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MULTI-STAKEHOLDER PARTNERSHIPS
UNDER THE
RAJASTHAN EDUCATION INITIATIVE:
IF NOT FOR PROFIT, THEN FOR WHAT?

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ABSTRACT

This thesis explores the development of a multi-stakeholder partnership model using a multiple case study research design. Specifically this study examines the rationale for the launch of the Rajasthan Education initiative, its development and its impact on educational development and reaches conclusions about the scalability and sustainability of multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs) in the context of Rajasthan.

The literature review shows that there is insufficient independent research evidence to support the widespread claims that public private partnerships (PPPs), of which MSP is a new ‘avatar’, are able to deliver results in terms of developmental gains and added value. This paucity of evidence and profusion of claims is partly explained by the fact, that the research that has been commissioned is not independent and its conclusions have been shaped by vested interests of those promoting the organisations they claim to evaluate. In particular organisations associated with the World Economic Forum (WEF) have been projecting PPPs and programmes of corporate responsibility as a way to engage for-profit organisations and enhance the effectiveness of external support for the delivery of services to basic education. Alongside this not-for-profit PPPs are seldom scrutinised in terms of public accountability, value for money, scalability, or sustainability partly due to the voluntary nature of such inputs to the public system. I believe my research makes a new and unique contribution to the independent evaluation of state enabled, not-for-profit MSPs in action.

The research selected eight formal partnerships for case study which were selected using a matrix of organisational characteristics, scale and scope of interventions. The case studies are organised into four thematic groups i.e, School adoption, ICT based interventions, teachers’ training and universalisation of elementary education in underserved urban localities. Each case study is examined using a framework which highlights three dimensions. These are i) the design of the partnership, ii) stakeholder involvement and intra agent dynamics and iii) the Governance of the partnership.

A cross case analysis of the eight partnerships is used to arrive at conclusions about MSPs in Rajasthan. This uses the concept of double contingency of power (Sayer 2004), and specifically the concept of causal power and causal susceptibilities and Stake’s (2006) multiple case analysis, to discuss the commonalities and differences across partnerships and emerging themes while cross analysing the partnerships.

I have engaged in interpretivist inquiry and sought to understand the workings of an MSP which involves businesses and CSR groups alongside NGOs and government agencies with

an aim to place Rajasthan on a fast development track. Rather than looking for an ideal type MSP, I problematise the MSPs in Rajasthan as I explain the workings of an MSP model in action. Given this methodological perspective, I have used semi structured interviews, observations of the partnership programmes in action, and document analysis as methods to collect and corroborate data for this study.

The study concludes that the exiting MSP arrangements in REI are not scalable, unsustainable and have very limited impact. Moreover, the MSPs are unstable and reflect fluid inter-organisational evolution, as well as ambiguous public accountability. There was no purposeful financial management at the REI management level. In addition the exit routes for partners supporting interventions were not planned, resulting in the fading away of even those interventions that showed promise in accruing learning gains for children, and by schools and teachers. Non-scalability and lack of sustainability can be inferred from the fact that the partners do not have a long term view of interventions, lack sustained commitment for resource input and the interventions are implemented with temporary work force. The instability of the partnerships can be explained through the absence of involvement of government teachers and communities. Also economic and political power dominated the fate of the programmes. In this MSP it was clear that corporate social responsibility (CSR) was a driving force for establishing the MSP but was not backed by continued and meaningful engagement. The ‘win-win’ situation of greater resources, efficiency and effectiveness, which formed the basic premise for launching the REI was not evident in reality.

MSPs are gaining currency globally. This research points to the fact that much more intentional action needs to be taken to ensure that partnerships such as these have a sustained impact on development. The problems and issues of education are historically, politically and socially embedded. Any action that does not take this into account and which is blind to the interests of different stakeholders in MSPs, will surely fall short of achieving what it set out to do. Further independent research examining the ambitions and realities of other MSPs is needed to inform policy development and implementation. This is essential for achieving the goals of education for all before investing further in what appears to be a flawed modality to improve access, equity and outcomes in education.

DEDICATION

I dedicate my thesis to my father Late Mr. R. P. Pachauri and my mother Mrs. Shakuntla Sharma who both were government teachers and my source of inspiration.

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I would also like to thank the University of Sussex library and BLDS for the library facilities over the years. The School of Education and the Centre for International Education provided me several opportunities to present selections from my work-in-progress at various platforms and on different occasions like special Research Days, Work-

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ADPC	Assistant District Project Coordinator
AIF	American India Foundation
AKF	Aga Khan Foundation
AT	Amber Trust
BEd	Bachelor of Education
BF	Bharti Foundation
BIP	Bureau of Investment Promotions
BOT	Build Operate Transfer
Bodh	Bodh Shiksha Samiti
BRC	Block Resource Centre
BRCF	Block Resource Centre Facilitator
BTF	Banyan Tree Foundation
CAL/CALP	Computer Aided Learning Programme
CCE	Continuous Comprehensive Evaluation
CEE	Centre for Elementary Education
CEO	Chief Executive Officer
CII	Confederation of Indian Industries
CRC	Cluster Resource Centre
CRCF	Cluster Resource Centre Facilitator
CREATE	Consortium for Research on Equity Access and Transitions in Education
CSDMS	Centre for Science Development and Media Studies
CSF	Community School Facilitator
CSO	Civil Society Organisation
CSR	Corporate Social Responsibility
CWSN	Children with Special Needs
DC	District Collector
DCEC	District Computer Education Centre
DD	Deputy Director

DEO	District Education Officer
DFID	Department for International Development
DIET	District Institute of Education and Training
Digantar	Digantar Shiksha Evam Khelkud Samiti
DLR	Digital Learning Resources Programme
DPC	District Project Coordinator
DPEP	District Primary Education Programme
DTP	Desktop Publishing
ECCE	Early Childhood Care and Education
EEI	Egyptian Education Initiative
EFA	Education for All
EGS	Education guarantee scheme
FEGG	Foundation to Educate Girls Globally
FTI	Fast Track Initiative
GEI	Global Education Initiative
GC	Governing Committee
GeSCI	Global e Schools and Communities Initiative
GIS	Geographic Information Systems
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GoI	Government of India
GoR	Government of Rajasthan
GPS	Government Primary School
GUPS	Government Upper Primary School
GSS	Government Secondary School
HiWel	Hole in the Wall
HM	Headmaster
IAS	Indian Administrative Services
ICEE	ICICI Bank's Centre for Elementary Education
ICT	Information and Communication Technology
IFC	International Finance Corporation
IFIG	ICICI Foundation for Inclusive Growth

IMF	International Monetary Fund
INGO	International Non Government Organisation
IPR	Intellectual Property Rights
IT	Information and Technology
ITES	Information Technology Enabled Services
JEI	Jordan Education Initiative
JMC	Jaipur Municipal Corporation
JRM	Joint Review Mission
KRP	Key Resource Person
LA	Cisco Learning Academy
LFA	Log Frame Analysis
LJ	Lok Jumbish
MDGs	Millennium Development Goals
MDM	Mid Day Meal
MHRD	Ministry of Human Resource and Development
MIS	Management Information System
MLA	Member of Legislative Assembly
MoU	Memorandum of Understanding
MSDF	Michael and Susan Dell Foundation
MSP	Multi-stakeholder Partnership
MSPE	Multi-stakeholder Partnerships in Education
MT	Master Trainer
MTA	Mother Teacher Association
NCERT	National Council for Educational Research and Training
NCF	National Curriculum Framework
NFP	Not-for-profit
NGO	Non Government Organisation
NPO	Non Profit Organisation
NSP	Non State Provider
NPM	New Public Management
OOSC	Out-of-school children

OSD	Officer on Special Duty
P4E	Partnerships for Education
PE	Programme Evaluation
PEI	Palestinian Education Initiative
PESLE	Programme for the Enrichment of School Level Education
PHF	Paul Hamlyn Foundation
PLC	Playground Learning Centre
PMEI	Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative
PMO	Programme Management Office
PMU	Programme Management Unit
PPP	Public Private Partnership
PS	Primary School
PSC	Programme Steering Committee
PTA	Parent Teacher Association
PTI	Physical Training Instructor
PTR	Pupil Teacher Ratio
QAT/P	Quality Assurance Test/Programme
QEP	Quality Education Programme
QIU	Quality Improvement Unit
RAS	Rajasthan Administrative Services
RCEE	Rajasthan Council for Elementary Education
RD	Resource Dependence
REI	Rajasthan Education Initiative
RMOL	Rajasthan Mission on Livelihoods
RQ	Research Question
RSA	Resource Support Agency
RtE	Right to Education
SC	Scheduled Caste
SCERT	State Council for Educational Research and Training
SDMC	School Development and Management Committee
SDMC	School Development and Management Committee

SIERT	State Institute of Educational Research and Training
SMC	School Management Committee
SMEs	Small and Medium Enterprises
SOLE(s)	Self Organizing Learning Environment(s)
SS	<i>Shiksha Samarthak</i>
SSA	Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
ST	Scheduled Tribe
TARU	Training and Academic Resource Unit
TLC	Total Literacy Campaign
TCE	Transaction Cost Economies
TLM	Teaching Learning Material
UEE	Universalisation of Elementary Education
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UNICEF	United Nations International Children's Education Fund
UPS	Upper Primary School
US	United States
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
VBERC	Vidya Bhawan Education Resource Centre
VBS	Vidya Bhawan Society
WB	World Bank
WEF	World Economic Forum
YEU	Young Explorer Unit

Chapter 1

Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships in Rajasthan

1. Introduction

This thesis explores how multi-stakeholder partnerships (MSPs), designed to accelerate progress towards universal access to education, are working in one state in India – Rajasthan. Such a venture is important for at least three reasons: First of all, many children remain out of school or are in school and learning little in the state of Rajasthan in western India. This is after more than ten years of the publicly funded Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) – the flagship programme of the Government of India (GoI) since 2002, for universalisation of elementary education (UEE). Secondly, MSPs have been promoted by the World Economic Forum (WEF) as a way forward to increase the impact of initiatives, improve participation and quality and complement the resources available from the State. WEF, which is a strategic platform involving business leaders, international agencies, governments and civil society, ‘shaping global and regional agendas’ (Schwab, in Foreword, Unwin and Wong, 2012) had championed the cause of partnerships, with this argument that MSPs would complement state initiatives. Thirdly, recent shifts in some of the discourses around development in major agencies such as the World Bank, the United Kingdom (UK) Department for International Development (DFID), the US Agency for International Development (USAID) and the United Nations International Children’s Education Fund (UNICEF) have been towards a greater emphasis on non-state actors in general and the private sector in particular. This is more so when the focus is on Education for All (EFA) goals and the MDGs and much recently on the Right to Education (RtE) in India. For all these reasons it is important to collate evidence from a real world initiative to examine what claims have been made, how these are realised in practice, and inquire whether such MSPs add value to the attempts to deliver RtE.

India has seen the expansion of her educational infrastructure, formulation of various policies, establishment of national and state level councils and advisory boards, decentralised management, community involvement in micro-planning, attempts to revise textbooks at the national level and a host of other initiatives and interventions, all aiming towards fulfilment of the constitutional commitment of providing quality education for all children.

Yet, after four and a half decades of planning and assorted interventions there were still 13.4 million children reported out-of-school by a national level sample survey (SRI, 2005 cited in Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2008, p.47). Moreover this is almost certainly a serious underestimate, especially if those not attending regularly, those very much over school-going age and under achieving pupils are taken into consideration. Different methods of accounting for children in each of these categories lead to different estimates. Data on the number of out-of school children (OOSC) reported in 2005, estimated the range from 7 million to 30 million (CREATE, 2009). The five Indian states Bihar, Madhya Pradesh, Uttar Pradesh, West Bengal and Rajasthan accounted for 70% of the OOSC in age group of 6-10 years (Census of India, 2001, cited in *ibid.*, p.3). Even in case of the children enrolled in school approximately 50% lack basic reading and writing competencies at the end of grade V (Govinda and Bandyopadhyay, 2011, p.4). The poor quality of schooling is therefore one of the reasons for the dropouts amongst OOSC and these children belong to low income families (*ibid.*).

There have been several significant experiences in India where non-governmental organisations set up schools (alternative schools with pedagogical innovations) parallel to the public education system to address these challenges of quality of schooling and access to education for all. Collaborative arrangements with state governments to make quality education accessible to all children are being operationalised by many non-state providers in India. Such interventions in the public education system are in one or more of the following areas: a) Infrastructure development, b) Mid-day meal, c) Incentives such as scholarship, uniform etc., d) Teachers' capacity building, e) Pedagogy, f) Personnel support, g) School development through community mobilisation. Most of these

interventions are welfare driven, not-for-profit and involve partnering of communities, civil society organisations and philanthropic organisations/groups with state agencies.

The Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI) of the government of the state of Rajasthan launched in 2005 at the behest of Cisco and other information and technology (IT) sector companies shepherded by the WEF, is an interesting example of MSPs claiming to achieve EFA goals. REI is touted as a venture engaging global and local players from the private sector, foundations and NGOs in an innovative multi-stakeholder collaborative to support education in Rajasthan (GoR, n.d.a). It involves the Confederation of Indian Industries (CII), Global e-Schools and Communities Initiative (GESCI) and WEF along with local NGOs.

The Rajasthan Government drew partly from the Jordan Education Initiative, launched in 2003 by the same global partners, whilst evolving its own structures and formulation of MSPs in education (MSPEs). This included strengthening models of teaching and learning methodologies through state curriculum (supported by improved facilities, new equipment and resources), deployment of new ways of learning through information and communication technologies (ICTs) and developing collaborative initiatives with communities for their proactive participation. Consequently many organisations have taken up responsibilities formalised through signing memoranda of understanding (MoUs) with the state government, defining their respective roles under REI.

It needs to be noted at this point that the REI partners are not addressing the gap in the public education system by putting up parallel structures. Rather, they are supporting and strengthening state driven initiatives by bringing in their respective institutional elements to the public education sector. The participant organisations in REI have differential socio-economic-institutional capacities. Some have been working in the field of education since the last 20 years, others were established only six or seven years ago, whilst there are still others which have religious affiliations. This diversity is also reflected in the REI experience. The fact that all the participants have their respective goals, strengths and weaknesses makes REI a complex field of action.

The research for studying MSPs in education in Rajasthan was undertaken over a period of 18 months to study the Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI) through qualitative inquiry. The REI as MSP and an innovative model of public private partnership (PPP) in education was launched by the government of Rajasthan (GoR) in 2005. The vision of the initiative was to put Rajasthan on a fast track of development and give its citizens an opportunity to become active participants of a global knowledge economy. Specifically, the objectives of the REI were quite similar to the goals of the SSA which is the Education for All (EFA) programme of the GoI.

Historically, the province of Rajasthan was created after 1947 from a merger of 29 princely states and three principalities and has a feudal past. Prior to 1947 development was a low priority and a regular organised education system was lacking with only two schools for girls in the entire region (GoR, n.d.a, p.1). Between 1951 and 2005 there has been a net rise of 51606 primary and 25469 upper primary schools in Rajasthan (p.4). The GoR has made several attempts to achieve the goal of education for all. These include Lok Jumbish programme focussed on community mobilisation, DFID assisted Shiksha Karmi project, total literacy campaign (TLC), the UN led Janshala programme, provision of para teachers through the education guarantee scheme (EGS) under the World Bank assisted district primary education programme (DPEP) and the SSA since 2001–02 (p.5).

Geographically, Rajasthan is an arid region with an economy based on subsistence agriculture and the mining of minerals. The oil fields discovered by Cairn during the time of launch of REI are expected to give impetus to the development of the state according to the REI partnership description document (GoR, n.d.b, p.1). However a critical diagnosis of efforts made to promote economic development is lacking in the REI documents. Economic development is attributed to liberalisation of economy (GoR, n.d.a, p.1) whilst the failure in implementing, monitoring and evaluating government development programmes is attributed to the feudal history and geographic singularities (GoR, 2007).

Besides historical and geographical disadvantages, the GoR identified the following challenges that are to be addressed through REI: a) legislating education as fundamental right, b) addressing the gender gap in education especially amongst disadvantaged groups, c) improving learning competencies of children, d) empowerment through education for competitive global society and above all e) facing the challenge of resource constraints (GoR, n.d.a, p.13). It was claimed that the Jordan Education Initiative (JEI), which the REI declared to have ‘emulated’, had brought together ‘educational theories, research and best practices from countries around the globe to create workable model and discover ideas that flourish in the local context’ (p.13–14).

The REI attracted interest from business (based both within and outside the country) through their direct involvement or involvement through foundations and corporate social responsibility (CSR) groups. REI had around 24 partners and ran more than 28 partnership programmes.

This thesis, through the analyses of eight partnership programmes under REI, provides insights into the design and working of the MSP model in a state enabled space of action. I argue that REI as MSP did not have the capacity to address its EFA mandate in the long term. This is due to its design as a project with short timelines and the absence of long term responsibility of partners in the MSPs. I further argue that whilst businesses might have specific expertise suitable for the market, sheer financial power, which they seem to use at their discretion, will not translate into achievement of MDGs, RtE or EFA goals. The lack of an education focus among these business partners and little or no understanding about REI or their own initiatives within REI are also problematic. Also some of the foundations whilst claiming to have developed an expertise to address education issues in the public sector (by their involvement with the state government over a period of years and showing workability of their initiatives in a short time frame and restricted geographies) developed an ambition to scale-up their activities in a state-like manner. This created further limitations because the fund flows from business into the public sector can never be unlimited or demand driven.

I must clarify here that the impact and outcomes that this research addresses are related specifically to the REI partnerships and not to the learning outcomes for children in the schools. This is mainly due to the following reasons. Firstly, not all the partnerships focussed on direct pedagogical inputs for children learning. Even those which did, approached aspects of pedagogical input in diverse ways e.g. use of ICTs in classrooms. The MSPs under the REI ranged from improving school infrastructure, provision of mid day meals to IT skills training for teachers. The learning outcomes of the children therefore would not have proved to be a reliable variable for evaluating partnerships. The main issue therefore was how to bring all the partnerships with such a huge variety and diverse focus together on a common platform for analysis. Secondly, the launch of the REI was first ever attempt of the government to bring global partners, local businesses and NGOs alongside the rhetoric of the WEF forging partnerships for development and REI's rhetoric of development and employability skills, it seemed pertinent to look at the partnership development as an aspect of partnership outcome individually as well as collectively through a comprehensive framework of Design, Stakeholders and the Governance. Therefore, instead of school or children's learning as a unit of analysis, each partnership itself and the REI as an MSP model serves as the unit of analysis. Thirdly, not all the government schools were running same or similar partnerships programmes. Some have two or three REI partners working with them while others had none. Therefore, a comparative assessment of children's learning as an outcome of a particular programme would not have been possible and also not useful to understand the claims and rhetoric of the REI.

Theoretically, the REI as an MSP model can be explained in terms of causal powers and susceptibilities of the design of MSP, partners, institutions and policy frameworks. These causal powers are contingent. These powers might not be always positive and due to contingencies and susceptibilities these are unable to bring desired, intended change in a sustained manner. Also the conflict of interest amongst partners e.g. the business interest to gain markets, control funds and management or upscale versus the government mandate for UEE/EFA) serve as major susceptibilities leading to failure of MSPs. The thesis argues that MSPs are also unable to address inherent parochialisms and are in fact giving birth to

new parochialisms such as selective recruitment policies. Moreover, because of the control of funds residing in one partner, partnerships which actually qualify as multi-stakeholder are uneven, unequal and unstable.

Globally, PPPs are being projected as a panacea to address development woes and the failures of the state to deliver on its promise. In recent years the role of private actors in various successful PPP models in education has been discussed in detail in development literature (Patrinos et al., 2009). On the other hand, this phenomenon has also led to a critical examination of the PPPs in action (Ball, 2007). Such examination has presented evidence regarding the political nature of PPPs and questioned their ability to deliver what they promise besides expressing concern over the changes such partnerships are bringing to the public sector.

Not-for-profit partnerships in education are one model within the PPP domain which needs close scrutiny because I feel these serve as an entry point for the private sector (and private providers) into the public sector. It has been noticed that private sector actors have been spreading their roots in the public space and are increasingly playing a significant role in shaping the public education.

These partnerships might at first appear on the scene as free gifts that deliver innovations without the burden of immediate financial liability on the public sector. Their avowed introduction of cost effective alternatives—such as low salaried teachers for supporting or strengthening the public system—helps them acquire legitimacy as a policy option for organising and providing education under the ever present shadow of budget constraints. However, in the long run, these actors might not be able to deliver on their promise because of the problems in the basic design of partnerships, their claims not being grounded in reality and the inter-organisational power relationships amongst the funders and the implementing organisations, all of which queer the pitch for their success.

This thesis is organised around five key research questions.

1. Why did the GoR initiate the Rajasthan Education Initiative and invite multiple providers to support public education service delivery?
2. What are the key features of the REI?
3. How has the REI developed and what are the influences on its development?
4. What impact has the REI had on service delivery and to what extent has it achieved its goals?
5. To what extent is the REI sustainable and scalable?

The above questions are explored using a variety of methods that are situated in qualitative inquiry. These include interviews with the partner organisations, government officials, teachers and community members, observations of the projects in operation in actual settings and study of documents over a period of 18 months.

This thesis on MSPEs is a natural progression from inter-related but seemingly disparate experiences that I have garnered over recent years as a researcher and practitioner working in India. These I will discuss in the next section.

2. Background of this Study

In 1998–99, when I conducted a research for my MPhil degree on the Alternative Schooling Programme¹ – launched in 1994–95 by the Rajiv Gandhi Prathamik Shiksha Mission of the government of the province of Madhya Pradesh, India with support from the World Bank—I had little familiarity with the era which has dawned following the structural adjustment programmes of the Indian government. Though I had commented in my research, on the key issues of centralisation, decentralisation and the commodification of power as impacts of globalisation, I had not fully realised what globalisation entails. In the Indian context globalisation entailed liberalisation of a centrally planned economy that had failed to deliver growth or reduce poverty and was plagued by a severe debt burden.

¹ Pachauri, 2000

Two years (2001–2002) later while working as a Biological Sciences teacher in a government school in Delhi, I witnessed anxiety amongst my colleagues about the threat of government schools being taken over by private companies for the purpose of improving school management.² The rationale behind this purported change was that those working closely with children do not teach well enough and that private sector management would be more effective. Those days the failure of government schools was being discussed as an outcome of bad public management, which gave too much freedom to overpaid teachers. These ideas infuriated my colleagues. They worried how their practice would be assessed by the new corporate bosses. Everyone was also worried about job security under the new dispensation. So the primary feeling was that of a loss of intellectual and professional freedom and coercion by corporates, who knew nothing about the complexities of education and schooling. No private body actually took over government schools in Delhi then and I thought the threat had subsided.

2.1 Globalisation and Privatisation Kick in

Meanwhile the juggernaut of globalisation had grown from strength to strength in my country and the effects of opening up and the new economy had begun to be felt in every sphere. In 2006, while working in Jaipur, India with an NGO – Bodh Shiksha Samiti (hereafter Bodh)—an organisation which works for the education of the children of the communities in rural areas and urban slums, I once again encountered private sector involvement in education through the ‘school adoption’ programme. This time a strategic twist had been introduced by the Government of the province of Rajasthan (Jaipur is the

² Public Private Partnership Subgroups on Social Sector and Infrastructure were constituted in a meeting of Committee of Secretaries on September 09, 2003 in India (for further discussion see Srivastava, 2010). The PPP subgroup on Social Sector mentions the Programme for Mobilising Local Support to Primary School (PLUS) whereby the corporate sector, voluntary organizations (VOs), banks, elected representatives, retired teachers, public sector, universities and colleges or any person from civil society could adopt schools for a period of two or more years. The state governments were asked to cover at least one percent of primary schools under PLUS reaching up to ten percent of total primary schools by 2010 (GoI, 2004).

capital of Rajasthan) by launching the Rajasthan Education Initiative involving international IT companies facilitated through the WEF (GoR, n.d a., p.13–19).

Bodh had then recently signed a partnership under REI as part of their urban education programme. I was a member of the Bodh-team implementing this programme and involved in writing programme reports for the organisation, that were to be shared with the government and other programme partners. My participation and representation at REI meetings where I met other REI partners ignited the intellectual curiosity to examine the claims of REI as MSP in a systematic manner and in a multi-organisation setting.

2.2 My Research on Partnerships in Education

It was just a coincidence that the Commonwealth scholarship announcement from the Consortium for Research on Equity Access and Transitions in Education (CREATE) – a multi country, DFID funded programme, was published around this time (in 2006). That was when I decided to propose to study the claims made by the REI.

In 2007, I was awarded the Commonwealth scholarship through CREATE to undertake this research.

3. Design of the Study and the Chapter Plan

The Rajasthan Education Initiative, which is the focus of my thesis, has brought together a variety of actors – NGOs, CSR groups, Foundations established by businesses, and IT majors into the education space. What apparently looks local (being a state level programme) is actually a reflection of the trends of opening up the education sector using new models and creative nomenclature that is visible in large parts of the globe today. Also, what apparently is at most a regional affair, confined to Rajasthan, has trans-national linkages through the involvement of multinational corporations with global networks.

I undertook the first phase of the field work from mid-September 2008 till mid-July 2009 and the second phase from mid of May 2010 till mid-September 2010. The focus of my enquiry was on the five research questions on p.7. Briefly these were to examine the reason for the launch of REI, its key features, its development and impact on service delivery in Rajasthan and its sustainability and scalability, EFA³ aspects. In other words, who are the partners, what is their contribution to the partnership, how has this changed over a period of time, and whether these partnerships are sustainable? In course of my analysis of REI, I will also comment on EFA goals and their realisation. This is necessary because EFA is at the centre of the public purpose of REI.

This research follows a multi-case study approach. In the early chapters, I have looked at initiatives similar to REI in other parts of the world and at work done by others on partnerships, before building the theoretical arguments for my analysis. Thereon I move into the substantive case studies.

I present the case studies of eight REI partnerships organised under four different programme themes. Each of these partnerships have been grouped under one of these thematic areas: i) School adoption, ii) Information and Communication Technology (ICT) based interventions, iii) Professional development of teachers and iv) Community based UEE in underserved locations. The case studies then explore specific questions regarding i) design of the partnership under study, ii) stakeholder involvement and iii) relationships and governance of the partnerships to answer the main research questions.

Finally, the eight case studies (grouped under four themes) are compared using a cross-case analysis framework that investigates emerging patterns and differences. On the basis of these observed patterns and using the theoretical scaffolding of earlier chapters, I present the conclusions linked to my research questions. The findings of this cross-case analysis also feed into the final chapter of my thesis, which discusses policy and practice.

³ Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan (SSA) is Government of India's programme for Education for All (EFA). I use the terms SSA and EFA interchangeably in this thesis.

3.1 Chapter Plan

In the following part of this chapter, I present brief descriptions of the content of each chapter of this thesis.

The first chapter (the present chapter) introduces the research, summarises the rationale and provides a summary overview of the REI as an example of a PPP. It then goes on to identify core issues related to MSPs, presents the key research questions, and provides some background to my involvement with this research before laying out the chapter plan for this study.

The second chapter undertakes a review of literature, exploring definitions of and the concepts relating to PPPs and MSPs. Available literature on state and non-state institutional relationships with reference to provision of education are also discussed here. Furthermore this chapter discusses literature on researching PPPs and Multi-stakeholder partnerships in education (MSPEs). This review is used to synthesise what is currently known about MSPs, identify gaps in knowledge and understanding that the research will try to address, and highlight key issues.

The third chapter presents the conceptual framework of the study and the research questions. Here I present critical realism and realist evaluation as the basis for my methodological position. This chapter also discusses methods used in the study and reflects on how on-the-ground situation deviated from plans with respect to field work. The principal methods to collect data, as outlined in this chapter, were interviews with different stakeholders, direct observation of the programmes in action including school/classroom observations, participation in review meetings of specific partnership programmes and document analysis.

A fundamental requirement for qualitative enquiry — negotiating access — remained my biggest concern throughout my research work and therefore I also reflect on

the process and outcomes of negotiating access in the third chapter. Finally I set out the structure of the case study chapters proposing to discuss individual partnerships using the conceptual framework which involves i) Design (D), ii) Stakeholder Involvement – depending on partnership design, stakeholders include one or more of these groups: organisational partners, parents, teachers, communities and children (S) and iii) the Governance of the partnerships (G). The D-S-G framework is then used to structure the case studies in way that foregrounds the issues specific to each case and linked to the RQs. At the edges, the aspects of D, S and G overlap slightly. For example the issue of recruitment of personnel of a programme can be discussed under the design (D) as well as governance of partnership (G) aspects.

The fourth chapter describes and discusses the Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI) in detail exploring the logic of involvement of private actors (especially the IT companies) in the public space. It examines the history of this involvement from the WEF, through various UN based initiatives such as Global Campaign for Education and WEF's own partnerships in Jordan, Egypt, Palestine right up to REI in the state of Rajasthan, India. Here I also discuss the programme management unit (PMU) of REI which has a bearing on all the partnerships discussed in the thesis, besides examining the role of the three core partners of REI. The examination of the role of these core partners – the WEF, the GeSCI and the CII – will help me understand how various actors play a part in influencing regional policies. This chapter is followed by the four case study chapters.

The first case study chapter (Chapter 5) – school adoption – discusses three partnerships for school adoption. These are: A CSR group of a telecom company (Bharti-Airtel) adopting 49 schools, two businesses and two charitable trusts belonging to the same family jointly adopting three schools (through the CII) and a charitable trust (Amber Trust) promising to adopt up to ten schools in a phased manner.

The second case study chapter (Chapter 6) – ICT interventions – discusses three different partnerships focused on ICT based interventions. These are respectively for out of school children (International Finance Corporation funded Hole-in-the-wall project in

slums of Jaipur city or IFC funded HiWel in short), primary school children (IBM-Pratham Kidsmart project in government primary schools) and skills training for people with secondary school qualification (Cisco Microsystems' work with the District Computer Training/Education Centres).

The third case study chapter (Chapter 7) discusses a district level partnership programme designed to train in-service teachers. This partnership works through existing institutional mechanisms of the government that include district level SSA team and the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET), block and cluster level academic resource support teams and schools. The quality education programme (QEP) partnership in Baran district of Rajasthan is a multipartite collaboration involving ICICI Bank (an Indian bank) as funding partner and two NGOs (Vidya Bhawan Society of Udaipur and Digantar Shiksha evam Khelkud Samiti of Jaipur) as implementation agencies. This chapter discusses different approaches of the partners vis-à-vis programme content, the ambition of partners who had the financial capacity to scale up the programme and the fate of the organisations who had the intellectual capacity but suffered from lack of finances.

The fourth case study chapter (Chapter 8) discusses a partnership under the programme theme – Community based UEE in underserved locations. The specific partnership being studied is the partnership to universalise elementary education in underserved and unserved localities of Jaipur city. This is a partnership between Bodh Shiksha Samiti (an NGO) and the GoR. This chapter highlights three notable components of this partnership namely –spatial visualisation of educational facilities in slums, the NGO's relationship and work with communities and the introduction of pre-school education as an innovative component in mainstream government schools in slum areas. This partnership brings to the fore the possibility of innovative policy interpretation and the positive role played by NGOs as mediator between the government and the communities for the delivery of rights. However, due to the existence of parallel governance structures and un-sustained finance for such programmes, I argue that the modality might not be suited for the UEE goals in the long run.

In the penultimate chapter (Chapter 9) of this thesis, I undertake a cross-case analysis of the eight partnerships discussed in the four case study chapters that are linked to the research questions through the D-S-G framework. I start off by discussing the commonalities and differences of these partnerships. Next I examine all the partnerships together in the light of the Design (D), Stakeholder Involvement (S) and Governance (G) aspects that were addressed in each case study chapter. In developing my analysis I also refer to the knowledge and legal framework of the partnerships as mentioned in the respective MoUs. To this end a summary of each of the eight MoUs is drawn out and appended at the end of the thesis.

The final chapter (Chapter 10) develops the major conclusions of this thesis – both theoretical and empirical. It seeks to draw together the complex and varied insights from the case study findings and comprehensively answer the main research questions. I also conclude by a discussion on researching MSPs, whilst proposing areas for further research into MSP arrangements in public sector education in general.

Chapter 2

Review of the Related Literature

1. Introduction

This chapter presents the review of the literature in the field of partnerships in education. The first section of the review discusses the various definitions of partnerships. In the second section I discuss the relationship and purposes of partnerships and the emerging issues. The third section discusses ‘multi-stakeholder’ partnerships which form the focus of my research and the fourth section discusses the literature on researching partnerships. The fifth and final section of this chapter discusses several theoretical and methodological insights emerging from the principal agent framework and the frameworks of power. It also identifies key concepts that are used to shape the research questions and fieldwork.

2. Defining Partnerships

As a Biology teacher and teacher educator when I first moved from the university to work in the NGO sector in 2006 I was overwhelmed with the terminology prevalent in the development sector literature. Learning terms such as ‘proactive involvement’, ‘community participation’, ‘mobilization’, ‘capacity building’, ‘synergising efforts’, ‘systemic bottlenecks’ were just a few examples amongst many which were crucial for writing effective reports and proposals to satisfy the funding partners of the organisation. Partnership was also one of these key ‘buzzwords’ (Woodward, 1994) alongside others such as ‘participation’, ‘poverty reduction’ and ‘empowerment’ prevalent in the development sector (Cornwall, 2007). Pollock sees partnership as ‘one of the most overused and abused terms’ (1995, cited in Brinkerhoff, 2002, p.20).

Though many collaborative arrangements increasingly use the term partnership there is little consensus on what partnership means as a concept. Partnerships require mutual obligations (Gallacher, 1995). There has to be a shared sense of purpose and complementary contribution, cooperation, an effective and functioning relationship (ibid.). Similarly, within social policy partnership means ‘a working relationship that is characterized by a shared sense of purpose, mutual respect and the willingness to negotiate’ (Pugh et al., 1987, cited in Lister, 2000, p.228). Public private partnerships are seen as one of the institutional arrangements alongside vouchers and contracts for effective service delivery (Savas, 2000). However, in reality the design and management of partnerships are less guided by theory (Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998, cited in Brinkerhoff, 2002, p.20) or conceptual frameworks and more guided by the realities of power, position and beneficiaries (Lister, 2000, cited in ibid., p.20).

The arguments in favour of public and private partnerships focus on the comparative advantage of organisations (Coston, 1998; Teamey, 2007). The experience in different country contexts, particularly the US and the UK, reveals that partnership has emerged as a popular approach to privatisation and to government and non-profit organisation relations (Young, 2000; Brinkerhoff, 2002; see Savas, 2000). Salamon (2000) argues that the involvement of the private sector – leading to privatisation of services – emerged from the quest to find solutions to public problems and from frustration with delivery failures of public programmes. The need to increase the responsiveness and efficiency of the state provided the legitimacy for private sector involvement whose benefits were alleged by the New Public Management (NPM) approach (Ferlie et al., 1996, cited in Brinkerhoff, op. cit., p.19). The techniques and practices in NPM are mainly drawn from the private sector shifting the emphasis from public administration to public management through decentralisation of public sector, use of market type of devices such as contracting out services and competition in provision of services (Larbi, 1999). Though the phenomenon emerged in developed countries, it is being increasingly used in developing countries facing fiscal crisis (p.1). Besides, the external pressure for reforms in the context of the structural adjustment programmes, the spread of neoliberal ideas in from 1970s onwards and the increasing focus on good governance in developing countries have

served as drivers for the NPM approach based reforms (p.3). The NPM has been critiqued for equating citizens to consumers and in a bid to emulate the involvement of stakeholders has allegedly placed the non-profit organisations within the privatisation agenda (Brinkerhoff, op. cit., p.20). Such critiques and the trends in service delivery have led to exploration of new forms of inter-sectoral collaborations different from traditional contracting out form of privatisation. Partnership rhetoric and its ambiguities in public service delivery is an outcome of these trends.

In the decade of the 90s there was a tendency in development literature to assume the involvement and collaboration of three sets of institutions i.e, markets, state and civil society through division of tasks for development – with the market providing funds, state providing regulated and peaceful democratic environment for investment and civil society pitching in to mobilise people and bridge gaps in the delivery of public services (Sen, 1999). Recently, this phenomenon of collaboration is moving towards further legitimacy through the governments launching state-enabled programmes for tripartite collaborations. The Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI), which is the focus of my research, is one such example. Though the studies focussing on the division of tasks for development have analysed state-civil society relationships (as pointed out in Sen, 1999), there is not any sizeable body of knowledge dedicated to tripartite collaborations enabled by the state. This is especially true for cross national partnerships.

In this section I reviewed the definitions of partnerships and the need to study multi-partite collaborations as a form of partnership. The next section reviews the literature on the relationships and purposes of partnerships.

3. Relationship and Purposes of Partnerships

Brinkerhoff (2002, p.20) has categorised the partnerships literature in three analytic streams. The first is the normative perspective (Fowler, 1999; Malena, 1995; Bush, 1992; Smillie, 1995) where the NGO advocates see the partnership as an end in itself, which maximises equity and inclusiveness through involvement of NGOs for collective efforts

towards sustainable development and service delivery. The second body of literature is what Brinkerhoff categorises as the reactive stream. This represents the literature from Donor agencies and international organisations, corporate and government materials (WB, 1996; DFID, 1998; USAID, 1997; Shell International, 1998). According to Brinkerhoff this literature has emerged in response to the normative stream and the purpose is to promote better public relations though some organisations might have more serious intentions and the materials from them truly reflect what they do or intend to achieve. This is true of some forms of corporate responsibility literature. The third stream of literature has pragmatic analytic focus and sees partnerships as instrumental and therefore focuses on effectiveness, efficiency and responsiveness (Brinkerhoff and Brinkerhoff, 2001; Coston, 1998; Edwards, 1996; Lowndes and Skelcher, 1998; Uphoff, 1993 all cited in *ibid.*). This literature is further categorised into three analytical threads. The first thread is the literature on relationship and purpose of partnership between the organisations. This also includes an emerging ‘how-to’ literature (Prince of Wales Business Leaders Forum, 1998). The second is the business alliances literature (Lambert et al., 1996; Dobbs, 1999). Equality in decision-making, autonomy of the partner organisations and corporate citizenship are the main issues addressed in this literature (Pollack, 1995; Williams, 1994). The third analytical thread in this stream includes literature on network theory (Agranoff and McGuire, 1999), political economy (Lipsky and Smith, 1989–1990; Ostrom, 1996) and the NPM and new governance models (Ferlie et al., 1996; Boston et al., 1996). The focus of this literature is inter-organisational relations particularly between the public and private sectors including civil society. Brinkerhoff cautions that though Network theory literature is rigorous and analytic, other literature in this thread, e.g. NPM and public choice often have a have normative orientation without a clear evidence base (p. 21).

My research also has a pragmatic analytic focus. In this study I intend to look at the relationships of the government and the partners in the partnerships under REI and also in the case of multiple partner partnerships, the relationships amongst the partners and the stakeholders. Thus, in discussing the partnerships in REI, I do not only ask the normative question ‘To what end?’ but also explore the inter-partner relationships in the partnership and nature of involvement of various stakeholders in the state enabled space for action.

The literature on partnerships in education emerges from the moral backdrop of coalescing national and global frames of education for all (EFA) as a human right, education for human capital, political democratization and civil society alongside differential capacities and intentions of states and organisations to fulfil this moral obligation (see UNICEF, 2007). A global will and intention to fulfil the global moral obligation thus serves as a major reason and purpose for partnering.


The partnerships thus range from those developed for the purpose of an aspect of service provision (for example, printing and supply of textbooks, supply and maintenance of computers) to educational provision as such (for example, establishing primary schools in unserved/underserved localities). The provision by the state is supplemented and /or complemented by non state provision. However although some literature identifies ‘any organisation outside the state’ as non–state provider (NSP) (Teamey, 2007, p.3), the proposition of the description of NSP in itself is amenable to debate (p.51).

India, for example, has a history of state subsidies provided to private efforts in the public interest. For example, the land subsidies given for the setting up of hospitals and educational institutions to organisations/societies; government aid to privately managed schools to the extent that 95% of teachers’ salaries were aided by the state. The surplus teachers in the government aided schools were often considered for ‘absorption’ in the government school system. The NGO sector also receives state subsidies and grants.⁴ Thus, what appears outside the state bears support of the state as well as linkages with the state in terms of rules of governance and management. That is to say that the organisational boundary between state and non-state is blurred (See also Lewin and Sayed, 2005) and in relation to policy with real social actors, this divide is becoming more blurred (Ball, 2008). A clear cut distinction between public and private; between profit and non-profit categories of service providers of education is difficult to make in some contexts (Rose, 2006).

⁴ According to Nair (2007) the Department of Elementary Education and Literacy of the Government of India granted aid of 100,000 INR (approx. USD 2222 at an exchange rate of 45 INR to the dollar) or above to 647 NGOs in the year 2003-04.

Fig. 2.1 Nexus between State and Civil-society

The nexus of state-society-civil society relations can be graphically demonstrated as follows :



Source: Ndue, 2001, p. 3

Policy impact is another dimension of the partnerships which forms the basis for relations between state and range of organisations. See for example the model of a successful PPP depicting the nexus between the state and civil society (Fig. 2.1). Though supporting PPPs for positive impact on policy in a developing country context, the model seems to convey that the flow of effect of an action between two entities is unidirectional. However conceptions such as this miss out upon the interaction and interplay of formal as well as non formal communications between entities as also directly participating and invisibly impacting on agencies/factors, ideological differences, differential emphasis of purpose and mandate, economic interests, legal status. The progress of the Cisco partnership, discussed in chapter 6, is a case in point. In a recently published article Bhanji (2012) discusses the case of Microsoft Corporation as a transnational private authority influencing educational policy through its localisation strategies through different partners — an ICT company in Jordan and an NGO in South Africa. The policy agency of the Ministry of Education in Jordan moved from that of being an owner, implementer and

funder to that of being a partner with the WEF through which Microsoft worked in Jordan.⁵ On the other hand in South Africa where Microsoft donated propriety software⁶ to the Department of Education, it had more control in decision making acting as an intermediary between the government department and the local NGO, which Microsoft partnered with to provide services on its behalf (ibid.). Thus the partnerships between public and private sectors partners can be seen not only as a tool of policy impact but also as strategic devices for sharing and gaining authority over specific state policies.

In the Ugandan context the partnerships for EFA were found to be between the NGOs and State or across the national borders between state actors and international NGOs or local NGOs and international organisations to form advocacy alliances (Murphy, 2005).


The theoretical dimensions of state-NGO-civil society relationships in context of third world countries and a global neo-liberal evolution of democracy mediated by global policy and development institutions is discussed by Kamat (2004). Describing the phenomenon following the ‘global launch of free markets’ leading to a ‘curious flip-flop’, Kamat observes the changes in notions related to the democratic State (from welfare state to the one serving the sectarian interests) as well as civil society (representing specific interest groups to general public interest). She explores the issue of the emergence of new

⁵ Microsoft was partner in the Jordan Education Initiative of the World Economic Forum. JEI is further discussed in Chapter 4 of this thesis.

⁶ This strategy is part of a longstanding global blueprint of the Microsoft Corporation. In Rajasthan also, as early as March 1999 Microsoft had signed a Memorandum of Understanding with the government of Rajasthan to build a technological infrastructure for improved governance. Establishing a Microsoft Certified Technical Education Centre in Jaipur, to achieve Rajasthan’s goal of becoming a piracy-free state in the next few years, ensuring the use of genuine software throughout the state, to design and develop IT curriculum for school and college students, making specialised courses more vocationally oriented were part of the MoU signed between the Rajcomp and Microsoft Corporation during the congress party led government in Rajasthan in 1999. Setting up the Microsoft Academy actually materialised with the launch of the Rajasthan Education Initiative in 2005 (see Chapter 4) during the Bharatiya Janata Party led government. These observations read alongside Bhanji’s (2012) work point towards the consistent moves of the transnational corporations in their strategy to acquire a share in authority over policy irrespective of country, partner and regime context through the devise of partnerships.

relationships between state and civil society due to emerging equations between public and private interests. There is an emerging neo-liberal model of civil society in which NGOs are being assimilated in complex ways (ibid.).

Fig. 2.2 Governance and Public-Private Interests Across Four Intersecting Dimensions



Source: Author (based on Kamat, 2004)

In fig 2.2 I have attempted to represent these two aspects – Governance and public-private interests across four intersecting dimensions. The angle of intersection is supposed to represent the relationship between the type of government and its closeness or remoteness with public or private interests.

The partnership relationships evolve or change as they are situated in a global political, economic and social milieu. The partnering organisations articulate and negotiate their roles and relationship with the state according to the context. In a paper based on field work in El Salvador, India, Bangladesh and Uganda, Archer (1994) discusses that due to the state's inaction NGOs were being put into a situation of a dilemma whether to remain "innovators or providers of alternate / non-formal education or to substitute state efforts for provision of education" for hitherto unreached, thus absolving the state of its responsibility (Archer, 1994). In a University of Sussex Development Lecture, David Archer discussed that over a period of practice Action Aid has moved to realise its role in the development scenario from that of service provider to that of policy advocacy organisation in collaboration with the community, practitioners and the state (Archer, 2008). Thus

advocacy is strongly emerging as a form of relation and partnership with the state. This position of Action Aid is more of an international-NGO (INGO) position. In REI we will see that the NGOs are more than advocates. The regional/national as well as international NGOs involved in REI are service deliverers and innovators.

In the context of organisational and management studies there are ample theoretical bases for inter-organisational collaborations, alliances and partnerships (see Barringer and Harrison, 2000). Barringer and Harrison discuss six 'theoretical paradigms' which, they argue, explain inter-organisational 'relationship formation.' These are transaction cost economies (TCE), resource dependency, strategic choice, stakeholder theory, organizational learning, and institutional theory. They further argue that the complexities of relationship formation cannot be explained by any one paradigm alone (p.368). For example, TCE can only explain the relationships when efficiency and cost-minimising form the rationale but not those alliances which are formed for reasons such as learning and legitimacy (p.369). REI was launched as an inter-organisational collaboration model for service delivery, innovation and learning. TCE to some extent can explain school adoption model kind of partnerships in REI (discussed in Chapter 5) but technology based interventions such as the Kid-smart project (see Chapter 6) which introduce learning of language and mathematics through interactive games software cannot be explained through TCE.

The Resource Dependence (RD) paradigm can provide a rationale for research consortia where the 'brains trust' could only be generated due to the collaborative nature of multi-organisational alliance (Dyer and Singh, 1998, cited in *ibid.*, p.373). Also acquisition of resources not only addresses the need to reduce resource dependency but also increases relative power of an organisation with respect to other organisations (p.372). In the case of the REI this theoretical paradigm can explain why organisations with financial power form partnerships with NGOs which have experience of training teachers and developing training materials (see Chapter 7). But this paradigm cannot explain why the Rajasthan government partnered with NIIT and the Jaipur Municipal Corporation (JMC) paid the project fee to NIIT for starting playground learning centres in Jaipur city (discussed in

Chapter 6). Further the organisations use various other strategies to cover their resource deficiency. Barringer and Harrison exemplify this through mergers, acquisitions and recruitment of key personnel from competitors (p.374). Though I did not come across examples of mergers and acquisitions amongst REI partners the ICICI Bank which was the funder of the QEP in district Baran did takeover The Rajasthan Bank in 2009. The corporate raiding of NGO trained personnel has been discussed (chapters 7 and 8) as an emergent outcome issue of the REI.

The Strategic Choice perspective is very broad in scope with the possibility of explaining almost every alliance which benefits an organisation, or presents the possibility of advantage, even in the long term as a strategic choice. However, this is also its weakness as it poses a challenge for researchers in understanding and grouping these strategies (ibid.). The WEF (see the WEF section in chapter 4) emerged as a strategic alliance of European businesses to counter their American competitors. Thus strategic alliances may be formed to increase the collective power or to found partnerships with local firms to gain new markets and enhance profits.⁷ However, we should not assume that strategies are ‘equally successful across environmental contexts’ (Kent, 1991, cited in ibid., p.376; also see chapter 10 of this thesis). The thesis therefore explores the extent to which this strategy of launching a programme with a promise of global resources, without putting in place the institutional structures locally to ensure that this happens, was indeed a strategic choice.

The stakeholder concept has been a popular concept in the development sector as well as in business and organisation studies. As Freeman puts it, stakeholder is “any group or individual who can affect and is affected by the achievement of the corporation’s purpose” and in a ‘narrow sense’, “those groups that are vital to the survival and success of the corporation” (Freeman, 2004, p.229). This analytical or descriptive definition of

⁷ In the Indian context another example of strategic alliance in retail sector is that of Wal-Mart with Bharti Enterprises whereby Wal-Mart will be the supplier to Bharti’s retail outlets. This alliance following government of India’s Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) regulation relaxation in the Indian retail sector in 2006 is critiqued to facilitate ‘back-door entry’ of Wal-Mart using Bharti as its ‘fig leaf’ and in conflict with the interests of small suppliers, farmers and local businesses (Guruswamy, Sharma and Jos, 2007).

stakeholder is different from the normative definition which includes a time related component whereby the stakeholders could be ‘any group or individual’ and the interest could be in ‘past, present or future’ (Clarkson, 1995, p.106, cited in Feige, Wallbaum and Krank, 2011, p.506). In the education partnerships complex the stakeholders include business organisations, governments, academia, communities, philanthropic foundations and various society organisations. The multi-stakeholder approach includes two types of stakeholders. The stakeholders included on the basis of ethical principles are called normative stakeholders and those whose focus is economic interest are the strategic stakeholders (Friedman and Miles, 2006, cited in *ibid.*). However, the literature suggests that the stakeholder relationships are constantly at risk because the interests of various stakeholders could be in conflict (Das and Takahashi, 2009) or have diverse backgrounds, dissimilar frames of reference, interests and agenda (Alsop and Farrington, 1998). Conflict may also arise due to different stakeholder conceptions which might have both social and financial dimensions (Feige, Wallbaum and Krank, *ibid.*; see CII school adoption case Chapter 5). Researchers in organisation ethics argue that the stakeholder theory is not a theory of political economy and caution that the stakeholder is not synonymous with ‘citizen’ or ‘moral agent’ (Phillips, Freeman and Wicks, 2003, p.491). The various stakeholder models though advocate that there can be congruence of stakeholder goals through alliance but fail to provide advice on the form of an alliance (Barringer and Harrison, 2000, p.377). Multi-stakeholder alliances as in the educational partnerships complex where the issue rather than the organisation is at the centre of the partnership and which are based on inter-organisational relationships, call for further examination and interpretation of the stakeholder theory.

The organisations enter into partnership for gaining the competitive advantage through organisational learning (Hamel, 1991, cited in *ibid.*, p.378). However, organisations vary in their capacity to learn and may not benefit equally or might be at disadvantage in the long run due to sharing of the propriety information with their partners (*ibid.*, p.382). Also there is institutional pressure on organisations to form partnerships. Institutional theory (DiMaggio and Powell, 1983, cited in *ibid.*, p.380) explains that the organisations conform to social norms to gain legitimacy (*ibid.*). However, whether the

decision to form partnership is a strategic choice or simply conformity to institutional norms is not clear. Business philanthropy is an example of an institutional social norm as well as a strategic choice (Breeze, 2007; Ball, 2007, cited in Ball, 2008). Again the role of private foundations which are institutional products of business organisations has been questioned by researchers who argue that there is an ideological push mixing philanthropy and partnerships (Srivastava and Oh, 2010).

Despite the theoretical legitimacy, ‘many inter-organizational relationships fall short of meeting the expectations of their participants or fail for other reasons’ (Barringer and Harrison, 2000, p.368). Further, there is lack of a theoretical basis for government and non-profit sector relationship (Salamon, 1987, cited in Coston, 1998). In the real world, the presence or lack of a legitimate theoretical basis does not seem to affect the outcome of the phenomenon of partnerships in terms of their success or failure. Whether there is a theoretical basis or not, the reality is that many forms of relationships and partnerships involving various actors with the state are emerging constantly, shaping the education sector (Ball, 2007) and therefore form a legitimate basis for informed inquiry and critique.

4. Multi-Stakeholder Partnerships

One such recent *avatar*⁸ of partnerships is MSP, which is labelled as a disguised form of privatisation in some debates. The MSPs are pitched as an innovative model of PPPs (Draxler, 2008; UN, 2000; IMF, 2004; WEF, 2005). These partnerships might not be contractual in nature and without agreed commercial benefit to the partner organisation.

“Multi-stakeholder partnerships ... [involve] actors from the private sector (private corporations, corporate foundations, groups or associations of businesses) and the public sector (Ministry of Education and schools)...This concept entails reciprocal obligations and mutual accountability...the sharing of investment (financial or in-kind) and reputational risks ...and joint responsibility in design and execution”(EI, 2009,119, cited in Ginsburg, 2012, in Ginsberg et al., 2012, p.156).

⁸ *Avatar* (incarnation) in Hindu mythology depicts the recent materialised embodied form of God. Thus though the materialised, embodied form may take different shapes and change over a period of time, the content, the spirit and the concept remains unchanged.

In such a scenario the state is no more a regulator, rather MSPs are self-regulated. This is not because the state is part of the partnership but because it is assumed that due to mutual accountability and reciprocal obligations ingrained in the MSP concept, partnerships are self-regulated by default. Therefore, the MSPs are critiqued as the latest vehicle of privatisation and marketisation (Robertson, 2008). Though proponents of PPPs in education like Patrinos argue that in absence of state as regulator the benefits of PPPs cannot be realised. At the same time, they also confess that close monitoring and regulation of the private sector is problematic in case of MSPs in education (Patrinos, 2012 in Ginsberg et al., 2012, p.163–164). This raises questions about the public accountability of the partnerships. The conflict of interests amongst partners with a political obligation and financial gain motive appears as a major challenge of MSPEs. Research suggests that formalisation of partnerships increases accountability. The formality of relationship of an organisation with regard to its constituency is seen as empowering (through rights of access, rectification and also ownership) and important to address the issue of downward accountability (Kilby, 2006). Here the indicators of formality include timely meetings with an announced agenda involving issues of the constituency and the minutes of the meetings reflecting response of the organisation to its constituency. As the degree of formality increases the downward accountability also tends to increase in the context of NGO-community relationships (ibid.).

This encourages us to ask similar questions regarding multipartite collaborations and MSPs. Does the increase in the level of formality between state and other collaborators lead to high accountability? How do different partners ensure downward accountability? How is the accountability ensured when multiple actors work in the same constituency? Is there a gap between the degree of formality as reported and that in actual practice? Does the differential capacity with regard to resource power (capitalist and a certain technological power of business houses, or capacity to work closely with poor communities) impact on the nature and quality of formality and hence the accountability? These are questions that the fieldwork considered.

The debates on partnerships are ideological and there is need for hard comparable evidence towards virtues and dangers of partnerships/MSPEs (Draxler, 2012, p.165; Klees, 2012, p.168, all in Ginsberg et al., *ibid.*). Klees also argues that the involvement of the private sector is impacting on the schools (*ibid.*). Whilst Draxler cautions that in the name of flexibility and informality the state should not compromise on the values of ‘democracy, transparency and labour laws’ (Draxler, *ibid.*, p.160), Klees argues that MSPEs offer a ‘pretense that power is not an issue’ although the partners have unequal powers (Klees, *ibid.*, p.161; see the case of QEP in Chapter 7). Thus, efficiency, accountability and strategic reshaping and reformulation of the public sector as well as education emerge as the issues to be researched with respect to MSPEs. The question ‘what for?’ is an important question to ask since as discussed in the case of Action Aid, where the organisation has moved from service provision to policy advocacy. Thus who are the organisations and partners partnering with the state and what do they intend to deliver are some of the question which I will answer in this research.

The discussions lead us to contemplate on how to research partnerships and MSPs as such. In the following section I will discuss the research frameworks to study partnerships in education, and more specifically MSPEs.

5. Researching Partnerships

As the discussion on MSPEs also reveals most of the work on success or failure of partnerships has focussed on partnership outcomes. Though this kind of research provides the evidence about short term benefits or dangers of the assessment of outcomes it does not tell us much about the long term benefits that could be accrued from partnerships or risks emerging from the partnerships (see Brinkerhoff, 2002; see chapter 9) nor does it always compare the outcomes with those that could be achieved through other means. These risks are not only financial but also political and democratic (Ham and Koppenjanm, 2001, p.598 cited in Greve and Hodge 2005, p.4). However, researching partner relations and the process of partnership in progress can signal towards the value-added of partnerships and thus a better assessment focus. PPPs have become part of a language game (Teisman and

Kiljn, 2002, cited in *ibid.*, p.4; p.7) played by governments and different actors to usher in privatisation. Therefore, researchers need to be careful in how they approach the empirical analysis of PPPs (Greve and Hodge, *ibid.*). This is to say that, the government policy language may change over a period of time but the nature of space and action remains the same or the language in policy does not change but the interpretation is different and this restructures space and action.

How does this role negotiation happen in MSPs? To what extent do partners define and decide their roles and relationships? To what extent are the relationships situational and how do they interact with prevailing policy environment?

According to Draxler, the essential themes which need to be considered in programmes and case description to ensure successful outcome of MSPs are need, ownership by stakeholders, conscious focus on impact, strong regulation and accountability, sustainability and lastly monitoring and evaluation (Draxler, 2008, p.16). Her review brings out the fact that in MSPs a comprehensive need analysis taking into account national goals and processes is less prevalent (p.28).

Secondly ownership is impossible if stakeholders at the receiving end or the implementers are not involved (*ibid.*). In case of REI, the teachers who are the implementers of the school level programmes and projects were not involved (see Chapter 5, 6). Who are the stakeholders and what is the nature of stakeholder involvement in REI?

Thirdly, as Draxler points out that limiting description to process or outputs has its risks as not much can be learnt about the initiatives. Therefore in view of the thin evidence on effects of partnerships (p.28 – 29) effects and agency of educational change should be closely looked at starting at the very onset of the programme. Though it is a paradox that though short term effect can be immediately analysed but in view of multiple change agents, actors and policies only a balanced speculative prediction can be made unless there is a way to have longitudinal studies assessing the programme. In the context of education

scenario due to interests of industries and government mandates to match international commitments the change is fast and a balanced interpretation is necessary.

Fourthly, she notes that the partnerships in which the UN is involved lack clarity to enable partners to know their merits (p.29). Hence it becomes pertinent to assess transparency in terms of 'how partnerships are formed, their management, financial structures, processes and results'. Fifthly she views partnerships for their value to innovate and experiment, to create models which can be scaled up. Thus sustainability is inferred as potential for up scaling. I discuss some of these issues in my research.

Scaling up of non state provisions to meet the demand in view of EFA and MDGs is an obvious concern as many non-state providers might not be prepared to take up the responsibility (Lewin, 2007). Operational scale up of NGO activities is also a matter of concern because this could lead to a reduction in public delivery of services thus impacting access to the services for the poor majority who are not catered to by NGOs (Edwards and Hulme, 1992). In a capitalist market scenario the economies of scale are not achievable for the not-for-profit organisations in comparison to for-profit organisations. This is because for-profit organisations have better access to capital markets which is required for the expansion of service provision (Marwell and McInerney, 2005, p.9). The Development Policy Review on India (WB, 2006) spots that many of the reform initiatives are either individual person or individual organisation driven. Such initiatives end as the individuals move on and hence their coming to scale is a difficulty. What incentive does the state have to scale-up innovations and reforms? Does scalability mean feasibility? Whose interest does the scaling up serve (funding organisation, NGO, the state, community, some other service provider)? How does scaling up impact partner relations?

Sixthly, Draxler points towards weak monitoring and evaluation evidences due to casual approaches towards spending, monitoring and evaluation (e.g. lack of financial management in REI, discussed in Chapter 4). My research is not focussed on answering the question 'How can we make MSPs successful?' rather it intends to bring to the table the evidence on how the partnerships have worked in practice in the specific context of

Rajasthan and add to the debate on MSPs. More specifically it seeks to find out how an MSP led by international partners unfolded in a regional context and if MSPs such as REI are sustainable? (see research questions in Chapter 3).

Brinkerhoff points out that there is a lack of evaluation frameworks to evaluate partnership relationships. She proposes a continuous process-oriented developmental assessment approach (2002). The organisational identity and mutuality are discussed as a matrix to assess partnership relationships. However her own experience in the consortium for which this assessment approach was developed points to the fact that the partners involved were not interested in the framework and approach. This is indicative of the politics of involvement of partners and how they view the role of a contractual assessor or evaluator. In the next chapter while discussing my efforts to negotiate access for the field study I also discuss the relationship and impact on the assessment of REI partnerships.

Ball (2007) in his book 'Education Plc' has used three sets of analytical tools to empirically examine educational partnerships in the UK. The first is discourse analysis of education, public sector reform, the private and the market, the second is drawn from Jessop's (1997, 1998a, 1988b, 2001, 2002, 2004, all cited in *ibid.*) work on economic geography and political sociology, his analysis of state and state intervention and emergence of competition state and the third tool is interactional whereby through the analysis of subjective positions of private actors across the public-private divide, Ball brings out the fact that new forms of governance are complex and so are the subjectivities (p.11) whereby private interests and public interest are inseparably mingled (p.12). The phenomenon of REI has brought in the private sector in the education sector with a new thrust as we will see in the discussion in chapter 4 (also Chapter 6). Also the logic of REI and the reason for participation of IT industry is based and developed on premises of educating for a competitive global society.

In the following section I discuss some theoretical insights

6. Theoretical and Methodological Insights

6.1 The Principal Agent Framework

Lane (2000) discusses the principal agent approach which models the interaction between two sets of people – the principal and the agent. The model is based on the assumption that the principal pays the agent for services according to the market-wise value of the output that the agent produces. The important aspect of the model is asymmetry of information skewed in favour of the agent. The interaction is supposed to take some time to evolve. Lane argues that the accountability in public organisations i.e., how public teams act as agents for their government (the principal) can be explained with the P-A framework.

This framework is used to examine organisational relationships as a ‘tension between the ‘principal’ who demands a service and the ‘agent’ who provides it (Batley, 2004, p.38). Analysing further the relationship Batley points out that the agents over a period of time could use their ‘superior knowledge’ to divert benefits in their own direction (ibid.). I share the critique held by Batley that the principal agent model offers only a one-dimensional view of interactional behaviour and ignores the cooperative aspects of social life.

When and as the multiple players enter into the game, it would lead to more probabilities of interactions between the principal and the chosen agents. Further, the P-A model might have to be developed further to understand a situation where the agents are collaborating with the principal towards delivery of service provision but all the agents have differential degree of information and different but interacting sets of responsibilities. How this impacts the mutuality of interactions and joint accountability is explored to some extent in this research.

The REI case might seem in the first instance a case of P-A framework where the state acts as the principal while the organisations supporting public education are agents. However, there is an intricate web of principals and agents in the case of

multilateral/multipartite collaborations. According to the stakeholder approach the managers are agents while the stakeholders are principals working towards the interest of the firm (Freeman, 2004). When managers outsource services, they are principals as well as agents at the same time. P-A model can accommodate contracting out of services in exchange of money but how to explain multi-stakeholder collaboration which are non-profit in spirit and not all aiming for delivery of services. The principals want the best service at lowest cost whilst profit agents want the best margins and highest prices for the least service. This can lead to conflict of interests not only between the principal and the agent. Also as discussed in the section on forms of partnerships, there can be inter-agent conflict and also conflict in the conceptualisation of stakeholders. The complexities of such interactions demand the development of a model having more explanatory capacity than the P-A model to explain the processes and outcomes.

6.2 Frameworks of Power

Partnerships entail inter-organisational relationships (see the section 'Relationships and purposes of partnerships' in this chapter). The sociology of organisations presupposes power in inter-organisational relationships (Clegg, Courpasson and Phillips, 2006, p.7). However what power is (Hobbesian mechanical foundations of power (Hobbes, 1651, cited in *ibid.*, p.129) and how it operates (Machiavellian interpretation, *ibid.*, p.218) are the questions which have been conceptualised in several ways (Clegg and Wilson, 1991). Power is a multilayered concept (Arts and Tatenhove, 2004) and essentially contested (Lukes, 2005). Broadly speaking, there is a social and political conceptualisation of power and there is a discursive conceptualisation. For state theorists, power is associated with state and formal political institutions (see Foucault, 2004b, cited in Jessop, 2007, p.35; Jessop, 1995). The capitalist power is yet another form of power situated outside the political institutions (Mandel, 1969) and shaping the society through use of state power (Leys, 2001, p.2, cited in Ball, 2007, p.6).

Other ways in which power is referred to across the literature reviewed include: Decision making, Purchasing power, Economic power, Ruling power/power of the

government/power of the state, Physical Power, Supra-sovereign power, Social power, Infrastructural power, Consensual power, Global economic and political power, Resource power, Legal power, Charisma and symbolic power. I will use these categories of power during my analysis of REI partnerships.

In an empirical study Tappin (2000) has used five forms of power to analyse the interviews exploring relationship between government and NGOs following three years of international funding in a small island. These five forms of power suggested by French and Raven (1958, 1959, cited in Tappin, 2000, p.7) are: reward, coercive, referent, legitimate, and expert where reward is control of material resources; coercive is ability to punish by taking away reward; referent is personality related qualities and ability to influence others' actions; legitimate is position power – authority – nature of position or status and expert is relevant experience or expertise, often acquired skills. This framework of power is derived from Dahl (1957, cited in *ibid.*).

Dahl defines power 'as a relationship between social actors in which one social actor A (controlling unit) can get another social actor B (responsive unit) to do something that it, B, would otherwise not have done' (*ibid.*; see also Power, Haugaard ed., 2002, p.12). This conceptualisation assumes a cause and effect relationship being an important dimension of power. Thus, social actor A becomes a causative agent of effecting a certain action by social actor B. This can be explained by the REI example where in the collaborative association between NGOs and government is enabling NGOs (Social actor A) to make the government (social actor B) address issues of infrastructure and provision of teachers in the areas where the NGO is supporting government schools. However, it may be argued that this kind of power is contingent upon the REI framework which provides the NGOs to assert and demand a certain action from their collaborating partner. As Dahl also explains that in the analysis of power, Resources, Skills, Motivations and Costs are important analytical-explanatory aspects to be considered to account for differences in power of social actors (Power, Haugaard ed., 2002, p. 14-15). This implies that besides Dahl's agency based concept of power we also need to take into account the 'structural conditions' and the 'systems of knowledge which make such an exercise of power possible' (Haugaard, 2002, p.304).


Box 2.1 Going beyond Power of Actor A over Actor B

Another example which I came across during this research is the work of an REI partner NGO in an educationally deprived locality in the city of Jaipur in Rajasthan (discussed in chapter 7). The NGO involved the local leaders and the member legislative assembly (MLA) representing the area by initially apprising them of the school- building construction work undertaken by the NGO for a government school which had no building. The leaders could see the point that their support for the government school building would ensure them future electoral gain. The MLA responded proactively by announcing contribution of 100,000 INR (approx. 2222 USD @ 45 INR to the dollar) for each government school-building coming up in their constituency. Thus the NGO was able to make the leaders become responsive to an aspect necessary for the educational development of the region. The MLAs have area development fund for their constituency which was till now not used for any development related to children's education. However, it may be difficult to identify an outcome and further attribute an outcome as an effect of a particular partnership/relation-ship. (Dowling et al., 2004).

The instance discussed above (Box 2.1) however has multiple layers which go beyond 'social actor A making social actor B do something' kind of power analysis as used by Dahl. That the NGO mentioned in this case was an REI partner, a programme which is highlighted by the state as well as media provides some legitimacy and charisma to the NGO as an assertive actor who is in an advantageous position to negotiate and involve stakeholders. This is besides the NGO's long standing reputation for working closely with educationally deprived localities and poor communities, lack of dependence of the NGO on public funds and its ability to attract funding from international agencies.

Further, the political and economic interests of collaborating partners in impacting upon a process to achieve a certain outcome also need to be taken into consideration. Another example of power analysis by Dowding (1996, p.28, cited in Lukes and Haglund, 2005, p.2) is that of international funding agencies pushing NGOs to scale up their projects and/or to enter into partnerships with the governments. The NGOs might not have done so otherwise but the money power of the funding agency makes them scale up or attain new partnerships. The question arises why do the agencies want NGOs to scale up or to work with government? Because the scaling up of a programme funded by them or adopted by the state provides these agencies, visibility and legitimacy and enhances possibility of future alliances with the state.

Fig 2.3 Three Dimensional Power



Source: Lukes, 2005


Thus the question of why would A want B to do something which B would not have otherwise done, essentially points towards the aspect of intentionality in the exercise of power. This aspect has been included by Steven Lukes (2005) in his three dimensional analysis of power (Fig. 2.3). Lukes undertakes the analysis of the power within the Marxist tradition and the debates (whether the social relations are contingent or determined by structures) within to theorise power and structural constraints of an agent as opposite ends of a continuum (Haugaard, 2002, p.38). Lukes' analysis focuses on firstly the role of intentionality in the exercise of power; Secondly, the meaning of 'real' or 'true' interests and thirdly the nature of relationship between power and responsibility. Thus power emerges as intentional. However, Lukes' analysis has been critiqued to be limited as it does not concern itself with the 'state's capacity to act on and through its subjects and

aspects of ‘government’ and ‘governance’ within states is today ‘being conducted by public-private partnerships and by formal and informal networks involving a variety of state and non-state agencies’ (Hindess, 2006, p.119, cited in Lukes, 2006, p.164). In the analysis of MSPs in this research, while it might be difficult to evaluate true interests or intentions of the alliances, I am able to comment on the power of these alliances and inquire into the purpose of these partnerships. This is achieved through an analysis of stated objectives and claims regarding the development and outcomes of these alliances, observations of the processes in the field over a period of time alongside textual analysis,

Gaventa (2006) builds upon Lukes’ ideas to develop a framework for power analysis represented by the ‘power cube’ (see Fig. 2.4) which includes levels of power (from local to global) and spaces of engagement being created (as closed, invited and claimed/created) in addition to the forms of power (visible, hidden, invisible) as separate but interrelated dimensions. He differentiates between positive and negative conceptions of power-which include power to exercise control over others and power as a capacity or agency to effect positive action.

