Causes and consequences of public and private acculturation preferences

Views of minority and majority group members in three countries

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I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be submitted in whole or in part to another University of the award of any other degree.

Signature: ....

To Mirthe, her cute little smile provided me with magical thesis-writing motivation.

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University of Sussex

Linda Kirsten Tip, PhD in Psychology

Causes and consequences of public and private acculturation preferences:

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Summary

This thesis explores antecedents and effects of public and private acculturation preferences of minority and majority group members. By differentiating between acculturation in public domains (outside one's home) and private domains (at home), and by reporting experiments, longitudinal data, and qualitative data, this thesis provides fuller insights in the acculturation process than previous literature, which has predominantly been correlational and lacked domain specificity.

Chapter one provides a critical overview of the acculturation literature.

Chapter two describes the results of three experiments investigating domain specificity in meta-perceptions of acculturation. In Study 1, we manipulated how Muslims were perceived to acculturate in *public* domains, and investigated how this affected own acculturation preferences and affective reactions of British majority members. Study 2 was similar, but perceived *private* acculturation preferences were manipulated too. In Study 3, we examined how the *public and private* acculturation preferences which British majority members were perceived to have affected own acculturation preferences and affective reactions of Muslim minority members.

Chapter three presents Studies 4 and 5 which experimentally investigated the effect of perceived ingroup norms about acculturation preferences for public and private life domains. Dependent variables were majority members' own acculturation preferences for public and private domains, their investment in acculturation, and positive affect felt towards their own ingroup members. This was studied in both England and Chile.

Chapter four looks into effects of public and private acculturation of Muslim minority members on their well-being and intergroup emotions. Both cross-sectional and longitudinal data are presented from two samples: Muslims in England (Study 6) and Muslims in the Netherlands (Study 7).

Chapter five reports interviews with fourteen Muslims living in England in which they explain their reasons for their public and private acculturation choices (Study 8).

Chapter six summarises the findings, and discusses implications and directions for future research.

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Chapter 1

Acculturation

"London is so cosmopolitan, there are so many people; anywhere you see tons of other people with a headscarf. Tons of people that are, you know, quite obviously Muslim... When we see each other on the train, it's always like... We have a greeting... We always say "Salam Alaikum", and that... You know, when you pass somebody, that's something that they smile and say to you, even though you have absolutely no idea who that person is. But it's kind of a nice... It makes you feel like you belong to a community"

A Muslim woman living in London

Immigration numbers in Europe are rising (Office for National Statistics, 2011), and it is becoming increasingly common for majority members to discuss the way in which minority members "adapt" or "should adapt" to the way of life of the majority. Examples are speeches by David Cameron in the UK (The Independent, 2011) or Angela Merkel in Germany (The Guardian, 2010), who both blame what they call the 'failure of multiculturalism' in their respective countries on a lack of adaptation on the side of minority members. On the other hand, experiences such as those expressed by the Muslim woman living in London quoted above, indicate that minority members may have positive outcomes by maintaining their heritage culture, too. The adaptation of immigrants and their descendants to the country of settlement, and of majority members to these newcomers, is affected by numerous sociological and psychological factors. Attitudes and behaviours towards ethnic minorities influence the social climate towards immigration and ethno-cultural diversity (Bourhis, Moïse, Perreault, & Sénécal, 1997). Better knowledge about this social climate of acceptance or rejection is useful and important for several reasons.

To start, minority members will adapt poorly when they face rejection (Dahlberg, 1998), but majority members who blame ethnic minorities for their 'lack of adaptation' may create an even more negative climate for intergroup relations between minority and majority members, generating a downward spiral of negativity in a multicultural society. This is particularly problematic because it is likely that migration rates will continue to grow. The

number of possible reasons for migration is wide in range. For example, disparities in economic affluence, war, political oppression, and natural or man-made disasters will continue to produce countless new migrants annually (e.g., Rudmin, 2003; Van de Vijver & Phalet, 2004). At the same time, with globalisation, international recruitment is becoming increasingly common and borders are becoming more porous. For example, inhabitants of the European Union do not need anything more than a passport to live and work without limits in any of the countries within the European Union. New developments in international transportation and communication will make it even easier for people of differing cultural backgrounds to be in contact worldwide.

All of this will contribute to the emergence of intercultural contact and culturally plural societies, making it essential to understand the psychology of multicultural individuals, or people who have been influenced by different cultural traditions. After all, this development means that people will have to learn about more than one culture (Church, 1982), and this is often not as easy as it may seem at first sight. For instance, minority members need to cope with the difficulties that come with living in a culture that differs from their own (Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987). This may become even more complicated if they start a family in their new country. Several studies have shown that families consisting of minority members may suffer from intergenerational conflict, or tension between immigrant parents and their children (Drachman, Kwon-Ahn, & Paulino, 1996; Ying & Chao, 1996). In addition, immigrants and other minority members are often lower in status than the dominant group (Moghaddam, 1988), and obstacles such as social disadvantage and discrimination can make it very difficult to improve this status (Kagitçibasi, 1997). Better understanding of attitudes of both ethnic minorities and majority members is needed in order to reduce the potential intercultural conflict and distress that may result from adapting to a new culture, and to design more efficient intervention programmes that will improve attitudes towards ethno-cultural diversity and specific minority communities. Therefore, this PhD thesis will examine the process in which immigrants and their descendants adapt to their country of settlement, and the process where majority members adapt to these newcomers.

Conceptualising acculturation

When groups of different cultural and religious backgrounds live in the same country, changes can occur in the original cultural pattern of either or both groups. This process is known as acculturation (Redfield, Linton, & Herskovits, 1936). During the past few decades, acculturation has been conceptualised with different models and has been investigated using

different measurements (see Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007). This chapter will give an overview of the developments that have taken place during the last four decades in acculturation research, and aims to identify gaps in this field of research that will subsequently be addressed in this thesis.

Up to the 1970s, acculturation was described in the literature mainly as a process of assimilation: ethnic minorities were expected to let go elements of their native culture, and instead adopt the culture of their new country of settlement (e.g., Bierstedt, 1963; Gordon, 1964; Taft & Johnston, 1967; and see Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). This policy was known as 'the melting pot' in the USA (Berry, 2005), and is still the official policy in France (Barette, Bourhis, Personnaz, & Personnaz, 2004; Sabatier & Boutry, 2006). This view on acculturation is summarised in a unidimensional model, which conceptualises acculturation as a process on one single continuum: as parts of the native culture are discarded, elements of the mainstream culture are adopted (e.g., Gordon, 1964; and see Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007). That is, this model conceives of acculturation as a one-directional and irreversible process of moving toward the host culture and away from the original ethnic culture (Trimble, 2003).

One of the first people to point out that minority members have more options than just those pictured by the one-dimensional model was the historian Herbert London. He explained that when minority and majority members interact with one another, this may lead to a cultural change in minority members, but that they do not necessarily lose their original ethnic identity (London, 1967). He called this integration. Sommerlad and Berry (1970) were inspired by London's idea and noted that although complete assimilation to the dominant society would be a likely option for an individual belonging to a small minority group, when a minority group is relatively large it would be possible to maintain one's values and beliefs while simultaneously contributing to the dominant society, and thus integrate in the way described by London (1967). In a study on Aboriginals in Australia, Sommerlad and Berry (1970) found that assimilation and integration were indeed different from one another, and that research should ensure to distinguish between the two as they may have different consequences.

Most subsequent work on acculturation suggested that individuals can successfully develop competency within more than one culture (e.g., Berry & Sam, 1997; Laroche, Kim, Hui, & Joy, 1996; Ogbu & Matute-Bianchi, 1986; Tsai, Ying, & Lee, 2000), thereby creating a view of acculturation as a bidimensional, two-directional process, in which assimilation into the mainstream culture is not the only way to acculturate (for reviews see Arends-Tóth & van de Vijver, 2007; Flannery, Reise, & Yu, 2001; Ryder, Alden, & Paulhus, 2000; Sam & Berry, 2006;

Zane & Mak, 2003). At the same time, an increasing number of minority members began to indicate that they endorsed a way of living different from complete assimilation to the dominant culture. Instead, they had a preference to maintain their heritage culture, either with or without the combination of adopting aspects of the culture of the majority (Van de Vijver & Phalet, 2004). Van de Vijver and Phalet (2004) gave two possible reasons for this phenomenon: First, they suggest that the fast growing migration numbers may have stimulated this. An additional explanation they give is that is that over the years, it has become less accepted for majority members to endorse assimilationist policies, and many societies have moved towards a climate where culture maintenance on the side of minority members is now accepted. The growing call for multicultural understanding and use of pluralistic policies in Western societies has also been highlighted by Smith and Bond (1998).

For those reasons, the bidimensional model portrays cultural maintenance and adaptation as two independent dimensions. That is, acculturation is no longer seen as a linear process, in which ethnic minorities move from unacculturated to assimilated but, instead, it is defined as a multidimensional process that includes the orientation to both the heritage culture and the dominant culture (Phinney, 1996). Thus in this model, adoption of the host culture does not necessarily accompany a decrease in maintenance of the heritage culture (e.g., Berry, 1997; Hutnik, 1986; Sanchez & Fernandez, 1993; Sayegh & Lasry, 1993; Szapocznik, Kurtines, & Fernandez, 1980).

At the present time, the most widely used bidimensional acculturation model is that of Berry (e.g., Berry, 1997; Berry, Kim, Power, Young, & Bujaki, 1989). In his bidimensional model of acculturation, Berry has summarised the ways in which ethnic minorities can adapt to living in a new country, based on two dimensions: the extent to which an individual wants to maintain his or her own ethnic culture, and the extent to which an individual wants to have contact with members of the majority group. Crossing these two dimensions produces four acculturation attitudes, which are displayed in Figure 1: *integration*, a minority member wants to maintain his or her own culture and in the same time be in contact with the majority; *separation*, where the individual maintains his or her own culture, but sees no need for contact with the majority; *assimilation*, when individuals see no need for maintaining their own culture, but would like to be in contact with the majority group; and *marginalisation*, when the individual wants neither to maintain his or her own culture nor to be in contact with the majority.

ISSUE 1

Is it considered to be of value to maintain cultural identity and characteristics?

"YES"   "NO"

ISSUE 2

| Is it considered to be "YES" of value to maintain relationships "NO" with other groups? | INTEGRATION ASSIMILATION SEPARATION MARGINALISATION |

Figure 1. *The four acculturation attitudes based on orientation towards issues of cultural maintenance and intergroup contact (from Berry, Kim, Minde, & Mok, 1987).*

Although Berry refers to the integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalisation as acculturation attitudes (e.g., Berry et al., 1987; Berry et al., 1989), they have also been referred to as alternatives, feelings, goals, identities, modes, options, orientations, outcomes, paths, policies, preferences, statuses, strategies, and styles (Berry, 1988; 1992; 1994; 1997; Berry et al., 1989; Berry, Poortinga, Segall, & Dasen, 1992; Hutnik, 1991; Williams & Berry, 1998; Ward, 2008; and see Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001). Some of these terms are more appropriate than others. For example, 'acculturation options' implies that minority members are free to choose whichever acculturation attitude pleases them. This is not always the case; it can be beyond the power of the minority members. The majority group has more influence and power regarding the process of acculturation in comparison to minority groups (Geschke, Mummendey, Kessler, & Funke, 2009). The majority group is larger and has often lived in the respective country for a longer period of time, therefore the country's policies are much more influenced by their culture than by minority cultures. Yet, the results of the acculturation process are most consequential for the minority group members (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003). It is important to keep this power difference in mind when discussing acculturation processes, therefore I will only refer to acculturation with terms which do not have the implication of the acculturation process being one of free choice, such as preferences or attitudes.

Another term for acculturation that is conceptually distinct from other terms is 'identities'. Instead of using Berry's two dimensions to get to the four acculturation attitudes, some researchers have treated acculturation as a matter of identification (Hutnik, 1991; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, in press; Phinney, 1990, 2003; Phinney, Horenczyk, Liebkind & Vedder, 2001). That is, they investigated whether minority members identify only with their ethnic culture, with the dominant culture, or both. Although an acculturation model of identification may seem similar to Berry's (1997) model, there is a crucial difference. Identity involves conscious endorsement, whereas cultural orientation does not (Tsai, Chentsova-Dutton, & Wong, 2002). For example, an individual of Pakistani background living in England may behave very similarly to English people, but could still unambiguously identify with the Pakistani culture. Smith (1986) noted that being part of an ethnic group has remained a significant part of how ethnic minorities view and describe themselves, even over many generations. Identification does not simply refer to one's ethnic ingroup as it currently is, it contains a reference to a larger historical context too (Takei, 1998). Since an individual's identification is not necessarily noticeable in daily life, whereas cultural orientation is, this thesis will look into cultural orientation rather than identification.

Ward & Kennedy (1994) suggested a different modification to Berry's (1997) acculturation model: to replace the contact dimension (the extent to which an individual wishes to have contact with members of the majority group) with a dimension measuring how much ethnic minority members consider it to be of value to adopt the culture of the dominant group. The reason for this was that it would be a better match with the culture maintenance dimension: It had been argued that Berry's (1997) dimension of culture maintenance assessed attitudes whereas the contact dimension measured a behavioural intention regarding the desirability of having contact with the host society (Sayegh & Lasry, 1993). Many researchers adopted this suggestion in subsequent acculturation research (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997; Farver, Narang, & Bhadha, 2002; Hwang & Ting, 2008; Nguyen, Messé, & Stollak, 1999). Snauwaert, Soenens, Vanbeselaere, and Boen (2003) compared the contact conceptualisation with the adoption conceptualisation of acculturation in a sample of Turkish minority members in Belgium. They found that these two conceptualisations were perceived as rather different by minority members. Their participants found it more important to have contact with Belgian majority members than to adopt the Belgian culture. That is, minority members who want contact with the majority do not necessarily want to adopt the dominant culture. Consequently, depending on which conceptualisation is used, minority members may be categorised as either integrationists or separationists. I agree that culture adoption is indeed a

better match with culture maintenance than contact, and being a minority member in England myself, I have experienced that it is very well possible to have a large amount of contact with majority members without adopting their culture. Therefore, when possible, I prefer to focus on culture maintenance and culture adoption when measuring acculturation. However, it will be noticed that I have used both approaches in this thesis. Whenever possible, the focus was on culture adoption, however in Chapter 4, the needs and practicalities of the research presented made an investigation of contact a better option, which will be further explained in the method section of that chapter.

It is important to note that Berry's (1997) definition of integration differs conceptually from how the same term is often used in the media. Lay people often understand integration as being unidirectional: minority members are expected to integrate into the existing culture and abandon their heritage culture. Similarly, many political discussions about integration assume that integration refers to conformity to a homogenous set of norms and values in a monocultural society (Castles, Korac, Vasta, Vertovec, 2002). In these cases integration refers to what Berry (1997) would classify as assimilation, whereas in this thesis integration will refer to maintaining one's heritage culture combined with adoption of the culture of the country of settlement.

Measuring acculturation

The way in which acculturation is measured depends on the model that is used. When the researcher adopts the unidimensional model of acculturation, then acculturation is usually measured on bipolar, single dimension scale, ranging from complete culture maintenance at one pole to complete adoption of the dominant culture at the other pole. For example, a scale could range from (1) 'Mainly Pakistani' to (5) 'Mainly English' (see Suinn, Ahuna, & Khoo, 1992). Every aspect of life in which one could acculturate is measured using a single item, therefore this method is also known as the one-statement measurement (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007).

If, however, a researcher uses a bidimensional model of acculturation, then there are two options. The first option is to measure acculturation using two separate scales: the first measures involvement in the heritage culture – usually known as desire for cultural maintenance, whereas the second measures adoption of the dominant culture – desire for culture adoption (or for intergroup contact). This is also referred to as the two-statement measurement method (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007). For example, participants could indicate their degree of involvement in Pakistani and English culture by answering questions

about a variety of activities such as media usage or food preference using a scale ranging from (1) 'Never' to (5) 'Always' (see Donà & Berry, 1994). The second option is to use what is called the four-statement measurement method, which includes four scales with statements capturing attitudes toward each of Berry's (1997) acculturation attitudes. Thus, separate items are used to measure attitudes toward integration, assimilation, separation, and marginalisation. For instance, "Because we live in Canada, we are always pressured to assimilate to Canadian lifestyle. Thus we must emphasise our distinct Korean identity and restrict our association with Canadian society" would measure separation, "While living in Canada we can retain our Korean cultural heritage and lifestyle and yet participate fully in various aspects of Canadian society" looks into integration, "We're living in Canada and that means giving up our traditional way of life and adopting a Canadian lifestyle, thinking and acting like Canadians" refers to assimilation, and "Politicians use national pride to exploit and to deceive the public" makes a reference to marginalisation (see Berry et al., 1989). Response options usually range from (1) 'Strongly disagree' to (5) 'Strongly agree'. The four-statement method has been criticised by many (e.g., Dona & Berry, 1994; Kang, 2006; Rudmin, 2003; Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001; Ryder et al., 2000; Ward & Rana-Deuba, 1999; Zane & Mak, 2003), because of its psychometrical and methodological limitations. For example, the items used in the four-statement method often contain double-barrelled items which ask two questions in one item, meaning it is unclear to which part of the item the participant is answering. Also, the four-statement items tend to contain double negations, which may confuse participants. In addition, the items are often longer than recommended and thus sometimes difficult to understand for participants (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007; Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001).

Many minority members are multicultural rather than monocultural (Benet-Martínez, Leu, Lee, & Morris, 2002) and nowadays there is robust evidence supporting the psychometric validity of the bidimensional model and the advantages of its use over unidimensional models (Flannery et al., 2001; Ryder et al., 2000; Tsai et al., 2000). For example, Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver (2007) compared the different acculturation measurements mentioned above by measuring acculturation attitudes using all three different methods in two studies with Turkish minority members in the Netherlands. In their comparison, it was revealed that participants had difficulties with the relatively complex items used in the four-statement method. Furthermore, when conducting a factor analysis on the items used for the four-statement method, they found that the factors extracted did not correctly represent the four acculturation preferences. Fewer problems but similar results were observed with the one-

and two-statement measurement methods. Although the one-statement method showed to be a simple and easy-to-interpret way of measuring acculturation, Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver (2007) pointed out an important limitation of this method: scores on the midpoint of this scale do not differentiate integration and marginalisation. Several other researchers had noted this constraint too (e.g., Ryder et al., 2000; Szapocznik et al., 1980). Other reasons why Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver (2007) recommend avoiding unidimensional scales is because there is an untested assumption in these scales that the change from separation to assimilation always goes via integration or marginalisation, and because the underlying model incorrectly equates involvement in one culture to a lack of involvement with the other culture (see also Nguyen, & Benet-Martínez, 2007). In conclusion, the best way to measure acculturation attitudes seems to be with a bi-dimensional, two-statement scale, measuring the underlying acculturation dimensions rather than the four strategies, which is what Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver (2007) concluded in their comparative research too. The fact that this method gives an opportunity to investigate the relationship between culture maintenance and culture adoption makes it advantageous to the one-statement method. Therefore, wherever possible, I will use the two-statement method to measure acculturation.

A bi-directional process

Traditionally, acculturation research was focussed only on minority members. Yet, immigration actually implies an adaptation process on not only the part of the migrating group, but also on the part of the host society. Castles and colleagues (2002) noticed that this aspect tends to be ignored by the general public. They conducted research into the integration of immigrants in England and pointed out that while popular views suggest that integration is a one-way process, in the sense that minority members should adapt to the host society, expert opinions agreed that integration is a joint responsibility: majority members should also adjust and adapt to meet the needs of minority members. In their view, a multicultural society provides an opportunity for both minority and majority members to increase positive relationships and participation in society. Ager and Strang (2004) also emphasised that both majority and minority members should strive to create possibilities for minority members to participate in society. As mentioned earlier in this chapter, the majority group usually has more influence and power over the process of acculturation than minority groups (Geschke et al., 2009). For these reasons a growing amount of acculturation research has underlined the importance of considering not only the acculturation attitudes held by ethnic minorities, but

also those endorsed by members of the majority (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997; Piontkowski, Florack, Hoelker, & Obdrzálek, 2000; Zagefka & Brown, 2002).

For example, acculturation models developed by Bourhis et al. (1997) and Piontkowski, Rohmann and Florack (2002) integrate acculturation preferences of both minority and majority members into one model. Bourhis and colleagues (1997) describe an Interactive Acculturation Model (IAM) which contains the following dimensions in one single framework: the acculturation attitudes of the ethnic minority members in the host society, the way in which majority members would like minority members to acculturate, and the relational consequences which result from the combination of the acculturation attitudes of minority and majority members. Bourhis et al. (1997) followed Ward and Kennedy's (1994) suggestion to replace Berry's (1997) contact dimension with a dimension of culture adoption of the dominant culture to complement the culture maintenance dimension. Regarding the acculturation attitudes of majority members, the IAM proposes that their acculturation attitudes are based on two dimensions too. The first dimension describes whether majority members find it acceptable that minority members maintain their heritage culture, while the second dimension refers to whether they accept that immigrants adopt the culture of the host community. The IAM states that acculturation preferences of majority members may be predictive of their behavioural intentions towards minority members. For example, they are predictive of relational outcomes and miscommunications with minority members, and of having stereotypes and discriminating against ethnic minorities (Bourhis et al., 1997). More importantly, according to the IAM, the specific *combination* or fit of the acculturation attitudes held by minority and majority members can generate consensual, problematic, or conflictual outcomes for the relations between the two groups. Consensual relational outcomes are positive outcomes in relationships between minority and majority members, such as positive and effective communication, positive attitudes towards the other group, low feelings of stress, and rarely any discrimination. These consensual outcomes take place when both majority and minority members share the same integration or assimilation acculturation attitudes. Problematic relational outcomes are predicted when the majority and minority group experience both partial agreement and partial disagreement with regards to their profile of acculturation orientations. For example, problematic outcomes emerge when minority members prefer to integrate while members of the dominant society prefer them to assimilate (or vice versa). Problematic outcomes are for example a breakdown in communication between members of different groups, an increase in negative intergroup stereotypes or even discriminatory behaviours, and an increase in acculturative stress, particularly among minority

members. Conflictual relational outcomes are the most negative of the three possible relational outcomes and will appear when either minority members or majority members are in support of a separation strategy. Majority members wanting separation are likely to have very negative stereotypes and discriminate against minority members. In such a situation, stress may increase among minority members.

