authorisation prior to implementation.

**Feedback regarding the status and conduct of approved projects**

- \* Any incidents with ethical implications that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported immediately to the Chair of the C-REC.

**Feedback regarding any adverse(1) and unexpected events(2)**

- \* Any adverse (undesirable and unintended) and unexpected events that occur during the implementation of the project must be reported to the Chair of the Science and Technology C-REC. In the event of a serious adverse event, research must be stopped immediately and the Chair alerted within 24 hours of the occurrence.

**Monitoring of Approved studies**

The University may undertake periodic monitoring of approved studies. Researchers will be requested to report on the outcomes of research activity in relation to approvals that were granted (full applications and amendments).

**Research Standards**

Failure to conduct University research in alignment with the Code of Practice for Research may be investigated under the Procedure for the Investigation of Allegations of Misconduct in Research or other appropriate internal mechanisms (3). Any queries can be addressed to the Research Governance Office: rgoffice@sussex.ac.uk

(1) An "adverse event" is one that occurs during the course of a research protocol that either causes physical or psychological harm, or increases the risk of physical or psychological harm, or results in a loss of privacy and/or confidentiality to research participant or others.

(2) An "unexpected event" is an occurrence or situation during the course of a research project that was a) harmful to a participant taking part in the research, or b) increased the probability of harm to participants taking part in the research.

(3) <http://www.sussex.ac.uk/staff/research/rqi/policy/research-policy>

## Appendix 4.2: Participants

Across all three surveys, we welcomed all gender identities and did not restrict (nor query) the sample regarding employment status or income level.

In the pilot study ( $N = 198$ ), the average age across all political affiliations was 40.96 years ( $SD = 12.63$ ). The distribution based on political affiliation was the following: 57 participants were left affiliated ( $M_{age} = 39$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.5$ ); 47 were centre affiliated ( $M_{age} = 40.4$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.4$ ); 53 were right affiliated ( $M_{age} = 47.2$ ,  $SD_{age} = 13.2$ ); and 41 were not affiliated ( $M_{age} = 36.2$ ,  $SD_{age} = 9.12$ ).

In Experiment 1 ( $N = 429$ ), the average age across all political affiliations was 42.42 years ( $SD = 12.65$ ). The distribution based on political affiliation was the following: 121 participants were left affiliated ( $M_{age} = 38.3$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.5$ ); 128 were centre affiliated ( $M_{age} = 43$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.6$ ); 105 participants were right affiliated ( $M_{age} = 48.3$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.2$ ); and 75 participants were not specifically affiliated ( $M_{age} = 39.7$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11.7$ ). Among left affiliated, the majority identified as women (74), followed by identifying as men (44), three further expressed to be genderqueer or non-conforming (1), a transwoman (1) and having a different identity (1). Among people affiliated with the centre, the majority identified as women (78), followed by identifying as men (49). One further person preferred to say their gender identity. Among people affiliated with the right, the majority expressed to identify as men (63), followed by identifying as women (42). Among the non-affiliated participants, the majority identified as women (54), followed by those identifying as men (21). The allocation to conditions was the following: Control: 142 participants; experimental condition 1: 144; experimental condition 2: 143) and constituted a balanced political representation in each condition (control: 40 left affiliated; 43 centre affiliated; 34 right affiliated; 25 non-affiliated; experimental condition 1: 41 left affiliated; 42 centre affiliated; 36 right affiliated; 25 non-affiliated; experimental condition 2: 40 left affiliated; 43 centre affiliated; 35 right affiliated; 25 non-affiliated).

In Experiment 2 ( $N = 360$ ), the average age across all political affiliations was 38.79 years ( $SD = 11.65$ ). The distribution based on political affiliation was the following: 92 participants were left affiliated ( $M_{age} = 35.2$ ,  $SD_{age} = 9.71$ ); 102 participants were centre affiliated ( $M_{age} = 40$ ,  $SD_{age} = 12.3$ ); 79 participants were right affiliated ( $M_{age} = 45.5$ ,  $SD_{age} = 11$ ); and 87 were not affiliated ( $M_{age} = 35$ ,  $SD_{age} = 10.4$ ).

In main study 1, we also assessed gender identity. In total, 251 participants identified as women, 107 identified as men, and two participants indicated to rather not mentioned their gender identity. Among left affiliated, 68 identified as women, and 24 as men; among the centre affiliated, 76 identified as women, 25 as men, and one participant wished not to mention their gender identity; among the right affiliated, 38 identified as women, and 41 as men; and among the non-affiliated, 69 identified as woman, 17 as man, and one participant wished not to mention their gender identity. The allocation to conditions involved both matching and random assignment: To eliminate systematic differences based on political affiliation, we allocated a balanced ratio of all affiliations to each condition; however, the subsequent allocation was random. This resulted in the following distribution: Control: 121 participants; experimental condition 1: 121; experimental condition 2: 118. Per condition, the distribution was: Control: 30 left affiliated; 35 centre affiliated; 26 right affiliated; 30 non-affiliated; experimental condition 1: 31 left affiliated; 34 centre affiliated; 27 right affiliated; 29 non-affiliated; experimental condition 2: 31 left affiliated; 33 centre affiliated; 26 right affiliated; 28 non-affiliated).