The power cube presents (see Fig 2.4) a model for alignment of strategies for social change by showing that those seeking to challenge power in all of its spaces, levels and forms need to search not for one solution, but to build , multiple, linked strategies and in different sequences, depending on the starting point in any given context (Gaventa, 2006). Further he emphasizes that the power cube cannot speculate which strategies and in what sequence would work rather it is a tool to reflect and analyze ‘how strategies for change in turn change power relations’ (p.31). The invited spaces are those in which users or beneficiaries are invited to participate by the government, super-national agencies or non-governmental organizations (Cornwall, 2002, cited in Gaventa, 2006, p.26). REI, however, is a different example where the businesses, their CSR groups and foundations and NGOs are invited to participate in the public sector. Moreover, we shall see in chapter 4 that the creation of the invited space for PPPs in Rajasthan was influenced by the advocacy alliances of the WEF on one hand, whilst the PPP strategies of the GoI also

Fig. 2.4 The Power Cube




Source: Gaventa, 2006

provided the framework and space for platforms such as WEF to forge MSPs. Also, as the case of GeSCI suggests in chapter 4, strategic alliances with transnational linkages mobilise various forms of power to affect policy and practices at the national level as part of globalisation strategies (see also Bhanji, 2012).

If we agree with the idea of unequal agency in the exercise of power and also power being structural then the level of access and participation in decision making which comes with the invitation varies according to the participants in the invited spaces. Who invites? What is the nature of the invited space? Who are the invitees? What privileges do the invitees get? To what extent does the invitation allow them to participate thus creating closed spaces or spaces with limited possibility of participation even within the invited space?

Fig. 2.5 Layers of Invited Spaces



I have depicted core and peripheral invited spaces in the above figure (2.5). The innermost ellipse is the core of the invited space where many of the decisions impacting the policy and change take place (e.g., the core partners of the REI – see Chapter 4). Also the ellipses are not centred or symmetrically arranged because invited spaces could be created within (e.g. the case of QEP in Chapter 7) or outside the invited space (organisations forming an alliance; expert groups; curriculum committees), according to the strategic needs. Again the invited spaces can have dense/privileged participation in decision making towards the core and lesser responsibility for action.

The role of agencies and actors in defining and negotiating the spaces is important as well. Though the Governments dominate in the continuum of power relations, they incorporate agencies and actors that can impact the relationship by being cooperative or repressive (Coston, 1998, p.365). This argument of the power continuum, who dominates the continuum and for what purpose has been explored in this study. However, those involved in these power relations face broader opportunities, options, and constraints and these form the basis of the power relations (Allen, 2003). In the emerging institutional reality of PPPs, the organisations come together or decide to work with the state or state has

to work with a variety of actors due to these emerging options and constraints. The organisations and the space as such is also impacted in the process. It thus emerges that power is highly differentiated. Global level organisations might have power to forge alliances or influence governments to launch programmes but how these alliances operate, what partnerships are organised and under what conditions and how the partners participate in the process will depend on various permutations and combinations of forms of power, organisations and spaces.

Multi-scalar, MSPs such as REI are aimed at educational issues of a particular region/geographical location. This complex setting has implications for theory, research and practice as MSPEs cannot be analysed on the basis of simple inter-organisational and institutional conceptualisations.

6.2.1 A Realist Account of Power

How do the different explanations and workings of power interact to bring to us the concept of power as an analytical tool for understanding MSPs? To this end, Andrew Sayer's discussion on understanding the spatiality of power immanent in the social phenomena through interrogation of causal powers and emergent properties (Sayer, 2004) is a helpful analytical tool.

According to Sayer there are two kinds of power — power1 which is structural, relational and acquired causal power of 'objects' but not necessarily exercised and power2 which is the activated causal power. The objects could be persons, social institutions and relations with other objects. Further, the objects as well as structures are susceptible to influence. In the context of MSPs the policy of the national and state governments to forge PPPs could provide the causal power to the government institutions to enter into partnerships with the private sector and also change the focus from citizens and rights to customers and privatisation (see Srivastava, 2010). The Indian government's PPP strategies in the tenth and eleventh five year plans are an example (ibid.). At the same time


an international thrust of businesses to enter into alliances with the governments is another form of causal power to launch PPPs. However there could be differences in interests and focus between the government and the businesses entering into partnerships. These differences serve as causal susceptibilities towards actualisation of the purposes.

The financial resources for launching an innovative programme by the private partners are yet another example of the role of causal power in the genesis, formalisation and operationalisation of PPPs.⁹ However, the private partners might not really have the vision and expertise to take forward the programme in the public domain (School adoption by the CII partner is an example discussed in Chapter 5; also see the analysis of extent of WEF's role in REI in case study chapters 5, 6, 7, 8).

These causal susceptibilities affect the exercise of power. The example of acquired power could be the ability to weigh options, judge, speak. However in terms of, how these powers exist and affect we need to consider two points regarding each kind of power. Firstly, the activation of power¹ of an object depends upon the power and 'susceptibilities' of other objects and structures in relation to one another. Secondly, the effects of activated causal power² of an object depend upon the causal powers of other objects. Thus power of an object may be further toughened, overruled, stopped or modified. The ability of civil society organisations to somewhat counter the repressive forces of globalisation is an example in this regard (see Novelli, 2004). GeSCI's example of influencing policy in Chapter 4 is yet another instance of how the activated causal power of the alliance was limited by the policy discussions nationally. I have tried to depict this in the following figure (2.6). Here the movement from causal power and susceptibilities to effect is not linear and does not mean actualisation of potential power, Sayer cautions. This is only a tendency and may not be necessarily achieved (Sayer, *ibid.*, p.262). This movement involves, what Sayer calls '*double contingency*'. Thus the relation between power¹ and power² is contingent but also tendential.

⁹ I would rather say – the promise or expectation of financial resources.

Fig 2.6 Double Contingency of Power



Source: based on Sayer, 2004

Sayer further explains what entails from this double contingency of power. Firstly he says that power1 and susceptibilities of other objects constitute the context for power2 of an object. Still the same action can produce different effects and different actions can produce the same effect, which is to say that the causal relation between action and effect is neither linear nor is it unilateral. Thus on the basis of outcomes it is difficult to say whether they are cause of a purposeful action and also even when there is a purposeful action is exercised the outcome might be unintended. Also the same strategy and action may not continue to affect same outcomes over a period of time. This double contingency of power contests the prevalent notions of central power while discussing multinational corporations or international organisations. At the same time it emerges that though causal powers are everywhere they are not equal everywhere. Thus the causal powers of governments, international aid agencies (with commitments to work with governments), transnational business corporations (with intentions to work with national governments for short term or long term business gains), civil society organisations (at national, regional and local levels) and philanthropy groups, even when aiming for a programme for ‘education for all’, will be

different. According to Sayer, this omnipresence of power1 and power2 forms the realist account of power. According to Sayer, a realist view of power is consistent with the Foucauldian idea of power operating through bodies (p.264) and Allen's description of resources which can be held and mobilized (p.257). Further as Sayer argues that this realist concept of causal powers can also hold the assertions of realists such as Bhasker and Fairclough that reasons and other discursive phenomena (e.g. this research) produce change (p.264).

Thus, Sayer's discussion of a realist concept of causal powers provides us with an important analytical tool and nuanced understanding of complexities, permutations, combinations and emergence of power in various manners, some of which might not be intentional. This is helpful for in this thesis is to use the concept of power1 and power2 to interpret the MSPs affected across spaces through linkages and alliances, their claims and intentions and the partnerships relationships, purposes and outcomes. For the purpose of the analysis, I use the concepts of power1 and power2 through identification of causalities and susceptibilities in each partnership and to evaluate the design of the partnership, involvement of stakeholders and the governance mechanisms of each specific partnership discussed in the case studies to conclude about the sustainability of each partnership and its power and capacity to deliver UEE goals. I will then synthesise my conclusion through cross case analysis in chapter 9.

7. Conclusion

In this chapter I started by discussing the various definitions of partnerships their relationships and purposes in terms of inter-organisational context, theoretical bases of inter-organisational relationships and MSPs in education as the new avatar of PPPs. The literature review in the MSP section brings out the fact that there is not only a lack of evidence about the success and failure of PPP initiatives, but also there is not enough research questioning and explaining how and why these partnerships are organised, their relationships and their outcomes. The principal agent theory and frameworks of power are discussed to arrive at analytical tools to understand state enabled MSPs in developing

country context and in a web of principals and agents. The realist framework of power is helpful for the analysis of each partnership, in terms of its causal powers and susceptibilities, and how they are impacted through local, regional and global contingencies in the invited spaces for PPP.

Chapter 3

Research Questions and Methodology

1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the conceptual framework of the study and the research questions. Here I present critical realism and realist evaluation as the basis for my methodological position. This chapter also discusses methods used in the study and reflects on how on-the-ground situation deviated from plans with respect to field work. A fundamental requirement for qualitative enquiry – negotiating access – remained my biggest concern throughout my research work and therefore I also reflect on the process and outcomes of negotiating access. Finally I set out the structure of the case study chapters proposing to discuss three different aspects of individual partnerships. These are: Design, Stakeholder Involvement (stakeholders, depending on partnership design, include one or more of these groups: partners, teachers, communities and children) and the Governance of the partnerships.

2. Research Questions and the Conceptual Framework

The literature review in the previous chapter indicates that public-private partnerships or MSPs are now ubiquitous and contested in terms of their nature, purpose and relationships. There is a dearth of evidence and we do not know enough as to how MSPs unfold in specific situations and why. Therefore there was a need to take up a context-based in-depth inquiry which looks at the MSPs taking shape in a state enabled space of action formalised amongst the partners. The purpose of this study is not only to comment on whether MSPs work or not but to garner insights about the stakeholders, their intended participation in terms of the design of these partnerships as not-for-profit (or by non-profit) and the practice of this multi-layered phenomenon in a developing country context. Thus, in this research study I locate empirical evidence of MSPs in practice into theoretical accounts of relationship and purposes of MSPs using frameworks of power

(discussed in Chapter 2) as the analytical tool. Moreover, the evaluations and assessments of MSPs so far have been internal, commissioned and therefore to a great extent serve the interests of those commissioning research. This research being an independent academic endeavour, where my experience as practitioner sparked the inspiration to undertake this research, qualifies it as potentially unbiased empirical research evidence.

I set out for this research with the following research questions (RQs). I developed these questions as a result of i) working with one of the REI partners, ii) the literature review on the purposes and relationships of partnerships, iii) the review of the theoretical approaches towards and forms of inter-organisational relationships and iv) while looking for research evidence on working of MSPs in a specific context.

1. Why did the government of Rajasthan (GoR) initiate the Rajasthan Education Initiative and invite multiple providers to support public education service delivery? This will cover a range of questions including:

- What are the central assumptions and propositions that underpin the REI as these relate to improved service delivery?
- Who were the key actors and what were goals?
- What were the processes that resulted in the REI?
- What factors influenced the early development and launch of the REI?
- What was the basis for inter-organisational collaboration to deliver educational services?
- What were the expected benefits of Rajasthan Education Initiative?

2. What are the key features of the REI? This will cover a range of questions including:

- Who are the Partners, what kind of organisations are they, what are their formal and informal roles, and what are their reasons for engagement?
- Who are the beneficiaries and which needs does the REI seek to meet?

- What structural arrangements for collaboration, resource flows and policy implementation have been made by the State government and the partners to achieve the goals of REI?
- What do Partners do and how are their contributions to service delivery coordinated and managed? What are their comparative advantages?
- How do Partners perceive their own roles and their special contributions to the REI, and how do they perceive the roles of other Partners?
- How is the REI financed and what are the mechanisms for accountability?

3. How has the REI developed and what are the influences on its development?

This will cover a range of questions including:

- How has the REI changed since its inception and why?
- Which Partners have most influence on patterns of development and why?
- What mechanisms give voice to different Partners and stakeholders and how are these voices heard?
- How do Partners negotiate and renegotiate their roles within the REI?
- How is coordination between partners achieved?
- How are competing and conflicting interests resolved?
- Which structures facilitate and inhibit the development of the partnership?

4. What impact has the REI had on service delivery and to what extent has it achieved its goals? This will cover a range of questions including:


- What are the internal and external mechanisms for monitoring and evaluation?
- Who participates in monitoring and evaluation and how are the views of different stakeholders taken into account?
- What does monitoring and evaluation data indicate about the impact of the REI on service delivery? Have expected benefits been realised?
- Have there been unanticipated outcomes and if so how have these contributed to service delivery?
- What has been the impact of external and multilateral partners on the development of the REI?

- What has been the impact of REI on state government policy and practice?

5. To what extent is the REI sustainable and scalable? This will cover a range of questions including:

- How do the State government and Partners visualise the future development of the REI?
- Under what conditions will it be sustained?
- Under what conditions will its contributions to service delivery extended to reach a wider audience of beneficiaries?
- Will aspects of the REI be institutionalised and if so which and why?
- To what extent is the REI a model for multi-partner collaboration to improve service delivery and access to basic education of quality?

Fig. 3.1 Conceptual Framework of the Research Study



The research questions, between themselves address the background, features, development, impact and sustainability aspects of REI. Fig 3.1 depicts the conceptual framework for studying the REI as an MSP and as an invited space for action. The research question 2 and 5 for example seeks to probe the level and scale of partnerships under REI, eight of which are discussed in chapters 5, 6, 7, 8. Similarly RQ 1 is about the antecedents of the REI which led to its formation and formalisation as MSP. Chapter 4 addresses this question. How REI has evolved over a period of time, how will it be sustained in future are issues related to partnership transformation and involve the aspect of temporality. These are the RQs 3 and 5 which are addressed across this thesis and specifically discussed in chapter 9 and 10. As stated earlier in the Chapter 1, I reiterate that this research addresses the impact and outcomes related specifically to the partnerships and not to the learning outcomes for children in school because of the differential focus of the partnerships, the need to understand the partnership evolution as partnership outcome so as to make an assessment about the rhetoric and claims of the REI and its global partners. Thus rather than school or the children's learning individual partnership is taken up as the unit of analysis.

2.1 Philosophical Approach

Exploration and understanding reality in the social system has been a constant concern of scientific as well as social science research. And for a researcher it is a pursuit of knowledge — to understand the social world, to make sense of what is going on out there and also to reflect upon one's own assumptions about reality and knowledge.

My research is broadly situated in the field of social science inquiry – to understand the dynamics of a purposeful and therefore causal relationship between the government and its various partners in REI. So, in this inquiry, there is an object of intention/purpose inherent in the interaction of two or more entities in a formalised setting. The purpose presupposes causality and its predictability to a certain extent. However the cause and effect relationships and their link to the structure are not straight forward.

In the following section I analyse and present my ontological view of society, epistemological position on the search for reality and my theoretical views on my role as a researcher. I begin by discussing paradigms of sociological analysis proposed by Burrell and Morgan (1979). As a researcher, my interest in the model is that it allows me to describe my position within a context of methodological pluralism vis-à-vis different aspects of the research study proposed by me.

The REI has brought in a multiplicity of organisations with varying legal status (State, registered non-governmental organisations, corporate groups, national and international level funding agencies), size and responsibility in partnership with the GoR. Further, the REI partner organisations also have their individual organisational focus and agenda. Thus a question arises – how to situate interactions which have a global as well as local context, which are impacted by and also having an impact on educational development.

3. Paradigms of Sociological Analysis

The paradigms for sociological analysis (SAPs) have been discussed in a 2x2 matrix by Burrell and Morgan (ibid.). The matrix is thus based on four main debates in sociology: Firstly, is reality given or a product of the mind? Secondly, must one experience something to understand it? Thirdly, do humans have free will or is there environmental determinism? Fourthly, which is the best approach to gain understanding – scientific method or direct experience?

The sets are described as follows:

- 1) The objective-subjective dimension related to the assumptions about the nature of social sciences in terms of ontology, epistemology, human nature, and methodology.
- 2) The regulation of society-radical change of society with respect to the nature of society with regulation and radical change placed in a polar relationship.

Further, within the above mentioned dimensions 1) and 2), there is further categorisation of assumptions along another two dimensions resulting in a grid. These are as follows

On the **objective –subjective** dimension the social world has two conceptions:


- a) At the **objective** end of the scale the social world is seen as real, external to the individual, rational and **deterministic**. The way to understand it is through **nomothetic** methodologies through trying to identify and define universal laws to describe relationships and regularities between the various elements of the social world.
- b) On the other hand i.e., at the **subjective** end the world is seen as nominalistic, **individualistic**, personal, and voluntaristic. The unique and particular aspects of the unique phenomena could be interpretation and understanding through opting for **ideographic** methodologies.

The second dimension of analysis i.e., **regulation-radical change** of society emphasises:

- a) Regulation of society through social order, reproduction, unity and cohesiveness, while,
- b) The sociology of radical change views radical, deep-seated conflict and modes of domination and contradictions as the key issues in society.

All the dimensions together represent four paradigmatic spaces where various group of theories can be situated in terms of their ontological and epistemological standpoint. As can be seen in Figure 3.2 the four paradigms which thus get represented in the above discussed model are – a) Functionalist paradigm; b) Interpretive paradigm; c) Radical Humanist paradigm and d) Radical structuralist paradigm.

Fig. 3.2 Paradigms for Sociological Analysis



Source: Burrell and Morgan, 1979

All the four paradigms are representative of different ontological and epistemological stances. The **functionalist paradigm** seeks to provide rational explanations of social events, assuming that social facts exist outside individual consciousness. This paradigm views 'society as ontologically prior to man and seeks to place man and his activities within that wider social context' (p.106). The **interpretive paradigm** seeks explanations for social affairs 'within the realm of individual consciousness and subjectivity, and within the frame of reference of the participant as opposed to the observer of action' (p.28). This paradigm challenges the validity of the ontological assumptions of functionalist approaches to sociology in general and in particular for the study of organisations. The **radical humanist paradigm** has a 'view of society which emphasises the importance of overthrowing or transcending the limitations of existing social limitations' (p.32). The **radical structuralist paradigm** emphasises 'the fact that radical change is built into the very nature and structure of contemporary society', and seeks to 'provide explanations of the basic interrelationships within the context of total social formations' (p.34).

Thus the SAPs matrices depict the range of theories, perspectives and standpoints in the form of a portrait. Burrell and Morgan used the term 'paradigm', which was used by Kuhn to describe changes and development of scientific knowledge. The use of the term paradigm has resulted in scholars relating the model, as with reduction of organisational studies, to a naturalist understanding (see Willmott, 1993). Though, the model is understood and represented as grid or 2x2 matrix which is why it seems that Willmott (ibid.) views it as nominalist device, this grid according to me is for representational purpose and not to create rigid boundaries of situating one's philosophical assumptions. To support this I draw upon Burrell and Morgan's reference to Silverman (1970, cited in ibid.) whose ontological position oscillates between the two paradigms of functionalist sociology and interpretive sociology. Though there are ontological differences between functionalist and interpretative approaches, they explain Silverman's position – '...while recognising that there is an external world which is ontologically prior to man, its crucial significance as far as the study of social affairs is concerned lies in the way in which its 'meaning' resulted from the interpretation placed upon it by individual actors' (p.199).

The relationship between individuals and society has been debated in traditions of holism as well as methodological individualism. Watkins argues that knowledge and ambition of human beings affect their social condition as they are necessary antecedents based on which human can choose to transform their conditions (1994). This implies that people do not create society but can effect change. Critical realism proposes a transformational model of the society-person linkage based on the conviction that society pre-exists people and is a necessary condition for their activity (Bhaskar, 1979). Society must be regarded as an ensemble of structures, practices and conventions which individuals reproduce or transform, but which would not exist unless they did so. Without human activity there will be no society but at the same time society is not a product of human action. Thus critical realist position does not see the cause and effect as a direct reductive relationship rather it examines the mechanisms of the operation of effect. These mechanisms result in powers and properties and complex linkages with structures. Therefore it is not possible to reduce the causation to single factor (Bhaskar, 1975).

Critical realism presents a dynamic view of causation and causal powers (discussed in the previous chapter) in relation to structures (Sayer, 2004, p.264).

In the light of above discussion, my theoretical position could be summarised as follows: I find that the critical realist position in explaining causality as dynamic and therefore reality as contingent and emergent is useful for me to understand the phenomenon of partnerships in a comprehensive manner. This also connects to the theoretical tool of analysing partnerships through the frameworks of power (more specifically causal power) as discussed in the previous chapter. In the objective-subjective continuum, my position is more towards the subjective end. Referring again to the controversial grid of paradigms for sociological analysis discussed previously my position permeates through interpretive sociology to functionalist sociology.

4. Research Design and Methods

Following the setting of the scene by asking a set of research questions, the next step before the starting the field work was choosing a set of research methods commensurate with the intended inquiry. The choice of methods frames the data windows through which phenomena are observed and hence the interpretive schema and the theoretical development are affected by the choice of methods (Buchanan and Bryman, 2007). However, what we choose and how we choose has multiple aspects not only epistemological, research aims and norms of practice but also several other including historical, political, ethical, evidential, personal and organisational characteristics associated with it. Buchanan and Bryman point out in the context of organisational research that the research process is less linear than usually depicted in research textbooks. They argue that organisational research has widened its boundaries and mixed method¹⁰ researches are gaining popularity abandoning rigid epistemological positions (p.486).

¹⁰In my initial research proposal I had proposed to use a combination of qualitative and quantitative methods not because I thought that these were popular but because that seemed as the logical way of exploring REI. However very early during the field work I decided to

Qualitative research designs are considered relevant to policy making and practice as much as the quantitative research design (Hammersley, 2000, cited in Robson, 2002, p.5). These designs are flexible as they involve lesser pre-specification as does the quantitative research design and make substantial use of methods to generate qualitative data (Robson, *ibid.*). However, though such flexibility of design allowed me to understand the hurdles due to time lag in responses from REI partners and or rescheduling of appointments, meetings, plans, it also gave me a sense of perpetual anxiety in terms of mapping out the extent of my efforts and the data. Even though I understood that the skill of social enquiry gets sharpened as one undertakes it, during the field work I often wished I had worked in a traditional ‘apprenticeship’ model of social enquiry as in disciplines of anthropology and sociology (*ibid.*).¹¹

4. 1 Qualitative Evaluation Research

Much enquiry in the real world is essentially some form of *evaluation* (emphasis original, Robson, 2002, p.6). I considered two ways of approaching the study of MSPs in REI. The first was to use an ideal definition of partnership (as used by Brinkerhoff, 2002) and use it to understand and compare REI partnerships. The second approach was to explore the MSP claims in the REI context and arrive at an evaluative judgment about the evolution and impact of MSPs and their relationships by studying the selected partnerships case by case and thus problematising MSPs. I decided for the second approach because I feel that concepts evolve and get meaning through actions of the agents and the structures. Although there is a scope of problematising the ideal type through an inquiry, I felt that

keep the focus on qualitative methods and use the secondary quantitative data relevant to the partnership programmes. Thus, my work is largely based on qualitative inquiry.

¹¹This I understand was because of my ongoing reflections on my field work seeking to answer the questions evaluative in nature. Had I done enough? Is it good enough? Do I understand what is going on? How do I make sense of my enquiry? Also because of the flexible design I could not guess all the principles and procedures in advance required for this inquiry. Some of these issues I discuss in the section on negotiating access.

following the first approach will be problematic as I will be looking for presences and absences in contrast to the ideal type (and reasons thereof) rather than understanding what MSPs entail and how they unfold in the context of a formalised invited space of action created by the state. At the same time however I must acknowledge that the assumption of unity, sovereignty and homogeneity that underlie the ideal-type state – an essential partner in the ideal definition of partnership invoked in the first approach – have also become problematised and the state is moving towards plurality and heterogeneity and polycentricism (Axtmann, 2004, p.268) through processes of internationalisation.

I found the approach to understand MSPs through problematisation coherent with my critical realist position. At the level of educational programs, during mid-term evaluations, the evaluators keep their criterion focussed on an ‘ideal’ formulation, while in practice there is a range of reorganisation, re-conceptualisation and shifting of emphasis taking place. This problem could be addressed by shifting the strategies and focus of evaluation to another sphere i.e., the milieu – the social psychological and material environment (Parlett and Hamilton, 1976, cited in Worthen and Sanders, 1987, p.132). They suggest a model of illuminative evaluation for studying innovations in educational settings. Innovations applied to educational settings could lead to new role relationships between actors, something which could be part of unintended consequences. However, not taking this aspect into consideration could lead to a half baked understanding of what is going on? Thus the focus of illuminative illumination is description and interpretation (ibid.).

Guba and Lincoln (1981) trace the development of evaluation from one based on the scientific inquiry model to naturalistic methodologies, and from the measurement approach to evaluation (reshaped by Ralph Tyler’s work in 1930’s and 1940’s) focussing on objective-oriented approach. The critique of Ralph Tyler’s approach incorporated values of project sites as an important aspect of evaluation, leading to an approach called responsive evaluation. In responsive evaluation the role of the evaluator is interactive and not objective and therefore the evaluator’s responses, identification of concerns and issues are stimulated by the program (ibid.). This implies that the responsive evaluation focuses on programme

implementation as a process. Walter Williams (1976, p.267, cited in Patton, 2002, p.161) identified the neglect of implementation as a major hurdle in informing program improvement, policy analysis and social policy experimentation. My research questions are concerned with the implementation of the programmes in REI. Therefore, my research involves implementation evaluation to an extent even though I am not in a formal assigned role to conduct the evaluation of the programmes.

4.2 Inputs from the Logical Framework Analysis (LFA) Documents

This issue of analysing whether what has been decided can be carried out brings us to the LFA documents of the projects. The LFA document provides a summary of project design and planned achievements facilitating management, communication and monitoring of a project (WWF, 2005). However, the LFA could be representative of ideas of senior officials of the organisations and thus remote from the actual field reality (Gasper, 2000). The 'log-frame' developed after a project has started is 'logic-less framework' (ibid., p.21) because the logic for designing a certain project through its early stages of conceptualisation is not reflected in it. LFA has also been critiqued as a top-down demand document rather than a logical project frame (ibid.). Gasper also points towards the fact that many aspects of the program design are left out of 'log-frame' (calling it lack-frame) and when it is not updated, it is destined to become 'lock-frame' (ibid.). LFA documents either from REI or the organisations were used as a guide and not a strict protocol for furthering the inquiry and analysis.

In 2007 the LFA document for all REI partnerships was under the process of development (after the REI was signed off!!) and I had access to it because it was circulated to all REI partners. I had referred to the REI partners' draft LFA document for developing the points for discussion on specific issues pertaining to respective partnerships. In addition to this the REI vision paper and base paper are two documents which were available and I analysed them for identifying issues for developing the semi-structured questionnaire and guided observations of some of the program interventions. I was also able to gain access to the compiled MoUs of the REI partnerships. For the programme

specific documents I visited the websites of the organisations and contacted the relevant person in-charge of the programme.

4.3 Methods of Document Analysis

A wide range of documents were collected for this research. These included written documents such as minutes of meetings, programme reports, REI vision document, partnership description, Memoranda of understanding, government policy documents and reports, print and web publications related to REI, the WEF and various partnerships, and organisations. Other source material included REI videos; PowerPoint presentations from REI update meetings and photographs. The research questions served as the starting point for the content analysis of the documents (Robson, 2002). The MoUs which were the documentary proofs of formalised partnerships were examined and analysed under the following categories:

1. Signatories of the partnership
2. Contractual framework of the partnerships which included a) programmes objectives and targets; b) Tenure; c) funding patterns/cost sharing; d) sharing of responsibilities – specified efforts vis-à-vis targets-sharing responsibility; e) risk sharing; f) conditions of contract termination
3. Evaluation framework of the partnership
4. Timeframe
5. Knowledge framework. This included a) sharing and intra-firm transfer of best practices; b) clauses on confidentiality and intellectual property
6. Policy framework
7. Management framework
8. Legal framework
9. Conditions of flexibility in partnerships

Finally the MoUs were also scanned for content on future of the programme and exit routes (See appendix to chapter 9).

The organisation specific programme reports were analysed vis-à-vis REI documents to understand the gaps and the consistencies of narratives. The organisational reports and other documents are strategic to the point that they represent what the teller wants to convey to an audience and are social products (Hammersley and Atkinson, 2007, p.121–139). The documents sometimes fed into planning the observations and interviews and on other occasions, into further develop categories for analysis of various field data.

4.4 Data Collection and Processing

I conducted semi-structured interviews with a range of participants and stakeholders in the REI including government officials, Heads/program-in-charge of participant organisations, field level direct service providers including teachers implementing REI program and those receiving ICT training under REI. My choice for semi-structured interviewing was based upon the advantages which it allows with respect to the exploration of the position taken by interviewees and emphasis on themes considered important by the respondents thus presenting the interviewees with a degree of control over the interview process (Neal, 1995). Some themes for the interviews varied according to the level of involvement of the participants for example as planner, evaluator, implementer, trainee and trainer. The thematic structure of the interviews was developed in the planning phase of the field work. Three broad themes were covered firstly the partner-government relationship, progress of partnership and thirdly a superset with subthemes pertaining to the individual partnership.

Besides, to make better sense of events in the field in terms of interventions by REI partners, I followed the method of participant observation of programmes in progress in their actual field settings. This served two purposes. Firstly these helped me to understand the events related to a particular intervention discussed by the interviewees while at the same time being aware that understanding of all aspects of discussion in the interview account might not be possible from direct observation. Secondly, by observing the partnership programmes as applied in the field settings I developed an understanding of the

content of materials, interactions, and workforce involved in individual programme. This helped me develop a comprehensive understanding of a formalised MSP in action.

The event history analysis of the partner organisations was undertaken regarding major turns in the development of the partnership since its inception with respect to relationship with the government, participation in other government-led programs, availability and source of funds and inter-partner relationships. The analysis of the partnerships through interview analysis, document analysis, event history analysis and analysis of participant observations highlighted trends and patterns in respective partnerships.

5. Case Study

My research explores why multilateral participations were organised under REI, how stakeholders participated and communicated and what is the impact of respective partnerships. Yin (2003) suggests that the case study method has a distinct advantage when ‘a “how” and “why” question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has no control’ (p.9). Again the case study is bounded in time and activity whereby the researcher collects detailed information about a program, an event, a process etc. through various data collection procedures (Creswell, 2003). The purpose of researching REI using the case study approach was that, this is the first program of its kind launched by the GoR which involved formalised partnerships of a spectrum of organisation including NGOs and businesses with a specific thrust on private sector participation and ICT interventions in public sector education system. The transnational thrust of the programme (see Chapter 4 for the REI context) to answer local issues and a global advocacy for MSPs for governance (see the section on MSPs in Chapter 2) also demanded that REI as an innovative model of PPPs should be studied as a case to make sense of MSPs. Thus an ‘evaluative case study’ approach is used to ‘judge the merit and worth’ (Bassey, 1999, cited in Stephens, 2009, p. 48) of REI as MSP to achieve EFA goals.

5.1 The Multicase Study and the *Quintain*

My study includes a set of small case studies of organisations collaborating with the state on some of the selected aspects of the public education delivery system. This kind of study involving multiple cases to make sense of a programme has been called ‘multicase study’ and the programme of which these multiple cases are part has been called a ‘quintain’ (Stake, 2006, p.4). In my research, the quintain is REI through which I will understand MSPs.


The quintain is studied through its multiple cases (ibid.) Stake discusses the strategy to make sense of the quintains by separate organisation of data gathering and reporting for each case. Thus the multiple case studies become ‘progressively focused’ as the study develops (ibid.). Each case is observed in its ordinary activities and places to enhance the understanding of the quintain. Stake argues that the multicase study to understand quintain is a subjective study and therefore advises to minimise any interference on account of assessments and tests (ibid.).

The partner organisations for individual case studies were selected so as to cover the spectrum of organisational and interventional variables (see matrix in appendix to Chapter 3). Though I had developed the matrix for the selection of the organisations for the case studies, I soon realised that the partnership focus and design in REI was very diverse. I selected four kinds of programme interventions namely school adoption (school management and governance – three partnerships discussed in Chapter 5), technology based interventions (ICT based pedagogic practices – three partnerships discussed in Chapter 6), professional development of teachers (work with institutional structures and processes and also a single multi-organisational partnership discussed in Chapter 7) and a multipronged approach for the education of children in the underserved localities in Jaipur city (NGO led intervention and pre-school education – one partnership discussed in Chapter 8). Thus eight partnership programmes cases are discussed followed by a cross case analysis of the partnerships in Chapter 9. Each case study was done with a focus on the following:

1. What is the design and framework of the partnership? These included issues about legal and policy framework, evaluation framework of the partnership, their scope and scale. The design (D) perspective.
2. Who are the stakeholders and what is their nature of participation in the partnership? These included implementers as well as beneficiaries. The stakeholder (S) perspective.
3. How is the partnership governed? These included funding, reporting and institutionalised structures such as steering committees. The governance (G) perspective.

The case studies were designed to focus on the above three points (aspects) because the basic issues addressed in the research questions can be mapped onto these broad case study points. This has been attempted in the Figure (3.3) below.

Fig. 3.3 Mapping Research Questions to the Case Study Foci for the Study of Partnerships



In terms of understanding the partnerships several cross cutting themes emerged during the first descriptive writing of each case. These included normative impact of the programme, work spaces, workforce and work culture, networks, materials, professional development, inter-partner support, governance. During the stages of writing and rewriting of the case studies I decided to further fuse some of the themes to arrive at a three-tiered thematic framework – Design, Stakeholders and Governance (DSG) – for organising each case. The cases are not simply ‘stories’ of REI partnerships, rather they reflect theoretically informed conceptual-analytical framework (Stewart, 2012, p.71) relating to partnership design, stakeholder involvement and governance in a state enabled space for inter-organisational collaboration in Rajasthan.

6. The Field Work

The field work was taken up in two phases. The first phase was from mid September 2008 till August 2009. The second phase started in February 2010 and ended in October 2010. The idea of revisiting the field was occasioned by my focus on the impact of temporality on partnerships. The field work suffered due to the legislative assembly elections and the parliament elections during the field period and later the municipality elections. Also I had to suspend my field visits for a period of three months to attend to two medical emergencies in my family whilst I was in India. However I used this time to review my field data and to conduct a few interviews in Delhi.

In my initial research proposal I had the following plan for the field work: The duration of survey of operational area for each case study was planned to range from 5 – 7 days. In this way, approximately 35 days of field survey were to be undertaken. This was besides 3 days each per case study to conduct interviews with the officials. However, the initial two months of the field experience from the mid of September 2008 to mid of December 2008 made me aware of the limitations of following the plan. The response from organisations varied greatly in terms of time taken to respond to calls and emails. And therefore negotiation was slow. Also when they agreed, I had to follow the timetable of activities and programmes, availability of teachers and children in the school.

The field work sites in terms of geographical location were largely focused in Jaipur and Baran but also in other districts Udaipur, Ajmer, Pali. The places where interviews were conducted were government offices at the district and block level, Head/Corporate offices of organizations in Delhi, their offices at project locations in Rajasthan, schools, houses in the community, open playgrounds, tea stalls and canteens. School and classroom observations, teachers' training sessions were also other events.

I had previously worked in Jaipur in an NGO which is one of the REI partners with the state government, so I knew some of the projects and REI partners (individuals) personally. Others I approached referring to my involvement with REI and my current status as the University of Sussex research student and through third parties known to the project managers. Thus, I used a combination of emails, phone calls, showing up without reference and refereed contact to gain access to the field. I found that the distinction between the warm resource and a cold call is not always fixed due to the hierarchies in organizations, gatekeepers and changing course of programme and individual interests.

The interviews are a prominent component of a qualitative case study research and can be used for a variety of purposes i.e., 'developing understanding', 'eliciting factual material', 'checking and validating perspectives' (Stewart, 2012, p.78). The interviews were informal in terms of settings and in respondents' choice of space in most of the cases. This included house of participants, street corner tea shops, schools in the community, offices of the projects. The government officials were mostly interviewed in their offices. In one or two cases I planned my journey with the officials while they were on an official visit and interviewed them as we travelled to save on time and to add a sense of informality and relaxed, free flowing discussion. This was also because of the time constraint as the officials were too busy for an interview appointment or it did not suit my field work plan in a particular district. Government officials were less outspoken than principals and teachers in schools.¹²

¹² Leung (1996, pg 59) also mentions this in their study on modernising geography curriculum.

7. Negotiating Access – A Multi-site Inter-organisational Partnership Context

Aspects of qualitative research make it more a product of a social interaction. In this context the process of negotiating access to locations, peoples and minds assumes an important role. It tends to bring anxiety to the researcher even in cases of well planned researches. Negotiating access acquires meaning and gets constructed in the process of research and is reflective of a researcher's positionality.

Some debates on researcher's position often tend to focus on where the researcher is in more powerful position than the interviewees (Patai, 1991, Sidaway, 1992, Lal, 1996, all cited in Mullings, 1999; Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005). There is lack of much discussion on difficulties when the researcher is not in a position of relative power (Mullings, *ibid.*). The informants in the research on MSPs operate in a state enabled space and range from CEOs to company directors to high ranking government officials and politicians. The encounter with the field and the power relation between the interviewer and the elite-interviewee are quite different from the situation when the researcher is interviewing other groups (*ibid.*). Moreover, due to political contingencies of the progress of partnerships, how the research participants view the researcher and relate with the research determines the progress of research. In this study, conducting interviews across various levels of officials from government and non government organisations was a challenge as I had to negotiate my role as interviewer and researcher-evaluator.

7.1 Understanding Access – What does Negotiating Access Mean?

This section discusses my experience of negotiating access to different REI partners at various sites and locations, Organisations-Corporate/NGO/Government Offices/Schools, Official documents (but not to financial documents and reports), Social groups and Minds. The experience of negotiating access which ran in a continuum, spread over the field work period, went side by side with a process of information accumulation, basic processing and

storage. While I continually engaged with access issues before and during the meetings and interviews. I went about digitising my experiences with photographs, voice recordings, cloud storage, chat records and field notes in an episodic manner. In between these, I also transcreated some of the visual and audio records to simple text while also writing sections of this thesis.

7.2 Negotiating Access as an Ethical and Institutional Requirement

The institutional context of access is defined by ethical research guidelines laid down by various research committees. Especially in case of participants who are considered vulnerable, especially in researches focusing on health and social welfare services, the ethics of research guidelines find particular mention (ESRC, 2004). Naturally informed consent forms integral part of these. The differences in Northern and Southern contexts (access to information, resources, and literacy levels) provide a challenging environment for implementing institutional ethics (Sultana, 2007) and therefore negotiating access.

In case of inter-organisational contexts in highly politicised development environment, access acquires much broader meaning. Aspects of access range from gaining permission from the organisations to share the knowledge, agree to participate in the process of research and generation of knowledge or to allow the researcher to stand witness to the events. In this section I structure my experience and reflections on negotiating access in terms of the following points.

1. Meanings of research as constructed and imposed on the researchers by various persons in the field.
2. Politics of partnerships
3. Deliberative negotiation
4. Facilitators also trying to negotiate their access into the complex world of partnerships in education

These are relevant from the purpose of serving as an organiser for my reflections on my experience of negotiating access.

7.2.1 Gender and Meanings of Research: Constructed and Imposed

The process of negotiating access was impacted by people's ideas about me as a researcher, reflected their meaning of research and therefore to some extent controlling and advising on what I should be doing in the field. Stakeholders were continuously making meaning of my presence and constructing me as a person. My gender identity constructed and interpreted by the people I encountered in the field had an impact on my role as a researcher. To some I appeared to be investing lots of time around in the field and therefore not focussed. Whilst to others my unescorted forays into distant places (mostly male-dominated) among unknown people (read mostly men) were signs of promiscuity. Then there were those who tried to interpret my gender through the lens of power. As one of the members of an organisation covered by my research study commented:

“You are almost a male (powerful) in the context of Indian society because you are city bred, studying in higher education, you look good according to several Indian standards and studying in a foreign university.”

The asymmetrical distribution of institutional power amongst men and women impacts the framing of the interview, the process and analysis of the interview (Herod, 1993, cited in Mullings, 1999, p.338). This construction of my identity played a dual role. It not only defined me as who am I in terms of gender and power but also by defining so impacted the outcome of interactions.

My identity as a researcher and what my research is or should be was also constantly constructed by the interviewees. During one of the interviews a male, senior official of an organisation said to me, “You do not know what you are researching. Your research questions are not clear.” Later during the course of interview when I asked a question about inter-organisational relationship amongst the partners of their programme, the same person retorted, “Why are you asking this? This is not part of your research.” Yet in another case a funder of the organisation which though not funding the REI partnership but were funding various programmes of the organisation declined to discuss about inter-organisation relationships saying that this aspect of the relationship was out of the scope of my research

study. Thus the respondents attempted to control, to a certain extent, the focus of my research.

Did I sometimes err in explaining the purpose and nature of my research to my respondents? Why then did some officials think I was there to retrieve something they called ‘data’ from them? One of the SSA commissioners after hearing my introduction straightaway declared: “See, we can provide you information which is there in public domain. Don’t think we will give you our data. *Data hamara hoga aur research apkee? Aisa to nahi hoga!* (Our data and your research, no way!).” Though this could be an attempt on part of the official to declare their stake in my research and call for a participatory research, I could not decipher the meaning of the statement at the moment and put it down as a hostile gesture.

Whilst I faced some hostile respondents (from private sector organisations) who after having agreed for an interview declined the meeting on the date of the interview without explanation, there were some officials (government) who took on a patronising attitude, as if trying to help a researcher in distress, and asked me to produce the checklists which I wanted them to tick. However it seemed that government officials in the PMU were not in control over data related to partnerships. At one of the instances when I went to ask for a particular report from the PMU of REI, the person in charge of communications, and placed there by one of the core partners, declined to share the report saying that the report had tables and graphs and was not relevant for my research. Even when the DD, REI asked him to share the report, the officer firmly declined and advised her that the report cannot be shared. Thus the nature of these encounters impacted upon the data I had access to.

The people I encountered in the field were also ideologically positing my research and also trying to filter the nature of data which I had access to (see also Hull, 2008). This was despite the fact that I had not discussed my ideological position (did I have one?) at any instance explicitly. For example an NGO Staff member (P) said to me: “So I should get you in touch with the progressive faction (referring to the members of the teachers’ union in Rajasthan.” And I asked, “Why, do you think the other faction would not want to

share their opinion? Are they in favour of teachers being transferred out of the adopted schools?” Thus participants and facilitators were seemingly controlling access to information or guiding me to a certain set of information which they assumed to be relevant to my ideology (as per their perception) and the focus of my inquiry (again their perception). This also points to the fact that participants of partnership programmes are well aware of the politics of the partnerships and that researchers stand the danger of becoming unintentionally biased due to the filtration of data on account of mediation by key respondents.

I understand that I was not the first researcher out there trying to make sense of things. These people had had previous encounters with other researchers and their research work. Maybe I was just another instance in the continuum but was I an instance oft repeated? What kind of researcher had they encountered earlier? One retired bureaucrat who is in the leadership role of an NGO wondered, “Why are you wandering in this sweltering summer? Researchers from foreign universities tend to place research assistants in the field and their whole research gets done, sometime without them ever visiting the field. Did no one give you this idea?” Though this was said in jest, I could not ascertain whether I really seemed to him a naïve researcher who does not know how to obtain data even with her foreign university affiliations. Perhaps he was voicing his disapproval of certain North–South relationships in terms of encountering the field and the conduct of research?

7.2.2 Politics of Partnerships

I adopted a low profile for the interviews and observations to make my presence unobtrusive and unthreatening to respective projects in any sense of the term. However, I am not sure if the REI partners, including several government officials, perceived my presence unthreatening.

In a particular instance, when I phoned a partner’s office through a third party contact, they advised me to send my research synopsis. I sent it promptly. In our telephonic

conversation they had agreed to get back to me for appointment, they did not. When I again followed it up over phone, conveying that I will be travelling in two days and will be in their district and if I can visit their office, they agreed and asked me to phone them again, as I reach the district, for the time of appointment. However on reaching the district as I phoned the person I had been communicating with, they declined to meet and instead asked me to produce a permission letter from PMU of REI for conducting my research.

Later on, one of the evenings in that district, during an informal discussion with an academic in the guest house of an NGO, I got to know that the organisation which declined me entry even to their office had been involved in unethical mining operations in the region. The company had bought mining rights during the regime of the same government which launched REI. Since the government had changed recently, they were probably unsure and insecure about the entry of an outsider with prying eyes. In 2010 this company was in the headlines nationally for unethical/unacceptable mining practices in Orissa, India and their bid to buy mining rights in Orissa were turned down by the environment ministry in India. A report commissioned by the ministry found out that mining of Bauxite will be against the rights of two tribes in the region.

This was amongst the failed stories of negotiating access though it made me aware of the wider political context of the partnerships.

7.2.3 Deliberative Negotiation

There were always delays and long pauses from some organisations even after they had agreed to give me access. They were probably trying to figure out my role in the programme and project sites. Obtaining documents or permission to attend trainings for example, took a lot of time.

In one organisation the partners wanted to confirm that I would not present or write about the programme without discussing with them, which I think was reasonable and a proactive attempt to influence research. After the initial email exchanges, the consent to

grant me access into the field was mostly verbal. This facilitated my entry to field sites, review meetings, training sessions and also informal social settings in the organisations.

However, in the last week of September when I wanted to attend a review meeting of the programme in a particular organisation which had allowed me access for the last one and a half years, I was asked to produce a letter from my university to endorse my research. After a series of deliberations with the programme Director we reached an agreement that my supervisor would write this letter for me, which my supervisor did. I forwarded the chapter (where I studied this organisation) for comments to the programme Director of the project but have not heard from him again.

7.2.4 Facilitators also trying to Negotiate their Access into the Complex World of Partnerships

Whilst doing field work I have also come across attempts by facilitators in the field to negotiate access into the complex world of partnerships in education. This is the instance of a facilitator in Udaipur district. I met this young person while researching on the collaboration of their organisation. The person offered himself as a willing facilitator to get me in touch with people or helping me in locating people and places. I was new in the district and was very happy to have a volunteer. During the course of my interaction with this facilitator I found out that he himself had his own NGO in the district. This was very common where people working with organisations involved in government-private sector partnerships also had their own ventures such as small private schools or an NGO on the side. It was becoming gradually clear to me that this person was more interested to be present, so that he could get into conversations with prominent government officials whom I wanted to interview. Thus I saw him sometimes projecting his connections to the people I was interviewing, and reviving acquaintances. In the complex arena of partnerships these facilitators were also negotiating space and access, looking for nodes in the network or building rapport with the existing collaborators/government officials.

7.3 Final Thoughts on Negotiating Access

The learning from the current study is that rather than access as an event with a start point and an end point, it is an ongoing process which spans from planning for the field till the final writing up of the research findings.

Negotiating access also made me aware of the presence of gatekeepers in organisations and government departments. I found that in organisations, say corporate houses, gatekeeping could be built into the organisational hierarchy. On the other hand in government departments, each and every member in the line serves as a gatekeeper actively deciding the nature and quantum of information to provide.

During the process of research, rhizomes of references and information were generated which sometimes facilitated access in the field and to the minds, but could also have acted as deterrents. Going through the process of negotiating access made me more aware of my parallel/multiple identities. Why and when do people share information with me? Do they look upon me as someone from their class and with similar political and ideological orientations and geopolitical affiliations? In all this I found that gender can be a facilitator as well as a hindrance. Whereas my position as perceived by the partners and other stakeholders of REI did help me in gaining access it was also a barrier in some cases.

8. Limitations of the Methods Chosen

This study arrives at conclusions about MSPs at two levels. The first is through an analysis of REI as MSP and then through cross case analysis of eight partnerships it draws conclusion about the worth of REI. The representativeness of the findings is very limited as the cases speak for themselves and at most are generalisable to other similar cases.

There are some other issues. Firstly the comparison with similar programmes in Jordan is undertaken on the basis of textual evidence available from the WEF sources

(McKinsey & Co., 2005; Casidy, 2007; Unwin and Wong, 2012) and two research articles published by Bhanji (2008, 2012). Secondly the multisite, multi-scalar, multi partner programmes are in a web of relationships not only embedded in geography and time but also transcending geography and time simultaneously. However, this research was not designed to study networks. There is therefore a methodological limitation. Thirdly in critiquing the partnerships, as discussed in the case study chapters, I have brought forth the fact that the teachers who are mostly expected to be implementers of the partnerships were not involved in the initial discussions to launch partnerships. At the same time I have also not used participatory research approaches to understand partnerships either at the level of data collection or analysis. None of the stakeholders either at the level of the individual or organisation were active research collaborators in this research study. Finally, during the writing of the research findings, conscious and deliberate omission of some data, which could be used as evidence, was inevitable due to ethical considerations (Altheidde and Johnson, 1998, cited in Dunne, Pryor and Yates, 2005, p.79). There have been some limitations vis-à-vis access which I have discussed in the section 7.

9. Conclusion

The Rajasthan Education Initiative was launched by the GoR in the form of MSPs. This was an innovative program which requires a specialised approach to explore the mechanisms and processes rather than the strict traditional form of evaluation with narrow definition of empirical reality. The research was designed as a multicase study to understand the quintain – REI, over an extended period of time. My understanding of reality, which derives from the critical realist position, also guides me to view causality as intricately linked to structures. The methods which I followed for this evaluation study are part of the social anthropological paradigm and my primary concern here, as explained earlier, has been to describe and interpret. Finally in this chapter I also discussed my positionality in terms of negotiating access and how it affected the course of the field work and access to data whilst at the same time giving me insights into politics of partnerships and research.

Chapter 4

The Rajasthan Education Initiative

1. Introduction

This chapter introduces the Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI), the focus of this research study on MSPs. Claims about REI, its goals, mission and how far it has travelled so far are explored using official websites of the partners engaged in the initiative, REI documents and other internet resources, interview and observation data. This chapter thus addresses the first and the second research questions – ‘Why did the GoR initiate the REI and invite multiple providers to support public education service delivery?’ and ‘What are the key features of REI?’

A review of the REI literature and interviews with various actors i.e., government officials, programme partners in REI explores the central assumptions and propositions that underpin the REI as these relate to improved service delivery; the key actors and their goals; the processes that resulted in the REI; the factors which influenced the early development and launch of the REI; the basis for inter-organisational collaboration to deliver educational services and the expected benefits of REI.

I start off with a discussion of the REI backstory – its origin and its relationship with other global education initiatives. The history of development of REI and the key actors involved in the launch of the programme are chalked out to portray the multi-scalar connections of the programme. The analysis thus points towards the presence of transnational alliances liaising (advocating) for interventions at the local and regional level, and consequent adoption and enforcement of such interventions at the region-specific level whereby meanings get translated and/or reconstructed by local actors and players.

This chapter is divided into five substantive sections. I start (i) with an analytic description of the origins of REI. Next I address (ii) typology of partnerships in REI, (iii)

modalities and (iv) scale of the initiative before going into detailed discussion about (v) motives and actions of the major partners in the last section.

2. Origins of REI

The story of the origin of REI sits at the intersection of several factors and tendencies among which are – a) India and the provincial government’s (government of the state of Rajasthan) commitment to achieve the goal of UEE, b) history of educational reforms and programmes such as Lok Jumbish and Shiksha Karmi in Rajasthan that were supported by international donor agencies,¹³ c) the aspiration of the state government to be part of the global economy (Box 4.1), d) scope and intentions of involvement of private sector via PPPs at national level (Box 4.2) as well as state level,¹⁴ and e) an emerging trend of international and transnational networks affecting policy and agendas across the globe.

Box 4.1 Excerpt from Chief Minister’s Speech

“to try and bring Rajasthan into, the basic structure, therefore into a framework of a developmental state and to create an economy that will be at par with anything in India and even abroad. That’s the dream. But for that unless I have my basic infrastructure in place, my kids are on same wavelength as they would be internationally and my children are educated enough to take on that load, I would not be able to succeed.”
(The Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje Scindia; WEF-GEI video transcript. See appendix to chapter 4)

¹³ Education Guarantee Scheme, Alternative Schooling, District Primary Education Programme, Lok Jumbish, Shiksha Karmi and in 2001 the Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan, at the Central as well as State level, supported by bilateral and multilateral agencies such as World Bank, DFID, and EC.

¹⁴ Rajasthan also launched a social viability gap funding scheme for involvement of private sector in organising social services such as health and education through construction of infrastructure. The Annual Plan of Rajasthan 2004-2005 had a chapter on voluntary sector where it discusses setting up of an Association for Rural Advancement through Voluntary Action and Local Involvement (ARAVALI) to promote collaboration between voluntary sector and the government.

Box 4.2 Scope and Intentions of Involvement of Private Sector via Public Private Partnerships

The national and regional policy on PPP: In India the eleventh five year plan (2007-2012) for development lays specific emphasis on the role of public private partnerships. The role of private sector in infrastructure development and role of NGOs in community mobilisation is envisaged for the development of education. The national policy on voluntary sector which formed part of the eleventh plan also focused on collaborations with the voluntary sector to achieve

“...innovative solutions to poverty, deprivation, discrimination and exclusion, through means such as awareness raising, social mobilization, service delivery, training, research, and advocacy. The voluntary sector has been serving as an effective non-political link between the people and the Government. This policy recognizes the important role that the voluntary sector has to play in various areas and affirms the growing need for collaboration ... at the local, provincial and national levels” (GoI 2007, p.1).

The launch of the REI in 2005 is an interesting example for understanding the role, power and influence of political leadership in introducing (or facilitating the introduction of) a new programme in their constituency while also being part of a global alliance to effect change. ‘Education responsive to a competitive global society’ as the vision document indicates was being aimed for through REI by a government facing resource scarcity (Box 4.3).

The Chief Minister of Rajasthan, Vasundhara Raje Scindia attended the WEF Meeting in Davos in January 2005, where she was impressed by the success of the Jordan Education Initiative (JEI) and expressed interest in launching an initiative modelled on MSPs (GoR, n.d.a, p. 14). This led to consultations with the business leaders¹⁵ at the WEF following which the REI partnership description and vision document was signed by its core partners at the India Economic Summit in November 2005 (GoR, n.d.a; interviews with PMU, 2008).

¹⁵ The REI documents do not specify which business leader and other participants were consulted

Box 4.3 Resource Scarcity and REI

Section II: The Concept of REI:

Education Responsive to a Competitive Global Society

Efforts made thus far while yielding encouraging results, are still required to be strengthened. Challenges facing the State today are complex: they include (a) legislation for compulsory education to children of 6-14 years, hitherto a part of Directive Principles, is now a fundamental right, making it incumbent on the state to achieve results in a specific time frame; (b) reducing gender gap in education, especially amongst tribal and other disadvantaged sections of society, a chronic problem which has now to be addressed in a focussed manner; (c) improving learning competencies of children; (d) empowering education for preparing the students for a competitive global society; and (e) above all, facing the challenge of resource constraints. The task for a Government alive to its responsibility in a parliamentary democracy is formidable, particularly when it is in the midst of resource scarcity. (GoR, n.d.a, p.13)

As seen in the above excerpt (Box 4.3) the GoR had articulated the education needs of Rajasthan as challenges e.g. implementation of RtE in a specific time frame, need to reduce the gender gap and improving learning competencies. However, there was a contradiction in the resource scarcity arguments in the REI documents and the Chief Minister's address at the REI planning meeting in August 2005 where she said that 'there is unprecedented financial commitment from the central government' for education in Rajasthan and that REI was to serve as an umbrella for all the efforts towards UEE (Scindia, 2005). It is not clear if the state government is resource scarce even in face of an unprecedented financial commitment from the central government. Moreover, could a small scale programme realistically serve as an umbrella for fulfilling the commitments of a nation-wide programme in terms of matching financial commitments and scope?

The REI partnerships were formalised by signing of MoU¹⁶ documents between the state government and the partners. Some of the MoUs reflected clear description of deliverables by both the parties, plans and resources while others were vague.¹⁷

¹⁶ The signing of the MoUs started as early as June 2005 but the partnership description was signed by the core partners in November 2005.

Box 4.4 A Brief Timeline of REI

January 2005: Vasundhara Raje, Chief Minister, Rajasthan attended the meeting of the World Economic Forum in Davos 2005

November 2005 a: World Summit on Information Society, Tunis, November 16-18, 2005

November 2005 b: REI launched in India with signing of the partnership description by Principal Secretary, Education, Government of Rajasthan, Peter Torreele, Managing Director, World Economic Forum (WEF), Stephan Nolan, Executive Director, Global e-Schools and Communities Initiative (GeSCI), N. Srinivasan, Director General, Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) on November 29, 2005 during the World Economic Forum India Summit in New Delhi.

January 2006: Chief Minister's Review Presentation at Davos


April 2006: The REI's first update meeting was held on April 21-22, 2006 in Jaipur, Rajasthan, India.

Source: (GoR, n.d.a,p.15; GoR, n.d.b; WSIS 2005)

Prior to this launch, representatives of the Rajasthan state government (including the Minister of Education, Ghanshyam Tiwari and Principal Secretary Education, C K Mathew) attended the India Roundtable on ICT Empowered Education in Dublin (May 13 – 15, 2005) and a month later attended the 5th Jordan Education Initiative Update Meeting in Amman (June 17 – 18, 2005). Later that year two REI planning meetings were held (August 1 – 2 and October 16 – 17) in Rajasthan, India. Rajasthan's Chief Minister presented a review of REI at Davos in January 2006 and the first update meeting of REI partnerships was held in Rajasthan in April 21 – 22, 2006. The speedy launch of this programme (see Box. 4.4), once an idea is adopted by the top leadership, is indicative of the 'soft power' of these international alliances in influencing the power elite and the power of the elite to initiate change. However, whether the state machinery is ready and capable of taking on the responsibility which such programmes demand from the platform, is an important determinant of the benefits accrued. This is a subject I will return to when discussing the impact of different aspects of the REI.

¹⁷ See appendix to Chapter 4 for list of MoUs signed and appendix to Chapter 9 for summary of the MoUs of the eight programmes discussed in this thesis.

The following chart (Fig.4.1) depicts the REI Organogram. It reveals important issues regarding the governance of REI. There appears to be top down and uni-directional relationship of the REI Governing Committee (GC) with the Programme Steering Committee (PSC) as well as the REI-Programme Management Unit (PMU) (Fig. 4.2). These two committees were constituted on October 19, 2006 vide office order F.No.6 (63)AR/Gr.3/2006. The relationship between i) PMU, ii) the MoU partners and iii) District Level executive committees (the Trio) seems more interactive/intercommunicative from the figure but was it really so on the ground? The REI partners reported that where the MoUs were signed directly at the district level, there were gaps in communication with the PMU and district level committees causing delays in partnership implementation. Moreover, till the end of 2009 there had been no meeting of GC and only one meeting of PSC was held on October 10, 2007.



Source: GoR, 2007, p.40

The partners also reported that their relationships with the government officials were developed at the personal level and REI had no role in facilitating partner interaction

with the officials. The PMU was relatively a stable structure because of its cadre of Deputy Directors (DDs), in-charge of programmes but the head of the PMU i.e., the SSA Commissioner/Director and the Deputy Manager of the PMU (Officer on Special Duty i.e., OSD,REI) were frequently transferred. Also the relationship of the REI's international partners with the PMU and their role is not explicit. It seems that they had no relationship with the REI-PMU and therefore any claims that they were to make unilaterally about the success or failure of REI comes into question.


3. Typology – Two Programme Tracks and SSA Overlap

The REI managed to attract multiple partners to support educational development in Rajasthan. The roles of these partners varied, depending on their organisational strength, expertise and capacities. The typology of initiatives primarily revolved around the use of information and communication technology (ICT) vs. other more conventional interventions that supported teachers and schools. Thus REI divided initiatives into two broad categories – ICT-track initiatives and non-ICT track initiatives.¹⁸

The ICT track interventions included capacity building of teachers through ICT based methods; provision of ICT based teaching-learning for children in the age group of 3 – 11 years, and ICT training for secondary school students (see chapter 6). Under the non-ICT track, some organisations adopted primary schools (see chapter 5), some introduced interventions for pre-school children (see chapter 8), others mobilised communities for enrolment of children. NAANDI Foundation and Akshay Patra through separate individual partnerships with GoR provided mid-day meals in primary schools and some others initiated a programme for district-wide professional development of teachers (see Chapter 7).

¹⁸ Similar typology was used to define the initiatives in the Jordan Education Initiative. Since these programmes were started at the behest of ICT companies and their advocacy in these alliances, the main focus of the programmes was ICT based. To some extent this reflects the limitation of vision on part of these alliances to address regional specificities.

The analysis of the content of the MoUs signed under REI reveals that the project size, scale and scope of the MoUs varied. At one end there were short-term partnerships such as the Read Rajasthan of Pratham designed for one academic session while at the other end a partnership such as the school adoption by Bharti Foundation was designed for ten years. Then again there was a partnership designed for 14 schools and on one hand while on the other hand there was a partnership to cover one whole district (Table 4.1; see the summary of partnerships in the appendix to chapter 3).



Source: GoR, 2007, p.41

It also needs to be noted here that REI had overlapping objectives with SSA, the GoI's programme for UEE. The programme aimed to contribute towards SSA through adopting common goals such as widening access, promoting efficiency, enhancing quality of learning and teaching and improving infrastructure and management systems (GoR,

n.d.a, pg. 17 – 19). This overlap with SSA will be revisited in the case study chapter 5, where I will discuss REI partnerships for school adoption. However the REI was not on a State wide scale and had only 5% coverage. Moreover, it is not clear what was to be the coordinating mechanism with SSA and its international partners (Fig. 4.1) except for the fact that the REI, PMU was organisationally located under the SSA leadership (Fig. 4.2). Moreover, no resources were allocated from SSA to the REI till 2009 though the PMU was physically housed in Department of Education (DoE) offices of the GoR in Jaipur.

4. Modalities – Invited, Formalised Space

The state government invited interested organisations to participate in REI and entered into partnerships with them. These partnerships were formalised through the signing of MoUs between the state government and organisations proposing programmes for the educational development of Rajasthan. These memoranda specified what each partner would do and how it would be resourced. However, not all the MoUs specified the fund requirements and how they planned to acquire those resources. Also none of the MoUs specified any strategy for handover nor any exit route.

At the time of the first update meeting of REI in April 2006, eleven partnerships had been formalised (Table 4.1). Of these, nine partnerships had been formalised even before the formal signing of a partnership between the core partners and the GoR (for discussion on REI partners see section 6).

As shown in the table (Table 4.1) six of the partnership-MoUs were for ICT based interventions in the education system. Three other partnerships were focused on school based non-ICT interventions. Finally two MoUs – No. 10 with core partners and No. 11 signed with the Global e-schools and Community Initiative (GeSCI) – were based on programme management aspects of REI.

I had assumed that the signing of the MoU implied formalisation of a partnership and that this was an important step – the first stage of partnership formation. However, in

case of the partnership signed between GoR and Intel it was clearly stated that the 'MoU does not create any agency, partnership, joint venture or any other business relationship

Table 4.1 Description of MoUs Signed at the Time of the First Update Meeting (April 2006) of REI

S.No.	Date	Agency	Description
1.	14 June 2005	Azim Premji Foundation	Computer Aided Learning Programme (CALP) Programme started in 187 schools; 25 more to start in the current year and 200 every year thereafter.
2.	17 Aug. 2005	Microsoft	Partners in Learning Programme and Teacher Training infrastructure. Information Technology Academy started in Shiksha Sankul, Jaipur
3.	6 Sept. 2005	Azim Premji Foundation	The Learning Guarantee Programme (LGP) in schools. Tonk and Sirohi Districts selected plus one block in every district; Training Programmes Initiated
4.	21 Sept. 2005	Hole in the Wall Education Ltd. (HIWEL) (NIIT)	Innovative learning in outdoor environment Jhalawar, Tonk and Dholpur selected. UNICEF to fund
5.	24 Sept. 2005	Educate Girls Globally (EGG)	For enrollment and retention of girls with community participation in certain blocks
6.	21 Oct. 2005	American India Foundation	Digital Equalizer Programme in 200 schools of three districts for capacity building of staff. Districts and schools identified
7.	21 Oct. 2005	Bodh Shiksha Samiti	For slum children of Jaipur: schools selected: intervention to start shortly
8.	21 Oct. 2005	CISCO	For learning Academies and networking including technical support as well as pro bono training of master teachers etc.
9.	21 Oct. 2005	Intel	For training of teachers in about 3600 schools, for new educational tools, for support in formulation of education IT policy Three training batches completed.
10.	21 Nov. 2005	With Core Partners	Partnership description document. Signed between State Government and three partners, World Economic Forum, Confederation of Indian Industry and the Global e-Schools and Communities Initiative.
11.	18 Jan. 2006	GeSCI	Between State Government and GeSCI for partnership in assistance for implementation of REI

between the Parties' (GoR-Intel, 2005). This was particularly intriguing since Intel had committed to support the GoR in drafting 'State ICT in Education Vision' and framing of a 'State ICT Policy' besides developing 'School Level Technology Plans' (ibid.). Moreover there was no timeline and exit route discussed in the MoU. Microsoft's MoU with the government besides setting up an IT academy also intended to develop content (GoR-Microsoft, 2005). At least three ICT partners shared on the condition of anonymity that they were part of a curriculum development committee. However, this was denied by the REI-PMU. American India Foundation's Digital Equalizer Programme MoU mentioned that it would pick the curriculum software 'off-the-shelf' and 'would recommend to the state government the most appropriate software to procure' (GoR-AIF, 2005).

There were certainly many organisations interested in bringing in content and shaping the IT environment in Rajasthan through inputs into the IT policy but there was no commitment for content development for ICTs through collaborative involvement of REI partners. Interestingly none of these organisations were giving computers or software to the schools. Rather they were helping the government in procurement, training teachers in technology-use and supporting districts in developing their plans. Three IT interventions (of HiWel, IBM-Pratham and Cisco) are discussed in chapter 6 on ICT based interventions.

HiWel's partnership with the GoR (No. 4) and Cisco's partnership (No.8) are discussed in chapter 6 of this thesis. Among the non-ICT programme partners one – Azim Premji Foundation – is a not-for profit foundation of the IT company, Wipro. Another non-ICT programme partner is Bodh Shiksha Samiti, a Rajasthan based NGO which was a technical and resource support partner for other NGOs in Rajasthan during the UN agency led Janshala Programme (common community school programme) from 1998 to 2002. This partnership is discussed in Chapter 8 of this thesis.

5. Scale of Interventions vs. Educational Needs of Rajasthan


At the time of the launch of the REI in 2005, the gender gap in the enrolment was 7% at the primary education level and 26.4% at the upper primary level. Single teacher

schools and shortage of teachers have been a problem during this time. 28% of the primary schools were reported to be single teacher schools in 2003-04 (GoR, n.d.a). Rajasthan had also been struggling with the problem of a large number of out of school children and more girls were reported out of school than boys. The GoR presentation at the REI meeting held on 21 – 22 April 2006 reported 134,000 children out of school. It was also mentioned that there was around 182,230 children with special needs (CWSN). However, none of the REI partnerships focussed on CWSN.

The interventions under REI programme aimed to cover 4000 schools in five years across 32 districts (WEF, 2007, p. 12). There was, however, no Master plan for the REI. In 2005 Rajasthan had 55942 primary schools and 26201 upper primary schools (GoR, n.d.a, p. 4). Thus REI aimed to cover about 5% of the schools in Rajasthan. Then again the REI goals were not proportional to its resources. Considering that REI project period was phased till 2010 (GoR, n.d.a, p. 21), the ambitious projections for REI of building solid ICT capacities in the state of Rajasthan (WEF, 2007), without an assessment of available ICT infrastructure in the state, when aiming to cover only 5% schools, overall i.e., with ICT and non-ICT projects) sounds like a pipe dream. Especially so in a region where drop-out rate from class I – VIII was more than 65% in 2004-05 (GoR, 2008b) and IT infrastructure in schools was insufficient. I wondered if this was recognised at the time of the launch of the REI. As one of the REI partners put it,

“The REI has a mistaken order of priorities. REI brought in players with various competencies but these were really not complementary. There was no need assessment. In Rajasthan when 40% of children in primary school cannot read even at the level of grade I, then one does not need rocket science to infer and rationalise what is needed first. There is a clear bias against non-ICT initiatives in REI.”
(Interview, non-ICT track partner, 2009)

Fig. 4.3 Map Showing Spread of REI



Source: GoR, 2008

The SSA Commissioner's presentation at the REI update meeting however shows that there were an equal number of partnerships in ICT and Non-ICT track (see Fig. 4.3). However most of the partnership interventions were concentrated in Jaipur, the capital of Rajasthan and other major cities such as Udaipur, Ajmer, Alwar, Bikaner and Jhalawar. So, the overall coverage of REI projects while wide was small and too thinly spread to make any deep impact.

Even before planning for this research study, I knew (because of my participation in REI update meetings in 2006 – 07) that REI core partners had the intention to advocate for scaling up of initiatives modelled on MSPs not only in Rajasthan but also across other states in India. Thus it seemed that if at the end of the project period (or even earlier) REI

was evaluated as successful, then it would very likely be scaled up across the state and the country. This intention is already apparent in the objectives of the REI which states:

‘to demonstrate robust, sustainable and scalable models, approaches, tools and methodologies that can significantly impact educational outcomes and transform the educational scenario of the State.’ (GoR, n.d.a, p.18)

I therefore considered it important to understand this program as it had the potential of making an impact on the architecture of service delivery of public education in Rajasthan in particular and over time, perhaps across the country.

6. The Partners in REI

There were two categories of partners involved in the REI – core partners and programme partners. The core partners were involved in project management of REI and in (in case of partners other than the government) providing consultancy services to the government in the field of public-private partnerships in education. The WEF, Global e-schools and communities Initiative (GeSCI) and the CII were the core partners along with the GoR. Interestingly, the function of the core partners was not to provide resources but to ‘facilitate and assist the State Government’ (see Box 4.5).