The basic principles of the IAM are in line with what Rokeach (1960) suggested in his belief congruence theory, namely that differences in beliefs between ingroup and outgroup members will create feelings of prejudice. However, the IAM also has several limitations, which I will discuss in the next section.

Perceived acculturation

The first criticism on the IAM was already put forward by its developers (Bourhis et al., 1997). That is, they noted that although the IAM investigates *actual* acculturation attitudes of minority and majority groups, subjective *perceptions* of the other group's acculturation attitudes might also be important for relational outcomes. Actual acculturation attitudes refer to what the minority group and the majority group's true preferences are in terms of acculturation. Perceived acculturation attitudes are slightly different: these provide information about which acculturation attitudes majority members think are endorsed by the minority, and vice versa. The importance of people's perceptions of the acculturation of the other group has been noted by many other researchers (e.g., Matera, Stefanile, & Brown, 2011; Navas et al., 2005; Navas, Rojas, Garcia, & Pumares, 2007; Tip, Zagefka, González, Brown, Cinnirella, & Na, 2012; Zagefka, Brown, Broquard, & Leventoglu Martin, 2007; Zagefka, González, & Brown, 2011; Zagefka, Tip, González, Brown, & Cinnirella, 2012). For example, Tip et al. (2012) found in three separate surveys in England that when English majority members perceived minority members to maintain their heritage culture, they experienced more feelings of threat. In contrast, a perception of minority members adopting the English culture was related to lower threat perception among members of the dominant group. In addition, researchers pointed out that self-reported acculturation attitudes are not always in accordance with the subjective perception of this attitude by the other group (e.g, Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Navas et al., 2007; Roccas, Horenczyk, & Schwartz, 2000; Rohmann, Florack, & Piontkowski, 2006; Van Oudenhoven, Prins, & Buunk, 1998; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). In the Netherlands, for instance, Dutch majority members thought that separation was the strategy most chosen by Turkish and Maroccan minority members, whereas these minority members themselves indicated they preferred to integrate.

Piontkowski et al. (2002) suggested that a *perceived* fit between own acculturation preferences and those of the outgroup may be more important for psychological understanding than an actual fit between the two. Van Oudenhoven explains this importance of perceptions (Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). He pointed out that since there are more individuals belonging to the majority group than to the minority group, it is likely that a larger proportion of minority members have contact with the majority group than vice versa. Since majority members then notice that only few of their ingroup members are in contact with minority members, they may interpret this as a lack of wish for contact from the side of the minority. In turn, this misperception may be intensified by the majority members' tendency to interpret the behaviour of minority members in line with their negative expectations (Hewstone, 1989; Pettigrew, 1979). For instance, even when an English majority member notices a Pakistani minority member adopting certain aspects of English culture, this Pakistani individual may be seen as an exception, i.e., not a typical Pakistani minority member. When majority members misunderstand minority members, it is feasible that majority members perceive a loss of control over the behaviour and ideas of minority groups. This lack of control has been found to have a negative effect on intergroup relations (Dijker, 1989). Taken together, the applied value of the IAM seems limited because it only focuses only on measurements of actual acculturation attitudes of minority and majority members, rather than looking into perceived acculturation attitudes.

Moreover, Piontkowski and colleagues (2002) called attention to the fact that the IAM does not differentiate between problematic or conflictual relational outcomes that come forth from differences between minority and majority members in the attitudes towards culture maintenance, and those that are the result from differences between attitudes towards contact and culture adoption. They argue that culture maintenance is strongly related to identification (Florack & Piontkowski, 2000; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998), and that therefore disagreement over culture maintenance between minority and majority groups should have stronger effects on the relational outcomes than disagreement over contact or participation. For example, some theorists suggest that majority members view immigrants' desire to maintain their heritage culture as a threat to the majority culture and to the unity of their country (Schalk-Soekar & Van de Vijver, 2008; Tip et al., 2012; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). In turn, the minority's identity could be threatened if the majority refuses to accept maintenance of their heritage culture, because it can be assumed that ethnic minorities usually want to maintain their cultural values (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994).

In order to create an acculturation model that addresses the shortcomings of the IAM, Piontkowski and colleagues (2002) developed the concordance model of acculturation (CMA). This model includes the role of perceived acculturation attitudes rather than actual acculturation attitudes, and examines the role of the effects of discrepancies on the contact and culture maintenance dimensions separately. The CMA defines four types of combinations of acculturation attitudes held by majority members and attitudes that they perceive minority members to have. These combinations are defined to be consensual, culture-problematic, contact-problematic, or conflictual. A consensual level is reached if the attitudes of the majority perfectly match the attitudes they perceive minority members to have (with the exception of marginalisation). If this is the case, it is safe to assume that the acculturation process will take place without substantial problems and that intergroup relations will be relatively conflict-free. In contrast, a problematic combination exists if attitudes of majority members differ from attitudes they perceive minority members to have on one of the two dimensions of acculturation. That is, a culture-problematic combination of acculturation attitudes occurs when attitudes and perceptions mismatch on cultural maintenance, while a contact-problematic combination arises when attitudes and perceptions mismatch on the contact dimension. Lastly, there will be a conflictual combination when attitudes differ on both culture maintenance and contact, or if the dominant group prefers exclusion. Piontkowski and colleagues (2002) predicted that a consensual level would be associated with positive intergroup relations, low feelings of threat, and few negative stereotypes. The problematic combinations were expected to lead to less positive intergroup relations. Finally, a conflictual combination was predicted to be associated with negative intergroup relations and high feelings of threat.

The CMA received empirical support from a number of studies (e.g., Piontkowski et al., 2002; Rohmann et al., 2006; Rohmann, Piontkowski, Van Randenborgh, 2008; Zagefka & Brown, 2002). For example, Piontkowski et al. (2002) found evidence among German majority members that the different levels of concordance between perceived acculturation attitudes of Polish and Italian minority members and their preferred acculturation were related to perceptions of threat in the predicted directions. Zagefka and Brown (2002) found that the fit between perceived and preferred acculturation among German majority members was related to ingroup bias, perceived intergroup relations, and perceived discrimination, all in the directions predicted by the CMA.

What distinguishes the two concordance models of acculturation from Berry's (1997) acculturation framework is that they do not only focus on outcomes for the acculturating

individual, but also take into account the effects on intergroup relations when minority and majority members have matching or mismatching acculturation attitudes. This interaction between the dominant group and minority groups and how they perceive one another is a key aspect of the present thesis. I will elaborate on the details at a later point in this chapter.

The "best" acculturation strategy

From the models introduced above, one would conclude that any matching combination of the acculturation attitudes held by minority and majority members would be desirable in a society, irrespective of whether it is a match of integration, assimilation, individualism, or separation attitudes. Yet, a wide array of research investigating the advantages and disadvantages of the different acculturation attitudes has concluded that certain acculturation attitudes have more benefits for both individual well-being and for intergroup relations than others. For example, Bochner (1982) pointed out that individuals who choose to integrate have the advantage of being able to maintain their own culture and identity. Consequently, integrating individuals can choose desirable characteristics from both cultures and combine them, without losing their own cultural background. Integration has a positive influence on personal development (Van Oudenhoven, 2008), and integrated individuals experience less ethno-cultural identity conflict than separated, assimilated, or marginalised individuals (Ward, Stuart, & Kus, 2011). In sum, integration tends to be the most adaptive acculturation attitude in many settings, generating the best psychological, socio-cultural, and health outcomes for immigrants, as well as more favourable intergroup attitudes (Berry, 1997; Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, in press; and see Brown & Zagefka, 2011; but see Rudmin, 2003, 2006). In contrast, marginalisation has worst acculturative results (Berry, 1997). This pattern has frequently been confirmed by empirical research (Berry et al., 1992).

Notably though, there are a few exceptions to this pattern. Some researchers argue that integration may be maladaptive and can create stress, because integrating minority members could feel like they are being pulled from both sides, experiencing pressures from both groups to behave more like the majority or their native culture (e.g., Rudmin, 2003; Van Oudenhoven & Eisses, 1998). For example, Van Oudenhoven & Eisses (1998) found that assimilating Moroccans living in the Netherlands experienced less prejudice and more respect from majority members than integrating Moroccans. Integrating minority members did, however, feel more positively about their ethnic descent. Although the latter gives an impression of being a positive effect of integration, it is simply in line with the definition of integration, since integrating individuals maintain their ethnic culture, whereas assimilating

individuals do not. Baysu, Phalet, & Brown (2011) reported that the success of a particular acculturation strategy may depend on the level of threat that minority members experience. In their study of people of Turkish background living in Belgium, they found that when perceived threat was low, integration was related to better academic achievement than other acculturation strategies. However, when perceived threat was high, separation or assimilation was associated with better performance. This means that although integration may be beneficial for one minority member, this is not necessarily true for somebody else.

Going even further than that, Rudmin (2003) claims that there is no robust evidence to show that integration is the most adaptive acculturation strategy. He points out that even some of Berry's own work does not confirm that integration is the most beneficial strategy. When discussing Berry's (1976) acculturation results from nine different samples, Rudmin (2003) emphasises that the combined results showed that although integration was negatively correlated with stress, assimilation had a slightly stronger negative correlation with stress, meaning that assimilation was a somewhat better predictor of stress reduction than integration. In addition, among indigenous samples, Berry (1976) found that integration was *positively* related to stress, while assimilation had a negative correlation with stress. Rudmin (2003) then notices how many years later, Berry (Berry et al., 1987) re-analysed the 1976 samples together with an additional four other samples, and concluded that integration was consistently related to less stress. This is clearly contradicting with what was originally found in 1976. In another comparison of the relationships between acculturation preferences and adaptation, Berry, Phinney, Sam, and Vedder (2006) reported a positive relationship between integration and adaptation. However, separation was positively related to adaptation too. Berry already pointed out that integration may not always be the most beneficial acculturation strategy for minority members: it is dependent on the cultural or political climate in the dominant society (Berry, 1997, 2008). That is, when the majority society is not in support of multiculturalism, then minority members who integrate may be as vulnerable to negative outcomes as those endorsing assimilation, separation, or marginalisation (see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Seeing how there are a few exceptions to integration being the "best" acculturation strategy, it is important to think about *why* integration may be a more beneficial strategy than assimilation, separation, and marginalisation, and when it may not be.

There are several plausible reasons as to why integration might lead to better acculturative results than other acculturation strategies. First, it is possible that integrating minority members are more adaptive because they share a common identity with the host majority and are at the same time able to distinguish themselves from the majority in a

positive way (Dovidio, Gaertner, & Validzic, 1998; Gaertner & Dovidio, 2000; Gaertner, Dovidio, Rust, Nier, Banker, Ward, Mottola, & Houlette, 1999; Hewstone & Brown, 1986). Another possibility is that involvement with two cultures creates social and cognitive flexibility (Benet-Martínez, Lee, & Leu, 2006; Tadmor & Tetlock, 2006), meaning that integrating minority members have a greater repertoire of behaviours and competences to choose from which may buffer against the maladjustment that can often characterize the acculturation experience (Padilla, 2006). This suggests that integrating, or dealing with two cultures at the same time, is not necessarily a stressful experience, in contrast to what Rudmin (2003) suggested. Indeed, although integrating individuals are constantly confronted with the challenge of combining two cultures in one country while struggling with contradictory expectations, most integrating minorities still successfully develop a compatible bicultural, integrated identity (LaFromboise, Coleman, & Gerton, 1993).

It is also possible that integration contributes to the understanding of intercultural relations: the techniques that integrating individuals use to negotiate and resolve cultural differences within themselves and with others could be put into use to negotiate and resolve cultural differences between individuals and groups (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). Moreover, integration can be beneficial for the wider society (Berry, 1998). That is, integrating individuals have skills such as bilingualism, cultural frame switching, and intercultural sensitivity, which are necessary for success in an increasingly globalized society. Hence, people who integrate could function as the perfect mediators for intercultural conflicts and miscommunications (Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007).

A preference for integration on the side of the majority has been found to be associated with better intergroup relations too (e.g., Nigbur et al., 2008; Pfafferott & Brown, 2006; Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zick, Wagner, Van Dick, & Petzel, 2001). For instance, Zagefka and colleagues (Zagefka & Brown, 2002; Zagefka et al., 2007) found that when majority members prefer minority members to integrate, less ingroup bias and fewer negative attitudes towards minorities were observed. In addition, a preference for integration on the side of the majority has been linked to lower levels of subtle and blatant prejudice (Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995; Zick et al., 2001), reduced antipathy against foreigners, more perceived similarity, and reduced discriminatory or avoidance intentions or actual behaviour (Zick et al., 2001). A study by Geschke and colleages (2009) showed that majority members' acculturation attitudes in favour of culture maintenance by minority members, were related to lower levels of prejudice, fewer negative emotions, and fewer discrimination intentions.

Altogether, the suggestions put doubts on the claims made in the concordance models discussed above (IAM by Bourhis et al., 1997; and CMA by Piontkowski et al., 2002). These models stated that it would not matter which acculturation attitudes minority and majority members would endorse: as long as they matched, it would be beneficial for society. Moreover, the concordance models are concerned with social outcomes only, whereas a large amount of research about the benefits of integration includes both positive social outcomes *and* positive psychosocial outcomes. Therefore, in the present thesis, I will further investigate both individual acculturation preferences and perceived acculturation preferences.

Domain specificity

A still under-researched subfield of acculturation research concerns domain specificity (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003, 2004, 2007; Navas et al., 2005; Navas et al., 2007). That is, the majority of studies have examined acculturation attitudes have without distinguishing between different life domains. However, several studies have shown that people's acculturation preferences might differ depending on the context or situation in which they are applied (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003, 2004, 2007; Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, & Poortinga, 2006; Clement & Noels, 1992; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Nagata, 1994; Navas et al., 2005, Navas et al., 2007; Phalet, Van Lotringen, & Entzinger, 2000; Sodowsky and Carey, 1988; Taylor & Lambert, 1996). Ethnic minority members often move between their heritage culture and the culture of the dominant society by adapting their attitudes and behaviours in response to the cultural context, a process also known as cultural frame switching (e.g., Hong, Morris, Chiu, & Benet-Martínez, 2000; Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, 2007). That is, one might show more behaviours corresponding with their heritage culture when being around family members, while displaying more behaviours fitting into the dominant culture when at work. Taking myself as an example, I emigrated from the Netherlands to England four years ago and I work at an English University, teach English students, and have an English supervisor. Therefore, I find it more comfortable to adopt English customs when I am at work in order to avoid miscommunications with students or my supervisor. However, inside my own home I do not have this issue, and I am free to behave as Dutch as I want. Zane and Mak (2003) indicated many different domains of life in which acculturation changes may take place, and pointed out that acculturation changes in some of these domains may occur independently of changes in other components. Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver (2003, 2004, 2007) also distinguished many life domains, which they clustered together into two categories: public (functional, utilitarian), and private (social-emotional, value-related). Examples of public

life domains used in their studies are education and social contacts, while child rearing and cultural habits fell into the category of private domains.

From the point of view from minority members, Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver (2003, 2007) found that Turkish minority members living in the Netherlands found it important to have elements of both Dutch and Turkish cultures in their lives, but this importance varied across domains: in public domains adjustment to Dutch culture was more emphasised, while maintenance of Turkish culture was prioritised in the private domains (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; 2004, 2007). More specifically, Turkish-Dutch preferred the separation in private domains, while integration was favoured in the public domains: Turkish minorities valued the Turkish culture more than the Dutch culture in the private domain, while both cultures were about equally favoured in the public domain (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; 2007). Phalet and colleagues (2000) and Sodowsky and Carey (1988) found similar patterns when defining the private domain as 'at home' and the public domain as 'outside home'. That is, Phalet and colleagues (2000) found that Dutch migrant youth preferred culture maintenance more at home, but valued Dutch culture more in the outside of the home. In addition, Sodowsky and Carey (1988) found that Indians living in the United States preferred Indian food and clothing at home, but American food and dress outside of their homes. In general, it seems that ethnic minorities prefer cultural maintenance more in private than in public domains of life (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003, 2004; Navas et al., 2007; Ouarasse & Van de Vijver, 2005; Taylor & Lambert, 1996; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). In contrast, majority members seem to prefer minority members to assimilate in all domains of life (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Navas et al., 2007, but see Taylor and Lambert, 1996). For example, in the Netherlands, Dutch majority members preferred assimilation above integration of Turkish minority members in all life domains (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003). To summarize, in public domains both cultural groups agreed that Turkish minorities should adapt to the Dutch culture, but in private domains acculturation attitudes of Dutch and Turks were opposite. This suggests that majority and minority group members may differ in their acculturation preferences in public and private domains, and highlights the need to elaborate on domain specificity in acculturation research. Aiming to contribute to closing this gap in the literature, the focus of subsequent chapters and this present thesis in general is to elucidate the interplay of domain specificity, acculturation preferences, and adaptation outcomes.

Arends-Tóth and Van de Vijver (2003) already suggested that 'at home' and 'outside home' are how these domains may usefully be conceptualized and other researchers have used this description too (e.g., Phalet et al., 2000; Sodowsky and Carey, 1988). In line with this,

the private domain is defined as 'at home' and the public domain as 'outside home' throughout this thesis.

Methodological approaches

Before we move into the details of the research which will be presented in this thesis, it is worth discussing the typical methodologies which have been used in acculturation research. With a few exceptions, the vast majority of acculturation research has been cross-sectional (correlational) in nature (see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). This is unfortunate, because cross-sectional results do not provide us with information about the direction of a process. For example, we do not know whether integration leads to better adaptation or vice versa. Complementing the existing correlational work with experimental work on acculturation would solve this issue, however there are of course some practical and ethical concerns involved in acculturation research: manipulating individuals' acculturation strategies in order to investigate how these impact on adaptation is not a realistic option. Yet, it would be possible to use experimental work to find out how we can *predict* specific acculturation attitudes. Considering the large amount of research stating that an acculturation attitude of integration is related to the best adaptation outcomes (see Brown & Zagefka, 2011), it is surprising that only few studies have investigated experimentally how we can predict integration. The few researchers who did conduct such experimental work (Kosic, Kruglanski, Pierro, & Mannetti, 2004; Zagefka et al., 2012) did not distinguish between public and private domains in which one can acculturate. This is problematic, because as mentioned above, several researchers have pointed out that people's acculturation preferences differ depending on the domain in which the acculturation process takes place (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003, 2004, 2007). Chapters 2 and 3 aim to fill this gap in the acculturation literature by presenting five experimental studies exploring predictors of acculturation attitudes in public and private domains.

Another way to investigate directions of the relationships between acculturation preferences and various outcome variables would be to conduct longitudinal research. In their review of acculturation research, Brown & Zagefka (2011) set out the benefits of longitudinal work. As they explain, a cause should occur before an effect. That is, if X is the cause and Y the effect, then X should occur before Y. Therefore, if a researcher manages to find a significant relationship between variable X at Time 1 and variable Y at Time 2 while controlling for variable Y at Time 1 (i.e., controlling for the stability of Y), then this would offer stronger results to suggest that X causes Y than cross-sectional data would be able to provide.

Longitudinal research is particularly relevant for the field of acculturation, because acculturation is not static; it is a process that is likely to change over time. For example, a minority member who has only just arrived in their new country of settlement has probably made fewer changes in his or her lifestyle compared to someone who has lived among members of the dominant society for decades. Although some longitudinal acculturation research has been conducted (e.g., Zagefka, Binder & Brown, 2011; González, Zagefka, Brown, Carrasco, Didier, Lay & De Tezanos-Pinto, 2010; Zagefka, Brown, & González, 2009), again, this work did not look into domain specificity. Therefore, Chapter 4 will present two studies investigating the longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation strategies.

Finally, the fact that most acculturation research has been correlational also means that the majority of the work has been quantitative rather than qualitative in nature. Several researches have pointed out that the field of acculturation would benefit from more qualitative work (Castles et al., 2002; Donà & Berry, 1999; Strang & Ager, 2010). The acculturation process may be different for each minority member, and the advantage of qualitative research is that it gives participants an opportunity to talk about their thoughts and experiences without having to limit themselves to an answer in a pre-defined format. For this reason, the final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, will present qualitative research investigating public and private acculturation attitudes. The studies presented in each chapter are described in more detail below.

The present thesis

In this thesis, I will address four research questions based on gaps in the acculturation literature which I will identify below. Each chapter aims to answer one of these research questions, with the exception of the last chapter, in which I will discuss the combined findings of all chapters. The specific hypotheses for each study will be introduced in detail at the start of each individual chapter.