## Appendix 4.3: Survey items

### *Pilot study*

#### Introduction party

**In the following, we will present you with an online article extract that we derived from a newspaper. Please read it carefully.**

The National Trust's director general Emily McCrady said: "While this way, campaigners of the only recently founded [New Forum] party argue, their suggested novel border policy, "can save our country's precious resources and prevent rapid overpopulation from the get-go".

New Forum further states that if their suggested policy came to force, it would grant asylum only based on "matching cultural values and required skills". This way, campaigners claim, "our hard-working men and women in the country [would be protected] from the inefficient and liberal immigration policies that are currently in place".

#### Self-categorisation

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

I have a lot in common with the average New Forum person.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I am similar to the average New Forum person.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I endorse New Forum's cause.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

#### Baseline condition

**In the following, we present you with the continuation of the article that you were just presented with. Please read it carefully.**

New Forum campaigners successfully gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday and held a public rally. They discussed their suggested border policy and appealed to the audience to vote for them in the next election. “They [New Forum campaigners] were really able to tell people what they had to say, you know,” said Adam M. who witnessed the rally.

The National must be set out how to become a great nation again.

#### Efficacy

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

I think that New Forum can generate change in social policies.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that New Forum will be able to achieve its goal.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that New Forum is effective in influencing policy makers.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that overall New Forum's event was well organized.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that New Forum's event organizers planned their event well.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Stereotype content - competence**

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

As viewed by society, how competent are members of New Forum?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Somewhat incompetent
- ☐ Neither competent, nor incompetent
- ☐ Somewhat competent
- ☐ Extremely

As viewed by society, how capable are members of New Forum?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Somewhat incapable
- ☐ Neither capable, nor incapable
- ☐ Somewhat capable
- ☐ Extremely

### Legitimacy

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

New Forum is a socially relevant party.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

New Forum is a legitimate party.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

New Forum is a credible party.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

### Support

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

I would vote for New Forum.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

### Manipulation check (efficacy)

**In the following, we would like you to compare five scenarios and to answer the subsequent questions based upon this comparison.**

Scenario 1: *"New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally which, however, got interrupted by counter-protestors. While trying to discuss their suggested border policy and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, counter-protestors shouted the campaigners down. 'They [New Forum campaigners] were not really able to tell people what they had to say, you know', said Adam M. who witnessed the rally." [...]*

In scenario 1, New Forum was able to freely express its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

In scenario 1, New Forum organized and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Scenario 2: *"New Forum campaigners successfully gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday and held a rally. They discussed their suggested border policy and appealed to the audience to vote for them in the next election. 'They [New Forum campaigners] were really able to tell people what they had to say, you know', said Adam M. who witnessed the rally." [...]*

In scenario 2, New Forum was able to freely express its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

In scenario 2, New Forum organized and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Scenario 3: *"New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally. While trying to discuss their suggested border policy and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, they got interrupted by counter-protestors loudly playing trumpets and dancing. " [...]*

In scenario 3, New Forum was able to freely express its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

In scenario 3, New Forum organized and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Scenario 4: *"New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally. While trying to discuss their suggested border policy and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, they got interrupted by counter-protestors loudly shouting slogans from signs they made, like 'Superman was a refugee' or 'I can't believe I still have to protest this s\*\*t'." [...]*

In scenario 4, New Forum was able to freely express its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

In scenario 4, New Forum organized and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Scenario 5: *"New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally. While trying to discuss their suggested border policies and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, they got interrupted by counter-protestors throwing milkshakes at campaigners."* [...]

In scenario 5, New Forum was able to freely express its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

In scenario 5, New Forum organized and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Manipulation check (humorous counter protest)**

**In the following three scenarios, we would like you to focus on the action undertaken by counter-protestors. Please rate how funny you find the counter actions presented to you in each scenario.**

Scenario 1: *"New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally. While trying to discuss their suggested border policy and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, they got interrupted by counter-protestors loudly playing trumpets and dancing. " [...]*

I found the counter action funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

The counter action made me laugh.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Scenario 2: *"New Forum campaigners gather near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally. While trying to discuss their suggested border policy and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, they got interrupted by counter-protestors loudly shouting slogans from signs they made, like 'Superman was a refugee' or 'I can't believe I still have to protest this s\*\*t'." [...]*

I found the counter action funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

The counter action made me laugh.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Scenario 3: *"New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally. While trying to discuss their suggested border policies and to appeal to the audience to vote for them in the next election, they got interrupted by counter-protestors throwing milkshakes at campaigners."*

I found the counter action funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

The counter action made me laugh.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

## ***Experiment 1***

### **Introduction movement**

**In the following, we will present you with a brief extract taken from an online newspaper article. Please read it carefully. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text)**

the country's economy, ensuring growth of reaching net zero by 2050.

Campaigners of the recently founded New Forum party suggest a novel border policy and argue that it “can save our country’s precious resources and prevent rapid overpopulation”.

New Forum further states that if their suggested policy came into force, it would only grant asylum based on “matching cultural values and required skills”. This way, campaigners claim, “our hard-working men and women in the country [would be protected] from the inefficient and liberal immigration policies that are currently in place”.