Box: 4.5 Role of Core Partners

The three core partners will facilitate and assist the State Government in the implementation, monitoring and reporting of the individual projects within the REI and evaluate the success of each of them so as to learn lessons from the experience.

Efforts shall also be undertaken to encourage the participation of more stakeholders willing to take part in this model of public private partnership.

The core partners will also assist the State Government of Rajasthan to explore the possibilities for scaling up the individual pilot projects presently under execution once their success has been demonstrated, so that a wider canvas with a greater number of schools and students can be benefitted with the power of ICT intervention in education and the other related projects involving social responsibility programmes. (GoR, n.d.a, p.34)

Moreover, till the third year of the programme there was no dedicated person from WEF, GeSCI or CII to support the PMU. In 2007, GeSCI placed a consultant to undertake

gap analysis for REI interventions and develop a LFA in consultation with partners for the purpose of conducting REI baseline study! This study was completed in 2008.

The programme partners whose function was to deliver individual project specific services ranged from organisations providing for educational services such as mid day meal, school health care, adoption and management of schools to those implementing innovations and ideas of classroom related reforms in the government school system.

In the following section, I discuss two of the core partners — GeSCI and WEF. I chose these as illustrative to identify some of the issues for the formation, formalisation and governance of MSPs. The discussion on each specific programme partner and CII which is another core partner (as well as a programme partner) will be taken up in the following chapters of this thesis as per their relevance to the discussion.

6.1 The Global e-schools and Communities Initiative (GeSCI)

The Global e-schools and Communities Initiative (GeSCI) was founded as an international not-for-profit organisation in 2003 emerging from the UN ICT task force. This was an alliance of 33 partners of which six were national governments – UK, Ireland, Germany, Cuba, Sweden, United States, five were UN agencies, four multilateral organisations including the World Bank (see appendix to chapter 4). The remaining eighteen partners were IT companies and ICT based interest groups.

Why is it necessary to look at the composition of the ICT task force and GeSCI that succeeded it? Firstly, it helps us to understand how much power the ICT task force and consequently GeSCI might wield while influencing policy decisions at the country and state level. Secondly, the various alliances of countries and companies subsequently reveals not only the multilateralism in the formation of alliances and involvement of organisations (specifically the IT industry) but also reveals the presence of transnational interest groups, which in various forms seem to be having an impact on policy decisions of sovereign countries or a sub-region therein.

6.1.1 Influence on National Policy

Shortly after the launch of the REI partnership GeSCI as the strategic partner of the Ministry of Human Resource and Development (MHRD), GoI launched consultations on IT policy at the national level along with another Indian group which identified itself as an NGO – Centre for Science Development and Media Studies (CSDMS) and served as the lead facilitator of the action group on ‘National policy on ICT in School Education’. The UN solution exchange¹⁹ discussion group which was launched in 2005 (interestingly it coincides with the time of launch of REI) in India was used as a platform to ask definitive questions about how to involve the private sector and pave the way for public-private partnerships in the realm of ICTs in education in India.

There was a certain ambiguity in terms of the intention of these discussions and consultations that began in 2008. Whether these discussions were initiated to seek out expertise for dovetailing ICTs into the IT and Education policy mix remains unclear. Some of the participants in these discussions questioned the basic premise of discussing ICT policy with a pre-decided PPP involvement and technology focus without first discussing the domain specific needs and concerns in the educational context of India

In August 2006, CSDMS along with alliance partners of Global Knowledge Partnerships²⁰ had organised a Digital Learning Conference where GeSCI led a session on ‘Framework for ICT in education policy’. The event involved 350 speakers and 700 participants from all over India and other parts of the world including businesses, government leaders, aid agencies and representatives of organisations working with specific focus on ICTs.

¹⁹ A knowledge management initiative of United Nations in India for National Development Goals and Millennium Development Goals.

²⁰ GKP is yet another network of organisations started in 1997 focusing on IT for development. It became a foundation in 2010.

Thus 2005 – 2008 was a crucial period when GeSCI having entered as a core partner of REI in Rajasthan was attempting to influence the policy level decisions in India. However, these attempts were being actively contested by other interest groups with the government and NGO sector. In December 2008 during one of the CREATE conferences in Delhi I chanced to meet some of the NGO members who had been active in contesting GeSCI's role in deciding India's ICT in education policy.²¹ Thus the influencing power of the GeSCI in terms of IT industry supported interest group for action that is spread geographically, its symbolic power in terms of its linkage with the UN and in acquiring strategic partner status with national level ministries, indicates several things.

Firstly it indicates that the influence of global forces and alliances on national level policy making is becoming explicit. Secondly by inviting email consultations, as happened in this case, for deciding a national level issue, a certain level of segregation of communities and stakeholders takes place while the decisions arrived at in such platforms might still affect them in the long run. This happens because of differential access of groups to technology. Thirdly, for the organisations and interest groups who might not be aligned with the focus and agenda there is a clear indication 'if you do not jump on to the bandwagon you will miss the train for ever'. Even the disconcerting voices in these alliances serve to provide further legitimacy to their power to influence and appropriate to some extent.

What was GeSCI trying to achieve with its influence? To answer this question we need to remind ourselves that GeSCI emerged through the UN ICT task force which was primarily an alliance of IT companies. My reading is that by thus gaining influence over ICT in education policy making, GeSCI was aiming at 'schools full of computers' so to speak and generally business which comes along with selling ICTs to the educational

²¹ GeSCI later published a document titled 'Towards a National Policy on ICT in School Education in India: A multi-stakeholder perspective' (GeSCI, 2008) along with its local partners, UN solution exchange and MHRD. This document is a compilation of the three UN solution exchange e-discussion queries on this topic and their responses along with several position papers.

institutions. No doubt GeSCI was a strategic alliance and it was certainly acting in the best interests of IT businesses (also see Box 4.9).

6.1.2 REI Review

As stated in the previous section, GeSCI was one of the core partners of REI providing consultation and managerial support to the government. In fact a consultant was appointed by GeSCI to work with the REI, PMU. GeSCI published a review of REI in 2009 according to which REI had failed to create a win-win situation for the partners (Box 4.6).

Box 4.6 REI Review

Indeed the REI has been very successful, in more ways than one, and yet when measured against the size and scope of problems that face Rajasthan, the REI seems to have failed miserably. Perhaps it is right to say that the REI was too ambitious in its undertaking, perhaps even audacious and therefore, despite its range of stakeholders and its international scope, it still failed to fulfill all its objectives. (GeSCI, 2009, p.15)

The report mentions several findings to show how REI failed in its objectives. First of all, according to the report the REI failed to convert the identified objectives, needs and priorities into a short and long-term strategic plan, strategies and milestones. This is despite continuous advocacy by core partners (GeSCI and the WEF) and other partners, especially Intel (GeSCI, 2009, p.15). The ultimate responsibility of the operationalisation was on the State government. Then, in the absence of a dedicated budget from the GoR, REI activities had been ad-hoc. Another issue was that due to non operationalised governing and steering committees and in the absence of strategic direction, REI had failed to produce successful innovative scalable models. My experience in one of the districts was an eye opener where the coordinator of one of the REI partners Foundation to Educate Girls Globally (FEGG) was trying to persuade the District Collector (DC) to allow the expansion of the programme from 50 to 500 schools. The District Collector was however of the view that the progress of the programme in the 50 schools has been limping along slowly and therefore did not qualify for upscaling (Field notes, July 2009). A few months

later I came to know that the programme was being praised as successful and had been up scaled to 500 schools. Clearly both cannot be true. In a 2007 update of REI, there was a clear indication that the project would be updated to 500 schools but it had actually not happened till July 2009. My interpretation is that the programme was actually facing implementation issues in the field but because of its specific focus on gender, which was aligned with SSA priorities, and the image of an international NGO partner, helped.

GeSCI's review also found that partners were being distracted away from REI. However the report does not explain the reason for and nature of this distraction. It does mention that the American India Foundation (AIF) reduced its activity from 213 to 96 schools and planned to close down its activities in 2009. The interview with the coordinator of AIF's Digital Equalizer programme revealed that due to economic recession there was a decision not to take the programme beyond its initial three year planned project phase. According to the AIF MoU the third year of the programme was to be the exit phase when the DE team would handover the programme to the state government. This involved identification and training of government staff. However, this does not seem to be a comprehensive exit plan as it did not specify who among the government staff would be trained and what would be their future roles in this context? Nor did it specify the nature of training. Furthermore, the exit plan did not discuss how, in future, the government would take the programme forward.


The REI review report mentions that REI started with the highest possible level of support i.e., from the Chief Minister of Rajasthan. However, since it was bound with the national level SSA programme and depended on SSA funds, the role which could have been played by the core partner in building a robust and sustainable initiative eroded (GeSCI, 2009, p.16). It is not clear from GeSCI's report how the role of core partners eroded because of the SSA linkage. In REI's third update meeting (2008), the GoR had made it clear that 'REI is not a substitute for Government Purchase System. It promotes CSR based partnerships' (GoR, 2008).

SSA had funds available for 15 different budget heads²² but none specifically allocated for REI. In March 2010 during the preparation of next year's plan, 100,000 INR (approx. 2222 USD) from the SSA budget was allocated for REI meetings (Interview, DD-REI, March 2010). In one of its three MoUs with GoR in April 2006, CII had committed that a CII-REI fund would be created where industry partners could transfer funds for adopted schools but this hadn't materialised even in 2010 (Interviews, REI-PMU, 2010; CII representative, 2009). Was it that the core partners expected to gain control over management and disbursement of SSA funds?

To attempt an answer to this question let us review Figure 4.4 which represents the roles of GoR, core partners and programme partners (co-partners) in brief. In this representation it is very clear that the GoR was expected to bring public funding to REI whereas core partners (in this case GeSCI, WEF and CII) would bring skills, knowledge, expertise and resources for effective management of REI. The partnership description of REI delineates a supportive role of the WEF in the management of PPPs. It is therefore plausible to draw the conclusion that core partners were interested in managing REI with public funds and their notion of resources did not include financial commitment to REI. There is a contradiction here, since the REI vision document had stated that 'Core partners in the REI, it is expected, shall substantially fund the Programme Office' (GoR, n.d.a, p. 31). This expectation was clearly not fulfilled. If the government was to bring the funds to REI and the core partners were to contribute skills, technology, design besides implementing programme interventions, then it is not clear what else could be the role, commitment and contribution of core partners if not to exercise control over public funds.

²² These SSA expenditure heads were comprised of civil work, maintenance and repairs, textbooks, teaching learning material, school grant, teacher grant, teachers training, training for community leaders, provision for disabled children, research evaluation supervision and monitoring, management costs, innovation, BRC, CRC, interventions for out of school children.

Fig 4.4 Role of GoR, Core Partners and Co-Partners in a Nutshell



Source: GeSCI, 2009, annex II, p.36.

Frequent change in leadership, more specifically SSA Director/Commissioner, no allocation of dedicated administrative staff and lack of resources are other problems cited in GeSCI's report. Since the time of my experience with REI as a practitioner in Jaipur in 2006 till the end of my fieldwork in September 2010, I saw the replacement of six OSDs – the Rajasthan Administrative Services officers deputed for REI; replacement of five DDs in-charge of REI and four Director/Commissioners of the SSA who served as the lead of the Programme management unit of REI. The interviews with over 20 partner organisations during the course of this study revealed that partners were unhappy with this frequent change of officers as this proved detrimental to the smooth progress of the programmes.

Every time the leadership changed the partners had to enter a new cycle of appraising the new officer with the vision and scope and progress of the programme. When this did not match the understanding and perhaps also the expectations of the officer, the programmes suffered.

The partners also shared that as fallout of their frequent presence in the SSA commissioner's office some notions of hierarchy and power tended to develop. "So what if she heads SSA, I am also in charge of this ... I earn as much as she earns" an ICT track initiative manager from a partner organisation told me off the record. It is clear that the non-governmental partner from the IT Company equated his power with the state government bureaucrat in terms of financial worth put by an organisation on their employees reflected in the salary structure. This could also be indicative of the notion of relative power and status felt by non-government, IT industry members of these transnational alliances due to their membership in these global networks and also because of their financial muscle. This does not however imply that the benefit of this power goes in favour of the programme. Furthermore, this indicates that the objectives are not shared by the key actors and quite often end up in power tensions between high ranking government officials and private sector executives.

Finally the fact that even in the third year of its pilot, REI continued to sign new partnerships, has been cited as a cause of its failure in the absence of a clear baseline for assessment of projects (GeSCI, 2009, p.16). So it can be said that the REI directed too much energy to new partners and not enough to the existing ones. However, if we review the role envisaged for core partners, the REI partnership description states that the core partners will strive to involve more stakeholders (see Box. 4.5). It does not say how many and till when, new partners will be invited and involved. Unwin (2005) asserts that programmes led by private players should be demand driven and developing an understanding of demand takes time. "The evidence suggests that activities that are supply led, and that do not sufficiently take into consideration the real needs and aspirations of poor people will rapidly become white elephants"(p.66). The supply led dynamics of REI

has surely been a major drawback of the programme (see chapter 6 for discussion of ICT partnerships).

The findings from GeSCI's review of REI clearly indicate that a transnational alliance and international scope does not ensure success of initiatives. Rather there are aspects which are local, particular and specific which need to be addressed. This thesis attempts to look at REI as a particular case to generate insights in relation to these specificities.

6.2 World Economic Forum

The WEF which is another core REI partner first emerged in 1971 as a strategic collective of European businesses to reclaim leadership of the international community from the Americans (Pigman, 2007, p.1). The forum has evolved since its inception and has acquired a reputation for diplomacy, affecting regions and peoples, through ideas involving a range of actors.

In recent years, the “narrative of the Forum’s evolution is inextricably entangled with the narrative of India’s emergence as an economic powerhouse ...” (p.5). Pigman’s analysis gives credit for India’s economic growth in the post-liberalisation era to the WEF. The period of economic liberalisation in India which had taken seed in the mid 80’s, served the WEF to institute the India Economic Summit in 1985 along with four major Indian business associations. In 1986 the WEF formed a partnership with the CII to co-sponsor these India summit meetings. The REI partnership was signed during one such India Economic Summit in November 2005. In 2003, the WEF had launched the Global Education Initiative (GEI) to improve the state of education through a public private initiative. Under the auspices of GEI, education initiatives were launched in Jordan (JEI) before Rajasthan and in Egypt (EEI), Palestine (PEI) and Rwanda around the same time as REI. Clearly GEI was an ambitious programme as is reflected in its claims which match these ambitions (See Box 4.7).

Box 4.7 The Global Education Initiative

‘In its six years of existence, the Global Education Initiative has impacted over 1.8 million students and teachers and mobilized over US\$ 100 million in resource support in Jordan, Rajasthan (India), Egypt, the Palestinian Territories and Rwanda. Today, the GEI engages over 40 private sector partners, 14 governments, seven international organizations and 20 NGOs with a Steering Board of nine Industry and Strategic Partners (AMD, Cisco, Edelman, HP, Intel, Microsoft, Satyam, StratReal, and SK Group).’ (World Economic Forum (WEF, n.d.))

The claims of the financial value of GEI contributions towards Rajasthan do not seem to be true, firstly because in the REI vision document there was no plan for the financial management system for REI. Secondly, the GeSCI’s report in 2009 had already critiqued REI for no funds and lack of financial reporting by REI partners. If this is so then how did they arrive at values for these contributions? Very few partnerships in their MoUs had declared the amount of funds and resources committed to their own project,²³ but even for those who did we do not have any assessment of the actual amounts spent by them on individual projects. The latest insight report on GEI also gives no figures towards investments catalyzed (WEF, 2012, p.23). Rather it provides revised figures of \$ 25 million for JEI²⁴ and \$ 90 Million for EEI.

Over the years the forum has managed to deepen its relationship with the UN and impacted programmes and practices (Robertson, 2008). Thus in 2007, the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) launched Partnerships for

²³ Even if we start estimating contributions from the International partners such as Microsoft where according to the MoU Microsoft agreed to pay rent to set up IT academy (ITA), the government provided the 2000-2500 square feet of area for ITA at a nominal charge of 1.00 INR (1 USD = 45 INR approx.) per annum for a period of five years. The government provided the site for the ITA in the posh new Education Directorate building in Jaipur which included ‘regularly maintained fixtures in form of buildings with facilities including electricity, running water, sewer, security and phone and/or lease lines in order to set up the ITA’ (GoR-Microsoft, 2005).

²⁴ The McKinsey & Company’s report on JEI assessed the worth of inputs put in by JEI partners to be \$ 22 million, of which 73% were financial. The report also assessed the benefit to the local firms. For example the ICT industry development received very little direct resources (less than \$ 100,000 in value) and \$ 3.7 million went to local firms through e-curricula development track (McKinsey & Company, 2005, pg. 27).

Education (P4E) in alignment with GEI. The P4E was “...a global coalition for s for education (MSPE’s), including the private sector, to advance progress toward the objectives of Education for All” (Robertson, 2008, p.13). The GEI has also been projected as an effective model of partnerships providing a systemic framework for planning and analysing partnerships (Cassidy, 2007); and education as ‘everyone’s business’ (WEF, 2007, see the video transcript in appendix to Chapter 4). This is despite the problems mentioned in the evaluation and review of these initiatives in reports of the WEF (see Cassidy, *ibid.*). Cassidy’s report on GEI points at the lack of monitoring and evaluation in all the three initiatives i.e., JEI, REI and EEI. This according to Cassidy limits the extent to which these partnerships could be evaluated as successful (p.20).

An evaluation report of JEI titled – Building effective public private partnerships: Lessons learnt from JEI, prepared by McKinsey & Company (2005) highlights that the progress made in ICT education was not as much as it was expected. The report expresses surprise over the fact that civil society was not part of this initiative (*ibid.*, p.25). However, the report mentions the success of JEI as having translated into gains for the IT industry.

“ICT industry development has achieved tangible results, in the form of a number of close partnerships with global companies and contracts with local firms valued at approximately \$3.7 million, but it is interesting that this has come as a by-product of the Discovery Schools tracks rather than any specific activities within Track 3.” (*ibid.*, p.27)

Also from the analyses of the reports it appears that private players have only been interested in the business and left the challenges of management to the programme management units.

‘the private sector (global and local) has not played as active a role in planning and managing these programs, and lending specialist skills. The burden has often fallen on the Programme Management Office (PMO) to fill the gap and it has become deeply involved in day-to-day implementation and trouble shooting’ (*ibid.*, p.31).

Cassidy points towards ‘unresolved tensions in the relationships of some partners with these initiatives’ (p.21). Finally, he notes the unsophisticated views of some of the partner-investors regarding learning and what needs to be done to bring change (Cassidy, 2007, p.26). This raises questions as to what educational change or reform could the

involvement of businesses, especially IT companies, could bring to these initiatives. As Unwin and Wong also observe, business interest lies at the heart of MSPEs (Box 4.8)

Box 4.8 What Lies at the Heart of MSPEs?


Most private sector companies involved in supporting educational partnerships are not educational specialists. The GEI began in part because ICT companies were eager to see how technology could transform educational systems. The underlying drivers for most companies engaged in education are threefold: selling services and products to an educational market funded by a state; gaining market intelligence and developing key relationships; or recruiting qualified labour trained by public sector schools and universities.

With the rise of academic interest in constructivist education and the corporate interest in selling ICT to educational establishments, a coalition of interests in ICT in education has been at the heart of many MSPEs. The GEI began at just this intersection. (Unwin and Wong, 2012, p.10)

Klaus Schwab's multi-stakeholder theory of global governance guides and represents the vision of WEF and was adopted by JEI (Pigman, *ibid.*, p.10, Fig 1.1). The stakeholders in this model (see Fig. 4.5) are the national governments (providing vision, lead and policy frameworks); global private sector/IT industry (providing partnership, technology, innovation); local industry providing (entrepreneurship); local NGOs (undertaking implementation); international and regional organisations (providing resource support and expertise in development partnership) and academic experts (providing academic support). Reading this model in terms of its pictorial representation, it is very clear that in this particular form of MSP, the global private sector in alliance with the government is acquiring a dominant position in deciding the educational issues in a region. Thus the local IT industry in Jordan along with the global IT partners such as Microsoft developed mathematics and science curricula and e-content for schools in Jordan (Bhanji, 2008, 2012). The private sector involvement was managed directly through the office of the King and the department of education was kept at a distance from decision making. Therefore the global and local IT partners had more say in governance than the department of education (Bhanji, 2012). There has been no external evaluation to assess actual impact on teaching and learning in Jordan and sustainability of such initiatives has been questioned

based on the fact that at the end of three years of JEI, it was handed over to the government of Jordan (Bhanji, 2008).

Fig: 4.5 JEI Model



Source: Pigman, 2007, p.10

In the context of educational change envisaged through an application of this model (Fig. 4.5) to REI, the case studies will bring out the striking absence of teachers being part of this model (see Fig. 10.1, Chapter 10). Secondly, in case of REI, the academic expertise component was also absent. The core partners had their roles delineated as managers. The WEF interestingly kept a ‘hands off’ approach towards REI (Unwin and Wong, 2012). It did sign the partnership description document along with two other core partners, the GeSCI and the CII, on November 29, 2005 but did not sign a separate MoU with the government as did the GeSCI (on January 18, 2006) and CII (April 22, 2006).

7. Conclusion

This chapter discussed the background story of REI – an innovative PPP model launched by the GoR and promoted as a MSP by the WEF. The partnerships in REI were launched under two streams: ICT and non ICT. This I argue is indicative of a dissociated understanding of the meaning and purpose of education among the REI planners. The GeSCI’s role in attempting to influence the IT policy at the national level is questioned because it largely reflects the position of an IT industry interest group. Though ICT was a major intervention focus in REI, the programme documents did not address the issue of content development for ICTs and the quality of the content as did JEI, its Jordanian cousin. Also the chapter brings out the fact that the non availability of financial resources for REI as such and a hands-off approach taken by WEF, were stumbling blocks to the realisation of the REI promise of putting Rajasthan on a fast track of development. This is notwithstanding the fact that REI as such was thin in spread and small in scale.

The PMU has a major responsibility in the governance of partnerships. The formation of the PMU, its roles and responsibilities, its resources and relationship with REI partners as also with the GoR’s SSA office, have been discussed here in detail. This discussion has revealed the limitations of such an institutional arrangement in undertaking effective implementation of formalised partnerships and the resulting implications for partnership transformation.

Partnership formation and formalisation has been the focus of the WEF backed MSP in JEI and also REI. However, post JEI, resource support from global businesses and the WEF, for transformation of the partnership into a government programme was not visible. This is a serious flaw of MSPs forged at the behest of business alliances. The case studies in this thesis will bring further empirical evidence about the lack of plans for exit routes and partnership transformation.

The following four chapters in this thesis are the case studies of programmes for school adoption, ICT based interventions, professional development of teachers and UEE in slums of Jaipur city.

Chapter 5

School Adoption Models

1. Introduction

This is the first chapter in the series of chapters on case studies of the partnerships under REI. This chapter presents the case studies of the partnerships focussed on adoption of government schools. The REI vision document proposes the scope of partnerships with the private sector for ‘adoption’ of schools. What such ‘adoption’ entails, what forms and contours it can possibly take, what are the dynamics and metamorphoses of on-the-ground adoption models, these are some of the issues that I will discuss through the case studies of three school adoption partnerships formalised under REI.

Each case study starts with an introduction of the school adopter and focuses on three broad aspects of school adoption partnership – Design, stakeholder relationships and participation and partnership governance to capture the dynamics, development and performance of the adoption models (see Fig.3.3, Ch.3). These three areas of focus will allow me to group the findings in a way that facilitates a direct engagement with the five categories of research questions. Specifically the three foci of this case study are:

- a) Design of the school adoption and inputs to the adopted schools by the partners,
- b) Stakeholder relationships including
 - i) Teachers’ involvement in the school adoption partnership, and
 - ii) The nature of school-community-partner relationship
- c) Partnership governance

1.1 The SSA Linkage and School Adoption

The Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI) supports and coordinates interventions designed to promote goals held in common with SSA (GoR, n.d.a). The SSA²⁵ framework rhetoric emphasises ‘community ownership of school based interventions through effective decentralisation’ and ‘participatory management of elementary education with community support’, also encouraging ‘involvement of private sector in improving functioning of government, local body or a private aided school.’ It is clear that school ‘adoption’ models have found explicit or implicit support in the SSA framework. This in itself creates an added layer of legitimacy of private sector partnerships for the purpose of adoption-oriented interventions within the REI framework.

1.2 School adoption in Government Programmes and Policies

The GoR also created a programme for adoption of schools. Based on the requirement/nature of expenditure, two models of school adoption have been proposed by the government. These are: a) Construction/Infrastructure support, material provision (Capital cost) and b) Management of school which includes deployment of teachers, monitoring and supervision of school functioning, maintenance of school infrastructure (Recurring cost).

These proposals are silent, as to how the government will identify or has identified the organisations with expertise in the area of school monitoring and supervision or how it will oversee and regulate adoption. Deployment of teachers is only one aspect of school adoption for management and it is nowhere specified whether the school adopter will bear the cost of salaries of the teachers deployed by them.

²⁵ Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan literally means Education for All. SSA was launched in 2002 as Indian government’s programme for Universalisation of Elementary Education. Recently the SSA mandate has been extended to include Secondary Education as well.

1.3 ‘Adopt a School’ in REI

The Rajasthan Education Initiative proposed three models for adoption of school through private sector participation (GoR, n.d.a, p.30).

Box 5.1 School Adoption Models

Model-I	for contribution towards construction of building
Model-II	for management and maintenance costs of schools
Model-III	for individual specific MoUs to cater to the specific needs of the schools and the donor
(GoR, n.d.a, p.30)	

2. Analysing School Adoption Models

Even a cursory glance of the proposed models of adoption under the REI or SSA framework brings out that the first two adoption models under the REI framework are the same as that proposed under government programmes (vide a. and b.; section 1.2). However, the phrase, ‘needs of the adopter’ (see Box 5.1) begs the question, why is the adopter’s ‘need’ being at all highlighted? Wouldn’t the ‘capacity’ of the adopter and the ‘needs’ of the school be the more logical way to proceed when the overarching objective of the adoption exercise is to provide quality education. In the case studies section of this chapter we will see how the needs of the adopter varied from partner to partner.

3. The School Adoption Case Studies

In the remaining sections of this chapter I will discuss the experience of the REI with different school adoption models. In doing this, I will explore how these models were developed and nuanced by the adopting organisations. Among other things I will look at the vision of the adopter, the relationship of the adopter with the school and community and the translation of that vision on the ground. Because of the very clear overlap with SSA goals I will also explore how the framework of SSA has been articulated by REI in the school adoption programmes and what impact (if any) has been made vis-à-vis SSA goals?

The first partnership under examination is the school adoption by the Bharti Foundation. The Bharti Foundation is the CSR arm of Bharti Telecom. The second case study looks at school adoption by a small and medium enterprise (SME) business (Mayur Leathers) through the CIL. The third case study takes up school adoption by the Amber Trust. These three case studies are illustrative but also exhaustive in the sense that there were only these three partners and models in operation since 2005 (when REI was initiated) till 2010 (the time of my field work).

The issues emerging from the school adoption models in operation and implications for school access, accountability and sustainability of PPP are discussed at the end.

4. Case Study – The Bharti Foundation Partnership

4.1 Design and Inputs

Bharti Foundation (BF), the philanthropic, non-profit arm of Bharti Enterprises, a telecom business group, was launched in 2000. Bharti Enterprises is not a primary actor in education domain. In 2006, the foundation launched its Satya Bharti School Programme (BF, 2009). This programme is operational in 236 schools under four different models (IBLF, 2010; see Box 5.2). BF has been operating in five states (Punjab, Haryana, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh and Tamil Nadu) covering 236 schools in total as on June 30, 2010 (BF, 2010; also see Table 5.1). In August 2007, BF adopted 50 government schools – 25 each in the districts of Alwar (Neemrana block) and Jaipur (Amer block) as REI partner. However the BF reports mention 49 government schools in total. The list of government schools for adoption, appended with the MoU mentions 48 schools with name/location.

Notwithstanding REI partnership of 49²⁶ government schools, BF is largely an operator of 187 private schools and is actually working with only one government secondary school in the province of Punjab. One wonders that if BF is such a robust school education provider or government school adopter then why other state governments or non governmental organisations in other states did not enter into partnership with BF giving away schools for adoption?

Box 5.2 Models of Bharti Foundation's Engagement with School Education

1. Greenfield schools constructed and run by BF: These schools have been constructed by BF on land allotted or leased either by the governments, panchayats or donors. These are private schools.
2. Schools run in Public-Private Partnership model with state governments (1 seni or secondary school in Punjab): In Punjab BF is actually working with just one school in PPP mode with the Punjab state government.
3. Government school Adoption: 49 government primary schools adopted in Rajasthan under REI
4. Schools in partnership with NGOs.

(BF, 2010; IBLF, 2010)

It is apparent that this private telecom company backed foundation has emerged as a private sector education provider. The REI through its commitment to pave the way for the private sector involvement has created a legitimate space for the school adopter to spread its roots from the private sector into the public sector. Why is a largely a private sector provider interested in adopting government schools in Rajasthan? The philanthropic and PPP initiatives by foundations in India such as BF have been gaining popularity for several years. They are not only gaining contributions from their own employees (IBLF, 2010) but also receiving huge amounts of foreign donations. According to a recent newspaper article in 'The Hindu', Google has given 5 million USD funding to BF for its Satya Bharti Schools

²⁶ The MoU mentioned adoption of 50 schools whilst the appended list of schools as part of the MoU has 48 schools. The BF reports provide data for 49 schools.

(The Hindu, 31st January, 2011). This amounts to approximately 21,186.00 USD per school.

The question then arises – why has the GoR given away government schools for adoption? Transaction cost economies (TCEs) (discussed in Chapter 2) emerge as the theoretical rationale of this partnership between GoR and BF.

Table 5.1 Reach of Satya Bharti Primary School Programme (as of October, 2010)

State	No. of districts	No. of schools	No. of children
Punjab	3	90	8727
Haryana	5	46	5766
Rajasthan*	3	78	12062
UP	2	12	2622
Tamil Nadu	1	10	898
Total	14	236	30025

* Includes 49 government schools adopted by BF.

Source: IBLF, 2010

According to the statement of objectives in the MoU signed between the GoR and BF, the schools in Rajasthan were adopted by the Foundation as they were not running well (see Box 5.3). In the following section I will bring together secondary data from BF reports to contest this claim of ‘schools not running well.’

Box 5.3 Excerpt from MoU

“Whereas Bharti Foundation has expressed an interest to carry forward the objectives of REI by adopting a large number of primary schools, which are not running optimally and can gain from Bharti Foundation’s involvement. These schools would be primarily in the rural areas and serving children from the socio-economically deprived sections, in particular the girl children.” (GoR-BF, 2007)

Then again it is not clear how the girl child is specifically catered to by the BF school adoption. One could argue that girls tend to stay enrolled more in a school with facilities than in a school with poor provision. Other than this, the adopted schools do not

have any targeted programme for the girl child. All children from the community attend the same school. The REI school adoption model does not increase provision. It just shifts managerial ownership of the school from the government to the private provider.

4.1.1 Issues regarding Choice and re-christening of School

As stated above, the reason for ‘giving away’ schools is that the government schools were running sub-optimally. The evidence to support this claim could be derived from two indicators. These are learning achievement and provision of facilities. The GoR introduced tests for primary schools under the Quality Assurance Programme (QAP) in 2006-2007. Before that besides the usual District Information System on Education (DISE) indicators on enrolment and school facilities in primary schools, there was no scale to measure learning of children across primary schools because of the government’s ‘no detention’ policy. So how did the government decide which schools were performing sub-optimally?

The performance of the government schools adopted by BF has reportedly shown improvement in the QAP tests conducted by the GoR²⁷ (BF, 2010). According to this report (see Box no 5.4) the number of schools getting A and B grades in QAP have increased from 22 to 38 since August 2007. BF’s report highlights that 22 out of 49 government schools had QAP grades A and B before adoption. This proves that at least 45% of the adopted schools were performing well and may be we can conclude that these schools were not running sub-optimally. Then, why did the government give up the schools for adoption?


One of the officers in the planning cell and one of the REI commissioners I interviewed were of the view that the government should take up the role of manager and

²⁷ The Government of Rajasthan started the QAP tests as part of the learning guarantee program, a partnership between Azim Premji Foundation and Government of REI in 2006. QAP scores for schools are cumulative indicators of school facilities, enrolment of children, attendance and learning achievement.

give away schools on adoption to private players (GoR, Interviews 2009). Both the officers believed that this would release the financial pressure on the government and also that private players could handle the issue of teacher performance better than the government. However I did not get a reasonable answer as to why those 49 schools were specifically selected for school adoption.

Box 5.4 Improvement in Performance Levels of Adopted Government Schools

X-axis: QAP Grades; Y-axis: Number of Government Schools



Source: BF, 2010

The argument for sub-optimal running of schools can, possibly, be related to the salaries of the teachers, which the government pays to its employees. BF also claims that they will ‘develop a unique model for primary schools in Rajasthan’ (See Box 5.5).²⁸

²⁸ Rajasthan has a long history of experiments with schools and schooling facilities for children in its quest to increase access and provide better education. There are examples/models for primary schools developed by civil society organisations in Rajasthan. The UN agency led Janshala Programme was instrumental in bringing together government departments, UN groups and several civil society groups in Rajasthan in 1995 leading to development of common community schools.

Box 5.5 A 'Unique Model' for Primary Schools

“BF has designed a special teachers training program suited for village based schools, child centric-evaluation matrix, teaching learning material and processes and school operations manual for professional management and evaluation of schools. BF intends to work along with REI, learn from their experiences and bring in its learning to develop a unique model for primary schools in Rajasthan.” (GoR-BF, 2007, Section 2.3)

The design of the BF school adoption programme subsumes a change in ownership of the school for 10 years. It however does not indicate how BF is related with REI other than the fact that the MoU was signed under REI. Also none of the REI's international partners have contributed to or are engaged with the BF programme. Thus any resource support linkage with the GEI or WEF and with any of the REI core partners does not exist.

BF's school adoption model does not involve working for the school development along with the government teachers. The GoR transferred out the government teachers in the BF adopted schools to the other government schools as per the conditions of the MoU (see Box 5.6).

Box 5.6 MoU Clause regarding Transfer of Government Teachers

School Education department will transfer all the existing staff and teachers out of the schools adopted by BF. They may be redeployed in other schools by School Education Department. (GoR-BF, 2007, item 5.4)

One can argue that if the failure of the schools given away on adoption was due to the government teachers, how will the placement of those government teachers in other government schools will benefit the schools. Or is it that it was not that the schools were not running sub-optimally due to non-performance of the government teachers, as some of the BF staff also wanted me to believe (Interview, Headmaster-HM, BF adopted school, 2009). Rather, it was the failure on part of the government administration to make basic provision for basic amenities such as water and electricity connection in schools, which could have led to low performance of schools. BF's report highlights the improvement in schools since adoption by illustrating increase in water and electricity connection facilities in schools (see Box. 5.7). Clearly, there has been some improvement in the provision of

water and electricity for schools. However, there is no defined exit route for the adoption. It is not clear how the provision of facilities and salaries of the teachers in adopted schools will be resourced at the end of the 10 year period of school adoption.

Box 5.7 Improvements in Provisions following School Adoption by BF

1. All adopted schools have been provided with water connections as against available water connections in 15 schools in Neemrana and 19 schools in Amer before adoption
 2. 46 of 49 schools have been provided electricity connections as against 3 schools in Neemrana and 0 schools in Amer before adoption
 3. Approximate cost of Rs 3-4 lakh* (*100,000) spent on every school for infrastructural renovation
- (BF, 2009a)

The government provides for free text books, notebooks and mid day meal for the BF adopted government schools (BF, 2009a). However, it seems that it is the policy of BF and design of the BF partnership to show the low running cost of schools by deploying low paid teachers. This however raises question about BF reinforcing the growing trend of unorganized, non-unionised work force in the education sector. The giving away of the rural government schools on the pretext of sub-optimal performance also indicates a trend towards shrinking space of government involvement in the rural areas. The infiltration of the public education sector by the private sector through school adoption will result in the state retreating from the legitimate space of action and this could further undermine the state's commitment towards ensuring democratic participation of communities through its institutionalised structures to ensure delivery of right to education.

Further, it is also interesting to note that the adopting Foundation is keen to have their name stamped onto the school. The MoU signed with the government clearly states, "All these adopted schools under this "Program" will be called "Satya Bharti Government primary Schools" (GoR-BF, 2007, Section 2.1). Undoubtedly, with this clause, some sort of branding of schools and layering of identification markers of a private entity has been formalised through the MoU with the government.

Should BF be entrusted with the government schools? Evidence of the nature of BF's involvement in opening up schools in the neighbouring state of Punjab and Haryana has been controversial (see section 4.3). What does the BF leadership have to say about it?

4.1.2 Understanding Change due to BF Partnership

Learners at BF Schools

As stated with reference to Boxes. 5.4 and 5.7, there has been improvement in the reported provision of school facilities and relative QAP grades of schools. What has brought about this change? The teachers invariably described the condition of the schools and learning levels of children as bad or poor before adoption prior to school adoption (Interview, BF teachers, 2009). Whatever happened to the schools after BF came into the picture was described as good in response to the question on what change they see in schools since BF's adoption.

The headmaster of one of the schools in Amer block school for example was proud to show off a child's newly acquired English language skills. I asked the child some simple questions in Hindi, such as whether he likes to come to school or not and he answered me just as his teacher had said (see the interview quote below) he would.

“This is such a backward region. Earlier the children in this school could not even speak proper Hindi. They used to respond in their ‘gaanv kee bhasha’ (local village dialect and hence backward). Now if you talk to these children – they will not speak a sentence without first uttering ‘Yes, Sir and No Sir.’ Our focus is making them learn English.” (Interview, Headmaster of an adopted school, 2009)

The child in fact did not utter anything apart from ‘Yes’ or ‘No’. The proud and enthusiastic headmaster called another child who was more interested to talk and he too started his answers with Yes and No. This child in grade IV had moved to the government school from a private school in the previous month. The headmaster thought it was a signal of the popularity and appreciation of BF's good work that the children from private schools are seeking admission in the BF supported government schools. However, my experience of interviews with the headmasters in other government schools (one such case will be

discussed in the Amber Trust school adoption) is that the children turned down and pushed out of the private schools come to seek admission in government schools in grade IV, grade IX and grade XII.²⁹ The phenomenon of movement from private to public schools might be part of the larger systemic push and pull between the two sectors failing children and cashing on children's learning achievement. We cannot consider it as an example/outcome of BF school adoption. Furthermore, the BF adoption does not increase access; it just changes the ownership of the school for a certain period without a defined or planned exit route.

However, the previous issue of language learning as pointed out by the headmaster is an important thing to consider. Do the teachers themselves use the English language in their school work apart from the classroom teaching? To what extent are the teachers themselves prepared for the teaching of English language? In this particular case the headmaster showed me the lesson plan register of one of the teachers to prove that they prepare their lesson plans in English. He said he had left his lesson plan register at home. The BF management had asked them to write their lesson plans in English. This register had a pre-printed format for writing lesson plans. The lesson plans were written in broken English with tenses mixed up and also problems of syntax. I was told that the academic supervisors read their lesson plan registers during their visits and make suggestions.

Even with errors in writing, the lesson plan register shown to me, has the possibility of developing as a learner portfolio where the teacher learns a language on the job. If the Bharti Foundation has a team of academic supervisors who can help teachers learn a language on the job then it can be very helpful for the teachers and present a good example of teacher development and new language acquisition. However, I did not see any markings, comments or suggestions by any academic supervisor on the plan register. The

²⁹ The reason seems to be the school transition exams i.e. Grade V for transition to Upper primary and Grade X for senior secondary and Grade XII for further studies. Thus it is common for private schools and some of the high performing government schools to either stop the students from appearing in exams or give them a transfer certificate for admission to some other school.

register had a given format for writing lesson plans, structures and hence to some extent limited the planning for the lesson.

Language has an important role in learning and teaching of language has an emancipating potential. Though it was heartening to see efforts being made by young teachers to teach English to their pupils, but the way children's first language was being undermined as backward (see the quote about '*gaanv kee bhasha*' above) in the minds of the teachers, points towards limitation of pedagogical understanding amongst the teachers trained by Bharti Foundation.

4.2 Teacher Involvement

4.2.1 The Teachers at the Adopted Schools of Bharti Foundation

As stated in the above section the design of Bharti Foundation partnership for school adoption did not involve government teachers. BF, in fact, employed its own teachers in the government schools adopted by them. The teachers interviewed in the four schools in Amber were proud and often referred themselves as the 'cream' as they were successful in the BF's selection exam. The management also had infused this idea of being the 'cream' in the minds of teachers during the orientations and trainings (Interviews, 2009; 2010). Though this might have been an organisational strategy to enhance the self-esteem of the teachers and motivate them to work, BF has had staffing issues.

Running of the schools hasn't been a smooth affair for BF. Besides the land scam controversies which probably through their contacts and the hired lawyers of the company might be able to handle, there is another problem which BF faces – the high attrition rate of teachers in BF schools. According to BF's own reports its annual attrition rate is 12% (BF, 2009b). Research on schools serving rural and urban low-income communities in the United States suggests that staffing problems do not occur due to insufficient supply of qualified teachers but due to excess demand (Ingersoll, 2002, 2004). The data also shows that job dissatisfaction and teachers pursuing other jobs are reasons for teacher turnover and

teachers in such locations are paid less. The effect of turnover is such that urban schools lose one-fifth of their staff every year leading to change of entire staff of the school in few years (*ibid.*). A similar scenario seems to be emerging in BF adopted schools.

The teachers in BF adopted schools in Rajasthan get a salary which is less than half of that of a teacher in a government primary school (4800 – 7000 INR or 107 – 156 USD per month compared to 18,000 INR or 400 USD onwards for government teachers). In one of the BF reports (BF, 2008) the organisation claims that BF teachers have a satisfaction level of 3.5 indicating ‘overall teacher happiness’ on a scale of 1 – 4 (1=poor and 4=very good). However this is not clear whether this quality audit is of BF’s own schools or the adopted government schools.

How will BF deliver quality education in view of staff turnover in their schools? The teachers in BF adopted schools are qualified (with BEd degrees) and low paid. The teachers I interviewed in the four BF schools were in the age group of 21 – 27 years and in early stages of their careers and were pursuing other career options besides working in the BF schools (Interview, 2009; 2010). I conducted informal group discussions with two groups of teachers regarding their career aspirations (Group discussion, 2009). One group had seven teachers the other four. There was one woman teacher in each group. Most of the teachers in the two groups, including one of the women teachers, were aiming for jobs in railways, administrative services or as MBAs in the corporate sector. Though they had obtained BEd³⁰ degrees, teaching was not their ultimate career goal and was more like a stop-gap activity till the time they achieved their aspirations.

These teachers are also more likely to leave the profession in accordance with research evidence that suggests that within five years of obtaining employment teachers, in early stages of career, are more likely to leave (*ibid.*; Ingersoll, 2002, 2004). Thus, the organisations need to think of ways to increase teacher retention.

³⁰ Most of the teachers in the four BF adopted schools I visited had BEd degrees from the University of Jammu. This university is a centre for minting candidates with professional degrees in teaching. Most part of this BEd course is provided through distance education with an only a month long teaching practice session.

However, in order to solve the problem of teacher turnover in their schools BF is planning ahead to contain the turnover at around 20% annually (which means more than 40% teachers leave in 2 years replaced by new ones). Their strategy involves increasingly employing women teachers. BF argues that the female teacher attrition rate is less (IBLF, 2010, pg. 11). This raises serious concerns about BF's analysis of the issue of turnover. While attempting to handle the challenge of teacher turnover BF is also shaping the education sector workforce by adopting gender selective policies. Rather than seeing low pay as a reason for attrition, it is constructing gender as a reason and solution through its policies. Thus, in future we might have an accentuated problem of women's work being undermined and devalued in BF adopted schools. BF is shaping a trend towards unorganised, non-unionised, low-paid women workforce, in private sector philanthropic initiatives in the public sector.

Moreover, the management of BF has a much specialised view about the role of the teacher, which no doubt will impact the school adoption model. The DGM, Training and Curriculum of BF shared that BF's trainings are different from NGO trainings. BF believes a teacher has to be a good manager. Besides teaching he should know how to manage people, how to manage emotions (Discussion, BF official, 2009)

During my fieldwork I attended several teachers' trainings organised by NGOs. I did not attend Bharti Foundation's training but certainly the NGO trainings did not expect teachers to be managers. To cite just one example: teachers in the QEP in Baran district (a tripartite partnership programme under REI which will be discussed in a later chapter) were asked to question their practice and belief systems. There were discussions on the nature of the subject (being taught), idea of social justice and nature of schools and schooling. The role of teacher as a reflective practitioner has been simplified and I argue that it has been reduced to the role of a manager in Bharti Foundation's programme.

The poem (Box 5.8) is an interesting article for analysis of philanthropic actions for many reasons. Firstly, it has been written by one of the teachers working at a Bharti Foundation school in another state (Haryana). Secondly, the poem appears in the

Box 5.8 A teacher's view of the Bharti Foundation's work	
<p>गाँव - गाँव , गली - गली फरिश्ता एक आया है इंन्सा है था देवता कोइ समझ नहीं पाया है ।</p> <p>मैं बच्चा लाचार था, फूल कांटेदार था फैंके हुए पत्थर की तरह बिलकुल बेकार था । रास्ते से उठाकर विद्यामन्दिर में लाया है गाँव - गाँव, गली - गली फरिश्ता एक आया है, इंन्सा है था देवता कोइ समझ नहीं पाया है ।</p> <p>जो देखा नहीं था दिखलाया, जो खाया नहीं था खिलाया, जो पहना नहीं था पहनाया उन्नति की डगर पर हमको चलाया है । गाँव - गाँव, गली - गली फरिश्ता एक आया है, इंन्सा है था देवता कोइ समझ नहीं पाया है ।</p> <p>भारत का राजदुलारा है, भारतमाता का प्यारा है भारत की आँख का तारा है । इसलिए भारती नाम उसने पाया है । गाँव - गाँव , गली - गली फरिश्ता एक आया है, इंन्सा है था देवता कोइ समझ नहीं पाया है ।</p>	<p>1. Every village, in every alley, an angel has arrived No one knows if this is human or god.</p> <p>2. I was a hapless child, a thorny flower Useless like a thrown away boulder Picked up from the roads and brought to the temple of knowledge Every village, in every alley, an angel has arrived No one knows if this is human or god.</p> <p>3. Shown what we had not seen Fed what we had never eaten Dressed with what we had never worn We have been taken on to the path of progress Every village, in every alley, an angel has arrived No one knows if this is human or god.</p> <p>4. He is beloved of Bharat (India), adored by mother India, An apple of Bharat's (India) eye So he was given the name Bharti Every village, in every alley, an angel has arrived No one knows if this is human or god.</p>
<p>BF, 2009a Translation: Researcher's own</p>	

foundation's newsletter, available through their website. This is indicative of the endorsement of the ideas in the poem by the foundation. And thirdly, the content which is an emotional rendition but the content can be analysed in terms of relationship of the employee with their organisation (a contract, low paid employee in a private sector

organisation), philanthropic giving, and readings of capitalism sounding patriotic. We can see the philanthropy evolving through a certain signification much endorsed by the foundation. If we read this emotional outpouring of a teacher of a private school in the light of citizenship and rights, then without doubt the neglect and delay in the delivery of entitlements is brought starkly before our eyes through the metaphors of ‘thorny flower’ and ‘boulder’. However, Bharti Foundation’s initiative is compared to divine intervention. It not only highlights the abject lack of delivery of entitlements (education in this case) to the citizenry but also points to a curious marriage of feminine³¹ nation (Bharat) and religion in the poet’s mind which, so to speak, begets the CSR initiative of Bharti Telecom in the form of Bharti Foundation. That, this is coming from a teacher who teaches in a BF adopted school is a matter of some concern.

4.3 Nature of School-Community-Partner Relationship:

The teachers in the four adopted schools I visited described their relationship with the community as very good. According to the headmaster of one such school, the school was in a bad shape before the Bharti Foundation intervention. He went on to say how community members have taken an interest and visit the school everyday. In his own words,

“The government teacher had no interest in this school. We have changed this situation. Earlier no community member would visit us. But now some members visit the school almost everyday. If the school staff is welcoming, the community wants to visit.”(Interview, HM of a BF adopted school, 2009)

4.3.1 Inherent Contradictions

Bharti Foundation in its own newsletter (see Box no: 5.9) has highlighted how the programme has been able to catalyse community participation.

³¹ The patriotic discourse of the Indian nation comprises of referring to the nation as mother.

Unpaid labour of poor community members for peripheral school activities while developing modes of school access has always been eulogised as an example of community participation. This is not something unique to BF. It seems from the above case study that besides singing praises for the contribution of free manual labour by a poor old villager, BF

Box 5.9 Community Participation in an Adopted School

Shri. Sriram Meghwal, Satya Bharti School, Sopara, Rajasthan

Raziya, Sharda and Bhaskar Ram study at the Satya Bharti School in Sopara village in Jodhpur. Having lost their father, they now live with their grandfather, Shri. Sriram Meghwal, who accompanies the children to school everyday. Shri Meghwal is over 77 years old but does not falter from his duty for even a single day.

It was during his visits to the school that Shri Meghwal noticed that the saplings planted by the students were being destroyed by the cattle. He then decided to build a boundary wall for the school in order to help keep the school clean and also protect it from stray animals.

He started collecting stones from nearby areas and putting together material for the school wall. Initially the other community members did not pay any heed to his effort. However, when they saw that he was carrying on with his job, alone, they decided to join hands with him and support his endeavour. They supported him by gathering stones from the nearby quarry and also helped in the construction. Shri Meghwal worked continuously for 6-7 hours a day for a period of six months. It is thanks to him that the Satya Bharti School in Sopara now boasts of a sturdy boundary wall, protecting their school and children. (BF, 2009c)

did nothing to help. However six months' of hard labour every day expended by a septuagenarian without support from BF sounds an awkward example to project when the CEO of Bharti Telecom believes that corporations rising from difficult situations find it difficult to part with their wealth; that if 'you come from poverty stricken background, you tend to eat more' (see Box 5.10).

Box 5.10 The CEO's View

“Now people ask why Indian corporations are not doing enough. I have a clear proposition for that; one, new found wealth, people are still not very comfortable under their skin that this is here to stay. When you come from poverty stricken background, you tend to eat more. Similarly when you have come from difficult situation, you do not have comfort of parting with your wealth ... as you get more comfortable you will see more people joining this bandwagon.” - Sunil Bharti Mittal (CNBC-TV18, 2010)

The chairman of the fifth biggest telecom company of the world seems to argue that if corporations retain their wealth long enough and continue to become richer then they will progress towards financial inclusion and philanthropic activities while the Foundation run by this company applauds a poor villager for donating his hard labour in bettering the infrastructure of an adopted school.

4.3.2 Worrying Facts and a Trust Deficit

The process of school adoption was not a smooth road at least in the initial stages. The government appointed teachers working in government schools adopted by Bharti Foundation were upset and so were the communities. They felt that the corporates were out on a land grab in the guise of providing school education.

“This school adoption is part of a huge land scam. The corporates will slowly grab land in these villages. Do you see that most of these schools are located just next to the National Highway? The government is party to this huge scam. The company is able to lure young people. They think they are employees of a Telecom Company.” (Interview, Jaipur based NGO activist, 2009)

These fears might not be totally unfounded. In two of the neighbouring states — Punjab and Haryana, where BF has been able to get land as donation or on lease, an environment of anger and anxiety has prevailed. In these states the *panchayat* land or ‘*shamlat*’ (village land kept for common/collective purposes) has been given out on lease or donated by various village *panchayats*. Allegedly the panchayats in Punjab are being coerced by a certain political party into donating *shamlat* land to BF. There is a fear that in future the corporation (Airtel) will use this land for commercial purposes by using legal ‘jugglery’ for ‘change of land use’ (see Box 5.11). In this open letter, addressed to the

CEO of Bharti Airtel, published by the World Sikh News, the author expresses disquiet at the moves being made by Airtel (the telecom company behind Bharti Foundation) and the new philanthropy in general:

Box 5.11 Philanthropy as Business

“It is fashionable to use the word “Foundation” and route all your “corporate responsibility” through that tube. Philanthropy as business is the new side-kick of the emerging corporate giants in Punjab. Huge marketing success and skyrocketing Stocks have resulted in surefire political clout. With civil society nearly dead, (it was never much alive anyway in Punjab), philanthropy as business is the new mantra of people like you” (Singh, 2007).

The Communist Party of India (Marxist) CPI(M) supported the campaign launched by *Haryana Rajkiya Adhyapak Sangh* (Haryana Government Teachers Association) against the state cabinet decision to give land in four districts of Haryana to BF on lease for 33 years (*The Tribune*, 26 June, 2008). While the appropriation of common land by private interests is a burning issue, the fear of government schools being privatised is also looming large amongst teachers and political parties in Haryana (see Box 5.12).

Box 5.12 Transfer of *Shamlat* Land

“The manner in which the resolutions have been procured from the village panchayats in order to facilitate the transfer of *shamlat* land to a private company having nothing to do with education raises doubt over the real motive behind the move.” (CPM state secretary Inderjit Singh quoted in *The Tribune*, 26 June, 2008)

In Haryana province, the distribution of village land by the Haryana government to corporations, film makers, cricketers and foundations has been challenged by a petition in Punjab and Haryana High Court. Since January 1, 2001, a total of 151 sites belonging to *panchayats* had been approved to be gifted sold or leased by the state government (*India Today*, 20 August, 2011). Of these, 76 sites totalling over 70 acres of land were given to BF on lease for either 20 years or 33 years to set up schools. In this context the Bharti foundation Chief Executive officer Vijay Chadha is quoted in the newspaper report saying

that the foundation paid 11.99 lakh³² INR (approx. 26,644 USD) as lease fee last year and this year will pay more as there is a five percent hike built into the agreement (ibid.). The foundation, which retained 46 sites and returned the rest, had written to the Haryana government seeking a waiver of the lease amount. It has cited the example of Punjab where it pays no lease for 90 sites allotted in that state. Chadha says, “We want it (lease amount) to be waived as it’s all for charity ... we will not undertake any commercial activity in these sites” (ibid.).

These developments with respect to the activities of BF raise some questions. What does charity mean and are these partnerships really charitable? If land is obtained through coercion or other devious means and a waiver on lease payments is expected, does not the concept of charity get a little diluted?

Rakesh Mittal, CEO-Bharti Airtel naturally has a different take on the whole issue. In an interview given to CNBC-TV18 (2010), while accepting that many were opposed to their move of acquiring land in Punjab, he said that a negative environment had been created against them. People had thought them to be land grabbers but in the end Bharti Foundation emerged successful and many had offered their village land for opening Satya Bharti schools. However, the larger question remains that should the voices of protests and contestations by the government teachers and owners of common land be ignored while evaluating/analysing philanthropic movements of the corporations?

4.3.3 Community Feedback about School Adoption

During my interviews more than one teacher talked about their “good work” which has been instrumental in bringing them closer to the communities. The communities too seem to be giving a positive feedback about adopted schools as per BF narratives.

“The communities are happy since they have observed the way children’s behaviour has changed — the way, they (children) appear more confident now.”(Interview, BF Official, 2009)

³² 1 lakh equals 100,000.

A survey to get community feedback about their experience with school adoption asked the parents questions such as – Do you feel that your child is now more confident than before? During the time of writing, their final report was still under process. However I gathered from a BF official that they have found most of the parents feel that their children have become more confident since school adoption by BF (ibid.).

In one of the villages the Bharti Foundation teacher took me to the house of one of the School Development and Management Committee (SDMC) members. She was a middle aged woman whose grand daughter was enrolled in the Anganwadi (Child day care centre). One BF teacher had also rented a room in her house. The Anganwadi also runs in the school premises. The woman used to visit the school everyday to bring the child to the Anganwadi. So the headmaster of the BF adopted school invited her to be a SDMC member. During the interview I referred to the BF headmaster's statement about the government teacher not being interested in the government school while BF teachers are interested in the pupils and school. The woman pointed out (see the following quote) that it was not really the government teacher's fault. The problem was that he was the only teacher there while now there are more.

“It is not that the government teacher was not interested in the school. He was holding the fort all on his own. What could a single teacher have done in such a big school? The school is same, children are same, we are also the same people but the only difference is that now there are three or more teachers for the school. The government teacher was a good man but tell me what option did he have when he had no other support?” (Interview, SDMC member (a woman) of an adopted school, 2010)

The above discussion brings to the fore the perceptions of a community member and how she correctly identified the student-teacher ratio as a basic requirements for a school and an important determinant of the quality education of children – in other words the claimed success of the adoption. What seems to have worked in favour of BF's programme is that they provided teachers as per requirement of the school. Besides infrastructural improvement, if the BF programme had shown development in the initial phase, this was because BF had around 5 – 7 teachers in each of the adopted schools. The infrastructure report on rural education in India reiterates that qualified teachers can be

effective educators with fewer resources rather than untrained and inexperienced teachers with poor qualifications (DFID, 2001, cited in pg. 288). However, as reports in the BFs newsletter mention, their schools have been losing teachers. The problem of teacher attrition along with continued low levels of attendance in rural areas call for BF to understand this ‘business’ of education more than just as an issue of infrastructural provision and management.

4.3.4 Reinforcing Parochialism?

I will close this section discussing the nature and nuances of school-community-partner relationship with a note of caution. While the Bharti Foundation claims that they have gradually earned the confidence of communities there remain inherent biases among its personnel which may be defeating some of the broader goals set out while forging this programme. To show what these biases are I will use a lengthy quote from an interview with the Bharti Foundation Coordinator of Amber block. I use his initials DC:

“DC: We try to involve communities in whatever we do at school. We invite community members to visit school and observe what is going on in school. We take their advice and try our best to address their voice. If I give you a recent example — Do you remember that when we were going to the school, I received a phone call? That call was from a community member from one of the BF schools. He was reminding us to deploy a male head master in their school. And we are going to deploy one soon.

Me: And why so?

DC: Because the community members (men) say that if we go to school, who do we discuss issues with? They (men) will not speak to a woman HM. Also the school is just next to the Highway and therefore many visitors come to school. Women cannot explain well and show around a visitor to the school.

Me: Is that so?

DC: Yes, this is how it is.

Me: So you think having a male HM is better?

DC: Yes”

(Interview, 2010)

I found this conversation very interesting because of two reasons. Firstly the Coordinator was referring to men from the community as ‘community members’. It was as if his concept of community members did not include women from the community. Secondly his statement that men are better administrators than women and therefore men

should be deployed as headmaster in schools exposed to visits by external visitors, reflected gender bias.

Community as a concept and community participation is full of political meanings. The idea of community involvement might not always be supportive and progressive for the school and society ideals (Pachauri, 2009). The management staff of the adopting organisation (in the above case) are reinforcing and/or sharing biases with the community about gendered school management. This goes clearly against the constitutional mandate and the vision of an equitable society. One is left wondering if government schools will run better and achieve SSA goals in the hands of administrators/managers with such biases.

According to July 2009 data BF schools have 57% women teachers (BF, 2009b). If women's and therefore girl students' (we assume) capacities are underestimated and excluded from the opportunity of participation in roles considered important by the administration, then how good is this 'unique model' of running primary schools that has been developed by this particular private provider? In all the four schools I visited, the in-charge of the school was a male teacher. It's a genuine worry that the Bharti Foundation model of school adoption could be feeding into or strengthening local level parochialisms.

4.4 Partnership Governance

I had hinted at the beginning of this case study that there exists a contradiction regarding the situation of government teachers in adopted schools as two clauses (4.6 and 5.4, see Box no 5.13) in the MoU signed between Bharti Foundation and the GoR, contradict each other.

Box no 5.13 Contradictory Clauses in the MoU for the Partnership

4.6 BF will initially be associated with School Education Department for a period of 10 years and will review the project for further extension. BF will build the capacity of these schools and education authorities to sustain the changes brought in by BF

5.4 School Education Department will transfer all the existing staff and teachers out of the schools adopted by BF. They may be redeployed in other schools by School Education Department.

(Excerpt from the MoU; GoR-BF, 2007)

If the government teachers are taken away from a school, then besides the building and children enrolled, whatever is left, can it be called education? That the teachers working in the government schools were transferred out when BF adopted them indicates that BF does not consider working with the existing government teachers a part of the capacity building of the government schools.

It would seem from on-the-ground observations that the real meaning of building capacities of schools and education authorities (GoR-BF, 2007, MoU, Clause 4.6) to sustain the changes brought in by BF, is about deployment of low salaried, para-teachers and contracting out of more and more government schools for adoption to private providers? Could this kind of a school adoption model where existing teachers are removed and low salaried para-teachers employed be the 'unique model' which BF intends to develop for primary schools in the state of Rajasthan?

In a recent article, Sunil Mittal the CEO of Bharti Foundation elaborated his approach to the issue of partnership governance (*Livemint*, 20 October, 2011). His view (excerpt in Box 5.14) is a clear defence of a hands-off policy, wherein the Foundation claims to be open to audit but is shy of more government control or what he calls 'interference'.

Box 5.14 Bharti Foundation's Approach to Partnership Governance

"I am happy when state governments want to partner with us. But what takes a long time usually in these partnerships is that we are clear that we don't want daily interference. We have said no to money because we will not compromise our style of functioning. That has been quite a struggle because when any government puts in money or the education department puts in capital, they want more control. We are happy to be subjected to massive amounts of transparency. If they want weekly reports, we will do it, if they want to audit us, we are happy, but we can't run the schools the way they want to run them. We have had a breakthrough in Punjab recently and now six Government Satya Bharti Adarsh Senior Secondary schools run in partnership with the government" (Livemint, 20 October, 2011)

Interviews with Bharti Foundation personnel exposed serious gaps in governance of the school adoption partnership. Among other things there is a lot of confusion about reporting mechanisms, reporting obligations or the easy availability of these reports in the public domain.

"Because, when we started we had grassroot level issues, teachers training, school management and students with very low learning levels. So first few months we took them into a remedial teaching programme and right now they are preparing for the exams. So right now we are weighed down with the expectation that they have to take the exam ... personally I do not agree with it (exams for children at such an early stage after school adoption) at all but since we are in a system, we have to go with it (preparing children to write exams)." (Interview, BF official, 2009)

There are three issues emerging from my interview with the BF-official. The first concerns accountability. How is accountability ensured when there is no reporting from the adopting partner to the government department? Secondly I found that there is a lack of communication between the two partners i.e., the government and BF: I had the information about the upcoming plan development week though I was an outsider whilst the partner of the government (BF) denied having any information about the REI plan development week.

When probed on reporting, the BF representative said that they were thinking of appraising the government about the work in schools. It seemed that the government had washed its hands of the school development/progress responsibilities after giving away the

schools in adoption to BF. The BF representative's statement reflects that BF could choose when to send the report. So the third issue is about fluidity or tentativeness of inter-organisation/inter-institutional accountability. However, BF (2009a) reports that government officials made 23 surprise visits and two planned visits to the schools.

The DD in charge of non-ICT partnerships in REI (Bharti Foundation's School Adoption programme is included in this category), I asked about the reports on school adoption sent by the Bharti Foundation. The official told me that, BF sends their report directly to the Assistant Director/Commissioner SSA and they have no information about BF's work. There is surely a gap here as the reports could very well have been copied to the PMU, across REI. There is clearly a communication gap which raises accountability concerns. The monitoring and accountability mechanisms of the school adoption partnership therefore appear tentative.

The school adopter in this case had also kept a check on information it shared with the government and the information which the government could seek from BF i.e., not granting the right and license to any information and inputs provided by BF. Though it was not specified in the MoU what amounts to confidential information with respect to adoption of government schools in rural communities of Rajasthan but the confidentiality clause clearly mentions that BF does not give the government any right into 'BF's confidential information' except when 'necessary to carry out the programme' (GoR-BF, 2007, clause 8.1). It is also not clear from the MoU, what it deemed as the intellectual property of BF and what is so confidential about it. The BF newsletters highlight infrastructural inputs and remedial teaching as the main achievement in the adopted schools. Thus the adopted school emerges as a black-box, making the schools impervious to public scrutiny due to a lack of public information.

Another allied issue is that of continuity of this partnership and the future of the workforce employed by these projects. How is partnership transformation planned? Where will the people employed in these programmes go when the partnership is terminated or comes to an end? One of the BF employees argued that it is very unlikely that the program

will be ended. BF has signed the MoU for ten years with the government and that another programme to adopt 200 schools was underway. If due to some reason, the program had to be stopped, the teachers did not have to worry about their jobs. They were employees of Airtel (the telecom company). They will remain employees of Airtel and will be recruited as required at Bharti's business outlets (Interview, BF employee, 2009).

The programme of adopting 200 schools which the BF employee alluded to was signed just before elections to the Rajasthan legislative assembly. After the elections a new political party came to power. The new MoU for adoption of 200 schools which was to be implemented from March 2010 onwards was not operationalised. I contacted the Deputy Director REI (non-ICT) about the progress of the new MoU implementation and was told that 'nothing has happened'. When I asked 'why', the officer replied ...'it just did not happen.'

This indicates that partnership formalisation does not necessarily ensure its operationalisation. There could be a host of factors that could have militated against this – Different policies of the new government for one, perhaps the inability of the foundation to cope with the challenge of running schools in philanthropic mode rather than like a business venture or even the impact of protests by various interest or pressure groups. Another matter of concern is the understanding of practice of education per se amongst BF employees. The Bharti Foundation employee who was one of the academic supervisors of the teachers clearly did not see any difference between teachers as a professional cadre and employees of a telecom company working at any business outlet. The difference in the two categories of agents, at least in his understanding, seemed blurred.

4.5 Conclusion

We need to keep in mind the fact that Bharti Foundation is the CSR branch of a telecom company – Airtel and Bharti Enterprises. These companies are not primarily a provider in the education domain.

According to the previously quoted interview of Sunil Mittal (CEO, Bharti Foundation) aired on CNBC-TV18, Bharti Foundation nurtures an ambition of expanding their philanthropic initiatives into Africa and starting a Bharti University in India. In Mohali, Punjab, the Foundation has already endowed an institute³³ on public policy because they ‘think’ there is no major institute on public policy in India. Sunil Mittal describes Bharti Foundation’s vision to rise to the stature of a Carnegie Endowment, a Ford Foundation or a Rockefeller Foundation.

The social and financial interests of the stakeholders are conflicting in BF’s initiatives. Creating endowments to support educational initiatives is one thing while delivery of social justice is something different. Understanding the school adoption in view of the BF’s conflicts with the villagers in Punjab and Haryana over the *shamlat* land and protests by teachers in Haryana, generates concern when Sunil Mittal hopes (Box 5.15) that ‘100 organisations will look at this model and says (sic) yes this works and then push for it too’.

Box 5.15 Excerpt from an Interview with the CEO of Airtel and Bharti Foundation

Right now, we are in a consolidation phase. We have 233 primary schools, 12 elementary schools and five senior secondary school running in Punjab, Haryana, West Bengal, Rajasthan, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh and some are in public-private partnership with the government too, so we have taken a step back to figure out if all is well; why is the attrition rate of teachers high; why do students drop out. There are still some students who are not doing well, their grades are not picking up. Absenteeism in schools bothers me and the sheer fact that children are coming from 2-3km away is upsetting. Our idea was to enrol children from nearby areas only but that is not happening. We get children from even 2-3km away. Sometimes parents use tractor-trolley (*jugaad*) to bring children to school. That is a challenge. There is discussion now, “Should we run buses?”, but I don’t think we can now be a transport company too. There is time when you need to stop, breathe and take corrective actions and then go ahead. That’s what we are doing now. Later we will look at states like Bihar and Orissa to open more schools (Livemint, 20 October, 2011)

We do not have enough evidence to conclude that BF schools are increasing access. The statement from Mittal (see Box 5.15) also indicates that teacher attrition and student

³³ The Mohali institute is part of the Indian business school for which 70 acres of land has been given by the government. See: (ISB, n.d.)

dropout are problems which the BF schools are still grappling with besides poor learning levels of children. The partnership design is problematic as it lacks involvement of the government teachers who are important stakeholders of PPPs. If the promotion of a model which is yet to deliver on the social justice and its adoption, becomes a trend then are we heading towards a massive privatisation exercise with large corporations and businesses setting the tone for the rejection of a state owned and state funded schooling system.

5. Case Study – The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) Partnership

The Confederation of Indian Industry (CII) partnership in school adoption is the second case study I am going to discuss. In this partnership model the infrastructure support costs are provided to the adopted schools by the adopter. The teachers in these schools are government school teachers and their salaries are paid by the government.

Confederation of Indian Industry was one of the core partners of REI. They had expressed an interest to carry forward REI objectives ‘to transform Education through involvement of all stakeholders’ by involvement of its industry members (GoR-CII, 2006). CII signed three MoUs with the GoR — one each for monitoring and evaluation and one for the adoption of three schools in Rajasthan.

5.1 Design and Inputs

The GoR entered into a partnership with a group of organisations under the banner of CII for adoption of three schools in Bhojlava and Jaitpura in the Chomu municipality of Jaipur district in Rajasthan. With just three schools, CII’s school adoption is small scale and much more limited in scope and time-scale compared to the BF school adoption design. The three schools were jointly adopted by four partners, Mayur Leather Products Ltd, Mayur Uniquoters Ltd, Champa Lal Jagjit Poddar Charitable Trust and Champa Lal Suresh Kumar Poddar Charitable Trust. It is interesting to note that two companies and two charitable trusts, all probably owned by the same family have come together to adopt three schools under the CII banner.

The adopted government schools were located near the Mayur Leather Industries' factory in Jaitpura Industrial Area. One of these school was in Bhojlava around a kilometre away from Jaitpura. The schools: UPS Bhojlava had a total strength of 350 children from grade I– VIII, Girls PS Jaitpura had 92 students and UPS Jaitpura had 150.