We know from the above literature that it would be most beneficial for minority members, majority members, and society in general if both groups would prefer integration as acculturation strategy. Integration is generally the strategy most preferred by sojourners, migrants, refugees and indigenous people (Berry et al., 1989; Berry et al., 2006; Berry & Sam, 1997; Lasry & Sayegh, 1992; Van Oudenhoven, Willemsma, & Prins, 1996; Van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz, & Feltzer, 1999; Verkuyten & Thijs, 1999). Minority members often prefer to keep (parts of) their own culture, rather than to assimilate completely to the majority's culture (Taylor & Moghaddam, 1994). However, as suggested earlier in this chapter, the preferences of

majority members influence the selection of acculturation attitudes available to minority members (Berry & Sam, 1997; Van Oudenhoven, Ward, & Masgoret, 2006). The extent to which minority members feel accepted influences their attitudes towards culture maintenance and culture adoption (Bovenkerk, Gras, & Ramsoedh, 1995). Unfortunately, many host societies encourage ethnic minorities to assimilate, despite the fact that acculturating individuals by and large prefer the integration strategy (Van Oudenhoven et al., 2006). In several countries, evidence has been found showing that majority members tend to disapprove of immigrants deciding to maintain their heritage culture. Instead, members of the majority culture prefer immigrants to adapt to the culture of the host society (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Breugelmans & Van de Vijver, 2004; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Zick et al., 2001; see Schalk-Soekar, Van de Vijver, & Hoogsteder, 2004; although see Zagefka & Brown, 2002). Due to the power differences between majority and minority groups, the majority group has more influence on the acculturation process (Geschke et al., 2009), but the results of the process are most consequential for the migrant group members (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003).

Given these findings, it is obviously important to investigate what might predict a preference for integration among both minority and majority groups. Previous work has indicated a possible predictor of integration attitudes to be how the respective outgroup is *perceived* to acculturate (Zagefka et al., 2011; Zagefka et al., 2012). When conducting two survey studies among the indigenous Mapuche in Chile, Zagefka and collaborators (2011) found support in both samples for the following: First, when Mapuche minority members perceived the majority to support culture maintenance, this was associated with a higher preference for maintenance of the heritage culture for these minority members. Second, when Mapuche perceived that the majority was in support of contact, their own preference for contact was higher too. Finally, when Mapuche perceived that Chilean majority members wanted integration, this was associated with more own desire for integration. Even though this research provides only correlational results, Zagefka et al. (2012) is the first and only research to experimentally investigate the effects of perceived acculturation of the other group on own acculturation preferences. They manipulated perceived acculturation preferences of English majority members by showing them a video in which Pakistani minority members expressed a preference for either integration, assimilation, separation, or spoke about a neutral topic. Their preferences were depicted as being representative of all Pakistani people living in England. When English majority members perceived the minority members in the video to desire culture adoption, this increased their preference for integration. When they perceived

minority members to want to maintain their heritage culture, this raised their preference for integration too, but only among majority members who were low in prejudice. Both the Chilean and the English study suggest that a perception of an integrating outgroup is likely to lead to the highest preference of integration on the part of ingroup members. However, only one of these studies provided any experimental evidence (Zagefka et al., 2012), strengthening the possibility of causal inference. A limitation of this experimental study is that it did not specify life domains when investigating acculturation.

Taken together, it can be concluded that there is a need for experimental research exploring the role of domain specificity in meta-perceptions of acculturation. The research reported in Chapter two is directed towards that need. It aims to find an answer for the first main research question: What is the role of domain specificity in the effects of meta-perceptions of acculturation on own acculturation preferences? This chapter describes the results of three experiments that explored the effects of perceived public and private acculturation preferences of the other group on own (public and private) acculturation preferences. This was investigated among both English majority members and Muslim minority members living in England.

The studies presented in Chapter three also look into the effects of perceived public and private acculturation preferences on own public and private preferences. However, here the experiments focus on perceived public and private acculturation preferences *of the ingroup* rather than the outgroup. Research has shown that perceived ingroup norms about attitudes towards the outgroup often steer the attitudes of individual ingroup members (Bennett et al., 2004; Blanchard, Crandall, Brigham, & Vaughn, 1994; Crandall, Eshleman, & O'Brien, 2002; Nesdale, Maass, Durkin, & Griffiths, 2005; Pettigrew, 1958; 1959). For example, ingroup norms have shown to be predictive of prejudice of ingroup members (Bennett et al., 2004; Pettigrew, 1958; 1959), social approval of having negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Crandall et al., 2002), views regarding racism (Blanchard et al., 1994), and liking of the outgroup (Nesdale et al., 2005). Some research even suggested that people tend to be more affected by information given by their fellow *ingroup* members than by outgroup information (Stangor, Sechrist, & Jost, 2001). Yet, the link between perceived *ingroup* norms about acculturation and own acculturation preferences has thus far not been investigated. Chapter 3 aims to address that gap by answering the second research question: How do domain-specific ingroup norms regarding acculturation influence own acculturation preferences of majority members? The chapter presents two experiments looking into the effect of perceived ingroup norms about acculturation preferences for public and private

domains in life on own acculturation preferences in public and private. Since there is evidence that there may be cross-cultural differences in acculturation preferences (Church, 1982; Phalet & Hagendoorn, 1996), this will be investigated in two very different cultural settings: in Chile, looking at majority members' attitudes towards indigenous Mapuche minority members, and in England focusing on attitudes towards Muslims.

Although integration has previously been associated with better well-being and intergroup relations than the other three acculturation preferences (e.g. Berry, 1997), it is not possible to draw conclusions about whether acculturation has an effect on well-being and intergroup relations or vice versa, because previous studies were of correlational nature. Furthermore, we do not know in which domain this integration should take place for it to have these positive effects. For example, will the general preference for separation in private domains mentioned earlier in this chapter lead to lesser well-being and/or intergroup relations than integration in the private domain, or does integration only have beneficial effects when it is endorsed in the public domain? Or, since no directional evidence has been found yet: do minority members choose for private separation as a consequence of bad intergroup relations or well-being? The research in Chapter four looks into these mechanisms by answering the third research question: What are the longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation strategies of minority members on their well-being and intergroup relations? Longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation strategies of Muslim minority members on well-being and intergroup relations are investigated in two countries: Britain and the Netherlands.

Why do minority members choose certain acculturation strategies over others in public and private domains? This fourth research question in this thesis focuses at the power differences between the majority and minority group (Geschke et al., 2009) identified above and the notion that minority members may not feel completely free to choose whichever acculturation strategy they want. Sayegh and Lasry (1993) suggested that researchers should examine obstacles influencing the acculturation process. At present, however, no study seems to have explored reasons whether and why people choose specific acculturation strategies, which is why Chapter five reports on fourteen interviews with Muslims in England who explain their reasons for their public and private acculturation strategies. Finally, Chapter six summarises the findings of the current PhD project, and discusses implications and directions for future research.

In sum, by differentiating between acculturation in public and private domains, and by reporting experiments, longitudinal, and qualitative data, this thesis will add substantial and

novel insight in the full acculturation process and will overcome limitations of correlational data and the lack of domain specificity.

Chapter 2

The role of domain specificity in meta-perceptions of acculturation and acculturation preferences

As explained in Chapter 1, it is important to investigate what might predict acculturation attitudes of integration for both majority and minority group members. The research reported in this chapter is directed towards that end.

Previous research has indicated that how the respective outgroup is perceived to acculturate potentially predicts *integration* attitudes (Zagefka et al., 2011; Zagefka et al., 2012). Both studies suggested that a perception of an integrating outgroup will lead to the highest preference of integration on the part of ingroup members. In addition, perceived acculturation of the other group has been shown to impact on affective/favourable reactions towards that group (e.g., Kosic, Mannetti, & Lackland Sam, 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Matera et al., 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Zagefka et al., 2012). These studies suggest that, generally, integrating or assimilating outgroup members are evaluated most favourably by the majority. Finally, perceived acculturation of the outgroup has also shown to have an effect on feelings of threat (Matera et al., 2011; Tip et al., 2012).

However, only three of these studies provided any experimental evidence (Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Matera et al., 2011; Zagefka et al., 2012), strengthening the possibility of causal inference. Following their lead, I experimentally manipulated perceptions of acculturation attitudes of the outgroup, in order to investigate the effects of these perceptions on own acculturation attitudes, affect towards that outgroup, and feelings of threat.

As mentioned in Chapter 1, another side of acculturation research that is still under investigated is domain specificity (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003, 2004, 2007; Navas et al., 2007; Navas et al., 2007). In all the above studies, acculturation attitudes have been investigated without distinguishing between specific life domains. However, previous research has established that majority and minority members generally differ in their acculturation preferences for different domains. That is, it seems that ethnic minorities prefer cultural maintenance more in private than in public domains of life (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003,

2004; Navas et al., 2007; Ouarasse & Van de Vijver, 2005; Taylor & Lambert, 1996; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). In contrast, majority members seem to prefer minority members to assimilate in *all* domains of life (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Navas et al., 2007, but see Taylor and Lambert, 1996). This suggests that majority and minority group members may differ in their acculturation preferences in public and private domains, and highlights the need to elaborate on domain specificity in acculturation research. For example, acculturation strategies might also be *perceived* and responded to in different ways depending on whether they are expressed in public or private domains (Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007), but to our knowledge this has not been examined to date.

The current research investigated experimentally the effects of perceived acculturation attitudes of other groups in public versus private domains. The main outcome measures were own preference for integration in public and private domains of life, positive affect felt towards the outgroup, and feelings of threat. These issues were examined among both English majority members and Muslim minority members living in England.

Acculturation theory discusses maintenance of culture only, but several researchers have highlighted the importance of studying religion as a form of culture in acculturation processes (e.g., Cohen, 2009; Güngör, Fleischmann, & Phalet, 2011; Saroglou & Galand, 2004). After all, according to Adams and Markus' (2004) definition, a culture consists of meaningful personal experiences and shared social worlds. Religion, then, can be viewed as a strong form of culture (Güngör et al., 2011). This is definitely the case for Muslims in Europe, for whom Muslim identity is not only a religious identity, but also a cultural one (Phalet & Kosic, 2006). We focus on Muslims as a minority group in England, because members of this group have become more vulnerable after Islamophobic trends following attacks such as the London bombings (Post & Sheffer, 2007; European Monitoring Centre on Racism and Xenophobia, 2005).

When manipulating and measuring acculturation attitudes, for practical and theoretical reasons we focus only on integration, assimilation, and separation. It has been pointed out that marginalisation has little theoretical or empirical support (Berry et al., 2006; Del Pilar & Udasco, 2004), and that it should not be conceptualised as an acculturation attitude, but rather as a pathological condition (Rudmin, 2003). Furthermore, marginalisation has often been found to yield the worst acculturative outcomes (Berry, 1997; Berry et al., 1992). Finally, attempting to manipulate all four strategies in both public and private domains produces an unwieldy 16 cell design.

In Study 1, we manipulated the way in which Muslims are perceived to acculturate in *public* domains, and examined how this affected the acculturation preferences and affective reactions of English majority members. Study 2 investigated the effects of both perceived *public and private* acculturation preferences of Muslim minority members on own acculturation preferences, affect, and feelings of threat of English majority members. Study 3 was very similar to Study 2, but had the opposite perspective: the perceived *public and private* acculturation preferences of English majority members were manipulated to examine how these impacted on own acculturation preferences, affect, and feelings of threat of Muslim minority members.

Study 1

Zagefka and colleagues (2007) suggested that perceived acculturation of immigrants might affect majority members' own preference for integration. In two surveys, conducted in Belgium and Turkey, they found that a perception that immigrants wanted to maintain their original culture, and a perception that immigrants wanted contact with majority members, were both associated with a greater preference for integration among majority members. In a later study, Zagefka and others (2012) experimentally investigated how the way in which Pakistani minority members in England were perceived to acculturate affected English majority members' own preference for integration. Findings showed that when Pakistani minority members were perceived to integrate, majority members expressed a higher preference for Pakistanis to integrate compared to when they perceived Pakistani minority members to assimilate or separate.

Although neither of these studies distinguished specific life domains of acculturation, it is likely that majority members think more about public than private domains when requested to consider acculturation of minority members. After all, public acculturation of minority members is more visible to them than private acculturation. If this is indeed the case, Zagefka et al.'s (2012) findings would suggest that majority members themselves will have a preference for the minority to integrate *in public domains* when these majority members perceive that the minority wants to integrate *in public* too. The aim of Study 1 was to test whether this assumption can be empirically supported. We expected that a perception of Muslims favouring integration in *public* will lead to a higher preference for *public* integration by majority members than when Muslims are perceived to assimilate or separate in public (H1).

When majority members are asked to specify how they want minority members to acculturate in public and in private domains of their lives, majority members generally do not show any differences in preferences over these domains (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; Navas et al., 2007). That is, they generally preferred minority members to acculturate in the same way in private as they do in public domains of life. If we assume that this lack of distinction between life domains will hold true for the majority members in our study (i.e., in response to perceived preferences of Muslims), then we can expect that a perception that Muslims integrate in *public*, will also lead to the highest preference for *private* integration compared to when they perceive Muslims to assimilate or separate in public (H2).

In general, outgroup members who integrate or assimilate have shown to evoke more positive affect in majority members than those who endorse other acculturation strategies (e.g., Kosic et al., 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Matera et al., 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). These studies did not include domain specificity, but following the same argument about visibility of public domains as in H1, we can hypothesise that publicly integrating or assimilating Muslims will be liked more than publicly separating Muslims (H3).

Method

Participants

One hundred and fifty-five sixth form students from an English college participated in this study (116 F, 38 M, and 1 unspecified), ranging in age from 16 to 20 years with a mean age of 16.59 (SD = .71)). Participation was voluntary. All participants classified themselves as born in Britain and having British nationality and none of them were Muslim.

Design

Perceptions of outgroup acculturation attitudes were manipulated by means of a bogus BBC newspaper article, in which two Muslims living in England were interviewed about how they acculturate in *public* domains. This yielded an experimental design with one factor with three levels: perceived public separation (N=53), perceived public integration (N=50), and perceived public assimilation (N=52).

Measures

Participants filled out a questionnaire with the measurements listed below. All items were pre-tested in pilot studies (N1 = 87, N2 = 72) to make sure that the items would be

appropriate for and well-understood by the relatively young age group. Answers were measured on a 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) Likert scale.

Manipulation checks. We measured how participants perceived Muslims to acculturate in public. To specify that we were asking about their perceptions about public domains only, we started each item with "I believe that outside their own homes,…". Then, the perceived *culture maintenance* item ended with "…Muslims want to live the Muslim way of life", perceived *culture adoption* item finished with "…Muslims want to live the English way of life". We decided to add an additional item measuring perceived integration because the pilot studies showed that when only asked about their preferences regarding culture maintenance and adoption, participants felt as if they had to choose one of the two options. The integration item was finished with the statement "Muslims want to combine the Muslim and the English way of life".

Own acculturation preferences. The preferences that participants had for Muslims living in England regarding culture maintenance and culture adoption were measured with items similar to the ones used by Zagefka and Brown (2002). The questions were adjusted to measure the acculturation preferences for public and private domains separately. Furthermore, new items were developed to be able to measure preference for public and private integration as a single acculturation style, because we did not want participants to feel as if they had to choose one of the two options, like they did in the pilot studies. Therefore, we had separate items measuring a preference for culture maintenance, culture adoption and integration.

Participants' preference for *public* integration was measured with the item "Outside their own homes, I wouldn't mind Muslims combining the Muslim and the English way of life" and their preference for *private* integration was measured with the item "At home, I wouldn't mind Muslims combining the Muslim and the English way of life". Similarly, preference for public and private culture adoption was measured with the statement "At home/Outside their own homes, I wouldn't mind Muslims living the English way of life" and a culture maintenance preference was measured with "At home/Outside their own homes, I wouldn't mind Muslims living the Muslim way of life". We chose for the wording "I wouldn't mind" rather than "I want" or "I prefer", because pilot testing indicated that participants were hesitant to answer prescriptively worded items about how they want Muslims to live their lives *inside their own homes,* and we wanted the wording of the items to be consistent over the two domains. The questionnaire had to be kept short due to time constraints and, since all questions are very straightforward, one-item measures were used.

Liking. For the same reason, we used only one item to measure how much participants liked the Muslims who were interviewed in the manipulation: 'How much do you like the people who were being interviewed?' (1 = not at all to 5 = very much).

Procedure

Before starting the experiment, participants were told that they would participate in a study about multiculturalism in England, consisting of two separate studies. For the first study, they were told that they would read a BBC article and answer a few questions, and that the goal was to find out how well people their age would understand and remember media information. In reality, the BBC article was the manipulation of the experiment: two Muslims living in England were interviewed about how they acculturate in public domains. For example, in the public integration condition, one of the interviewees says: "I am going to an English college, and I'm happy about that. However, I also want to know about the background of my family, so I also have Koran lessons." In the public separation condition, "English college" is replaced with "Muslim college", while in the public assimilation condition, the interviewee goes to an English college, but doesn't find it important to have Koran lessons (see Appendix, pages 172-174 for the full manipulations of Study 1). For the rest, the wording was kept as consistent as possible. To ensure that participants would read the article thoroughly, they were told that there would be questions about the article at the end of the questionnaire. The instructions emphasized that the second study was unrelated to the first, and was aimed at finding out their own opinions about multiculturalism. All aspects of the research were in line with APA and BPS ethics guidelines. After all participants had completed the questionnaires, they were thanked and debriefed.

Results

Manipulation check

To test whether the manipulation was successful, one-way ANOVAs were performed with 'condition' (perceived public separation, integration, or assimilation) as the independent variable and 'perceived public culture maintenance', 'perceived public culture adoption', and 'perceived public integration' as dependent variables. There was a significant effect of condition on each of these variables in the intended direction: perceived public culture maintenance was highest in the separation condition, perceived public integration was highest

in the integration condition, and perceived public adoption was highest in the assimilation condition[1]. Thus, the manipulation seems to have been successfully manipulated (Table 1).

Table 1. Study 1: Effect of manipulation on manipulation check.

		Public acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived culture maintenance	M	4.30^a	2.76^b	2.29^b	F = 57.12,
	(SD)	(.95)	(1.08)	(1.00)	*p* < .001
Perceived integration	M	2.41^b	4.52^a	2.88^b	F = 61.20,
	(SD)	(1.17)	(.68)	(1.10)	*p* < .001
Perceived culture adoption	M	1.87^c	2.80^b	3.87^a	F = 56.86,
	(SD)	(.92)	(.95)	(1.01)	*p* < .001

Note. Superscripts represent significant differences between conditions as indicated by Bonferroni post-hoc tests. All are significant at the level of *p* < .001.

Experimental effects

To test whether perceived public acculturation preferences of Muslim minority members had an effect on the majority members' own acculturation preferences, one-way ANOVAs were conducted with condition as the independent variable, and the participants' own acculturation preferences as dependent variables.

Preference for public integration differed across the three conditions (*F* (2, 152) = 4.64, *p* < .02). As hypothesized (H1), English majority members preferred Muslims in England to integrate in public the most when they also perceived Muslims to integrate in public (M = 4.46, SD = .84). This was significantly more than when they perceived Muslims to assimilate (M = 3.90, SD = 1.01, Bonferroni, *p* < .02). The mean score for preferred public integration in the separation conditions was between that of the other two conditions (M = 4.28, SD = .97) and did not differ significantly from either one.

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[1] Although one may expect perceived culture maintenance to be at the same level in the separation and integration conditions, and perceived culture adoption to be the same in the integration and assimilation conditions, the nature of the Berry-style acculturation preferences might have caused a slightly more extreme shift in the perceptions of our participants. That is, separation can be seen as 100% culture maintenance and 0% culture adoption, integration can be seen as 50% of both, and assimilation as 0% culture maintenance and 100% culture adoption. As can be seen in Table 1, this is exactly the pattern of means found in our manipulation check.

Besides having an effect on preference for *public* integration, perceived preferences also affected the majority members' preference for *private* integration (F (2, 152) = 3.35, $p <$ .04) (H2). As with public integration, majority members had the highest preference for private integration (M = 4.68, SD = .74) when they perceived Muslims to integrate in public, which was significantly higher than when they perceived Muslims to assimilate in public (M = 4.27, SD = .93; Bonferroni, $p <$ .04). Their preference for private integration when they perceived Muslims to separate in public (M = 4.54, SD = .77) was not significantly different from when they perceived them to integrate or assimilate.

The way in which English majority members perceived Muslim minority members to acculturate, did not change their preference for the separate dimensions of culture maintenance and culture adoption, whether in private or public. It did, however, affect how much they liked those Muslims (F (2, 152) = 22.09, $p <$ .001) (H3). Publicly assimilating (M = 3.44, SD = .67) or integrating (M = 3.66, SD = .72) Muslims were liked significantly more than Muslims who were perceived to separate in public (M = 2.75, SD = .78; both Bonferroni, $p <$ .001). The difference between the public integration and the public assimilation conditions was not significant.

Discussion

The results from Study 1 provided support for all three hypotheses. Firstly, a perception that Muslims integrate in public led to the highest preference for public and for private integration among English majority members (H1 and H2). However, although the means were in the predicted direction, preference for public/private integration differed only significantly between the integration and assimilation conditions; there was no significant difference between the integration and separation conditions, suggesting that H1 and H2 were only partially supported.

In addition, publicly integrating or assimilating Muslims were liked more than publicly separating Muslim (H3). This is in line with our expectation that studies that did not differentiate between public and private domain will likely have assessed majority members' perceptions of the public domain, for them these are the more visible domains.