---

**Recommended**

### **Self-categorization**

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

-----

I have a lot in common with the average New Forum member.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
- 


I am similar to the average New Forum member.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Control condition**

**In the following, we present you with a continuation of the article you have just seen. Please read it carefully and answer the following questions based on the**


**information provided to you. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text).**



---


New Forum campaigners successfully gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday and held a public rally. They discussed their suggested border policies and appealed to people in the crowd to vote for them in the next election. “They [New Forum campaigners] were really able to tell people what they had to say, you know”, said Adam M., who witnessed the rally.

---



#### Experimental condition 1


**In the following, we present you with a continuation of the article you have just seen. Please read it carefully and answer the following questions based on the information provided to you. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text).**



---

New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally which, however, was interrupted by counter-protestors. New Forum campaigners tried to discuss their suggested border policy and appeal to people in the crowd to vote for them in the next election. “They [New Forum campaigners] were not really able to tell people what they had to say, you know, I heard counter-protesters shouting the campaigners down”, said Adam M., who witnessed the rally.

---



#### Experimental condition 2

**In the following, we present you with a continuation of the article you have just seen. Please read it carefully and answer the following questions based on the information provided to you. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract**

**begins mid-text).**



New Forum campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday attempting to hold a public rally which, however, was interrupted by counter-protestors. New Forum campaigners tried to discuss their suggested border policy and appeal to people in the crowd to vote for them in the next election. “They [New Forum campaigners] were not really able to tell people what they had to say, you know, I heard counter-protesters playing trumpets loudly and saw them dancing”, said Adam M. who witnessed the rally.



### Efficacy

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

I think that New Forum is able to organise its events well.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that choosing the capital as rally location was a good idea.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
- 

I think New Forum's event organisers are able to plan their events well.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
-

I think that members chose a good name ("New Forum") for the party.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Stereotype content - competence**

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

As viewed by society, how generous are members of New Forum?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Somewhat ungenerous
- ☐ Neither generous nor ungenerous
- ☐ Somewhat generous
- ☐ Extremely

As viewed by society, how competent are members of New Forum?

- ☐ Not at all
  - ☐ Somewhat incompetent
  - ☐ Neither competent, nor incompetent
  - ☐ Somewhat competent
  - ☐ Extremely
- 

As viewed by society, how educated are members of New Forum?

- ☐ Not at all
  - ☐ Somewhat uneducated
  - ☐ Neither educated nor uneducated
  - ☐ Somewhat educated
  - ☐ Extremely
- 

As viewed by society, how capable are members of New Forum?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Somewhat incapable
- ☐ Neither capable, nor incapable
- ☐ Somewhat capable
- ☐ Extremely

## Legitimacy

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

---

New Forum is a modern movement.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
-

New Forum is a socially relevant party.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
- 

New Forum is a legitimate movement.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
-

New Forum is a trustworthy movement.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
- 

New Forum is a credible movement.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Support**

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

---

I would subscribe to New Forum's newsletter if they had one.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
- 

I would vote for New Forum.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
-

I would tell a friend and/ or my family about New Forum.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

#### Manipulation checks efficacy

Please answer the following questions based on New Forum's event.

-----

New Forum freely expressed its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
-

New Forum organised and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

#### Manipulation check humour

Please answer the following questions based on the counter-protest (protesters playing trumpets and dancing).

-----

I found the counter-protest funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
  - ☐ Disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat disagree
  - ☐ Neither agree, nor disagree
  - ☐ Somewhat agree
  - ☐ Agree
  - ☐ Strongly agree
- 

I think that others would find the counter-protest funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree, nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

## Experiment 2

### Introduction movement

**In the following, we will present you with a brief extract taken from an online newspaper article. Please read it carefully. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text)**

... tree-planting programme across a portfolio of 10.5 million acres, to help.

Campaigners belonging to the recently founded Switched On movement demand for blue-light services to equip their vehicles with additional light bars.

Blue-light services, such as ambulances, fire engines and police, need to navigate through traffic safe and quick. To make their environment aware of their arrival, they rely on sirens and blue light. With the noise level of sirens under scrutiny to endanger physical and mental health, Switched On advocates for a novel solution which, the campaigners argue, "can help to tone down the noise level, and keep alert levels high".

Switched On demands an increase in the extent to which emergency services equip their vehicles with light, in concrete; to add running light bars to the vehicles' sides. They argue that this would allow emergency services to continue to alert the environment while improving the safety for those in and outside the vehicles.

---

**Recommended**

### Self-categorization

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**



I have a lot in common with the average Switched On member.


- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I am similar to the average Switched On member.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Control condition**


**In the following, we present you with the continuation of the article that you were just presented with. Please read it carefully and answer the following questions based on the information provided to you. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text).**



---


Switched On campaigners successfully gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday and held a rally. They demonstrated on a dummy vehicle how the suggested light bars would work and appealed to people in the crowd to sign a petition supporting the movement. “They [Switched On campaigners] were really able to tell people what they had to say, you know”, said Adam M. who witnessed the rally.

---



### Experimental condition 1


**In the following, we present you with the continuation of the article that you were just presented with. Please read it carefully and answer the following questions based on the information provided to you. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text).**



---

Switched On campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday, trying to hold a rally which, however, got interrupted by counter protestors. Campaigners tried to demonstrate on a dummy vehicle how the suggested light bars would work, and to appeal to people in the crowd to sign a petition supporting the movement. “They [Switched On campaigners] were not really able to tell people what they had to say, you know, I heard counter protestors shouting the campaigners down”, says Adam M. who witnessed the rally.