The school adoption plan in the MoU mentions that the advertisements mentioning the CII or specific industries will be displayed on the school building and industry will have wide-ranging monitoring authority on the functioning of the schools (Box 5.16). A reading of the MoU reveals that the focus of the school adoption was on School governance through monitoring of school funds and school attendance. It is immediately apparent from a reading of this excerpt (ibid.) that the CII intention was meant to provide one time support towards infrastructure. The adopter expected the government to bear the recurring costs. What then, we may ask, is the real contribution of the adopter?

Box no 5.16 Excerpt from CII MoU.....

“- CII/specific industry advertisement will be displayed on those schools stating that such schools are being maintained by CII/donor agency.

-Industry member will monitor use of funds, teacher training, quality of education, performance of staff, teachers and students and use of other government aids such as free books, mid day meals etc.

- CII/ Industry member has carried out SWOT analysis regarding each school's infrastructure.....

- Based on the above, a report on corrective action to be taken with proposed action plan has been prepared by Industry Member which can be implemented with the available resources of the State Government. Industry member will thus become a Nodal agency between the school and the Education Department of the State Government so as prepare the plan of action involving active participation in school management with the objective of improving cooperation of all parties concern.

- Government will take appropriate action based on CII report so that effective governance is implemented

- Since the asset primarily belongs to the Government, all activities relating to maintenance and further development of these assets is to be taken care of by the Government as per availability of funds with government as per advice of the donor.

(GoR-CII, 2006)

These schools were not ‘orphan’ schools, so the concept of ‘adoption’ seems somewhat of a stretch. The government had been paying teacher salaries and moreover these three schools were well established and running. So the MoU for partnership would have been rightly called a ‘partnership for donation towards infrastructure improvement’ and not a partnership for ‘school adoption’. There is also no evidence from the field about any active role being played by the ‘school adopter’ towards school development.

5.2 Teachers Involvement – A Problem of Convenience?

The school adopter had envisaged the organisation of classrooms with the logic of space for children. They wanted to have not more than 30 children per classroom with one teacher each. They had also proposed for subject specific teachers for Mathematics and Science (R.K.Poddar, Interview, 2010). However, no teacher is willing to come that far as the schools are situated beyond the city limits of Jaipur. I came to realise soon that that this so-called situational disadvantage of the school is a logic that the adopting partner would use time and again to justify gaps in delivery.

The problem of non availability of teachers in remote areas and use of political pressure on individual teachers are problems embedded in the larger socio-political milieu and in the complexities of organising school education in India. A school adopter has to negotiate these issues and develop innovative strategies and solutions. However in this particular partnership, the adopter has chosen a one-time injection of funds for school infrastructure as his contribution to the partnership and is therefore shy of negotiating solutions to these teething problems by giving the logic that since it is a remote area, they have difficulty in finding private teachers to add to the existing staff of the government school³⁴ (Interview, RKP, 2009). The non-availability of teachers it would seem is a convenient logic that feeds into their arm’s length style of engagement. There is also a tendency of passing-the-buck on to the government for problems that plague this partnership.

³⁴ There were two private schools thriving in the area and allegedly competing for intake with the government UPS in Bhojlava.

“Industry does not know about the curriculum and issues in schools. There is no data base from the government also which can help us to plan. We feel that only providing infrastructure is not successful model in absence of adequate teachers. Small and medium enterprises cannot adopt schools where they keep on giving money. The government has to develop a self sustaining model for school, only then industry member can adopt” (Interview, Nitin Gupta, CII, 2009).

However it did not emerge clearly from the interview that what kind of self-sustaining model the CII representative was proposing. The entire discussion revolved around government putting in resources and funds and the industry partner monitoring the utilization of fund. The CII with its clout has been able to get its name included in major policy documents at the national level also with an argument that the industry involvement will bring efficiency.³⁵ However the practice of school adoption by a small industry focussing on its CSR requirement only without a vision and plan for education leaves much to be desired. The partner realises and agrees that they know little or nothing about curriculum or the issues facing these schools. Therefore, it appears logical to conclude that they are not the best candidate to take over monitoring and management of the government schools.

5.3 School-Community-Partner relationship – Some Issues

The problems of these schools are not simply of management or provision of funds but are more complex, rooted as they are in the local politics, work culture and the economics of schooling provisions. The two private schools in the area are run by the dominant caste groups of village Bhojlava. According to the headmaster of UPS Bhojlava, these private schools are interested in increasing their student intake as it is their business and have emerged as strong competitors of the adopted school. So, the adopted schools not only face competition but the community support for them is also quite limited (Interview, 2009).

³⁵ See for example the excerpt on provision for education in urban slums in appendix to chapter 8.

The lack of understanding or support between partners and the partner wanting to see the result of the money being put in the infrastructure translating into increase in pass percentage in a short duration reflects the limited vision of the partnership and the school adopter. This lack of reflexivity about the context and blinkered understanding of their role, inputs and outcomes was also reflected in the management of scholarships given by the school adopter (Box 5.17).

Box 5.17 The Case of Scholarships

The high achieving children from the upper primary school adopted by CII were given scholarships when they entered secondary school. Five children were sponsored. Mr. Poddar told me during the interview that they want to see results and do not want the beneficiaries to think that they can continue getting the money without showing results. To substantiate his argument he told me further that they stopped the scholarships for two girls as they were not performing well when they transited from grade VIII to IX.

I asked Mr. Poddar if they tried to find out if there were problems with the two girls at home or at school since they moved from UPS to secondary school. Mr Poddar said that they have not asked the girls, they just stopped the scholarships!

It is clear that the adopter harboured a very skewed notion of merit and excellence and believed that performers continue performing and the social context does not have any bearing on learning, outcomes and performance.

Further there was a sense of contradiction whilst sitting in the office of Mr. Poddar I saw that he had displayed a CSR award for philanthropy which he had received in the previous year when he adopted the school. It left me thinking that in case of children while their scores in exams qualify them as performer/achiever, in case of CSR giving simply giving the money without responsibility for outcome is enough to earn philanthropy awards. (Field notes, 2009)

5.4 Partnership Governance

During several update meetings of REI which I attended in the capacity of an NGO representative during 2006 – 2007, I found the CII partners complaining about inaction on part of the government. There are systemic problems which hindered the work with schools. For example, in Jaitpura Industrial area there are 13 sanctioned posts against which only 8 teachers are placed. Teachers have affiliation with local leaders and there is a problem of teacher absenteeism, and teachers being transferred away from school

(Interviews, Nitin Gupta – CII representative, HM and school teachers of an adopted school, 2009).

The school which is being referred to here is one of the three being discussed in this case study. It had nine teachers and two teachers were on election duty. The school headmaster and the adopter were not able to resolve the problem of a particular teacher with political links remaining persistently absent from the school. Whilst the teacher absenteeism was seen as a matter of concern by the school adopter, uneven teacher pupil ratio in one of the other government schools where there were 92 girl-children and 10 women teachers was another problem which the adopter could not deal with. The adopter was not confident to talk about this particular school. He and their appointed local contact fleetingly referred to the case of a male head teacher being harassed by the women teachers in the school and eventually transferred out of the school. The CII representatives said that though they had visited the Commissioner's office (SSA) a number of times to discuss issues about the adopted government schools, the officers are not ready to budge from their office.

The MoU for this partnership has visible foundations of push and pull of power between the donor-adopter and the government. By the sheer power of money the donor formalised an MoU for advising and lecturing the government about school development and governance. However, the actual field situation limited the extent to which the school adopter could intervene. However the adopter had a skewed analysis of the situation and therefore the solution which they suggested could also be argued to be narrow in focus.

“The government has various models. They have allocated funds but still the schools are in a bad shape. There is not one to look into management of schools. Our suggestion is that a society should be constituted with industry member as chair and involving the local panchayat. Funds can be transferred to the society. Industry knows how to run business. See, the need is to create a compendium of primary education. Existing adoption is only focused on infrastructure. There is no role for school adopters in school governance.” (Interview, Nitin Gupta, CII, 2009)

From what we have discussed till this point it is apparent that the school adopter's (see 5.1 for the names of the four adopters) as well as the CII representative's idea of school governance was the monitoring of attendance and school funds. The CII did not

have any plan for involving the community. A local doctor of alternative medicines was appointed as representative of the CII donors for the three schools. The doctor³⁶ acted as a mediator between the schools and the CII. The GoR-CII MoU has no mention of involving communities. Nor does it talk of reviving dysfunctional SDMCs as part of school governance. At the time of my visit to the UPS Bhojlava school, the SDMC had not been constituted for the running academic session. So we can see that there are severe gaps on the governance side arising from lacunae in the MoU.

The CII representatives were of the view that the PMU of REI is negative in its approach and that there is no political will for change. Whilst they complained that the PMU is not much interested in appointing teachers for the adopted schools, the fact of the matter is, REI-PMU has no authority to appoint teachers. (Interview, 2009)

“We are businesses. Education is not our purpose. We can’t leave business for this (school adoption partnership/philanthropic work). Government wanted to show to external partners that they have support of Indian industry. If the government wants to work with local industry, you (government) have to create model according to them (industry). Before REI there was no model of school adoption. Maintenance was also our responsibility. But we also want to see the result of the money we are putting in. In our adopted schools, we wanted to increase the pass out by 10%.” (Interview, Nitin Gupta, CII, 2009).

There is undoubtedly a degree of negativity afflicting this partnership. Some of these have their origin outside the partnership structure and need innovative strategies that are sadly lacking. Another source of this negativity is within the partnership structure itself and in the general attitude of passing on responsibilities to the government or in the denial of knowledge about the inner-workings of the school system. The difference in conceptions of stakeholders about school functioning and their role and non involvement of communities has thus become a cause for conflict.

³⁶ His shop-cum-clinic was at the corner of the single main road leading into Jaitpura village where two of the adopted schools are located.

5.5 Conclusion

This section discusses the evidence on school adoption by the CII to question the seriousness and capabilities of the school adopters. The adopter in this case seemed to have been interested in outcomes which they assume should be visible because of their donation (investment?) of a certain amount of money. But the adopter is clearly not interested in a proactive analysis of the processes to find out the reason behind unsatisfactory outcomes.

The degree of responsibility and seriousness of the adopters can be questioned when they say that they do not have time for educational issues or that they know how to do business but not education. It is clear that their business acumen fell short when it came to the question of running a school and demonstrating satisfactory outcomes. Should the government invite anyone without experience and understanding of the intricacies of school education to adopt schools? The big question is should someone be considered eligible for a partnership for school adoption just because they have funds for infrastructure which they stop when they feel like and no vision of school development but want to take on school governance.

The CII was one of the local industry core partners of REI (see Chapter 4). They clearly had power to effect change due to their structural relationship with REI (power1). However this power1 could not be actualised to power2 due to difference in purpose and vision between the government and the CII partner. The school adopters from the CII certainly did not have a clear idea of the challenges and also the commitment to take forward a not-for-profit model of PPP in education, through REI. Moreover, the wisdom and expertise (if there was any), of the global partners of REI, has neither informed nor helped this school adoption model in establishing itself as an implementable and scalable model.

6. Case Study – The Amber Trust Partnership

This is the third and final case study on school adoption. In terms of the model of school adoption the Amber Trust Partnership is similar to the CII school adoption partnership. The first major difference is that, here, the adopter is a trust whose school adoption activities were funded by donations from various sources including British Airways and some other UK based donors. The second major difference as we will see in the following section is the continuous involvement the adopter in the school activities. The MoU between GoR and Amber Trust (AT) introduces AT as a community based organisation, registered under the Indian Trust Act in 1998. The website of the trust however only mentions that it is a registered UK charity (Box 5.18). There is no mention of partners and it appears that the source of funding is mainly gift aid donations.

Box no 5.18 About Amber Trust

“Amber Communities Trust is a registered UK charity (Registered number 1059704). We have been working in Amber, a small community just outside Jaipur in Rajasthan, India, since 1998. **Amber Communities Trust** (previously Jyoti Charitable Trust) Registered Charity Number 1059704” (AT website)

AT also has some environment-related activities having developed an eco-trail in Amber to educate school children about recycling, renewable sources of energy, water conservation and environment.

The Director of Amber Trust Rashmi Dickinson introduced herself as an ex-civil servant from the UK and the niece of a former governor of Rajasthan. During the interview Rashmi shared with me her contacts with important people from Rajasthan and interestingly they belonged to each of the parties from the right, centre and left. Here is another example of an adopter who belongs to and shares affiliation with an elite and influential group of people in India and the UK. What impact will such an adopter make on an adopted school, is a question that immediately came to my mind. What forms of governance does this lead to? What are the mutual expectations of the adopter and the

school? These were some of my thoughts when I got down to studying this partnership in school adoption.

6.1 Design and Inputs

Amber Trust had been working in one of the adopted schools since 2001, i.e., before REI took off (Interview, AT Director, 2009). According to Rashmi Dickinson the Trust had been active in the area from that period (“from the time of Ashok Gehlot³⁷”) and was running an ‘empowerment’ programme in ten schools which had infrastructure improvement and extracurricular activity components. The pilot of this programme was from 2001 – 2004 and the idea was to let people take over. In Rashmi Dickinson’s words, “The focus was to change the attitude from *hum kya ker saktey hein* (what can we do) to *hum sab ker saktey hein* (we can do everything).”

GoR-AT partnership MoU was signed May 26, 2008 for adoption of schools in phased manner for a period of five years with three schools to be taken up for intervention in the first year. The trust aimed to cover 15 – 25 schools over a period of years with a flexible timing and number of schools changing as per the success of the programme (GoR-AT, 2008). As an annexure to the MoU, AT also included a list of 14 schools with details of number of students, existing infrastructure and requirement of further infrastructure. However this list does not mention the number of teachers in these schools. I visited three schools adopted by AT one of which was working with AT since 2001.

The first school is housed in a building which was once a *sarai* (inn) and is known as Gandhi Chowk UPS. The building has 3 big rooms and 6 very small sized rooms. I found the rooms dark and dingy and all rooms had at least one door which opened into a common small courtyard. AT appointed a Physical Training Instructor (PTI) and two lady teachers as yoga teachers and provided furniture, desks for children, items for cultural activities and sports, infrastructural inputs such as an iron barrier for increased security and

³⁷ The Chief Minister of Rajasthan during that period

protection of children and facilities for meetings. Apart from the PTI and yoga teachers whose salaries AT pays, all other teachers in the school are government teachers and their salaries are paid by the government. The HM said that the space is limited for approximately 300 children, the school has to cater to and so it runs in two shifts. The school has an active SDMC and monitors the utilisation of money from DPEP and SSA.

It seems that Amber Trust has been enthusiastic in resolving the issues that plague schools. In this particular school the AT Director had proactively solved an issue about non-availability of toilets for children and also added two new rooms to the school. However it did not appear that this work was undertaken only in last one year since the signing of the partnership in 2008. This work was in continuation with a long ongoing association of AT with the school since 2001.

“Our school did not have toilets. There were public toilets next to the school building which were not being used. Rashmi (Director of AT) took the case up with the Collector. Now the toilets have been taken into school premises and use by children. Also at the Collector’s intervention two rooms which were previously acquired by Jaipur Municipal Corporation (JMC) have been given to the school.” (Interview, School HM, 2009)

P.S. Koli Mohalla was another adopted school where AT has been working since 2005. The school had three women teachers but on the day of my visit I found only one of them present. She happened to be the headmistress. Also there was no student around and on inquiring learned that they had gone home as it was lunch time. Except for blocked access to an upper floor room and some lack of cleanliness (Box 5.19) the school seemed well taken care of with brightly painted walls and slogans in the display board.

Since the staircase was blocked with some furniture, there was no access to the room on the first floor and it was clearly not being utilised at all. The painting work on the walls of the classroom which included pictures of animals, fruits and vegetables with their names in English and the construction of an extra room on the first floor of the school building was clear evidence of AT’s contribution to the school. However, the extent to which the school and the teaching learning situation had improved after the partnership was formalised was not clear.

Box 5.19 A Visit to an Adopted School – P.S. Koli Mohalla

On the day of my visit, there was only one teacher in the school. She was the headmistress of the school. Three girls of grade III were lazily walking around. In the lobby space of the building a woman was sitting on the floor with a big tray full of cooked lentils and rice. A two-three years old child was sitting with her with flies all around. The woman was feeding the child. As I entered the hall the woman sitting on the floor got up to go out. The teacher said the children have gone home since it was lunch time. AT had recently built the temporary structure (2008). The walls inside the classroom are painted in bright colours with pictures of fruits, flowers and animals. The display board inside HM's office had photographs showing Rashmi's husband (an Englishman) and some community members painting the school. The slogan card- *Hum sab kuchh ker saktey hein* (We can do everything), was also pinned up on the display board but the staircase leading to the newly built room on the first floor was blocked with furniture. I asked the HM if there was anything wrong with the staircase. She replied that probably everything was fine but she had never been upstairs to the room.

...

As I was looking at the swarm of houseflies inside the lobby, the teacher called out to one of the girls in the room and asked her to sweep the floor. She then looked at me and says, 'Cleanliness is emphasised by the trust (AT) but there is no one to do the cleaning work at the school level. SSA gives Rs 50 per week to appoint a person for cleaning work. Who will come to do cleaning job at this rate? AT does not support expenses for cleaner. (Field notes, July 2009)

6.2 Nature of School-Community-Partner Relationship

The association and involvement of the community with the school seemed to be arbitrary. In one of the schools which I visited, the adopter had mobilised the community to provide the necessary labour force for the painting work in the school. However, after the work was over the involvement of the community in the school was not sustained. According to the headmistress of PS Koli Mohalla, this involvement was only for that particular year. The community was also allegedly not interested in the school, nor are the parents as they had no time for the school. The SDMC was also reported to be dysfunctional (HM, Interview, 2009).

On the positive side, I gathered that the school has received support under different heads from AT. These included connection for electricity and water, payment of bills till 2008; furniture, school building repair, provision of TV and DVD player among others.

6.2.1 Multiple Stakeholders

In another adopted school in the same cluster (Menhadi ka bas), AT had supplied building material for repairing and furniture for classrooms. It had also contributed by providing for electrical fittings, fans and electricity bill payments. Two classrooms were built in this school utilising the MLA (Member of Legislative Assembly) quota. The boundary wall and swings for the park were put up by the municipal corporation of Jaipur (JMC) while rest of the construction work has been undertaken with SSA support.

Besides the school adopter (AT), this school has many stakeholders. The community here comprises of Muslims, Scheduled Castes (SC) and Other Backward Classes (OBC) members. Unlike the previously discussed school the community occasionally supports the school and contributes during celebrations.

In fact, when a local business tried to encroach on the land, the local community took the initiative to hold it off and with the help of a local MLA (who arranged funds) got a new room built for the school (Interview, HM, AT adopted school, 2009).

Lately however a new problem has cropped up. People from the community are worried that the school will expand further and thus encroach on land (the school is inside a park) that they use for community events. So, while the school needs more space the local community has kept it in check even threatening to go to court (ibid.).

The school is facing a peculiar situation related to the rights of use of the common space. This problem is very much local and the community stakeholders are in contact with each other. It seems that an outside adopter, even if willing to pay for the construction of new classrooms, can do little to resolve the situation.

6.3 Partnership Governance

When I had interviewed the Director of Amber Trust she had told me that she was seen as close to Vasundhara Raje.³⁸ The MoU under REI was signed by Amber Trust in May 2008 and work started in July 2008. AT adopted 20 schools (but the initial plan was to take up three schools and move to include more schools in phased manner). However, problems cropped up in the first year of this formalised partnership (Interview, AT Director, 2009). These had to do with corruption, caste-based power games, encroachment on land meant for school, lethargy of the local development authority among many others. However the adopter (AT) took initiative to solve these problems and a 1 million INR (approx. 22,222 USD) grant was given from the government SSA budget for the schools adopted by AT. Thus the school adopter using her influence was able to expedite the development of school by fast allocation of government funds to the government schools adopted by her.

Other issues faced by AT included disproportionate pupil-teacher ratio (with 7 children and 10 government teachers—school name not specified but in the list of 14 schools as annexure to the MoU, no such school with enrolment of 7 children exists), truant staff, election duties assigned to teachers among others. The AT Director told me that school results were negatively affected because in some schools good teachers were sent away on election duty. However the Director claims to have been proactive in solving problems such as that of school-staff truancy. She pointed out that despite there being supportive officers in the government one major issue with REI was the frequent transfer of Project Management Unit (PMU) staff.

Frequent transfer of the officers at the REI PMU has been a cause of concern for almost all the REI partners. These frequent transfers create gaps in partnership governance

³⁸ The Chief Minister of Rajasthan in 2005 who had introduced the World Economic Forum (WEF) model of PPP education initiatives through REI

and thus negatively impact the pace and continuity of tasks taken up by partner. Delays in decision-making on the government side have also discouraged partners to some extent.

6.3.1 Adopting Partner's Relation with Schools

Whilst the school adopter seems to have been very proactive in seeking out solutions to teething problems hampering school development and had taken a personal interest in resolving those issues, this has always not found favour with the school administration and teachers. The school headmasters were not happy that the Director of AT had taken control over management and governance related issues.

The teachers in the three school adopted by AT acknowledged the infrastructural support given by AT for the development of the school. However school governance and day to day management of the school are areas which they do not want the adopter to control. The adopter might be using various strategies to garner support of the school head masters but the situation is further complicated by the alleged use of caste sympathies by the AT Director as a means to solving problems with different schools.

“Rashmi (The Director) is very active, which is good but there is a problem with the way schools have been adopted. ... Whenever she has any conflict with HMs of other schools, she tries to recruit me as her supporter. She tries to invoke our caste identity saying, ‘you are a Rajput like I am.’ This approach is however not good for all schools because, HMs of other schools have developed this feeling that she is favouring me because of the caste affinity. She should not focus on caste affinities with teachers at school. Caste should not form the basis for developing a relation with schools. If this goes on then school headmasters and teachers will stop to cooperate with her, as they will feel discriminated. I don’t know how to discourage her from doing this.” (Interview, HM, AT adopted school, Amber, 2009)

Though the headmaster I had interviewed, asserted that he didn’t support the use of caste references by the AT Director, shortly thereafter, during a discussion about the impact of private schools in the region and relationship of the schools with the government school, he mentioned,

“Devendra Singh Rathore was a coordinator for Bharti Foundation, Jaipur. He is also a Rajput (like me). He contacted me for conducting tests for recruitment of teachers for Bharti foundation. Initially not many applicants came forward to work in Bharti Foundation schools. Later on the Principal of the secondary school in Gandhi

Chowk conducted interviews.” (Interview, AT adopted school, Amber, 2009)

Thus we can see references to caste seeping into the narratives of both the adopter and the school in-charge. Caste based identities are used to forge alliances and also to critique attempts to form alliances which are not suitable for the relationship.

In any case the relationship between the adopter and the adopted schools always suffer from some tension. The stakeholders’ interests are often in conflict with each other. Here the conflict of interest stems from the fact that the adopter wants to gain administrative control of the school and also take up the role of financial auditor. In the words of the Director of AT, “The schools were not ready to show me their accounts. If I am giving money to these schools I think I have the right to ask how it is being spent.”

The adopter sees it as their right to monitor spending, however, the schools (usually the head teachers) do not want any financial input from an external agent which would make them forego their autonomy (Interviews of two HMs of AT adopted schools, Amber, 2009). They would rather that the adopting partner takes care of larger infrastructure and allied issues that require macro-management.

“We do not have a problem with the teaching-learning situation at the school. This is our responsibility and we do it well. The problems in this school are related to infrastructure and allied issues which can only be dealt only at higher administrative levels ... People (community) are interested in the education of their children. However they cannot make much contribution to the school. Issues like that of making arrangements to include an unused public toilet into the school boundary, require decision from officers. So a person like Rashmi who has connections can be very helpful to the school in resolving such issues.” (Interview, HM, AT adopted school, 2009)

Money is just one of the many other inputs that the schools require. The head teachers’ view of the relationship with the school adopter is that of someone, who can deal with school infrastructure and facilities related bottlenecks and take up governance related issues at the higher levels of administration for speedy remedies. In the words of the headmaster I had interviewed,

“Then there are some issues which a school adopter cannot address. This is because of the circumstances. This year there had been eight new admissions in class VIII.

All of these eight children had failed in their exams in private schools. When children fail to perform in a private school they send them away. This puts pressure on us to admit children rejected by the private system. We are a government institution; we cannot send away any child” (Interview, HM, AT adopted school in Amber, 2009).

Thus there are limits to what a school adopter can do to bring change and quality to the government school. As alluded to by the headmaster in the quoted interview, the school adopter will not be able to solve a problem arising out of the push and pull between the private education sector and the government school system.

6.4 Conclusion

Amber Trust’s engagement with schools and communities begins with the assumption that these entities are lacking in confidence — apparent in their ‘what can we do?’ attitude. Rashmi Dickinson the Director of AT wants to change this attitude to one of ‘we can do everything’. However ATs view of communities is not completely true. This is borne out by the case of the community which mobilised itself and approached a local leader to stop the encroachment on a municipality park by a local business (a bar) and facilitate the building of a school structure instead. Thus this particular community in Amber had been proactive in advocating for the school. Adopters coming to school with a negative bias undermine the power of participation of communities in bringing about change.

Based on information gathered from three schools, two pictures emerge: The first is that of enthusiastic elite with connections intervening for change through orders from high level government officials. However once they leave the communities do not carry on with that ‘we can do everything’ spirit. This is because of the limitations of the community as well as school headmasters assuming that communities cannot support the school. The second picture is that of a politically aware proactive community mobilised for school development, whose interests sometimes diverge from that of the school thus creating conflicts amongst stakeholders.

In the first scenario the material inputs remain, sometimes unutilised, while the participation of the community fizzles out. In the second scenario, I feel, an outsider such as Amber Trust is perhaps not the right agent to do the tight-rope walk between the government school and community while negotiating the subtleties of this complex relation. The REI kind of partnership framework when applied to school adoption does bring forth elite intervention models but these are unable to sustain the participatory model envisaged by SSA. I could however not ascertain, that to what extent Rashmi's being a woman, could have been a reason for the schools not agreeing for routine intervention in school governance.

7. Partnerships in School Adoption – Final Thoughts

In this final section I draw certain conclusions about school adoption partnerships as discussed through the three case studies. All the three partnerships differ in their model of adoption and levels of involvement of the adopter in school development, various activities as also the scale of involvement. The analysis of the evidence presented brings out several issues regarding i) the sustainability of the three adoption cases; ii) the accountability concerns regarding philanthropic and CSR adoption; iii) absence of plan for exit routes i.e., partnership transformation and iv) lack of integration with the overall REI plan.

This chapter raises a number of crucial points for debating the efficacy of PPPs in general and MSP model in particular. Firstly, there was no continuous evaluation of effect of school adoption by the government department and in case of BF, the formalised period of school adoption was beyond REI project period.

Adoption arrangements are more effective in relation to infrastructure improvement than in relation to quality improvement and greater access because the adopted schools are not new schools. Yet the latter is often explicitly highlighted by the REI as a central goal. When schools are adopted, especially by corporate entities, this can lead to an erosion of community engagement as sponsors wish to display some ownership and often have particular preferences and special interests. Thus the real space for community engagement

in public-funded and privately-managed elementary schools can get compromised as a result of a lack of articulation between the REI and SSA, and the politics of provision that surround school adoption and the flow of resources.

Box 5.20 Excerpt from GESCI Report

“In the absence of any strategic plan and dedicated budget, the REI’s activities have been ad-hoc. The focus has been on increasing the number of partnerships, which may adopt as many schools as possible and provide management, teachers, training and infrastructural and curriculum support for a significant number (10) of years. The number of schools adopted so far is 55. The results and impact of these experiments are as of yet unknown, especially in view of a large number of primary and upper primary schools (105,000) in the State” (GeSCI, 2009, p.15).

The school adoption component under REI is not only small but also none of the school adopters had any experience or expertise in education. Also as the case of the CII school adoption reveals, education is not even their priority. School adoptions so far have been CSR and philanthropy initiatives without any qualified vision of educational access or any sustainable strategy for school development.

BF has been unable to implement the new MoU for adopting 200 schools due to financial constraints (Interview, REI-PMU, 2010). However no further comment on the future of these schools is forthcoming. The schools still continue to be run by the government as before. This example raises accountability and responsibility issues when the adopter even after making a formalised commitment is unable or unwilling to take up the responsibility.

We have seen that private providers, capitalising on their corporate image, can convince governments to forsake control of public institutions. They do this with the promise of taking over every responsibility of running these institutions. However in times of trouble (such as in the years of economic recession in the recent past) due to restricted inflow of donations and funds for philanthropic activities, private providers have been found to quietly bury their philanthropic activities and plans. With the gradual withering of the welfare State and the continuous shrinking of its associated roles, is the dependence on

private provision a comfortable alternative? Doesn't look like it. At least not at the ongoing or envisaged levels, nor utilising the existing models of provision.

Sustainability of the school adoption programme is another important question. The schools which were supposed to be adopted by a partner but were never taken up remain in limbo and so do their teachers, facing an uncertain future. BF model of adoption seems to work on the premise that government school teachers are a cadre that the adopter cannot work with. In the absence of the government teachers it does not appear that the adopter has any intention of strengthening or supporting the state education system.

The GoR has plans to involve private players in school adoption based on the Build operate transfer (BOT) model. However there had been no other school adoption under REI utilising the BOT model. Up till the end of my field work in 2010 there were only these three school adopters under REI (see Box. 5.20). This is indicative of the fact that REI has failed to develop a robust sustainable model of school adoption which could be emulated by the government on a bigger scale.

A final point on the relationship of the school adoption models as well the adoption partners with GEI. There is clearly an absence of linkage with the global partners which reflects a lack of commitment of REI core partners. Therefore, any of the images of success projected by GEI and WEF regarding REI and the contribution of GEI/WEF partners ring untrue (also see transcript of the GEI video, appendix to Chapter 4).

Chapter 6

Information and Communication Technologies in Education

1. Introduction

This chapter discusses Information and communication technology based partnerships in Rajasthan started under the Rajasthan Education Initiative. The chapter has two sections. The first section discusses the IT policies in Rajasthan since 2000 and the GoR's vision of growth in relation to the digital divide. It shows that ICT based curricular interventions in Rajasthan had been state driven, supply led rather than demand led. It therefore raises questions about the possibility of success of such programmes in the absence of sustained curricular interventions.

The second section of this chapter presents case studies of three ICT based partnerships in REI namely 1) HiWel Playground Learning Centres – IT interventions based out of school – a partnership between HiWel and the JMC, 2) IBM-Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative partnership with the GoR – IBM-Kidsmart Pratham Project for 3-5 year old school children and 3) Cisco-District Computer Education Centre (DCEC) partnership – Cisco IT Essentials course for secondary school children and 'unemployed' youth. These partnerships were amongst several others planned to address the digital divide through the use of information and communication technologies.

The data from interviews with the government officials, partnership programme coordinators, participants and field observations is discussed alongside the partnership design to trace how the partnerships have evolved over a period of time and how the ICT based partnerships addressed the issue of digital divide.

Section I

2. Vision of Rajasthan's Growth: State-led, Supply Driven ICT Services?

2.1 Understanding the Digital Divide in India

Singh (2010) discusses three kinds of digital divides in the Indian context: i) tele-density,³⁹ ii) mobile and iii) internet divide between the rural and urban areas. Based on Telecommunication Regulation Authority of India assessments, the overall tele-density in Rajasthan is 22.98% while the percentage for rural areas is 12.07 percent, way behind the urban areas where it is 57.98% (TRAI, 2009, cited in Singh, *ibid.*).⁴⁰ According to a recent estimate, tele-density in India reached 67.7% during January 2011 with rural tele-density 32.1% and urban tele-density 150.7% (ITO, 2011). The wireless market is largely controlled by private operators with 87.8% share and the two public sector companies holding only 12.2% (*ibid.*). All India figures for regular/active users were 35.09 million and 14.34 million for occasional users. In terms of the digital divide assessment based on mobile subscriber base, the penetration of mobile usage in rural Rajasthan in 2008 was 6.72% with 3.27 million users from the rural population of 48.66 million. Besides these the factors such as electricity also become crucial to define access to ICTs. In Rajasthan though 98.38% villages have electrification, only 54.70% households in rural areas have electricity. In conclusion we can argue that not only in terms of rural areas or Rajasthan the

³⁹ Refers to access to landline telephones. However in literature the term is used to also denote access to mobile phones, internet and television per 100 habitants in a population (UN, 2007).

⁴⁰ Around 70% of Internet users are in top 7 cities – Mumbai, Delhi, Chennai, Bangalore, Hyderabad, Kolkata, Pune – of India with only 30% internet access in all other cities put together. Whilst the internet users are 4.5% of the Indian population in 2008, the internet users of the urban population increased from 7% to 12% between 2005 and 2008. In the survey the active internet users were defined as users who had accessed internet at least once in the preceding month of the survey.

overall digital divide in India is huge. The limited electricity infrastructure in itself presents itself as a structural constraint towards functional ICT facilities.⁴¹

2.2 IT Policies in Rajasthan

As discussed in the chapters 1 and 3, the Rajasthan Education Initiative was started in 2005 at the behest of IT companies led by WEF and GeSCI (formalised through a UN-ICT task force group). The 2007 IT & Information Technology Enabled Services (ITES) policy which had the aim to build a talent pool for IT industry, had a self congratulatory tone regarding REI and a promise to enhance employability of young people in the Global economy (See Box 6.1).

Box. 6.1 Excerpt from IT & ITES Policy (2007)

“Government of Rajasthan has undertaken a successful endeavour in the form of ‘Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI)’ that is aimed at comprehensively improving the delivery of educational services at school level through a set of innovative interventions. This program extensively uses Public Private Partnership (PPP) models for promoting use of ICT in education for mitigating digital divide. State Government would take appropriate steps to extend the REI to cover the entire education life cycle starting from primary school to secondary school to senior secondary and further on to college / vocational / higher education / university level. This way, REI would be positioned as a long term program aimed at enhancing the employability of youth in the Global economy. Secondary Schools shall be funded to have internet connections to enable students to connect to the rest of the world.” (GoR, 2007b)

In fact, the government did intend to bring the entire education life cycle under the purview of the ICT intervention in REI. However, the extent and nature of the digital divide are not discussed either in the REI vision document (GoR, n.d.a, p.1) or the IT policy document of 2007 (GoR, 2007b). Furthermore, the REI-PMU did not have the remit or the resources to realise the REI vision.

This chapter through an analysis of three cases representing attempts of IT sector partnerships and the REI as such to bring in change through IT sector and industry

⁴¹ According to the programme evaluation report on SSA, only 5% schools of the three sample districts in Rajasthan had electricity (GoI, 2010).

involvement argues that the scale of REI and the ICT partnerships was not sufficient to achieve REI goals.

Again, there was an inherent contradiction within the government which was aiming at enhancing employability of youth through PPPs in REI (Box 6.1) whilst the REI vision document under a specific heading titled ‘Employment Aspect’, clarifies:

It will not be out of place to mention here that with the kind of strategy REI will have at the primary, upper primary and secondary school level, employment should not be mistaken as the goal of education. It is too early to place employment as the goal of education at this early stage. It is, however, true that eventually the ability to meet competitiveness will automatically develop as is true of every society. (GoR, n.d.a, p. 21)

What would employability mean without employment opportunities?⁴² Even with the involvement of international core partners in the planning of REI, this MSP model had no planned employment generation aspects, only education inputs. Rather the team had altogether absolved itself of answerability to any demand for employment opportunities which this programme could possibly generate (ibid.). This is notwithstanding the fact that GEI documents promote partnerships in education with a promise for economic growth and employment.

The ambition to tread on the path of IT driven progress and becoming a knowledge economy is not something which Rajasthan developed during or because of the launch of the REI in 2005. However what is interesting to note here is that though the idea of competitiveness has been brought into the public education system, the government also believed that this will evolve in an organic manner. Rajasthan had launched its first IT

⁴² The Rajasthan Industrial and Investment Promotion Policy – 2010 estimates that by 2015 Rajasthan will need human resource of 5-5.2 million persons till 2015 in various industries with construction industry followed by textiles, healthcare, tourism and hospitality. In this estimate of incremental demand the IT and ITes industry requirement is expected to grow from 6000 (in 2006-2007) to 48000 in 2015. If we compare it with the requirement estimated in construction where it will increase from 500,000 to 3188,000, we can see which industry is growing and where the employment opportunities will spring up in the years to come (BIP, 2010, pg.3).

policy in 2000 during the Congress party regime which was revised in year 2007 (GoR, 2007b) during the Bharatiya Janata Party regime.

The IT policy of 2000 document dates the first phase of computerisation in Rajasthan way back in 1985 – 86 which was limited to automating clerical operations (GoR, 2000, p.19). Rajasthan wanted to build upon this success and to make it available to most of its population. The policy envisaged this through integrating IT supported education in higher secondary schools and colleges. An IT course module was made compulsory component of all degree courses from the session starting April 2003.

“The State Government is quite aware that the goal of creating an IT driven and knowledge-based society in the State cannot be achieved without building core competencies in human resource development with substantial inputs of information technology knowledge.” (ibid., p.15)

At the time of launch of the policy in 2000 a GoI funded scheme “Computer Literacy & Studies in School” (CLASS) was in operation in 135 Government Senior Secondary Schools in Rajasthan (p.16).⁴³

There are 9801 secondary and senior secondary schools in Rajasthan (GoR, 2010). The teachers who were initially trained for handling computers had been transferred to some other school while others had forgotten how to work with computers since they never used computers for either personal or professional purposes. This was the situation in 2009, in most of the schools which were given computers around eight-nine years ago. The computers had been simply sitting in schools as exhibits of a previous scheme and were not usable because of outdated operating system and slow speed. The teachers also said that it is very inconvenient to work with computers when the electricity supply keeps on

⁴³ In 2009, I was in Udaipur city to study several REI partnerships, one of them being Naandi Foundations partnership focussing on comprehensive health care to school students in Udaipur city. During my visit to schools to speak with children and teachers about the health care services provided by the foundation, I came across two government secondary schools in Udaipur City which had computers. In one school the computers were in the school principal’s room and in another school in the staff room safely placed on desks collecting dust and covered. In both the cases the computers had not been in use since a long time. These computers were given to the schools in year 1999-2000 (Interviews, government teachers, 2009).

fluctuating and is inconsistent. So despite the policy formulation for IT supported education envisaged at secondary level and degree level courses the programme the attempts for computer literacy were not successful due to implementation bottlenecks and lack of curricular integration.

The IT policy (2000) had set the mandate for the state to develop standardised computer syllabi besides taking necessary steps to enrich the existing curriculum in Senior Secondary level schools through use of computers and multimedia technology (p.16). However any strategy for integration was never developed (Interview, SSA official, 2009). Provision for free floor space to private providers for setting up internet café and IT training centres was made through the IT policy 2000 (p.18). Thirty two district level IT training centres were proposed to be set up and outsourced to private companies so that the government employees including the teachers in secondary schools could be trained. The IT companies were given special exemptions,

“IT Software and IT Services companies, being the constituents of the knowledge industry, shall be exempted from routine inspection by inspectors such as those for Factory, Boiler, Excise, Labor, Pollution, Environment, Industry, RSEB etc. in line with the approved policy of GoI. Notification No.F.() IIB/IT/Ind/2K” (ibid., p.9)

Thus the digital provision in the state was state-led providing business opportunities to the market through not only creating scope for business but also giving subsidies and exemptions and started as early as in the year 2000. The newness in the REI story is that REI itself was launched at the behest of IT companies and when a different political party was at the helm in Rajasthan. There was no attempt to evaluate the previous initiatives of the government or build on these while designing REI.

The GoR revised its IT policy in 2007 after the launch of REI. This was also the period when another government programme – India’s Computer Aided Learning Programme (CALP or simply CAL) – was in operation. The demands created by another state-led programme also created opportunities for IT businesses to serve as providers for IT infrastructure. Thus NIIT, one of the REI partners of the HiWel project, won the tender under the Build-operate-transfer (BOT) model for installing computers in 2000 CAL schools in 2010 (Field notes, 2010).

The training of teachers in ICTs conducted by the Microsoft IT Academy and Intel partnerships of REI were in operation in the same time period when the expansion plans of computer aided learning (CAL) of the GoR were being implemented (Field notes, 2009).

These training programmes were merely the first step towards computer literacy and their pedagogic utility and impact cannot be ascertained. This is because of the lack of a comprehensive curricular plan in the state for deploying ICTs as a pedagogic tool besides infrastructural issues such as unpredictable electricity supply and security constraints (Interviews with SSA officials, government school teachers and HMs in Ajmer, Udaipur and Jaipur, 2009, 2010).

But what did this mean for the education life cycle from Primary to secondary school and the employability of young people which the IT policy and REI claimed to deliver? Was the scale of the projects and programmes sufficient to achieve the REI aims or the aims of the IT & ITES policy? Are the attempts made through IT based initiatives under REI enough to bridge the digital divide and are they sustainable? These are the questions I will attempt to answer in this chapter in my pursuit to understand REI as an innovative PPP and MSP model.

The chapter addresses research questions 2, 3, 4 and 5 focussing on the content of the partnerships, their governance, development and impact, and finally an assessment whether these partnerships are sustainable and scalable. As in the previous chapter, I have organised each case study using the DSG framework which I developed in Chapter 3.

In this section I discussed the Rajasthan's IT policies launched in 2000 and 2007 with reference to the government's vision of growth and employability. In the next section I will present three case studies of ICT based interventions in REI.

Section II

3. The ICT-track Case Studies

This section discusses three ICT based interventions. These are 1) HiWel Playground Learning Centres (out of school IT intervention); 2) IBM-Kidsmart Pratham Project (for 3 – 5 year old school children) and 3) Cisco IT Essentials (secondary school children and ‘unemployed’ youth). Though each of the partnerships is different in terms of its focus and design, there is one aspect common in these three partnerships. This, as we shall see, is the absence of government teachers’ participation/involvement in the design, development and implementation of the IT interventions — a characteristic, which also links them with the school adoption partnerships discussed in the previous chapter. The case studies are organised in the design, stakeholders and governance framework as in the previous chapter.

Case Study 1

4. HiWel Playground Learning Centres:

Low Accountability, Unsustainable Education Intervention for the Children of the Poor?

4.1 Introduction

HiWel Education Ltd. emerged in 2001 as a joint venture between NIIT Ltd. (an Indian IT training company) and IFC (of the World Bank group) and with support from ICICI Bank (Nambissan and Ball, 2010). The idea of this venture came from Sugata Mitra (1999) then a scientist with NIIT and now a professor at Newcastle University (Mitra and Dangwal, 2010). Mitra installed a computer along with a touch pad mouse and high speed internet within a wall facing a slum near his office. The children were allowed to use the computer without an adult supervision. The use of the computer by children was recorded through a video camera. Mitra claims that children self-taught themselves the usage of computers and acquired some skills in English and mathematics. This kind of learning

environment he calls ‘minimally invasive’ where children self organise their learning in an unsupervised environment (p.685). In 2008 HiWel won the ‘Digital Opportunity Award’ conferred by World Information Technology Services Alliance (WITSA) for its work in ‘spreading computer literacy and improving the quality of education at the grassroots levels’ (HiWel, 2008)

I will approach this partnership by examining the philosophy on which it is founded before moving to salient features of its MoU and cost sharing arrangements. Then I will move on to the implementation part of the partnership and try to find out if the philosophy and allied claims stand the test of the field. In this context I will examine how volunteers and partner organisations had played a role in implementing the partnership project and how their involvement bears on its claims and founding philosophies. Finally I will look at the involvement of teachers and the governance of this partnership as we had done in the previous chapter.

4.2 Self Organizing Learning Environments (SOLEs) Claims

In a recent paper in the British Journal of Educational Technology, discussing the SOLEs, Mitra and Dangwal (2010) cite similar HiWel experiments with children who were given free public access to computers with internet. On the basis of these experiments they claim firstly that these children become computer literate on their own, that is to say, learn to use computers and the internet for most of the tasks carried out by lay users. Secondly they claim that the children with internet access can teach themselves sufficient English to use email, chat and search engines. Thirdly they learn to search the Internet for answers to their questions. Fourthly they improve their English pronunciation on their own (Mitra et al., 2003, cited in *ibid.*). The fifth claim is that the children improve their mathematics and science scores in school (Inamdar, 2006; Nicaud et al., 2004, all cited in *ibid.*). According to their sixth claim, the children answer examination questions several years before they might normally be expected to be capable of doing so. Finally, it is claimed that the children develop their social interaction skills and value systems and eighthly they form independent opinions and detect indoctrination.

We can see from the above that the claims of the experimenters fall basically into three categories. The first category is self-learning ability (the first four claims as summarised above) and its impact on scholastic achievement (fifth and sixth claims as summarised above), second category of claims is about children developing social interaction skills and values and the third has to do with the ability of the human mind to form opinion.

In the first category, as studies by Mitra have shown the basic premise is that children learn better in groups. To anyone interested in how children learn or rather how human beings learn, it is needless to say that not only for ICT mediated learning but for any kind of learning environment, the impact of group learning situation is mostly higher. This however is also dependent on individual learning styles and group dynamics-such as gender, caste, class, attitudes and values of the group and rules of group membership. The role and impact of SOLEs, in relation to the above mentioned dependencies of learning in a social situation, are not discussed in the HiWel experiment. The second category relates to emergence of value systems. But, is it not how society has developed through social interaction and value systems have arisen in different social systems? Specific role of ICTs/playground labs in causing the emergence of value system is not clear.

Looking at the third category— How do we ensure that opinions in a learning system are free from bias and based on rational consideration of the information. The internet and technology in general are just tools. They appear to be value free and neutral but once in a social situation, the content and how users react to it takes the form of opinions, reactions and biases which might not have a rational basis. The usage of technology is after all socially constructed and has social implications.⁴⁴

⁴⁴ In India during festival months it is not very uncommon for some email users to send across blessings of some Hindu god or goddess asking the recipients to forward those mails to *n* number of users to appease their stars and maximise their luck.

Thus the three categories of claims which the programme flaunts as unique to itself are actually not so and are problematic to a great extent. One wonders that if the claims of the HiWel experiments were so true then why this programme has not been adopted by education systems all over the world to solve the problems of educational access and learning progress. Why also didn't all educational systems adopt it instead of spending huge sums on formal schooling provision? One also wonders why rich parents do not adopt self learning pedagogies such as those promoted by HiWel?

It may seem that HiWel follows Vygotsky's constructivist approach to learning (Arora, 2010). However, it is not clear how children can learn algebra in this way. Are children expected to revisit and relive the whole history of discovering algebra before they catch up on the knowledge and cross over the zone of proximal development? One wonders how many generations it will take for HiWel to deliver the opportunity of self discovered emancipation for the children of the communities which are poor and where no teachers want to go.

4.3 Design

4.3.1 HiWel in Jaipur city: *Pacifying Troublemakers?*

There are places on Earth, in every country where, for various reasons, good schools cannot be built and good teachers cannot or do not want to go.....On top of that, those are the places from where trouble comes...(Mitra, 2010)

In Jaipur city, the capital of the state of Rajasthan, HiWel⁴⁵ proposed to start 200 playground learning stations/centres (PLCs) through an MoU with the JMC with the aim to target 50,000 children through this project. I visited five PLCs in five locations of Jaipur

⁴⁵ HiWel had one more partnership (24 month duration) with UNICEF and Rajasthan Council for Elementary Education (RCEE) in three districts (Tonk, Jhalawar and Dholpur). This aimed to set up 15 learning stations with two computers each in 15 selected schools in Rajasthan and to demonstrate their impact on the outcomes of elementary education. At the time of data collection (July 2009) these three district partnership project had already ended.

city and interviewed two instructors in two of these locations, the project coordinator, the person in-charge of operations and logistics, the HiWel-NIIT team in Delhi (Interview, HiWel team, Delhi, 2009) and the children using the labs in the field. Children's use of computers at PLCs was observed and recorded as field notes. I also interviewed the CEO of JMC but he was not very much aware of the HiWel partnership since he had joined only a month ago.⁴⁶

Information and communication technologies have been promoted to a great extent as a panacea for all development ills. This applies even more in case of REI, where ICTbased partnerships have received strong support. The HiWel logic seems partly to stem from this cure-all approach that has infected the advocates of ICTs in development.

“Jaipur City in Rajasthan has the highest percentage of children in its slums populations among other cities of Rajasthan. The lack of education for this chunk poses a huge challenge in terms of awareness about critical issues such as health sanitation and water conservation. If children are provided access to quality education and are made aware of the critical issues relating to health, sanitation and water conservation, it is very likely that these disadvantaged communities will be transformed in a few short years. In fact, focus on children, and especially the girl⁴⁷ child, might be the most important agenda for change.” (GoR-HiWel-JMC, 2007)

A cursory reading of the MoU reveals a lack of planned strategy towards defined learning outcomes. In this case for instance, the outcomes are described as ‘likely’ to be achieved. The focus on girls through self learning seems to ignore the larger structural constraints and biases in society which have been widely recognised in development literature as hurdles towards equity in gender participation. A defined intention or a qualified implementation strategy seems to be missing in the HiWel project. Was REI then an ‘innovative experiment’ where the outcomes were left under the care of probability and

⁴⁶ The CEO did not know at the time of the interview that JMC has five schools under its administration in the Municipal area. On his advice I tried to contact the Divisional Head Quarter Commissioner. Since the session of the legislative assembly was on, she was reportedly away from the office during my three visits and several phone-calls.

⁴⁷ Whilst the project MoU highlights the gap in enrolment rates of boys and girls: 10.71% in 2005-06, this however comes out as an incidental statement in the MoU because the HiWel project was never launched as a gender project. In fact, at least at one of the HiWel PLC locations, the government teacher had locked the PLC so that girls could attend school as parents were uncomfortable with the presence of out-of-school boys at the PLC.

good luck? Is this not too shaky an idea of development promoted as it was by IT companies and the GoR? The claim that self learning will lead to planned outcomes is quite paradoxical.

The HiWel MoU document says ‘it is very likely that these disadvantaged communities will be transformed in a few short years’ but fails to answer the question — transformed into what? There is no evidence in development literature that disadvantaged communities transform or change on their own. Structural disadvantages do not reduce without planned interventions. This programme had no strategic plan beyond experimentation, to make any sustained attempt towards this end. Nor is there any independent evaluation of this programme which can confirm that HiWel is indeed a coherent, sustainable, reliable experiment that was successful in achieving planned learning outcomes without planned interventions in a developing country context.

4.3.2 Fee and Costs

HiWel PLC is the only partnership amongst the various partnerships signed under REI where the partner organisation i.e., HiWel has quoted a consultancy fee to be paid by the GoR.⁴⁸ This partnership could thus be seen as the first instance of a private for-profit company led experiment being partially funded with public money. This is different from other state funded support for innovations and experiments which focus on teaching and learning according to the context of the children and for building capacities of teachers without fee payments.

Fees and cost-sharing of this partnership project are clearly outlined in the MoU document. HiWel had proposed 200 learning stations in their partnership with JMC. For

⁴⁸ In the UNICEF supported partnership UNICEF had provided the computers and also paid the quarterly fee to RCEE to be paid to HiWel. Besides, UNICEF also paid towards professional fees for implementation and power management unit. RCEE contribution was payment towards civil construction for the stations (2,250,00.00 INR) and Remote monitoring system: HiWel proprietary software (81,000.00 INR).

HiWel the project deliverables involved providing equipment, hardware and software, tamper proof accessories, remote monitoring system software, learning content in Hindi, data management software and services e.g. implementation of enclosure, provision of electricity and internet (see Appendix 1 to Chapter 6), the responsibility of funding and execution for the electricity and internet is with the JMC but HiWel had included the implementation of these as part of their project deliverable; implementation of hardware software and accessories, monitoring and evaluation, learning interventions; maintenance of all enclosures, equipment, hardware and software. However the learning outcomes are not listed in this list of deliverables.

Four hundred units of hardware, software and related accessories for the project were funded by a third party (Michael and Susan Dell Foundation). The remote monitoring system software (Application log, URL log, Screen shot grabber, data analyzer and viewer) were also funded by a third party. The learning content (life skills related to health, sanitation and water conservation) was funded by JMC as also the data management software (field data collection, data availability for community, portal for community). JMC was also responsible for the construction of PLC enclosures.

The project aimed to benefit 50,000 children with 250 children per PLC (two computers for 250 children!) with total funding requirement of 4,48,30,000 INR (996,222 USD)⁴⁹ for the three-year project. This translates to 1,49,43,333.33 INR (332,074 USD) per annum for 200 locations (see Appendix 1 to Chapter 6) or 74,716.66 INR (1660 USD) per location consisting of two computers. According to the HiWel MoU the cost per child is estimated to be 900 INR (20 USD) per year. JMC's share of funding the project was 1,79,46,000 INR (approx. 398,800 USD). Rest of the funds towards hardware and software (1,30,24,000 INR i.e., approx. 289,422 USD) and research (1,38,60,000 INR i.e., approx. 308,000 USD) were provided by Michael and Susan Dell Foundation (MSDF). However,

⁴⁹ Approximate calculations assuming an exchange rate of 1USD=45 INR

despite funding more than 50% towards the project, MSDF was not a signatory of the MoU.

4.4 Stakeholders and Intra-agent Dynamics

4.4.1 PLC in Action and SOLE at PLC

The HiWel project intended to address health, sanitation and hygiene related awareness through the provision of related content in the PLCs. The content was to be funded by the government (JMC) and delivered by HiWel. However, during the field visit to the PLCs, I did not come across content developed by HiWel. The children were mostly observed playing with MS Paint application and at another site the content introduction mentioned that it belonged to Madhya Pradesh, Rajiv Gandhi Prathamik Shiksha Mission (a government programme for elementary education). This seems to imply that HiWel acted as procurer of the content funded by the government.

The literature on the PLCs projects portrays it as a programme for self guided learning. The project also aimed at slum development through increasing learning achievement in children in the age group of 6 – 16 years besides helping them acquire functional computer literacy. While the MoU with JMC does not use phrases such as ‘minimally invasive learning’ or ‘self organising learning environment’ but it does discuss the aspect of self-guided learning approach (See Box 6.1).

Box 6.2 Excerpt from HiWel-JMC MoU

“When the computers are first installed, and the children explore this new “toy,” most of the discoveries are around navigating the operating system. Apart from learning how to operate the computer, this phase is critical to establishing a mindset of discovery and problem-solving. Once the children get used to operating the computer, they start discovering the Learning Content loaded on the local hard drive. The learning Content typically includes curricular content in the local language. In addition, for the Jaipur project, HiWel will create and deploy critical content on issues such as personal hygiene, sanitation and water conservation. Unlike traditional settings where the content works as transmission of information, in the PLC settings the content generates conversation among the children. The conversation is critical to ensuring learning outcomes.” (GoR-HiWel-JMC, 2007)

Amongst certain proponents of ICTs, it is very common to classify everything other than ICT settings as ‘traditional’ and ‘archaic’ (See Box 6.2) and therefore having limitation in generating critical learning situations. However the field experience of HiWel PLC settings where the content is assumed to generate conversation leading to learning outcomes suggests that the outcome depends on how the setting is used by the users.

I will first discuss issues with the learning content. The learning content is only vaguely termed ‘critical’ in the MoU document. The REI did not set up any content development or learning content approval team for the content brought into the public education domain by partners. This is not something specific to HiWel and is true for other ICT based content.

Since HiWel was in partnership with the JMC, there was no particular DD in-charge of the project in REI. Initially I was informed by DD, REI that DD,IT is in charge of all ICT based partnerships but in an introductory conversation, the officer declined an interview saying that he had been given the charge of several partnerships because of his helpful nature and that it was a JMC partnership. The HiWel team and the project manager however shared that the learning content has been approved by an IT curriculum committee within REI/SSA. This information was unofficially shared by several ICT based intervention partners who were on board in the committee but interestingly this information was never discussed openly or officially.

Though the approval of learning content remains an issue, it was interesting to see how the content was being used in the actual field situation. The following observation (See Box 6.3) at one of the PLCs in Jaipur municipal area reveals how school children are using the PLC and learning about WATER from the content loaded in the PLC computer. This school runs in the premises of a temple located in the old city area in Jaipur. The PLC is installed in the temple premises and was being used by the school children.

We can clearly see here that an outdoor PLC setting has replaced the blackboard and chalk with children simply copying the content from the screen. There was clearly no

conversation amongst children on the content. Rather, as the supervisor mentioned, the whole exercise was simply to reinforce the content in the textbooks. The learning, reading

Box 6.3 Observations from a PLC in Jaipur

The school was buzzing with activity and the sight of children talking, playing; moving around in the premises was quite heartening. There was a group of about 25 children around the two computers of the PLC. All the children had notebooks and pencil/pen with them and they were busy writing in their notebooks. A girl and a boy were standing next to one of the computers and trying to copy the content displayed on one of the computer screens. On both sides of these two children there were children sitting on the floor and very often, one or two of them would stand up and run up to the children standing next to the screen, read from their notebook or from the screen, come back and begin writing in their notebook. Though the computers had overhead shade but the sun had changed position and the light was falling on to the screen of the computer from which children were trying to read and copy. They had to come very close to the computer and read content in the little shadow of their body falling on to the screen. There was one girl who had probably finished copying the content and was reading out aloud from her notebook and taking a peep on to the screen in between. Rest of the children, sitting on the floor, were writing down as she read out. Some of them who were almost done were correcting their work, carefully listening and writing the words left out. The volunteer of the PLC and a supervisor stood and observed as the children worked. The content on the screen was about sources of water and the language was Hindi. The children around the PLC, all school going children from grade VII, were copying the content displayed on the screen. I asked the project volunteer and the supervisor, why the children were copying the content in their notebooks. The volunteer pointed towards the supervisor. She said that water and environment are part of the curriculum in grade VI and VII so children are studying it as an extension of what is already there in the textbooks and relevant to their coursework. (Field notes, Jaipur, 2009)

and reflection on the content is certainly important and even in the absence of any conversation, in the act of copying the content, the children might have learnt something about water. However the claim in the HiWel MoU, setting itself apart and the PLC from what it calls ‘traditional’ cuts no ice.

Location of the PLCs in the physical space also had design issues. During my field visit I found that most of the kiosks were in the open and were built in such a manner that with the changing position of the sun there were times when nothing was visible on

screens.⁵⁰ JMC was responsible for building kiosks for PLCs and clearly had not considered sunlight glare, making PLCs unusable. There were delays in construction of kiosks as well.

4.4.2 Partnering with other Organisations for Programme Implementation

Bodh Shiksha Samiti

When I was working in Rajasthan with Bodh Shiksha Samiti (an NGO), the HiWel team had approached Bodh to help them in project implementation. Bodh has done extensive work with government schools in the slums of Jaipur city. The initial discussions revolved around how Bodh would help in monitoring and evaluation of PLCs in the slum localities. The collaboration however did not take off.

Pratham-Rajasthan

Pratham-Rajasthan (see next case study for an introduction to Pratham) had collaborated with HiWel for part of their work with communities and in monitoring and evaluation (see Box 6.4).

We can see from the above observation (Box 6.3), the facilitators were eliciting responses from the children and reinforcing learning through revision and recapitulation. Guided learning techniques were being used to discuss the film after the children had watched the movie. Children were not left to learn on their own. I would not be amazed if these children were tested later and in future the HiWel team is able to show learning of the content in their tests.

⁵⁰ If the computers had high-contrast on screens then this problem would have been somewhat addressed as such screens/monitors can be used in strong sunlight but are naturally more expensive.

Box 6.4 Pratham's Involvement in the Project

All the children were assembled in a big room. This room served as a computer classroom in the government school. A silent movie on the theme of water being shown by Pratham-team, projected on one of the walls of the room. The movie had captivating music and it showed people from around the globe in search of water, enjoying water, drinking water and doing various activities with water. There were visuals of ponds, lakes, seas and rains. After the movie a facilitator from the group of three people stood up and started asking the children questions such as what they liked in the movie? What the movie was trying to show etc. The children were initially reluctant to speak but on constant prodding by the facilitator one boy replied, "I liked the sound of water." The facilitator went on to ask, "Did you see people using water?" Children replied in chorus, "Yes." Facilitator: "What were they using water for?" Another boy: "Drinking." Just then three boys sitting around him started making gestures of drinking water from a glass and other children around them started laughing. The facilitator summarized the various activities which the children had seen in the movie, just then the bell rung. The children were now eager to go out of the room. (*Field notes, Jaipur, 2009*)

4.4.3 Examining *SOLE* claims

There was evidence in the field that the Pratham team was supporting the education of children through video film shows (Box 6.4). So the claim that simply placing the material on computers locked in a kiosk will enable communities to educate themselves on issues of health, hygiene etc is not factually correct. There are some inherent contradictions in terms of what HiWel experiments project in their research material and what actually goes on in field.

Whilst Mitra (2010) can quote Arthur C. Clarke: 'A teacher that can be replaced by a machine should be', to strike a balance, the input provided by volunteers, trainers and partner organisations in the claimed success of HiWel experiments, needs also to be highlighted by HiWel. The reality of the field is that if not government school teachers then other workers (volunteers) have engaged with children according to their capacities and have been able to reflect on the necessary requirements for children's learning. This is again brought out by the following observation from the field (See Box 6.5).

Box 6.5 Involvement of Volunteers in the HiWel project

When we reached the school premises where the PLC was located, we found the PLC locked. The school shift was over and there were no children in the school. The coordinator of the project who was accompanying me phoned the volunteer who was a local resident in the community. The volunteer brought the keys with him and along with him followed three children (one girl and two boys aged 7-8 years old). He opened the locks of the computers and asked the children to show me how they work and play with the computers. The children were hesitant to begin with but as the three adults around them got into conversation with each other, the children started playing on the computer. The content was from the Rajiv Gandhi Prathamik Shiksha Mission, Madhya Pradesh. The coordinator asked the facilitator how the preparations for function on the Independence Day were going. He said that he is working with children and also teaching the students beyond the school hours as added instruction in reading and writing. He said that if the children do not know how to read and write then they cannot make better use of the computer. (Field notes, Jaipur, 2009)

Here is a very important point raised by the volunteer-teacher regarding reading and writing skills of the children and the limits of the benefit they can obtain from the content on PCs. Sugata Mitra and the HiWel project on the other hand have ignored this practical issue faced by the teachers and learning facilitators when they claim that children can learn content on their own – “... children will learn to do what they want to learn to do” (ibid.).

These children who were using the PLCs were studying in the school and also attended tuition classes. They could not use the PLCs for self-learning without further guided learning intervention in the 3Rs. I did not ask if the children were paying any fee for this extra tutoring by the volunteer teacher. Even if this tutoring was privately funded or emerged from the anxiety of the project team to show success of the HiWel experiment, in both cases a conclusion can easily be drawn which is: that external guidance or additional learning inputs were being given to the children and young people who are using the PLCs in under-developed localities of JMC.

At another PLC at a kiosk built in the vicinity of a JMC school, I observed that amongst a group of six children, there were only two children who were regular users and who could show me how they can use joystick to draw circles and other figures. However on closer discussion I realised that these two children – both boys – studied in a low fee

private school in the vicinity which also has provision for computer training for children. The HiWel staff accompanying me on the visit stated that the several private schools in the area were interested in HiWel PLCs and wanted them to install their kiosks in their schools. He thought that it was a good idea because these low fee private schools cater to children from poor families.

The project claims that HiWel will be able to show enhancement in students learning by use of playground learning centres through achievement tests. Could that be the reason for this extra effort by the volunteers at the PLCs? It seems that more than anything this extra coaching or intervention to enhance learning was strategic in order to show the success of the project through achievement tests. This is a paradox that the programme which claims itself to be based on the concept of self organising learning environments (SOLEs) was in practice employing volunteers to tutor children in this project.

4.4.4 Teachers' Participation and the Role of the Volunteer

Interviews with the HiWel team reveal that their experience of another UNICEF supported project under REI in three districts in Rajasthan was not very encouraging in terms of the participation of the government school teachers. Even though the computers were located in school premises, the teachers would not let children leave the classroom and go near the PLCs as they feared their officers, in case they came for a surprise visit and found children outside the classroom, might penalise them. According to the team, most of the teachers would not let the children out because they feel that the PLCs were not part of the formal school curriculum.

In one of the Jaipur slum localities next to the National Highway, the PLC station had been constructed in the wall of the school building. I could go inside the main hall of the building and look at the bunker sort of enclosure for the computers which was locked from inside. The PLC were locked from outside as well and so the screen and the joystick

were not accessible. I asked the head teacher about the timings when they open the PLC for use. She said,

“I cannot keep the PLC unlocked when the school is on. The PLC attracts so many out of school young boys and men. They stand there on the pretext of using the computer. When the boys started visiting the PLC, this made an adverse impact on attendance of girls in schools.” (Interview, 2009)

It seemed however from my conversation with the head teacher, that she was pleased with the PLC volunteer who used to work there. She told me,

“Now when the programme has been withdrawn and the volunteer has left the school, there is no one to open and lock the PLC. The volunteer was good. He used to share his plan to work with children with us.” (ibid.)

The government teacher could not throw any light on the nature of the volunteer's work at the PLC in her school which was an indication of non-involvement of the teacher in the HiWel programme. At the time of this visit the project had ended and the PLCs were given over to schools. The PLCs were locked without any trace of children or youth. Two months later when travelling along this highway I saw one of the PLCs unlocked. I was happy to see group of young men standing around the PLC and thought the PLC had again become operational. I phoned one of the teachers in the school and found out that the PLC had been vandalised. Someone had broken the lock and removed the iron cover and as there was no electricity connection the PLC was still not usable.⁵¹ A really sorry predicament for an innovative experiment which hoped to bring new ideas to the field.

4.5 Governance

4.5.1 Partnership Concept and Governance

The concept and nature of not-for-profit PPP in education (See Box no 6.6) is not crystallised yet. Though the two parties are in partnership but the idea, as to what this partnership entails, is not the same for HiWel and the government partner. In the absence of

⁵¹ I did not collect data on the number of PLCs vandalised but from passing reference made by the HiWel-Jaipur team came to know that PLCs in at least 4 locations in Jaipur city were vandalised. Later during the field work in 2010 I stood witness to a vandalised PLC in the wall of a Government Samudayik Janshala School building by the Highway.

a common conceptualisation one will not be surprised if the impact of the partnership is not visible or if the benefits of the partnerships fade away as the projects end.

Box 6.6 Concept of PPP Remains to be Understood

“When it comes to PPP, the government still has idea of contracting out the construction of roads and bridges as the only kind of partnership. Even in case of JMC, education is not on their agenda yet. They do not understand the concept of partnership in education.” (Interview, HiWel team-Delhi, 2010)

The project had suffered delays in payments agreed upon in the MoU. The construction of kiosks for establishing PLCs was the responsibility of the JMC. At the time of data collection in July 2009 out of 200 PLCs as planned in the MoU in 2007 only 45 had been established because of delay on part of JMC in constructing the kiosks. Rest of the computers were stored in a building constructed by JMC for the purpose of an old age home.

The HiWel-JMC-MoU however does not go into the details as to how PLCs will function once the project is over. There is no exit plan. The sustainability and partnership transformation of such MSP model is suspect because a clear phase out plan is neither mentioned in the MoU nor discussed amongst partners during the process of the project implementation. After the end of the project timeline one could see the schools with PLCs struggling with the running cost and maintenance issues (See Box 6.7).

Box 6.7 Sustainability Issues

“Now since HiWel has handed over the PLC to the government, the PLC will remain shut down. I do not know where and how to pay the electricity bill. Last summer, I received a bill of 5000 INR (111 USD approx) and the electricity board then snapped the connection. We have been without electricity since the beginning of the new term. Now if the computers run, there will be electricity bill too, but there is no provision to pay for those bills. How could I keep the PLC working?” (Interview, Government teacher of a school with PLCs kiosk in school building, 2010)

Prior to my visit to Jaipur to study PLCs, I had asked the HiWel team in Delhi how it was possible for children who never had access to formal schooling or good schooling to learn without any sort of handholding? One team member had told me that they are aware

of the challenge and therefore their work with SSA (in Delhi) has a special focus on working with and through government schools and teachers. In case of REI, HiWel had clearly not delivered benefits due to lack of integration with SSA.

4.6 Conclusion

There is a conflict between how the HiWel project is promoted as an example of self organising learning environments and ground level realities in under-developed locations in Jaipur city. Though the approach towards learning as adopted by HiWel is self exploratory, in actual practice it was found that various modes of support guidance and inputs were being provided to the children through collaborating partners, volunteers and supervisors. Some of the approaches were almost akin to what goes on in a classroom where teachers simply write on the blackboard and children copy the content in their notebooks.

There was conflict of interest between the government-led programmes in providing access to education for girls in schools vis-à-vis programmes focussed on education for out of school youth or children or communities through HiWel kind of experiment, due to their location when the PLCs were in walls of the government school. If out of school boys accessed computers then this affected attendance of adolescent girls in those schools. Thus the introduction of innovations, providing access to information for communities, improvement in learning achievement in curricular subjects and bridging the digital divide was not without situational, community or location specific peculiarities. This intervention which was planned to fill the digital divide had a very limited impact and had faded away once the project came to an end and was handed over to the government.

Arora (2010) has critiqued the premises, features and sustainability of such experiments on the basis of her study of Central Himalayan communities. One thing which Arora points out (and which had intrigued me right from my introduction with HiWel project in 2007) is that the experiments cited by Mitra and HiWel team are part of insider research. There has been no independent research and discussion on the premises and post-

experiment long term outcomes of these experiments. So in one sense we have only a one-sided, insider story claiming success of initiatives.

Secondly, the discussions only focus on the success of experiments. The impediments faced by the team that could have led to formulating the experiments differently have not yet been discussed and published as learning from these experiments. Thirdly, SOLEs which Mitra has been discussing is still developing as an idea. Whilst experiments are welcome, the one under discussion fell short in proving its credentials as a candidate for delivering the REI vision of providing quality education. So its replication in future education related initiatives, where quality provision of education in less-developed localities is needed, should not be automatic.