Study 2

Study 1 confirmed that the public acculturation strategies of Muslims have an impact on acculturation attitudes of majority members. However, Study 1 did not address one important question: How do majority members respond to the *private* acculturation

preferences of minority members? Addressing this was the aim of Study 2, which investigated the effects of perceived *public* and *private* acculturation preferences of Muslim minority members on the acculturation preferences and intergroup liking of English majority members. To begin with, we intended to replicate H1, H2, and H3 of Study 1 in the current study. The novelty of our design made it difficult to make specific a priori predictions about the various factorial combinations of perceived public and private acculturation strategies (e.g., integrating in public while separating in private), therefore these were investigated mostly in an exploratory fashion. However, related research has suggested that when group members perceive the ingroup and outgroup as very similar, they may experience threat (Roccas & Schwartz, 1993), and that this distinctiveness threat often results in attempts to differentiate the ingroup on available dimensions of comparison (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Jetten & Spears, 2004). Looking at the two domains of interest to the current study, it is possible that this distinctiveness threat would particularly be relevant for the private domain: if minority members assimilate even inside their own homes, then they must have truly internalised the culture of the majority. If this would indeed lead to attempts to differentiate the ingroup on available dimensions of comparison, then we could expect the following: when Muslims assimilate in private domains, majority members may feel a need for them to maintain their original culture in other (public) domains in order to maintain distinctiveness between themselves and the outgroup (H4).

If we pursue the same distinctiveness threat argument for feelings of threat experienced by the majority, then we could hypothesise that as long as Muslims are perceived to separate or integrate in private, their preferences for the public domain do not affect symbolic threat experienced by majority members. However, when Muslims are perceived to favour assimilation in private (low distinctiveness), then majority members may experience the least threat when they perceive that these Muslims combine it with separation in public domains (which will raise the distinctiveness between the two groups) than when they combine it with either integration or assimilation (H5).

Method

Participants and design

Two hundred and twenty-nine sixth form students from an English college participated in this study (138 F, 89 M, and 2 unspecified). Ages ranged from 16 to 22 years, with a mean of 16.86 (SD = .59). Participation was voluntary. All participants classified themselves as born in Britain and having British nationality and none of them were Muslim.

Study 2 has an experimental design with two factors, which each have three levels, creating a 3 X 3 design: Perceived *public* acculturation strategies of Muslim minority members (separation, integration, assimilation) **X** Perceived *private* acculturation strategies of Muslim minority members (separation, integration, assimilation). Perceptions of participants were again manipulated by means of a bogus BBC newspaper article, in which two Muslims living in England were interviewed about how they live their lives in England in terms of acculturation, in both public and private domains. The number of participants per condition ranged from 24 to 28.

Measures

Participants' perceived public acculturation preferences, own acculturation preferences in public and private, and how much participants liked the Muslims in the BBC article were measured in the same as way as in Study 1. In addition to those, perceived private acculturation (second half of the manipulation check) was measured with three items: "I believe that at home, Muslims want to live the Muslim way of life/live the English way of life/combine the Muslim and the English way of life".

Symbolic threat. Threat was measured with a 4-item scale drawing on Stephan and Stephan (2000). An example item is: 'A large number of Muslims could make the English culture weaker' (disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (5); α = .86).

Procedure

The procedure was the same as in Study 1, with one exception: perceived private acculturation preferences were now manipulated as well. For example, in the case of private separation, one of the remarks of the interviewee is: "...at home we never celebrate English traditions like Christmas. But we do for example fast during Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan." In the private assimilation condition, the interviewees say that they celebrate Christmas, but do not adhere to Ramadan, whereas in the private integration condition they celebrate both (see Appendix pages 175-183 for the full manipulations used in Study 2).

Results

Manipulation check

To test for the effectiveness of the manipulation on perceived *public* and *private* acculturation strategies, ANOVAs were performed with 'public condition' (perceived public

separation, integration, or assimilation) and 'private condition' (perceived private separation, integration, or assimilation) as two independent factors and 'perceived public culture maintenance', 'perceived public culture adoption' and 'perceived public integration' as dependent variables. As expected, this yielded a significant main effect for 'public condition' on each of these variables in the intended directions (Table 2 (upper panel)). There were no significant main effects of 'private condition', nor were there any significant interactions.

A similar analysis was conducted for the perceived private acculturation strategies, revealing significant main effects of 'private condition' (Table 2, lower panel). There were no significant main effects of 'public condition', nor any significant interactions. From all the above it can be concluded that the manipulation of both variables was successful.

Table 2. Study 2: Main effects of public and private acculturation conditions on manipulation check

		Public acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *public* maintenance	M	4.28[a]	2.64[b]	1.97[c]	$F = 125.97$, p
	(SD)	(.81)	(.95)	(.94)	$< .001$
Perceived *public* integration	M	2.46[b]	4.53[a]	2.61[b]	$F = 80.57$,
	(SD)	(1.22)	(.73)	(1.34)	$p < .001$
Perceived *public* adoption	M	1.95[c]	2.79[b]	4.22[a]	$F = 101.20$, p
	(SD)	(1.01)	(1.00)	(.92)	$< .001$
		Private acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *private* maintenance	M	4.61[a]	2.96[b]	2.00[c]	$F = 147.20$, p
	(SD)	(.59)	(1.14)	(1.03)	$< .001$
Perceived *private* integration	M	2.09[c]	4.55[a]	2.79[b]	$F = 99.30$,
	(SD)	(1.20)	(.78)	(1.33)	$p < .001$
Perceived *private* adoption	M	1.42[c]	2.71[b]	4.16[a]	$F = 182.33$, p
	(SD)	(.63)	(1.06)	(.88)	$< .001$

Note. Superscripts represent significant differences between conditions as indicated by Bonferroni post-hoc tests. All are significant at the level of $p < .001$.

Experimental effects on acculturation preferences

3 X 3 ANOVAs with perceived public and private acculturation strategies of Muslims as the independent variables (separation, integration, assimilation), and participants' own acculturation preferences, liking, and symbolic threat as dependent variables were conducted.

Preference for public integration (H1). Similar to Study 1, a significant main effect of the *public* acculturation strategies used by Muslims on participants' own preference for public integration was revealed, although the effect was only marginally significant (F (2, 220) = 2.66, p = .072). The pattern was however similar to what was found in Study 1: Preference for integration in public domains was slightly higher in the public integration (M = 4.38, SD = .86) and separation (M = 4.42, SD = .96) conditions than in the public assimilation conditions (M = 4.11, SD = 1.07).

There was also a main effect of perceived *private* acculturation strategy (F (2, 220) = 5.02, p < .008). This time, preference for public integration was higher in the private assimilation conditions (M = 4.49, SD = 1.17) than in the integration condition (M = 4.04, SD = 1.19; Bonferroni, p < .02). The mean in the separation conditions (M = 4.38, SD = 1.27) was between the means of the other conditions and did not differ significantly from either. No significant interaction was found.

Preference for private integration (H2). People's preference for *private* integration was also influenced by how they perceived Muslims to acculturate in public domains (F (2, 219) = 3.03, p = .050). The pattern replicated the pattern found in Study 1: Preference for integration in private domains was higher in the public integration conditions (M = 4.80, SD = .46) than in the public assimilation conditions (M = 4.55, SD = .76, Bonferroni, p < 05). The average level of preference for private integration within the separation conditions (M = 4.69, SD = .65) lay in-between that of the other conditions and did not differ significantly from the other conditions. No significant interaction effect was yielded.

Preference for public maintenance (H4). The way in which participants perceived Muslims to acculturate in private had a significant effect on their own preference for public cultural maintenance (F (2, 220) = 5.44, p < .01). This was highest in the private assimilation condition (M = 4.00, SD = 1.17), higher than in the integration conditions (M = 3.35, SD = 1.40), Bonferroni, p < .01). Neither of these conditions differed significantly from the separation conditions (M = 3.85, SD = 1.27). This pattern is very similar to the effect of private conditions found on preference for public integration (H4). There were no other main or interaction effects found on any of the other acculturation preferences measured in the questionnaire.

Liking (H3)*.* As hypothesised, the way in which Muslims were perceived to acculturate in public significantly affected how much participants liked these Muslims (F (2, 220) = 11.96, p < .001). The pattern was the same as in Study 1: Participants liked the Muslims in the interview more in the public integration (M = 3.58, SD = .79) and assimilation conditions (M = 3.45, SD = .74) than in the public separation condition (M = 2.99, SD = .78; both Bonferroni, p < .001). The integration and assimilation conditions did not differ significantly.

Symbolic threat (H5). Although the public and private acculturation strategies did not impact on people's feelings of symbolic threat separately, their interaction did (F (4, 219) = 2.64, p <.04). As clarified by Figure 2[2], as long as Muslims were perceived to separate or integrate in private, their preferences for the public domain did not affect symbolic threat experienced by majority members. However, when Muslims were perceived to favour assimilation in private, then threat was lowest when they combined this with separation in public (M = 2.09, SD = .62), which was significantly less threatening than when Muslims were perceived to combine it with public integration (M = 2.72, SD = .71; Bonferroni, p = .014).

Figure 2. *Study 2: Interaction between perceived public and private acculturation strategies on symbolic threat (p < .04) experienced by English majority participants.*

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[2] Viewed the other way around, the interaction looks as follows: perceived private acculturation did not have an effect on the amount of threat experienced by our participants as long as Muslims integrated or assimilated in public. However, when they perceived Muslims to separate in public, then they felt less threatened when these Muslims assimilated in private (M = 2.09, SD = .62), than when separation (M = 2.59, SD = .85) or integration (M = 2.81, SD = 1.06; Bonferroni, p < .03) was used in private domains.

When it was combined with public assimilation, the level of threat was in-between that of the two other conditions (M = 2.37, SD = .87).

Discussion

Study 2 replicated the findings of Study 1: perceptions of how Muslims acculturate in public affected how much participants liked these Muslims and it had an effect on their preference for public and private integration in much the same way as it did in Study 1 (H1, H2, H3). Although the effect of perceived public acculturation on own preference for public integration was less strong than in Study 1 (only marginal), the pattern was still very similar to that found in Study 1.

In addition, Study 2 showed that perceived *private* acculturation strategies also impact on the majority's own acculturation preferences. Their preference for public culture maintenance (H4) and their preference for public integration were higher when they perceived Muslims to assimilate in private than when they perceived them to integrate. This is in line with our assumption that assimilation in private domains might lead to too much distinctiveness threat, and therefore majority members may feel a need for them to maintain their original culture in other (public) domains in order to maintain distinctiveness between themselves and the outgroup.

Moreover, perceptions of public and private acculturation strategies interacted to affect people's feelings of symbolic threat (H5). We find again support for the distinctiveness threat argument mentioned above: as long as Muslims are perceived to separate or integrate in private, their preferences for the public domain do not affect symbolic threat experienced by majority members. However, when Muslims are perceived to favour assimilation in private (low distinctiveness), then majority members experience the least threat when they perceive that these Muslims combine it with separation in public domains (which will raise the distinctiveness between the two groups).

Study 3

Studies 1 and 2 investigated the relationship between perceived and own acculturation attitudes among members of the dominant society. In Study 3 we examined the same processes as Study 2, but from the viewpoint of Muslim minority members. That is, whether perceptions of how the majority wants Muslims to acculturate in public and private domains affect the acculturation preferences and the affective reactions of Muslim minority

members. When Zagefka and colleagues (2011) investigated the relationship between perceived acculturation and own acculturation among minority members in Chile, they found in two cross-sectional studies that a perception that majority members were in favour of integration was associated with more support for integration among minority members. Combining these findings with our reasoning and findings in Studies 1 and 2, we expected that perceiving the English majority members to want Muslims to integrate in *public* will lead to a higher preference for *public* integration among Muslim participants compared to when they perceive majority members to be in favour of public assimilation or separation (H6). In contrast to Studies 1 and 2, we did not expect that perceived public strategies will have the same impact in on preference for private integration, because minority members have been shown to distinguish more strongly between different domains than majority members when choosing their acculturation preferences (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; 2004).

Previous research has indicated that minority members tend to value cultural maintenance more in private than in public domains of life (Navas et al., 2007; Ouarasse & Van de Vijver, 2005; Phalet et al., 2000; Sodowsky and Carey, 1988; Taylor & Lambert, 1996; Vermeulen & Penninx, 2000). That is, they have been found to prefer separation in private, but integration in public domains (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; 2007). Therefore, it might be expected that minority members will like majority members who support those preferences more than majority members who do not support them. So, we predicted that Muslim minority members will like English majority members the most when they express a preference for integration in public and when they favour separation in private (H7).

If minority members are not supported by the majority in their acculturation preferences, then this might lead to them experiencing feelings of threat as well, because the inequality in power between the majority and ethnic minorities causes the majority to have more influence and power regarding the process of acculturation in comparison to minority groups (Geschke et al., 2009). This leads us to expect that Muslim minority members will feel the least threatened when majority members express a preference for integration in public, but for separation in private domains (H8).

Method

Participants and design

One hundred and sixty-two college students from 7 different English colleges participated in this study. All participants were Muslim and living in England. They were aged

between 16 and 21 (M = 17.39, SD = .99), 87 of them were female, 70 were male, and 5 did not state their sex.

Two factors were manipulated: Perceived *public* acculturation preferences of English majority members (three levels: separation, integration, or assimilation) and perceived *private* acculturation strategies of English majority members (separation, integration, or assimilation), leading to a 3 X 3 design. Perceptions are manipulated by giving the participants a similar bogus BBC newspaper article to read as in Studies 1 and 2, in which two white English majority members are being interviewed about how they would like Muslim minority members in England to acculturate. The number of participants in each condition ranged from 14 to 20.

Measures

Participants' own acculturation preferences in public and private and how much participants liked the protagonists in the article were measured in the same way as in Study 2.

Perceived acculturation (the manipulation check) was changed to adjust the questions to the change of perspective. For example, perceived private integration was measured with the item: "I believe that English people want Muslims to combine Muslim and the English way of life at home".

The measure of symbolic threat was also adjusted to the target group and was measured with three items (1 factor, α = .72), such as "Native English people are trying to limit our religious freedom" (disagree strongly (1) to agree strongly (5)).

Procedure

The procedure used for the current study was the same as in Studies 1 and 2, with of course the exception that the manipulation was now written from the opposite point of view (see Appendix pages 184-192 for the manipulations used for Study 3).

Results

Manipulation check

ANOVAs were computed to examine whether the manipulations had their intended effects. With regards to the perceived public acculturation strategies, there were significant main effects of 'public acculturation condition' (perceived public separation, integration, or assimilation) on all perceived public acculturation variables (Table 3, upper panel). There were no significant main effects of 'private condition', nor were there any significant interactions.

Table 3. Study 3: Main effects of public and private acculturation conditions on manipulation check

		Public acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *public* maintenance	M	3.68[a]	2.51[b]	1.75[c]	F = 34.55, *p* <
	(SD)	(1.35)	(1.25)	(1.05)	.001
Perceived *public* integration	M	2.46[b]	3.92[a]	2.33[b]	F = 28.95, *p* <
	(SD)	(1.21)	(1.19)	(1.19)	.001
Perceived *public* adoption	M	2.38[c]	3.38[b]	4.25[a]	F = 29.36, *p* <
	(SD)	(1.30)	(1.32)	(1.18)	.001
		Private acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *private* maintenance	M	3.82[a]	2.95[b]	1.91[c]	F = 38.95, *p* <
	(SD)	(1.03)	(1.09)	(1.20)	.001
Perceived *private* integration	M	2.60[b]	3.95[a]	2.35[b]	F = 30.06, *p* <
	(SD)	(1.16)	(1.10)	(1.22)	.001
Perceived *private* adoption	M	1.96[c]	2.86[b]	4.04[a]	F = 37.20, *p* <
	(SD)	(1.17)	(1.24)	(1.30)	.001

Note. Superscripts represent significant differences between conditions as indicated by Bonferroni post-hoc tests. All are significant at the level of $p < .001$.

Similar ANOVAs were conducted for the 'private' manipulation checks. There were significant main effects for 'private condition' on each of these variables in the intended directions (Table 3, lower panel). There were no significant main effects of 'public condition', nor any significant interactions. In conclusion, the manipulations had the effects we intended them to have.

Experimental effects.

3 X 3 ANOVAs were conducted with the public acculturation strategies (separation, integration, assimilation) and the private acculturation strategies (separation, integration, assimilation) of the English people in the manipulation as the two independent variables and participants' own acculturation preferences and symbolic threat as dependent variables.

Preference for public integration (H6). There were significant main effects of public (F (2, 152) = 4.43, $p < .02$) and private conditions (F (2, 152) = 3.26, $p < .05$) on preference for

integration, but there was no significant interaction. In line with our predictions, Muslims prefer to integrate in public the most when they perceive the majority to prefer *public* integration as well (M = 3.79, SD = 1.23) which is significantly more than in the public separation conditions (M = 3.14, Bonferroni *p* < .03). The mean score for preferred public integration in the assimilation conditions (M = 3.60, SD = 1.36) was between those of the other conditions and did not differ from the other conditions.

The way in which the majority wants Muslims to acculturate in *private* also affected participants' preference for public integration: it was the most preferred strategy outside of the home when native English people were perceived to have a preference for private integration (M = 3.71, SD = 1.25). This is marginally more than when they were perceived to have a preference for private assimilation (M = 3.18, SD = 1.31, Bonferroni *p* < .08). Participants' preference for public integration was in-between that of the other two conditions when the majority was perceived to prefer separation in private (M = 3.65, SD = 1.38) and did not significantly differ from either one.

Preference for adoption of the English culture in public was also affected by how participants thought that the majority wanted them to acculturate in public (*F* (2, 151) = 4.08, *p* < .02). The Muslim participants preferred to publicly adopt the English culture the most when they perceived that majority members want them to assimilate in public (M = 3.18, SD = 1.38), which is significantly more than when they perceive a preference for public separation (M = 2.55, SD = 1.33; Bonferroni, *p* < .05). When they perceived the English majority to want integration in public, preference for public adoption (M = 3.11, SD = 1.38) was in-between the averages of the other two conditions.

Preference for adoption of the English culture in private. The way in which participants thought that the English majority wanted them to acculturate in public (*F* (2, 153) = 3.81, *p* < .03) and in private (*F* (2, 153) = 4.96, *p* < .01) affected the extent to which they preferred to adopt the English culture in *private*, too. Preference for adoption of the English culture in private was significantly higher when it was perceived that majority members wanted Muslims to assimilate in *public* (M = 3.37, SD = 1.44) than when they were perceived to want separation in public (M = 2.70, SD = 1.43; Bonferroni, *p* < .04). Again, preference for private adoption in the perceived integration condition (M = 3.02, SD = 1.34) was in-between those of the other two conditions and did not differ significantly from either one.

However, in contrast to the effects of perceived public acculturation strategies, participants expressed a significantly greater preference to adopt the English culture inside their homes when they perceived English majority members to want them to integrate in

private domains (M = 3.41, SD = 1.33) than when they perceived a preference for private assimilation (M = 2.63, SD = 1.29; Bonferroni $p < .01$). Their preference for private adoption did not differ significantly from the other two conditions when majority members were perceived to prefer private separation (M = 3.02, SD = 1.56).

Liking (H7). As predicted, participants liked the majority members being interviewed less or more depending on the way in which these preferred Muslims to acculturate in public (F (2, 153) = 10.87, $p < .001$) and in private (F (2, 153) = 8.39, $p < .001$). Majority members were liked the most when they had a preference for integration in public (M = 3.23, SD = 1.09), which is significantly more than when they preferred public assimilation (M = 2.29, SD = 1.04; Bonferroni $p < .001$). The extent to which they liked the majority members if these preferred Muslims to separate in public was in-between the levels of liking of the two other conditions (M = 2.79, SD = 1.08), but only differed significantly from the public assimilation condition (Bonferroni $p < .04$).

Contrasting the effects of perceived public strategies, participants liked English majority members the most when these preferred Muslims to separate in private (M = 3.10, SD = 1.12). This is significantly more than when they perceived majority members to want private assimilation (M = 2.33, SD = 1.06, Bonferroni $p < .01$). Liking of the majority members in the perceived private integration condition lie in-between the other two conditions (M = 2.93, SD = 1.08), but was only significantly different from the public assimilation condition (Bonferroni $p < .01$).

Symbolic threat (H8). The extent to which participants experienced symbolic threat depended on how they thought majority members wanted them to acculturate in private (F (2, 146) = 3.18, $p < .05$). Symbolic threat was higher in the private assimilation (M = 3.16, SD = 1.25) and integration conditions (M = 3.20, SD = 1.11) than in the private separation conditions (M = 2.74, SD = 1.08), although post-hoc Bonferroni tests did not show any significant differences. Furthermore, as can be seen in Figure 3, perceived public and private acculturation conditions interacted on feelings of symbolic threat (F (4, 146) = 2.94, $p < .03$). In most conditions, participants' feelings of threat was around the midpoint of the scale, as long as the majority favoured assimilation or separation in public, their preferences for private domains did not impact on threat. However, this changed when the majority desired integration in public. There was a large drop in symbolic threat when majority members were perceived to want integration in public and separation in private (M = 2.05, SD = .68), this is significantly lower than when the majority preferred public integration in combination with

Figure 3. *Study 3: Interaction between perceived public and private acculturation strategies on symbolic threat (p < .03) experienced by Muslim participants.*

either private integration (M = 3.16, SD = .1.22; Bonferroni, *p* < .03) or assimilation (M = 3.45, SD = .1.27; Bonferroni, *p* < .01).[3]

Discussion

As hypothesised, the effects of perceived public acculturation preferences of the other group on how much people like the members of that other group and on their own preference for public integration found in Studies 1 and 2 with English majority members, were shown to be in effect for Muslim minority members as well. That is, majority members were liked the most (H7) and Muslims' own preference for public integration was highest when they perceived the majority to have a preference for public integration (H6). Furthermore, for both the majority and Muslim minority members, perceived public and private acculturation preferences of the other group interacted on their feelings of symbolic threat. However, the interaction pattern was different for majority members compared to minority members,

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[3] Viewed the other way around, the interaction looks as follows: as long as majority members are perceived to favour assimilation or integration in private, their public preferences do not affect symbolic threat experienced by Muslim minority members. However, when the majority is perceived to want separation in private, then threat is lowest when this is combined with integration in public (M = 2.05, SD = .68), which is significantly less threatening than when the majority wanted private separation in combination with public assimilation (M = 2.96, SD = 1.31; Bonferroni, *p* = .053) or public separation (M = 3.07, SD = .91; Bonferroni, *p* = .020).

showing that what is threatening to one group, is not necessarily threatening to the other group.