---



### Experimental condition 2

**In the following, we present you with the continuation of the article that you were just presented with. Please read it carefully and answer the following questions based on the information provided to you. (You will only see a part of the text since the extract begins mid-text).**



Switched On campaigners gathered near a major junction in the capital last Saturday, trying to hold a rally which, however, got interrupted by creative counter protestors. Campaigners tried to demonstrate on a dummy vehicle how the suggested light bars would work, and to appeal to people in the crowd to sign a petition supporting the movement. “They [Switched On campaigners] were not really able to tell people what they had to say, you know, I heard counter-protestors playing trumpets loudly and saw them dancing”, says Adam M. who witnessed the rally.

P

### Efficacy

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

I think that overall Switched On's event was well organised.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that Switched On's event organisers planned their event well.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Stereotype content - competence**

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

As viewed by society, how competent are members of Switched On?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Somewhat incompetent
- ☐ Neither competent, nor incompetent
- ☐ Somewhat competent
- ☐ Extremely

As viewed by society, how capable are members of Switched On?

- ☐ Not at all
- ☐ Somewhat incapable
- ☐ Neither capable, nor incapable
- ☐ Somewhat capable
- ☐ Extremely

### Legitimacy

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

Switched On is a socially relevant party.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Switched On is a legitimate movement.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Switched On is a credible movement.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

### Support

**Please answer the following questions based on the extract you just read.**

I would sign Switched On's petition.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Manipulation checks efficacy**

Please answer the following questions based on Switched On's event.

Switched On was able to freely express its ideas and agenda to an audience.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

Switched On organised and held its rally successfully.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

#### Manipulation check humour

Please answer the following questions based on the counteraction (protesters playing music and dancing).

I found the counteraction funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

I think that others would find the counteraction funny.

- ☐ Strongly disagree
- ☐ Disagree
- ☐ Somewhat disagree
- ☐ Neither agree nor disagree
- ☐ Somewhat agree
- ☐ Agree
- ☐ Strongly agree

**Manipulation check background knowledge**

We are almost done. Please briefly tell us, what do you think the purpose of this survey was.

---

#### **Appendix 4.4: Deviations from pre-registrations**

For the sake of presentation in this study, we reversed the order of the experiments compared to how they were chronologically conducted. Therefore, “Experiment 1” in this study refers to “main study 2” in the pre-registration, and “Experiment 2” to “main study 1”.

##### ***Experiment 1***

We said that we would inspect scatterplots of the individual recreated regressions underlying the mediation and conditional process models. However, due to the categorical variable of the experimental condition, we were unable to do so.

We intended to drop the effect of social identification on the relationship between the first mediator and the dependent variable (using model 90 instead of model 89) due a repeatedly non-significant effect of the first mediator and consequently a non-significant interaction with the moderator in Experiment 2 (chronologically before Experiment 1). However, throughout the analysis in Experiment 1, we observed that the effect of the first mediator turned significant and we presumed that efficacy and legitimacy might reflect different pathways for different people (low vs high identifiers). We, therefore, decided to test the interaction as in Experiment 2, i.e., to use model 89 again (the interaction was non-significant).

After the pilot study (and additionally non-published analyses from Experiment 2, chronologically taken place before Experiment 1) had shown that organisational efficacy and stereotypic competence showed almost identical effects, we retained from explicitly discussing these; Exp1H1a and pre-registered (main study 2) H1a, as well as Exp1H1b and pre-registered (main study 2) H1b, therefore, slightly differ. Building on pre-registered hypothesis H2a from Experiment 2 (main study 1), Exp1H3a and Exp1H4a further specify that it was the effect on perceived legitimacy (within the serial mediation) that we expected to be moderated by social identification (again, we retained from including stereotypic competence in these hypotheses).

##### ***Experiment 2***

We used Hayes (2022) model 89, not 14, which considers serial mediation. Further, we did not mean-centre the variables in the mediational analyses, only in the

moderated mediations. In the moderated mediation models, we mean-centred both mediators, not just mediator 2.

We further inspected outliers using re-created regressions and model-specific outliers (see Appendix 4.12 for a detailed elaboration), which deviated from our pre-registration.

Again, we retained from discussing the pre-registered (main study 1) hypotheses H1c, H1g and H2c, which all focussed on stereotypic competence. The pre-registered (main study 1) hypotheses H1b and H1e are discussed jointly as the serial indirect effect (Exp2H1a). Lastly, since our focal proposal concerned the serial effect, the effects via one mediator only (i.e., pre-registered main study 1: H1f, H1h, H2b, and Hd2) were deemed secondary but partially reported in the footnotes (no. 55, 56, 60, also see Volume 1, Figure 8).