Besides this, the government has also not shown the evidence of commitment towards its partner. There were delays in building of kiosks, the electricity bills were not verified by JMC accounts department and payments were not made to HiWel in time. The partnership was functional in a limited manner. This is worth noting considering the fact that this was the only partnership signed under REI where JMC (the government) had to pay some charges to the private provider-HiWel. The issue of wastage of time, money and efforts due to delays on part of the government partners raises questions about the design and governance of partnership programmes. In such an environment the possibility of learning from the experiment and using it according to the systemic need remains neglected. The impact of such PPPs cannot be seen and the benefits cannot be harnessed for either the short term or long term.

Case Study 2

5. IBM-Pratham Kidsmart Project

5.1 Introduction

Described as a corporate community relations initiative the IBM-Pratham Kidsmart project (or simply Kidsmart project) envisaged to provide a stimulating environment for

young children by providing computers, software and educational material to schools. It was agreed in the MoU that the beneficiary schools, called ‘target schools’ would be government schools selected jointly by the partners (See Box 6.8).

As we shall see in the following sections, the project suffered from delays right from its inception. This coupled with the lack of involvement of government teachers, lack of training of instructors and a kind of entrenched parochialism could have queered the pitch for the success of the Kidsmart.

I present the case of the Kidsmart partnership under two broad heads before moving onto my conclusions. The first section titled ‘Structures, Timelines and Content’ will look at the partnership in a static frame focussing on partners, deadlines, personnel among other things. The second major section is titled ‘Kidsmart: Making Smart Kids out of the Children of the Poor’ will examine the partnership in operation and in several sub-sections point out issues that I encountered while studying this partnership.

Box 6.8 Excerpts from Kidsmart MoU

“The IBM Kidsmart Early Learning Program (“Program”) is a Corporate Community Relations initiative from IBM. The program will utilise effective, up-to-date hardware, software and educational materials in order to give young children who are attending pre-school centres and primary/upper primary schools an enriched stimulation environment”

“The parties to this MoU shall implement the programme in the Government schools selected jointly (“Target Schools”), during the academic year starting July 2006.” (GoR-IBM-Pratham, 2006)

5.2 Design

5.2.1 Kidsmart: Structure, Timelines and Content

IBM-Kidsmart Partners

The MoU with the Rajasthan government has been signed with Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative (PMEI) and IBM as the two collaborating partners. Pratham is a non-

profit organisation which was started in 1994 in Mumbai with the aim to make available pre-school education to children in slums of Mumbai. The organisation is a tripartite collaboration of state, corporations and citizens. In 1997 ICICI bank acquired role of a parent funder of Pratham (PIEI; Nambissan and Ball, 2010). Pratham's Assessment of reading reports conducted on large scale all over India every year have been instrumental in highlighting the reading skill lag in primary school children in India. The organisation aims to 'supplement' rather than 'supplant' government's role. There are several arms and offshoots of Pratham of which there are Pratham Infotech, Pratham Software Foundation, Sancharinfotech. Sancharinfotech for example is a business organisation aimed at the export import of computer software and hardware. The company emerged with PMEI and works in more than 400 schools for CAL (Sancharinfotech). Their objectives are: To engage in education of all those desire of learning about various aspect of computers & peripherals including hardware software and those desire of using computer technology to learn other skills or subject of knowledge; To engage in research related to computer & information technology and its use; To develop, manufacture, process import, export, purchase, sell or otherwise deal in computer software and hardware including programs systems, data and other facilities relating to computer operations and data processing equipment's of all kinds and in any business machines including computers, its peripherals, printer, disk drives, tapes or any other similar machines or their parts (Box. 6.9).

Box 6.9: Learning Objectives Description of CAL

CAL provides training for the primary school children (Std. I to IV) mainly focus on the school syllabus based on the guidelines under the Central & State Government. With the aid of computers & educational software designed by Sanchar, we try to enhance the child's basic competencies like knowledge of number, operations on numbers, geometry, recognition of vowels and consonants, word formation, Basic English vocabulary, pronunciation, recognition of measurements, recognition of direction, map reading, social studies and general knowledge. The school children, who pass the competencies laid in the educational games, are certified by IBM for qualifying in their computer exams as a token of appreciation.

Available from: http://www.sancharinfotech.in/IT_program.aspx (accessed December 14, 2011)

Though the REI MoU of Kidsmart was signed between IBM-PMEI and the GoR, the advertisement board for the project displayed in the project office in Jaipur had four

partners of the Kidsmart project namely Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative (PMEI), Bharti Foundation, Byrraju Foundation, and The Promise Foundation.⁵²

The Project Timeline

Late start of the partnership projects has been a common experience of the REI partners. The timelines of the projects on paper have been found to differ from real implementation schedules not only by weeks but months or a year. According to the REI report the agreement for the Kidsmart project was signed in 2005 – 2006. The MoU of the project gives the warranty timeline for the project as one year (see appendix 9.5). PMEI was to support the programme till April 2007. At the time of data collection in March 2009 the programme was still in operation. In the absence of any proof of extension of the MoU timeline, it was evident that the project either hadn't taken off on time or had faced difficulties. The project team leaders confirmed that the programme could actually start in 2007, when it was originally scheduled to come to an end. The MoU had a clause

⁵² Bharti Foundation is a non-profit foundation from Airtel -- the telecom company. BF's school adoption model was discussed in the previous chapter. Byrraju Foundation is a non-profit foundation was set up in 2001 as philanthropic arm of the Satyam Computers. Satyam's founder was recently (2008-09) found out in the infamous Satyam Scam for over valuing the company and the government had to intervene to save the company. The company has now been bought by Mahindra group of industries. Can foundations run by corrupt businesses or corrupt business executives benefit public education? Or should they be given space in public education? With the businesses acquiring increasing role in philanthropic activities in public education system is it too early or too late to ask the questions pertaining to the ethical dimension of partnership in relation to a partners' business history? According to the website of The Promise Foundation '*A nation's greatest resource is her human resource. The Promise Foundation (TPF) was established in 1987 to apply the behavioural sciences and contribute toward the development of this resource.*' The foundation has quoted various researches on their website to highlight the need for them to undertake computer education projects for the poor communities.

"A large majority of a developing nation's human resource belongs to the underprivileged sector. Our research and research around the world has indicated that people from socially and economically deprived backgrounds, have certain unique mind sets and attitudes, that cause them to remain caught in the cycle of poverty, generation after generation, in spite of various opportunities being made available to them."

(http://www.thepromisefoundation.org/a_who.htm)

according to which the partner schools should be supported for at least four years.⁵³ The Team Leaders had told me that there are plans and it might so happen that the project will be terminated in the year 2009 – 2010, because of the economic downturn. However, the District Coordinator of the project denied any such plan. Thus the responses of the Team Leaders and the District coordinator regarding continuation of the project were inconsistent. There was clearly no handover or exit plan either mention in the MoU or visible in the field.

The Project Staff

The IBM Kidsmart project had a team of 25 instructors (*sancharaks*⁵⁴) working at the school level. According to the MoU the programme was supposed to run in 14 schools but in field situation it was reported by the coordinator of the programme that it is operational in 25 schools. The REI PMU also confirmed that the programme is running in 14 schools. So it was almost double the number of schools in which the programme was actually functioning vis-à-vis the number of schools for which the MoU was signed.


The partnership programme which was formalised for 14 schools was running in 25 schools at the time of data collection. Of these, according to the team, labs in two schools did not work due to either non-cooperation from the school principal and inner conflicts of management at the school level regarding payment of electricity bills. The initial plan was to train the government teachers so that they take up the ownership and run the project. The teachers were trained. Yet in the first year of the programme, when it came to field level implementation, government teachers expressed unwillingness to teach through computers. This reaction stemmed from various factors. For example: work load on teachers, lack of prioritisation of computer lab teaching, timetable mismanagement, attempt to use computer

⁵³ ‘Support the host partner schools for a period of at least 4 years from the date of this MoU for implementation, monitoring and supervision of the Program’ (GoR-IBM-Pratham, 2006, Annexure 2).

⁵⁴ *Sancharak* literally means transmitter.

for other official purposes and lack of interest of teachers and therefore unwillingness to implement the project.

The following image (Fig 6.1) illustrates the context and summary of computer aided learning through IBM-Kidsmart project.



The MoU of the IBM-Kidsmart partnership does mention role of teacher and use of software and instructional manual for software but does not say to what end? It does not specify if there were any measurable learning goals of this project.

There is evidence of transfer of human resources from one organisation to another arm of the umbrella organisation. The *sancharaks* working in the Kidsmart project earlier had been involved in the reading programme of Pratham Rajasthan. After appointment of volunteers as *sancharaks*, they were trained in basic level ICT skills including training in MS Word and MS EXCEL sheet. *Sancharaks* started working in computer labs from the second year of the programme and were paid an honorarium of around Rs. 1000 per month to contribute 2.5 hrs per day during schooldays.

In addition to this, there was a team comprising of two team leaders (one male and one female) whose main task was the maintenance of Management Information System (MIS) and supervision, monitoring and reporting. Besides a district coordinator there was one person responsible for hardware issues.

One of the team leaders was a woman who had been working as a science teacher in a private education institution prior to joining the project. The coordinator of the project invited her to join as the team leader in the Kidsmart project. The other team leader had earlier worked in the HiWel project with Pratham Rajasthan.

5.3 Stakeholders

5.3.1 Kidmsart: Making Smart Kids out of Poor Children

Parochialisms Supported in Subtle Form

The learning software for the project was developed by Pratham Software Foundation. The team leader described the software as a ‘very impressive’ and ‘effective’ learning tool. She demonstrated a simulation game from the software package ‘Jigar I’ on her computer (Box. 6.10).

Firstly, how a game such as this amounts to better teaching than regular teaching is not clear to me. Often the children were repeating playing the same game over and over again and mostly the level 1 or level 2. Also the concept of ‘addition’ is more than mere

adding of numbers. It does involve understanding of the number concept. Without active engagement with a teacher how would children learn the idea of ‘number’ and further that of addition and other such mathematical operations?

Box 6.10 The Jigar Software Package

A warrior dressed in traditional attire with a sword in hand calls out to children to help him attack the fort. He often shouts a slogan of victory and elation- ‘Har Har Mahadev!’. This is a mathematics learning kit where children are doing the exercise of adding numbers. There is the face of a lion on the fort and a certain number is displayed in the mouth of the lion. Various combinations of numbers, some of which add up to the number displayed in the lion’s mouth, are written on the bricks of the fort. Children have to click the mouse to make the man with the sword attack using a canon targeting the bricks on which correct combination of numbers is displayed. (YEU software observation, 2009)

Secondly, what could be the felt need for including the imagery of violence and war to make children learn mathematical operations? In Hindu mythology and practitioners of religion, Lord Shiva is praised and pleased by devouts with ‘*Har har mahadev*’.⁵⁵ The slogan has acquired a symbolic value in politics, invoking the aggressive side of religious fundamentalism against religious minorities. Whilst such slogans do marginalise children from other religious identities, it is also an example of a subtle attack on children who come from Hindu families, psychologically conditioning them to be violent or aggressive for achieving something or to win or target something using aggression if they think what they are aiming for is right.

In this particular school, I also observed that the computer desktop had the image of the Hindu goddess Saraswati (the goddess of learning and knowledge in Hindu mythology). Though this might be an incidental observation in the context of Young Explorer Unit (YEU) computer, my experience of fieldwork in Rajasthan has revealed to me a strong presence of Hindu religious symbols and teachings from Hindu scriptures on the walls of classrooms.

⁵⁵ Mahadev- literally means the supreme lord and refers to Shiva

The transformative capacity of ICT is not evident in this partnership. Though projected as a modern learning tool, this particular case (at least at one level) is rather an extension of the existing dominant socio-religious parochialisms and didactic repetitive learning.

Rote Learning and Lack of Physical Activity

The team leader demonstrated software for learning a language and for mathematical operations which was from the package Jigar I – IV. There were packages for English language learning with interactive games. I observed some of the games being used by children in classroom situation at YEUs along with the *sancharak*.

Box 6.11 Learning by Clicking?

In an English language lesson/activity for children of class-I, there is an animated cartoon where a girl is doing some activity with background music and she commands other children to do something -- for example: Sushma says 'stand up', Sushma says 'sit down', Sushma says 'bend down'. There is a group of children in the animation doing the activity following the command. There is a list of commands appearing on the screen and the children have to click on the text representing the spoken command. (Field notes, March 2009)

In one of these, (See Box 6.11) children had to click on-screen text following visual (animation) and voice cues appearing on the screen about certain common actions. Would little children really learn better by doing this activity in computer animation mode or rather by doing this exercise as a physical activity in the classroom? Wouldn't it be more fun for children to do these together? The government schools in Jaipur city often do not have playgrounds. There are often little open spaces but children still run around and jump and play in whatever is available to them.

In another school, the *sancharak* with the project demonstrated another animation game titled 'tidy up'. An invisible woman's voice commanded the child to do certain tasks, picking up a broom, cleaning the room etc. With the voice command the children had to pick the items and put them in place.

Both of the above mentioned learning packages are for English language learning for little kids. However due to the professional limitation of the *sancharaks* and non-involvement of the government teachers I could not find any evidence of a structured learning of language with any systematic pedagogy through these packages. The observations of YEU raise questions related to the issue of language and power. These software packages are used in schools located in deprived urban localities. The content of the two activities, instead of being interactional, are geared towards passive reception and the following of instructions. In a way it is a computerised version of rote learning for little children. Though there were several interactive games loaded on YEUs, the classroom observation in the two schools revealed that children usually played only a few games again and again, the favourite animation being the one where a mouse bludgeons a cat when the child is able to complete the game-puzzle successfully. Thus the pedagogy is clearly not Freirian and falls short in achieving the first objective of the project i.e., ‘to offer children from communities of low socio-economic status, good quality teaching learning opportunities ...’ (GoR-IBM-Pratham, 2006, objective i).

Location of the Project in the Social Context of Learners

Referring back to the issue of quality which is the focus of the project, what change is this education (instruction) bringing to the lives of the children from poor communities? The children in the two schools observed for the study were from households where the parents were employed as drivers, vegetable vendors, cleaners, and domestic help. None of the children had any computer access in their homes. The YEU in schools were their only source of computer based learning opportunity.

The head teacher of one of the schools had strictly adhered to the requirement of providing learning opportunity for the children of grade III. The interpretation of this requirement emerges from an inherent contradiction in the MoU where in Annexure 3, item 3, it identifies children from pre-school to grade V as beneficiaries but then in item 4 identifies the core group of teachers who work with children from pre-school to grade 3 for professional development. However in both the schools the teachers had left the teaching

and learning through YEUs to the *sancharak* from the project. So these teachers do not seem to view the Kidsmart project as a curricular practice that can make any difference to children's learning. They were clearly not participating. Thus the project was actually not integrated in any way with the school curriculum.

Another observation (not only a matter of coincidence but rather a recurrence in many government schools which I visited during my research study) brought out the fact that children from poor communities were being instructed by the teachers and by the text as in the above mentioned observation to follow and obey orders and commands. Children from poor working class parents were being made to do housekeeping tasks at school, even when it was not necessarily needed to be done.

Sustenance of Benefits of Experimental Innovations

Kidsmart might be bringing in a new tool for learning into the classroom for children but it is certainly not bringing in new learning for social change. This is worth noting in the context of the fact that the project did not have involvement of government teachers. Annexure 3 of the MoU (GoR-IBM-Pratham, 2006) discusses partnership role and responsibility of the Host Primary School with IBM but not any of the Host primary schools were signatories to the MoU. This led to problems in implementation later in the field because the teachers in the host primary schools declined to participate and take on additional teaching and research responsibilities.

The project was being carried out through *sancharaks*. In the initial stages of its launch, the government teachers had stopped cooperating and participating. Therefore the project had to appoint and train its own instructors — *sancharaks*. Most of the *sancharaks* had been working in another project on reading and library run by Pratham-Rajasthan. Sustaining benefits of experimental interventions through volunteers is not a feasible option for the learning environment of government schools because as the project ends the volunteers also disappear.

Sancharaks' Capacity to Support CAL

The discussion with the team leader and the *sancharak* whom I shadowed for a week show that there is a growth in learning in terms of new skill acquisition by *sancharaks*. The *sancharaks* were not initially used in any aspect of ICT and all their training on and about computers has been on the job. When the *sancharaks* started working in the schools they would come back and share their difficulties with the team leader and this was kept in mind when designing their training e.g. how to use excel sheets etc. However deeper understanding of computer aided pedagogy could not be ascertained. The *sancharak's* language skills and their ability to use functions such as 'spell check' in MS word can be guessed from the following constructed description of a decorative multicoloured chart with a picture of a computer displayed in the YEU classroom next to the head teachers desk at one of the government schools. The *sancharak* had expanded the alphabets of the word 'computer' to express the meaning of the term (Table 6.1).

Table 6.1 Reconstruction of a Chart prepared by a <i>Sancharak</i>		
Title: Computer's Full Name:		
	Written text	Possible word
C	comnaly	Commonly
O	oprating	operating
M	machine	machine
P	Prossing	Processing
U	usully	usually
T	teaching	teaching
E	education	Education
R	researching	Researching

At the time of the field observations, one academic year was coming to an end and the project was in evaluation phase. The *sancharaks* were administering paper pencil tests

to evaluate children's learning.⁵⁶ In one of the schools I observed the test based on mathematical operations administered on children. The questions in mathematical operations were in the sequence of multiplication, fractions, subtraction and addition. The instructor distributed the paper to children of grade III. She asked the children to solve the questions in the reverse order of the sequence in the paper. When asked 'why', the instructor said "these children have very low levels of learning. The question papers are designed for the programme but I know that the children will find it easier if they solve simple addition and subtraction sums first." The logic behind the design of the question papers did not quite match her logic that children will benefit if they solve simple sums first. All children attempted the questions based on addition and left out the entire set of questions requiring descriptive answers that involved addition, subtraction and multiplication operations. The *sancharak* was constantly giving cue that each page of the question paper contains one type of question.

The *sancharak* also keeps track of children's attendance. In one of the schools the *sancharak* showed me how she uses the Excel sheet. She had a list of all the children enrolled in grade III in the Excel sheet. In the next column she would put attendance of children during the Kidsmart class. Her idea was to draw a conclusion about the effectiveness of the programme by showing an increase in attendance of the children. On further probing I could elicit that she also intended to compare test scores of children vis-à-vis their attendance. The children who were enrolled in school but had not attended school since last several months were also in the list with 'mean attendance' for the month marked as '0' against their name.⁵⁷

⁵⁶ I could not ascertain whether they had ever conducted any baseline.

⁵⁷ Since the data was still being collected by the team when I returned from the field, I could not see the final interpretation of the result. However, I did explain the consequences of including children who have never attended the YEU class in interpreting relationship of the programme and school attendance to the *sancharak*.

Project is Actually Software Testing Lab

These software packages were reported by the team leader as not into the market and that the private schools had not used these till now. That the description of the learning packages is available on Sancharinfotech's website shows that the packages are available in the open market. The use of these packages by the government partnership programme, can be argued, is creating legitimacy for the software so that they can be consequently pushed in the open market for sale. However I could not find any external evaluation of the packages which could provide me with evidence that they work in under-resourced learning environments and without a qualified teacher.

Why Schools Run Experiments?

Some of the schools also seem to have accepted various programmes without much articulation about the value of programmes to the schools and without participation of regular government teachers. In the school where I had observed the *sancharak* conducting paper pencil test for children's learning of concepts through use of YEU, the Head teacher said,

"We welcome whatever programme the government asks us to implement in the school. Whatever programme is introduced it is for the benefit of the school. We do not have time for this kind of programme but if they are sending their volunteer and also give us computer then there is no harm. Each programme is here to gives us something and not take away anything from us" (Interview, April, 2009).

However, this particular school though eager to adopt all experiments and programmes in anticipation of additional funds, did not seem to have gained much as their QAP scores were 'C' for last two years i.e., 2007 – 08 and 2008 – 09. The teachers were happy with the YEUs but were not keen to get involved in the process of learning through YEUs (Interviews: Programme team, Teachers, 2009). The regular class teachers were observed writing in their diaries, chatting with colleagues or the school head master during the YEU lessons.

5.4 Governance

5.4.1 Relationship with REI PMU

The district coordinator of the programme was unaware of the recent personnel changes at the REI PMU. Every query about PMU and its role was responded with – “yes we are in regular contact with them (PMU), they are impressed with our work.” But there was no response to queries regarding the kind of interaction that happens with PMU. The coordinator could not even give the name of the nodal officer from the education department whom they should be interacting with regarding the progress of the project. On repeated questions about the people with whom they interact with, he finally said that the commissioner has visited the project schools and has appreciated the work. He referred to the commissioner with a different name. Then he said that we do our work, if there is any issue we write letters to them.

The REI DD had said that all IT based projects are looked after by DD IT. When I mentioned this programme to DD IT, the officer completely denied any knowledge of the project since he had been given charge of other projects but not Kidsmart. Thus the absence of any communication between the PMU and the project office was quite evident.

5.4.2 Communication Delays

Was this delayed implementation part of some strategy used by the organisation, in the absence of any clear line and schedule of communication from the REI PMU? One of Pratham’s staff in Rajasthan during an interview about Read-Rajasthan programme (a one academic term programme under REI) blamed communication bottlenecks within government offices for delays in projects (See Box 6.12).

Box 6.12 Communication Bottlenecks

“The communication chain in the government offices is very slow. When the office orders about our partnership take so much time to reach schools (referring to six month gap between signing of MoU and release of letters to schools to cooperate) and sometimes do not even reach there, how would schools know that our partnership period has ended? There is no communication. So we use this lag as an opportunity to keep going our work with schools, even when the partnership on paper/ as per the MoU ended last year.” (Interview, Pratham official, March 2009)

5.5 Conclusion

The power of ICTs in shaping learning cannot be ruled out in general however the conceptualisation of ICT in this project is game and software-centric. This makes children focus only on a particular task of passing one level of a game and moving on to the next level. Moreover the outcome of learning is gauged with a paper pencil test. So an innovative learning tool, rather than creating a dynamic learning environment where children/learners could enter into a dialogue and transform the relationships in the classroom, is operationally as ‘archaic’ as the non-ICT based classroom environments and methods where children end up demonstrating learning on test-paper. In its current form and usage the ICTs are being used for computer literacy and computer aided literacy and not as a context for learning.

Secondly the *sancharaks* in this project had no previous experience of learning or working in ICT based environments. They were learning on job. To what extent they are capable enough to become active partners in children’s learning is an issue which requires further research. The learning situation, which focussed on predesigned games without interactions between the teacher and the children, is far from being transformative.

Thirdly, since regular school teachers are not part of the project, the benefits of the project are not long term and sustainable.

Finally, the long term profit earning motive from the partnership cannot be ruled out because the ‘sancharinfotech’ involves buying and selling of computer hardware and

software including import and export of the same. In a scenario where the government school system has been aiming to expand computer-aided learning as part of its policy mandate and under the current limited conceptualisation of ‘computer-aided’ there is an obvious scope for some sort of learning software coming in demand for the government schools. In such a case the organisation with whatsoever experience of testing their learning software will come forth as suppliers though the learning content has not gone through a curriculum and content approval procedure for implementation in government schools.

Case Study 3

6. Cisco IT Essentials – PC Hardware and Software course in District Computer Education Centres (DCECs) of Rajasthan

6.1 Introduction

This section presents the third and the last case study of these ICT based interventions. The Cisco Microsystems partnership with the Rajasthan government was part of the rhetoric to develop critical IT skills and enhance employability of young people in the state. Through this case study I will examine the claims which the programme and REI as such had made and the translation of those claims on the ground. I will also try to address the question – what is Cisco offering through its IT Essentials curriculum which would otherwise have been unavailable to the beneficiaries?

We will see that two concepts stand out in the objectives of the relevant MoU. These are ‘formation of human capital’ and ‘creation of a pool of talent’ neither of which directly implies an increase in employments. I argue that in terms of employability outcomes, the programme design, characteristics of individuals, their assessment of choices and employment opportunities and the actual employment environment intersect. One of the main education objectives identified for the state of Rajasthan by its government is:

“Empowering for a Global Knowledge Economy: expanding curriculum to provide

ICT⁵⁸ skills to secondary school students and to enable formation of human capital for the economy” (GoR, n.d.a, p.17).

Did the Cisco partnership address the REI vision or the education objectives of GoR or did it even ensure the skill development of those who reach grade 9?⁵⁹

6.2 Design

The GoR signed a MoU with Cisco Systems, Inc. on the 21st October 2005 to accelerate IT education for instructors and students in 32 government DCECs across the state. The MoU was signed under the aegis of the WEF. On the face, the involvement of WEF and Cisco in 32 DCECs sounds impressive but what does it mean in practice? WEF had appointed only one person to oversee communication for REI in 2008 – 09. Also, apart from WEF representatives attending REI update meetings (in 2006 – 2008) there was no regular physical representation in Rajasthan.

6.2.1 Description of the Partnership between Cisco and GoR

The partnership was formalised to provide internet and networking education to the instructors at 32 District Computer Education Centres⁶⁰ as well as secondary and senior secondary students through Cisco’s IT essentials curriculum (Box 6.13). The MoU among other things invokes the rhetoric around the words – ‘sustainable’, ‘talent’, ‘critical IT skills’, promising to build a pool of talent with critical IT skills. However, the ‘IT Essentials curriculum’ was about basic PC-handling skills and not ‘internet and networking education’ as proposed in the MoU (GoR-Cisco, 2005).

At the time of data collection in 2010, this course was available in 18 DCECs with total enrolment of 1950 candidates of which 450 were women (Cisco, 2010). Though the

⁵⁸ Information and Communication Technology

⁵⁹ The Gross Enrolment Rate in lower secondary school i.e., grade 9 is less than 56 percent in Rajasthan (Lewin, 2011).

⁶⁰ There are 33 districts in Rajasthan and each district has a Computer Education Centre.

programme was running in 18 DCECs, yet 82 instructors from all 32 DCECs were trained by CICSO by July 2010 (ibid.). According to the report, around 1500 candidates had graduated since 2005 (ibid.). However, a study commissioned by USAID shows that ‘due to a shortage of staff in schools, non-availability of computer literate teachers, and non-availability of internet connections or the requisite infrastructure at the DCECs, only six DCECs were fully operational (Enge, Kumar and Luthra, 2010, p.20).

There are 1056 secondary/senior secondary schools covered under the CALP of the government (GoR, 2010). The figure was 503 in 2009. Thus there is an overall increase of almost 100% in one year. However not many schools are networked. Even not all BRCs are networked yet, which is a felt need of the school administration (Interview, Government official, 2009).

Box 6.13 Objectives of the Cisco MoU

It was proposed that through the Cisco Networking Academy program, 32 District Computer Education Centre (DCEC) instructors as well as secondary and senior secondary level students (grade 9 to 12) in Rajasthan will receive the benefit of Internet and networking education through the IT Essentials curriculum or any other Academy Curriculum mutually agreed upon between Government of Rajasthan and Cisco Systems, Inc.. This will also help Rajasthan in its development to build a sustainable pool of talent, equipped with critical IT skills.

Cisco agreed to provide training on IT Essentials: PC Hardware and Software curriculum to the instructors of the DCECs who in turn will provide this training to the students. Cisco also agreed to assist Government in the development of a sustainable pool of talent equipped with critical IT skills in the state.

These DCECs can also offer IT training to the general public on a charged basis and thereby run on a self sustaining mode. Cisco and Department of Education intended to accredit the DCEC as Cisco Local Academies (LAs) in Rajasthan.

Cisco agreed to fund the cost of training for up to 100 instructors to support the LAs in the programme.

Cisco is providing free of charge to all the LAs the web-based curriculum, 24X7 technical support, online course material and certificate of course completion.

Providing training on IT Essentials: PC Hardware and Software trainings to teachers and school students - on hardware and computer trouble shooting course, concepts in TCP/IP processes and network administration using open source to help in the development of a sustainable pool of talent equipped with critical IT skills in the state.

Implementation of IT Essentials: PC Hardware and Software Course in 32 District Computer Education Centers (DCEC) located in Sr. Sec. School of each district in Rajasthan and developing them on self-sustaining mode to serve as local academies for this purpose. Enabling students to learn through e-learning environments; anytime, anywhere at their own pace, and with more targeted assessments and accountability than traditional classroom setup.(Source: GoR-Cisco, 2005)

The cost and training burden are also worked out in the MoU with Cisco committing to fund training costs of up to 100 instructors besides providing curriculum, technical support and other aids. Under this agreement, the DCECs were also allowed to operate as paid IT training centres for the general public to make them sustainable, aided by the stamp of Cisco Local Academy for added legitimacy. The MoU also goes into the nitty gritty of the IT Essentials course to be offered promising to cover PC Hardware and Software trainings, hardware and computer trouble shooting, TCP/IP concepts and processes, and network administration.

The students enrolled for the course had to pay some fee (250 – 300 INR i.e., approx. 5.6 – 6.6 USD for a 45 days IT essentials course). There was evidence of free access to the computers for grade 9 – 12 in schools but the purpose of the access was to attract customers for the course later. There was no formal selection of candidates for enrolment to the course. However, we shall see in the following pages, most of the DCECs were gender selective to an extent

In the following section I will explore my proposition that in terms of employability outcomes the programme design, characteristics of individuals, their assessment of choices and employment opportunities and the actual employment environment intersect. I started with asking the basic question – what kinds of skills did the enrolled candidates get from this course and what jobs would they be able to do?⁶¹

6.2.2 Provision for Skills and Employability through DCEC

The GoR has established and made operational District Computer Education Centres (DCECs) (one DCEC to be set up in a senior secondary school of each district) utilising Eleventh Finance Commission allocations of 4,500,000 INR (approx. 112,500 USD). The DCEC project budget of the government thus provided for a well set up

⁶¹ My initial impression about the Cisco course, formed after a cursory look at the MoU, was that it would be focussed on networking concepts and the setup and running of networks. However I soon realised that this IT Essentials curriculum only focussed on basic computer handling skills.

computer laboratory in each district with 35 – 50 PCs each. In addition an annual maintenance budget of 100,000 INR (approx. 2,300 USD) was also provided for covering recurring expenses such as electricity, internet, and cleaning. The main intention for taking up the Cisco IT Essentials project was to ensure students have access to computers and to enhance computer literacy. It was envisaged that these DCECs will not only provide exposure to students of that very school and surrounding schools, but also provide opportunities to *unemployed youth* for attending paid courses which will make them fit for a job or for self-employment (Cisco, 2010; emphasis mine).

The one room DCEC in each district is a highly bureaucratised unit. A district level committee was constituted for the proper functioning of the DCEC-lab. The District Collector of each district is Chairman of the committee. The District Education Officer (DEO) Secondary – I, acts as the Secretary. The Principal of the school where the lab is established is the Centre Superintendent.

Box 6.14 Excerpts from Cisco MoU: Exhibit A- Obligations of the Government of Rajasthan

1. Recommend up to 32 District Computer Education Centres to be the LAs, as set out in the Appendix. These LAs in turn will impart the **Networking Academy Program** to a minimum of 100 students in each LA each year.
2. Fund or secure funding for the costs of acquiring the necessary laboratory (“**Lab**”) equipment for these LAs in Appendix. The type of equipment needed will depend on the course opted by the respective **District Computer Education Centre**.
3. Grant faculty of **District Computer Education Centre** time off for training to become instructors;
4. Fund or secure funding for the annual curriculum support fee, which at present is Rs. 6500 per annum, to be paid by the Local Academy to its parent academy nominated by Cisco for ongoing mentoring and support activities;
5. Endeavour to incorporate the Network Academy Program as part of the curriculum for schools teaching IT, particularly computer networking, and offer credits for Networking Academy graduates to do their further education in IT in Rajasthan

(Source: GoR-Cisco, 2005)

An interesting point to note here is that the DCECs established with government funds have already been planned to be rechristened as Cisco Local Academies under the above obligations of the government read with previously mentioned parts of the MoU

(Box 6.14). This rechristening in itself entails a symbolic transfer of ownership (and a metamorphosis) of the DCECs (set-up with government funds and initiative) to a private entity. Under these obligations also, the school curriculum would get affected.

6.2.3 What Skill-related Opportunities Exist?

The Cisco India website in an article by their Regional Manager, quotes NASSCOM⁶² data on the growth of networking industry highlighting the case for network education and allied opportunities

- Networking's growing importance as an industry and as a sector for emerging job opportunities, through good network education, are evident in the International Data Corporation's (IDC) report which predicts 1,37,000 new jobs in this sector in 2009, while Evalueserve predicts 87,000 openings in 2008. According to a NASSCOM report, while growth in the IT sector faces stagnation, the multimedia grew at 32% and networking industry grew at 29% in 2007.
- As most of the network education certifications are globally accepted, a certified associate in the US would get anything between Rs. 35,000 to Rs. 50,000 (approx. 700 – 1000 USD) per-month, while a professional could get over a lakh rupees (approx. 2000 USD) per-month and in case of certified expert the salary would start from Rs. 1.2 lakh (approx. 2500 USD) per-month.

(Regional Manager, Corporate Responsibility, South Asia, Cisco Systems- Mehra, 2011)

Intuitively it is more likely that ICT jobs will be filled by those already employed than by those unemployed and likely to be less educated. In one of these interviews (Box 6.15) the Cisco partnership Coordinator told me that graduates from the IT Essentials programme are fit to assist engineers. So though employment was not the goal but the promise of employability seems to exist.

The Cisco report (Cisco, 2010) also envisaged the possibility of the students of this course taking up IT related courses in higher education or enrolling for their Professional Network Academy Course. Did the IT Essentials course match the employment

⁶² National Association of Software and Services Companies (NASSCOM) is the industry association for the IT and BPO sector in India (www.nasscom.in).

opportunities in the region and aspirations of the candidates? A probe into this question will help us better examine the employment aspect of this partnership and to understand the intersection of employability with opportunities and aspirations.

Box 6.15 Excerpt of Interview with DCCE Coordinator

Me: How much can these students, who do the basic networking course, earn?

Coordinator: Around 1500-2000 INR per month.

Me: Isn't it too small and amount?

Coordinator: Considering that many students enrolled for these courses are from rural background, where there are not many job opportunities, they can at least earn 1500-2000 INR (30 USD) per month.

Me: What are the job opportunities?

Coordinator: They can assist engineers.

Me: What do they learn in this course?

Coordinator: This is a first level course in hardware and networking -- IT Essentials in PC hardware and software installation. They learn how to troubleshoot computers. Also this course grooms them so that they can communicate with clients in a technician level job. (Interview, Cisco Coordinator, 2009)

6.2.4 Low Cost Opportunity for Skill Development

The DCEC-Baran instructor viewed this course as providing low-cost opportunities to students and unemployed youth – a kind of passport to the IT sphere. Though he highlighted the affordability of the skill development course, at the same time he was also aware of the lack of opportunities in the IT sector in Rajasthan. The lack of opportunities had made him take up a low paid job as the DCEC instructor (see Box 6.16).

Whilst the DCEC Baran created the opportunity for low cost skill development through Cisco's course and also job opportunity for a local resident, the access it had been able to provide across genders was skewed. There were no girl students enrolled for any course in the year 2009 – 10, at the time of field work. In the previous year also there was only one mixed batch with some women and girls. In the next section I will show how this skewed access was an outcome of partnership governance.

Box 6.16 Interview with DCEC-Baran Instructor

The DCEC instructor has a degree in Mathematics and post graduate degree in Computer Sciences from Udaipur University. He was appointed on contractual basis about 4 years ago. His monthly remuneration is around 4500.00 INR. His salary was 2500.00 INR earlier but has been increased since April 2010. He says, “There is a 10% annual increment.” Besides this he gets an incentive of 200.00 INR per batch of trainees. This includes school student batches for which no fee is charged. I prodded him asking why he works for a remuneration which is not commensurate with his qualifications. He replied,

“... In Baran there is no real job opportunity for me. The only job I could get is that of a computer operator. Now after attaining a certain level of qualification, I wouldn't want to do an operator's job. Secondly, during the Rajasthan Mission on Livelihood RMOL training, I get some extra benefit once or twice in a year. The computer operator's profession is not that well-paying. It has many problems. Besides, now as we are associated with the education sector, I can see more scope in future. I can teach in a college and progress further. Once one becomes an operator then there is no scope for development.” (Interview, September 2010)

6.3 Governance of the Partnership

The initial challenges faced by Cisco included appraising people in the government system about REI. The programme was for secondary school students. Therefore, to involve secondary schools the Cisco team required to coordinate with the Directorate of secondary education which is located in the city of Bikaner. REI on the other hand had a PMU whose head was Commissioner/Director SSA⁶³ and the unit was located in Jaipur. The district level officials understood REI within the purview of SSA and as SSA⁶⁴ at that time was focused on elementary education, therefore they did not cooperate. In addition to the lack of awareness about REI, general apathy in the system and non-functional DCEC labs were also issues which the team had to struggle with, in the initial phase (See Box 6.17).

⁶³ Sarvya Shikshya Abhijan

⁶⁴ SSA has now an expanded mandate to Universalise Secondary Education.

Box 6.17 Systemic Issues

The district education officers (secondary) were not aware of REI. Till 2008 there was no dedicated staff for DCEC labs. In many cases the school principals did not know the whereabouts of lab keys. Again many powerful officers were in charge of different aspects of this programme, the implication being that they would not agree to each others propositions or office orders. For example if we found a skilful instructor who is a primary school teacher, it was very difficult to get permission from their officer to transfer him to the DCEC which is located in a secondary school. (Interview, Coordinator, 2009)

When projects and programmes are located in an interdepartmental domain there is need for a mechanism for management coordination. This is very important especially when innovations are being tried out which do not have any budgetary implication for any partnering government department. This leads to a situation where the stakes and responsibility do not seem to lay anywhere and the programme suffered from coordination problems (See Box 6.18).

Box 6.18 Coordination Issues

The District Collector is the Chairman of the Committee of DCEC and the secondary school principal is the Superintendent of DCEC. So it was a challenge to coordinate between high ranking administrative services officers and the principal (for example) who comes from the teaching profession, to get one small work approved. If the District education officers had been supportive and proactive, the programme could proceed smoothly. This was not the case because there had been no planning about operationalising REI and little or no intent to make ground level actors aware about REI and its goals. (Interview, Coordinator, 2009)

The issue of partnership coordination with the three different high level administrators (The Director Secondary School, Director/commissioner SSA, District Collector)⁶⁵ were not addressed consciously as is clear from the experience of the Cisco Coordinator (Box 6.18). Also the power relations between equal ranking officials heading different departments come into play when the partnership is in an inter-departmental domain. Thus causal powers of some appear as susceptibilities which suppress activation of power¹. This implies that causal powers of the administrative units and people affect the actualisation of power to take decisions and implement them. A report commissioned by

⁶⁵ The Directorate of Secondary Education is in Bikaner whereas the SSA office, Directorate of Primary Education and the REI-PMU are in Jaipur.

USAID studied Cisco's Network Academy discovered similar issues. The report discusses the strategy used by the Cisco team in this scenario:

In light of these problems, the NetAcad team had to go beyond normal bureaucratic channels and build personal relationships with government officials at all levels to ensure that the training programs ran smoothly. (Enge, Kumar and Luthra, 2010, p.16)

The problem of partnership administration was partly resolved due to a systemic change when the SSA mandate expanded from elementary education to include secondary education also. Thus, the expansion of the scope of an institutional policy and mandate caused the activation of power1 (ability of partners to make and implement decisions) to power2 (concrete actions), thereby facilitating decision making in favour of Cisco.

The Cisco coordinator who is a local resident of Bikaner could persuade the Director of Secondary Education to issue an official order for the principal's of secondary schools where the DCECs are located (Directorate of Secondary Education, Order dated 19/07/2009; Re: Proper functioning of DCEC) as a strategy to ensure regular enrolment of candidates for the IT essentials course. This move somewhat energised the IT Essentials course with making the DCEC in-charge to ensure intake of 10 batches per year with 30 candidates in each batch. As in other cases there seems a lot of supply side thinking with little diagnosis of demand.

6.3.1 Skewed Access

As per orders of the Director of Secondary Education (ibid.), the DCEC schools had to get 100 students enrolled in the Cisco course (supply side).⁶⁶ The DCEC-Baran is located in a boys' senior secondary school. Now the DCEC superintendent (who is the secondary school principal) does send official information to all schools in the district but

⁶⁶ There was some contradiction. The office orders mentioned intake of 30 candidates per batch with 10 batches per year. However, I gathered the impression from the interviews with the Cisco coordinator and DCEC-Baran instructor that the expectation was from the school principal where the DCEC was located to enrol 100 students from the school. Thus there was some gap in terms of interpretation regarding what was on paper and what understood to be practised.

the responsibility of enrolment of girl students to the course is left to the respective school principals. In Baran, it is not usual for girl students to access the premises of a boys' school. The location of DCEC-Baran in the campus of a boys' secondary school is therefore a deterrent for girls and their parents. The Cisco team have not kept segregated data of girls and boys enrolment for the IT Essentials course so it is not possible to comment on the situation in the other 17 DCECs. However, the case of Baran reveals that the coercive force of the official order can effect regular enrolment to the course but is unable to ensure equal access across gender.

6.3.2 Instructor-dependent DCEC and Power Struggles

Initially I had decided to visit DCECs in Jaipur and Ajmer districts but during the course of my field work there was some delay due to my research visits in other organisations and offices. When I contacted the project coordinator to re-plan my visits he advised me that I should now not visit the Jaipur DCEC because the teacher in-charge was about to retire and the DCEC-Jaipur was not functioning as it was in the previous year. Is the DCEC functioning instructor dependent? This indeed seems to be the case as I discovered while interviewing the instructor (See Box 6.19).

Box 6.19 Power Struggles in DCEC-Tonk

Me: I want to visit the DCEC, so wanted to know about the timings of the centre

Instructor: You can't visit now. There is some problem going on in the DCEC and it has been shut down at the moment.

Me: So when can I visit?

Instructor: Your visit will be possible sometime after September 11, after Eid.

Me: What is the problem with DCEC that you mentioned? Is it some technical issue or an administrative issue?

Instructor: Actually there is a new principal in the DCEC School. He wants to remove me. I was in-charge of DCEC since last two and a half years. Now, if they try to remove me from my position then DCEC will obviously remain closed. Tomorrow we have a meeting with the district collector where a decision will be taken about this. I will let you know and call on your mobile number about the plan for visit. (Telephone conversation-Diary notes, Instructor, DCEC Tonk, 2010)

The DCEC instructors could be government employees – teachers or administrative staff – as in Jaipur and Ajmer.⁶⁷ In some cases the instructors are temporarily appointed on contract basis as in the case of Tonk and Baran. In the case of Tonk the school principal was trying to offer the job to someone of his choice whilst the person who had been working in the DCEC earlier as a contractual appointee wanted to continue. Thus it was an issue of control of DCEC and its resources as also employment opportunity for the instructor. It is evident that these DCECs instituted with public funding are emerging as centres of power struggle and control due to contractual nature of availability of job opportunity, control for resources and because of the very nature of ICTs also.

In the remaining part of this chapter I will present a study of the DCEC-Baran to provide a snapshot view of a DCEC in operation. I will discuss its infrastructure, income, courses and expenditure and finally through a series of interviews and analysis I will try to throw some light about the choices for skill development. This will allow me to examine how the vision for the DCECs compares with skills, opportunities and aspirations of the students at DCEC-Baran.

6.3.3 Infrastructure, Courses, Income and Expenditure (DCEC Baran)

I visited the DCEC-Baran in September 2010. This DCEC lab was established in 2005 and is located in the campus of a government-run Senior Secondary School for boys. The school itself is housed in an impressive old building from 1916, which used to be a glass factory earlier. A new room was built near the school gate in 2005, for the purpose of establishing the computer training lab. In the first two years, the government provided 100,000 INR (2222 USD) annually for establishing the lab. Now it provides 25,000 INR (556 USD) per year which according to the DCEC in charge is not enough to run it and therefore they have to generate income through courses.

⁶⁷ The DCEC instructor in Ajmer district is an accountant in the government education department and working in the DCEC on deputation. He is getting additional consolidated honorarium besides his regular salary. His salary is approximately 10,000 INR per month plus the DCEC honorarium is 4000 INR p.m.

Courses at the DCEC-Baran

The Cisco certified IT Essentials course was started in 2009. Besides the IT Essentials course the DCEC-Baran has been running a Commercial Tally⁶⁸ course supported by Rajasthan Mission on Livelihood (RMOL). RMOL pays 21,000 INR (467 USD) per training for a batch of 25 for a 2 months course. The DCEC also has a facility for conducting Desktop Publishing (DTP) courses.⁶⁹

Income: From Fee-free to Fee Paying

The DCEC-Baran instructor took up his present duties in July 2006. He said that the annual income of DCEC is now around 100,000 INR (2222 USD). He claimed that the Cisco course, started in August 2009, has led to an increase in this DCEC's income. In his words, "The government aid is too little. It is only 25,000 INR (556 USD) per annum. Rest we have to earn on our own."

The Rajasthan Mission on Livelihood (RMOL) also conducts training through DCECs. For a training of a batch of 25 for two months, RMOL pays around 21,000 INR (467 USD). In the previous year the DCEC-Baran earned more than 65000 INR (1444 USD) through RMOL trainings while the income through Cisco course was around 40,000 INR i.e., 889 USD approximately (Interview, DCEC-Baran, Instructor, 2010). The general claim that Cisco's course has financially helped the DCEC is only partly true. A grant of 25,000 INR (556 USD) from the government and a fee free training with support from a government institution (RMOL) has been the major source of sustainability for the DCEC-Baran. Other government funded trainings such as 'e-mitra' training (another government sponsored project for e-governance in 33 districts of Rajasthan) have now been outsourced

⁶⁸ Tally is the widely used accounting software

⁶⁹ I did not collect data on destinations of graduates.

to a private company Compucom through a tendering process (Interview, DCEC-Baran, Instructor, 2010).

It seems that private providers are not only making inroads into public institutions and earning revenue but as appears from example of DCEC-Baran, they could also be the cause of loss of revenues of the programmes such as DCEC which were started with public money and were publicly funded. So there is a clear case of privatisation emerging from the setting up of computer centres on self-sustaining mode. The government centre starts charging a user fee – as in case of Cisco, whilst a private provider earns from public funds – as in case of Compucom giving e-mitra training.

6.3.4 DCEC Management

The school principal is the Superintendent of DCEC and the school's Upper Divisional Clerk (UDC) looks after accounts. There is one DCEC instructor and one support staff. There is a monitoring committee of DCEC headed by the District Collector. The committee discusses issues related to management of DCEC and introduction of courses. The monitoring committee has been making a special effort to keep fees low so that more students can attend the course which includes a large number of unemployed youth. However there is no particular selection procedure for the course.

Exposure to a New Learning Tool or Luring Future Customers?

The instructors tell the students that they can learn only by handling computers. A 45 days course with a certificate from Cisco for only 300 INR (6.7 USD) served as a good inducement to join the course. The government school students, where the DCEC is located are allowed free practice time on computers.

Thus the free course (Box 6.21) seems to be a kind of enticement for drawing prospective students for the paid course in IT Essentials. Technically there was no

requirement to rehearse on computers before taking up the paid IT Essentials course. However, to a certain extent this ensured that some students later enrol for the paid course.

Box 6.21 A Free Course?

On the day of my visit a group of 40 boys was working on computers in the lab. These boys were class IX students of the school where the DCEC is located. The instructor told me that their course in hardware will commence from the 1st of October 2010. The course fee is 300INR (7 USD approx). The students had their textbooks open and were trying to type out from their books into the word documents open on their computer screen. The online course required skills and understanding of some basic commands and therefore he had asked students to work on their typing skills, opening and closing of documents, so that they get comfortable with computers when the actual online course starts. He also added that they run free courses for school students. These free batches continue throughout year. Because of this they get continuous batches for the Cisco hardware course. (Field notes, 2010)

6.4 Stakeholders

6.4.1 IT Essentials Course at DCEC Baran – Skills, Opportunities and Aspirations

I contacted the previous batch of students of the IT Essentials course through the DCEC-instructor. This was a group of eight young men in the age range of 19 – 25 years from a batch of 28 candidates for the course from April 01, 2010 – May 15, 2010. Though initially I had intended to explore the experience of the students about the IT Essentials course I was particularly struck by the description ‘Batch of Unemployed Youth’ when introducing these young people to me.

The purpose of interviewing DCEC students was firstly to get a feedback on what these young people enrolled for the course think they have gained in terms of skills over those 45 days of the IT Essentials course. Secondly I also wanted to understand how these young people approach a career and what connection they visualise between the course and skills thus obtained and their future career choices/trajectories. Thirdly I wanted to find out how these young people came to know about the course, believing this will provide me with a fair idea about the energies invested in creating consumer awareness about the course. It emerged that all the eight IT Essentials course students had a fair idea about

possible careers. This however did not include a career in computer networking. They were aware that a 45 days course in basic skills will not fetch jobs (for details see appendix to Chapter 6: Cisco partnership: student interviews⁷⁰).

6.4.2 Negative Imposition — Unemployed Youth

The DCEC instructor introduced this group of young men as “students from the batch of unemployed youth.’ I found here an imposition of a negative category on the young people. The eight student graduates of the IT Essentials course were not working anywhere. However, all of them but one were either studying for their undergraduate degree course or a professional degree course after completing graduate degrees. The job profile envisaged by Cisco for these ‘unemployed youth’ was as assistants to a network engineer earning approx. 30 USD per-month.

All the students in the group did not have prior exposure to computers. So this was the first ever opportunity for them. I am aware that we should not expect too much in terms of new skill⁷¹ acquisition from a short-term course and that there are limited opportunities to access information online.⁷² Except one, none of the other students I interviewed had gained employment; they were into higher education aiming for jobs such as teaching and business administration. However, they did think the IT essentials skills would help them in future, not necessarily in the job market though.

⁷⁰ This analysis formed a part of the paper which I presented at the Oxford UKFIET conference in 2011 under the thematic session on Skill Development (Pachauri, 2011).

⁷¹ The duration of the IT Essentials course is 45 days with 1 to 1.5 hour classes each day (this comes to about 70 hrs over the entire course period). The duration of the class on a particular day depends upon the level of support and instruction required by individual students.

⁷² This group of students had gone to a cybercafé only for BEd admission counseling. During the IT Essentials course all of them had opened their email accounts but they hardly accessed their emails. When I asked for their email addresses, they said that they will share the address but since they hardly access emails, telephonic contact is better.

6.5 Conclusion

This section summarises the findings of the Cisco partnership for IT essentials course run at DCEC. The DCECs were set up by the Rajasthan government through a central government grant but reading the objectives of the Cisco MoU one finds an attempt by the company to rename (through accreditation) the DCECs as Cisco Local Academies. This could be interpreted as an example of corporate capture of public sector structures/resources.

The evidence suggests that besides Cisco's IT Essentials course the courses previously conducted with support of RMOL and the e-mitra training have contributed to the sustenance of DCEC. If more government department training is diverted to DCEC then it will further add to the sustenance efforts of DCEC while keeping costs low at the same time.

What can we surmise from this particular case study of the Cisco partnership? First of all we have seen REI was simply an umbrella arrangement to enable the partnership whilst issues of governance of the partnership were resolved either through personal efforts and networking of the Cisco coordinator or by systemic revisions of the SSA mandate. The Cisco partnership, in terms of delivering the IT Essentials course and enabling DCECs to generate some revenue, seemed to be working fine. However the thrust of the programme needed to include provision of equitable access and opportunities for skill development to all young people. It is not clear what value, if any, did REI as an MSP model add for DCEC through the Cisco partnership.

This partnership looks like corporate window dressing married with the added opportunity to run computer courses, that do not necessarily lead to employment. Courses, as in the case of IT Essentials, which are often very basic and un-ambitious, narrowly focused on a set of skills related to networking and basic computer operations. Thus, the success of Cisco partnership in achieving the stated goals is contingent upon employability, skills and relevant employment opportunities (Pachauri, 2011). This is notwithstanding the

fact that though the partnership is covering 32 DCECs, in real terms this coverage is pretty meagre and hence incapable of delivering the promise of developing a ‘talent pool’. For if we may take the recourse to rhetorics, the magnitude of Cisco’s intervention can at best create an inconsequential puddle, and not a big enough pool, that the lack of skill development and little or no employment opportunities, will soon leave dry.

7. Technology based Interventions – Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed three IT intervention based partnerships programmes. IT based partnerships were launched with an intention to enhance critical IT skills and employability and to also cover the school cycle through computer aided learning interventions. The first case discussed was HiWel’s PLC, followed by IBM-Pratham’s Kidsmart project and finally Cisco’s IT Essentials course.

These three partnerships have involved major IT companies (directly or indirectly) such as NIIT, Dell, IBM, Sanchar Infotech and Cisco.⁷³ The ambition, scale of operations and results observed on the field do not however reflect the potential of these major players. For example, the effort to run 25 schools for two years as in the case of the IBM-Kidsmart partnership or provide 45 days training in 33 DCECs (Cisco-IT Essentials) and so ensuring 300 trainees per DCEC per year, look more like corporate window dressing rather than concerted exercises in skill enhancement or learning environment changes in a sustainable mode. The scale of these partnerships is too small, targeting weak and their sustainability suspect. Furthermore, all the three partnerships are supply driven and not demand led.

The experience of partners with the government department is indicative of gaps in planning and operationalisation of partnerships. In all the three partnerships there were delays in the programmes taking off due to governmental inaction and coordination issues between high level officials in different departments.

⁷³ Cisco is one of the founding corporate members of the World Economic Forum and the Jordan Education Initiative.

The first two partnerships studied in this chapter, were focussed on children's learning. However government teachers were not part of the interventions and the programmes were run by underpaid and less qualified instructors and *sancharaks*. Referring these findings back to Schwab's MSP model discussed in Chapter 4 the absence of teachers in the framework is apparent. The MSPs such as REI informed by such a model will be unable to address various parochialisms because the framework excludes teachers, learners and communities. This raises questions about the long term impact of the partnership and in turn, about the public accountability of such MSPs and their sustainability in view of lack of stakeholder involvement and therefore absence of ownership (Draxler, 2008).

The claims made by the partners have not always stood the test of the field. For example HiWel's SOLEs were not found to be self organising – children were very much guided and supported by adults. Nor were there any independent evidence of learning outcomes either in HiWel's case as well as IBM-Kidsmart case. Similarly, Cisco's claim of development of critical IT skills falls short of target. However, the skills attained by the students of IT essentials course might not be retained due to the IT deprived environment in the region.

Textbook content as well as the process of writing textbooks have always been a highly debated issue in India. While ICTs are becoming a new learning platform and context, the debate of content in ICT learning material is yet to begin. Whether such content becomes the object of reflection and debate amongst teachers and learners or whether various parochialisms intentionally or unintentionally creep in or remain unaddressed in this new content, are issues that need further study. Closed room content approval committees with representatives from the government and IT companies partnering with the government, might not be the best way to ensure that the ICT based learning content delivers social justice.

An equally serious issue is that of a less qualified and underpaid cadre of instructors becoming part of the ICT expansion dream. The expansion of computer-aided learning

(CAL) and the trend of outsourcing CAL related services to the private sector is an example of phenomenon whereby public and private interests mix with each other (see also Ball, 2007). The outcome of this intermingling will be an increase in underpaid and less qualified instructors as we have seen in the case of the IBM-Kidsmart partnership.

Information and communication technologies, in the three cases discussed before, have made very limited systemic impact on learning in schools and community situations. This has also been the experience of Azim Premji Foundation in their Digital Learning Resources (DLR) programmes. Behar (2010) analyses from the DLR experience that — the computer is another tool of learning and is as good as a teacher is. The dialogic and discovery driven process of actual learning unfolds between children and teacher and the DLR seemed to have made no impact on standard rote learning methods. He cautions,

“At its best, the fascination with ICT as a solution distracts from the real issues. At its worst, ICT is suggested as substitute to solving the real problems, for example, “why bother about teachers, when ICT can be the teacher”. This perspective is lethal.” (Behar, *ibid.*).

The three cases discussed here reflect serious gaps between the promise and the reality of REI. The promise, as we would remember, was one of enhancing learning quality through ICTs and also increasing skills for employability, so that the beneficiaries can be part of global economy. Its quite clear from our analysis of these ICT based partnerships that we are far from that Promised Land.

Chapter 7

Quality Education Programme (QEP) – Baran⁷⁴

1. Introduction

This chapter is the third case study in this series. In the previous two chapters I discussed the models of school adoption and ICT based experimental interventions under REI. This chapter presents a study of the QEP for Baran district in Rajasthan. The QEP partnership is an example of a multipartite partnership focussed on in-service teacher education for the teachers of primary and upper primary government schools of Baran district in Rajasthan, along with academic support for the block resource coordinators and cluster resource coordinators in the district.

This case study differs from those discussed in the previous two chapters in three important aspects: Firstly there is a difference in the focus on intervention. Unlike the previous examples here the focus is on in-service training of government school teachers and activities are carried out within the existing structures of SSA and the District Institute of Education and Training (DIET).⁷⁵ The second difference lies in the fact that the two partners in this programme — Digantar and Vidya Bhawan Society are non-profit organisations with a long experience in the field of education i.e., primary school education, teacher education, development of curricular materials, teacher training materials and participation in various educational activities⁷⁶ at the regional and national

⁷⁴ A project for the universalisation of quality elementary education in the district of Baran (Rajasthan) - hereafter referred to as QEP.

⁷⁵ DIETs were envisaged in the 1986 / 92 education policy in India to usher in a new focus on improving the quality of government primary school teachers through systematic in-service training, curriculum development, and technological inputs. For the study on DIETs in India, see Dyer and Choksi et al., 2004.

⁷⁶ The two organisations which are the Resource Support Agencies (RSA) are involved in contributing to the larger discourse of education in the region. In September 2008, I attended a conference organised by VBS on library and reading where government teachers and officials from several Indian states participated besides several educationists and organisations working in the education sector. The three day conference discussed various

level besides having an experience of partnering with other state governments. Both organisations are based in Rajasthan.

The third difference is in the multipartite partnership design of this programme and includes one funder organisation (ICICI Bank) and the two organisations as resource support agencies (RSAs). QEP was initiated in Baran district at the invitation of the GoR to three organisations – ICICI Bank, Vidya Bhawan Society (VBS) and Digantar Shiksha Evam KhelKud Samiti (hereafter Digantar) (GoR-ICICI-VBS-Digantar, 2006). ICICI Bank works here through its social initiative groups in the area of elementary education, health and livelihoods.

Baran is amongst the most under-developed districts of Rajasthan, with a large population of indigenous peoples (tribes). The literacy rate hovers between 3 and 4 percent and malnutrition is very high. According to the QEP Baseline study, Baran district has a population of 21% Scheduled tribes and 39% scheduled castes (VBERC, 2009). The overall percentage of Scheduled tribes living in Rajasthan is 12%. More than 80% of the people of Baran live in rural areas (ibid.). The ICICI Foundation for Inclusive Growth's Annual report for the year 2009 — 2010 reports that the 78 schools under the remit of QEP were located in rural or peri-urban areas catering to approximately 6000 children (IFIG, 2010).

2. Programme Vision and Proposed Outcomes

The values of equity and social justice enshrined in the constitution of India formed the basis for envisioning quality education in the QEP. The QEP vision has been articulated as addressing the need to develop schools as spaces where children can learn

conceptualisations of reading and its challenges in educational programmes of different organisations. Digantar along with several other organisations and teachers' groups also organised a two days seminar on February 28, 2009 and March 1, 2009 on 'Curricula, Syllabi and Textbooks in Rajasthan' as part of the 'Right to Education Campaign' where the presenters critiqued the current textbooks in Rajasthan as biased and skewed to project certain political religious and gender identities. The participants called for a much needed curricular change through collective action.

collaboratively and develop as rational beings with mutual respect for their fellow beings. It also strives to instil attitudes and an understanding of the aims of education (among Cluster Resource Centre (CRC), Block Resource Centre (BRC) and DIET functionaries) that are guided by the constitutional mandate. The QEP programme documents also make frequent references to the National Curriculum Framework (NCF)⁷⁷ as one of the defining frameworks for school education.

The QEP baseline study for Baran reveals that most of the primary school classrooms in Baran are multi-grade by default; teachers in Baran emphasise obedience in classrooms, the instruction is teacher led without space for collaborative learning for children and often children are subjected to various forms of punishment for not completing class tasks or to keep them under control. The baseline categorises the teaching learning activities in classrooms as: ‘rote’, ‘recall’ and ‘repetition’. The in-service training of teachers was therefore envisaged to address these issues in the system and also to achieve the vision for schools that follows the constitutional mandate. There are 996 government-primary-school (GPS) and 517 government-upper-primary-school (GUPS) in Baran with 1479 male teachers and 377 women teachers in GPS and 1913 male teachers and 489 women teachers in GUPS (GoR, 2010). The training programmes through QEP covered all the teachers in the GPS and GUPS.

The QEP aimed to see the impact of the programme in terms of the following outcomes. At the school level it aimed primarily to achieve improved teacher and regular attendance of children besides practice of school/class level planning and shared review among teachers, improved classroom teaching, better teacher-child and teacher-community relationships, improved enrolment, retention, and learning levels, reduction in gaps in learning levels of children based on caste and gender and an improvement in school learning environment.

⁷⁷ NCERT, 2005

Table 7.1 Programme Outline with Objectives				
Objective of programme	Block	Cluster	Number of schools	Scope of intervention
Develop Pacesetter Schools	Atru	Dada	25	Direct intervention with schools, BRCs and CRCs
		Ardand	20	
	Shahbad	Samrania	14	
		Ganeshpura	12	
Work with BRC and CRC	Atru	Bicchi	-	Intervention with BRCs and CRCs
	Shahbad	Kundi	-	
Work with DIET	-	-	-	Capacity building intervention in DIET

(Source: VBERC, 2009)

At the level of DIET, BRCs and CRCs, QEP aimed to develop ‘capable academic support structures’ and ‘teams’ through the ‘development of a tried and tested training package’, ‘Regular in-service training’, ‘Action research that helps understand the ground level situation and helps find solutions’ and ‘Infrastructure for academic support in place at cluster level’. The programme also involved ‘work with the BRCs and CRCs for sustainable academic support’ and ‘support to select CRCs to develop 78 Pacesetter Schools’ located in six clusters across two blocks of Baran (Table 7.1). The pace-setter schools were envisaged to ‘create alternative experiences to connect the alternative descriptions of classrooms to reality’ (QEP, n.d., p.5). The schools were provided academic support through *Shiksha samarthaks* (SS) and Cluster Resource Centre Facilitators (CRCFs). Each SS worked with 7 – 8 schools and each CRCF with 4 schools with school visits once in eight days (Interviews, 2009). However, many times when SS were involved in district level training or had to undergo their own professional development training programmes, the gap in school visits increased to two weeks or even a month (ibid.).

Dhankar (2011) describes QEP-Baran as a ‘complex’, ‘ambitious’ and ‘joint-partnership’ programme. He explains that the programme’s ‘complexity’ arose from the fact that it involved work at various levels – direct work with children, in-service teachers

training to attempt to develop dialogue with the teacher. The programme was ‘ambitious’ because of its emphasis on adopting new ideas or ways of work which are distinct from the prevalent ways of doing things, and that the ideas had to be developed and negotiated along with people working in Baran. Finally as the programme involved organisations from the GoR (DIET, SSA, Education department), Digantar (an NGO), VBS (an NGO), and ICICI Bank (working through its Corporate Social Responsibility Arm and provided funds for this partnership), it was described as a ‘joint-partnership.’

At the time of my field work the QEP was in its second year and I considered it important to understand the impact of QEP on the academic support structures at the levels of clusters, blocks and DIET. Among other things I wanted to understand was that how QEP trainings and materials were different from those I had found in other parts of Rajasthan and Delhi? What is the role of RSAs? What is the nature of teachers’ participation as planned and as actually revealed during the trainings and who are the Master Trainers (MTs)?

3. Analysis of the Quality Education Programme⁷⁸

This partnership like the others is analysed from the perspective of design, dynamics and development finally looking at what has been and what could be better. For

⁷⁸ The field work started in the last week of September 2008 and ended with revisiting MTs in Baran after the review and planning meeting of all the partners and stakeholders of QEP in September 2010. The analysis of the partnership programme is based on the study of documents provided by the partnering organisations-Programme reports, proposals, Memorandum of Understanding between the partners and the government of Rajasthan; Public addresses given by representatives of partner organisations at the teachers’ meet/seminar; Observations of trainings, workshops involving government personnel (teachers, CRCs, BRCs); MT selection cum training workshops; review and planning meetings at various levels of programme; interviews with programme staff from partner organisations at various levels; interviews with government officials related with the programmes. I also conducted school visits (lasting from 2-4 hours each), classroom observations in Atru Block to understand the structure and function of academic support structures and pace-setter schools and interviews with government teachers and MTs of the programme. The field work started in the last week of September 2008 and ended with revisiting MTs in Baran after the review and planning meeting of all the partners and stakeholders of QEP in September 2010.

this we look at QEP using the following three criteria:

- i) Design of the partnership
- ii) Stakeholder Involvement and Intra-Agent dynamics
- iii) Partnership governance and development

The naming of these criteria makes it amply clear what issues surrounding the partnership will be discussed in a particular section. When I talk of stakeholders I cover all the partners of QEP as well as students and communities. The agents in my criteria set are the micro players such as teachers, trainers and instructors.

4. Partnership Design

The QEP was a multipartite partnership model where three organisations ICICI Bank, VBS and Digantar together formed a partnership and signed a collective MoU on September 05, 2006 with the GoR. Digantar and VBS had the role of Resource Support Agencies (RSAs) in this partnership (GoR-ICICI-VBS-Digantar, 2006).

The programme had a medium term view of the proposed intervention and was therefore designed for a 3– 5 year period. But is this timeline enough to bring change? The ICICI Bank made a financial commitment for ‘a grant of up to 6.758 million INR (approx. 150,178 USD) towards the costs of the first three years of the project to the RSAs’ with disbursements to be made to RSAs ‘on a quarterly basis’ and dependent on ‘plans submitted by RSAs as well as review of utilisation’. However the ICICI Bank reserved the decision to fund the project for the remaining two years of the programme.

“ICICI Bank will have the *discretion to decide whether it wants to provide additional funds for the remaining two years* of the project.” (GoR-ICICI-VBS-Digantar, 2006) (emphasis mine)


Thus, though QEP was a multipartite partnership design the source of funding for the QEP was unilateral with ICICI Bank as the only funding partner. During an interview

one of the members of the RSAs said that “The government has signed this partnership with the ICICI Bank. This partnership is in their name.”

Whilst investigating this claim I found that the MoU has the names of the three partner organisations but the table of contents of the compiled MoU documents of the REI partnerships enlists this particular MoU under the title ‘ICICI’. This indeed is indicative of unequal power of partners not only as perceived amongst themselves but also as recognised by the government partner. On the ground the academic expertise for the programme was provided by Digantar and VBS. In addition to this, the team at ICICI’s Centre for Elementary Education frequently visited the QEP trainings and schools for research and monitoring. We will see in a later section how the financial power of ICICI, enabled it to influence the trajectory of the programme and the involvement of the other two organisations.

Setting up of defined structures and institutional provisions were envisaged as an integral part of the project design. These included: setting up of a Quality Improvement Unit (QIU) with membership from DIET-Baran, all Block resource centre academic staff and resource persons from GoR and reconstitution of cluster level teams in four clusters for pacesetter schools (GoR-ICICI-VBS-Digantar, 2006).

Fig 7.1 Venn Diagram Showing QEP Partnership Structure



Source: Based on GoR-ICICI-VBS-Digantar, 2006

Through the constitution of the QIU and by designating two agencies as Resource Support Agencies (RSAs), the QEP partnership created a decentralised structure of implementation and governance. The division of roles and responsibilities as well as inter-linkages between QIU and RSAs were clearly spelt out in the MoU (Fig. 7.1). Since the partnership was with the government, the administrative and governing aspects of government school education systems were to be looked after by the government departments. Thus governance of schools, planning for training of teachers was the responsibility of the government.

The SSA was made responsible for planning of teachers training and QIU was responsible for the selection of MTs. However till the end of the second year of the programme the four government representatives for the QIU team had not been identified by the government department (Interviews with QEP team, 2009). Though responsibilities were more or less clearly defined there was an overlap of responsibilities and also an interconnection between functions and responsibilities, of the government department and the RSAs. However the QEP team was proactively involved in addressing the gaps and overlaps of responsibilities so that programme plans could move ahead.

The project was managed at the district level by the QEP team consisting of members from the RSAs which included district and block level coordinators, research staff and *Shiksha-samarthaks*. The deliverables at the school level included a change in format and conduct of morning assembly, planning for language learning by the primary school teacher who are supported by SS and improvement in teacher-child relationship at school level. Along with these were development of training module, regular conduct of training and review of training and other activities of QEP among the other deliverables (Interviews, QEP team; DIET-Baran Principal, 2009).

In the pace setter schools in Atru Block of Baran district I observed the teachers developing learning plans for the children and discussing their work with SS. The five SSs interviewed agreed that there have been improvements in the schools in terms of friendly learning environment for the children, child-centric activities in the morning assembly and

teachers beginning to take interest in developing plans. However, at the time of this interview at least three of these SS were planning to leave their jobs and move to another corporate foundation with higher salary packages (Interview, SS, 2009).

The children in the pace-setter schools where the reading package of the QEP was used showed 25% improvement in their reading ability in the short span of two years (IFIG, 2010, p 9). However, the not all pacesetter schools were running optimally and copying from blackboard was still prevalent (ibid.).

5. Stakeholder Involvement and Intra-agent Relationship

There are a host of stakeholders and a number of agents involved in this partnership and in this section I will explore their dynamics, the power relations and their mutual interface.

As master trainers are an important cog in the QEP wheel, we will dedicate two subsections on the challenges to the image of this agent of change and the issues encountered whilst identifying an effective master trainer. Here too the role of other agents (for example those involved in the selection of MTs) will be touched upon thus throwing light on inter-agent dynamics.