The interaction followed our prediction (H8): Muslim minority members felt the least threatened when they thought that majority members wanted them to separate in private and integrate in public. This suggests that this might be the combination of public and private acculturation strategies that our participants are most comfortable with. This idea is further supported by the results showing that participants liked majority members the most when they had a preference for integration in public, but also when they had a preference for separation in private.

In addition to our hypothesised findings, the results also showed that Muslim participants generally accommodated the wishes of majority members when it came to adoption of the English culture. For both domains, their preference for culture adoption was highest when they perceived the majority to prefer public assimilation, followed by public integration, and then public separation. However, when majority members preferred Muslims to assimilate in *private*, this seemed to backfire as this caused Muslims to have a lower preference for adoption of the English culture in private than when they preferred Muslims to integrate or separate in private. This is in line with our finding that Muslims feel the most threatened when the majority wants them to assimilate in private.

General discussion

In line with the hypotheses, a perceived outgroup preference for public integration increased liking of that outgroup and own preference for public integration in all three experiments. For majority members, but not for Muslims, the same perception also increased own preference for private integration, which might be an indication that the integration preferences of majority members differ less between the two domains than those of minority members do.

However, when majority members perceive Muslims to assimilate in private, they seem to want Muslims to maintain their original culture in other (public) domains more than when they integrate or separate in private, perhaps in order to maintain distinctiveness between themselves and the outgroup (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Jetten & Spears, 2004).

Muslim participants generally followed the wishes of majority members when it came to adoption of the English culture. In both public and private domains, their preference for culture adoption was highest when they perceived the majority to prefer public assimilation, followed by public integration, and lastly public separation. Even so, they only responded in an

accommodating way when it came to their preferences for the *public* domain: when majority members preferred Muslims to assimilate in *private*, Muslims had a lower preference for adoption of the English culture in private than when they preferred Muslims to integrate or separate in private, which suggests a resistance to losing the Muslim culture inside the own home.

Finally, we found interactions between perceived public and private acculturation preferences of the other group on the amount of symbolic threat experienced by both majority members and Muslim minority members, but the pattern differed for these two groups: Muslims felt the least threatened when they thought that majority members wanted them to separate in private combined with integration in public, which is also when they like those majority members the most. Majority members however, felt the least threatened when they perceive Muslims to assimilate in private, combined with separation in public. Comparing these results with results found by Tip et al. (2012) and Matera et al. (2011), it shows how important it is to take domain specificity into account. Both these studies looked at the effects of perceived acculturation preferences of minority members on feelings of threat experienced by the majority, without specifying life domains, and found that perceived contact was associated with less threat. Tip et al. (2012) also looked at perceived adoption, and found that this was negatively related with feelings of threat, too. Finally, although Tip et al (2012) found a positive relationship between perceived culture maintenance and perceived threat, Matera et al. (2011) found no significant relationship between these two variables. Looking at the results found in the present study, it seems like the negative relationship between perceived contact/adoption and threat only holds up when the contact or adoption takes place in the private domain. In addition, the positive relationship between perceived culture maintenance and perceived threat found by Tip et al. (2012) does not appear to hold up when culture maintenance takes place in the public domain. However, the combination of assimilation in private and separation in public is a combination of acculturation attitudes that is probably only endorsed by a relatively small group of minority members, since it suggests more adjustment towards the dominant culture at home than in public. Therefore, future research will need to further investigate perceptions of such rare combinations, in order to find out why these make majority members feel less threatened.

A weakness that these experiments have in common is that one-item measures were used to measure the acculturation preferences and affective responses. The reason for this is that participants of these studies were relatively young and there were time restrictions imposed by the schools where the research was conducted. Therefore, the questionnaire

needed to be simple and short. Yet, the present research still created consistent findings that are in line with theoretical reasoning. Furthermore, our findings are, of course, restricted to the situation of Muslims in England. Further research is needed to find out if the same responses occur among different minority or majority groups. The consistent findings in our studies do, however, show that acculturation research should not be limited to studying cultural minority groups; religious minority groups can be studied in terms of their acculturation too.

Our findings stress the importance of domain specificity in acculturation research. More specifically, it highlights a possible need for minority members to maintain their original culture inside their own homes. Previous research has pointed out repeatedly that a preference for *integration* leads to the best psychological, socio-cultural, and health outcomes for immigrants, as well as more favourable intergroup attitudes (Berry, 1997; Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Those studies did not specify different life domains. Our research might be an indication that minority members feel most comfortable with integration in *public* when it is combined with separation in *private*.

Future research needs to confirm whether this is indeed the case. That is, longitudinal research could find out whether and how public and private acculturation preferences affect well-being and intergroup relations. This is exactly what will be investigated in Chapter 4. In addition, once the most beneficial strategies for the different domains have been established, research should focus on finding other predictors of public and private acculturation preferences.

In conclusion, the present research gives experimental evidence in three independent studies that the way in which other groups are perceived to acculturate has an effect on own acculturation preferences and intergroup affect. Also, the findings underline the importance of domain specificity in acculturation research.

Chapter 3

Effects of ingroup norms and domain specificity on majority members' preferences for and investment in acculturation: a cross-cultural study

With immigration numbers growing, immigration and multiculturalism have become popular topics the media. Newspapers regularly present survey results showing how the general public feels about immigrants and immigration (for an example, see The Guardian, 2011). Among other things, such articles also provide majority members with information about the norms prevailing within their own group regarding acculturation issues. Research has shown that perceived ingroup norms about attitudes towards the outgroup often influence attitudes of individual ingroup members (Bennett et al., 2004; Blanchard et al., 1994; Crandall et al., 2002; Nesdale et al., 2005; Pettigrew, 1958; 1959). For example, ingroup norms have shown to be predictive of prejudice of ingroup members (Bennett, 2004; Pettigrew, 1958; 1959), social approval of having negative attitudes towards the outgroup (Crandall et al., 2002), views regarding racism (Blanchard et al., 1994), and liking of the outgroup (Nesdale et al., 2005). However, the role of ingroup norms in influencing acculturation preferences has not yet been investigated.

In Chapter 2, it was already explained why it is important to find out how we can predict a preference for integration among majority members. However, some researchers have indicated that measuring integration and other acculturation strategies the traditional way, i.e. by measuring the four acculturation strategies separately, can be problematic. For example, Van de Vijver, Helms-Lorenz, and Feltzer (1999) investigated Berry's (1980) four acculturation scales and their factor analysis showed that rather than tapping into the two underlying acculturation dimensions, there was support for a unidimensional acculturation strategy with integration on one end and assimilation, separation, and marginalisation on the other. Moreover, Rudmin (2006) noted that virtually all acculturation studies show that people are bicultural in their acculturative preferences. That is, he pointed out that participants rarely,

if ever, give consistent and extreme answers in favour of uniculturalism. He suggested that perhaps it would be more useful to focus on *degrees* of integration instead.

Looking back at the results reported in Chapter 2, Rudmin has an interesting point. All mean scores on integration, in all three studies, in all conditions, were well above the midpoint of the scale. Therefore, we suggest a new way to investigate integration, by looking at preference for culture maintenance *relative* to preference for culture adoption. This addresses issues with the traditional scales mentioned above, and it would be a very complete and sensible way to find out what people's acculturation preferences are. In the case of the current study, this means that it will be explored whether majority members' preference for maintenance *relative* to their preference for culture adoption will differ depending on the acculturation norms in their ingroup. In other words, various levels of a preference for integration in response to particular ingroup norms are explored.

As discussed in the previous chapter, one possible predictor of acculturation attitudes is how the respective outgroup is perceived to want to acculturate (Zagefka et al., 2011; Zagefka et al., 2012). Furthermore, perceived acculturation of the other group has shown to impact on affective reactions towards that group (e.g., Kosic et al., 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Matera et al., 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998; Zagefka et al., 2012). Thus, *outgroup* norms concerning acculturation impact on people's own acculturation preferences and intergroup attitudes, but from previous research we also know that people tend to be more affected by information given by their fellow *ingroup* members than by outgroup information (Stangor et al., 2001). Yet, the link between perceived *ingroup* norms about acculturation and own acculturation preferences has never been investigated. The present research aims to address that gap.

However, investigating participants' acculturation *preferences* only may not be sufficient. True integration entails effort and investment from an individual. From the point of view of the majority, this means that they have to try to foster an environment for ethnic minorities that will not only encourage them to keep their own culture, but also maximises their own contact with minority members. It is therefore relevant to study majority members' investment in acculturation. As opposed to the commonly used acculturation measures, which usually tap into a rather passive attitude towards acculturation (Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001), investment in acculturation could for example investigate to what extent majority members actively create possibilities for minority members to maintain their culture. Roccas and Brewer (2002) already noted that an individuals' subjective experience of their identity does not necessarily map onto their actual behaviour. This has been confirmed by findings of

Arends-Tóth, Van de Vijver, and Poortinga (2006), who found that acculturation attitudes and behaviours are not interchangeable, and recommend that both attitudes and behaviours should be measured in order to obtain a more comprehensive picture of acculturation. Accordingly, in the current research we do not only examine acculturation preferences, but also majority members' actual *investment* in acculturation of minority members.

Chapter 2 also highlighted the need to further examine domain specificity in acculturation research. In the case of the present research, perceived ingroup norms regarding acculturation might influence people's acculturation in a different way for each of the two domains. In line with previous research (e.g., Phalet et al., 2000; Sodowsky and Carey, 1988), we define 'private' here as 'at home' and 'public' as 'outside the home'.

This research will experimentally investigate the effect of perceived ingroup norms about acculturation preferences for public and private domains in life in a cross-cultural design encompassing England and Chile. In Chile, we will look at majority members' acculturation preferences regarding the indigenous Mapuche population, whereas in England, acculturation preferences of the English majority regarding Muslim minority members will be studied. According to the 2002 Chilean census, there were just over 600.000 Mapuche in Chile, which equals to 4% of the total population (Chilean census, 2002). In comparison, the UK 2001 census stated that there were 1.6 million Muslims living in the UK, which is 3% of the total population (Office for National Statistics, 2004). At first sight, these percentages seem rather similar, but since Chile has a population density of on average only 23 inhabitants per square kilometre, while the UK has 255 people per square kilometre (United Nations Population Division, 2011), people in the UK are more likely to encounter Muslims on a daily basis than non-indigenous Chileans are to see Mapuche on a daily basis. Another substantial difference between the two cultural groups is that the Mapuche are an indigenous population who lived in Chile for centuries before the people arrived who now constitute the non-indigenous Chilean population, and who are mostly descendants of the Spanish colonisers. Ever since the Mapuche were defeated by colonisers in the 1880s, the Mapuche have suffered infringements of their land rights, suppression of their culture, and bad health and education services (Bengoa, 2000; Bengoa & Coaut, 1997). During the past decade, a public debate has developed about non-indigenous Chilean people's mistreatment of the Mapuche in the past, and the possible need to rectify historical injustices. The Chilean government has set up a body for the improvement of the Mapuche's situation (Ministerio de Planificacion y Cooperacion, 2003), and there is now a strong official recognition of the Mapuche identity and the important role that Mapuche people have played in Chile's history (Pehrson, González, & Brown, 2011). That

is, there is growing concern among the non-indigenous population about how to act in a more enlightened manner compared to the policies of the past (Zagefka et al., 2009). In contrast, England's Muslim population comprises almost exclusively individuals who immigrated to England from the 1950s onwards, or their descendants. The number of Muslims in Europe is still increasing (Pew Research Center, 2011). More importantly, negative attitudes towards Muslims have risen (Bleich, 2009) and prejudice against Muslims is now more widespread than prejudice against other minorities (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Lastly, Britain is a lot more individualistic than Chile. On Hofstede's (2001) value dimensions, Britain has one of the highest scores on the individualistic ranking (89 out of 100). Children are taught from an early age to think for themselves, to find out what their unique purpose in life is, and how they uniquely can contribute to society. Chile however, with a score of 23 out of 100 on Hofstede's individualism scale, scores rather low on the individualism dimension, meaning that they have more of a tightly-knit framework in society in which people can expect members of a particular ingroup to look after them in exchange for unconditional loyalty. That is, in Chile, an individual's self-image will be defined more in terms of "we", whereas in Britain it will be defined more as "I." If this is compared to other value-systems, such as Inglehart's (2006) survival/self-expression values and Schwartz's (2006) concept of autonomy/embeddedness, then it is noticeable that Britain also scores higher on self-expression and autonomy than Chile. This is not surprising, because as Inglehart (2006) has pointed out, individualism, autonomy, and self-expression all refer to a common theme: the extent to which a society emphasizes an autonomous choice for individuals.

The fact that these countries and minority groups are so different from one another provides a valuable opportunity to investigate whether results from acculturation research in one country can be generalised to another. Berry himself (e.g., Berry et al., 1987) already indicated that acculturation experiences may differ depending on the nature of the dominant society and the acculturating group. Rudmin (2006) advised that in order to fully comprehend the acculturation process, researchers need to conduct studies outside the Anglo-Saxon societies (e.g., the United States, Canada, Australia, England), because these societies are all too similar to one another. There is already some evidence that there may be cross-cultural differences in acculturation preferences (Berry et al., 2006; Church, 1982; Phalet & Hagendoorn, 1996). Therefore, we will make a careful comparison between the two very different cultural settings examined in this chapter. We will explore how perceived ingroup norms about public and private acculturation preferences affect majority members' own acculturation preferences for public and private domains, their investment in acculturation,

and positive affect felt towards their own ingroup members. As mentioned above, England seems to emphasize more of an autonomous choice for individuals than Chile. It is therefore tenable that Chileans will be more inclined to follow the preferences of their ingroup members than English people. For the same reasons as we mentioned in Chapter 2, we will again focus only on integration, assimilation, and separation in our manipulation of perceived normative acculturation attitudes.

Study 4

In Study 4 we investigated the effects of ingroup norms regarding public and private acculturation of Muslims living in England on English majority members' own acculturation preferences for public and private domains, their investment in acculturation, and positive affect felt towards their own ingroup members.

In general, majority members have been found to like minority members who integrate or assimilate more than those who have other acculturation preferences (e.g., Kosic et al., 2005; Maisonneuve & Testé, 2007; Matera et al., 2011; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998). These studies did not include domain specificity, but the studies described in Chapter 2 did contain measures of this aspect. We found that *publicly* integrating or assimilating Muslims were liked more by English majority members than publicly separating Muslims. In the same study, perceived *private* acculturation of Muslims did not have an effect on how much they were liked. If English people would be consistent in these preferences, then they would also like their own ingroup members more when they support *public* integration or assimilation of Muslims than when they favour public separation (H1).

Due to the novelty of the design of this study, which includes manipulations of ingroup norms about acculturation, domain specificity, a new way of measuring acculturation preferences, and a first-time use of investment in acculturation, this study is relatively exploratory in its nature. Therefore, we did not have any other specific hypotheses. Instead, based on the knowledge that perceived ingroup norms about attitudes towards the outgroup often influence attitudes of individual ingroup members in the same direction (e.g., Bennett et al., 2004; Blanchard et al., 1994; Crandall et al., 2002; Nesdale et al., 2005; Pettigrew, 1958; 1959), we expect that English majority members will roughly follow the public and private acculturation preferences of their peers (H2).

Method

Participants

A total of 237 sixth form students from an English college participated in this study; 172 were female, 64 were male, and 1 participant did not specify his/her sex. Their age ranged from 16 to 19 years old, with a mean age of 16.33 (SD = .58). Participation was voluntary. All participants classified themselves as born in Britain and having British nationality, and none of them were Muslim.

Design

Perceptions of ingroup norms were manipulated by means of a bogus BBC newspaper article, in which two English college students (like the participants themselves) were interviewed about how they would like Muslims living in England to acculturate in public and private domains. Thus, the study had an experimental design with two factors, each consisting of three levels: Perceived **public** acculturation norms of ingroup members (separation, integration, assimilation) **X** Perceived **private** acculturation norms of ingroup members (separation, integration, assimilation). Participants were randomly assigned to one of the nine conditions and the number of participants per condition ranged from 23 to 30.

Measures

Participants filled out a questionnaire with the measures listed below. Similar items were pre-tested in pilot studies (N1 = 87, N2 = 72) to make sure that all items would be appropriate for and well understood by the relatively young age group.

Perceived acculturation preferences. To check whether the manipulation was a success, we measured how participants thought that other English college students, like those in the manipulation, wanted Muslims to acculturate in public and private. To specify that we were asking about their perceptions about public domains, we ended each item with "...outside of their homes", whereas items about private domains ended with "... at home". The perceived culture maintenance item started with "I believe that English college students want Muslims to live the Muslim way of life...", perceived adoption of the English culture started with "I believe that English college students want Muslims to live the English way of life...", and the item measuring perceived integration ended with the statement "I believe that English college students want Muslims to combine Muslim and the English way of life...". Answers were measured on a 1 (disagree strongly) to 5 (agree strongly) Likert scale.

Liking. One item measured how much participants liked the ingroup members who were interviewed in the manipulation: 'How much do you like the people who were being interviewed?' (1 = not at all to 5 = very much).

Own acculturation preferences. Participants' preferences for public and private culture maintenance, culture adoption, and integration were measured with the exact same items as in Studies 1 and 2 (see Chapter 2). The reason why preference for public and private integration was also measured directly was to ensure that we would be able to check whether our novel approach to analyse acculturation preferences (looking at various levels of a preference for integration) would indeed provide more information about participants' acculturation preferences than measuring a preference for integration.

Investment in acculturation. Investment in acculturation was measured on two dimensions: investment in maintenance and investment in contact. Although ideally investment in culture adoption rather than contact would have been measured as a second dimension, pilot testing showed that investment in adoption was seen as something negative by participants, i.e., 'pushing' minority members to become more English. Therefore, a second dimension of investment in contact was chosen instead, alongside investment in maintenance. There was no specification of life domains in these measures. The reason for this is that it is not really feasible for a majority member to invest in culture maintenance inside the home of a minority member. Moreover, although the scale measuring investment in contact looked into contact both outside and inside the home of the minority member, all items loaded on the same factor, which could be due to the fact that both these domains are public domains from the point of view from a majority member. Investment in contact was measured using 4 items, which were worded as follows: "Imagine a Muslim classmate asks you to hang out together after school. How likely is it that you'll do this?", "Suppose a Muslim friend is spending a sunny day in the park together with some other Muslim friends. He/she invited you to join them. How likely is it that you'll go?", "There is a Muslim girl/boy who you get along well with and he/she invited you over for a dinner with some of his/her friends and family. How likely is it that you'll accept the invitation?", and "Imagine a couple of Muslim classmates are going out and ask you to come along. How likely is it that you'll go with them?" (α = .86). Investment in culture maintenance was also measured with 4 items: "Suppose your school wants to give Muslims days off during their own religious holidays. The school wants to find out if the majority of students agree with this. How likely is it that you'll agree?", "Imagine there is a vote in your school about if it should be allowed to wear the headscarf in school or not. How likely is it that you'd go and vote for the headscarf to be allowed?", "Islam states that Muslims

should pray 5 times per day. Imagine your school is considering creating a prayer room for Muslim students and the school wants to know if there is enough support for this idea. How likely is it that you will support it?", and "Imagine that there are plans to build a mosque in your neighbourhood. Some of your neighbours are organising a protest against the building of the mosque and ask you to join them. How likely is it you'll join them?" (Reversed item). The scale was high on internal reliability (α = .80). All answers on the investment scales were measured on a 1 (very unlikely) to 5 (very likely) Likert scale.

Procedure

Before starting the experiment, participants were told that they would participate in a study about multiculturalism in England, consisting of two separate studies. For the first study, they would read a BBC article and answer a few questions, and it was said that the goal was to find out how well people their age would understand and remember media information. In reality, the BBC article was the manipulation of the experiment: two English college students were interviewed about how they want Muslims living in England to acculturate in public and private domains. For example, in the public integration conditions, one of the interviewees says: "I think it's OK if Muslims want to go to an English college. However, I completely understand if Muslims want to know about the background of their family, so they could also have Koran lessons". In the public separation conditions, "English college" is replaced with "Muslim college", while in the public assimilation condition, the interviewee is still in favour of Muslims going to English colleges, but doesn't find it necessary for them to have Koran lessons. For the rest, the wording was kept as consistent as possible over the different conditions. With regards to the manipulation of perceived private acculturation preferences, in the case of private separation for example, one of the remarks of interviewee is: "I don't think it's necessary for them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home. But I definitely wouldn't mind it they'd for example fast during Ramadan..." In the private assimilation condition, the interviewees say that they would like it if Muslims would celebrate Christmas, but do not think it is necessary for them to adhere to Ramadan, whereas in the private integration condition they would like Muslims to celebrate both. For the full manipulations used in the current study, please see the Appendix on pages 193-201. To ensure that participants would read the article thoroughly, they were told that there would be questions about the article at the end of the questionnaire. The instructions emphasized that the second study was unrelated to the first, and was aimed at finding out their own opinions about multiculturalism. All aspects of the research were in line with APA and BPS ethics guidelines.