## Appendix 4.5: A priori power analysis

### *Pilot study*

We approached the estimation of the sample size and power by turning to previous key studies. Where possible, we derived effect sizes in the form of regression coefficients from these and established their “size” in line with Wang and Rhemtulla (2021) and Fritz and MacKinnon (2007) recommendations for small, medium, and large effects among regression coefficients. We then engaged in Monte Carlo simulations using pwrSEM (Wang & Rhemtulla, 2021), however, using manifest variables, and a serial mediational design with two mediators. We varied the effect sizes among all regressions, and where in doubt, used conservative estimates (i.e., small effect sizes). Using a sample size of 170, an alpha level of .05 and a number of repetitions of 5,000 repetitions, we found that the power ( $1-\beta$ ) to detect a small direct effect was .58; to detect medium-sized effects of the mediators on the outcome variable ranged from .80 to .85; to detect a large-sized effect of mediator one on mediator two as well as of the independent variable on mediator two was 1.00, and on mediator one was .98. Finally, the power to detect small indirect effect sizes via mediator one was .73, and via mediator two was .66. The power to detect small total effects ranged from .65 (mediator two) to .72 (mediator one). To account for the fact that we neglected the moderation effect in our power analysis, we aimed for as many more participants as our budget for this study allowed, which resulted in an aspired sample size of 200.

### *Experiment 1 (and 2)*

The presentation of Experiments in this paper is opposite to how we conducted them. Since our design featured experimental as well as conditional process elements, we approached the power analysis in two steps: First, using G\*Power (Universität Düsseldorf, 2023), and then Monte-Carlo simulation using pwrSEM with manifest variables only. For the latter, we based our parameter estimates on the insights we gained from the pilot study. However, between the time of conducting the pilot study and the experiments, the guidelines for participant payment on Prolific changed (the minimum payment per participant increased to £6/ hour). Consequently, for what we describe as “Experiment 2” in this paper, we had to decrease our aspired sample size to 360 to align it with the costs initially planned for a sample size of 432. Although this was regrettable, the smaller sample size would still be bigger than the one Bartlett

(2021) deemed to equate to a “typical effect size in psychology” (p. 31), i.e., Cohen’s  $d$  of 0.4. Using the same parameters and settings, the Monte-Carlo simulation yielded a drop in power when using the reduced sample size. Nonetheless, we decided to use this reduced sample size considering that we did not want to compromise power in the subsequent and most relevant main study 2 (in this paper described as “Experiment 1”).

## Appendix 4.6: Preparatory analyses (pilot study)

### *Manipulation checks*

Participants rated a scenario that portrayed counter-protesters as playing trumpets and dancing – comparable to the actions by “English Disco Lovers” – as the funniest ( $M = 3.26$ ,  $SD = 1.33$ ), and we decided to use this scenario in further studies. As expected, participants perceived the movement as expressing itself most freely ( $M = 4.36$ ,  $SD = 0.82$ ) and holding a successful rally ( $M = 4.23$ ,  $SD = 0.76$ ) when the rally was undisrupted. This was followed by the rally being disrupted due to mocking (free expression:  $M_{\text{trumpets\&dance}} = 2.07$ ,  $SD_{\text{trumpets\&dance}} = 1.03$ ; successful rally:  $M_{\text{trumpets\&dance}} = 2.11$ ,  $SD_{\text{trumpets\&dance}} = 0.96$ ), and by it being disrupted without mocking (free expression:  $M = 1.90$ ,  $SD = 0.99$ ; successful:  $M = 1.98$ ,  $SD = 0.87$ ).

### *Factor analysis*

Vo (2020) could not fully establish whether organisational and political efficacy were two different concepts. In our study, an exploratory principal axis factor analysis with oblique rotation ( $KMO = .72$ , Bartlett:  $\chi^2(10) = 574.85$ ,  $p < .001$ ,  $det = .05$ ) showed a clear two-factor solution for political efficacy (eigenvalue = 3.07, explaining 53% of the variance) and organisational efficacy (eigenvalue = 1.09, explaining 47% of the variance). Consequently, political and organisational efficacy were treated as two separate variables in subsequent analyses.

### Appendix 4.7: Descriptive statistics (pilot study) by political affiliation

**Table App. 4.7: 1**

*Descriptive statistics (pilot study) by political affiliation*

Political affiliation	Social identification				Endorsement of the cause				Perceived political efficacy				Support intention			
	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Left	1.00	5.00	2.10	1.19	1.00	5.00	1.93	1.08	1.00	4.00	2.60	0.83	1.00	5.00	1.56	0.98
Centre	1.00	7.00	3.17	1.51	1.00	7.00	3.26	1.54	1.00	4.00	2.91	0.78	1.00	7.00	2.62	1.65
Right	1.00	7.00	3.93	1.56	1.00	7.00	4.02	1.75	1.00	5.00	2.50	0.86	1.00	7.00	3.08	1.85
Not affiliated	1.00	7.00	3.12	1.35	1.00	7.00	3.41	1.50	1.00	4.33	3.02	0.82	1.00	7.00	3.15	1.56

	Perceived organisational efficacy				Stereotypic competence				Legitimacy			
	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>	Min	Max	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Left	1.00	6.00	3.87	1.24	1.00	4.00	3.01	0.76	1.00	7.00	3.36	1.35
Centre	2.00	6.00	4.01	0.99	2.00	4.00	3.36	0.68	2.00	6.33	4.05	0.93
Right	1.00	6.00	3.99	1.23	1.00	5.00	3.08	0.81	2.33	7.00	4.44	1.00
Not affiliated	1.00	7.00	4.22	1.12	2.00	4.00	3.44	0.57	1.00	7.00	4.35	1.09


#### Appendix 4.8: Political affiliation as underlying influence

Inspecting the relationship between perceived legitimacy and support intention, we observed that 61 cases substantially pushed the relationship (see Figure App. 4.8: 1). A closer look at these data points revealed that 24.59% of participants among these were affiliated with the centre, 32.79% were affiliated with the right, and 37.70% were not affiliated. Only 18.30% (three cases) were affiliated with the left.