In the next two subsections we will delve further into inter-agent dynamics and stakeholder involvement and show how arbitrary approaches at the individual (agent) level can be detrimental to the success of a programme whereas adaptive strategies (of other stakeholders/agents) could work in its favour. Finally I will discuss certain systemic issues such as equity, religious biases etc and how they over determine the involvement of various stakeholders and agents.

5.1 Challenging the Image of the Master Trainer

The District Education Office (DEO) maintains a list of resource persons who could be contacted for conducting the training when needed. The trainings conducted by DIET are interceded by DEO (Dyer and Choksi et al., 2004). It has been found that the role of Master trainer (MT) was considered prestigious by teachers and naturally there was an aspiration for this. Teachers of secondary schools or head-teachers of middle/upper primary schools or anyone who had contacts at the DEO could be invited for this role.

The MTs had a general sense of anxiety about their ‘performance’ on the day of the training assignment, worrying if they would be able to address all the queries of the teachers who they were supposed to train. The focus of the QEP team in the three days duration MT-selection cum training workshop was to discuss the training module with the MTs and support the MTs to prepare them for the upcoming five-day teachers training camps in the district. Initially in 2008, the master trainers’ idea of a good MT was more focused on authoritative presence in terms of personality related attributes such as loud voice, ability to manage rowdy groups of teachers, ability to counter argue and answer all queries till the teachers fall silent and having an authoritative presence because of their official position/seniority etc.

The trainer training guide (QEP, 2008) specifically states that the purpose of training is not to talk and tell the content of the module but to establish it as the basis for discussion and to arrive at understandings and conclusions (p.3). For this purpose a list of 11 articles was compiled for primary school teachers training. These articles were written or adapted from various sources such as NCF to discuss the vision of schooling, children’s learning, formation of concepts and ways of knowing amongst others (See appendix to chapter 7). It was observed that the teachers’ reading and discussion time in groups ranged from 20 – 30 min in a 1 hr 15 min session. The remaining time of the session was for collective discussion. There was no direct follow up of the trainings for the 4000 teachers in the schools. However, in the blocks where the QEP worked in pace setter schools, the SS

organised quarterly cluster meetings connecting discussions in the training for further subject specific work.

A study on DIETs has shown that lack of professional support to trainers could ‘undermine’ the training experience of teachers (Dyer and Choksi et al., *ibid.*, p.11). In the usual practice prevalent in the state, the trainers are casually trained and there is not equal emphasis on work on the training modules. This is important keeping the fact in view that the Master trainers are often not involved in development of training modules. QEP had a clear focus on training of master trainers with equal rigour as would be expected of them. However, the three day long workshop in preparation for a five-day training seemed too much of an investment of time for some of the government officials.

One of the DIET lecturers who was a member of the QIU, had a specific criticism (Box 7.1) about the organisation of the MT training. He expected the teachers to be able to perform certain feats to qualify as MTs. The importance of the role of MTs and the need for their development as trainers is not only ignored but also a quick fix approach to professional development activities is reflected in the remarks of this DIET faculty.

Box 7.1 A Quick-Fix Approach to Selections

‘You are wasting too much time on discussing the module and selecting the MTs. We in DIET, have conducted MT selection previously too. You should have given them (the teachers to be trained as MTs) a chalk and should have asked them to demonstrate how they will speak in front of teachers. Give them five minutes each and see who you find suitable to speak. You could find out quickly who will be a good MT. You could thus save two days.’ (DIET faculty, MT training, December 2008)

The training of the trainers expected trainers to read the articles included in the modules for teachers and reflect on the content and discuss it with the groups. This was a departure from trainings before the QEP had started when trainers used to arrive at the training camps without reading the content of the module and without a reflection on the plan to conduct the training (Interviews of MTs and SS, 2008).

Box 7.2: Master Trainers and Shopkeepers

“Master trainer (*Daksh*-skillful/Master; *Prashikshak*-trainer) is the one who is skillful in everything. I consider MT as one who has *Sauda* (material worth trading) in his mind. And he can satisfy his customers with his *Sauda*.... If a shopkeeper does not have *Sauda* and a customer comes to him and asks for matchstick, shopkeeper says I do not have. Then he asks for sugar, the shopkeeper says I do not have. Then he asks for tea, the shopkeeper says I do not have. The customer asks, then why are you sitting at your shop? In case of a *Daksh Prashikshak* -- Ask him for stuff of any quality and he can give it to you. You ask for Taj Mahal Tea, he can offer. Then you say no not this quality but the other, he can offer that too. Such MT will impress the other person ...” (SSA official’s address, Teachers’ meet, December 2008)

The participation of MTs at their training ranged from some dozing off to quietly sitting in groups listening to what the RSA team members had to say. A few MTs were seen copying the text from the training-module in their notebooks. During the group-work the RSA team members took the lead to discuss the readings and the MTs responded only when they were directly asked to express their opinion on a certain idea in the text.

The MT training group also included QEP’s academic support staff — *Shiksha-Samarthak* (SS). The ratio of RSA members to the MTs was usually 5:2 in each group. The *Shiksha-Samarthaks* also suffered from pressure of performance during teachers’ trainings. However their anxiety arose from a self-assessment of their preparedness (or lack of it) and how to negotiate the situations as they faced in June 2008 trainings, when teachers accused them of being agents propagating NGO ideology (Interviews, SSs, December 2008).

The demand on the part of some of the government officials for ‘order’, ‘performance’ and ‘delivery’ without reflection, debates and discussions was quite evident in their public lectures and addresses, during monitoring visits to the teacher training camps (Box 7.2). In one of the training sessions the government official (DIET Principal) arrived in the training hall when the MTs and RSA members were discussing questions raised by teachers’ in previous training camps. The officer did not seem to agree that the conceptual questions related to the practice need to be discussed. (Box 7.3)

Box 7.3 Commitment without Reflection

“Just now someone asked - how can we ensure quality? You do not have to address this question of quality.... there is this man building a house and filling the foundation. Whilst filling the foundation he starts thinking whether this will be a magnificent house, a beautiful splendid house.... He has to fill the foundation with concrete. If he puts all his effort and commitment in the foundation and makes a good foundation then the house will be magnificent on its own. Whatever work we have to do, we should do it with commitment. Quality will come automatically. However if instead of doing our work we start thinking about the concept of quality, it will be of no use. (DIET principal, Baran-MT training, December 20083

The government official’s emphasis on ‘not to think’ is symptomatic of a larger phenomenon whereby those who teach are not expected to be concerned about the conceptual issues regarding their practice or question their practice and its systemic context. This is in contrast to the fact that QEP aimed to develop teachers’ autonomy and thought for professional practice (Dhankar, 2011).

There are some further issues with the programme. There were no women MTs in 2008 – 2009 and the QEP-team had only two women staff members in the field, working on-site. One was the Block coordinator and the other was a SS. In the following year, the woman SS left the team to do a BEd degree.

This model of training input with an expectation of teachers changing without changing the condition of the schools has an inherent limitation because the teachers return to the same schools without proper ongoing academic support. Even in the schools where the teachers were supported by SSs, it was reported that if the SSs did not go to the schools for a month, the teachers would neither take any initiative to plan for their lessons nor would they use the Teaching Learning Material (Member, TARU team, 2010). Thus a sustained academic support seemed crucial for changing the state of teaching-learning in schools. However, in the absence of a sustained plan for continuous professional development for all the 4000 teachers trained through QEP, its aims sounded over-ambitious. In 2010 when I went back for field work, many of the schools had been

upgraded to upper primary schools and a need was being felt by the QEP team to develop a focussed programme for these upper primary schools also.

5.2 Identifying Master Trainers – The Role of RSAs

Master Trainers are important agents for bringing about change in school practices, in any education system. In case of the Quality Education Programme at Baran, the RSA team was actively engaged in identifying MTs who could be trained and supported to become part of the resource pool for the district. Developing a team of effective MTs was seen as essential to affect a change in the conduct of trainings. The RSA team members training the master trainers were conscious of their ideological differences with some of the MTs but did not consider this a hurdle to the task of professional development of the teachers. Teachers' proficiency and subject knowledge and their willingness to engage in dialogue were considered important by the resource persons from the RSAs.

“The good thing is that he is competent in his subject. The doubts which he raised during discussions today point towards the fact that he knows his subject ... I think if a person is open to rational arguments he can be converted. He will prove to be a good MT.” (Key Resource Person-KRP, 2008)

The MTs interviewed in the third year of the programme had been associated with the QEP trainings since its inception. They perceived change not only in the reception of the programme amongst teachers but could also reflect on how the programme had changed them at the personal level.

It is not that I read a lot now. I read only newspapers but having been associated with the QEP trainings I keep on thinking about the module and the trainings. It has been like never before. The thoughts of training keep on floating through the mind. It is positive, not like the trainings before QEP. (Interview, MT-2, 2010)

Earlier I used to get very angry if someone contradicted my arguments. I wanted to push my thought and expected the other person to agree. The experience of QEP team and the trainings in Udaipur has changed me a lot. Now if someone does not agree with me, I can still continue a dialogue with them. Personally I feel that this is a big change in me. Now I do not get angry. I understand that we can have different viewpoints on the same aspect of the problem. (Interview, MT-3, 2010)

This recognition of a multiplicity of viewpoints is a clear indication of a change in attitudes besides being a necessary condition for the development of collaborative learning environments. I could see that the programme had made serious attempts to identify and develop capacities of MTs. In the third year of the programme some MTs and then DIET principal were also involved in the training module development. However, one cannot say if after the end of three years of the Quality Education Programme, the district of Baran had enough Master Trainers to carry on with the task in the absence of the two RSAs.

5.3 Arbitrary Impact of Government Administrators and Related Bottlenecks

The Quality Education Programme represented a decentralised mode of teachers' training at the district level. The programme also involved the development of training modules specifically for the district. In the third year of the project the teachers and Master Trainers (MTs) were also involved in this module development. The state of Rajasthan on the other hand develops a centralised module to be used in teachers' training across the state. This module development focuses on the 'hard spots' in the textbook content, identified on the basis of performance of children in the achievement tests. Whilst in the district of Baran a new programme sowed seeds of change, business in the rest of the state went on as usual.

The DD (Training) SSA-Rajasthan who addressed the *Shikshak Sammelan* (Teachers' Seminar) in December 2008 in Baran that talked about the need to reflect on the structure and format of training as part of the QEP and role of organisations such as Digantar in the professional development of teachers was also coordinating the module development workshop for the entire state. Also the government officials and administrators are bound by assigned official responsibilities which could be contradictory to each other or in conflict with the official's ideological inclinations towards the programmes. This introduces an element of conflict and arbitrariness in the process that could affect both the district level partnership and the state level programme.

Communication gaps between SSA-Baran and DIET officers affected the programme at the initial stages. The person in charge at SSA-Baran was suspended on charges of bribery and the DIET principal assumed additional responsibility of the SSA in 2009. A few months later this principal was transferred to a government school. The SSA official who had been suspended was absolved of the charges and was reinstated. Meanwhile, a new DIET principal had assumed charge. At the time of my third visit to Baran in September 2010, the previous DIET principal had affected his transfer back to the Baran-DIET reportedly using his political connections. This frequent change of leadership, at least in this particular case, however did not appear to be detrimental to the progress of the programme.

5.4 Adaptive Responsibilities and the Role of Change Agents

As we have seen in case of the HiWel case study (Chapter 6), the non-fulfilment of mutual responsibilities could become a reason for discord and stall the progress of partnership programmes.

Quite often, new responsibilities may emerge or hitherto unforeseen tasks get identified during the implementation of programmes. Adapting to the partners' responsibilities becomes important in such a scenario, in the interest of the shared and formalised goals. The QEP team showed willingness to adapt to the responsibilities of their government counterpart to facilitate development and progress of the project.

Whilst development of the training module was the responsibility of the RSA and QIU, printing and distribution was the responsibility of the government department. In June 2008, the training modules did not reach the training camp sites in sufficient numbers or in proper time (KRP experience diary, 2008). This not only affected the conduct of training but also, since it was the first year of the QEP training, the RSA staff members at the camps were taken to task. The resource persons were ridiculed by the teachers and their governance and capacities were called into question (Interviews, KRP, 2008). An outcome of this experience was that in December 2008, the KRP team travelling from Jaipur to

conduct the training of the MTs, carried the training modules to all the camp sites to ensure their availability.

Other instances of QEP staff members adapting to the government partner's responsibilities include preparation of lists of teachers for camp sites and ensuring timely intimation of training and camp site details to participants. In 2009 – 10, the RSA team prepared a format to seek feedback from teachers about the choice of timing for trainings and the choice of camp site. The QEP coordinator regularly liaised with the DIET principal who was the immediate in-charge of QEP-Baran – in conducting visits to the training camp sites and being present at most of the collective training review meetings at the QEP office in Baran.

Even though the partners agreed that the relevant government agencies (BRC, CRC, DIET) do not have certain capacities, they engaged in an adaptive manner with the government functionaries. This manner of functioning was more than just being proactive. It entailed facilitating the actions of the partner as well and building capacities in the process.

5.5 Systemic Issues in QEP and Stakeholder Involvement

Over the years various programs such as Operation Blackboard, Shiksha Karmi, Lok Jumbish, DPEP and now the SSA have been taken up in Rajasthan aimed at the UEE. All these programmes have identified 'teachers' training' as crucial to achieve the UEE goal. Furthermore the national curriculum framework 2005 sees teachers playing an important role in delivering social justice.

Interactions with teachers and direct observation of trainings make it evident that teachers are divided on the basis of religion, caste and politics. At the training camps, dominant Hindu ideologies were often freely discussed and thrust upon the training group during the discussions on the nature of school and learning by the teachers from the dominant caste groups. These often degenerated into discussions about Pakistan – an

Islamic republic bordering India at the west and relations between the two countries thus drifting away from the planned pedagogic discussions.

The teachers training modules had components discussing knowledge, nature of school subjects, and difference between facts, assumptions and belief. The programme attempted to develop a dialogue amongst teachers through reflection on various concepts and academic practices. Irrespective of the point of discussion – constitutional mandate, its relation with what goes on in school and what is worth teaching – these were often manipulated by some teachers into inferential statements drawn from the dominant Hindu discourse and mythology.

The history for example is all about what Maharana Pratap⁷⁹ did or what Shivaji⁸⁰ did and in one of the sessions the construction of knowledge through experiential learning was fallaciously argued with the claim that Abhimanyu⁸¹ learnt about Chakravyuh⁸² in his mother's womb. In one of the training camps a teacher of Biological sciences started arguing that he had learnt about his sense organs in the pre-natal stage. The session turned into a debate when he said that he knows this because he was not born deaf, blind or spastic. To which I had to respond that 'deaf, blind and spastic children also learn from experience.' The government official visiting the camp reinforced the teacher's argument.

"As far as Abhimanyu's example is concerned, this isn't a solitary example. One can ask how a child learns to suckle at birth. He had no experience of it earlier and no one taught him or gave him this knowledge. You just give it a thought. If you start thinking, many more examples will be revealed to you." (Field observation, Camp 5, December 2008)

This was the fate of the teachers' perspective building discussions on the reading in the training booklet focusing on how human beings learn. This training camp had not been running smoothly and the SS and KRP felt that they were being harassed by the teachers.

⁷⁹ A Rajput ruler who fought the Mughals.

⁸⁰ A Maratha ruler.

⁸¹ A character in the Hindu epic 'Mahabharat'.

⁸² A complex formation of troops in the battlefield.

Also they were not getting support of the MTs. The dominant religious discourse derived from mythology and the idea of revealed knowledge dominated the teachers' narratives and was argued as if these constituted undisputable and unquestionable knowledge. Spirituality, religion, evidence of scientific advancement in Hindu mythology and the colonial experience together formed a heady cocktail in this official's intervention at an ongoing training session (Box 7.4).

Box 7.4 Systemic Issues –A Heady Cocktail

“Our education could not be called ‘correct education’ unless it gives importance to ‘*adhyatmic chintan*’ (spiritual thinking). We have been living in a democratic country for the last 50-60 years. ... our history is replete with great feats of knowledge that indicate we had made major advancements in science and technology long ago! You say that we have better medical facilities now, but why do you forget this fact that lord Shiva transplanted the head of Ganesha! Similarly, it is assumed that Einstein gave formulated the equation - $E=mc^2$. This is not true. Dear friends, the substance of this equation had already been mentioned thousands of years back in our great ‘Gita’ [a Hindu scripture]. It says, ‘soul never dies, only changes incarnations.’ And soul is nothing but an energy, therefore, we should realise this fact that our ‘rishis’ (saints) were scientists and they had already discovered all such facts. You see our books are presenting tempered and twisted history of India. Shivaji is called a ‘*luter*’ (looter). We are being educated in a system which adopts curriculum developed by the British. Even we are being taught the history of Muslims! Therefore, I request you to be aware of this politics and do justice with our culture and ancient knowledge.” (Digantar, 2008)

Thus, the training sessions can often get subverted by cockeyed thinking or hidden agendas of various stakeholders reflecting conflict of interests. In Baran, the narratives, intending to legitimise dominant Hindu rituals and practices in secular state run schools, hijacked the focus of training sessions from social science, mathematics, biology, language and constitutional mandate to in coherent debate. This was apparent invariably across most of the camps.

Sometimes these systemic problems are so ingrained (through value systems, right-wing politics) that questioning a certain practice (for example invocation of the Hindu Goddess of Knowledge in schools) could draw threats and false accusations as was experienced by RSA workers whilst working in Baran.

At one of these instances where the KRP asked the teachers to reflect whether ‘*Saraswati Vandana*’⁸³ should be sung in secular state run schools, since it belonged to a particular religious group, one of the participants asked in a threatening tone, “What do you want? Do you want to instigate riots?” The teachers and officers from Hindu majority saw it obvious to start the training sessions with singing prayer of ‘Saraswati’ (observations, KRP reports and interview, 2008). The practice expected teachers from minority community to either participate or accept quietly. The singing of *Saraswati Vandana* is not only part of the Hindu identity but also Hindu nationalist ideology played out in the political scenario of the district and state. During my field work in 2008, the Congress party had won elections in the recent legislative assembly elections. One of the RSA members exclaimed that ‘some people in the state think that the defeat of a right wing party in Baran is an outcome of our work’. I asked if this is what the organisation thinks, to which they answered ‘not us but people say so’ (field notes, December 2008). The Bharatiya Janata Party faced a big defeat not only in Baran but also in Rajasthan in 2008. However in the Parliamentary elections in May next year the BJP candidate from Baran won the seat.

There not only exists a silent conflict between Hindu and Muslim teachers but also participation of teachers from tribal communities participating in the teacher trainings was very low key. The public shaming and denigration of newly appointed tribal teachers by a certain government official for the low level of education in tribal communities and disdain shown towards tribal culture is recorded in one of the KRP’s reports – ‘Why we are in such an impasse?’ (Digantar, 2008)

Whilst winning and losing elections are part of complex political equations and strategies of political parties, the teachers are certainly an active variable of this equation. The task of RSAs in such a scenario is thus very challenging indeed as they have to engage not only with changing the routine teaching-learning practice in schools but also such practices arising from a larger social political context. How do organisations cope with this

⁸³ Hymns in praise of the Hindu Goddess of Knowledge

challenge? The strategy for change, if any, needed long term intervention and a short term programme was not suited for the purpose.

In the next section we will see how the QEP partnership has been governed and what lessons we can learn from it that can be carried over to the conclusions of this case study.

6. Partnership Governance

6.1 Review Cycles and Work Culture

A culture of persistent insistence on review of practice was observed to be deeply ingrained in the QEP design and the team. Such review included monthly review meetings of the RSA staff including the administrators and *Shiksha-Samarthaks*. Also on the days of the training each MT was not only expected but also supported by the RSA staff to review the training of the day. This would include identification of the good aspects of the training as well as pointing out of issues and challenges in the module, structure or logistics which need to be addressed for future. A collective group review meeting of the RSA staff that reflected on the training would follow.

Constant comparisons with the first training experience in June 2008 and progress made then onwards along with sharing of experience across the camp-sites reflected that the RSA staff had a continuous, developmental and comparative view of the teachers' training. However the reviews were not taken up seriously by some of the MTs (Digantar, 2008b, Field notes 2008; Box 7.5).

Box 7.5 Gaps in the Review Process

At one of the training camps (December 28, 2008) after the training session was over, the MT said to the facilitator from the project team, “I have already written the review report that the training went well. What is the need of any further discussion?” When the facilitator insisted on the review he said, “You write whatever you want I will sign.” However the facilitator insisted that it is for them to discuss it together so the MT participated unwillingly. The MT was thus compelled by the facilitator to reflect on the day’s training and to write the review report. I wondered if this was an impact of my presence or whether it was the woman facilitator whose polite assertion made him review the day’s training. (Field notes, December 2008)

Setting a trend or introducing a work culture in an inter-organisational setting is a challenge and requires persistence, action and patience. I gathered from my interviews that the project team gave due emphasis to the seriousness of this business and did their best to support the MTs, teachers and officials so that they arrive at the same level of intention and seriousness of purpose.

“.....But that lays lots of responsibility on the resource organisation – that you are not there for some/any trivial purpose, any petty purpose. It has to be the purpose of actually strengthening and constructively strengthening. That any discord, any aberration needs to be tackled carefully, needs to be dealt with in a sensitive manner.” (Interview, Vidya Bhavan Education Resource Centre-VBERC representative-Diwan, 2008)

6.2 Force and Speed of Change and the Differential Powers of Partners

The PPPs are forged on the assumption that they have capacity of relieving the system of ailments and providing solutions through involvement of entities outside the public sector. The involvement of private entities including businesses will, it is assumed, impact the system quickly and in an efficient manner. These views and their proponents have spread far and wide and some of the supporters are also to be found among government functionaries. These forces, interests and perspectives problematise the situation and also construe solutions.

We have seen before that the QEP funding from the ICICI Bank was stopped after the third year review meeting of the programme. So the programme came to an end in

March 2011. As the ICICI Bank stopped funding the two RSAs the personnel of the QEP appointed by the two RSAs were called back. This was occasioned by a change in strategy on part of the bank to work directly with the State government. This also reflects the fact that an exit route for resource organisations was not planned in advance.

Can these short term efforts of QEP to bring change in the school environment, impact deeply ingrained practices, remove various biases, tackle rigidities and resolve conflicts succeed in a short period of time? Doesn't it seem more likely that the ambitious objectives and scope of the programme would be better addressed in a long term intervention? This kind of change requires a long term intervention. The members of the RSA had a realistic assessment of the challenges and possibilities.

"We conducted the first training in June 2008. It will be too early to say whether the programme has been fully successful or not. We do not claim anything at the moment. But we do not get depressed with this evaluation because we are working with teachers who are in the system since 20 – 25 years. It is a challenge to change their pattern of thinking. I reflect on my training and education in good organisations. I know how my thought pattern has changed in a better way. I feel we have to keep working with the same zest. Hopefully we will begin to make an impact." (Interview, RSA coordinator, 2008)

The RSA staff was right in asserting that the changes in practices take time. However it would seem that the funding partners were keen to make an impact in a short period of time. At a training review meeting where the RSA team was discussing problems faced because some teachers hampered the trainings or arrived late and not participate, the official from the funding partner (ICICI Bank) asked,

"If all the attention during the training goes in properly organising the training session, how will you impact the discourse in the state?" (Interview, ICICI Official, Training Camp Collective Review Meeting, Day 2, 2008)

The RSA team's focus on proper organisation of training and involving teachers in a dialogue was therefore seen as a hurdle, by the funding partner, in the efforts to change the 'discourse'. Only teachers in the 78 pacesetter schools received additional academic support through SS.

6.3 Unequal Accountability

The RSAs were supposed to get their plans approved for reimbursement and funding through ICICI Bank. Thus the Bank was more than a partner for the RSAs. The association was more of an implementer (RSAs) – programme evaluator (ICICI Bank). The inter-organisation accountability between the funding partner (ICICI Bank) and the RSAs was thus uni-directional.

This limitation of inter-partner accountability can be gauged from the fact that when the leadership changed the programme was called off without explanation to the RSA partners for closing down the programme. In the last newsletter published as part of the QEP, the project Director of QEP writes:

“The ICICI Bank says that their policies have changed and now they will work directly with the GoR. They also say that they will implement the learnings from this programme on a larger scale but for this to happen – what was the need of closing down this programme? This they can explain at least.” (Dhankar, 2011: translation mine)

Such a partnership design where the fate of the programme and the resource support partners hangs on the whims and fancies of funding partners, points towards the inherent instability of such arrangements. Such outcomes also reflect the hierarchical power relationships between the funder and the implementer. The ICICI Bank stopped funds and the activities of RSAs were wound up by March 2011. Many of the RSA staff appointed in Baran for the QEP had to leave the organisations. The fate of the programme and partners depended on money after all!

The QEP now exists in a different form in Baran involving different NGO partners. The ICICI Bank now aims to work with the state level teams of SSA in Rajasthan and other states across India. This abrupt change of the QEP plan and change of partners, goes against the claims of the QEP to envisage teachers’ professional development as a continuum. As a consequence the developmental view of the programme is also undermined. The MTs expressed their displeasure with the development.

“Digantar and Vidya Bhawan knew the work well and they were doing it

honestly.....I was deeply hurt by the manner in which they had to explain before the ICICI Bank their work (refers to the review meeting of QEP), as if to beg for money. Why the people who do good work should beg?” (Interview, MT, Baran, 2010)

The ICICI Foundation in its annual report (IFIG, 2011) subsection titled ‘ Shift in ICICI Foundation’s approach state-wide and system-wide school and teacher education reform’ declares that the foundation’s strategy has changed in the wake of recent policy changes such as Right to Education Act 2009 in India and they will set their initiatives directly within the ‘government educational institutional space’ (ibid., p.29) . The forces and drivers of this change in strategy might be related to the vision of expansion of the ICICI Bank and the government officials looking for quick fix solutions for addressing systemic challenges.

Box 7.6 The ‘Pill’ Syndrome – Finding Solutions to Educational Problems

One officer stated in the envisioning workshop that there is no need of processes in Education. There is requirement of a pill, like the one for headache. Give one such pill to the Education System to cure all ailments.

(Translation of the quote from Dhankar, 2011)

Though Dhankar refers to this meeting as the envisioning workshop, I was informed by one of the ICICI team members that it was going to be a review meeting for the QEP (Field notes, 2010).

Dhankar (2011) discusses the above example (Box 7.6) to critique the idea of education in the minds of senior level officials in the government which could have led to the closure of the programme. He argues that there is no such pill in education and one has to make concerted efforts to deal with the problems in/of education (ibid.). That remark might have been made by the government official as an excuse to close down the QEP but the ‘pill syndrome’ is a strong signifier of a widely prevailing ‘medical model’ of the ‘health of a system’ and its management based on prescriptions and pills with instant impact. Such models (to extend that analogy without defending it) are more like symptomatic treatment, which intends to provide quick relief and minimise the appearance of symptoms without going into a comprehensive diagnosis.

6.4 The Politics of Education and the Future of Resource Organisations

“The lessons and achievements from this programme (QEP-Baran) encouraged the GoR and ICICI Foundation to carry forward their work at the state level for another six years.” (IFIG-CEE, website)

The ICICI Bank started with one DIET and 78 pace setter schools in Rajasthan in collaboration with two resource-support-agencies in 2007. At the end of the fourth year the ICICI Bank entered into a new partnership with the GoR without the two RSAs. The scope of the programme also expanded to 33 Districts whilst support to schools increased from 78 in one district to a total of 100 schools in two blocks in two districts. However even this expansion seems not only tiny but also arbitrary, considering the demands of SSA and RtE. We do not have data on latest developments or about the progress of the new envisaged work for module development for 33 districts and textbook development for Rajasthan, reformulating pre-service and in-service teacher education curricula. However, the changes in the design of the programme and plans of expansion raise several questions.

Firstly, did the ICICI Bank which had the capacity to roll out funds use the two RSAs with intellectual resources as a springboard to usher in their expansion agenda? This however is difficult to be inferred considering the fact that in 2009 – 2010 ICICI disbursed sums of 9.95 million INR (approx. 221,111 USD) to Vidya Bhawan Society and in the year 2010 – 2011 disbursed 12.28 million INR (272,889 USD) to Digantar.

Secondly, how does the Bank conceptualise and visualise the role of their partner RSAs in their new expansion agenda? Will the ICICI foundation appoint these RSAs as consultants rather than partners under the new programme? Who will they work with? Why these RSAs are not part of their expansion plan?

These expansion aspirations of the foundations⁸⁴ and new collaborative relationships with the state government and consultants are going to add a new chapter to the politics educational provision and MSPs in India. It is not yet clear what strategy will resource support organisations develop to cope with the challenge of the new roles thrust upon them by the funders, foundation or corporations i.e., organisations with financial power?

7. Conclusion

In this chapter I discussed the specific regional context of QEP Baran, a programme for district wide training of teachers supported by ICICI bank and its resource partner NGOs. The QEP in Baran is steeped in social hierarchies, dominant religious identities and suchlike and reflective of religious parochialisms. This poses challenge for the organisations working for QEP which is further enhanced by nuanced notions about quality, role of teachers and trainers and work cultures in the system. Despite these challenges, the QEP could make important strides and gained gradual recognition amongst teachers and trainers.

In a multipartite model the power of the funder eventually gains precedence, enabling it to decide the future of the partners and partnerships. The resource support agencies (in this case the two NGOs) were left out of the architecture of the new

⁸⁴ In January 2011 the members of the Centre for Elementary Education from the ICICI Foundation attended and presented two papers (on teachers' dialogue and academic support for teachers in pace setter schools in the Baran district) at the Global Conclave of Young Scholars organised in New Delhi by the National University of Educational Planning and Administration (NUEPA). However there were strong undercurrents and hectic activity at this event which might look as an academic exercise to the outsider. The ICICI team members present at the conclave were actively networking and seeking out researchers from foreign universities with an offer to join the Foundation. The participation in information dissemination, organising consultative meetings, presentation of in-house research papers in International conferences and other fora is part of the 'information politics' and 'symbolic politics' of transnational advocacy networks in the post neoliberal era where the state is supported but eventually the object is to route the public funds to the private providers (Nambissan and Ball, 2010).

programme after QEP Baran was folded. The resource support agencies might have to articulate specific strategies in the new scenario, where if at all, their role could be reduced from that of a partner to one of a consultant.

The QEP did bring resources to the district of Baran for teachers' training thus linking itself with the SSA as envisaged by REI. Apart from the fact that ICICI executives attended WEF meetings, there does not seem any contribution of WEF and other international partners to the QEP and teachers' training in the State or in Baran. Therefore the REI which is one among other GEIs, could not mobilise international expertise and resources, as far as QEP was concerned.

With the absence of international support and contributions, the successes, challenges as well as failures of QEP are naturally born of local causes and situations. It seems that the QEP partnership would have come into effect anyway (i.e., without international support) since ICICI has business interests in the region.⁸⁵ However, QEP did not have a sustained resource input plan, no exit route and plan for CPD. The evaluation of the programme was also internal. It was conducted by the funding partner i.e., ICICI bank. Evaluation of QEP and its dissemination has resulted in various strategic gains for ICICI, both on the matter control of funds and in gaining networking advantages.

The field evidence suggests that three years was indeed a short period even for sustaining change in schools which were supported by SS. Moreover, there has been no evidence in the field that the training changed classroom practices. Trainings were conducted for 4000 GPS teachers whilst SS supported only 78 pace-setter schools. The pace could not be set in a short span of three years because the scale was tiny not only in terms of the State but also the district. Plans for further expansion, as announced by ICICI, sound unambitious and are unlikely to address SSA goals or goals of RtE as envisaged by ICICI.

⁸⁵ The Rajasthan Bank was merged into ICICI bank in 2009-10 further enhancing the infrastructure and financial muscle of the bank.

Chapter 8

Universalisation of Elementary Education in Jaipur City⁸⁶

1. Introduction

This chapter is the fourth and final in the series of case studies of partnership programmes under REI. The chapter discusses the ‘Programme for Universalisation of Equitable Quality Elementary Education for deprived⁸⁷ Urban Children in Jaipur City’—a partnership between Bodh Shiksha Samiti (hereafter referred as Bodh) and the GoR.

This partnership programme has an important place in this thesis for several reasons. Firstly, the case study is important because of the multi-pronged and developmental approach of this partnership programme and the conception of this programme entailing Bodh’s work in the previous years. This programme attempted to influence the policy and practices in the public school system through enabling collaborative institutional attempts towards the construction of buildings for government schools in underserved localities of the city and work with communities, children and teachers.

⁸⁶ The full title of the programme is ‘Programme for Universalisation of Equitable Quality Elementary Education for deprived Urban Children in Jaipur City’

⁸⁷ According to a survey undertaken by Bodh in 1998 there were 279 slums in Jaipur city with only 74 having schooling facilities. The survey also revealed that about 30% of the population of the Jaipur city lived in slums. Also, in nearly 50% of the slum colonies, more than half the children were out of school. (UNICEF-Rajasthan and Bodh Shiksha Samiti. Base Line Study of Jaipur, 1998, cited in Jagannathan, 2001). According to Janbodh proposal and programme reports (Janbodh, 2005, 2006, 2009) there are 324 underserved localities in Jaipur city with 224 government schools- 163 of which are located within the locality and 61 near the locality. According to Bodh estimates there were 100 localities without schooling facilities. According to the Jaipur Municipal Corporation (JMC, 2012) there are 164 slums in JMC’s jurisdiction and 47 slums in Jaipur Development Authority’s jurisdiction. This amounts to 211 slum localities, far less than Bodh’s estimate of 324 underserved localities.

Secondly, the importance of studying this programme arises from the fact that this partnership was signed following the launch of REI in 2005 and is therefore one of the long standing partnerships – continuing in an extended form towards the end of my field work in September 2010⁸⁸ though with no linkage with any of the REI core partners. Thus this case can provide us with further analytical insights to comment on the extent, efficacy and longevity of MSPs for the government education system.

2. Bodh

Bodh began its journey in 1980s by establishing a school in a slum locality without any schooling facility. Currently Bodh runs 6 schools called Bodhshalas in 6 slum localities of Jaipur city. These schools have emerged as a demonstration of community based school governance. Bodh has a long standing experience of working with the government schools as well (Jagannathan, 2001; AKF, 2007).

Bodh signed the MoU for the ‘Programme for Universalisation of equitable quality elementary education for deprived urban children in Jaipur city’ – hereafter referred to as Janbodh⁸⁹ with the GoR on October 21, 2005 (GoR-Bodh, 2005). The main text of the MoU document does not mention the timeline of the programme. However, the cover page of the MoU document mentions the time period as 2005 – 2010 which is in line with the REI pilot timeline till 2010. Bodh’s reports and staff termed this partnership as a multi-partite partnership involving Bodh, communities of the underserved localities of Jaipur city,

⁸⁸ The first phase of field work was conducted from September 2008-July 2009 in Rajasthan. This involved visits to REI partner organisations, interviews with the programme staff and concerned government officials. Since the focus was to understand programmes in action, substantial time of the field work in district Jaipur was spent in school observations, trainings and interviews with the programme partners.

⁸⁹ Though the MoU of the programme UEE in Jaipur City does not mention the term ‘Janbodh’ but the proposal of the programme developed by the organization and reference to the programme in the annual reports of the organization use the term ‘Janbodh’. Janbodh is the name of the urban education programme of Bodh. The MoU with the government was consequently brought under the ambit of Janbodh. The draft of a later MoU (2009) for Bodh’s role as ‘State Technical Support Agency’ mentions the previous partnership programme as Janbodh Education Programme (GoR-Bodh, 2009).

the GoR and the funding agencies. However, the community is not a formal signatory in the MoU. On May 24, 2006 Bodh announced the public launch of Janbodh as a participatory model of partnership involving communities from 324 localities of Jaipur City. The programme was presided over by the Principal Secretary, School Education and Minister of Education, GoR addressed the gathering.

The representatives of two of the funding organisations⁹⁰ i.e., Aga Khan Foundation (AKF) and American India Foundation (AIF) were signatories merely as witnesses in the MoU and not the partner signatories. Consequently, the MoU was a commitment between the government and Bodh for delivery of the programme and there were no details of any financial commitment from any of the funders. The partnership was thus based on a programmatic goals commitment but without promise of financial resources. How did this affect the partnership programme? Did the absence of funding commitments pose any hurdle to the programme implementation or did it rather give Bodh more control and flexibility and thus power over its relationship with the government?

So how did Bodh's involvement in this REI project come about? For sometime, Bodh had been intending to work with the government to take forward the work done during the Janshala⁹¹ project. However, a few senior bureaucrats had been averse to the involvement of NGOs with the government. The launch of REI was a coincidence. The government's intention to provide space for action for multiple partners with the scope to design projects according to the strengths of the organisation and need of the region along with a positively inclined bureaucratic leadership with a comprehensive view of partnerships facilitated Bodh's efforts to formalise their proposal for work in the schools in the slum localities of Jaipur city (Interview, Bodh Director, 2009). So Bodh had already been pursuing the government department. The SSA has a provision for involvement of NGOs in fulfilling the goals of UEE. Therefore, it seems that Bodh could have got involved even in the absence of the REI.

⁹⁰ These two organisations had been funding some of Bodh's programmes at the time of formalisation of this partnership in 2005.

⁹¹ A UN-agencies led project to establish common community schools with the help of civil society organisations.

Whilst QEP focussed on the professional development of teachers, creating a collaborative learning environment in schools and working with different government structures to achieve the goals of UEE in district Baran, as discussed in the previous chapter, Janbodh's focus was to achieve quality elementary education along with the government's programme for UEE (see appendix to Chapter 9). The scope of the programme which intended to align itself with SSA goals was thus wide.

Bodh appreciates GoR's invitation for collaborating to contribute towards the realisation of quality education and decentralised governance through implementation of mutually agreed action plan by way of innovative academic and pedagogical practices, building and enhancing people's capacities, ensuring integrated socio-systemic environment and community partnerships for child care and schooling to attain the aforementioned objectives. (Janbodh, 2005, p.1)

Though both the partners agreed that this programme is 'accepted as a component of SSA Rajasthan' the inter-relation with other agents e.g. local government is not specifically discussed in the MoU. Though SSA money was not made available directly to Bodh as such but when Bodh organised the residential bridge course for out of school girls in 2006 – 2007, SSA funded the course as per its norms. The gap in the funds was filled by Bodh through her own programme funds. Similarly during the field visits in 2009, I observed that Bodh supported the government in selection and appointment of *Shiksha Mitra* (instructors/para-teachers) for running *Shiksha Mitra Kendra*⁹² (bridge courses for out of school children in slum localities). The finance for these centres was provided by SSA and logistics was managed by Bodh (Interview, DD-Urban Slums, SSA, 2009).

3. Programme Design

This section discusses the Janbodh programme design in terms of scope of intervention and scale of intervention. It also highlights how the demands evinced by the mandate of the government towards UEE created a challenge for the organization to scale

⁹² Literally means - Shiksha: Education; Mitra: Friend; Kendra: Centre

up the intervention and also to retain the personnel. Could the challenges faced be result of absence of a funding partner in the formalized MoU?

3.1 Scope and Funding

As stated in the previous section, due to alignment with the SSA objectives the scope of Janbodh was wide. Nevertheless, Bodh agreed to perform certain specific tasks. These involved firstly identifying out of school children and unserved/underserved localities of Jaipur city through mutually agreed survey formats; using Geographic Information Systems (GIS) for mapping underserved localities to start new schools or alternative education provision as per District Primary Education Programme (DPEP)/SSA norms (GoR-Bodh, 2005).

Secondly Bodh agreed to set up a maximum of 25 Bodh schools which would act as resource centres for capacity building. Thirdly Bodh agreed to start pre-school/Early Childhood Care and Education (ECCE) centres with a minimum group of 20 out of pre-school children in the age group of 3 – 6 years and funded by Bodh. Similarly Bodh also agreed to set up adolescent learning centres for out of school adolescent girls aged 9 – 14 years. However, these were to be set up as per the need of the locality and to be funded by Bodh. The MoU keeps the option of funding of the adolescent learning centres as per approved budget under SSA norms (*ibid.*).

Fourthly, capacity building of government school teachers through training, school visits, study circles fortnightly. Fifthly onsite support for government school teachers through resource teachers and academic support personnel. Sixthly working with communities and school level governance bodies such as school development and management committee (SDMC), parent teacher association (PTA) and mother teacher association (MTA) creating 'bridge' between school and community. Finally Bodh agreed to bear costs of salary of Bodh staff engaged for all the above activities (*ibid.*).

The personnel appointed to work with the government schools were called community school facilitators (CSFs). As the term indicates CSFs were meant to be the link between the school and the community (ibid.).

3.2 The Scale of Intervention

The MoU does not specifically mention the design of phased intervention as planned by Bodh and written in the programme proposal and plans in detail. The Janbodh programme reports (Janbodh, 2006; 2007), and interviews with the functionaries from the organisation (2009) reveal that from the onset of the partnership, the programme's scale of intervention changed constantly because of the demands evinced by the government and Janbodh.

To illustrate this fact I discuss the change in scale of intervention in terms of personnel placement by Bodh in the government schools (Table 8.1) since the onset of the programme. The initial design of the programme, as discussed in the initial programme plan/proposal, had planned the placement of 40 Bodh-teachers (called the community-school facilitators or CSFs) in 40 government schools in the phase I. The 40 CSFs were to work in 40 government schools and localities around the school, mobilising enrolment of out of school children in the government schools and supporting the government teacher in the academic work. It was proposed that after a period of 1 – 2 years the CSFs would then move to the next set of 40 schools.

However, in April 2006, Bodh had to place 100 teachers in government schools responding to a demand from the government. According to Bodh's data there were 224 government schools spread across 324 slum and underserved localities of Jaipur city. The demand for service was high as most of the schools in slums – established as common community schools during the Janshala project and converted to government schools later – didn't have buildings. Besides these were single teacher schools with a high drop out rate.

The scarcity of teachers was not only a problem in the government schools in underserved localities of Jaipur city but a challenge afflicting the whole of Rajasthan⁹³. Thus sixty newly recruited teachers for the programme who were undergoing a six-month training at Bodh had to be placed in government schools even before the completion of their training, along with 40 previously trained Bodh teachers. These Bodh teachers are appointed on six months probation with terms of contract to be regularised after training and review.⁹⁴

This raises questions on the preparedness of the new recruits for the field conditions. In an attempt to address the situational demands and to emulate SSA's responsibility towards underserved localities, the organisation seems to have taken up too much burden on its shoulders without support from REI and its core partners — CII, GeSCI and WEF.

In the second year of the programme some schools were dropped due to non cooperation of the government teachers or due to low enrolment of children and a few other new schools were taken up. In the following years the change in the direct intervention model for the urban deprived localities in Jaipur City continued. The following table broadly depicts changes in the intervention plan in terms of CSF support to the government schools from 2005 – 2010.

⁹³ According to the minutes of the project approval board meeting for 2007, out of the sanction for new recruitment of total 86516 teachers in Rajasthan, the state had recruited only 31000 teachers up till 2006-07. In 2007 the state had planned to recruit another 32000 teachers out of the remaining 55516 (Project Approval Board-PAB, 2007). A recent publication of DISE data reveals that nearly 33% of schools in urban areas of Rajasthan were without a regular headmaster/teacher in 2009 (NUEPA, 2010).

⁹⁴ There is no commitment of a permanent contract but then it also does not specify the appointment as temporary. The appointment of all Bodh staff is usually at the organisation irrespective of the placement in project, unless stated otherwise.

Table 8.1 Changes in Intervention Plan from Year to Year	
Year and Coverage of Schools	Intervention Structure
Year 2005 – 2006 100 schools	100 community-school facilitators 4 community coordinators (one each for a cluster of 25 schools) 4 academic support fellows (one each for a cluster of 25 schools)
Year 2006 – 2007 66 schools	66 community-school facilitators 4 community coordinators 4 academic support fellows
Year 2007 – 2008 58 schools	58 community school facilitators 2 academic support fellows
Year 2008 – 2009 46 schools	16 teachers/facilitators working directly in school 15 teacher facilitators working on rotation basis with 30 schools
Tentative Plan for 2009 – 2010 (at the time of data collection April 2009) 20 schools	17 teacher facilitators to be deployed in 17 schools, developed as cluster resource schools in deprived localities 3 facilitators in schools in Brick Kiln area on the outskirts of Jaipur City
Source: Janbodh 2006, 2007; Interviews, Bodh team, 2008, 2009, 2010	

Most of the schools which remained with the programme in the later stages were those in which Bodh had started to work in 2006. In fact very few new schools had been brought under the programme in next few years. Frequent changes in the mode of interventions and dropping some schools out of the programme did not bode well for the programme. This affected enrolment and the integration of out of school children in a sustainable manner.

As we can see in the above table the intervention envisaged for 40 schools catered to in a developmental and annual phase out mode swelled to 100 schools in the first few months of its implementation and again shrank to 46 schools towards the end of the third year of the intervention. These were the schools out of the same 100 Schools taken up in the first year of the programme. Whether this frequent change in plan was caused by the paucity of programme funds due to a non committed funder for Janbodh cannot be ascertained as such a situation was denied by the programme team. To me it reflected the ambition of the organisation to project itself as a strong credible partner capable of planning and delivering educational interventions on scale — a partner whom the government could turn to for support whilst planning and delivering education services for specific groups. However in the absence of a sustainable long term plan either from SSA or REI partners, the efforts could not bring desired outcome irrespective of the scale of intervention.

The decision to change the course of action was an effect of not only the demands from the government but also based on the deliberations by Bodh's team in the internal monthly review and planning meetings of Janbodh.

“We started with 100 CSFs placed in 100 schools of Jaipur city. After the review of the work at the end of the first year we moved out 44 of our facilitators from government schools. These were the schools which were either unwilling to participate with the programme or did not have enough enrolment of children that it would require a CSF to work with the school.

Me: So what happened to these 44 facilitators?

BE: Bodh has their own resource schools in Jaipur city and they also have their Rural Education Programme so some of them were moved back into Bodh's own schools. Some of them also left the programme. Demands of working in slum schools.... Many of these were women teachers who hardly otherwise step out of their homes find it really challenging to go for community contact in slums.”

(Interview, Bodh-GoR Liaison officer & Bodh employee (BE), 2008)

The question arises why they chose such schools in the first place which do not need a CSF. The schools were in fact picked up from the lists of schools which Bodh had, since its involvement in the Janshala project. The conditions of the localities and schools in terms of population kept changing at some places due to migrant population as well as the city's development projects. Thus the actual assessment of the support required and the need felt by the schools could only take place after initial placement of CSFs.

Meanwhile the teacher-recruitment drive by the state government was on. Bodh's policy of not allowing their teachers to pursue a course while working at this job caused some teachers to leave the organisation to do a BEd course in anticipation of becoming eligible to apply for the government teacher recruitment examination. Some of the new staff could not cope with the challenge of working in schools in slums. The high rate of personnel attrition thus led to a paucity of teachers for the partnership programme. According to some Bodh staff, this was also one reason for changing the mode of intervention in government schools. High attrition rates due to a variety of reasons thus posed a big challenge for further programme implementation and future planning (CSF Coordinator, Bodh, 2009).

3.2.1 CSR Initiatives and New Challenges

During the course of my field work spanning around 18 months I met several people now employed in different organisations who had worked for several years in Bodh. Some cited pressure on Bodh's programme due to lack of funds as their reason for leaving the organisation. This was the time when the AKF funded Programme for the Enrichment of School Level Education (PESLE) was coming to an end. There were a few according to whom the new influx of corporate sector supported foundations and CSR initiatives have created opportunities for the grassroots level education development workers in terms of high pay packages. These were the people who had worked for a good period of time at Bodh and/or other credible NGOs such as Digantar and were aiming for development jobs as education managers in programmes owned by the corporate sector. As one of the development workers put it

“I would say that presence of corporate sector has done well to the image of education workers. Why should I be punished for my idealism to work in education sector in deprived localities? I think I deserve good salary which NGOs dependent on external funds cannot provide.” (Interview, Ex-employee, Bodh, 2011)

Since the launch of REI several new organisations and foundations have come up which are the CSR wings of businesses. Such organisations definitely have a continuous source of funding and ambition to scale up their programmes. However, they require a

workforce — people who have exposure to the field realities and who have been trained into addressing hitherto underserved population. Organisations such as Bodh and Digantar which started with the spirit to deliver quality education to the poor and a vision of social justice might end up being the launching pad for careers in the education development sector in the long run. In the past, the end of a project and lack of funds created a high NGO workforce turnover. The employees of such organisations used to be on the look out for similar opportunities in organisations with similar focus and programmes.

Post REI, the situation seems to have changed where decisions to leave an organisation might not necessarily be a matter of a continued employment opportunity rather an ambition of earning higher pay package and a raise in social image and self esteem-going global from local. In the emerging scenario, it seems, the major corporate social responsibility initiatives with ambition to work on scale might siphon off the staff trained by NGOs. The staff attrition will remain a big issue in NGOs. Thus in larger systemic terms there emerge conflicts of interest. There is competition for quality manpower amongst NGOs which depend on other funding sources and NGOs which are CSR arms of businesses. This is yet another example of corporate raiding of resources. We do not know enough at the moment due to insufficient research evidence to say to what extent these education NGO trained personnel will impact on the CSR initiatives they join or will the ‘profit making’ but ‘philanthropic giving’ culture engulf the vision for social justice and ‘idealism’ as mentioned by the NGO worker-turned corporate manager in the above statement.


4. Stakeholder

This section discusses the relation between the Janbodh programme with the schools, teachers and communities. How Bodh’s programme functionaries including their teachers were able to impact on the work culture of the government school teachers and functionaries is also discussed in this section.

4.1 Schools and Community

Community based school governance is one of Bodh's major focus in all educational interventions and initiatives. In their Urban Education Programme Bodh works not only with the institutionalised governance structures in the government schools in slum localities but has also worked with different stake holders within the communities.

Fig 8.1 The Community in Urban Slums -- Who Influences?



Note: The size of each ellipse represents the relative power of these groups for organising access to schooling within the locality. The size i.e., the relative power may vary according to the development history of the locality and level of political participation and voice of the parents in the local demography.

These stakeholders can be understood as different interest groups but can be broadly categorised into three groups in the context of their relative influence on activities in their respective slum locality and further at the level of organising physical access to school. These are represented in the Fig 8.1.

The first group is the one that has been the foundation of the slum. These include the Founder of the slum who could be some influential local leader, other politically active persons, comparatively well off people in the locality and these might include early

residents of the slum and those who are influential in the community including local philanthropists. These people have a major impact on developing the locality as a political constituency and also control the development politics of the slums.

The second group of people might be relatively influential and this is important in terms of those slums having a single religious identity. These religious leaders can influence community based decisions through culturally and religiously institutionalised structures such as place of worship. These may be or may not be part of the first group.

The third group is that of parents. This group consists of slum residents who arrived in the city as migrants in search of employment opportunities. These people, who live in the newly set up slums, might have children who have had previous experience of schooling back in their villages or in their previous slum localities. Some of these might be already disillusioned of the prospects of schooling while others will be looking for better educational access. In case of slums which had graduated to the status of regularised colonies the children were attending private schools – a number of these set up as small ventures.⁹⁵

The religious leaders in these localities could be parents of the children studying in schools but not necessarily so. In many localities the schools were established with the support of the religious leader or clergymen, utilising space available at the place of worship. The children of the local religious leader attended Bodh's school in one of its minority community constituencies.

However many government teachers are not open to the idea (and associated complexities) of involving various community groups in school-related affairs. They have quite often contributed unwittingly to the negative experience of the communities with the government schools in some slums.

⁹⁵ According to the survey conducted by Bodh in 2007 in 100 slum localities of Jaipur city, around 65% of the children attending school were enrolled in private schools.

“This is a big community. What have we got to do with whole community? Bodh people want to contact community for politics. They have only one motive- to defame the government teacher. What can community do? Why should we invite them to interfere in school? Community also creates problems. I ask, How? He says, “Aaj subah hee kisi ne school ke samney Murga halal ker dia.” (Someone slaughtered a chicken outside the school) There was blood all over. When I came here the first thing I did in the morning is to wash it all. You can still find some blood splattered on the walls... If Bodh people were here, what would have they done? They would have gone to the community, called a few people and discussed if such thing should happen here or not. And that community should take care of school etc.... In all this exercise, half day would have gone wasted without any solution. What can you expect of such a dirty, useless community?” (Interview, Government teacher, school B, 2010)

The personnel at Bodh, through experience, have developed a reflexive understanding regarding the importance of working across these groups. They believe that this has benefits vis-à-vis schooling facilities and community-based school governance in the slum localities. However, this particular teacher of the above example was the only government teacher placed on deputation in this primary school with five grades and an enrolment of 148 children out of which 73 children were enrolled in grade 1. That the teacher did not see role of the community in school governance is only one part of the problem afflicting the school. A single teacher school with high primary grade enrolments is a systemic issue which could not have been addressed by REI due to its limited administrative powers (for example, to place or recruit new teachers) and required more specific local solutions.

Acknowledging teachers as well as communities amongst stakeholders and involving all stakeholders in decision making is important for ensuring quality of education in a developing country context (Stephens, 1991). Keeping the local context in mind is important considering the fact that most of these slum localities do not figure in the development plans of the government.⁹⁶ In terms of developing an education plan for the city this was the scenario at least till the end of the last decade (Interviews with Bodh

⁹⁶ Discussed in the article titled ‘Data needs for achieving UEE in urban areas: focus on disadvantaged groups’ by Sunita Chugh.
http://www.dise.in/Downloads/Use%20of%20Dise%20Data/Sunita%20Chugh_UEE%20urban.pdf. (Last accessed on February 06, 2012)

education plan development team, March 2009⁹⁷). Provision of schooling facilities would mean legitimising the localities illegally set up after encroachment of government land. Moreover, since the land belonged to different departments e.g. Forest Department, Jaipur Development Authority and JMC, many times a slum was located on portions of lands belonging to more than one department and there was no single responsible body to provide for the facilities. Thus the institutional frameworks and diversity of decision makers and stakeholders were bottlenecks which the Janbodh partnership had to deal with since its onset. What strategy did Janbodh develop and what role did REI play? In the following passages I will discuss, how this was done.

4.1.1 Enabling Construction of School Buildings for the Government Schools

The Janbodh partnership worked within the SSA framework. In 2005, Bodh submitted the proposal to SSA for construction of 82 school buildings for Rajakiya Janshalas⁹⁸ in slum localities. Though the partnership MoU does not mention construction of school building as Bodh's responsibility to achieve equitable quality elementary education for deprived children, the detailed Janbodh proposal does discuss the essentiality of non-negotiable educational facilities in terms of a school building with basic facilities and provision of teachers.

The Janbodh team studied the available alternatives and the plausible options to address the systemic deadlocks and came up with the strategy of constructing 'Temporary Structures', in response to the legal concerns regarding construction of structures on the

⁹⁷ In March 2009, I volunteered to work for a week with the planning team organised by Bodh to prepare for the state government the million plus city development plan in education sector for Jaipur city.

⁹⁸ Bodh had identified a list of 82 schools without building. These schools had come up during the Janshala programme (Janbodh, 2009). Janshala- a UN project in Rajasthan to raise community schools in collaboration with 5 local NGOs. The project came to end in year 2003-04, when these schools were merged with the government system along with withdrawal of NGOs from the project. In a post Janshala study after a gap of almost 2 years conducted by Bodh Shiksha Samiti, it was found that out of the 107 Samudayik Janshalas converted into Rajkiya Samudayik Janshalas (government-community schools) 89 were functional. Rest of the schools closed down or became defunct due to wither of the collaboration between government and community.

unauthorised land. Bodh was able to convince and reach an understanding with various stakeholders including community and government departments that the structures will ‘move as the community moves/rehabilitated’ and that these buildings will be ‘Quality Economic Structures’, not compromising on the safety, appropriateness and durability concerns (Janbodh, 2009). An important role in this achievement was played by a proactive government official.

“ ... this was peculiar situation where one hand the government had adopted community schools as government schools but could not provide buildings ... Bodh succeeded in bringing together all the concerned departments under one umbrella and the divisional headquarter commissioner issued permission for the construction of school buildings. This was a milestone since nothing like this had ever happened before. This paved the way for ensuring schooling facilities for unserved localities. An important step towards fulfilling UEE mandate” (Bodh CSF-coordinator, 2009)

The construction of school buildings as the coordinator said is an important step towards UEE mandate. This also ameliorated the work conditions for the government school teachers who were sent to hold the fort at these schools (Interviews, Government teachers, 2009). Bodh constructed fifteen buildings and thirteen buildings were constructed by the government department. However we must not forget that this was the period when the educational scenario in India was undergoing a major change following the Right to Education Bill and the RTE⁹⁹ act which soon followed. Subtly though Bodh emerges as a powerful mediator amongst various stakeholders and an enabler for the government department in taking important steps towards their responsibility.

The community stakeholders, as discussed above, have control and influence over land resources in their locality and decide the usage pattern of the available land especially if some of them have economic interest in the available piece of land. It was interesting to find out that even in these illegally organised slum localities there were portions of land which the community had agreed for as common land or the land for common usage for the community.

⁹⁹ The Director of Bodh – Yogendra Bhushan is the RTE representative for the government of Rajasthan and also convenor for the Consortium on Right to Education for Rajasthan.

Bodh's CSFs with the support of the government school teachers fostered communities to agree over a piece of undisputed land for building up temporary structure for school in their respective localities. The agreement document is a simple proposal document written in the style of a non-judicial agreement between community members. The document is titled '*Rajakiya Vidyalaya ke liye asthayee dhaanchey hetu bhoomi chinhit ka prastaav*' (Proposal for identified land for the construction of temporary building for government school) See Box 8.1.

Box 8.1 Proposal Outline

Proposal for identified land for the construction of temporary building for government school

1. the name of the the *Basti* (slum locality),
2. number of children enrolled in the government school,
3. description of problem of school due to open space,
4. reference to the proposal for construction of school in general meetings of locality,
5. collective agreement statement of the community members and the school development and management committee regarding the undisputed piece of land identified for the construction of temporary structures;
6. a declaration that the community will contribute money and labour to the construction of these structures.

Note: The agreement documents were usually signed by more than 10-15 community members. In one of the documents the municipal councillor of the ward, in which the government school building was to be constructed had also signed the proposal cum agreement for the school.

The communities have contributed approximately 1,21,433 INR (approx 2698 USD*) towards the construction of buildings started by Bodh (Janbodh 2009). Three municipal councillors elected from these localities promised contribution towards construction of building in their wards in 2007. However only one of the councillors contributed 2,00,000 INR (approx 4444 USD) for two schools in his constituency.

(Janbodh, 2007; Interviews, 2009)

*Exchange rate: 1 USD = 45 INR

Bodh had 4 CSF coordinators appointed full time for the construction of school buildings. The teachers working in Bodh's Resource schools worked closely with the communities and took part in managing or supervising the construction of school buildings.

Several of these Bodh Resource school teachers were also roped in to support the programme in its initial phase. The government teachers who were appointed in these building-less schools also joined in the initiative supporting Bodh's team. The team faced issues such as conflict of interests with the communities and constraint of space for construction of a building (see Box. 8.2).

Box 8.2 Community in Support of Proposed School

In one of the densely populated slum localities where there was no common vacant land to construct a school building for the government school Bodh CSFs convinced the local councillor to allow the government school to run in the premises of the Community Centre. This move upset some community members. At the same time some members of the community came out in support of the school. The locality is so densely populated that there is no space for construction of a school building.

In this basti, the parshad (Councillor) and community were on same platform. Some people did not want the government school. Land is expensive. They thought we could have Masjid (Mosque), shops and Madarsa but majority community opposed and said we want government school in interest of our children and girls. Earlier when SSA officials had visited for the construction of school building the Parshad has told head-mistress (HM)- 'Hamarey jatigat kaam mein interfere na karein' (do not interfere in our religious community work). You can see this documented in community meeting register. But with our constant contact and advocacy we found out solution to this politics. (CSF coordinator, Bodh, 2009)

4.2 Selective Replication of Organisational Programmes?

Bodh has a pre-school programme in Bodhshalas. The women of the community called 'Mother Teachers' are trained through a designed training programme with regular trainings throughout the year and monthly review and planning workshops to work along with the pre-school teachers. These Mother-teachers have been influential in ensuring children's access and retention in the schools.

The REI MoU of Janbodh does discuss the setting up of pre schools but does not mention the number of pre-schools to be set up. Bodh started with 10 preschools in the government schools as part of Janbodh with a committed funding support from ITC Ltd. However the component of provision of and training of mother teachers which is elemental

to the preschools in Bodhshalas has been missing in the government school intervention. Due to limited funding and contact with new communities it might never be possible for Bodh to replicate their own pre-school programme in the mainstream government schools

The learning resources, the pedagogic inputs by the teachers, the selection and training of teachers and their academic support was all part of Bodh's work. There is no specific role and contribution of REI or any of its core partners. They have in no way influenced either the programme resources or the programme characteristics. In fact REI or for that matter WEF, GeSCI and CII have no expertise in designing programmes for out of school children and pre-school children in slum localities. They also lack expertise in working with communities in underserved localities.

4.3 Community School Facilitators

The task of pedagogic support to the schools was parallel to the task of mobilising communities for the construction of the school buildings. This involved training of Bodh's teachers as CSFs and child centred teaching-learning. The teaching learning materials required for this aspect were developed and provided by Bodh for the government schools. The CSF's appointed to the school had multiple responsibilities i.e., survey of the locality for identifying un-enrolled/out of school children, mobilising enrolment of children in the school and supporting the government teacher in academic activities. Most of the time the CSF-teachers worked with grade 1 and 2 in the school while the government teacher in grade 3, 4 and 5. One of the CSF-teachers, who had 62 children in grade 1 and 2 said,

"The number of children in grade 1 and 2 is over whelming for the government teacher. They usually write some alphabets and counting on the blackboard and leave up to the children to copy in their notebooks/slates. Children in grade 1 and 2 need more attention. The government teacher in my school is very supportive but she is not willing to take up responsibility of grade 1 and 2. She says I do it better but then what will happen when the programme moves. When I am or someone else from Bodh is not there, who will see these children. It will be like going back to where we started." (Interview, CSF-teacher, 2009)

The concern of the Bodh employee is worth paying attention because partner organisations through their workforce can demonstrate how things can be done in a

different way and show success of efforts. However such changes are not sustainable in the long run because of timed interventions and ad hoc workforce. The work is not only overwhelming for the government school teachers but for some of the Bodh-teachers as well.

In the third year of the programme the CSF coordinators were appointed to work as school teachers in a school of their cluster. The CSF coordinators were earlier Bodh teachers working with the organisation since 1999 or even earlier. These teachers had experience of working with the communities in Bodh's resource schools and were therefore appointed as CSF-coordinators for Janbodh. During of the meetings of the clusters one former coordinator was very upset about the non performance of children , "I do not know where I have gone wrong. I do everything I can but something is not working in my school. If you think I am not capable, give me some work other than teaching." He was visibly very upset and uncomfortable with his current responsibility. One of his colleagues later on confided,

The teaching job is not easy. If the organisation deputies him to some other managerial task, he will be very happy again. He is upset now because he has to teach."(Interview, Teacher, Bodh, 2009)

The NGO-staff who are able to negotiate the politics within different community interest groups in a locality (for the provision of land and schooling facilities) might not necessarily be good at direct teaching learning work with children. These are two different specialised skills and while some people might be comfortable with both, others find it difficult. A systemic intervention therefore cannot be left to a workforce supplied by the partners.

Furthermore, the teachers often have their preferences between work with community and academic work with children. Daily Community contact, for example, is part of the profile of the teachers in all Bodh schools and for CSF in the government schools.

"The role of CSF coordinator has now changed from community coordinator to that of a teacher researcher. Assumption was that facilitator will take up this role but this could not happen. Lack of monitoring was an issue. This work requires academic

work of 7 hrs, understanding and perspective of work and willingness to put effort. To give an example- every school had 8-10 people from community but in the absence of monitoring we lost that group. It takes time to build relationships. We strived for two years to build relationship of community with Bodh. More work was required for developing school (headmaster) and community relation. This requires skill, perspective and confidence for community based schooling. Some facilitators are limited to classroom most of the time. They do not give an hour daily for community sampark (contact). School map has been given to facilitators. They now know position of basti. They couldn't start ungraded learning groups. Why? When asked they sent list of children without getting their consent. So when it came to establishing learning centre it could not happen. They remained limited to teaching class I and II in school rather than understanding that their role is to influence the school and community.
(Interview, CSF coordinator, 2009)

Lack of monitoring and limitation of skills and perspectives were identified by the coordinators as aspects affecting partnership work in the government schools. Besides, there were school specific challenges. The CSFs worked with the government teachers in the school sharing the responsibility of academic work in the school and developed daily work plan. However due to large numbers of children enrolled in these schools and most of the schools being single teacher schools, the scope of discussions between the government teacher and the CSF was very lean.

At the same time the government teachers criticised Bodh's way of doing things. They showed little or no interest in developing the academic plan with the CSF. Because of government teachers' differentiating 'our' and 'their' responsibilities and the way of doing things, the partnership at the academic level was limited (Interviews, Government teachers, 2009; 2010).

The CSF's work was supported and supervised by Bodh functionaries and their trainings and reviews were done by Bodh whilst the government teachers were to be supported by the Cluster resource centre facilitators (CRCFs) of the DPEP's office. Evidently there were two parallel structures for academic support and supervision of the government school teachers and CSFs working in the same government school.

4.4 Government Teachers and Functionaries

4.4.1 *Sharing Data and Work with Government Functionaries to Develop Educational Plans*

The identification of out of school children and unserved/underserved localities in Jaipur city was one of the tasks and responsibilities mentioned in the MoU with GoR. Bodh developed GIS maps of Jaipur city alongside the survey of 100 slum localities conducted by Bodh staff (Janbodh, 2007). The survey conducted by Bodh staff in 2007 involved the government officials in the verification and monitoring exercise of the survey.

This joint exercise is a step in right direction that in time when government agencies and non government organizations in the field of education come up with contradictory, non-consensual figures regarding educationally deprived children. (Janbodh, 2009)

However the report does not mention the figures of out of school children. Even in the PSC meeting where this report was being presented, the Assistant district project coordinator (ADPC) presented figures on out of school children which was one-fifth of the figures discussed with me by Bodh staff prior to the meeting.

The status of state provision of educational facilities along with need assessment of the requirement of more schools was presented as spatial data in the form of attributes of the points on the map. In another version of the maps which Bodh developed, the GIS and MIS information collected by the organization was brought together. The population of localities (*bastis*) alongside data of out of school children in each locality was mapped. Thus the information on *bastis* with government school and without government school are presented on the map.

This information was shared in a series of meetings cum workshops with the cluster and block resource coordinators of the SSA along with the other government officials at the district level. The argument presented by Bodh was as follows:

“... There is a huge task for us. With the right to education soon to become an act we need to think how we are going to deliver our responsibility. There is now an emergent need to understand the situation of the provision of school facilities for school. We are out in the field but do we know the nature of our work? Before

planning we need to understand the demands of our work. Who are we planning for? Which are the children we want to enrol and where are they?"
(Bodh Director, Janbodh/SSA planning workshop, 2009)

These maps along with the information of out of school children were shared in workshops of CRCFs and Block Resource Centre Facilitators (BRCFs) along with Bodh's staff in a planning meetings presided over by the DEO. Bodh shared the lists of out of school children as outcome of survey in 2007 with the CRCFs so that they can confirm the lists in their school area (Meeting observation, February 2009). The interjections by CRCFs initially focussed on pointing out faults and trying to prove that the lists were not authentic. They had simply ignored the issue that in two years children could have moved. When the programme staff shared that the purpose of the workshop was to handover the maps along with lists to CRCs for updating then CRCFs began to complain of the excessive workload.

"... get orders issued from the education department to appoint one person from your organisation for the survey and mention in the note that CRCF will supervise the survey done by Bodh staff." (Interview, CRCF, 2009)

Despite their technical expertise in mapping the educational provisions and identification of specific educational needs of a locality, the NGO teachers and personnel were hardly viewed as partners by the teachers and officials in the government system. The terms community mobilisation and role of NGOs in community mobilisation are prevalent in the rhetoric regarding involving communities with the school in policy documents as well as by the government officials, without assimilating what it entails. I asked the DD of Education (urban slums) about what needs to be done for the education of largely deprived children in urban slums. He responded

"I do not know what we can do. It is so difficult. These people are so ignorant of the value of education. I can only think of one solution that all children should be put in a hostel where they are not affected by migration of their parents in search of labour. If the government can take this action, only then anything can happen. Otherwise I do not see any other solution." (Interview, Deputy Director Education, 2009)

Why would ignorant people (as in the words of the government officer), migrants to a new city contribute towards building government school? The apathy of some of the

government officials might itself be a stumbling block in exploring pathways towards innovative solutions and interpretations of policy intentions in favour of the poor.

“The community and strategy to work with communities is very different from Rural to Urban scenario. First we also need to understand the nature of community in urban slums. We cannot work with the same strategy in urban slums as we do in rural areas.” (Interview, Bodh staff, 2008)

Bodh has demonstrated that to deliver rights to the urban poor and make provision for the educational facilities a multi-pronged approach with continuous critical reflection and revision of work is an important stride.

4.4.2 Affecting Work Culture at School and Training of the Government Teachers

The government teachers considered the innovative teaching learning methodologies practiced by CSFs, an alien style of work. Many government teachers considered CSFs as an assistant or additional support staff to relieve them of their burden. The lack of academic dialogue between the CSF and government teacher was apparent. This is notwithstanding the fact that several government teachers were inclined to try out the teaching-learning methods practiced by CSFs. However, they were also sceptical about the long term benefits of Bodh's interventions. They argued that organisations external to the public system are not there forever.