Results

Manipulation check

To test for the effectiveness of the manipulation on perceived *public* and *private* acculturation strategies, ANOVAs were performed with 'public condition' (perceived public separation, integration, or assimilation) and 'private condition' (perceived private separation, integration, or assimilation) as two independent factors and 'perceived public culture maintenance', 'perceived public culture adoption' and 'perceived public integration' as dependent variables. As expected, this yielded highly significant main effects for 'public condition' on each of these variables in the intended directions (Table 4, upper panel). That is, perceived public maintenance was higher in the public separation and integration conditions than in the public assimilation condition, perceived public integration was higher in the public integration condition than in the other two public conditions, and perceived public adoption was higher in the public assimilation and integration conditions than in public separation condition. A similar analysis was conducted for the private acculturation strategies (Table 4, lower panel). Main effects of 'private condition' on each of the private acculturations perceptions were also in the intended directions, in the same way as described for the public conditions. From this we conclude that the manipulation of both variables was a success.[4]

Experimental effects

Significant effects on liking. An ANOVA was conducted with the public (separation, integration, assimilation) and private acculturation strategies (separation, integration, assimilation) of the college students in the manipulation as independent variables, and participants' liking of the college students in the manipulation as a dependent variable. There was a significant main effect of perceived **public** strategies on liking of the college students ($F(2,228) = 4.62$, $p < .02$). Post-hoc Tukey comparisons showed that English college students who wanted Muslims to integrate in public were liked significantly more (M = 2.93, SD = .86; p < .01) than those who were perceived to have a preference for public assimilation (M = 2.49, SD = .98). Comparisons between the public separation condition (M = 2.70, SD = .97) and the

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[4] As was the case in Study 1, the Berry-style acculturation preferences seem to have caused a slightly more extreme shift in the perceptions of our participants (separation was likely to be seen as 100% culture maintenance and 0% culture adoption, integration as 50% of both, and assimilation as 0% culture maintenance and 100% culture adoption). As can be seen in Table 4, this is exactly the pattern of means found in our manipulation check.

Table 4. Main effects of public and private acculturation conditions on manipulation check in Study 4

		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
		Public acculturation condition			
Perceived *public* maintenance	M	3.91[a]	2.77[b]	2.09[c]	F = 57.12,
	(SD)	(1.04)	(1.17)	(1.08)	p < .001
Perceived *public* integration	M	2.67[b]	4.32[a]	2.72[b]	F = 59.87,
	(SD)	(1.11)	(.92)	(1.19)	p < .001
Perceived *public* adoption	M	2.23[c]	3.08[b]	4.29[a]	F = 80.20,
	(SD)	(1.04)	(1.19)	(.85)	p < .001
		Private acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *private* maintenance	M	4.17[a]	2.96[b]	2.32[c]	F = 56.66,
	(SD)	(.99)	(1.01)	(1.31)	p < .001
Perceived *private* integration	M	2.37[b]	4.36[a]	2.73[b]	F = 82.44,
	(SD)	(.93)	(.88)	(1.21)	p < .001
Perceived *private* adoption	M	1.67[c]	2.81[b]	4.00[a]	F = 110.82,
	(SD)	(.82)	(.97)	(1.14)	p < .001

Note. Superscripts represent significant differences between conditions as indicated by Tukey post-hoc tests. All are significant at the level of p < .001.

other two public conditions were not statistically significant, suggesting that H1 was partially supported.

Perceived ***private*** strategies also significantly affected how much participants liked the college students who were expressing their acculturation preferences (F(2,228) = 6.52, p < .01). Tukey post-hoc comparisons of the three groups indicated that English college students who preferred Muslims to assimilate inside their homes were liked significantly less (M = 2.42, SD = .90) than those who preferred private integration (M = 2.88, SD = .95; p < .01) or private separation (M = 2.85, SD = .95; p < .01).

Lastly, the ANOVA also showed an interaction effect of perceived public and private strategies on liking (F(4,228) = 2.72, p < .04). As can be seen in Figure 4, as long as the English students in the manipulation expressed a preference for public separation, their preferences for the private domain did not have an effect on how much they were liked. When they

Figure 4. *Study 4: Interaction effect of perceived public and private acculturation preferences of ingroup members regarding Muslims in England on liking of these ingroup members (p < .04).*

favoured public integration, however, they were liked significantly more when this was combined with a preference for separation in private (M = 3.30, SD = .70) than when it was combined with a preference for private assimilation (M = 2.62, SD = .90, *p* < .02), as indicated by Tukey post-hoc comparisons. When public integration was combined with private integration, liking was in-between that of the two other conditions (M = 2.96, SD = .82). Those who were in favour of public assimilation were also liked differently depending on their preferences for the private domain: when it was combined with a preference for private assimilation (M = 1.97, SD = .81), they were liked significantly less than when it went together with a preference for private integration (M = 2.92, SD = .95, *p* < .02) or private separation (M = 2.68, SD = .94, *p* < .01). To summarise the interaction: those preferring private separation combined with public integration were liked the most, whereas those favouring assimilation in both domains were liked the least.

Effects on own acculturation preferences. To investigate people's preference for public culture maintenance **relative to** their preference for culture adoption in the public domain, we conducted a two-way mixed design ANOVA with 'preference for public maintenance' and 'preference for public adoption' paired as a within-subjects factor, combined with two between-subjects factors: 'perceived public acculturation preferences' and 'perceived private acculturation preferences'. There was a main effect of the within-subjects factor (F(1,128) = 87.27, *p* < .001), meaning that overall (independent of the manipulation), participants

significantly preferred Muslims to adopt the English culture in public (M = 4.35, SD = 0.81) over Muslims' culture maintenance in public (M = 3.55, SD = 1.25). This main effect was qualified by an interaction with perceived **public** acculturation preferences of peers ($F(2,228)$ = 3.09, $p <$ .05). Figure 5 shows the nature of this interaction effect. Tukey post-hoc comparisons[5] showed that the difference between preference for public maintenance and preference for public adoption was smaller in the public separation condition (M_{diff} = .53, SD = 1.33) than in the public integration condition (M_{diff} = 1.08, SD = 1.46, $p <$ .03). The difference score in the public assimilation condition was in-between that of the other two conditions (M_{diff} = .81, SD = 1.20) and was not significantly different from either.


Figure 5. *Study 4: Interaction effect between perceived **public** strategies and the difference between preference for **public** maintenance and preference for **public** adoption (p < .05).*

Finally, there was an interaction between the within-subjects factor and the perceived **private** acculturation preferences of peers ($F(2,228)$ = 4.29, $p <$ .02). As Figure 6 shows, participants' preference for public adoption is higher relative to public maintenance in the private assimilation condition, compared to the other two conditions. It appears that participants express a need for consistency: if ingroup members want Muslims to behave completely like English people inside their own homes, participants wanted Muslims to do

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[5]For ease of presentation, a difference score (preference for public adoption – preference for public maintenance) was calculated on which we ran a one-way ANOVA with Tukey post hoc tests, in order to further investigate the significant interaction. This will be done for all significant interactions throughout this chapter.

Figure 6. *Study 4: Interaction effect between perceived **private** strategies and the difference between preference for **public** maintenance and preference for **public** adoption (p < .02).*

something similar in public domains. Post-hoc Tukey tests revealed that the difference was marginally larger in the private assimilation condition (M_{diff} = 1.11, SD = 1.32) than in the private integration (M_{diff} = .62, SD = 1.33, p < .06) or separation condition (M_{diff} = .64, SD = 1.34, p < .07).

The effects of the manipulations on **private** acculturation preferences were investigated with a similar two-way mixed design ANOVA with 'preference for private maintenance' and 'preference for private adoption' paired as a within-subjects factor, combined with two between-subjects factors: 'perceived public acculturation preferences' and 'perceived private acculturation preferences'. We found a significant main effect of the within-subjects factor (F(1,228) = 7.43, p < .01); overall, participants had more of a preference for Muslims to maintain their original culture inside their own homes (M = 4.57, SD = .71) than they wanted Muslims to adopt the English culture at home (M = 4.43, SD = .82). In addition, there was a significant interaction: the difference between preference for **private** maintenance and preference for **private** adoption was influenced by perceived **private** acculturation preferences of peers (*F*(2,228) = 4.29, *p* < .02). Figure 7 clarifies that the more their peers preferred private culture adoption (or maintenance), the more they did, too. Putting it differently, there seems to be a peer influence effect: the graph indicates a pattern which is in line with the manipulation of ingroup norms regarding private acculturation, meaning H2 was

Figure 7. *Study 4: Interaction effect between perceived **private** strategies and the difference between preference for **private** maintenance and preference for **private** adoption (p < .02).*

supported for the private domain. Tukey post-hoc comparisons showed that the difference was significantly larger in the private separation condition (M_{diff} = -.31, SD = .92) than in the private assimilation condition (M_{diff} = .06, SD = .75, p < .02). The private integration condition (M_{diff} = -.19, SD = .81) did not significantly differ from the other two private conditions.

Effects on investment in acculturation. To find out whether the same patterns occurred for investment in acculturation, a two-way mixed design ANOVA was conducted with 'investment in maintenance' and 'investment in contact' paired as a within-subjects factor, and 'perceived public acculturation preferences' as a between-subjects factor. As predicted, a significant main effect of the within-subjects factor appeared as well (F(1,228) = 27.76, p < .001), suggesting that overall, participants' investment in contact (M = 3.75, SD = .81) was higher than their investment in culture maintenance (M = 3.43, SD = 1.03). Again, a significant interaction effect between the within-subjects factor and public conditions emerged (*F*(2,228) = 4.58, p < .02). Figure 8 shows the direction of this interaction effect, which looks very similar to the effect found for public acculturation preferences (see Figure 5). Tukey post-hoc comparisons revealed the difference to be significantly smaller in the public separation condition (M_{diff} = .08, SD = .87) than in the public integration condition (M_{diff} = .53, SD =.94, p < .01). Comparisons between the public assimilation condition (M_{diff} = .32, SD = .94) and the other two public conditions were not statistically significant.

Effects on preference for integration. Finally, we ran an additional analysis to find out whether our way of investigating acculturation preferences did in fact provide more insight in

Figure 8. *Study 4: Interaction effect between perceived **public** strategies and the difference between investment in public maintenance and investment in contact (p < .02).*

participants' acculturation preferences than looking at their preference for integration directly. We used one-way ANOVAS to find out whether perceived public and private acculturation preferences of peers had an impact on participants' own preference for public and private integration. No significant main or interaction effects were found. From this, we can conclude that our novel approach of investigating a preference for integration, by looking at culture maintenance and adoption separately, provides more information than the traditional way of investigating integration which measures this preference directly, on only one scale.

Discussion

Study 4 is the first to show that ingroup norms regarding acculturation do indeed have an impact on people's affect felt towards ingroup members, their own acculturation preferences, and their investment in acculturation, and that the effects differ for public and private domains.

H1 was partially supported: although ingroup members in favour of public integration were liked the most, those wanting public assimilation were liked the least. This supports the idea that majority members respond differently to acculturation preferences depending on whether these preferences are expressed by the outgroup or the ingroup. Whereas in Chapter 1 it became clear that separating *outgroup* members were liked the least, here, *ingroup* members supporting assimilation were liked the least. This suggests that majority members are in favour of assimilation as long as they are under the impression that it is the own choice

of Muslim minority members to do so, but not when it is imposed on them by majority members. Ingroup members were also liked differently depending on how they wanted Muslims to acculturate inside their own homes. That is, ingroup members who wanted Muslims to either separate or integrate at home were liked more than those wanting private assimilation. It seems like English majority members like their peers more as long as they give Muslims a chance to maintain their original culture inside their own homes, whereas when their peers demand Muslims to become completely English inside their own home, they like them less. Putting together the effects of both domains, ingroup members were liked the least when they wanted Muslims to assimilate in public and in private. This was supported by a significant interaction showing that overall, ingroup members preferring private separation combined with public integration were liked the most, whereas those favouring assimilation in both domains were liked the least. Interestingly, in Study 3 (Chapter 2) we found that Muslim minority members also like English majority members the most when these are in favour of public integration, but private separation, which may indicate that there is somewhat of an agreement between the two groups regarding which acculturation strategies for public and private domains they like the most.

Looking at effects of ingroup norms on own acculturation, when it came to *public* domains, English people generally wanted Muslims to adopt the English culture more than they wanted them to maintain their original culture; this was independent of the perceived preferences of their peers. This result is in line with what has been found in earlier work (e.g., Kosic et al., 2005; Van Oudenhoven et al., 1998) where majority members generally favoured of outgroup members who integrated or assimilated (i.e., adopted parts of the dominant culture) more than those who had acculturation preferences that did not involve culture adoption. Furthermore, participants lowered their preference for public culture maintenance *relative to* their preference for public culture adoption when they perceived their peers to want public integration compared to when they perceived their peers to support separation (with a perception of assimilation being in-between these two). A possible explanation for this effect may lie within people's tendency to assign themselves and other people to social categories in order to simplify their environment and make sense of the world (Turner, Hogg, Oakes, Reicher & Wetherell, 1987). Therefore, people's public acculturation preferences might not differ much depending on their peer's public preferences, as long as their peers prefer Muslims to either stay in a separate category (public separation) or leave their old identity behind and become completely English (public assimilation). However, when their peers prefer public integration, this may clash with their need to categorise people in clearly separated

social categories: integration would put someone in two categories at the same time. To compensate, people lowered their own preference for public maintenance relative to their preference for culture adoption when they perceived their ingroup members to be in favour of public integration.

Interestingly, participants had a need for consistency from private to public domains: when ingroup members wanted Muslims to behave completely like English people inside their own homes, then participants wanted Muslims to match this preference in public domains. This behaviour may be driven by a desire to make sense of their peers' preferences, since it will not happen very often that a minority member maintains their original culture less in private than in public domains.

Effects of ingroup norms on participants' investment in maintenance and investment in contact resembled the effects on their public acculturation preferences mentioned above. That is, overall, majority members invested more in contact than in culture maintenance, and they lowered their own investment in maintenance relative to their preference for contact when they perceived their ingroup members to be in favour of public integration compared to when they perceived their peers to want separation. There are several interesting points to note about this. First, since the English majority's acculturation preferences for the public domains match their investment in acculturation, there seems to be a match between their attitudes and their behavioural intentions. Second, whereas items regarding acculturation preferences referred to culture adoption and maintenance, investment was measured by asking about contact and culture maintenance. That is, the majority members in this study did not seem to distinguish between contact and public culture adoption; the manipulations had the same effects on both. This is in line with Tip et al., (2012) who found similar effects of a perception of Pakistani minority members wanting contact and them wanting culture adoption on feelings of threat experienced by English majority members.

With regards to participants' acculturation preferences for the *private* domain, majority members had overall a higher preference for culture maintenance than for culture adoption. Based on the results found in Chapter 2, we suggested that English majority members may experience somewhat of a distinctiveness threat when Muslim minority members behave too similar to English people when they are at home. This could possibly explain why the English majority members in the present study had an overall preference for private maintenance over adoption too.

Finally, there seems to be a peer influence for the private domain: the more majority members' peers preferred private culture adoption (or maintenance), the more they did, too.

We know from classic work on the psychology of social norms that people are more likely to conform to group norms in situations that are novel or ambiguous (Sherif, 1936). It is probably safe to assume that most majority members do not have much experience with the way in which Muslims acculturate inside their own homes, which may explain why majority members followed the preferences for private domains of their peers.

Of course we cannot generalise these results to situations differing from those of Muslims in England. Study 5 addresses this issue and investigates the same research paradigm in Chile, looking at effects of ingroup norms regarding acculturation of an indigenous minority group: the Mapuche.

Study 5

As discussed in the general introduction of this chapter, the intergroup situation in Chile is very different from that in England. Therefore, it is possible that there will be different reactions to ingroup norms regarding public and private acculturation. However, in Study 4, we already found that English majority members liked their ingroup members the least when they had a preference for public and private assimilation. Considering the Chilean context, due to the strong focus on recognition of the Mapuche identity in recent public debates, we expected that this effect would be even stronger in Chile. That is, we hypothesised that non-indigenous Chileans will like their ingroup members less when these want the Mapuche to leave their original culture behind and behave completely like the non-indigenous Chileans (i.e., assimilate) than when they support integration or separation. We expect to find this effect for both public (H3) and private (H4) domains.

In Study 4 we found that majority members did lower their preference for maintenance *relative* to their preference for culture adoption when their peers preferred public integration, probably because public integration creates a clash with the need to categorise people in clearly separated social categories. However, turning to the Chilean context, the Mapuche have lived in Chile for centuries before the people who are now the non-indigenous Chileans arrived, meaning that virtually all of them are Chilean citizens and always have been. Hence, the Mapuche *are* Chileans, no matter what acculturation strategy they endorse. Combining this with what we already know about the current political climate in Chile, which is in support of protecting the Mapuche's heritage culture, we expect that Chileans generally, will show resistance against their peers wanting assimilation, possibly by increasing their preference for culture maintenance relative to their preference for culture adoption (H5). For which domains this will happen is difficult to predict, because as Study 4,

Study 5 is very much of an exploratory study due to the novelty of its design. Therefore, we will simply explore the effects rather than trying to predict them any more than we have done so far.

Ingroup norms about contact

Although there is a lack of literature about ingroup norms and acculturation, since we are investigating investment in *contact* rather than adoption, we have an opportunity to build upon the contact literature. Pettigrew (1998) stated that contact between groups can both affect and be affected by social norms regarding the relationship between these two groups. De Tezanos-Pinto, Bratt, & Brown (2010) took this a step further and suggested that when other ingroup members have more contact with the outgroup, this will create a perception of ingroup norms supporting the acceptability of such contact, which will in turn generate more positive attitudes towards the outgroup. Therefore, in the present study, we expect that the manipulations of public acculturation preferences will affect ingroup norms regarding contact, which will be in line with the acculturation preferences in the manipulation (highest in the public assimilation condition, lowest in the public separation condition). In turn, ingroup norms regarding contact will affect investment in contact (H6). This means that the current study will include an additional measure compared to Study 4; in Study 4 we only measured perceived acculturation preferences, which asked how participants thought that other majority members, *like those in the manipulation*, wanted minority members to acculturate in public and private. In order to be able to test our hypothesis, in Study 5 we will add a measure asking to what extent participants think that other young Chileans *in general* want minority members have contact with the majority, as a measure of wider cultural ingroup norms regarding contact.

Method

Participants

Two hundred and ninety-one Chilean University students participated in this study; 145 were female, 146 were male. Their age ranged from 17 to 35 years old, with a mean age of 21.33 (SD = .58). Participation was voluntary. All participants classified themselves as Chilean and none of them were Mapuche.

Design

Perceptions of participants were manipulated by means of a bogus article of a research centre. The article described two Chilean students (like the participants themselves) who were being interviewed about how they would like Mapuche to acculturate in public and private domains. This leads to an experimental design with two factors, each consisting of three levels: Perceived **public** acculturation strategies of ingroup members (separation, integration, assimilation) **X** Perceived **private** acculturation strategies of ingroup members (separation, integration, assimilation). The number of participants per condition ranged from 28 to 37.

Measures

Perceived acculturation preferences. To ensure that the manipulation was successful, we measured how participants thought that young Chileans, like the ones in the article, wanted Mapuche to acculturate in public and private. The items from Study 4 were translated into Spanish by one of the collaborators who is fluent in both English and Spanish, and adapted to the Chilean/Mapuche context, but other than that, the items were the same.

Perceived ingroup norms regarding contact. Participants were asked what they thought that young Chileans *in general* wanted Mapuche to do. The two items were: "Young Chileans want Mapuche to have non-indigenous Chilean friends" and "Young Chileans want Mapuche to spend their free time with non-indigenous Chileans after school or work" (1 factor, α = .64).

Liking. Two items measured how much participants liked the Chileans who were interviewed in the manipulation: "In general, what is your opinion regarding Angélica (or Pedro) from what you read in the article?" (1 = very negative to 5 = very positive; 1 factor, α = .76).

Own acculturation preferences. The preferences that participants themselves had for Mapuche regarding the maintenance of their ethnic culture and adopting the Chilean culture were measured as follows. Preference for public adoption was measured with the item "I want Mapuche to live according to Chilean customs outside of their homes" and their preference for private adoption was measured with the item "I want Mapuche to live according to Chilean customs inside their homes". Correspondingly, preference for public and private culture maintenance was measured with the statements "I want Mapuche to maintain their customs outside of their homes/inside their homes". Like in the English study, we added items measuring public and private integration to compare results on these items to our new way of

analysing a preference for integration. These were measured as follows: "I want Mapuche to maintain Chilean and Mapuche customs outside of their homes/inside their homes". All answered were measured on a 5-point Likert scale (1 = disagree strongly, 5 = agree strongly).

Investment in acculturation. As in the English sample, investment in acculturation looked into two dimensions: investment in culture maintenance and investment in contact. Investment in culture maintenance was measured with a 4-item scale (α = .66) containing the following items: "Mapuche have a ceremonial symbol called Rewe, which is planted along the canelo tree as a centre of prayer and celebration. How likely is it that you would support the idea for a Rewe to be planted at your university for the ceremonies of Mapuche students?", "Imagine that you have a Mapuche friend who is ill and opts to follow the treatment given by the Machi instead of conventional medicine. How likely is it that you would support this decision?", "Imagine that the University organised a concert for university bands, and there is a traditional Mapuche orchestra that wants to participate to show their culture. How likely is it that you would go and see them play?", and "Imagine that a Mapuche classmate invites you to celebrate Guillatún (traditional Mapuche celebration). How likely is it that you would accept the invitation?"[6]. Investment in contact was measured with 3 items: "Imagine that a Mapuche friend is spending the afternoon in the park with other Mapuche. How likely is it that you would go if you where invited?" "Imagine that a Mapuche classmate with whom you get along invites you for dinner with their family. How likely is it that you would accept the invitation?", and "Imagine that a Mapuche friend invites you to spend the holidays with their family. How likely is it that you would accept this invitation?" The scale had an internal consistency of α = .78.