T-tests on the relationship between political affiliation and social identification, endorsement, perceived legitimacy, and support intentions revealed significant differences between “left” affiliated and “other” affiliated (clustering not affiliated, right and centre affiliated participants). Other showed significantly higher social identification ( $M = 3.44$ ,  $SD = 1.52$ ) compared to the left ( $M = 2.10$ ,  $SD = 1.19$ ,  $t(132.08) = -6.64$ ,  $p < .001$ ); endorsement (other:  $M = 3.59$ ,  $SD = 1.63$ ; left:  $M = 1.93$ ,  $SD = 1.08$ ,  $t(154.27) = -8.34$ ,  $p < .001$ ); perceived legitimacy (other:  $M = 4.28$ ,  $SD = 1.01$ ; left:  $M = 3.36$ ,  $SD = 1.35$ ,  $t(82.50) = -4.68$ ,  $p < .001$ ), and support intentions (other:  $M = 2.94$ ,  $SD = 1.71$ ; left:  $M = 1.56$ ,  $SD = 0.98$ ,  $t(172.98) = -7.13$ ,  $p < .001$ ).

**Figure App. 4.8: 1**

*Mapping perceived legitimacy on support intention; comparison with and without outliers*




## Appendix 4.9: Moderated mediation models with varying independent variables

### (IV) pilot study

#### Moderated mediation models 5

**Figure App. 4.9: 1**


*Moderated mediation model 5 (stereotypic competence = IV)*




*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines are significant ( $p < .05$ ). Conditional direct effect: (low level)  $b = -.04$ ,  $p = .79$ , CI  $[-.37; .28]$ ; (moderate level)  $b = .31$ ,  $p = .007$ , CI  $[.09; .53]$ ; (high level)  $b = .66$ ,  $p = .001$ , CI  $[.31; 1.01]$ . Indirect effect:  $b = .19$ , bootSE = .06, bootCI  $[.08; .33]$

**Figure App. 4.9: 2**


*Moderated mediation model 5 (political efficacy = IV)*




*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines are significant ( $p < .05$ ). Conditional direct effects: (low level)  $b = .05$ ,  $p = .73$ , CI  $[-.22; .31]$ ; (moderate level)  $b = .47$ ,  $p < .001$ , CI  $[.29; .64]$ ; (high level)  $b = .88$ ,  $p < .001$ , CI  $[.61; 1.15]$ . Indirect effect:  $b = .13$ , bootSE = .04, bootCI  $[.06; .22]$

**Figure App. 4.9: 3***Moderated mediation model 5 (organisational efficacy = IV)*


*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines are significant ( $p < .05$ ). Conditional direct effect: (low level)  $b = -.03, p = .78, \text{CI } [-.23; .17]$ ; (moderate level)  $b = .16, p = .03, \text{CI } [.01; .31]$ ; (high level)  $b = .35, p = .002, \text{CI } [.13; .57]$ . Indirect effect:  $b = .13, \text{bootSE} = .04, \text{bootCI } [.06; .24]$

**Moderated mediation models 7****Figure App. 4.9: 4***Moderated mediation model 7 (stereotypic competence = IV)*

*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Direct effect:  $b = .21, p = .15, \text{CI } [-.08; .49]$ ; Conditional indirect effect: (low levels)  $b = .41, \text{bootSE} = .12, \text{bootCI } [.18; .65]$ ; (moderate levels)  $b = .42, \text{bootSE} = .08, \text{bootCI } [.27; .58]$ ; (high levels)  $b = .43, \text{bootSE} = .11, \text{bootCI } [.23; .66]$ . Index of moderated mediation = .00,  $\text{bootSE} = .04, \text{bootCI } [-.07; .09]$ .

**Figure App. 4.9: 5***Moderated mediation model 7 (political efficacy = IV)*

*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Direct effect:  $b = .54, p < .001, \text{CI} [.32; .77]$ ; Conditional indirect effect: (low levels)  $b = .21, \text{bootSE} = .10, \text{bootCI} [.03; .42]$ ; (moderate levels)  $b = .21, \text{bootSE} = .06, \text{bootCI} [.09; .34]$ ; (high levels)  $b = .19, \text{bootSE} = .08, \text{bootCI} [.04; .37]$ . Index of moderated mediation = .01,  $\text{bootSE} = .03, \text{bootCI} [-.07; .06]$ .


**Figure App. 4.9: 6***Moderated mediation model 7 (organisational efficacy = IV)*

*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Direct effect:  $b = .06, p = .49, \text{CI} [-.12; .25]$ ; Conditional indirect effect: (low levels)  $b = .30, \text{bootSE} = .09, \text{bootCI} [.14; .49]$ ; (moderate levels)  $b = .31, \text{bootSE} = .06, \text{bootCI} [.20; .44]$ ; (high levels)  $b = .32, \text{bootSE} = .07, \text{bootCI} [.19; .46]$ . Index of moderated mediation = .00,  $\text{bootSE} = .03, \text{bootCI} [-.05; .06]$ .