In 2010 when the GoR implemented the Continuous Comprehensive Evaluation (CCE) in the government schools in Jaipur city on a pilot project basis, Bodh was the resource support agency for CCE conducting trainings for the participating government schools. Twenty five government schools covered through Janbodh programme were in the CCE pilot. I visited two of the schools in August 2010 when the government teachers in these schools had recently completed a 10 day orientation workshop on CCE conducted by Bodh. The teachers were however anxious about using CCE in their classrooms as this was going to be an added responsibility along with the recent Right to Education Act. The demands put by the government policy and administration seemed to have made teachers more open to support from an external agency which was already using similar comprehensive evaluation of learning in their own schools. This means that the quality

work of the NGO partner can affect change and support the government schools when based on their own experience they have the capacity to address relevant changes in the policy and /or curriculum.

5. Governance

The programme steering committee (PSC) for the Janbodh programme had the members/representatives of several funding organisations. The MoU outlined the constitution of the PSC and its role as:

A Programme Steering Committee will be set up under the chairmanship of Secretary Education, GoR. It shall consist of members from GoR, Bodh, all organisations funding this programme and community representatives, one each from SDMC¹⁰⁰s, PTA¹⁰¹s and MTA¹⁰²s to be nominated by DPC¹⁰³ Jaipur in consultation with Bodh. This committee will review progress of the Programme on a 6-monthly basis. Bodh and GoR will submit six-monthly progress reports to this committee covering activities undertaken in the reporting period, progress made during the period, recommendations for future to the GoR and Bodh for proposing activities for the next 6 months. (Janbodh, 2005, p.5, para1)

The representatives from European Commission, Aga Khan Foundation (AKF),¹⁰⁴ American India Foundation (AIF), Paul Hamlyn Foundation (PHF), and Banyan Tree Foundation (BTF) were members of the PSC. These organisations were funding components of Bodh's various programmes at the time of signing of Janbodh partnership in 2005. The PSC meetings were held every six months where Bodh presented reports of previous months and presented work plans for the following months. The members of the funding organisations also attended these PSCs. However in March 2009 only one such member was present.

¹⁰⁰ SDMC: School development and management committee

¹⁰¹ PTA: Parent teacher association

¹⁰² Mother teacher association

¹⁰³ District Project Coordinator

¹⁰⁴ Bodh was one of the five organisations participating in Agha Khan Foundation-AKF's Programme for the Enrichment of School Level Education (PESLE, 1999-2007).

Bodh had aimed for work not only with the government schools but also to make important interventions at the Block and District level offices (AKF, 2007). This included involving the government officials and block education officers and CRCFs in collective review meetings and workshops. In 2009, Bodh organised a surprise visit of DD (urban slums) to the government schools in slum localities. On an average about 43 percent of government teachers were found absent from the schools. Later in a review and work plan development meetings organised at Bodh's office presided over by DD urban slums, Bodh's Director praised the action taken by the officer in preparing the report and submitting to the SSA office. During the same meeting the CRCFs were however anxious to ask the DD (Urban Slums) to exempt the government schools participating in the radio¹⁰⁵ programme from participation in other REI programmes.

The absence of government teachers from the school could limit the benefit which the government school system can gain from the support of the NGO partner. Most of the REI interventions were seen as extra work on the school not only by the teachers but also by CRCFs. Most of the government teachers interviewed during my field work critiqued REI and said that REI partnerships are not designed to address real issues nor can they bring any benefit to the schools due to a lack of curricular integration and absence of institutional linkages. REI as a PPP design aiming to have a state wide impact failed to present a consolidated model of school based interventions mainly due to a lack of participation of several government functionaries as well as direct involvement of its core-partners.

6. Conclusion

This chapter presented the case of Janbodh, a programme for the UEE in Jaipur city. Though the signatory NGO – Bodh, describes the programme as a multi-partite partnership, the MoU was signed between the GoR and Bodh only. Other REI core partners did not contribute to Janbodh either through financial resources or any other expertise.

¹⁰⁵ A UNICEF and USAID supported partnership programme under REI, focusing on English language lessons broadcasted on Radio.

The organisation could demonstrate its strength of networking with communities, local interest groups and government officials from the related departments. It could show how this kind of deliberation can work in building schools. There is thus a proven importance of such networks in arriving at collective solutions. However, it must be noted that the power of favourable decision making which Bodh mobilised was vested only in the government officials. No external agency or alliance such as WEF has influenced or supported this institutionalised form of power.

Bodh's experience indicates that even with a previous experience of successful work with communities the networks tend to disappear if they are not used constantly and creatively. Considering REI timelines, scale, lack of resources and limits of workforce available to the NGO partner, this kind of MSP is neither sustainable nor a scalable model.

This case study also reflects the fact that an NGO partner with the right experience can have an impact and support government schools especially during the period of new policy implementation and/or curriculum changes or the launch of planned systemic interventions. The implementation of CCE for example was an important juncture where the government teachers needed added academic support. However, the organisation could take the responsibility for implementation only up to a certain extent. Limited availability of funds and human resource bottlenecks affected the plans for long term and sustained implementation of this REI partnership. In any case, within a welfare state the ultimate responsibility for the delivery of rights has to be shouldered by the government (Lewin and Little, 2011).

In terms of understanding REI, it seems plausible to question the role of WEF or any other international expertise and resource that was promised by GEI and REI. The REI and the UEE partnership therein were again very local and region specific and therefore any claims made by WEF towards resource support to REI are apparently not true. The resources mobilised were also local since Bodh used its own programme funds and SSA contributed its budgetary funds in the joint programmes.

Chapter 9

Cross Case Analysis


1. Introduction

This chapter presents a cross case analysis of the partnership case studies discussed in the previous four chapters. The eight partnerships studied in this thesis among themselves cover: school management with long term adoption plan and short term resource support adoption model, ICT content for out of school children creating informal learning space but without learning objectives, learning software for school children and IT skills training for young people with secondary school qualification, training of teachers in one district and UEE in Jaipur city. The aim of this chapter is to arrive at an interpretation of the ‘quintain’ (Stake, 2006, p.4) i.e., REI as MSP through cross case analysis of the eight partnerships and to relate this to the original research questions that are linked to the case studies.

The REI was floated as an MSP model and promoted as one of the global-education-initiatives (GEIs) of the WEF (see Fig 4.5 chapter 4). The key concepts about partnerships and MSPs identified in the literature review are used to help interpret findings with respect to the research questions (Fig. 9.1 and 9.2). The case study framework of DSG is used to structure the discussion across the cases. Since the partnerships under REI did not have homogeneity in terms of the nature of interventions, only limited comparisons between the organisations and partnerships can be made. All the cases have been brought together in this chapter to also look for patterns, understand REI as an MSP and generate insights for further study of MSPs.

Stake (2006) presents the method of undertaking multiple-case analysis in the following manner. First he says that the individual cases can be written by an individual researcher or team of researchers. Secondly for the purpose of the multiple-case analysis he advises that a person who has not been involved in the case study should do the multiple-case analysis. In this manner the biases in individual case study do not creep into the multiple-case analysis and it brings more objectivity to the final report. However, this


poses a limitation that those involved in writing of the individual case report do not get the overall picture of the multiple cases. Stake further advises the multiple-case analyst to write a summary of each case in individual case report sheets in her own words. Then she develops the themes.



In this research the cases were all developed by the researcher, who also undertook the synthesis. Biases in individual case studies have been avoided to the maximum extent possible by cross checking and triangulating data from documents, interviews and observations and also feeding back accounts of events to different stakeholders to validate the perspectives that emerged. These stakeholders included teachers, parents, children,

government officials and people working in the partner organisations. In instances when I had visited the programme in action before interviewing the official from the partner organisation, the feedback was obvious and necessary to refer to the field observations for a meaningful conversation. In addition, during the writing stages of the case studies, the discussions with my supervisors were helpful in minimising personal biases.

Fig. 9.2 Conceptual Framework for Cross Case Analysis (CCA)



The fig. 9.2 depicts the conceptual framework for cross-case analysis. The concepts – causal power and susceptibilities – which affect activation of causal power and are also affected by structures and causal powers of other objects are layered over the DSG framework to understand partnerships. The literature review in Chapter 2 shows that purpose (including motivation and focus), stakeholder ownership, risk sharing, decision making, formalisation, value of partnerships, resources (including skills and costs) and exit routes are important aspects of partnerships. In the following sections I discuss the commonalities and differences in DSG of the cases (Section 2) and the causal powers and susceptibilities of the partnerships (Section 3). Section 4 discusses the inputs and outcomes

of the REI partnerships. The concluding section (Section 5) of this chapter attempts to answer the questions: i) Whether the partnerships in REI were MSPs and if REI was an MSP? ii) To what extent the partnerships in REI were suited for the purpose of achieving either the SSA goals or the promise of developing a global economy as envisaged in the REI vision document.


2. Commonalities and Differences

2.1 Design

The REI partnerships had no homogeneity and varied in terms of their size, scale, scope and timelines. The partnership designs were quite unrealistic in terms of being able to fulfil REIs ambitions for State level transformations of access and quality since they were all relatively small and localised in realisation. The Fig. 9.3 shows the size and levels of organisations involved in the partnership programmes in REI studied in this case study.

Only two partnerships out of the eight had an international organisation partner with the GoR. Of these, Cisco's (Appendix 9.6) IT essentials course for DCECs was a single party partnership with the government and the Kidsmart project partnership had IBM partnership with a regional NGO Pratham (Appendix 9.5). Thus it was a mixed type of partnership. I devised a three level scale with point 1 for local/regional organisation partnership, point 2 for a mixed organisation partnership and 3 for a global/international player partnership. Thus, six out of these eight partnerships were local regional partnerships. HiWel (Appendix 9.4) partnership needs to be discussed as a special case because it had mentioned that it will receive support from MSDF. However, technically it does not qualify for a mixed partnership because MSDF was among the signatories to the MoU with GoR. So we can safely conclude for our eight programmes that REI partnerships were largely local. Even where there were international partners their engagement was often largely symbolic and restricted to limited resource provision. No sustained technical support for the projects was given or skilled staff seconded.

Fig. 9.3 Understanding REI as MSP



Source: Based on an analysis of REI partnerships discussed in Chapters 5, 6, 7 and 8

For the programme time lines I use a 3 level scale. The programmes ranging from 1 – 3 years are considered short term, the programmes planned for 3 – 5 years are medium term and the programme for more than the 5 years are long term. Considering that the REI was planned to be in operation up to 2010, it was not suited for long term programme interventions. GEI's recent insight report considers that REI ended in 2008. It is not clear on what basis the GEI/WEF decided that their association with REI should end in 2008. Was it because of the time for legislative assembly and later parliament elections in the state which led to the change in political leadership? Or was it a well thought out exit plan on part of the core partners? GeSCI published a report on behalf of the core partners which informs us about the successes and failures of the programme (GeSCI, 2009). This report came out in 2009 but in 2007 April, GeSCI was still preparing LFA for REI and was seeking partners' response to undertake a baseline study (retrieved from a 2007 email

communication). So what was the status of this report in 2009? Was it a baseline or mid term review? Short term programmes are unlikely to achieve the tall goals which REI had set for itself because the problems of the region have been long standing and require long term, planned concerted efforts. The programmes were clearly not long enough to make an impact. The only long term partnership was the school adoption by BF. However, the review report on REI argues that the focus on partnerships to adopt schools was because of absence of dedicated budget and strategic plan for REI (GeSCI, *ibid.* p.16).

The size of interventions is analysed using three categories – small, moderate and large. Programmes covering up to 50 schools in one district are categorised as small and depicted by score of 1, the programmes with coverage of 50 – 100 schools in one district are represented with a score of two and considered moderate sized and the programmes covering at least one whole district are categorised as large with a score of 3. On this basis, the QEP-Baran (Appendix 9.7) and the UEE-Janbodh (Appendix 9.8) for Jaipur city emerge as moderate sized partnerships and rest of the 6 programmes emerge as small partnerships.

2.2 Stakeholder

Ideally MSPs would have the government, local and international businesses, civil society organisations, communities and parents and children working for a common goal. So firstly an MSP has to be multi-partite. But do the partnerships in REI qualify to this ideal type? If we look at the individual programmes then only three of the eight partnerships are multi-partite partnerships. CII partnership (Appendix 9.2) is also a misnomer since CII was simply the tag under which the partnership was signed by two SMEs and two trusts. As the names of the 4 organisations indicate they belong to the same family. Hence, technically as Trusts and SMEs coming together they do appear to be multipartite partnership constitutive of 4 partners. However, the absence of educational expertise and the lack of involvement of communities in the CII partnership design indicate that though multi-partite, the CII partnership is not a MSP. The QEP-Baran partnership whereby three partners namely ICICI Bank, Vidya Bhawan Society and Digantar formed a

partnership with the government could seem to qualify as an MSP. However, it does not since this partnership lacked international resource support and international organisation involvement and no external academic expertise (though VBS and Digantar both are organisations with long standing academic resource expertise and are both non-governments, non-profit organisations). Thus this partnership though multi-partite cannot be categorised as MSP. The third partnership which is multi-partite and which we bring under examination is the Kismart project which brings IBM and Pratham together. This partnership brings content, and international business partners and a local organisation into partnership with the government. However, they do not bring any international NGO and external academic expertise to the table. So this partnership is again not an MSP. The HiWel partnership could have qualified in the category of MSP had MSDF, Pratham, HiWel's sponsors (World Bank and IFC) and Sugata Mitra himself been signatories to the MoU with the government. However, only HiWel signed the MoU with the government and JMC. To reiterate, the reality of a partnership can be judged against the following key elements: purpose (including motivation and focus), stakeholder ownership, risk sharing, decision making, formalisation, value of partnerships, resources (including skills and costs) and exit routes.

2.3 Governance

The cases also reveal that the MoUs did not include any future plans for the projects after REI had run its course. Whether the responsibility and reporting will automatically move to SSA or the department of education – is not mentioned in any of the MoUs. The short term CSR projects in REI without accountability towards stakeholders and without evaluation mechanisms could be presented as first hand examples of this phenomenon of MSPs without responsibility and accountability focus. Across all the partnerships there was not evidence either of planned “exit routes” which would allow interventions to start and finish in an orderly way. Nor was there evidence of a concern for sustainability for those interventions that met a recurring need.

On a case to case basis, individually the partnerships fall short of being considered MSPs. It can very well be argued that the characteristics of the whole are different from its

constituent parts or that the characteristics of the part do not determine the whole. In such a situation even if the partnerships under REI are not MSPs, REI still could itself be an MSP. However, the inactive programme steering committee is a reflection of the fact that the partners never met for developing a common plan. In the initial years of REI, the REI update meetings which were organised, were attended by WEF and other partners. However the partners denied gaining any benefit out of these meetings towards partnership strengthening.¹⁰⁶ The three core partners of REI – CII, WEF and GeSCI were representative alliances of local businesses, global private sector and international organisations respectively. The presence of these along with the programme partners of individual partnerships qualifies REI as MSP to a certain extent. However external academic expertise as a component of support to the REI is largely missing. Besides, there is a lack of involvement of teachers and non-commitment of resources by the private sector. In sum one can say that REI is a multi-partite PPP programme with a few shortcomings.

2.4 Common Themes Across Cases

2.4.1 *State Enabled, Invited Space for Action and Policy Frames (D)*¹⁰⁷

The first common aspect across the cases is actually provided by the general context of this research i.e., all the partnership programmes are being implemented in a state enabled, invited space of action defined by the REI. Though REI like other GEI initiatives was initiated at Cisco's behest it was taken up as a programme under SSA. The state if not the 'Principal' in the technical sense of the term acted as the agency which invited organisations across the spectrum to enter into partnerships. This was also aligned to the policy framework of the GoI and Rajasthan to encourage private participation in the education sector in general and SSA in particular. Thus the partnerships were framed in a pro-PPP national and international environment. However this framing of partnership is relevant only for starting the partnership. It does not ensure the progress of the partnership

¹⁰⁶ The NGO partners felt left out to the extent that one partner described the update meetings as a 'charade'.

¹⁰⁷ The bracketed alphabets – D, S and G indicate how some of the common themes across cases are linked to the Design, Stakeholder and Governance categories.

or the success of the partnership. The importance of a relevant policy framework and the programme's conceptualisation of linkages with the policy were evident in the relative progress in the participation of teachers in QEP (Chapter 7) and Janbodh (Chapter 8) following the RTE Act and Rajasthan government's decision to implement continuous and comprehensive evaluation in government schools.

2.4.2 Formalised Partnerships without Financial Management (G)

Another common aspect across these partnerships is their formalisation through a programme specific MoU. However, the extent of details regarding programmes and specific commitments differ. So there is an element of non-formalisation or open-endedness of commitments even in the formalised partnerships. This informality is obvious from the fact that the Programme Management Unit of the REI never received a financial report of the MoU based programmes from its partners. Some of the partnerships vanished from the scene without ever sharing even the programme progress report (IBM-Pratham's case in Chapter 6).

According to the REI vision document the Chief Minister of Rajasthan had promised resources at the time of the launch of the REI (GoR, n.d.a). At the same time there was an expectation within the government and certain promises by the CII that private sector will bring in resources. However, REI did not provide any resource support to the programmes. Some SSA funds for teacher-training were utilised in a limited way but overall no resource (academic or financial) unit was set up in REI. All the partnerships analysed in this research, except the HiWel-JMC partnership discussed in chapter 6, have commonalities in terms of a 'no money/fee paid' by the government to the implementer for delivery of the programmes. However MoUs such as UEE-Janbodh (Appendix 9.8) show the possibility of the government considering funding the pre-school centres and adolescent learning centres. So in general REI provides no resources of its own nor have the global and core partners brought in resources. Individual programmes under REI are resourced by partner organisations and the partnerships are susceptible to the whims and fancies of the organisation with financial strength in each case.

2.4.3 Fluid Accountability (G)

Similarly, mutual accountability between the partners emerges as fluid. In some of the programmes, the progress of the programme was stalled due to delay in decision making and implementation on part of the government department (for example, HiWel-JMC partnership), whilst in several other formalised partnerships, the partner organisations emerged as the decisive agency for the continuity in terms of the next phase or expansion in scope or scale (example, Janbodh) or responsible for no progress (BF's second MoU for adopting 200 schools: GoR-BF, 2008) of the programme at all. CII stopped funding the schools it had adopted after 2 years. The voluntary nature of the partnerships made them fluid in terms of mutual accountability. And the accountability was not between partners but between each partner and the Govt of Rajasthan. So mutuality was not across the REI partners and there was no real coordinating mechanism between partners.

Another difference arises from how the formalised partnerships define their legal framework (See appendix to Chapter 9). Three organisations out of the eight, discussed in the case study chapters, do not cite any legal framework in their respective MoUs. The QEP partnership MoU (Appendix 9.7) mentions the commitments of VBS, Digantar and ICICI bank as voluntary in nature and hence not open for contest in the courts of law. This leaves us with four organisations. BF which has adopted 49 schools and HiWel partnership both kept the jurisdiction exclusive to the legal courts in Rajasthan. However, both the partnerships do not mention the nature of the situation in which the intervention of the court could be sought. Similar is IBM-Pratham Kidsmart project partnership MoU which simply has a single sentence 'This agreement shall be governed by the Laws of India'. Cisco partnership (Appendix 9.6) on the other hand has the Limitation of liability whereby in case of intellectual property or proprietary rights 'either Party may seek interim injunctive relief in any court of appropriate jurisdiction' whilst in the Exhibit A – Non binding terms of the MoU it is clearly mentioned that 'this proposed business terms does not constitute nor create, and shall not be deemed to constitute nor create, any legally binding or enforceable obligation on the part of either party'. Thus the voluntary nature of the partnerships does not put either of the partners under any obligation.

2.4.4 '*Flocking*' (D)

The partners are networked because of being partners in REI but also because of their individual histories of collaborations and alliances amongst themselves, with the UN agencies and with the government. However, within the network and also in the design and implementation of the partnerships there is a significant element of 'Flocking'.

I describe flocking in two distinct ways. The first meaning is akin to the meaning of the term derived from biological sciences or as in mathematical modelling – the collective motion of self-propelled entities (in our case – the organisations) with similar values, behaviours, habitat. Flocking patterns can be formed differently for different purposes. There are advantages and also disadvantages of being a member of the flock. This does not require any centralised control. REI is thus an example of a mixed-species flock.

The second meaning of the term flock that I bring to bear in this discussion is the process of producing a texture by sticking small pieces together on to a surface. The purpose of the activity and the process is to produce a certain effect or texture to increase the appeal or perceived value of the substance. It could be merely aesthetic value or a certain object is made to look like something else of greater appeal or value. Also it is a process used to produce an effect to make the objects look more realistic. Thus the real value or worth is neither as it appears, nor does the object – as presented – have the same function and properties as the object it fakes. A common example of this could be Christmas decoration with cotton to mimic snow on a tree.

The partnerships such as CII, HiWel, IBM, and Cisco might appear as inputs from the industry to address education concerns in the region but in reality they fail to provide us evidence of value added. CII's MoU (Appendix 9.2) is an example of the partner's move for increased control of the Industry/businesses on schools/monitoring of schools, in addition to tax exemptions in return for the inputs given to the government schools

In case of HiWel, the learning outcomes are not defined and teachers are not involved, temporary workforce is used but their support is not acknowledged while discussing self-organising learning environment and computers are used as tools of rote learning. Again in case of IBM-Kidsmart, low qualified and temporary workforce is handling ICT pedagogies and the software content has issues and biases.

In the context of MSPs in REI, the projects such as CII, IBM-Kidsmart, Cisco are more in the nature of CSR window dressing. This is because their scale is small. The linkages with the main school curriculum weak and government teachers are not involved. Also some partnerships such as BF school adoption are a reflection of the ambitions of corporate backed foundations to scale up the programmes whilst ignoring a reflexive assessment of their capabilities and mandate. Out of the eight partnerships examined to understand the quintain, seven are CSR initiatives. One of these seven has timeframes extending beyond the timeline of REI itself (BF discussed in Chapter 5). Furthermore, in terms of WEF's claim of their role in bringing benefits to India on one hand, WEF backed REI's vision of enabling private sector in gaining markets and the lack of commitment of WEF and other core partners in ensuring resources for Rajasthan for the long term are all evidence that the REI model of MSP is an exemplar of flocking.

2.4.5 Power-centric Location (D)

Except the QEP Baran project, and Cisco's project which is located around 22 districts, all the other six programmes are in and around the capital city Jaipur. The capital city region, as the centre of power, has attracted more organisations to start CSR based partnerships. BF schools are on the Jaipur Delhi highway which is part of the government's IT development plan. This observation cannot be used to generalise about the quintain as such because the programmes were not selected purposely on the basis of their geographical location. However according to the government presentations at the REI update meeting there was a concentration of projects and programmes in and around Jaipur and some other major cities of Rajasthan (see Fig. 4.3). Most of the programmes seem to

be functional in pockets of under development in the developed patches of the province. If the programmes were started as an experiment in the REI pilot, it does make sense to some extent to have the experiments in regions where administrative and governance support was available to the programmes due to geographical proximity to the seat of the PMU. However, it seems that mere geography does not ensure successful implementation of the programmes. The inter-organisational and inter-institutional aspects of programme implementation affect the programme outcomes. The REI did not evolve in any way to fit into the overall strategy at State level for targeting of need. Moreover the government, which created the invited space and articulated the need for private sector involvement in REI update meetings, couldn't gain inputs towards need targeting. The presence of need and scope for intervention does not ensure that private sector will intervene and respond. The ultimate responsibility for targeting need therefore lies with the government.

2.4.6 Investment for Organisational Gains (D)

Finally, investments in the training and development of the personnel emerge as an important component of the programmes in the quintain which needs to be examined in some further research. Partners invest towards their workforce employed to support the government partnership, rather than community members and government teachers. From the viewpoint of building organisational capacity workforce training is important and desirable. However, this work force is temporary, more often less qualified and underpaid. Moreover the benefits of these workforce development opportunities are not appropriately planned to make a sustainable impact on the public system. It was found that the main stakeholders are left out. In the context of REI, the government and the PMU has not developed any systematic research based mechanism to evaluate the in-service professional development programmes (of the workforce engaged in REI projects) run by the partner organisations. On the whole the investments, if any, by the partner organisations were for their organisational benefits rather than towards people and the public system. There was only one partnership amongst the cases discussed, specifically designed for government teachers' training (QEP-Baran).

2.4.7 Temporary Workforce (S)

The programmes were envisaged to work with and within government structures but were not planned to address the varying needs of the system and develop necessary linkages therein. Thus programmes such as IBM-Pratham's Kidsmart project appeared as experiments to test the learning software on the children in government schools using government teachers but could not garner their support due to lack of partnership with 'host school' teachers in the planning stage. Therefore there was no ownership of the programme at the 'host school' level. The BF-school adoption programme is yet another case where schools were adopted but without involving the public sector workforce (government teachers in this case). The organisation employed its own teachers and had its own academic support and professional development structure. Similarly, HiWel's playground labs were also an experiment without government teachers. In the case of Bodh the organisation added its own workforce to the government school system but had their own training and academic support structures for their own workforce. The programme IBM-Pratham's Kidsmart, despite being planned to involve government teachers had to engage volunteers because the partners were unable to involve teachers.

2.5 Differences

2.5.1 Professional Development of Workforce (D)

The programmes differ in the design of professional development and support for their own workforce. In this study I collected data on aspects of professional development in organisations to confirm the presence of these processes but did not delve into making a systematic comparative analysis of professional development programmes by partner organisations for their workforce for work in the government schools. This emerges as an area of study which I would like to take up for further research. However two kinds of professional development appear to be present in practice in these programmes. The first focuses on 'how to' — skill based trainings as emerging from the requirement of the field. An example could be training of volunteers in the IBM-Pratham project to work on excel sheets. This kind of training is in the functional-operational domain as it focuses on

programme related tasks. The second kind of training though also related to the need of the programme could be categorised as situated in the domain of broader pedagogic practices focusing on review cycles, formal platform for dialogue and development of pedagogic plans and materials by teachers as a professional group. The example of QEP and training of Bodh teachers could be categorised here. However, I am, by no means, suggesting that all these are of same nature or one is better than the other.

2.5.2 Funds (G)

Also the pattern of funding of programmes differed and this was a deciding aspect of the programme's fate and ownership. Not all funding commitments were formalised in the partnership MoUs. What if these partnerships are stopped – is a sustainability question. The importance of what if question is not for imaginative and simple predictive purposes but also to weigh the relative importance of the programme in addressing systemic needs in the long term. Some parts of planning for the provision for education are aspirational and projectional but more or less this needs to be grounded in reality. In the absence of a financial management and accounting system for REI, the financial benefit and assessment of the cost of the nature of inputs provided by the partners, REI cannot serve as a model for the basis of furthering MSPs or for the planning of similar level/nature of services by the government.

2.5.3 Knowledge Frameworks

The knowledge frameworks of the partnerships differed in terms of their contribution to the government school system. The MoUs of some of the partnerships documents discussed intellectual property rights (IPR) issues and confidentiality clauses (Cisco, Appendix 9.6). Some MoUs such as the BF school adoption case mention intra firm transfer of best practices and the development of sustainable models in a specific situation and inform the government (BF, Appendix 9.1; also Janbodh, Appendix 9.8). However, due to lack of mutual reporting amongst partners and between individual partnerships and the government the aspect of inter-organisational learning remains

informal and unrealised. Apart from the annual update meeting in the first three years of REI, the PMU or the global partners of REI did not develop any platform or institutionalised process for partners to learn mutually and share resources (Discussed in Chapter 4).

2.5.4 Programme Progress

Finally, the rate of progress of the programmes differed across partnerships. It is interesting that programmes which were planned to work in inter institutional setting with the government teachers and schools in and around Jaipur showed relatively staggered progress in comparison to the QEP programme in Baran district. The BF programme is a different case since it operated in schools where BF had placed their own teachers. However, during my second visit to BF schools I found that BF had started the concept of mobile teachers due to the specific requirement of teachers and the limitation of the availability of teachers. Jandbodh programme was a peculiar case where the plan of intervention in terms of coverage of schools and placement of Bodh's teachers changed frequently throughout the programme phase.

In discussing the commonalities and differences across cases along various aspects of the MoU formalisation, scope and funding, and workforce involvement I have tried to draw conclusions about REI as a quintain.

In summary the REI as an MSP model does not involve all stakeholders (more specifically government teachers) in the design and governance of partnerships. The partnership design and processes are controlled by the organisations and specifically by the partners with financial power. The gains from the partnerships towards achieving SSA goals are suspect due to the small size of programmes, symbolic engagement linked with limited resource provision, bilateral arrangements, absence of need targeting, lack of involvement of teachers and communities and finally because partnership implementation is being carried on with temporary less-paid workforce. The partnerships that aligned their scope within the institutional framework of SSA could involve teachers but the non

availability of financial resources constrained the scope, scale and timelines, thus limiting the benefits to the public system.

In the next section I will briefly discuss causal powers and their susceptibilities in the context of MSPs as revealed by the cross case analysis.

3. Understanding Causal Powers and Susceptibilities

In this section I return to Sayer's framework of power which explains the double contingency of power. Objects and structures have causal powers but at the same time they are susceptible to other objects and structures. The activation of causal power i.e., power1 into power2 is contingent upon causal powers of other objects, structures and susceptibilities (Sayer, 2004). In case of REI, it is useful to use this analysis of power to reflect on what REI and each partnership therein aimed to achieve and how it developed. I will now analyse the causal powers and susceptibilities of each partnership discussed in the respective case studies. The cross case analysis of causal powers and susceptibilities is further layered over the DSG framework (Fig. 9.1).

Whilst discussing the commonalities in the first section I mentioned that the PPP policy at the central and state level is a commonality in all the partnership cases. The pro-PPP policy environment thus served as an important driver for the launch of MSPs. This was also aligned with a global focus on the promotion of PPPs for the last two decades. However, in a national and provincial framework the policies could be in an array and also intertwined in terms of their inter-relationships, budgetary provisions, constitutional mandate and public support. There is an internal systemic logic to the national level policies. The systemic logic and the relationships between policies have an impact upon the implementation of a policy. However, as the REI case studies show, this logical continuity was only apparent in terms of programmatic ideas with respect to the global agenda of MSPs. The logic was build without any realistic evaluation of needs of the system and also without assessment of the readiness of the system for the proposed change. Moreover the partnerships were not themselves multi stakeholder but bilateral arrangements with the GoR.

A cross case analysis of the partnership programmes reveals that the programmes which had continuity with the programmes already in place in Rajasthan, focusing on the strengthening of the public sector to fulfil its constitutional mandate were able to garner the support of the communities and the government functionaries much better than the programmes with short term, small scale experiments. Could we say that a deeper systemic focus of the partnership programmes is more likely to bring benefit to the system? I am not sure as there might be some value in experiments but in the absence of accountability and governance mechanisms, I am unable to make a judgment.

At the level of the programmes, a sustained communication about the development of the programme by the partner organisation towards the progress of the formalised intention of the government partner seems to be an important requirement. The case of the Cisco partnership, as also documented in the USAID study (Enge, Kumar and Luthra, 2010), QEP and Janbodh partnerships are evidence of this fact.

GeSCI's review of REI, also discussed in chapter 4, depicts the frequent transfer of government officials as detrimental to the progress of the projects. During field work, I too found that officers were replaced frequently. As to the extent this was detrimental to the progress of the project needs more exploration. There seemed to be no mechanisms to ensure continuity and therefore no likelihood of partnership transformation in the long term.

During the interviews of the government officials it also emerged that some male officials (partial towards ICT based partnerships) felt that certain male officers had been visionaries of ICT based partnerships while their subsequent female counterparts did not have a clear grasp about the technical aspects of ICTs and hence did not facilitate these partnerships. Thus, even within the government system, perceptions about technical skills being gendered or age related could be a self-defeating argument for the system.

Such parochialisms at various levels were observed during the field study and are discussed in case of BF school adoption (Chapter 5) and IBM-Kidsmart partnership

(Chapter 6). The MSP model of REI does not have a mechanism or a conscious intention to address various social disparities and biases. It also does not have a mechanism to check the promotion of such biases on account of the values of the private sector organisations. Also short timeline projects in REI lacked vision and ability to address long standing educational challenges (CII and ATs case discussed in Chapter 5).

Table 9.1 Causal Powers and Susceptibilities in REI partnerships

	Causalities	Susceptibilities
D	Continuity of the programme with similar programmes in Rajasthan; Pro-PPP policy at central and state level; Systemic focus of the partnership projects	Ethical lags/ claims vs reality? Small scale, Short duration intervention; experimental projects not according to the needs of the system
S	Sustained communication across partners and stakeholders with implementation responsibilities, involving communities	Lack of teachers' involvement; Temporary workforce
G	Functional programme steering committees (PSC) at individual project level; Long term fund/resource commitment; Plan for partnership transformation and curricular integration	Non-functional PSC; Experimental projects without reporting on experiments to inform the government department; Frequent transfer of PMU heads; Lack of financial management

The funding pattern or control of funding to the programme by one organisation might seem an efficient model to ensure accountability but might not be a potentially

feasible model for funding MSPs. This has been discussed in the previous section's sub section on differences.

In summary, the partnerships which have programmatic continuity with the government seem to bring benefit to the system and gain teachers' support. Such partnerships have communication across partners with long term resource commitment. Transformation of the partnerships can be articulated as the causal powers which could be actualised to deliver SSA goals. However, small scale, short term projects and ethical lags in terms of claims vs reality, introduction of temporary workforce, lack of teachers' involvement, non functional governance structures and lack of assessment of value and gains could stop, modify or strengthen the causal powers i.e., power1 to become power2 – the activated power.

4. Inputs and Outcomes

The partnerships have brought a number of resources, materials, practices, ideas and experiments to the public sector. Some of these have historical linkages with the programmes in Rajasthan (e.g. UEE-Janbodh), some have linkages with new policy initiatives at the central and national level and push for private sector involvement (e.g. ICT interventions). There are some ideas which have the support of international agencies and are being tried in other parts of the world. However, to what extent these ideas and ways of doing things are feasible remains a big question. What will happen to these resources brought in and generated by these programmes, once the projects end and when the organisation effecting change is not around? How are these efforts going to be sustained in the future? Moreover, are these changes desirable?

A major input which could be seen across the programmes in the REI was a parallel and/or alternative workforce as per the design of the programme. Thus BF brought in their own teachers in 49 schools, IBM-Pratham project brought in volunteers in 14 schools. Similarly, HiWel project engaged volunteers from communities at 45 sites to open the PLC-kiosks and support children. QEP brought in academic resource support personnel

working at various levels with the government teachers and Janbodh brought in pre-school teachers (20) and community school facilitators in the government schools (45) to work alongside the government school teachers.

However, this practice of ‘bringing in staff’ undermines the government school teachers and reinforces the bias that private sector is better than the government. Furthermore, the long term impact of these changes could be disastrous as these could lead to breaking of union organisations and give rise to monopsonistic tendencies in the market for hiring education sector workforce. The closest example is the case of BF where the organisation has decided to recruit more women teachers as they tend to be more stable than their men counterparts. However, this temporary workforce is more often than not, less qualified and therefore the delivery of service for the poor is seriously compromised.

Another related issue is that of the workforce lacking in classroom experience involved in training the government teachers (see Box 9.1).

Box 9.1 Trainers without Classroom Experience

NGOs are a major fixture of neo-liberal governance in education across the developing world. The new work culture that the NGOs partnering with state agencies promote involves frequent in-service training at the hands of para-academics serving as resource persons. They typically lack classroom experience as well as theoretical knowledge of education but enjoy a higher status compared to the teacher. Cynicism and frustration characterise the teachers’ response to the training programmes that they are forced to attend. (Kumar 2011, p.39)

In the REI context, ‘*NGOs partnering with the state agencies*’ should be assumed to include all organisations such as CSR groups and CSR backed philanthropic foundations. The emphasis (above sentence) not only highlights the nature of the new workforce but also points to the fact of government teachers being undermined. This perhaps explains why most of the REI partnerships could not gain support of teachers.

Materials such as workbooks, textbooks, and a variety of teaching learning material as well as computers were also brought in to the government schools through REI. The training modules were developed for the programmes as in QEP. Similarly, IBM-Kidsmart introduced learning software for a few schools. However, there was no mechanism in REI

for assessment of utility, quality and sustainability of resources brought in by the partnerships for the government schools. The resource scarce schools certainly need more teachers rather than tools such as IT interventions without a concurrent vision for curricular integration. HiWel's PLC for example does not address the issue of access of education for the out of school children. Moreover, the programme relies heavily on low paid and, in specific contexts of ICT pedagogies, less qualified volunteers. The appropriateness as well as sustainability of technology inputs in resource starved environments is therefore questionable.

In summary the inputs and outcomes under REI are unable to target needs in a long term sustained manner due to temporary workforce involvement and use of materials and technologies which are not suitable, in terms of their appropriateness and usage, in poor school environments. The inputs and outcomes might bring short term benefits to the partnership but are negatively affecting the public education system by undermining the role of government teachers

5. Conclusion

This chapter through the cross case analysis of the Design, Stakeholders and Governance aspects of the eight partnerships under REI attempted to answer firstly if REI is an MSP and what are the features of the partnerships. The partnerships under REI are mostly bilateral arrangements between respective organisations and the government. There is no larger stakeholder involvement. Ownership and involvement from stakeholders could not be ensured due to limitations in design and the fact that barring two partnerships, the teachers were not part of the design. The partnerships depend on temporary workforce for implementation. Hence no plan could be drawn out about continuity and scaling up aspects of partnership transformation. The REI as an example of MSP design does not have ability to deliver its promise since it does not have commitment from the private sector for long term resource flows into the public system to target needs, nor is it on a sufficient scale. Also the partnerships are neither scalable nor sustainable.

The next chapter concludes the thesis and is where I will draw my major conclusions – both theoretical and empirical. It seeks to draw together the complex and different insights from the case study findings and comprehensively answer the main research questions. I will also conclude by discussing the policy implications of this research and propose areas for further research.

Chapter 10

Conclusions – MSPs in Rajasthan

1. Introduction

In this thesis, I set out to understand the new and emergent phenomenon of MSPEs in the particular regional context of the state of Rajasthan in India. In exploring this, I sought out to analyse the reasons for the GoR to launch the Rajasthan Education Initiative as an innovative PPP model and the policies, processes, programmes and agents which defined the features of REI and influenced its development. More broadly, through an empirical piece of research using qualitative case study methodology and multi-case research design, I sought to bring forth evidence about the formation, formalisation, implementation and outcomes of MSPEs in a developing country context.

With the purpose of arriving at conclusions, I will first of all assess the extent to which the research has been able to critique and provide insights into the development and working of MSPEs. MSPEs, as has been mentioned earlier, were pushed since 2000 by global business alliances such as WEF and endorsed by governments, through policy and programme initiatives involving businesses, philanthropy foundations and civil society organisations.

Secondly, I will answer the research questions whilst simultaneously drawing out the broader insights that the case study can offer for understanding the nature of MSPs, their participants and the extent to which MSPs can deliver the promise and mandate of the public education system. The research also has importance because it seeks to probe the not-for-profit PPPs in education as well as corporate sponsors and therefore explore the question: ‘Multi-stakeholder partnerships under the Rajasthan Education Initiative: if not for profit, then for what?’

2. Researching MSPs

This research is built upon my practical and personal experience of working with one of the REI partners in 2006. Thus, in my role as a researcher, when I went back to Rajasthan for my fieldwork in 2008, I was an informed outsider. I began my work with the objective of understanding non-profit PPPs and the role and contribution of REI partners including WEF. I could gain privileged access to some partner organisations and government offices because of the continuity of my academic interest in a particular aspect of the practice of my professional ex-colleagues and networks.

Nevertheless, as discussed in the section, 'Negotiating Access', in Chapter 3, the politics of partnerships in a multi-site, multi-case context was revealed to me in a number of ways. This happened when access was agreed but delayed or later denied or when participants entered into a deliberative negotiation with me over my role as researcher and my commitments and even when some participants pre-judged my ideological position thereby themselves assuming role of gatekeepers to the information. The consciousness of the filtered information, most of the time, encouraged me to consult various participants, seek documents, news, reports thus helping me to use the challenge as a source of critical insights into the workings of REI and inter-organisational relationships.

In the initial stages of data collection I considered the concepts of intentionality and intentional collectives in trying to theoretically approach MSPEs. Around the same time I was also reading about the role of Transnational Corporations (TNCs) and the forging of PPPs looked liked a conspiracy of TNCs to me. However, these theoretical tools were not sophisticated enough for explaining the transnational as well as local, political nature of the REI or for translating an MSP model in the regional context of Rajasthan. During this journey of over five years that included thinking about this research, gathering of data, encounter with people involved, familiarisation with the data and literature and writing over of several drafts, I came to realise that I needed to develop a framework which takes into account not only the spatiality of power in interorganisational relationships (forged for a seemingly public purpose) but also explain the gaps that existed. These gaps between

rhetoric, project images, claims and real world unfolding of events were vividly revealed to me in the field. In terms of my positionality I can say that I am now less biased and have begun to understand this phenomenon as the interplay of various layers of networks, structures and contexts, thus explaining the contingency of their relationships and the consequent outcomes.

With the hindsight of my experience in conducting this research, I am now able to discuss its limitations. This research would have benefitted from an action research design involving organisations and other stakeholders, especially teachers, to reflect on their practice as they analyse their role and participation in REI. Likewise, research on the specific learning pedagogies as understood, practised and promoted by the partners working directly with schools, teachers and materials would have been immensely valuable in understanding aspects of curriculum reformulation happening due to the involvement of the private sector in the public system. I could have used a comparative research design to study ICTs and other technology based pedagogies alongside pedagogies promoted by the teacher training institutes, SSA trainings, NGOs and those practiced by teachers in schools. This would lead to a more comprehensive understanding as to how MSPs, as claimed, are different and benefit the government school system. The MSP research could have developed much deeper insights by probing the nature of professional development and practice of the workforce from the partner organisations and thus understand how this workforce is better equipped to deliver what the government school teachers allegedly cannot.

Though financial management was not within the purview of REI-PMU and therefore the partners did not divulge details of financial inputs to the government (based on the planned and actual spread of each programme under REI and how the partnerships have developed) I could have calculated a speculative resource input valuation to feed into the analysis report on MSPs, using comparative valuation rates for the services in the public and private sector. This would also have allowed me to engage with and critique GEI claims in this regard.

At the time of starting the fieldwork the GEIs in Egypt, Jordan and Palestine were already in place. I could have developed a cross-case study research embedded in these country contexts alongside Rajasthan. Also, I did not compare how the REI case is different from other partnerships in education, which predate REI, in the context of their participants, inputs and experience. Similarly, a comparison of the nature of involvement of REI partners with the governments of other Indian provinces could have strengthened the insights on MSPs in Rajasthan.

All these possibilities have merits but within the life cycle of this research I was constrained by time, resources, access, and scale. Thus decisions were made to adopt the research strategy chosen with the judgement that these were the most viable and operationally feasible. Despite the limitations, and the possibilities of alternative approaches, I believe that I have adequately addressed the research questions.

I turn to a brief note on the literature review and research questions which is followed by a discussion of the research questions themselves.

A select body of literature pertaining to inter-organisational relationships and partnerships between state and other organisations was reviewed in order to identify the key concepts and models that could help understand how MSPs develop and work. This exercise also threw light on the nature of MSPs, their emergence in education and helped in developing a critique of partnerships. The review also helped to identify aspects of MSPs such as – long term benefits to the system (hence the question of purpose and sustainability of partnerships); formalisation of partnerships and accountability; and stakeholder involvement and decision making, something which specifically needs to be probed in MSP research. For me, the literature review was an ongoing process which helped me keep level with the latest developments regarding MSPs globally.

I set out to probe five research questions related to development of REI i.e., i) why was it started, ii) its key features, its participants, inputs, iii) how it developed, iv) its impact and v) are the partnerships scalable and sustainable? The answers to these questions

are to be found in the previous empirically based chapters, and are embedded in the narrative account below of the case studies and the development of findings related to MSPs at a more general level. I used a multiple case study design and selected eight partnerships based on a matrix developed to map organisational characteristics, the size, scope and scale of partnerships, their project timelines and previous experience of partners of working in Rajasthan. Based on literature review a conceptual framework for examining the cases was developed.

Each case study addressed specific questions according to the nature of the cluster and scope of the formalised partnership. The Design of the partnerships, Stakeholder involvement and intra-agent dynamics and Governance of partnerships were three categories under which I organised the questions for discussion of each case study. However, there were some overlaps in these categories. For example, funds could be a design issue as well as a governance issue for discussing partnerships.

The eight cases were further placed into four thematic clusters namely, school adoption, ICT interventions, teachers' training and community based model of school development for UEE in urban slums. The first cluster (Ch.5) comprised of three partnerships varying in scale and models of adoption, the second cluster (Ch.6) also consisted of three technology based partnerships – one each for educating out-of-school children, poor children in schools and IT skills course for young people. The third thematic cluster consisted of one partnership for teachers' training in a single district and the fourth cluster also had one partnership.

3. Findings

In the following section I will discuss findings. Firstly I will discuss cluster specific findings of the cases and then move on to the findings at the broader REI level before moving on to more general conclusions.

3.1 Case Study Findings

3.1.1 School Adoption Models (Chapter-5)

Two school adoption models for school management including teacher recruitment (BF) and one for infrastructure input (CII; AT) were in operation. The school adoption component under REI is small in relation to the number of schools in Rajasthan i.e., 105190 schools of which 78460 are government schools (GoR, 2011). Partners adopted only 55 schools, of which BF adopted 49 schools for ten years. At the outset, when REI had just taken off, none of the school adopting organisations under REI had any experience or expertise in education. Education is not even their priority as a service provider (see CII). School adoptions were part of CSR and philanthropy initiatives. The partners did not have any qualified vision of educational access or any sustainable strategy for school development.

The sustainability of the school adoption programme is suspect because the organisations had limited timeline commitments towards the adopted schools. Furthermore, these commitments are contingent upon economic conditions, political situations and whims and fancies of the organisations.

The three case studies illustrate that a focus on money and resources is only part of the reason for uneven service delivery. The government schools face a much wider range of issues which a private sector partner cannot address. These include, for example, lack of teachers, administrative delays in decision making, inflow of children pushed out by private schools and conflicts of interests between school and community.

As the REI developed, the partners in REI school adoption were transforming their initiatives into a non-participatory, centralised-elite (money power) driven model. Interestingly none of the three school adopters sent their school adoption reports to the DD, REI who is in charge of non-ICT initiatives. This is one of many illustrations of organisational disconnects and unclear channels of accountability and reporting. Moreover

the global partners of REI provided no contribution to the school adoption component either in terms of finances or other resources.

3.1.2 ICT Interventions (Chapter 6)

The three partnerships discussed in this research are between REI and three major IT companies (directly or indirectly) such as NIIT, IBM-Sanchar Infotech and Cisco. The analysis shows that the scale of these supply driven partnerships is small, the targeting is weak and the sustainability suspect.

The experience of partners with the government department is indicative of gaps in the planning and operationalisation of partnerships. The first two cases (HiWel and IBM-Pratham), had a focus on learning for children. However government teachers were not part of the interventions even though one of these two partnerships was in government schools (IBM-Pratham-Kidsmart). The other partnership (HiWel) seems to propagate a self-organising model of learning leading to emancipation of the poor. The informalisation of learning for out-of-school children emerges as a major concern from HiWel partnership. Similarly, Cisco's claim of the development of critical IT skills falls short of its target. The IT essentials' course which it runs through 18 DCECs is very basic in skills, which most people who handle computers acquire informally. Moreover the course does not lead to any skills acquisition which could be specifically termed 'employable' in comparison to Network Engineering course which Cisco seems to promote through DCECs.

Whilst advocates argue that ICTs are becoming a new learning platform and context, the debate on content in ICT learning material is yet to begin in the REI. There is little evidence that what was devised was at all demand led or pre tested to determine if it resulted in worthwhile learning gains.

3.1.3 QEP-Baran (Chapter 7)

The QEP comprised of one funder and two resource agencies forming a partnership. The programme did bring resources to the district of Baran for teacher training thus linking itself with the SSA as envisaged by REI. However sustainability of such a partnership is suspect not because of its vision or content but because in a multipartite model the power of the funder eventually gains precedence, enabling them to decide the future of the partners and programmes. Inter-organisational accountability in this multi-partite collaboration is weak due to unequal economic power of partners. The fate of QEP and the two implementation partners was decided by the partner with the capitalist power (ICICI Bank). The programme director of QEP has questioned why ICICI Bank did not explain the reason for termination of the QEP whilst aiming to expand the programme to the whole state.

Moreover, there has been no evidence in the field that the training changed classroom practices. The training programme was conducted for 4000 GPS teachers across Baran whilst SS supported only 78 pace-setter schools in two blocks. The plan for further expansion to 100 schools as announced by ICICI still sounds small since there are 78460 government schools in Rajasthan and thus the project was unlikely to address SSA goals or the goals of RTE. No evidence was found of any contribution of WEF and other international partners to the QEP and teachers' training in the State or even in district Baran. Therefore in terms of international expertise and resources the REI in the league of other GEIs has not influenced QEP.

3.1.4 UEE-Janbodh (Chapter 8)

UEE-Janbodh partnership focussed on slum localities of Jaipur city. Janbodh's case demonstrates the possibility of dialogue across different government departments to arrive at pro-poor solutions within a given policy framework. Bodh used its own resources and funds to implement the programme and their experience of collaboration with government predates REI. REI or for that matter WEF, GeSCI and CII have no expertise of designing programmes for out of school children and pre-school children in slum localities or work

with marginalised communities. Nor did they seek to contract in such expertise for reasons that are not clear.

3.1.5 International implications of PPPs.

Learning from the REI experience we can now discuss the international implications of PPPs. Internationally, transnational alliances are emerging as major stakeholders in the development sector. These alliances also incorporate global organisations as well as national governments. Because of their transnational scale and financial clout, these groupings have the capacity to influence governments at various levels, for entering into partnerships either using philanthropic or value for money arguments.

However, the MSPs thus forged at the behest of business alliances while subscribing to the rhetoric of economic development of the region through PPP, tend to focus on partnership formation without defined plans for exit routes and partnership transformation. Then again, while these business alliances might have expertise in business they do not necessarily have an adequate understanding of the scope nor have access to the kind of resources necessary to fulfil the developmental needs. Thus the ultimate responsibility for outcomes falls on the government entering into partnership leaving the alliances with little or no accountability.

The case studies presented in this thesis have brought out the above evidence. Such interventions, which do not adequately weigh the educational needs of a region and merely focus on branding and business agendas, cannot generate sustained need-based benefits. Thus a major lesson which members of the alliances as well as the governments and funding agencies can draw from the REI example is to realise that there is a need to qualify claims through sustained, impartial research and scrutiny, to involve communities and teachers as participant strategic stakeholders and to have the willingness to align inputs with the commitments of national governments to their people.

3.2 REI Level Conclusions

3.2.1 Design Variation – Competing Models (D)

The promise to create a win-win situation for education systems as well as businesses has not happened in REI because its scale was too small (only 5% of schools covered). A win-win situation would require targeting areas of need and complementary inputs rather than competing ones. Moreover, there were huge variations in terms of timelines, scale, inputs and financial commitment of partners, organisational size and variety of programmes with confused objectives and competing models. This is illustrated by the contrasting examples of BF which adopted government schools in rural, peri-urban areas with a model where government teachers were moved out of school and Bodh which was working in government schools in urban slums alongside government teachers and community members.

3.2.2 Teacher Involvement (S)

Most of the partners reported the non-involvement of teachers in their interventions. The programmes were designed without taking into consideration the role of the teacher. This is evident from those partnerships where the organisations hired under-qualified volunteers or underpaid contract teachers (See HiWel and IBM-Kidsmart, Ch.6; BF Ch.5) when the teachers whom they expected to implement the intervention at school level did not cooperate. Thus a parallel model was set up which seems on the face of it inefficient and unsustainable.

The government administration as well as the teachers lacked ownership of the interventions. These were still looked upon as programmes of the partners with no sustainable gains for the schools. The lack of curricular integration was cited as the reason behind this view. This view was largely held by most of the teachers working in schools where the partnership programmes were being implemented. However QEP and to some extent Janbodh were exceptions.

3.2.3 Funds vs Value Added (G)

The REI had no account of financial management of REI partners' interventions. In the absence of this the government system lacks any learning about the requirement or resource input assessment vis-à-vis interventions made by the REI partners. One of the most vocal claims of PPP promoters is that the state is failing and therefore the private sector needs to get involved but without taking on responsibility of the state (Schwab, 2008).

Without an assessment of the value of inputs how can any claims about the government's lack of capacity and partners' expertise or capacity, for a particular intervention, be made? In the absence of a financial management and accounting system for REI and thus a lack of any estimates of the financial benefit or assessment of the cost of the nature of inputs provided by the partners, REI cannot serve as a model for furthering MSPs. Neither can it serve as the basis for planning of services of a similar level or nature by the government.

3.2.4 PSC – Accountability (G)

The accountability structure of partnerships in REI is arbitrary and tentative. Changes in staff bring in changes in power relations and therefore in accountability outcomes. In the absence of clear cut accountability measures it will be difficult to consolidate learning from the programme. As the GeSCI report also shows, a body such as PSC which could have to some extent ensured public accountability was very tentative. During the phase of data collection there had been only one PSC meeting (GeSCI, 2009).

The partner organisations might have a system of mutual accountability in multi-lateral collaborations like PPP but in case of partnerships such as HiWel, the systems of accountability are not clearly spelt out or put in place and hence we could see the results — out of the promised 200, only 65 computers installed and working. However there is no

system to ensure intra-institutional accountability as evident from the example of PSC meetings being convened at the government level.

3.2.5 Causal Powers and Susceptibilities of MSPs

I had discussed in the previous chapter on cross case analysis about the causalities and susceptibilities as emerging from the cross case analysis. I will now draw attention to a few specific aspect of causal powers and susceptibilities of MSPs.

The REI was launched as an innovative MSP model of PPPs in education. As an MSP model REI was like an experimental pilot project without comprehensive evaluation. There is something about innovation and experiments in education which is able to influence organisations and government to undertake an intervention. It is about trying out new solutions to problems. The organisations which are resource scarce or are assessed to be resource scare can easily buy into trying new things in the hope of stumbling into low cost solutions or new resources. However, this aspect of innovations and experiment makes it difficult to hold partners accountable to each other. The newness of an intervention and especially when it is a technological intervention makes a new user or contractor unsure about what to expect from the provider. This makes it difficult to arrive at appropriate accountability monitoring mechanisms. It may also be true that energy, interest and money is in initiating innovation rather than implementing them – NGOs and companies need “new” stories to get interested and attract funding or investment. This could also be part of the problem. Moreover, political systems like to look forward not back, nor do they enjoy evaluating past initiatives.

The availability of sustained funds is an indispensable requirement for any educational intervention. Funds are needed to develop infrastructure and to maintain them as also to introduce new ideas and support and train people to implement those ideas. In case of MSPs, the corporate funding for example is often a causal power for partnership formation and operation. However, it could also turn into susceptibility and raise inter-organisational accountability concerns as well as user accountability issues. In MSPs the

State or the partner with implementation responsibility depends on funds to keep the wheel turning. Since funds, services and support from private sector cannot be available for the long term or in perpetuity, the programmes planned to alleviate problems of marginalised populations and underserved localities could get undermined. It has to be remembered that the state is the guarantor of services and rights. Furthermore, in developing countries contexts the state is the ‘provider of last resort’ for the poor (Lewin and Little, 2011, p. 335).

The government teachers, though seen as susceptibilities (many partners reported non-involvement of teachers or had designed programmes – school adoption by Bharti Foundation where these teachers were transferred out of government schools – without government teachers) they are in fact the most important human resource for any educational, pedagogical interventions designed with or without technology for any school system. A stable teaching workforce with continuous professional development that can participate in programme design could become a causal power for SSA to achieve its goals rather than MSPs with their tall claims and little or no gains. Also ICTs in schools without curricular integration and without involvement of government teachers cannot address SSA and REI goals. Moreover, a public system with limited resources and struggling to fulfil their promises and mandate need to prioritise their investments towards more teachers rather than ICTs.

Finally, most of the programmes were operational and implemented with responsibility on the shoulders of underpaid volunteers or a temporary workforce. These would prove to be susceptible in the long run as people move from one organisation to another. This could be due to i) corporate raiding; ii) in search of stable job prospects; iii) promise of higher pay packet; iv) end of the project term; v) because the organisation could no longer sustain the programme due to the lack of funds. Often this temporary workforce hired to support innovations is not professionally trained and even when it is trained the support cannot be sustained on an ongoing basis.

3.3 Overall Conclusions

UEE has been a long standing goal in India which is yet to be realised. The number of out-of-school children in India is estimated to be in the range of 7 – 30 million though even this higher number is likely to be an under-estimate (CREATE, 2009). Recently the Right to Education Act has further added to the pressure on the public education system to address the gap of access to education.

Historically the central and provincial governments in India have collaborated with NGOs and other non state providers in attempts to address the challenge of quality and access to education. At the same time international agencies such as World Bank, DFID, USAID and UNICEF have been increasingly partial towards PPPs in the quest to achieve MDGs and EFA goals.

Not only these agencies but business alliances such as WEF have also been enticing resource scarce governments to initiate PPPs for achieving a win-win situation for the governments and the markets. Five years ago, shortly after the launch of the Jordan Education Initiative (JEI), one of the series of Global Education Initiatives promoted by the WEF, big claims were made for what MSPs have delivered globally (see Box 4.1, Fig. 4.5). However, empirical evidence from the Rajasthan Education Initiative (REI)¹⁰⁸ suggests that the reality is disappointing (Fig. 10.1).

There are serious limitations of the MSP governance model because of its failure to posit responsibility of the intervention equally on the governments as well as the private players. Globally there is not enough evidence to arrive at clear conclusions on educational success and failures of MSPs. This is due to the fact that most of the researches regarding MSPs are internal and commissioned for gains geared towards private sector objectives. Thus, for example, the onus of failures in the REI is squarely put at the door of governments in GEI reports.

¹⁰⁸ The REI launched in 2005 belongs to the same league of MSPs as JEI.


So the responsibility for failure is not distributed or shared amongst stakeholders. It is not clear who is responsible for what. Furthermore, in the REI context, failure is painted as the failure of government's responsibility towards management and facilitation of partnerships however not a single word is expended to talk about faulty designs of partnerships as such. An analysis of the content of the partnership intervention vis-à-vis specific identified needs should have been the first step towards deciding whether to go ahead with the intervention plan. Expertise of stakeholders-the users and teachers in designing and executing educational interventions has been largely neglected in the REI partnerships.

The REI particularly aimed to achieve the goals of SSA and foster the development of IT skills through involvement of IT companies. In fact its programme management unit was housed in GoR's SSA office. The core team of REI comprised of WEF, GeSCI and CII. As per the design of REI these core-partners had an advisory role. However, REI had no well-defined plan, though an REI vision document did exist. The absence of a plan is evident in the formalisation of partnerships of all sizes, scales and timelines (see Chapter 9) and programmes which started at different points of time without any research based need assessment by the core partners. There were no resources for programmes under REI either from the government or from the core partners, especially the WEF which claims huge resource inputs to GEI countries (for comparison see Box. 4.7 ; Fig. 4.5 and 10.1). Thus the conceptualisation of REI was flawed and its claims suspect.

Research suggests that formalised partnerships have better accountability outcomes (Kilby, 2006). However, the implementation of the formalised partnerships in REI was partial, delayed or aborted (the second partnership for adopting 200 schools in BF's instance) leading to accountability concerns. Furthermore, the lack of resources meant that any intervention even if planned on an identified need could not be sustained on long term basis. This is ironical since the REI claimed to address the long standing needs of the province and its rhetoric revolved around planning for the future of Rajasthan. Obviously, long standing educational needs cannot be addressed in a short time period through meagre unsustainable experiments or even by employing rhetoric in your language.

Fig. 10.1

Analysis of REI with respect to Klaus Schwab's Model of Multi-stakeholder Theory of



The evidence from REI therefore calls for soul-searching and honesty when discussing what MSPs are and what they aren't. The PPP policy of the GoI, the WEF's global agenda of promoting MSPs, besides educational needs of the region and the government's mandate and space for action together served as the launching pad for REI. However, this seemingly sturdy base is in itself not sufficient to ensure that promises are delivered. There is a need for realistic appraisal of the necessary antecedents, nature of participants, capacities, participation and transactions before accepting the claims of MSPs as the panacea for a hundred ills that plague nations on the road to development.

3.4 Issues of Accountability – Responsibility Gaps


The figure 10.2 depicts the responsibility gap of the private sector vis-à-vis resources and response to a felt need/demand. The private sector may have tools and resources, they may have ability and willingness to respond but will they take responsibility and be accountable for their actions and impacts? Their response is contingent upon inflow of surplus resources, willingness to share those resources and ability to respond. As CII (Chapter 5) partners shared that the industry knows how to do business but education is not their area. Furthermore even with resources and ability to respond it is not necessary that private sector will take responsibility. Klaus Schwab seems to agree (see Schwab, 2008). The ultimate responsibility to respond to the demand by directing resources rests on the government (BF — Chapter 5). The case of BF partnership is illustrative, wherein even after formalisation, the plan for adoption of 200 schools was not operationalised. The government did not leave the schools orphaned and continued with all the responsibilities towards the schools.

The MoU documents of partnerships do not mention details of financial inputs and sharing or public accountability. All such partnerships which claimed to be voluntary and philanthropic have clauses to end the programme with short notice. This poses questions on the voluntariness in contrast to responsibility, and about the liabilities of partners who start programmes and terminate them.

The voluntary and not-for-profit nature of the PPP interventions should not be the reason for poor monitoring and evaluation procedures. The government officials in charge of partnerships mostly discussed partnerships as contracted out tasks which are voluntary rather than a system enhancement intervention. Moreover, queries about a comprehensive internal evaluation of REI were responded by '*Daan ki bachhiyaa ke daant nahi giney jatey*' (literally: No one counts teeth of a donated she-calf) (Interview, SSA Official, 2009). The complexities of free gifts, philanthropic and voluntary actions shaping the education

space in the interest of private sector but not necessarily addressing the needs of the public system have been ignored by the government partners in SSA-Rajasthan.

Fig 10.2 Responsibility Gaps in MSP Governance



The fate of public sector provision, either in part or whole, should not be based on the voluntariness of the private sector and an open ended guarantee from the public partner to pick up the pieces due to accountability failure of private sector partners. Thus it is imperative to include the triad of three Rs i.e., Resources, Response and Responsibility in the models of MSP governance.

3.5 Partnership Transformation – Ensuring Sustainability and Scalability

In this section I discuss my research conclusions regarding sustainability and scalability of the REI partnerships. Temporality is an important component of defining space and forms of action. Because, the partnerships in education are organised for the purpose of educational value to the organisations in the system it is important to consider how the action and the purpose itself will take shape in the future, who will be the agents for action and which factors will influence it. Therefore, educational partnerships need to consider three stages of planning for change (Fig. 10.3).


The first stage (Stage 1) is when the logic for intervention is developed and the partners agree to work towards the common goal through formalising the partnership. Stage 2 which closely follows and should follow is the implementation stage where the intention unfolds and is projected at the field level. However, educational needs and therefore practices flow from past to present to future and therefore need consistent planning and intervention. This implies that when the partners develop ‘what for’ logic for intervention, they need to address the issue of ‘what after’ at the same stage.

Thus a stage (Stage 3) defining partnership exit routes, transformation in scale, scope and stakeholders, termination, transfer and resource support needs to be part of the plan for partnerships. In our discussion on double contingency of power we said that intended actions can have unintended outcomes and some intended outcomes might follow an unintended action. However, the focus here is not to look at the outcomes as end product but a persistent structural aspect for which action which is bound in space and time is necessary.

REI focussed on partnership formation and formalisation (Stage 1; Fig. 10.3). The operationalisation of the partnership and implementation (Stage 2; Fig. 10.3) was the thrust of respective partners. Thus, stage 1 and to a certain extent stage 2 of the PPPs received focused interest. The eight case studies reveal that there were commitment gaps at the implementation stage on part of the partners as well the government. The MoUs which

discuss the project/programme timelines do not discuss their exit routes (Stage 3; see also Appendix to Ch.9). This evidence resonates with the PPPs literature and research which mostly focuses on short term outputs of the partnerships.

Fig.10.3 Partnership Transformation Across Stages



Existing research is largely silent about stage 3 i.e., exit routes and other forms of partnership transformation (Fig. 10.3). This is the blind spot of partnerships that needs serious critical attention. While researching MSPs which claim to revive the public system with new ideas and approaches, it is important to probe the ‘what after’ to comprehensively analyse delivery of the claims. It is important therefore to subject that blind spot of MSPs to a serious scrutiny while examining those claims of a possible future.

4. Contribution of the Research to the Theory of Power

This research brings empirical evidence and a concrete real world example while putting to use the framework of double contingency of power to understand the MSPs. According to Sayer (2004) power is relational and needs to be understood both as capacity as well as immanent power. As we have seen before, structures, resources and processes affect causal Power1 to become actualised Power2. The relationship and causality is however not linear. Moreover, to me it seems that Power1 may not be necessarily contained, fixed and defined but can be developed. This is because it is a capacity which, as Sayer says, is not innate.

Also the actualised power2 could be a capacity in some sense and therefore another form of Power1, in relation to some other processes and structures. This again could be actualised as power2. In the social arena, processes and phenomena are not linear, and voluntary actions may not bring intended outcomes while different unintended actions could result in similar outcomes. We also know that spatiality, temporality, structures and agents are the four important aspects which affect causal Power1 to emerge as actualised power2.

Drawing from the example of REI, the power of global alliances with resources and influence can be seen as their capacity or causal power1 and the emergent effect could be forged partnerships. However, the power of partnership formation is a causal power which might not be actualised to power2 as intended by the alliance members. This could be due to the fact that the partnership design is itself susceptible.

For example, estimating teachers as normative stakeholders rather than strategic stakeholders when intending to change classroom processes, through the introduction of technology, or attempting to improve schools could lead to non-involvement of teachers. Another such instance is to be found in the introduction of technology in classrooms, where limited or no capacity of the structure as well the agents, hampers actualisation of causal powers. An example of the emergent properties of causal powers, affected by their inherent

and relational susceptibilities, could be in the discontentment of the partners in the case of the CII partnership. Therefore the recognition of power as capacity is helpful in understanding the purpose, formation, workings and outcomes of inter-organisational relationships such as occurs in case of alliances and partnerships.

5. A Brief Summary

To sum it all up this research examined the working of an MSP programme REI – which was launched as innovate PPP model by the GoR in 2005. Through exploration of eight partnerships organised under four thematic areas, this research arrived at conclusions related to five specific questions pertaining to REI and its development. In the following paragraphs I will provide a final summary of the conclusions I have arrived at, while trying to answer these questions.

i) Why was REI initiated?

REI was launched as a top down, externally initiated collaboration that met needs articulated within the WEF (a business interest led platform) and the GoR to create a ‘win-win’ situation. REI set out on a fast track with a ‘development for competitive global society’ rhetoric involving WEF backed IT companies and other businesses. Though claimed to have been adapted to the needs of Rajasthan (while emulating JEI) the REI as MSP model is reflective of idiosyncrasies of its partners rather than needs of the state. Whilst the GoR’s priority is to increase access as well as improve quality of education to achieve SSA goals, the businesses involved were focussed on CSR interventions without a qualified vision of the nature of inputs that could strengthen the system.

Critically, the REI was not demand-led or grounded in diagnostic studies identifying needs of the state. The ‘IT skills development for increased employability’ rhetoric which failed to create employment opportunities or substantial IT-skill development programmes is a case in point. In short, the WEF led REI claimed and aimed for more than they could deliver.

ii) What are REI's key features – in terms of participants and inputs?

The partnerships under REI were mostly bilateral arrangements between the government and organisations while the REI as such did have the characteristics of an MSP model. It was also found that there were no resource flows from WEF to Rajasthan and REI. The inputs by the REI programme partners were insubstantial, limited in scope, thinly spread and small in scale. Interventions of varying timelines and a variety of partners were a key feature. The participants included businesses' CSR arms, philanthropic foundations and NGOs funded by CSR groups and foundations.

Overall the phenomenon reflected flocking of organisations with business interests while organisations with financial power dominated the fate of the programmes. The implementation of the programmes which focused on IT based pedagogy was mediated through temporary, low paid, poorly qualified and inexperienced workforce. The SSA mandate of community participation did not reflect in the school based programmes in the cases discussed in this research. Even when involved, a sustained relationship with communities for school development could not be achieved due to changes in the intervention model of the programme, intra-agent conflicts and limitations of the workforce. Furthermore, REI or any of its core partners did not bring in any academic expertise to address critical issues related to the educational development in the state.

iii) How has REI developed?

The development of the REI was not planned as part of a long term strategy. It evolved in unpredictable ways with changes in staff and priorities, variable funding, and no clear exit routes for key activities. Lack of financial management and non involvement of core partners in ensuring resource inflows to REI also proved to be a major stumbling block in developing a vibrant model of MSPs whereby gains to the public system could be assessed and planned for the future.

iv) What is the impact of REI?

The impact of REI, in terms of increasing access, ICT strengthened learning environment, improved school management and quality of teaching and learning, is largely not visible due to lack of curricular integration and partners not involving government teachers and communities. Moreover, the interventions in IT were more focussed on the innovation aspect rather than feasibility aspect. The systemic impact of innovations (which tried to ride on the shoulders of temporary, low-paid workforce) raises serious concerns as they undermine government teachers and introduce monopsonistic tendencies regarding hiring unorganised temporary labour to keep the wheel turning. Furthermore, corporate raiding of NGO workforce seems to be emerging as a long term outcome of corporate sector led initiatives.

v) Are the REI-MSPs scalable and sustainable?

In view of a) the lack of resources and committed funds, b) absence of long term strategic planning, c) conflicts of interests amongst stakeholders, d) fluid accountability of private sector partners and e) non involvement of government teachers and communities, the REI partnerships are neither scalable nor sustainable and therefore cannot be endorsed as an MSP model to be followed by similar educational systems. The evidence so far indicates that REI has not established itself as an exemplar MSP which could impact and sustain change. Any claims of WEF regarding GEI and resource inputs are therefore questionable.