Procedure

Questionnaires were handed out on campuses of various Universities in Santiago, Chile, to Chilean undergraduate students of any University and any course except for psychology students. Participants were given the opportunity to answer the questionnaire in their own time (i.e., some took it home, some filled it out on campus, etc.). The first page of the questionnaire contained a consent form and instructions, which asked participants to read an article from the website of the Centre for Indigenous Studies of Chile (CEICH). The article was printed on the next page, however a fictitious link to the article and background information about the CEICH were provided in order to make it appear as if the article and the

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[6] Although the last two items also contain an element of contact, they all have a strong focus on supporting culture maintenance of the Mapuche, and factor analysis confirmed that all items loaded on one and the same factor.

research centre truly existed. The instructions explained to participants that the aim of the study was to move the research described in the article forward by creating better understanding about the process in which young Chileans form opinions issues such as the ones described in the article. In reality, the article was the manipulation of the experiment: two Chilean students were interviewed about how they want the Mapuche to acculturate in public and private domains. This was done in the same way as in the English study with the exception that Muslim traditions and customs were replaced with those of Mapuche. A full (translated) example of the condition combining public integration with private separation is available in the Appendix on page 202. Upon returning the questionnaires, participants were debriefed with a written letter, explaining the design and purpose of the study. All aspects of the research were in line with APA and BPS ethics guidelines.

Results

Manipulation check

To check whether the manipulation was a success, ANOVAs were conducted with the public and private acculturation conditions as independent variables and perceived public and private acculturation preferences as dependent variables. Table 5 (upper panel) shows that effects of the manipulations of ingroup norms regarding public domains on perceived public acculturation preferences were successful. That is, perceived public maintenance was higher in the public separation and integration conditions than in the public assimilation condition, perceived public integration was higher in the public integration condition than in the other two public conditions, and perceived public adoption was higher in the public assimilation and integration conditions than in public separation condition. A similar analysis was conducted for the manipulation of ingroup norms about private domains (Table 5, lower panel). Main effects of 'private condition' on each of the private acculturations perceptions were also in the intended directions, in the exact same way as described for the public conditions. From this we conclude that the manipulation of both variables was successful.

Experimental effects

Effects on liking. An ANOVA was conducted with the normative public (separation, integration, assimilation) and private acculturation strategies (separation, integration, assimilation) of the Chileans in the manipulation as independent variables, and participants' liking of the Chileans in the manipulation as a dependent variable. Perceived acculturation preferences of ingroup members had an effect on how much participants liked these ingroup

Table 5. Main effects of public and private acculturation conditions on manipulation check in Study 5

		Public acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *public* maintenance	M	4.27[a]	3.47[b]	2.12[c]	F = 83.71,
	(SD)	(1.08)	(1.27)	(1.28)	$p < .001$
Perceived *public* integration	M	3.11[b]	4.18[a]	2.52[c]	F = 50.11,
	(SD)	(1.31)	(1.10)	(1.11)	$p < .001$
Perceived *public* adoption	M	2.46[c]	3.42[b]	3.95[a]	F = 35.52,
	(SD)	(1.31)	(1.16)	(1.36)	$p < .001$
		Private acculturation condition			
		Separation	Integration	Assimilation	ANOVA
Perceived *private* maintenance	M	4.09[a]	3.50[b]	2.88[c]	F = 18.65,
	(SD)	(1.08)	(1.52)	(1.48)	$p < .001$
Perceived *private* integration	M	2.47[c]	3.97[a]	3.50[b]	F = 35.17,
	(SD)	(1.33)	(1.21)	(1.21)	$p < .001$
Perceived *private* adoption	M	1.77[c]	2.66[b]	3.66[a]	F = 55.48,
	(SD)	(1.17)	(1.32)	(1.29)	$p < .001$

Note. Superscripts represent significant differences between conditions as indicated by Tukey post-hoc tests. All are significant at the level of $p < .03$.

members. First, liking of the interviewees depended on the ***public*** acculturation strategies they were perceived to endorse (F(2, 279= 19.47, $p < .001$). Tukey post-hoc comparisons revealed that Chileans who wanted Mapuche to assimilate in public were liked the least (M = 3.13, SD = .81), significantly less than when they were perceived to have a preference for public integration (M = 3.91, SD = .86, $p < .001$) or for public separation (M = 3.69, $p < .001$), supporting H1. The last two conditions did not differ significantly from each other. The ***private*** acculturation strategies endorsed by the Chilean interviewees also significantly affected how much participants liked them (F(2,279= 3.77, $p < .025$). Tukey post-hoc tests showed that those who thought that the Chilean students preferred Mapuche to separate inside their homes were liked the most (M = 3.69, SD = .91), marginally more than when they perceived them to want private assimilation (M = 3.41, SD = .98; $p < .07$). The private integration condition (M = 3.65, SD = .96) did not differ significantly from the other two conditions. These results partially support H2. These findings are roughly in line with what was found in the English sample,

although for the public domains, the effects were stronger in Chile than they were in England, which may be caused by the fact that in Chile there is a strong political focus on respecting the Mapuche heritage culture. In addition, although we found a significant interaction between perceived public and private norms on liking, in Chile there was no significant interaction effect.

Effects on own acculturation preferences. To find out whether participants' preference for culture maintenance changed **relative to** their preference for adoption per condition, we conducted a two-way mixed design ANOVA with 'preference for public maintenance' and 'preference for public adoption' paired as a within-subjects factor, combined with two between-subjects factors: 'perceived public acculturation preferences' and 'perceived private acculturation preferences'. As in Study 4, there was a main effect of the within-subjects factor ($F(1,281) = 97.86$, $p < .001$), however its nature was in stark contrast to that observed with English participants: overall, the Chilean participants preferred Mapuche to maintain their original culture in **public** ($M = 3.98$, $SD = 1.07$) more than they preferred them to adopt the Chilean culture in **public** ($M = 2.91$, $SD = 1.24$). This is opposite to the preferences for public domains of English participants. No significant interactions effects were found, indicating that the manipulations failed to moderate this overall preference for public culture maintenance.

The effects of the manipulations on **private** acculturation preferences were investigated with a similar analysis: a two-way mixed design ANOVA with 'preference for private maintenance' and 'preference for private adoption' paired as a within-subjects factor, combined with two between-subjects factors: 'perceived public acculturation preferences' and 'perceived private acculturation preferences'. There was once more a main effect of the within-subjects factor ($F(1,280) = 245.38$, $p < .001$), meaning that, overall, participants preferred Mapuche to maintain their original culture inside their own homes ($M = 3.84$, $SD = 1.32$) more than they preferred them to adopt the Chilean culture inside their homes ($M = 2.34$, $SD = 1.26$), which is in line with what was found among English participants.

Significant interactions were also revealed between the within-subject factors and between-subjects factors. That is, the difference between participants' preference for **private** maintenance and their preference for **private** adoption differed depending on the **private** acculturation preferences they perceived their peers to have ($F(2,280) = 5.33$, $p < .03$). As clarified by Figure 9 and post-hoc Tukey tests, the difference between preference for private culture maintenance and private culture adoption was larger when participants perceived their ingroup members to want private separation ($M_{diff} = -1.86$, $SD = 1.79$) than when they were perceived to want private integration ($M_{diff} = -1.20$, $SD = 1.61$, $p < .02$). Comparisons between

Figure 9. *Study 5: Interaction effect between perceived **private** strategies and the difference between preference for **private** maintenance and preference for **private** adoption (p < .03).*

the private assimilation condition (M_{diff} = -1.47, SD = 1.72) and the other two private conditions were not statistically significant. This suggests that participants followed the preferences of their peers when they perceived them to prefer either separation or integration in private, but not when they had a preference for private assimilation. Here, participants resisted against their peers wanting assimilation by increasing their preference for culture maintenance relative to their preference for culture adoption, which is in line with what we predicted in H5. However, the assimilation condition did not differ significantly from the other two conditions.

The difference between participants' preference for **private** maintenance and their preference for **private** adoption differed depending on the **public** acculturation preferences they perceived their peers to have ($F(2,280)$ = 10.29, p < .001). The pattern of this interaction is shown in Figure 10. From post-hoc Tukey comparisons on the difference scores, it was concluded that participants' difference between preference for private maintenance and preference for private adoption was larger when peers were perceived to favour public assimilation (M_{diff} = -2.11, SD = 1.69) than when they were perceived to want public integration (M_{diff} = -1.39, SD = 1.69, p < .01) or public separation (M_{diff} = -1.04, SD = 1.65, p < .001). The public integration and separation conditions did not differ significantly from one another. This shows clear support for H5: participants increased their preference for private culture maintenance relative to their preference for private culture adoption when they perceive their

Figure 10. *Study 5: Interaction effect between perceived **public** strategies and the difference between preference for **private** maintenance and preference for **private** adoption (p < .001).*

peers to want public assimilation, meaning they tried to compensate for their peers' preferences in a different domain.

Effects on investment in acculturation. We ran a mixed design ANOVA with 'investment in maintenance' and 'investment in contact' paired as a within-subjects factor, combined with two between-subjects factors: 'perceived public acculturation preferences' and 'perceived private acculturation preferences'. Different from the English sample, there were no significant interactions. There was however a main effect of the within-subjects factor ($F(1,281) = 69.04$, $p < .001$). Overall, participants invested more in contact (M = 4.18, SD = .85) than they did in culture maintenance of Mapuche (M = 3.69, SD = .88), which is in line with the English results. In addition, there was a main effect for the public conditions ($F(2,281) = 4.50$, $p < .02$). Looking at Figure 11, it becomes clear that a perception of ingroup members wanting public separation leads to the smallest amount of investment in both culture maintenance and contact. The investment in both is slightly higher when there is a perception of public integration, and perceived public assimilation leads to the most investment in maintenance and contact. Tukey post-hoc tests confirmed that for both investment in maintenance ($p < .03$) and investment in contact ($p < .02$) only the public separation and the public assimilation conditions differed significantly.

Figure 11. *Study 5: Main effect of perceived **public** strategies on investment in maintenance (p < .04) and on investment in contact (p < .02).*

Effects on preference for integration. Similar to Study 4, we computed one-way ANOVAS to find out whether perceived public and private acculturation preferences of peers had an impact on participants' own preference for public and private integration. No significant main or interaction effects were found. Again, our novel approach of investigating a preference for integration provided more information than the traditional way of investigating integration would have done.

Perceived norms as a mediator

To test the mediation model proposed in H6, we first tested whether perceived ingroup norms about contact were indeed affected by the manipulations of perceived pubic acculturation. A one-way ANOVA showed that this was indeed the case ($F(2,281) = 13.66$, $p <$ .001). The means were in the intended directions: perceived norms supporting contact were lowest in the public separation condition (M = 2.99, SD = .90), followed up by the public integration condition (M = 3.56, SD = .96), and were highest in the public assimilation condition (M = 3.62, SD = .95). The correlation between norms regarding contact and investment in contact was r = .12, $p <$ .04, meaning that the more people perceive norms supporting contact, the higher their own investment in contact. Finally when running an ANCOVA with the manipulation of perceived **public** acculturation preferences as an IV, investment in contact as a DV, and norms regarding contact as a covariate, the original effect of public conditions on investment in contact (F(2,281) = 4.25, $p <$ .02) drops in size and statistical significance

(F(2,286) = 3.14, *p* = .05). From this we can conclude that, as predicted, perceived ingroup norms in support of contact mediate the effect of perceived public acculturation preferences of peers in the manipulation on own investment in contact (H6).

Discussion

Study 5 supported our first two predictions that Chileans would like their ingroup members less when these want the Mapuche to leave their original culture behind and behave completely like the non-indigenous Chileans (i.e., assimilate) compared to when they support integration or separation. This effect was found for perceived preferences in both public (H3) and private domains (H4), although for the private domains there was only a significant main effect: post-hoc comparisons did not reach significance, but the pattern was in the predicted direction. Hence, Chileans do not like their peers when these force the Mapuche to leave their culture behind, independent of whether this referred to public or private domains. This fits the Chilean context, where a strong focus on recognition of the Mapuche identity can be observed. This particular context also explains why, overall (independent of perceived acculturation preferences of fellow ingroup members), Chileans had more of a preference for the Mapuche maintaining their original culture than for them adopting the Chilean culture for both public and private domains.

When examining effects of ingroup norms on own acculturation preferences, it was found that Chilean majority members increased their preference for *private* maintenance compared to their preference for *private* adoption when they perceived their peers to prefer *public* assimilation, thereby creating a larger difference between these two preferences for the private domain in this condition. This supports what we hypothesised regarding Chilean majority members showing resistance against their peers having a preference for assimilation (H5). It is interesting that this resistance took place in their preference for a different domain. A possible explanation for this is that this behaviour may be a way to avoid open deviation from the ingroup norm. That is, ingroup norms are not openly criticized but compensated for in other domains.

However, participants did clearly deviate from an assimilation norm for the private domain: they followed the preferences for the private domain of their peers when they perceived them to desire either separation or integration, but not when they perceived them as wanting assimilation. That is, the more their peers preferred private culture adoption (or maintenance), the more they did, too, with the exception of the private assimilation condition: here, Chileans compensated for the lack of support for culture maintenance on the side of

their peers by increasing their preference for private maintenance relative to their preference for private adoption. This reactance against an assimilation norm is in support with H5.

In the Chilean sample, the findings regarding investment in acculturation differed from the findings for acculturation preferences; overall, Chileans invested more in contact than they did in culture maintenance of Mapuche. This could be due to the fact that we examined investment in contact as opposed to culture adoption: actively seeking contact with the Mapuche may be seen as something more positive than encouraging the Mapuche to adopt the Chilean way of life, and perhaps even more positive than helping the Mapuche maintaining their culture. This is different from the English context, where majority members did not distinguish between their preference for culture adoption in public domains and their investment in contact: effects of ingroup norms on these two variables were very similar. Possibly, this difference between the two cultural settings is explained by Chile being a less individualistic society than England (Hofstede, 2001). As described in the introduction of this chapter, an individual's self-image in Chile is more defined in terms of "we", whereas in England it is defined more as "I." Consequently, the Chilean culture may have more of a focus on contact with others than the English culture, explaining why Chileans generally invested more in contact than they did in maintenance.

Although there were no interactions on participants' investment, there was a main effect showing that a perceived ingroup norm of a preference for separation in public led to the least investment in both culture maintenance and contact, investment in both was slightly higher when there was a perception of public integration, and investment in both was lowest when the norm was perceived to be public assimilation. That is, Chilean majority members still resisted against their peers desiring public assimilation by increasing their investment in culture maintenance compared to the other conditions, but their investment in contact was higher too. This effect on investment in contact may again be explained by contact being seen as something positive in their culture: to compensate for the norm of assimilation, which does not go together with their values regarding supporting Mapuche in maintaining their heritage culture, they increase their investment in contact.

Finally, the results supported H6: the manipulations of public acculturation preferences affected perceived norms regarding contact, which, in turn, had a positive effect on investment in contact. That is, participants believed that the statements in the newspaper article were in line with the actual norms regarding contact with the Mapuche, and their investment in contact was adjusted accordingly.

In sum, majority members in Chile seem to generally follow their ingroups' norms regarding contact with the Mapuche. However, when it comes to their preferences for and investment in maintenance, they 'rebel' against a perception of their peers wanting assimilation by increasing their own preference for and investment in maintenance. An ingroup norm of a preference for assimilation was not accepted by Chilean majority members.

General discussion

The present research is the first to investigate effects of ingroup norms regarding acculturation, and showed that ingroup norms do in fact have an impact on people's own preferences for and investment in acculturation, and their affective reactions.

Hypotheses about affective reactions were partially supported: in England, majority members were liked the most if they had a combined preference for public integration and private separation, while they were liked the least if they desired Muslims to assimilate in both domains. Notably, this pattern is similar to what we found in Chapter 2 in the study on Muslim participants: they too liked English majority members the most if they had preference for public integration and private separation, while they liked English majority members the least if they desired Muslims to assimilate in both domains. We also learnt from Chapter 2 that English majority members liked Muslims the most when they either integrated or separated in private. If we take all of these findings together, we find a level of agreement between English majority members and Muslims living in England in terms of their preferred acculturation preferences: both groups seem to be in favour of Muslims integrating in public domains. Considering that previous research has pointed out repeatedly that a preference for integration leads to the best psychological, socio-cultural, and health outcomes for immigrants, as well as more favourable intergroup attitudes (Berry, 1997; Brown & Zagefka, 2011), these effects are encouraging: perhaps England is slowly moving towards a multicultural society in which both minority and majority members are in favour of integration in public domains of life. However, the own acculturation preferences of English majority members do not reflect this view. This will be discussed in more detail below.

In Chile, majority members with a preference for assimilation were liked the least, irrespective of which domain they had this preference for, which was in line with our assumptions. This suggests that Chileans generally support the government body, which encourages people to recognise and respect the Mapuche identity, meaning that the new government policy trying to improve the Mapuche's situation may be working as intended. Similar to the effects in England, Chileans supporting public integration were liked the most.

However, when it came to preferences for the private domain, ingroup members in support of separation were liked the most, suggesting that for the private domain Chileans' ideas of acculturation are 'live and let live'.

Effects on own acculturation preferences and investment in acculturation were different for England than they were for Chile. For the private domain, English participants roughly followed the preferences of their peers, showing a peer-influence effect. For the public domain however, English majority members responded to their peers desiring integration by a decrease in their preference for maintenance compared to their preference for adoption. In Chile, there was a particularly strong response against peers supporting assimilation: generally, majority members seemed to increase their preferences for culture maintenance and investment in culture maintenance when they perceived an ingroup norm of assimilation. Overall acculturation preferences also differed between the two countries: Chileans had more of a preference for the Mapuche maintaining their original culture than for them adopting the Chilean culture in both public and private domains. In England, the overall preference was the same for the private domain, but opposite for the public domain: majority members in this sample generally had a preference for public culture adoption over public culture maintenance. Taken together, these effects seem to reflect the cultural context of each country: in Chile, there is now a strong official recognition of the Mapuche identity and the important role that Mapuche people have played in Chile's history (Pehrson, González, & Brown, 2011), whereas in England prejudice and negative attitudes towards Muslims are growing (Bleich, 2009; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Perhaps England would benefit from a government body similar to the one in place in Chile: one to improve the situation of Muslims in England. Moreover, this suggests that although English majority members like their ingroup members the most when these are in support of public integration, this does not mean that they like Muslims to display both the Muslim and the English culture *equally*.

Returning to the general hypothesis proposed in the beginning of this chapter: were Chileans indeed more inclined to follow the preferences of their peers than English people were? This was only the case for ingroup norms regarding contact, which were followed by Chilean majority members but not by English majority members. As we concluded above, Chileans' preference for culture maintenance and their investment in maintenance were heightened when they perceived their peers to want the Mapuche to assimilate, almost as if they protested against their peers' preferences. English people tended to only follow their peers when it came to their preferences for private culture maintenance and adoption. They

did not follow their ingroup's norms in terms of their public acculturation preferences or their investment in maintenance or contact.

The fact that English majority members may not like Muslims to display both the Muslim and the English culture to an equal amount highlights the importance of the new approach to investigating preferences for integration presented in this research. Since Rudmin (2006) pointed out that people very rarely give consistent and extreme answers in favour of uniculturalism (full separation or assimilation), we presented an analysis where we explored differing levels of integration attitudes by looking at individual's preference for maintenance *relative* to their preference for culture adoption. In both the English and the Chilean study, there were no significant effects of ingroup norms on participants' preference for integration when this was measured the traditional way: on only one scale asking to what extent participants wanted minority members to endorse a combination of heritage culture and dominant culture. Such a scale is rather vague and does not specify what amounts of each culture are desired. This further supports the idea that an analysis looking into relative preferences for maintenance and adoption is the most comprehensive and sensible way to investigate people's acculturation preferences. We recommend for future acculturation research to take on this novel idea.

In addition, since the current research is the first to investigate effects of ingroup norms regarding acculturation, and provided some very interesting results, we advise other acculturation researchers to further investigate this paradigm.

A limitation of this research is that the cultural settings compared were different in terms of both the dominant culture and the type of minority group. If we had varied only the dominant culture *or* the minority group, then it would have been easier to find out what caused the different findings for the different settings. This issue notwithstanding, the present study emphasised that acculturation processes can differ significantly depending on the cultural context. It is important to keep this in mind when interpreting findings of previous acculturation research, which should not simply be generalised to a variety of countries and cultural groups.

To conclude, the two studies described in these chapters provide experimental evidence showing that ingroup norms regarding public and private acculturation have an impact on people's own public and private acculturation preferences, their investment in culture maintenance and contact, and their affective responses. In addition, the findings highlight the importance of taking cultural contexts into account when conducting

acculturation research. Finally, the present research presents novel and comprehensive way of investigating acculturation preferences, which will hopefully inspire future researchers.

Chapter 4

Longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation attitudes on well-being and intergroup emotions among Muslims in two European countries

It was already mentioned in the previous chapter that the number of Muslims in Europe has vastly increased, and it is expected to increase even further over the upcoming decades (Pew Research Center, 2011). However, much research has shown that life as a Muslim in Europe can be challenging: negative attitudes towards Muslims have risen (Bleich, 2009) and prejudice against Muslims is now more widespread than prejudice against other immigrants (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). For example, in Britain, 80 percent of female Muslims and 78 percent of male Muslims reported that they had experienced discrimination (Ameli, Elahi, & Merali, 2004). At the same time, we see signs suggesting that Muslims have a wish to maintain their Muslim identity while living in non-Muslim countries. An example is the large number of Facebook groups created specifically for Muslims living in various European countries. This inspired us to investigate whether maintaining a Muslim identity can protect an individual against discrimination: the current research looks into the effects of acculturation strategies and discrimination on well-being and intergroup relations.