### Moderated mediation models 14

**Figure App. 4.9: 7**


*Moderated mediation model 14 (stereotypic competence = IV)*




*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines are significant ( $p < .05$ ). Direct effect:  $b = .27, p = .01, CI [.06; .49]$ ; Conditional indirect effect: (low levels)  $b = .03, bootSE = .05, bootCI [-.07; .14]$ ; (moderate levels)  $b = .22, bootSE = .07, bootCI [.11; .37]$ ; (high levels)  $b = .41, bootSE = .12, bootCI [.22; .68]$ . Index of moderated mediation = .10,  $bootSE = .03, bootCI [.04; .17]$ .

**Figure App. 4.9: 8**

*Moderated mediation model 14 (political efficacy = IV)*



*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines are significant ( $p < .05$ ). Direct effect:  $b = .47, p < .001, CI [.30; .64]$ ; Conditional indirect effect: (low levels)  $b = .01, bootSE = .03, bootCI [-.06; .07]$ ; (moderate levels)  $b = .15, bootSE = .05, bootCI [.08; .25]$ ; (high levels)  $b = .29, bootSE = .09, bootCI [.15; .49]$ . Index of moderated mediation = .07,  $bootSE = .02, bootCI [.03; .13]$ .

**Figure App. 4.9: 9***Moderated mediation model 14 (organisational efficacy = IV)*

*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (5,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines are significant ( $p < .05$ ). Direct effect:  $b = .15, p = .05, \text{CI} [.00; .29]$ ; Conditional indirect effect: (low levels)  $b = .02, \text{bootSE} = .04, \text{bootCI} [-.05; .10]$ ; (moderate levels)  $b = .16, \text{bootSE} = .05, \text{bootCI} [.08; .27]$ ; (high levels)  $b = .29, \text{bootSE} = .08, \text{bootCI} [.16; .48]$ . Index of moderated mediation = .07,  $\text{bootSE} = .02, \text{bootCI} [.03; .11]$ .

#### **Appendix 4.10: Additional analyses pilot study (Johnson-Neymar technique)**

Moderation analyses revealed that the predictors' (and mediators') conditional effects on the outcome variable support intentions were moderated on moderate and high levels of social identification, yet not on low levels. In order to further examine this, we conducted additional analyses using the Johnson-Neymar technique, which probes the interaction without relying on pre-determined moderator levels. Since the technique is commonly used in moderations, however, not in moderated mediational models, we followed Hayes' (2022) example and transformed our models into simple moderation analyses using the mediator perceived legitimacy (in model 5) and the predictor variables perceived organisational and political efficacy/ stereotypic competence (in model 14) as covariates. Although we had mean-centred social identification, for the sake of understanding the cut-off levels in terms of the social identification scale, we report the following results in the uncentred version:

Transformed from model 5, the conditional effect of perceived political efficacy on support intention ( $b = 0.21$ ) turned significant at a level of social identification of 1.79 ( $p = .05$ , CI [0.00; 0.42]); the conditional effect of perceived organisational efficacy on support intention ( $b = 0.17$ ) turned significant at a level of social identification of 3.10 ( $p = .02$ , CI [0.02; 0.32]); the conditional effect of stereotypic competence ( $b = 0.27$ ) turned significant at a level of social identification of 2.80 ( $p = .02$ , CI [0.05; 0.49]).

Transformed from model 14, the conditional effect of perceived legitimacy on support intentions ( $b = 0.15$ ), considering perceived political efficacy as a covariate, turned significant at a level of social identification of 2 ( $p = .05$ , CI [0.00; 0.31]); considering organisational efficacy as a covariate ( $b = 0.18$ ), turned significant at a level of social identification of 1.95 ( $p = .05$ , CI [0.00; 0.35]); considering perceived competence as a covariate ( $b = 0.20$ ), turned significant at a level of social identification of 2.20 ( $p = .02$ , CI [0.04; 0.37]).

All effects stayed significant up until the scale maximum score of 7.

#### **Appendix 4.11: Inspecting participants for demand characteristics (Experiments 1 and 2)**

In Experiment 1, after inspecting participants' responses to their idea of what the survey might have been about, we found that 21 participants (4.90%) were coming somewhat close to guessing the real purpose. This was despite using filler items. Consequently, we inspected whether this could have influenced the DV compared to those that did not show to guess the real purpose of the survey. The difference in support intention between those that somewhat guessed the real purpose ( $M = 2.90$ ,  $SD = 1.87$ ) and those that did not ( $M = 2.67$ ,  $SD = 1.74$ ) was, however, not significant  $t(21.83) = -0.57$ ,  $p = .58$ .


In Experiment 2, after inspecting participants' responses to the purpose of the survey, we found that 15 (4.16%) were in an area that we judged as having some idea of the real purpose of the study. We decided to inspect whether their presuming idea of the survey's purpose might have influenced the DV. This was not the case; those individuals deemed as coming somewhat near to guessing the survey's purpose ( $M_{exp1} = 3.86$ ,  $SD_{exp1} = 1.95$ ;  $M_{exp2} = 3$ ,  $SD_{exp2} = 1.93$ ) did not significantly differ in their intention to support the movement from those that were not so close to guessing the purpose ( $M_{exp1} = 3.37$ ,  $SD_{exp1} = 1.78$ ;  $M_{exp2} = 2.95$ ,  $SD_{exp2} = 1.65$  (experimental condition 1:  $t(6.62) = -0.65$ ,  $p = .54$ ; experimental condition 2:  $t(7.76) = -0.06$ ,  $p = .95$ ).