It is quite possible that MSPs have the potential to add value to development programmes and generate new momentum towards educational development goals. However if this has to be achieved on the ground, then the lessons from REI have to be learned and future efforts must address the weaknesses that have compromised its impact.

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Appendix to Chapter 3

Brief Field Work Plan

The Data Collection (Includes interviews and field visits)

Phase I: 30 August 2008 to 01 August 2009

Phase II: 18 February 2010 to 04 October 2010 (includes one term intermission)

Group A : Interviews with the REI officials

1. SSA commissioner (REI in-charge),
2. a) REI Deputy Directors (ICT interventions), b) REI Deputy Director (non- ICT interventions),
3. REI Consultant from GeSCI
4. Deputy Director (Urban Slums), Rajasthan
5. CEO Jaipur Municipal Corporation
6. Jaipur District Collector
7. DEEO, Jaipur
8. a) ADPC, Jaipur, b) ADPC, Udaipur
9. DD Plan Ajmer

Group B : Interviews with REI Partners since 2005-2006:

1. Programme in charge of projects from Azim Premji Foundation (2 MoUs)on
 - a) Computer Aided Learning Programme with SSA; b) Learning Guarantee Programme
2. Microsoft Academy Programme in charge
3. Hole in the Wall (2 MoUs)
 - a) Playground labs in 3 districts-Jhalawar, Tonk and Dholpur
 - b) HiWel /JMC and RCEE for Jaipur City
4. EGG –
 - post project /retrospective accounts of the partnership; new project on scale in 500 schools in District Pali
5. American India Foundation

- on Digital Equilizer Programme
- 6. Bodh Shiksha Samiti on Universalisation of Education in 324 Educationally deprived localities of Jaipur City (Janbodh Karyakram)
- 7. CISCO-networking with other project partners (to find out details)
- 8. Intel
 - Development of District Computer Education Centres into self-sustaining business centres
 - Training of students in schools with CALP and in Kasturba Gandhi Balika Vidyalaya (girls schools)
- 9. Confederation of Indian Industries (CII)
 - School adoption, monitoring and evaluation
- 10. IBM kidsmart project (to find out relation with Pratham; Mumbai education initiative)
 - 14 schools in Jaipur, ;computer education to 3-11 years old children from socially and educationally marginalised communities ;training of teachers in Microsoft Academy
- 11. ICICI Bank
 - Support to District Institute of Education and Training (DIET)
- 12. Akshay Patra- in coordination with Rajasthan Council for Elementary education- RCEE
 - Mid day meal to school children

Group C : Interviews with REI Partners 2006 onwards

- 13. Peeramal Foundation
 - learning skill training of teachers in District Jhunjhunu
- 14. NAANDI foundation (3 MoUs)
 - a) Mid day meals; b) Health Check up; c) Subsidised meals for poor families
- 15. Bharti Foundation
 - adoption of 25 schools each in District Alwar and Jaipur; Monitoring and evaluation of adopted schools; responsibility of non-recurring and recurring expenditure for schools
- 16. Sterlite Foundation (Hindustan Zinc Limited) : Access Denied for Interview
 - Computer education of 2 teachers in each of the 50 schools in Udaipur District

- 5 computers (hardware) and furniture in 50 schools; Plan for next 50 schools

17. KC Mahindra Education Trust

- Educational support to 10,000 ST girls in 290 schools in Udaipur

18. Pratham

- on teaching children of 6-14 years age group through Story card, focus on Hindi Language and Maths skills in 14 Districts

19. Blossom Charitable Trust

- 4 Districts, placement of 2 computers in each of the government upper primary schools, provision of basic computer education to all students

Group D : Interviews with new Partners of REI –signed in 2007- 2008

20. World Vision

- universalization of equitable, quality education for the disadvantaged children in 20 slums of Jaipur city and 27 Government Schools in project area.

21. Amber Trust

- Adoption of 3 schools in Jaipur District

22. UNICEF in partnership with local NGOs in 7 districts (Udaipur, Dungarpur, Baran, Banswara, Jhalawar, Rajsamand, Chittorgarh)-650 villages-ensuring access to quality education

23. Room to Read

- Setting up children's libraries(in selected schools) and enhancing reading and comprehension skills in two districts Ajmer and Bharatpur

24. One World South Asia and UNICEF

- technology-enabled helpline to serve as an aid to learning support and a professional development tool for teachers in Udaipur District

Appendix to Chapter 4:

4.1

Transcript of the GEI -2007 Video

(This transcript is focussed on the audio of the GEI video, the interviews and the narration. It does not include the visuals used in the video.)

**World Economic Forum
Committed to Improving the state of the world
The Global Education Initiative
(Title slide)**


Narration: Children from Rajasthan, Egypt and Jordan make their way to school in today's globalised world. Education is essential if you and your society is going to make progress. Providing education for all however can be a challenge .

During the World Economic Forum's annual meeting in 2003, business leaders launched 'The Global education Initiative'- a new model of multi-stakeholder partnerships, offering a new hope for millions of children.

John Chambers , CEO CISCO Systems says, ' The GEI which in Jordan will be a first move, can make a difference for a nations economic growth, skilled labour force, productivity and standard of living for a nation. It allows many nations to address the challenges they face that has been challenging us for nearly a century . The ability to give people a chance to participate in all walks of life. Give them access to jobs, and therefore chance to make a difference in the future, regardless of gender, religion or other factors. It gives us a chance to make not just a small dent in poverty but a huge dent'.

Alex Wong, Director, World Economic Forum, "We have three very successful models in Jordan, Rajasthan and Egypt. All are based on a very similar premise of a model where- by government taking leadership and companies both at the global and local level, together with donors, civil society-that if we could provide a platform with a common approach methodology, with a programme management office, that we have created a working model and now we are looking together with our partners to see how we can scale this model or share this model better with the rest of the world."

Narration: So how does it work on the ground. Jordan's Education Initiative was launched in June 2003. Here international and local companies and organisations are supporting education in the kingdom according to their own specialities and expertise and along the way transferring skills and knowledge to the local private sector. CISCO for example in partnership with RUBICON-a local Jordanian IT company, and the Jordan Ministry of Education has contributed to help built world's first kindergarten to grade 12 Maths –e curricula. In fact companies have, so far, made direct contributions totalling close to 35 million USD.



(Slide on JEI Programme Management Structure)

The key to the success of GEI model in Jordan Rajasthan and Egypt is the Programme Management Office (PMO) owned and steered by the host country government. The PMO provides the platform for collaboration and coordination. Within the PMO resides the individual programme tracks . Advising the PMO and ensuring the integrity of the programme is an independent advisory board consisting of local and global education experts. Finally overseeing the PMO is the steering committee which monitors overall implementation of the JEI programmes and the Executive Board reporting to the Head of State, In the case of Jordan, the Executive Board reports to Her Majesty Queen Rania of Jordan.

Queen Rania, “The example here heralds a new era of educational advancement. Through these different partnerships we have seen how bringing together public sector commitment with private sector creativity has really revised the whole education equation and if we can demonstrate the success and really sort of standardise it then we can use it as a model that can serve as an example for many other countries.”

Narration: India, a different country, a very different set of challenges. Rajasthan’s Education Initiative (REI) was launched in November 2005. Parents in the state often keep girls away from school. The simple provision of mid day meal is enough for many girls to be able to come to the classroom and learn. The mid day meal epitomises what education initiatives are all about. The meal is provided by Akshay Patra Foundation supported by the Confederation of India Industry, to help free up teachers to do what they do best-teaching.

The technology giant Microsoft is also working in Rajasthan, training teachers in IT skills for them to then pass on to their students. Industry has also been encouraged to adopt schools in Rajasthan and help the government in maintaining and managing schools. The Confederation of Indian Industries has adopted a few (three) primary level government schools in the state. In the adopted schools, the Confederation will deploy donor funds towards improvement of school infrastructure, teacher training, improving quality of education, provision of mid day meals, performance monitoring of teachers and students among several other areas.

Vasundhara Raje, Chief Minister, Rajasthan, “to try and bring Rajasthan into, the basic structure , therefore into a framework of a developmental state and to create an economy that will be at par with anything in India and even abroad. That’s the dream. But for that unless I have my basic infrastructure in place, my kids are on same wavelength as they would be internationally and my children are educated enough to take on that load, I would not be able to succeed.”

Narration: Information and communication technology is one of the key areas of the emphasis of

the Egyptian Education Initiative launched in May 2006. One of the ambitious aims of the partnership which includes world class firms and government ministries is, starting with students, to provide ICTs to all Egyptians at affordable cost. The country is hoping that its education initiative will act as a model that will be replicated throughout many parts of the world.

First Lady of Egypt, Suzzane Mubarak, “ I think it is developing beautifully. I mean it is really moving ahead, in all fields, with the training. Students have been trained, teachers have been trained, schools have been provided with all the necessary equipment and I think we are all amazed at the rates of success.”

Narration: The experiences of Jordan, Rajasthan and Egypt have been successful enough to now to take this model of public private partnership on to a global scale. The World Economic Forum is now teaming up with the United Nations Educational Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) to take the project to the next level.

Koichiro Matsuura, Director-General of UNESCO, “It is important to promote public private partnership with the private sector. In that context UNESCO’s new initiative with the World Economic Forum is very very crucial, given the strategic importance of the World Economic Forum in the private sector.”

Narration: Other areas being explored by the GEI include developing an index that measures effectiveness of a country’s education system, to prepare citizen’s for today’s globalised knowledge economy and mobilisation of the donor community to further explore multi-stakeholder partnerships as catalyst for education reform.

Bill Gates, Chairman of Microsoft Corporation, “ Global Education Initiative is an unprecedented opportunity to bring government, business and concerned citizens together to focus on one of the most critical issues of our day- the quality of education. From young children acquiring basic literacy to adult learners striving to acquire new skills. The future success of individuals and entire nations rests on the quality of the education that our societies can provide.”

Narration: There is an urgent need for reform in education. We are already falling short of the targets for the UN Millennium Development Goals. Girls ought to have access to education, children should be able to read and write, students must have IT skills to get along in the modern work place. Education is not for teachers and governments to care about. Its everyone’s business.

Klaus Schwab, Founder World Economic Forum, “ The Global education Initiative of World Economic Forum shall become a key instrument in creating the educated people which we need in our world in order to ensure economic and social development .”

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The Global Education Initiative**

Appendix to chapter 4

4.2

Table: The organizations and initiatives associated with the work of the UN ICT Task Force.¹

1.	Dot Force	http://www.dotforce.org
2.	African Information Society Gender Working Group	http://www.whrnet.org
3.	Association for Progressive Communication	http://www.apc.org
4.	Cisco Systems	http://www.cisco.com
5.	Cisneros Group of Companies	http://www.cisneros.com
6.	Department for International Development	http://www.dfid.gov.uk
7.	Department of Public Enterprise - Government of Ireland	http://www.irlgov.ie/tec
8.	Development Gateway Foundation	http://www.dgfoundation.org
9.	German Foreign Office	http://www.auswaertiges-amt.de
10.	Grameen Bank, Bangladesh	www.grameen.org
11.	Hewlett Packard	http://www.hp.com
12.	Industry Canada	http://www.ic.gc.ca
13.	Information Society Programme in Brazil	http://www.socinfo.org.br
14.	International Trade Centre	http://www.intracen.org/e-trade

¹ UN-ICT Task Force: <http://www.unicttf.org/stakeholders/partnerships.html> (accessed on November 04, 2009)

15.	ITU	http://www.itu.int
16.	KTF	http://www.ktf.com
17.	Markle Foundation	http://www.markle.org
18.	Ministry of Informatics and Communications of Cuba	http://www.mic.cu
19.	Network Computer Systems Ltd.	http://www.ghana.com.gh
20.	Nokia Corporation	http://www.nokia.com
21.	STMicroelectronics	http://www.st.com
22.	Stockholm Challenge	http://www.stockholmchallenge.se/
23.	Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency	http://www.sida.se
24.	Talal Abu-Ghazaleh & Co. International	http://www.tagi.com
25.	U.S. Department of State	http://www.state.gov
26.	UNCTAD	http://www.unctad.org
27.	UNDP	http://undp.org
28.	UNESCO	http://www.unesco.org
29.	UNFIP	http://www.un.org/unfip
30.	World Agriculture Information Center	http://www.fao.org/waicent
31.	World Bank	http://www.worldbank.org
32.	World Intellectual Property Organization (WIPO)	http://ecommerce.wipo.int/databases/cctld/index.html
33.	World Summit Awards	http://www.wsis-award.org

Appendix to Chapter 5

5.1: <http://www.rei.org.in/reipartnershipareas/proposed-partnership-themes>, accessed on April 21, 2011

Partnership Models

The REI proposes three models of the **Adopt a School** programme, in order to garner the collaborative synergy of the potential partners for supporting the multifaceted dimensions of school development in the state.

a. Adopt a School for Construction

1. One time construction expenditure in a specific area of infra-structural development.
2. Advisable for Senior Schools apart from Elementary Level where construction funds are available.

b. Adopt a School for Management

1. Expenditure, both recurring or non-recurring can be incurred for a Welfare and Management, Repairs and Maintenance of the selected schools.
2. This model is applicable for supporting Primary, Upper Primary, Secondary and Sr. Secondary Schools on an annual basis.

c. Adopt a School on MoU Model

1. Customized MoU can be drafted as per the needs of the adopter and the exigency of the selected school.
2. Various proposals pertaining to specific needs can be taken-up, viz., improvement of instructional quality, installation and maintenance of computer lab, facilities of drinking water and sanitation, library or play elements and rainwater harvesting system.

MoU can be

1. For one to ten years. The tenure of adoption can be extended on mutual consent from time to time.
2. Expenditure will be made with the consent of SDMC of the school and the trustee or a separate committee constituted for the purpose.
3. On a case to case basis, modification can be made to suit the needs of the adoptor.

5.2: <http://www.rei.org.in/resources/sample-template-for-making-proposal-for-rei-partnership>

Sample Template For Making Proposal For REI Partnership

1. Name and details of agency/organization/individual
 - * Legal name and contact information
 - * Nature of organization (corporate, NGO, Foundation, individual)
 - * Area of operation
 - * Experience (General/in India)
 - * Experience in Rajasthan (please specify if your organization is currently undertaking any work/programme/activity in Rajasthan, and if so, details thereof)
2. Whether partnership – participation in particular school/block/district/state (if yes, please specify details)
3. Please specify proposed area of partnership, such as
 - * Smart School Infrastructure Costs
 - * ICT Hardware costs for Smart School
 - * Mobile Computer Lab – new buses or running costs of existing buses
 - * School based telecenters
 - * Block level Resource Hubs
 - * Infrastructure provision in Govt. PS/UPS
 - * Infrastructure/maintenance/repairs
 - * School Expenditure
 - * Any other
4. Proposed mode of PPP – your role and expectations from GoR
5. Willingness to work with other partners/and suggestions regarding form of partnership
6. What are your objectives for participating in this venture? How would your objectives align with those of REI?
7. Project Narrative
 - o Background and rationale
 - o Project objectives and planned activities to contribute to the objectives
 - o Implementation Plan and Timeline
 - o Expected outcomes, outputs and milestones, if any
 - o Project Management Structure
 - o Reporting, Monitoring and Evaluation
8. Details of expected resource commitment from your organization and expectations from GoR/partners/other stakeholders
9. Other suggestion, if any

5.3 : Summary of the three school adoption partnerships

		Bharti Foundation	CII	Amber Trust
Teachers	Teachers	Appointed by the Foundation	Government Teachers	Government Teachers
	Salaries	Foundation (lower than the government scale)	Government	Government
	Training	Foundation	Government	Government
	Academic supervision and support	Foundation (appointed a team of academic support fellows)	Government (academic support) Monitoring - of attendance etc. (CII)	Government
	Extra scholastic tasks for teachers	School based only	Census, polio , elections etc.	Election duties etc.
Inputs	Curriculum	Government and materials and resource books developed by BF	Government	Government
	Infrastructure	Government school building, rooms added or the building renovated by the foundation	Government school building, infrastructure added by CII	Building renovation support
	Mid day meals	Government	Government	Government
Partnership governance	No. of schools	50 + 200 (new MoU signed for 200 schools in December 2008)	3	20

		but did not take off till July 2010(at the time of final stages of data collection))		
	Routine Interaction with the government	Nil (apart from some occasional visit by some government official)	Approached government with report of 80 schools. No communication/interaction since last 1.5 years.	Frequent at the block and district level, about the land encroachment issues, and teachers' posting in schools
	Issues	Seemingly none, apart from teachers leaving teaching, Initial problems with the community , now more acceptance	Staff not full, example given- there are 8 teachers when the staff requirement is of 13, teacher politics, government not willing to appoint teachers or depute teachers due to political pressure, remote schools in Jaipur Rural therefore, not many teachers are interested to work in those schools	Government's apathy,
	SDMC	No role	Not functional	_____
	Status of funding	Foundation supported by Airtel- a telecom company, all expenses taken care of by Foundation,	Small manufacturing enterprises adopting school for infrastructural support usually one -time input,	Funds of the Trust
	Duration of school adoption	schools have been taken on lease for 10 years	Three -five years	15 schools to be covered over a period of five years

	Area of Intervention	Block Amber: Jaipur (Rural)-24 Block Neemrana: Alwar (Rural)-25	Jaitpura: Jaipur Rural	Block Amber (Jaipur-Rural)
	Community involvement	Peripheral activities	Not active	Peripheral activities when mobilised by AT
	School visits	4 in Amber	1 Bhojlava+2 Jaitpura	3 in Amber

Appendix to Chapter 6

6.1 Break-up of PLC project fee that JMC was supposed to pay to HiWel

Item	Amount (INR)	Payment terms	Payment schedule
1. Project Management	6,50,000/-	25% (Rs 1,62,000/-) on submission of plan and specifications for PLCs	11 May 2007
		Balance monthly @ Rs 61,000/- starting 11 May for 8 months	Starting end of month from 31 May 2007- monthly till 31 December 2007
b. Awareness content	22,50,000/-	25% at submission of high level Design	11 May 2007
		75% on delivery of software	31 August 2007
c. Customised Software	10,80,000/-	25% on submission of high level design	11 May 2007
		75% on delivery of software	31 August 2007
d. Equipment maintenance	45,96,000/-	5 installments @ Rs. 9,19,200/- starting 1 st October 2007 and every six months thereafter. The equipment is in open and users are first generation users and equipment may be subject to abuse. The maintenance is	1. October 1, 2007 2. March 1, 2008 3. October 1, 2008 4. March 1, 2009 5. October 1, 2009

higher than normal
use in offices and
controlled spaces.

Total 85, 76, 000.00

The following table shows the list of project components, funding requirement, source of funding and responsibility for execution.

Project Component	Funding Requirement (in INR)	Source of Funding	Responsibility of Execution
PLC enclosures	20,00,000	JMC	JMC
Initial design, drawings, specifications and project management support for implementing	6,50,000	JMC	HiWel
Electricity	32,40,000	JMC	JMC
Internet connectivity	37,80,000	JMC	JMC
Equipment, maintenance and replacement	45,96,000	JMC	HiWel
Awareness content	22,50,000	JMC	HiWel
Customised software	10,80,000	JMC	HiWel
Computers, UPS and HiWel proprietary hardware	1,30,24,000	3 rd Party	HiWel
Research costs	1,38,60,000	3 rd Party	HiWel
Additional project Management and contingency for construction of PLCs, electricity and internet	3,50,000	JMC	JMC
Total	4,48,30,000		

6.2

Cisco partnership case study

Student Interviews:**Negative imposition - *unemployed youth***

The first level of data categorisation was undertaken to identify assessment of choices for skill development undertaken by the individual. I discuss the choices for skill development through IT Essentials course under three heads: Exploratory; Exploitative; and Pushed/Referred.

Exploratory

This category refers to the exploration of initial levels of skills to undertake a higher level course in future. The choice for undertaking skill development is also associated with newness of the skill and its attraction and prestige. There is a degree of temporary uncertainty about the skill requirement in future but nevertheless it is considered as an option. I illustrate this with the cases of 'Y' and 'M' and 'P' (see box 6.23)

(Y) saw the skill (Box 6.23) to be of some use in the BEd course he had taken up, but was not sure how it will be useful in future. Another student (M) considered this skill as a base for the next higher-level course and the higher-level course as a means to keep practising acquired skills. Finally P, who is from a family of farmers and was in the process of joining a BEd course in a private college in Jhalawar district, aimed to become a teacher. P was attracted to the course because it provided certification from an IT company and the fact that the course is conducted online. However he could not use the skill (during his BEd course counselling) of using the internet on his own and took help from the cybercafé owner. I wondered what he learnt if he could not access the internet after taking the course.

Exploitative

This category of skill choice arises from the intention to demonstrate to future employers some proficiency in IT (another line in the CV). It is not essential here what skills the course aimed to develop but the fact what benefit in terms of employment, the certification could bring. I illustrate this with the case of 'V' (See Box 6.24).

V's idea of joining the course was more of an exploitative nature since he was already professionally qualified and working. He had opted for the course in order to get a better paid job. He took up the course to add a certification of computer handling skills to his bio-data so that he could prove to his employers in the electricity (where he worked) company that he had some knowledge of computers. This earned him the position of an electricity meter reader from that of a worker installing electricity meters. Thus his salary was raised by 1000.00 INR. Previously also he had used the connections of his father (who was a lower division clerk in a government school) to get his first job. Similar personal social networks informed him about the course and its possible benefits. So he already has an idea of the job market through his networks and knows what he needs to do to find a job. He however does not aim to become a hardware mechanic or engineer. His focus is on getting a government job in the electricity department.

Pushed/Referred

This is a category of skill development choice which is somewhat similar to 'exploratory'

with the difference that the person is pushed or recommended by someone else, more likely from his family or his social network. The agency of choice is linked to the powerful other. Secondly, due to the current circumstance, there is also an uncertainty about immediate benefits of the course/skills. I illustrate this with the case of 'J'.

J's father is a lower-division clerk (LDC) in the forest department. J attended a two year diploma course to become a veterinary compounder because his father asked him to do it. Since his father worked in the forest department, this gentleman was hopeful that J would stand some chance of appointment as veterinary compounder. J has not benefited yet from this qualification. He is now studying BA. He is waiting for some vacancy, for veterinary compounders, which has not been advertised since last 10 years. When I asked him about his reasons for doing the IT Essentials course, he replied, "My father asked me to do this course."

However, as in the case of another student (U), he could not articulate the usefulness of the networking course to him. U is a student of BA final year and plans to do an MBA because his brother has suggested it. However he was not sure about the benefits the skill garnered from the IT Essentials course could bring for him (Box. 6.25).

Looking forward

The students who had completed their graduation were either preparing for administrative services and/or pursuing further studies for a professional degree course in teaching.² The IT Essentials course in computer hardware and networking is just an added skill enhancement course for these students. They appeared to be aware that they need to do an additional six-month course to be eligible to get a job in computer hardware and networking.

One student (S) interpreted my question about self-assessment of his skills quite differently from his group. He said,

² District Baran is close to District Kota. Kota is the centre of an ever thriving private coaching institutions training aspirants for Civil Service examinations and other competitive examinations to gain entry into various professional training institutions all over India. One can say that the economy of this city thrives on students with dreams of joining the Indian bureaucracy. Also there is an acute shortage of teachers in Rajasthan. With the commitment of the government and the SSA mandate to universalise secondary education there is a demand for more teachers. Rajasthan Public Service commission has been conducting tests for recruiting teachers in various grades. It is not uncommon to find young graduates in various urban centres of Rajasthan, preparing for various competitive examinations. During my interactions with teachers in the QEP programme in Baran, I met several teachers whose first career choice was to opt for administrative services but they could not succeed in the competitive examination or the interviews for the Indian administrative services. Many of them could however clear the examination for teaching positions. To the extent that one teacher told me, "I still consider myself an administrator rather than a teacher. I have been into teaching since the last 18 years but have never taught." (Discussion notes, December 2008)

“ earlier I did not know how to connect to the internet. Now I can do it on my own. I used it for online counselling for the BEd course. I did it on my own in an internet café.”³ (Interview, September 2010)

‘S’ is now a BEd student in a private college. He is a science graduate and wants to enroll for a postgraduate degree in Chemistry besides preparing for competitive exams.

This was something similar to ‘V’ (See box 6.24) who besides using the certification to gain the new role of meter reader in the electricity company mentioned his ability to take printouts of electricity meter readings entered into an Excel sheet.

The duration of the IT Essentials course is 45 days with 1 to 1.5 hour classes each day (this comes to about 70hrs over the entire course period). The duration of the class on a particular day depends upon the level of support and instruction required by individual students. All the students in the group did not have prior exposure to computers. So this was the first ever opportunity for them.

I am aware that we should not expect too much in terms of new skill acquisition from a short-term course and that there are limited opportunities to access information online.⁴ Except V none of the other seven students I interviewed had gained employment, they were into higher education. However, they did think the skills gathered would help them in future.

³ I asked students if they use cybercafés. Very few do. Two students said they went to a cybercafé once for their BEd counseling and one said that he once went to a cybercafé to ‘see’ his email. I asked him if the internet speed is slow or fast. He said it was very slow. I also asked the students if there were many cybercafés around where they lived. They said there are hardly any. One student said there were two in the area. Later, in January 2011, I was discussing the issue of internet facilities in Baran with a resident of Baran. He informed me that recently five cybercafés have come up in the main market area near Baran railway station. There are also one or two cybercafés in new residential colonies.

⁴ This group of students had gone to a cybercafé only for BEd admission counseling. During the IT Essentials course all of them had opened their email accounts but they hardly accessed their emails. When I asked for their email addresses, they said that they will share the address but since they hardly access emails, telephonic contact is better.

Appendix to Chapter 7

7.1: QEP Baran: 2008-2009; Training Plan : 9.30 am to 4.30 pm

	Duration	
9.30 - 10.15	45 min.	Morning Assembly session for feedback and discussion on previous day work
10.15- 11.30		Session I
11.30- 11.45	15 min.	Tea Break
11.45- 1.00	1 hr. 15 min.	Session II
1.00- 1.45	45 min.	Lunch
1.50- 3.00	1 hr. 10 min.	Session III
3.00- 3.15	15 min.	Tea Break
3.15- 4.30	1 hr. 15 min.	Session IV
4.30-5.30	1 hr	Review and Planning by Resource Persons/MT

Day	9.30 - 10.15	10.15- 11.30	11.45- 1.00	1.50- 3.00	3.15- 4.30
	Morning session for feedback and discussion on previous day work 45 min.	Session I 1 hr. 15 min.	Session II 1 hr. 15 min.	Session III 1 hr. 10 min.	Session IV 1 hr. 15 min.
1.	Inauguration/Registra tion/Introduction	SSA Introduction Discussions on Perspectives on Training and Plan for training		MTs work planning with groups according to the camps	

2.	Assembly and Feedback	Various views about School	Need of School	Human beings, Society and Learning	Formation and learning of Concepts
3.	Assembly and Feedback	Democratic Values	Aims of Education	Formation and learning of Concepts	Children's Learning
4.	Assembly and Feedback	<p>Teacher's Perspective: Expectations and Attitudes towards children and its impact on learning</p> <p>Reading of Article 8</p> <p>Reading time 25-30 min; followed by discussion on a set of 3 questions</p>	<p>Forms of Understanding</p> <p>Reading of Article 9 from the module. Followed by activity.</p> <p>Set of 6 statements written on a chart or display board.</p> <p>Participants asked to note down 2 questions to reflect on the six statements.</p> <p>Q1: Whether the statement is true or false?</p> <p>Q2: How to prove whether it is true or false? What are the bases for the</p>	Forms of Understanding	Forms of Understanding

			<p>conclusion? How to verify the conclusion?/how to find that the statement is true</p> <p>Three groups of participants work on 2 statements each and write their answers on chart paper.</p> <p>35 min for group work</p> <p>Followed by group-wise presentation</p>		
5.	Assembly and Feedback	<p>Forms of Understanding</p> <p>Discussion carried over from previous day</p>	<p>Vision of School</p> <p>Reading of Article 11 from the module</p> <p>20 min group work;</p> <p>Followed by discussion on given set of 4 questions</p>	<p>Evaluation of training</p> <p>MTs to ask participants to write their experience of training</p>	<p>Closing Ceremony;</p> <p>MTs can organise some cultural programme along with the participants ;</p> <p>Distribution of TA/DA</p>

Appendix 7.2

1. Excerpts form interactions at a Training camp (Date, place? IS THIS Camp 5, Day 5, December 30, 2008)

T: I have a doubt, it was discussed that the child who has more experience learns faster....relatively.

F: Yes, by that it is meant that there are comments about children that these children do not learn even though we teach them a lot. So, one issue is whether you are giving enough opportunity to experience that learning or not. We discussed this yesterday that the child takes experience from all five sense organs. We explain things in abstract and if the child has no idea about what it is then it is difficult to learn. Therefore we need to provide opportunities for experiential learning.

T: Yes, but the process of learning is different. One can say that if some children form village and some from town are taught together then they come to school with different set of experience. But it has been seen that when children from similar background, say village are admitted together in a class and taught, it is not necessary that all children will be equal in their learning. It has been seen that some children are talented and catch fast, some children learn at normal pace and some children are such that they need to repeat again and again and the outcome in such cases is seen after a long time. So the No. 1 child learners fast and we can bring the No. 2 child to his level with little effort but the No. 3 child learns what he should have learnt in 1 year , in 2 years and sometimes the situation is so bad that even if we attempt a million times we are unable to bring him up to that learning level. So the child has internal problems, his mental level is low.

MT: What you are saying about mental level, we do not consider it as weakness. The thing is that it is difference in nature. The children who take interest in education learn faster. Others who do not they lag behind. Some have interest in sports but not in studies. They are expert in sports but lag behind in studies

T: But this creates problem. The government policy is that no child should be failed. Now this child who is not learning at proper pace will go on from grade 1 to 2 to 3. And we know that this child is not yet at the level of grade 1 but have sent him to grade 3. Are we doing justice to that child? If we promote him to grade 3 he will be given grade 3 books definitely. And if we consider on our own that this child should be taught with everyone else and also grade 1 then all this is useless for the child. This child will eventually drop out.

MT: What we can do is that we can make him sit with grade 1, 2 or 3 as per the requirement. He might be able to cover what he lags.

T: But the child does not know what is going on with him. Next year he will move to grade 4 and will still lag behind.

T2: The question is why in 4 years he could not learn up to level of grade 2.

T: No, but the issue of discussion from the beginning is the mental level of the

child. His situation is such that he ca not progress at proper pace.

T3: Yes you are right. There are some children whose IQ is less. They can not learn even in 3 years.

T2: But here we are discussing the experience given to the child to enable him to learn.

T: (raises his voice, sounds angry) What do you mean? It is a practical problem. It is not that I have invented it on my own. We discuss what we do, what we are in reality. We do not talk in air. I can give evidence.

T: 'What ever is going on...is going on. The one above will see to it.

Me: Who does u mean?

T: The one above.

Me: Do you mean the Administrator or God or some foreign power?

T: All of it...who can take responsibility...No one is ready to take responsibility so what ever is going on, is carrying on.

Me: But then when we have families and face problems, do we say similar things then also? Don't we take responsibility?

T: Yes, we can't handle the problem then we say...the one above will see to it.

T2: Whenever there is some new planning in India it is imposed on teachers. No one discusses with teacher that how do we do this. So they impose on teachers and then teachers impose on children. This will go on like this because no one involves teachers.

As we were discussing this suddenly the MT moved the discussion about need for a war with one of India's neighbours because he thought that the country is creating nuisance in India by instigating terrorist activities. (Field notes, December 30, 2008)

.....

(Three more teachers enter the training hall)

T2: (raises voice).....(not audible)

T: (in much more raised voice and angry tone) the problem which we place is real problem. We are not talking fiction. We are discussing the practical problem we face in the field. We are sensitive. We are not like others. And I tell you, these trainings which are going on...if we come to our level...then we can halt your trainings. Not even a single training will proceed. There are ways of holding trainings. There are sensitivities. We have done till 1994. We know what training is. The current trainings are useless. We counter challenge each other. Stain each other ...what is the use of it all. This is a practical issue about a genuine problem. What is happening these days is that no one is concerned about genuine problem. Everyone is singing their own rhyme. To work the situation has to be corrected. One person (administrators) wants that he should get results and the other (teacher) who is standing in the field has to show/achieve those results. Who will resolve his situations? Someone wants to work genuinely but can not work. The soul pinches.

F: Yes, I understand your problem. See the grades and pass fail is a system for our convenience so that we know how the child is learning. Now as far as quality of experience is concerned we can work with him whether he is in grade 1 or 3.

T: (voice lowered) I see your point. I am with the child from grade 1-3 and I am

sensitive to his issues. But is it necessary that the other teacher who takes over from grade 4 onwards will be as sensitive as I am?

F: see...

T: (Much louder and emphatic) No. This child is destined to lag in education. This child can not progress. He will eventually go in out of school situation. And I tell you that this is the situation where we want to see the child..in other situations it will be worse.

Me: Are we hypothesising about other teacher's sensitivity? Let us focus on what we can do and what we will do in a certain situation.

T4: Madam, let me tell you one thing. Our education policy is like Indian railways. Have you seen it? I am trying to conclude what these 4 people are saying. What happens in Indian railways is that- everyone busys ticket from the ticket window. Someone is going to Jaipur, some going to Kota and some to Baran. And some will get on to this rail and have got seats and some not. I mean everyone has got ticket and are authorised to get on the train but some have got seats for others the gate won't open so they get on to the top of the train and some others get on to the steps of the train. This is the situation of our students whom our teachers are teaching. These students are class like passengers of the train. The one who has got seat is eligible and the one who is travelling on doorstep is useless.there is a desination for everyone. Some will drop out, some will reach grade 5. And this will go on... Some will reach college and some will leave studies after finishing the school. We just talk about change. We have not changed anything in 60 years of education policy. If you can write this then write. We say that 6-14 yesrs old children will get free education but I can certify and bet on it that no one is giving free education to children from 6-14 years. Indian government is not taking responsibility of this. In grade 1 in private school they interview parents then admit child in L-KG, then U-KG the grade 1. Our education policy is in such a bad shape. Researches are conducted on our education policy. Whatever research ever happens, is conducted on education. No one researches the police department. How are we going to bring change? We have one main officer, our Director who can be changed today then again tomorrow. And this Director is an IAS but has got to do nothing with education policy. The education cadre officials like District education officer, lecturer, they will never become Director. And the IAS who is education Director has no idea about the nature of problems in education.

.....

T5: (addressing the facilitator) First of all you remove the word human from the board. We are not discussing how humans learn. We are discussing how child learns.

T6: (addressing me) Yesterday, this person said that humans are two-legged animals. How can he say that?

Me: You are a science teacher. How would you discuss classification of human beings? Would you not place them in Animal Kingdom.

T6: Humans are not animals.

Me: Are humans mammals?

T6: Yes.

Me: Mammalia is classified under Animal Kingdom or not?

T6: Yes and so I say you are a woman.

Me: What do you mean?

T6: I mean to say that you are a female?

Me: Yes, so?

T6: Then I say you are an expert scholar.

Me: You will need to mention indicators for this classification. (Everyone bursts into laughter)

T5: Now I understand what you mean. You mean to say that this session is about how teachers learn. Then remove the word child too. You should write how teacher learns. You want to set the teacher right. Nothing will change, the teacher will have to change. (Camp 5, Day 5, December 30, 2008)

Appendix to Chapter 8

Sarva Shiksha Abhiyan
Manual for Planning and Appraisal
Ministry of Human Resource Development
Department of Elementary Education & Literacy
April, 2004

Excerpt:

4.6 Urban Deprived Children

4.6.0.1 An important category of children, which needs special interventions, belongs to the urban poor section of society, as almost one-third of the population of India resides in urban areas. These children are not only economically poor, but often deprived of the family support and educational environment. Children of urban poor and the deprived are often excluded from education and their coverage under UEE remains a challenge. Multiplicity of administrative units, lack of micro level units for planning and implementation and a very heterogeneous community, are some of the numerous issues affecting UEE in urban areas.

4.6.0.2 The problems of educating the deprived urban child are complex and varied. These include, lack of reliable data, inadequate schooling infrastructure, specific incentives for such children, the location of schools, and so on. Although a number of NGOs have been working in the area, yet the coverage has been small compared to the size of deprived urban children.

4.6.0.3 Moreover, urban population growth in the last decade has been unprecedented, thus, rendering the urban areas unable to cope with the ever-increasing pressure of migrants. The city plans have not been able to meet the challenges of this fast growth of urban population.

4.6.0.4 Children in such situations are a heterogeneous group, and can be classified into different categories. These would include, among others:

1. Children living in slums and resettlement colonies
2. Child workers/labourers, including children working as domestic servants
3. Street children
4. Children of sex workers
5. Children of migrant workers
6. Children in remand homes, juvenile homes, and in conflict with law.
7. Child beggars
8. Children studying in religious institutions such as Madarsa/Maktab.

A large number of urban deprived children belong to Special focus Groups e.g. SC/ST, girls, children with special needs etc.

4.6.0.5 The education of this group of children needs to be addressed specifically in the plans. Therefore, the states need to develop an urban perspective on education. Also the states need to evolve a clear-cut strategy for education of the poor in cities in general and the Deprived Children, in particular. To achieve this, city/ urban specific plans will have to be made either separately or supplementary to the district plan.

4.6.0.6 The major issues concerning the urban deprived children are:

1. It is important to realize that there are wide socio-economic disparities in urban areas. While basic services are available to the economically better off, large sections of urban populace living in unauthorized colonies/slum clusters have limited access to schooling facilities along with other basic services.
2. Government schools in urban areas coexist with privately funded schools, and are often ill-equipped in terms of infrastructure and basic amenities. Differences exist in the curriculum transacted also, particularly with reference to the study of the English language.
3. Even though children may be formally enrolled in schools, a large number—particularly girls—remain out of school. This may be on account of social and/or economic reasons, which remain unchanged even after migration from rural areas.
4. In general, there is a lack of incentive for children in urban areas to attend school. In fact, there may even be a strong disincentive in terms of loss of earning, poor quality of teaching, lack of infrastructure, the location of the school, etc. At times, the issues may be simpler, as for example, the difficulties faced by small children who need to cross a busy road to reach the local school.
5. The management structure of education in a city is also relevant—this structure varies from State to State. While in some States the local body may be charged with the responsibility of education, in others it remains with the education department of the State government. A multiplicity of agencies, generally uncoordinated, has an impact on the quality of elementary education provided to the child.
6. It is often difficult to identify a proper unit of planning. The same slum may be part of different wards. Delimitation of wards and slum is not done keeping in mind the planning needs. Identification of appropriate planning unit is another challenge in planning for urban deprived children.
7. Lack of proper and authentic database for out of school children in urban areas.
8. Severe scarcity of land for opening new schools.
9. Many of these groups such as street & working children will require long-term support and very individualized personal attention. NGO's assistance could be effective for this kind of resource support.

4.6.0.7 Thus, while planning for this group of children, the plan should clearly focus on ensuring that the strategies adopted are flexible to meet the needs of every child in different situations. In particular, while attempting to mainstream these children, it should be borne in mind that the nature of their circumstances might require longer and more intensive interventions and this may require networking with other welfare & development programmes including, health, self help groups etc. Also, there is a need for involving Corporate Sector, known for the managerial skills. Their involvement will definitely give a boost to efforts in this direction. In this endeavor, convergence with apex bodies like CII, FICCI, Chamber of Commerce, besides individual corporate houses, will prove to be useful.

Appendix to Chapter 9

9.1

Title of the MoU		MoU by and between School Education Department, Rajasthan and Bharti Foundation
Date of MoU		August 23, 2007
Name of the Organisation/s		<p>Bharti Foundation, an Indian Trust incorporated in year 2000</p> <p>School Education Department of the Government of Rajasthan</p>
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		<p>Sudhir Bhargava, Principal Secretary, School &Sanskrit Education, GoR</p> <p>Badri Agarwal. President , Bharti Foundation</p> <p>Witnesses:</p> <p>1. signature: name, designation and affiliation not printed</p> <p>2. Chetan Kapoor, DGM (Projects), Bharti Foundation</p>
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	To strengthen the network of government primary schools to have a deep and sustainable impact on the quality of education, focusing on low-income and rural areas and on underprivileged girl children.
	b) Tenure	<p>10 years (!)</p> <p>The REI was launched in 2005 as pilot of an innovative PPP model for a period of five years. This is the only MoU signed to roll out a programme on pilot scale under REI which is double its tenure (pilot phase).</p>

	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	BF will bear entire cost of the program
	d) sharing of responsibilities-specified efforts vis a vis targets-sharing responsibility	<p>GoR:</p> <p>Convey school adoption status to all important stakeholders; Joint annual review with BF; facilitate collaboration between BF and agencies like DIET, CRCs</p> <p>BF: All implementation and management responsibility; submit progress report of the project on a quarterly basis in the format to be agreed upon in consultation with REI</p> <p>All financial and non-financial support; conduct activities for awareness generation among communities and parents.</p>
	e) sharing of risk	
	f) Contract Termination	The MoU may be terminated by either Party giving two(2) months notice to the other party
B. Evaluation Framework		There will be annual review, mid-term and end-line evaluation of the project.
C. Timeframe		MoU may be terminated by either Party
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	Nothing contained in this MoU shall be deemed to grant to Government of Rajasthan and /or the School Education Department either directly or by implication, any right, by license or otherwise under any copyrights or other intellectual property rights with respect to any information or inputs provided by BF nor shall this MoU grant Government of Rajasthan and/or the School Education Department any rights whatsoever in or to BF's confidential information, except the limited right to use the information and/or the intellectual property as necessary to carry out the proposed Program between the Parties. In the event of expiration or termination of

		<p>this MoU, the obligations of Government of Rajasthan and/or School Education Department under this clause shall survive such termination or expiration</p> <p>Without obtaining the prior written consent of the other Party hereto, a Party shall not (i) refer to itself as an authorised representative of the other Party in promotional, advertising or other materials or otherwise; or (ii) release any public announcements referring to the other Party or this Agreement or (iii) use or publicize the intellectual property of the other Party.</p>
E. Policy Framework		REI
F. Management Framework		District level Steering Committees with representation from the District Education Department , local community and BF functionaries to monitor the project and seek approval for any additional mid-course shifts
G. Flexibility		<p>As above; review of the project after 10 years for further extension.</p> <p>No waiver, alteration, modification, or amendment shall be binding or effective for any purpose whatsoever unless and until reduced to writing and executed by authorised representatives of the Parties.</p>
H. Legal Framework		In accordance with laws of India and shall be subject to the exclusive jurisdiction of courts at Rajasthan.

9.2

Title of the MoU		Memorandum of Understanding between State government and Confederation of Indian Industry
Date of MoU		April 22, 2006
Name of the Organisation/s		CII Mayur Leather Products Ltd, Mayur Uniquoters Ltd, Champa Lal Jagjit Poddar Charitable Trust and Champa Lal Suresh Kumar Poddar Charitable Trust and GoR
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		CK Mathew, principal Secretary, School and Sanskrit Education, GoR RK Poddar, Managing Director, Mayur Leather Products Ltd.
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	'Adopt a School' programme of REI (three schools adopted through this MoU)
	b) Tenure	No mention
	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	Industry donor: Estimated 1. Capital expenditure of Rs 100,000 for Furniture and electric fittings 2. Capital expenditure to Akshaypatra for 1 delivery Van for transporting Cooked hot meals from Central Kitchen to three adopted schools 3. Annual Recurring expenditure of Rs. 357, 000 for mid day meals for 540 students in three adopted schools

		<p>4. Annual Recurring expenditure of Rs 135,000 for cleanliness and sanitation, payment of electricity bills and other miscellaneous expenses</p> <p>SSA:</p> <p>Capital expenditure of Rs 265,000 for repairs, construction of girls toilet, electricity connection, electric wiring etc. urgently required</p>	
	d) sharing of responsibilities- specified efforts vis a vis targets- sharing responsibility	<p>GoR/SSA</p> <p>Making available adequate number of teachers</p>	
	e) sharing of risk	-----	
	f) Contract Termination	Any of the parties may terminate this MoU at any time by giving a written notice to the other party	
B. Evaluation Framework		Industry Member will monitor use of funds, teacher training, quality of education, performance of staff, Teachers & students and use of other Government aids such as free books, mid day meal scheme, etc.	
C. Timeframe			
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	<p>CII will set up a CII-REI fund in which the donors can transfer their funds for further transfer to the respective schools.</p> <p>Funding to set up and maintain a monitoring mechanism, GoR shall assist CII to get exemption from Income Tax for donations into this CII-REI fund</p> <p>Note the move for increased control of Industry/businesses on schools /monitoring schools and</p> <p>Tax exemptions in return</p>	

	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	CII/Specific Industry advertisement will be displayed on those schools stating that such schools are being maintained by CC/donor industry
E. Policy Framework		REI, PPP
F. Management Framework		Quarterly & Annual meets of Teachers/Principals will be convened for better management solutions
G. Flexibility		Termination of MoU without a notice period
H. Legal Framework		-----

9.3

Title of the MoU		Memorandum of Understanding between GoR and Amber Trust	
Date of MoU		May 26, 2008	
Name of the Organisation/s		GoR Amber Trust	
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		<p>For GoR:</p> <p>Sudheer Bhargava, Principal Secretary, School Education, GoR</p> <p>Witnesses:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Usman Ghani, Assistant Director, RCEE Jaipur. 2. Shyamlal Sawmi, Assistant Director, RCEE Jaipur <p>For Amber Trust</p> <p>Rashmi Dickinson , Honorary Managing</p> <p>Witnesses:</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. I.S. Solanki, OSD, RCEE, Jaipur 2. Suresh Sharma, Assistant Director, RCEE Jaipur 	
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Ensure basic minimum standard of schools infrastructure • Introduce co-curricular activities • Introduce computer training • Improve access and increase school attendance • Involve children and community in educational development • Develop teachers <p>Three schools in first year rising to four or five in the later years.</p>	
	b) Tenure	Five years in phased manner	
	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	<p>GoR expenditure as per the SSA norms</p> <p>AT expects to at least match the contribution made by SSA</p>	

	d) sharing of responsibilities- specified efforts vis a vis targets- sharing responsibility	The State Government shall take note of and initiate action on suggestion made by AT	
	e) sharing of risk	-----	
	f) Contract Termination	Any of the parties may terminate the MoU at any time by giving a written notice of thirty days to the other party	
B. Evaluation Framework		AT will submit progress report of the project activities to REI in the prescribed format	
C. Timeframe		Five years from May 26, 2008	
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	AT in cooperation with GoR will find ways of PPPs to improve infrastructure	
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	AT logo will be displayed on all schools where its expenditure matches that of the GoR (SSA)	
E. Policy Framework		Right to Education; Constitutional mandate of GoR; REI to achieve SSA goals	
F. Management Framework		State government to activate a committee with the District education office and school development management committee chairperson for each school. A nodal representative of Amber trust shall participate in committee All major issue arising during implementation requiring mediation shall be dealt by the Director/Commissioner of RCEE	
G. Flexibility		The partnership shall have the flexibility to modify the programme based on the new learning during the implementation process	
H. Legal Framework		-----	

9.4

Title of the MoU		‘Hole-in-the-Wall Project’ MoU cum Agreement
Date of MoU		May 05, 2007
Name of the Organisation/s		Jaipur Municipal Corporation (JMC) Rajasthan Council of Elementary Education, Government of Rajasthan (RCEE) Hole-in-the-Wall Education Ltd. (HiWEL); a subsidiary company of NIIT Ltd.
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		Mayor, JMC CEO, JMC Commissioner (RCEE), GoR Head, HiWEL Note: Only signatures, names of signatories not printed.
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	To set up and operate 200 HiWEL Playground learning Stations (PLCs) in the government and municipal schools of Jaipur in Rajasthan; “Each site will have two computers and each site will address about 250 children. Therefore, about 50,000 children will be targeted through this project.” (Note Two computers for 250 children!) @ unit cost of 900.00 INR per child
	b) Tenure	Three years from the date of the agreement
	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	The total project cost for 3 years/36 months was INR 4,48,30,000.00 JMC to open account for the project and transfer entire fund of project Rs. 17,94,60,00.00 (this includes the amount to be paid by JMCs INR 85,76,000. 00 to HiWEL for maintenance, management, software and content of PLCs) For details of payments agreed to be made by JMC to HiWEL refer to page 7-10 of Chapter 7 on IT based

		<p>partnerships.</p> <p>Computer, UPS and HiWEL proprietary Hardware (1,30,24,000.00 INR) and Research Costs (1,38,60,000.00 INR) to be paid by the 3rd party.</p> <p>The MoU mentions that Michael and Susan Dell Foundation (MSDF) is providing funding for hardware and for PLCs. This is being managed directly by HiWEL with MSDF.</p> <p>Although the 3rd party seem to be funding a major portion of the project (almost 2/3rd) but they are not the signatories of the project.</p> <p>This was a unique partnership in REI where the government body explicitly agreed to make payments to a partner for an experiment.</p>	
	d) sharing of responsibilities-specified efforts vis a vis targets-sharing responsibility	<p>JMC: 1. Construction of PLC enclosures; 2. Electricity connections at PLCs; 3. Internet connectivity at PLCs; management fee to HiWEL @3250.00 INR per PLC</p> <p>HiWEL: 400 units of equipment, hardware, software , proofing accessories, remote monitoring system, learning content (in Hindi), data management software; services: implementation of programme, monitoring and evaluation, learning interventions, maintenance of all enclosures, equipment, hardware and software.</p>	
	e) sharing of risk	<p>HiWEL will not be responsible for damage to PLCs</p> <p>HiWEL shall not be liable for any direct, indirect, incidental, consequential, and/or other damages alleged in connection with use of these HiWEL learning stations.</p> <p>HiWEL, GoR , and JMC shall not be liable or deemed to be in default for any delay or failure in performance resulting directly or indirectly for the causes arising due to natural calamities, fire, civil disturbance and sabotage.</p>	
	f) Contract Termination	-----	
	B. Evaluation Framework	A project monitoring committee will be formed to oversee and monitor the project implementation work.	
	C. Timeframe	May 05, 2007 to April 05, 2010 (36 months)	

D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	Hardware/equipment design and source code of the software are not part of HiWEL's deliverables and GoR/JMC shall not copy, alter or modify any of the HiWEL
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	HiWEL will retain the ownership and all intellectual property rights over all its proprietary items deployed by it for this project.
E. Policy Framework		-----
F. Management Framework		All payment will be processed by the accounts team after receiving a recommendation and approval from a team of three officials one each from HiWEL, Department of Education (GoR) and Accounts (JMC)
G. Flexibility		Any additions and /or changes in scope of work shall be requested for in writing by GoR/JMC to HiWEL. HiWEL would then communicate to goR/JMC, the effect this would have on the project schedule/milestones and cost.
H. Legal Framework		In case of any dispute, claims and differences arising out of or in connection with, this set terms & conditions between GoR, JMC and HiWEL, the matter will be referred to an arbitrator mutually agreeable to the three parties. The venue of arbitration shall be Jaipur. The Courts in the City of Jaipur in the Republic of India shall have jurisdiction to entertain any proceedings related to this project, whether during its currency or after its expiry/termination. No other courts shall have jurisdiction.

9.5

Title of the MoU		IBM Kidsmart Early Learning Program Partnership
Date of MoU		September 15, 2006
Name of the Organisation/s		<p>Government of Rajasthan</p> <p>IBM India Pvt. Limited (IBM): a company registered under the Companies Act, 1956</p> <p>Pratham Mumbai Education Initiative (PMEI): a trust registered with Charities commissioner, Maharashtra under Bombay Public Trust Act (Registration No. E 15454)</p>
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		<p>CK Mathew, Principal Secretary, School Education, GoR, Jaipur.</p> <p>Farida Lambey, Executive Secretary, PMEI, Mumbai, Maharashtra</p> <p>Jatin Ahluwalia, Country Manager- Marketing, IBM India Pvt. Ltd., Bangalore.</p>
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. To offer children from low socio-economic status communities good quality teaching – learning opportunities in their pre, primary and upper primary school years 2. To offer teachers of these children access to the educational methodology and appropriate use of technology. 3. To help these children have a smooth transition from pre-primary school.
	b) Tenure	<p>MoU valid for one year from the date of signing</p> <p>Note: Annexure 2 mentions GoRs responsibility to support the Host Partner schools for a period of atleast 4 years from the date of this MoU for implementation, monitoring and supervision of the program</p>
	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	<p>No specific mention of funding.</p> <p>Note: There is a list of components of Young explorer unit- 1 computer, 1 set of furniture , 1 microphone, 1 UPS, 1 CD of the software and 1 Instruction Manual for the software. According to the MoU, the YEU were provided by IBM</p>

	d) sharing of responsibilities- specified efforts- vis a vis targets- sharing responsibility	<p>GoR , IBM and PMEI 's share of responsibilities is listed</p> <p>GoR: to build, renovate exclusive learning centres, nominate teachers, ensure host primary schools implement activities as per Annexure 2 of the MoU, monitoring , maintenance and insurance of the equipment, research and evaluation</p> <p>IBM: same as in A c); teacher taining and support; installation and supprt services</p> <p>PMEI: employ 2 project coordinators to monitor and support the Program in Target schools, provide teacher training, provide language content for use in YEUs</p>
	e) sharing of risk	
	f) Contract Termination	<p>Either of the parties may terminate this MoU by providing one month's written notice to the other. In the event of breach by any otjher party of this MoU, either of the parties may terminate this MoU with immediate effect. However in the event of termination by the Government, the Government shall forthwith return to IBM all YEUs and printers supplied pursuant to this MoU.</p>
B. Evaluation Framework		<p>PMEI responsible for teacher training, project implementation and evaluation of the project.</p> <p>Host Primary school where the programme was proposed to run was supposed to engage in research and evaluation as set out under the project. This included</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> • baseline information of children's attainments and teaching practices • periodic assessments of children's attainments • changes in teacher's use of technology in the classroom curriculum <p>In practice however the Host Primary school did not do these tasks and PMEI has to appoint volunteers through Pratham Rajasthan to carry n the project.</p>
C. Timeframe		<p>September 15, 2006- April 2007 ?</p> <p>The parties of this MoU shall implement the Program in the Government schools selected jointly ("Traget schools"), during the academic year starting July 2006</p> <p>Note 1: The programme had not actually taken off till end of 2007. In 2008-09, the programme was still on when I was in Rajasthan for the fieldwork and I visited the schools where the programme was running.</p>

		Note 2: It is not clear from the MoU if the tenure was 1 year, two years or four years.
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	Each party will be free to use and disclose ideas, concepts, techniques and know how related to Information Technology that the Party learns from having access to the other Party's materials and information.
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	IBM will own the intellectual property rights in any inventions, materials or other items in whole or in part developed by IBM Neither party may use the other's corporate name or any trade mark or name or any other items or assets protected by intellectual property rights, including but not respricted to, use in any promotional material, press releases, advertisements, communications, stationery, web sites, or the like.
E. Policy Framework		For IBM: IBM Kidsmart Early Learning Program is a Corporate Community Relations initiative from IBM, Note: No mention of any other policy framework
F. Management Framework		PMEI to appoint coordinators, liaise with all concerned parties to establish and sustain programme; GoR to ensure participation of Host Primary schools.
G. Flexibility		-----
H. Legal Framework		This agreement shall be governed by the Laws of India

9.6		
Title of the MoU		Memorandum of Understanding between Government of Rajasthan and Cisco Systems, Inc.
Date of MoU		<p>“as of the date last written below (“Effective Date”)</p> <p>“ IN WITNESS WHEREOF, the parties hereto have executed this MoU by persons duly authorized as of date and year first above written”</p> <p>October 14, 2005: Adrian Godfrey, Director-Corporate Responsibility</p> <p>October 21, 2005: Sandy Walsh, Manager-Education Programs, Asia Pacific;</p> <p>October 25, 2005: CK Mathew, Principal Secretary to Government, School & Sanskrit Education Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur.</p>
Name of the Organisation/s		<p>Government of Rajasthan</p> <p>Cisco Systems, Inc.</p>
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		<p>For Government of Rajasthan: CK Mathew, Principal Secretary to Government, School & Sanskrit Education Department, Government of Rajasthan, Jaipur.</p> <p>For Cisco Systems, Inc.:</p> <p>1. Adrian Godfrey, Director-Corporate Responsibility</p> <p>2. Sandy Walsh, Manager-Education Programs, Asia Pacific</p>
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	<p>The Government of Rajasthan and Cisco recognize the benefit of implementing the Rajasthan Education Initiative (“REI”) on the lines of the Jordan Education Initiative. To that end, both Parties intend to collaborate in the establishment of non-profit educational institutions in Rajasthan for implementing various programs on the terms as set forth in this MoU (the “Project”). This MoU is intended solely to facilitate the negotiation and preparation of agreements which embodies the final understanding between the parties (“Definitive Agreement”) (para 2, GoR-Cisco MoU)</p> <p>Exhibit A</p> <p>The Parties intend to accredit District Computer</p>

		Education Centres as Local Academies
b) Tenure		Undefined; see A (f)
c) Funding patterns/cost sharing		<p>Proposed obligation of the GoR (Exhibit A):</p> <p>B2. Fund or secure funding for the costs of acquiring necessary laboratory ('Lab') equipment for these Las.</p> <p>B4. Fund or secure funding for the annual curriculum support fee, which at present is Rs. 6500 per annum, to be paid by the Local Academy to its parent academy nominated by Cisco for ongoing mentoring and support activities</p> <p>B6. Appoint and fund a Project coordinator within the Government of Rajasthan charged with the responsibility of daily operations and as a point of contact between the relevant Parties of this MoU.</p> <p>Proposed Obligations of Cisco:</p> <p>Fund the cost of training for upto 100 instructors</p> <p>Provide free of charge to all Las the web based curriculum and online course materials</p>
d) sharing of responsibilities-specified efforts vis a vis targets-sharing responsibility		<p>The MoU has two sections: Binding terms and Non binding business terms plus an Annexure A to the Non binding business terms</p> <p>"The business terms and objectives set forth in Exhibit A shall be used for discussion purposes only and shall not be deemed to create any rights and obligations for or on behalf of any Party."</p> <p>Proposed obligations of the GoR</p> <p>1. Recommend 32 DCECs to be Learning Academies (Las)</p>
e) sharing of risk		The Parties agree to proceed at their own risk and expense regarding the subject matter of this MoU until the execution of the Definitive Agreement or termination of negotiations, whichever is earlier.
f) Contract Termination		The Parties agree that this MoU shall be effective as of the Effective Date and shall continue in effect until the earliest occurrence of one of the following: (1) the execution by the parties of the Definitive Agreement; or (2) written notice by one Party to the other of termination of this MoU. Section B (including all subsections) shall

		survive any termination of this MoU.
B. Evaluation Framework		No framework
C. Timeframe		Not clear from the MoU
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	<p>Cisco's proposed obligations</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. to provide technical support through helpdesk function 2. free of charge, web based curriculum and online course materials 3. Assistance to GoR with any issues regarding the Net Academy Programme and implementation of MoU 4. consultancy for interconnecting data centres to other locations
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	<p>There shall be no disclosure of or reference to any part of this MoU at any time during or after expiry or termination of MoU without prior written approval of the other Party.;</p> <p>The Parties hereby agree that no press release or other public announcements regarding this MoU or any agreements contemplated thereby shall be made without prior review and written agreement signed by a duly authorized representative of the other Party. (para 9, B.3, Publicity, Section B, Binding terms, GoR-Cisco MoU).</p>
E. Policy Framework		<p>Not specifically mentioned in the MoU but</p> <ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. intention of GoR to implement REI on lines of JEI 2. establishing non-profit educational institutions 3. Education department computerisation programme 4. benefit of Cisco's IT essentials curriculum to DCECs (these were established as part of XIth finance commission)
F. Management Framework		<p>Though not mentioned in the MoU, a district level management team was set up for each DCEC, comprising of District collector as Head, school principal as DCEC in-charge and DCEC instructor as member.</p> <p>Exhibit A of MoU mentions that GoR will appoint and fund a Project coordinator within the Government of Rajasthan charged with the responsibility of daily</p>

	operations and as a point of contact between the relevant Parties of this MoU.
G. Flexibility	All aspects of IT essentials curriculum are part of the non binding terms in Exhibit A of the MoU and mentioned as proposed obligations. The flexibility is so high that this kind of MoU raises questions about the public accountability of both the partners.
H. Legal Framework	<p>Limitation of Liability/Governing Law</p> <p>EXCEPT WITH RESPECT TO THE RIGHTS AND OBLIGATIONS OF THE PARTIES BASED ON THEIR RESPECTIVE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS UNDER NO CIRCUMSTANCES WILL EITHER PART BE LIABLE TO THE OTHER UNDER ANY CONTRACT , STRICT LIABILITY, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER LEGAL OR EQUITABEL THEORY FOR ANY DAMAGES OR OTHER RELIEF WHATSOEVER. Any dispute arising out of this MoU may be resolved through an Arbitrator (sic) mutually acceptable to both the parties. Notwithstanding the foregoing, either Party may seek interim injunctive relief in any court of appropriate jurisdiction with respect to any alleged breach of such Party's intellectual property or proprietary rights. (B.5, Cisco-GoR MoU)</p> <p>Exhibit A</p> <p>Non Binding Business Terms</p> <p>THIS PROPOSED BUSINESS TERMS DOES NOT CONSTITUTE NOR CREATE, AND SHALL NOT BE DEEMED TO CONSTITUTE NOR CREATE, ANY LEGALLY BINDING OR ENFORCEABLE OBLIGATION ON THE PART OF EITHER PARTY. EACH PARTY AGREES THAT IT SHALL NOT BE ENTITLED TO DAMAGES OF ANY KIND IN THE EVENT THAT THE OTHER PARTY DETERMINES, IN ITS SOLE DISCRETION, NOT TO PURSUE THE TRANSACTION PROPOSED IN THIS NON-BINDING TERMS.</p>

9.7		
Title of the MoU		A project for the Universalisation of Quality Elementary Education in the District of Baran (Rajasthan)
Date of MoU		September 05, 2006
Name of the Organisation/s		<p>Government of Rajasthan (GoR)</p> <p>ICICI Bank Limited: A company incorporated under the Companies Act, 1956 and liscensed as a Bank under the Banking Regulation Act, 1949</p> <p>Digantar Shiksha Evam Khelkud Samiti, Jaipur (Digantar): A registered non-profit society</p> <p>Vidya Bhawan Society, Udaipur (VBS): registered under Societies Act in 1941 as non government and non-profit organisation</p>
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		<p>For Government: Principal Secretary, School Education</p> <p>For ICICI Bank: Deviinder Gupta, Joint General Manager</p> <p>For Vidya Bhawan Society: Hriday Kant Dewan, Secretary</p> <p>For Digantar: Rohit Dhankar, Secretary</p>
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	Strengthening DIET and SSA processes in Baran
	b) Tenure	<p>(3+2) 5 years from the commencement of the project.</p> <p>Review after 3 years by ICICI Bank</p>
	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	<p>ICICI bank will provide a grant of up to 6.758 million INR for first 3 years.</p> <p>(No commitment of minimum funds)</p> <p>Funding for last 2 years of the project at the discretion of the ICICI Bank;</p> <p>Quarterly disbursement of funds by Bank based on review of utilisation.;</p> <p>GoR will continue to provide and allocate budgets as per</p>

		SSA norms and approved action plan
	d) sharing of responsibilities- specified efforts vis a vis targets- sharing responsibility	Resource Support Agencies (RSA) i.e., Digantar and VBS- responsible for activities with the Quality improvement Unit (QIU); GoR to ensure participation of teachers/DIET, BRC and CRC staff in the project; provide access to RSA in the government schools and academic support agencies; depute teachers and staff in the DIET, BRCs and CRCs as per SSA norms
	e) sharing of risk	
	f) Contract Termination	Upon review through the Programme steering committee if GoR finds that the project is not having the desired impact, GoR can terminate the partnership. In case ICICI bank is of the opinion that the cost /funds advanced by it for the project are not being utilised in manner satisfactory to ICICI Bank, ICICI shall be entitled to stop any further infusion of funds/cost and/or seek reimbursement of the funds/cost advanced.
B. Evaluation Framework		Review through the programme steering committee headed by the Principal secretary , Education and represented by ICICI and RSAs Progress review by the Funding Organisation (The funding partners is ICICI Bank in this case)
C. Timeframe		3+2 years Project ended after 3 years because ICICI bank stopped funding in March 2011
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	
E. Policy Framework		Constitutional obligation of the Govt of Rajasthan for achieving Universalisation of Quality Elementary Education; Collaboration with individuals, corporate bodies, trusts and other such entities as are engaged in implementation of quality elementary education across the state (this is in

	<p>reference to the SSA framework; PPP framework of the Central government-though not explicitly mentioned in the MoU);</p> <p>At the level of the ICICI Bank, the MoU is part of the Social Initiative Group of the ICICI Bank.</p>
F. Management Framework	<p>Decentralization?/redesigned centralization at the district level</p> <p>Assigning the status function of resource support agency (RSA) to the two partner organisations in the MoU and provision for organising a Quality Improvement Unit (QIU) with representation from the government as well as the RSA's</p>
G. Flexibility	<p>When necessary the parties to the MoU shall enter into further and fresh MoU to achieve the propose set forth herein by mutual consent and understanding.</p> <p>The terms of these presents shall bind the successors of each of the party herein and the terms being voluntary accepted between the parties are subject to such changes as each of the parties may feel necessary however with notice of 30 days to the other parties concerned which includes recession of these presents if so desired by either party.</p>
H. Legal Framework	<p>The responsibilities and obligations of the ICICI Bank, Digantar and VBS are commitment of voluntary nature and hence not open for contest in the courts of law.</p>

9.8		
Title of the MoU		Programme for Universalisation of Equitable Quality Elementary Education for Deprived Urban Children in Jaipur City
Date of MoU		October 21, 2005
Name of the Organisation/s		Government of Rajasthan Bodh Shiksha Samiti
MoU Signatories And (Witnesses)		For the Government of Rajasthan: Principal Secretary, School and Sanskrit Education, Government of Rajasthan For Bodh Shiksha Samiti: Secretary, Bodh Shiksha Samiti Witness: Dayaram, Programme officer , Agha Khan Foundation (AKF) Witness: Executive Director, American India Foundation (AIF)
A. Contractual Framework	a) Programme objectives/project specific targets	a) Understanding the nature and extent of the phenomenon of deprivation in the urban context with specific reference to Jaipur city; b) Providing and ensuring care and education without discrimination, for all children (6-14 years) in slums /localities of Jaipur city; c) Providing quality care and learning support to the 0-6 age group as well as left out adolescents in the above localities; d) Informing policy and practices at large about the educational scenario with regard to the education of deprived urban children; e) Building and consolidating integrated socio-systemic environment and partnerships for child care and schooling
	b) Tenure	The period of the MoU will coincide with the SSA time period-until 2010
	c) Funding patterns/cost sharing	Personnel cost: All salary of Bodh staff, engaged in quality improvement and community involvement activities will be borne by Bodh. Note: No other mention of any funding commitment

		<p>either from the government or from the organisation or other signatories as witnesses.</p> <p>In the section on Bodh's tasks and responsibilities, regarding preschool and adolescent learning centres, it is mentioned that GoR may consider funding both the abovementioned programme subsequently as per approved budget under SSA norms.</p> <p>The section on programme monitoring and reporting discusses constitution of Programme steering committee and mentions 'all organisations funding this programme' as members of PSC. The annexure of the MoU mentions Representatives from European commission, AKF, AIF, Paul Hamlyn Foundation and Banyan Tree Foundation as members of PSC.</p>
	d) sharing of responsibilities-specified efforts vis a vis targets-sharing responsibility	<p>Different set of responsibilities for Bodh and GoR. No parallel set clearly mentioned in the MoU.</p> <p>Bodh: identification of out of school children and unserved/underserved localities in Jaipur city; Setting up of Bodh school-cum-resource centres; Pre-school and Adolescent Learning centres; Capacity building of teachers and related government functionaries; Onsite support to teachers through resource teachers and academic support personnel; community participation through SDMCs, PTAs, MTAs; personnel cost of Bodh staff.</p> <p>GoR: School facilities as per SSA/DPEP norms; provision of teachers to ensure 40:1 Pupil teacher ratio; providing access to Bodh in government schools and other schooling facilities in programme area; participation of teachers/related government functionaries; evaluation-continuous comprehensive evaluation; formalising and facilitating community involvement in school management.</p>
	e) sharing of risk	No mention
	f) Contract Termination	No mention
B. Evaluation Framework		<p>Programme monitoring and reporting through Programme Steering Committee (PSC):</p> <p>Setting up of Programme steering committee under chairmanship of Secretary Education, GoR. And membership consisting of community representatives (nominated by DPC Jaipur in consultation with Bodh) and organisations funding the programme</p>

		Out of the 17 members enlisted as committee members, 5 are representatives of funding organisations, 2 from Bodh, three from community (one each from SDMC, MTA, PTA)
C. Timeframe		The period of the MoU will coincide with the SSA time period-until 2010
D. Knowledge Framework Including Confidentiality Clause-	a) sharing and intra firm transfer of best practices	Community based, child centred and congenial classroom processes to facilitate smooth and educationally productive schooling of urban deprived children (Bodh's experience of 17 years);
	b) Clause on confidentiality and IPR	
E. Policy Framework		Government Policy: SSA and UEE, partnerships to realise SSA objectives- 'the state is set to partner with Individuals, Institutions, Trusts, Corporate bodies and other such entities as are engaged in the realization of the objectives decided by the SSA.' ; decentralised democratic governance
F. Management Framework		Same as above in B
G. Flexibility		No particular mention in terms of programme expansion or extension. In practice the organisation did sign extension MoUs with the government of Rajasthan.
H. Legal Framework		No mention