## Appendix 4.12: Mediation and moderated mediation models with robust regression comparisons (Experiment 1)

In addition to uni- and multivariate outlier detection, we decided to inspect the mediation and moderated mediation models for model-specific outliers. We did this by reconstructing the PROCESS (Hayes, 2023) OLS regressions and inspected each underlying regression for potential outliers (see Figures App. 4.12: 1 – 4). When comparisons per regression model with and without detected outliers led to changes (i.e., in significance level and/ or valence), we also compared the overall mediation or moderated mediation model with and without these relevant outliers. However, even after doing so, we did not exclude any outliers for good but rather compared the results from robust regressions with the PROCESS OLS regressions and where no substantial deviations were found (i.e., in significance level and/or valence), we took this as an indicator that our OLS regressions were robust against the detected outliers. These double-layered outlier checks, on the one hand, were applied in order to keep the sample size (i.e., power) as high as possible considering the involuntary drop in sample size for Experiment 2, but on the other hand, also demonstrate that we did not thoughtlessly apply robust measures but actually investigated the impact of the detected outliers.

**Figure App. 4.12: 1**


*Comparison with robust regression; mediation (disruption (mockery) vs disruption (no mockery) = IV)*



*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression ( $N = 429$ ) whose comparison served as a robustness check against 51 outliers that had been detected. The exclusion of 17 outliers in the third regression (support ~ condition + organizational efficacy + legitimacy) led to a valence change in the effect of condition on support intentions (the effect turned negative) which was also reflected in the robust regression (see graph). While this indicates a vulnerability of the OLS regression to the impact of outliers, the changes were minor and non-significant, and we decided to continue the analyses without excluding the outliers.

Figure App. 4.12: 2


Comparison with robust regressions; mediation (disruption (any) vs no disruption = IV)



Note. Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression ( $N = 429$ ) whose comparison served as a robustness check against 51 outliers that had been detected (yet whose exclusion did not change the significance level nor the valence substantially). If OLS and robust regression did not differ substantially (i.e., significance level and/ or valence), we treated the OLS regression as robust against the outliers.

Figure App. 4.12: 3


Comparison with robust regressions; moderated mediation (disruption (any) vs disruption = IV)



Note. Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression whose comparison served as a robustness check against 45 outliers that had been detected. The effect of the experimental condition on support intention, as well as its interaction with social identification turned non-significant in the robust regressions which indicates that the OLS regression might be vulnerable to 13 outliers found in the third regression (support intention ~ condition + organizational efficacy + legitimacy + social identification + condition\*social identification + organisational efficacy\*social identification + legitimacy\*social identification) which we, however, did not exclude from the analysis.

**Figure App. 4.12: 4**

Comparison with robust regressions; moderated mediation (disruption (mockery) vs disruption (no mockery) = IV)




Note: Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression whose comparison served as a robustness check against 45 outliers that had been detected. If OLS and robust regression did not differ substantially (i.e., significance level and/ or valence), we treated the OLS regression as robust against the outliers.

## Appendix 4.13: Mediation and moderated mediation models with robust regression comparisons (Experiment 2)

Aligning with Appendix 4.12, Figures App. 4.13: 1 – 4 illustrate the comparison between OLS regression and robust regressions.

**Figure App. 4.13: 1**


*Comparison with robust regressions; mediation (disruption (any) vs no disruption = IV)*



*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression whose comparison served as a robustness check against 39 outliers that had been detected (yet whose exclusion did not change the significance level nor the valence substantially). If OLS and robust regression did not differ substantially (i.e., significance level and/or valence), we treated the OLS regression as robust against the outliers.

**Figure App. 4.13: 2**


*Comparison with robust regressions; mediation (disruption (mockery) vs disruption (no mockery) = IV)*



*Note.* Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression whose comparison served as a robustness check against 39 outliers that had been detected (yet whose exclusion did not change the significance level nor the valence substantially). If OLS and robust regression did not differ substantially (i.e., significance level and/or valence), we treated the OLS regression as robust against the outliers.

Figure App. 4.13: 3


Comparison with robust regression; moderated mediation (disruption (any) vs no disruption = IV)



Note. Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression whose comparison served as a robustness check against 37 outliers that had been detected. If OLS and robust regression did not differ substantially (i.e., significance level and/ or valence), we treated the OLS regression as robust against the outliers.

Figure App. 4.13: 4

Comparison with robust regression; moderated mediation (disruption (mockery) vs disruption (no mockery) = IV)



Note. Results from mediation analyses using bootstrap (10,000 repetitions). Values in bold and solid lines represent significant effects ( $p < .05$ ), values not in bold and dashed lines represent non-significant effects ( $p > .05$ ). Values in brackets result from robust regression whose comparison served as a robustness check against 37 outliers that had been detected. If OLS and robust regression did not differ substantially (i.e., significance level and/ or valence), we treated the OLS regression as robust against the outliers.

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