As discussed in Chapter 1, much research has focussed on the effects of acculturation strategies on various outcome variables and the results are fairly consistent. That is, generally, integration has been found to be the most adaptive acculturation strategy, it is associated with the best psychological, socio-cultural, and health outcomes for immigrants, as well as more favourable intergroup attitudes (Berry, 1997; Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, in press; and see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). However, all of these studies are based on cross-sectional survey data, meaning we cannot draw conclusions about whether acculturation has an effect on well-being and intergroup relations or vice versa. Furthermore, these studies have investigated acculturation without specifying different life domains in which people acculturated. Considering the importance of domains specificity highlighted in earlier chapters, this means that we do not know in which domain integration should take place for it to have these

positive effects. Several researchers found that in general, minority members have a preference for separation in private domains, while integration is favoured in public domains (Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; 2004; Phalet et al., 2000; Sodowsky & Carey, 1988). It would be interesting to find out whether this general preference for separation in private domains leads to lower well-being and less favourable intergroup relations then a preference for private integration. Or, since no directional evidence has been found yet, do minority members choose private separation as a consequence of negative intergroup relations or low well-being? The present research will examine these questions by investigating longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation strategies of Muslim minority members on well-being and intergroup relations.

Another variable that may influence well-being of minority members and intergroup relations is perceived discrimination. Berry and colleagues (2006) consistently reported stronger correlations between discrimination and adaptation than between the any of the four acculturation strategies and adaptation, in various countries. Indeed, much research has pointed out the damaging effects of discrimination on well-being of minority members (e.g., Branscombe, Schmitt, Harvey, 1999; Sellers & Shelton, 2003; and see Pascoe & Smart Richman, 2009). On the other hand, minority group identification is associated with increased well-being and better adaptation (e.g., Bat-Chava, 1994; Munford, 1994; Grossman, Wirt, & Davids, 1985; Rowley, Sellers, Chavous & Smith, 1998; and see Phinney, 1990). It has been suggested that cultural identification may work as a buffer against the damaging effects of discrimination on well-being (Branscombe et al., 1999; Bourguignon, Seron, Yzerbyt, & Herman, 2006). According to the rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999) the generally negative consequences of perceived discrimination can be diminished by identification with the minority group. That is, the model predicts that discrimination will increase minority group identification, which, in turn, will increase well-being. Leach, Rodriguez Mosquera, Vliek, and Hirt (2010) challenge this mediation hypothesis. They argue that minority members will generally already identify with their group to a certain extent before they experience discrimination. In their view, this pre-existing ingroup identification may be sufficient to work as a protective buffer against experiences of discrimination. Their research showed that black people living in Britain did indeed report relatively high identification with their ingroup even before being exposed to discrimination. Yet, in their study, identification worked as a buffer too: when their participants had been given an opportunity to identify with their ingroup, they seemed to view the experienced discrimination as less of a threat.

Ethnic identification of minority members has shown to be positively related to culture maintenance (Verkuyten & Thijs, 2002) and some researchers even view culture maintenance as a matter of identification rather than one of preferred behavioural practices (e.g., Nguyen & Benet-Martínez, in press; Phinney, 1990, Phinney et al., 2001; Snauwaert, Soenens, Vanbeselaere, & Boen, 2003; and see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). Therefore, we suggest that maintaining one's ethnic culture might have a similar buffering effect for discrimination as ethnic identification. However, although the rejection-identification model predicts a mediation effect, we take Leach and colleagues' (2010) argument into consideration and suggest that a buffer effect could as well, or perhaps even better, be explained by moderation. That is, if culture maintenance would work as a buffer against the generally harmful effects of discrimination on well-being, then discrimination should have a negative effect on well-being for those who do not maintain much of their heritage culture, while it should not affect well-being of those who highly maintain their culture. We speculate that this will happen only in public domains, because as the private domain is less likely to be shared with majority members, it is feasible that minority members will experience less discrimination inside their own homes. As a result, for the present study, we expect that generally, public culture maintenance of Muslim minority members will lead to heightened well-being (H1). Furthermore, we expect that culture maintenance and perceived discrimination will interact on well-being, in such a way that Muslims who perceive high levels of discrimination will experience increased well-being when they highly maintain their culture in public more, compared to when they maintain their culture to a lesser extent (H2). Of course, the mediation effect proposed in the rejection-identification model (Branscombe et al., 1999) will be tested, too. There is yet another hypothesis suggested in the discrimination literature by McCoy and Major (2003). They argue that for minority members who highly identify with their ingroup, discrimination will be *more* rather than less of a threat to the self. By testing our own hypothesis, we will simultaneously test the validity of McCoy and Major's (2003) suggestion.

Effects of public and private acculturation on intergroup relations are expected to be slightly different. Zagefka and Brown (2002) investigated the effect of acculturation strategies of minority members on intergroup relations and found that only desire for contact, but not desire for culture maintenance, was related to ingroup bias, with greater desire for contact being associated with less bias. Since intergroup relations will be more salient in the public domain, we hypothesise that endorsing public contact will lead to less negative emotions towards majority members (H3). In the same study, Zagefka and Brown found that an integration strategy was associated with less bias than any of the other three acculturation

strategies. Hence, we expect an interaction between preference for public maintenance and public contact, which will show that a combination of high culture maintenance and high contact (i.e., integration) in public domains will lead to less negative intergroup emotions (H4). Moreover, since experiences of discrimination among minority members have been shown to be related to a hostile attitude towards the majority society (Döring, 2007), we hypothesise that more perceived discrimination will be associated with more negative intergroup emotions (H5).

Finally, as it is probable that minority members will feel more free to choose the acculturation strategy that they are most comfortable with inside their own homes, we do not expect private acculturation strategies to have an impact on either well-being or on intergroup emotions.

These hypotheses will be tested amongst two samples of minority members: Muslims in Britain and Muslims in the Netherlands. We will provide both cross-sectional and longitudinal results for each sample.

Study 6

Method

Participants and design

Study 6 was a longitudinal study with two time points, the average time lag was 45.19 days (SD = 3.73). Two-hundred and nine participants filled out the questionnaire at the first time point (122 female, 87 male). Their mean age was 27.45 years old (SD = 10.94), ranging from 18 to 71. Seventy people filled out the questionnaire twice (46 female, 24 male, mean age = 26.94, SD = 10.08, ranging 18-61). All participants were Muslims living in Britain.

Materials

The questionnaires were almost identical at time 1 and time 2, with one exception: at the end of the questionnaire at time 1, participants were asked to fill out their email address if they were willing to fill out the questionnaire once more in six weeks time.

Acculturation strategies. Acculturation strategies were measured with items designed for the purpose of this study, looking into the underlying dimensions rather than the four preferences for each domain separately. However, in the current studies we decided examine contact rather than culture adoption, because of the sensitivity of the topic. We did not wish to alienate participants while they filled out the first questionnaire by asking them about

culture adoption. This could have been interpreted as a check whether they had become "British enough", and we feared that this would lead to participants not wishing to fill out the questionnaire a second time. *Public culture maintenance* was measured with three items, for example "It is important to me that there is room for Muslim values/traditions in the work place". The Cronbach's alpha's were α = .60 for the cross-sectional sample, and for the longitudinal sample α = .66 at time 1 and α = .72 at time 2 (test-retest reliability (r) = .76, $p <$ .001). *Public contact* was measured with three items, such as "It is good to work together with non-Muslims" (cross-sectional sample: α = .78, longitudinal sample: α = .73 at time 1 and α = .70 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .82, $p <$ .001). *Private culture maintenance* was also measured with a three-item scale. An example item is "I like to celebrate Muslim traditions at home" (cross-sectional sample: α = .76, longitudinal sample: α = .89 at time 1 and α = .88 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .61, $p <$ .001). Finally, *private contact* was measure with two items, for example: "When I am spending free time with friends at my home, I like to invite people who are not Muslim" (cross-sectional sample: α = .86, longitudinal sample: α = .85 at time 1 and α = .76 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .70, $p <$ .001). The complete scale measuring acculturation strategies can be found in the Appendix on page 203.

Well-being. Well-being was measured with items looking into positive affect, which were taken from the short Positive and Negative Affect Scale (PANAS) designed by Thompson (2007): "Thinking about yourself and how you normally feel, to what extent do you generally feel …alert; ...inspired; ...determined; ...attentive; ...active (cross-sectional sample: α = .75, longitudinal sample: α = .80 at time 1 and α = .75 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) =.83, $p <$ .001).

Intergroup emotions. Negative emotions towards the British majority were measured with items measuring negative intergroup emotions used by Binder and colleagues (Binder et al., 2009, adapted to the British context: "In general, what are your feelings toward non-Muslim British people? Do you ...feel angry toward them; ...irritated by them; ...annoyed by them" (cross-sectional sample: α = .89, longitudinal sample: α = .84 at time 1 and α = .68 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .57, $p <$ .001).

Perceived discrimination. The extent to which participants felt discriminated against was measured with 5 items, which were inspired by items used by Phinney, Madden, and Santos (1998), but adjusted for British Muslim context and for non-adolescents. For example: "I feel that people treat me unfairly or negatively because of my religious background" (cross-sectional sample: α = .83, longitudinal sample: α = .74 at time 1 and α = .78 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .79, $p <$ .001).

Procedure

The study was an online questionnaire. Participants were recruited through Facebook groups for Muslims living in Britain, and by approaching people on British Muslim forums. In addition, a snowball technique was used: emails were sent out to all contacts of the researcher, asking to forward a request to fill out the questionnaire to all Muslims in Britain they knew, who were then asked to do the same. Participants who indicated on the first questionnaire that they were interested in filling out the questionnaire a second time, were emailed six weeks later with a new link to the second questionnaire. This email also contained a unique code to insert at the beginning of the second questionnaire, to ensure that the participants' answers of time 1 could be linked to those at time 2.

Results

Results from cross-sectional analyses will be presented first, to see whether the predicted relationships are in existence at a single time point. This will be followed by analyses testing for longitudinal effects (for means, standard deviations, and correlations between all variables in the longitudinal sample, see Table 6). Several scholars have indicated that longitudinal data can be used to provide evidence for causal relationships, or at least for the temporal order of effects (see e.g., Cook & Campbell, 1979; Finkel, 1995; Kessler & Greenberg, 1981). Therefore, the longitudinal data will be used to test whether the predicted effects do indeed take place in the expected directions, and tests for possible opposite paths will be conducted too.

A MANOVA showed that participants who filled out the questionnaire at the first time point only did not differ significantly from those who filled it out at both time points, with one exception: those who filled it out only once were slightly lower in their preference for public contact ($M = 3.89$, $SD = .92$) than those who filled it out twice ($M = 4.20$, $SD = .73$; $F(1,207) = 6.14$, $p < .02$). On all other measures the F-values were far from significant (all $ps > .11$). It seems reasonable to conclude, therefore, that participant attrition was not systematically related to most variables of interest.

Table 6. Study 6: Correlations, means, and standard deviations of all variables in the longitudinal sample

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	Public maintenance T1	1													
2	Public contact T1	.22	1												
3	Private maintenance T1	.76**	.28*	1											
4	Private contact T1	.13	.71**	.07	1										
5	Well-being T1	.15	.30*	.10	.36**	1									
6	Negative intergroup emotions T1	.06	-.33**	.09	-.28*	-.24*	1								
7	Discrimination T1	.24*	-.01	.28*	-.02	.00	.39**	1							
8	Public maintenance T2	.76**	.02	.57**	.13	.03	.10	.27*	1						
9	Public contact T2	.05	.82**	.03	.71**	.22	-.38**	-.14	.01	1					
10	Private maintenance T2	.56**	.09	.61**	.16	.03	.00	.22	.73**	.11	1				
11	Private contact T2	.04	.56**	.00	.70**	.34**	-.17	.04	.03	.69**	.09	1			
12	Well-being T2	.25*	.28*	.11	.29*	.83**	-.13	-.01	.04	.16	-.05	.26*	1		
13	Negative intergroup emotions T2	-.10	-.30*	.04	-.26*	-.12	.57**	.30*	.03	-.38**	.03	-.20	-.14	1	
14	Discrimination T2	.15	-.21	.23	-.18	-.05	.31**	.79**	.21	-.36**	.14	-.07	-.02	.40**	1
	Means	4.53	4.20	4.65	3.84	3.80	1.71	2.67	4.43	4.17	4.70	3.81	3.71	1.59	2.64
	Standard deviations	.67	.73	.70	.83	.63	.77	.73	.65	.65	.52	.86	.60	.64	.71

Note: T1 = time 1, T2 = time 2, $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

Cross-sectional Analyses

To test whether well-being could be predicted from public and private acculturation strategies and discrimination within our larger sample at the first time point, we conducted a regression with four steps. In the first step, well-being was regressed on public culture maintenance, public contact, private culture maintenance, and private contact. In the second step, interactions between public maintenance and public contact, and between private maintenance and private contact were added. In the third step, discrimination was entered. In the last step, we added interactions between public maintenance and discrimination, and between public contact and discrimination in order to test whether culture maintenance and/or contact could diminish the damaging effects of discrimination. The same steps were taken to test effects on negative emotions towards the majority[7]. All independent variables were mean-centred before running the analyses to avoid issues resulting from multicollinearity.

Predicting well-being cross-sectionally. The results of the analysis, including R^2 and change in R^2 for each step, are reported in Table 7 (left panel). The final model was significant $F(9,199) = 4.94$, $p < .001$. As we predicted (H1), the more our Muslim participants maintained their culture in public, the higher was their well-being. In addition, somewhat unexpectedly, more contact with British majority members inside their own homes, was also associated with higher well-being. Finally, public culture maintenance interacted significantly with discrimination on well-being. As shown in Figure 12, the pattern was in the hypothesised direction (H2). That is, public maintenance indeed seemed to work as a buffer against discrimination: for those who did not maintain much of their heritage culture discrimination had a negative effect on well-being, while for those who highly maintained their culture discrimination did not affect their well-being.[8]

Predicting negative emotions towards the British majority cross-sectionally. The right panel of Table 7 shows the results of this analysis. The final model was significant $F(9,199) = 13.03$, $p < .001$. As can be seen in the table, more public contact was related to less negative intergroup emotions (H3). In addition, the hypothesised interaction between public culture maintenance and public contact was significant too, and Figure 13 shows this interaction to be in the expected direction: participants display the least negative intergroup emotions when they highly maintain their culture in combination with much public contact with majority

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[7] These steps were theoretically the most sensible. However, we did check what the results were when adding discrimination*private acculturation interactions and 3-way interactions (public/private maintenance * public/private contact * discrimination) to the analyses. These additional interactions were all non-significant.
[8] We also tested for the mediation effect predicted by the rejection-identification model, but no significant mediation was found (in none of the studies presented in this Chapter).

Table 7. Study 6, cross-sectional analysis: Public and private acculturation and perceived discrimination as predictors of well-being/intergroup emotions (N = 209).

	WELL-BEING								NEGATIVE INTERGROUP EMOTIONS							
	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4	
	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β
Public maintenance	.08	.30***	.08	.28**	.08	.28**	.09	.25**	.12	-.02	.11	.05	.11	.05	.12	.02
Public contact	.07	.00	.07	.01	.08	-.05	.08	.02	.10	-.35***	.10	-.35***	.10	-.22*	.11	-.15
Private maintenance	.08	-.06	.08	-.06	.08	-.05	.08	-.04	.12	-.06	.11	-.10	.11	-.13	.11	-.14
Private contact	.06	.25*	.06	.22*	.06	.24*	.06	.23*	.09	-.16	.09	-.06	.08	-.11	.08	-.13
Interaction Public maint.*Public contact			.07	.10	.08	.05	.09	.00			.10	-.30***	.10	-.20**	.12	-.12
Interaction Private maint.* Private contact			.08	-.03	.08	-.03	.08	-.02			.11	-.01	.11	-.01	.10	-.01
Discrimination					.05	-.14	.06	-.11					.07	.30***	.07	.28***
Interaction Public maintenance*Discr.							.06	.20*							.08	-.10
Interaction Public contact*Discr.							.05	.00							.06	-.17*
R^2		.13		.14		.15		.18		.21		.29		.36		.37
R^2 Change		.13		.01		.01		.03		.21		.08		.06		.02

Note: $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$, $^{***}p < .001$.

Figure 12. *Study 6: Interaction effect of public culture maintenance and perceived discrimination on well-being.*


Figure 13. *Study 6: Interaction effect of public culture maintenance and public contact on negative emotions towards the British majority.*

members. That is, those who endorsed a public integration strategy showed the least negative attitudes toward the majority (H4). Perceived discrimination also showed the hypothesised positive effect on negative intergroup emotions: the more perceived discrimination, the higher were negative intergroup attitudes (H5). Moreover, there was a significant interaction between perceived discrimination and public contact: when perceived discrimination was low,

negative emotions towards the majority were generally low too, irrespective of whether participants had little or a lot of contact with the majority in public domains. However, when discrimination was high, intergroup emotions were less negative when participants had more contact with majority members (see Figure 14).


Figure 14. *Study 6: Interaction effect of public contact and perceived discrimination on negative emotions towards the British majority.*

Although these results give us insight in the relationships between these variables at a single time point, we cannot draw any conclusions about the temporal order of any of the effects found above. To address this issue, longitudinal analyses were conducted with data from two time points.

Longitudinal Analyses.

To test whether well-being and intergroup emotions at time 2 could be predicted from public and private acculturation strategies and discrimination at time 1, we conducted a regression analysis with five steps. In the first step, the dependent variable (DV) at time 1 was included to control for initial levels in the DV. The following steps were the same as in the cross-sectional analyses: in step 2 public culture maintenance, public contact, private culture maintenance, and private contact were added. In the third step, interactions between public maintenance and public contact, and between private maintenance and private contact were

entered. Step 4 included discrimination, and in the last step, we added interactions between public maintenance and discrimination, and between public contact and discrimination. Acculturation strategies and discrimination were mean-centred before creating interaction terms and running the analyses. Additionally, alternative directions of causality were examined.

Predicting well-being longitudinally. The results of each step within the analysis are reported in Table 8 (left panel). The model was significant $F(10,59) = 16.34$, $p < .001$. The only significant predictor of well-being at time 2, after controlling for well-being at time 1, was public culture maintenance: the more public culture maintenance, the more well-being (H1).

Predicting negative emotions towards the British majority longitudinally. Results of this analysis are depicted in the right panel of Table 8. Again, the model was significant $F(10,59) = 4.20$, $p < .001$, and unexpectedly, the only significant predictor of negative intergroup emotions at time 2, after controlling for these at time 1, was public culture maintenance: when Muslims maintained their culture more in public domains, they felt fewer negative emotions towards the British majority.

Testing for opposite directions of causality. To test whether well-being at time 1 predicted acculturation or discrimination at time 2, a regression analysis was computed for each of the acculturation strategies and for discrimination. For example, public culture maintenance at time 2 was regressed on well-being at time 1, after controlling for public culture maintenance at time 1. The same analyses were conducted for public contact, private culture maintenance, private contact, and discrimination. Well-being at time 1 did not predict any of the acculturation strategies nor discrimination at time 2. When running similar analyses to investigate whether intergroup emotions at time 1 predicted acculturation or discrimination at time 2, there were again no significant results. Thus, it seems likely that well-being and intergroup relations do not have causal effects on acculturation or discrimination.

Discussion

Study 6 is the first study to provide us information about the effects of public and private acculturation on well-being and intergroup emotions, in a sample of Muslims living in Britain. When all variables were measured at a single time point, support was found for the majority of our hypotheses. That is, the more they maintained their culture in public, the higher their well-being was, thereby supporting H1. H2 was supported as well, since public culture maintenance showed to work as a buffer against discrimination: when people perceived much discrimination, their well-being was notably higher when they highly

Table 8. Study 6, longitudinal analysis: Public and private acculturation and perceived discrimination at time 1 as predictors of well-being/intergroup emotions at time 2 (N = 70).

	WELL-BEING								NEGATIVE INTERGROUP EMOTIONS							
	Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5	
	SE	St. β	SE	St. B	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β
Well-being T1 / Neg. intergroup emotions T1	.07	.82**	.07	.80**	.07	.80**	.08	.78**	.09	.51**	.09	.52**	.10	.47**	.10	.46**
Public mainten.	.09	.26*	.09	.29*	.09	.29*	.10	.31*	.15	-.31*	.15	-.32*	.15	-.33*	.16	-.40*
Public contact	.08	.10	.09	.03	.09	.03	.10	.01	.14	-.15	.16	-.08	.16	-.09	.16	-.06
Private mainten.	.09	-.19	.10	-.21	.10	-.20	.11	-.16	.15	.28	.16	.33	.16	.31	.18	.21
Private contact	.07	-.10	.08	-.05	.08	-.05	.09	-.04	.11	.01	.13	-.05	.13	-.05	.13	-.08
Interaction Public maint.*Public con			.08	-.08	.08	-.08	.09	-.09			.13	.12	.13	.11	.13	.12
Interaction Priv maint.* Private contact			.10	.10	.10	.10	.11	.09			.17	.01	.17	.01	.18	.04
Discrimination					.06	-.02	.06	-.03					.10	.12	.10	.17
Interaction Public maintenance*Dis							.11	.06							.16	-.22
Interaction Public contact*Discr.							.10	.02							.16	.00
R^2		.72		.73		.73		.74		.38		.38		.40		.42
R^2 Change		.03		.01		.00		.00		.06		.01		.01		.02

Note: *p < .05, **p < .001

maintained their culture in public, than when they did not maintain much of their culture. Private contact with British majority members was also positively related to well-being. It is possible that private contact breaks down the borders between the two cultural groups, i.e., that it creates somewhat of a shared identity. Alternatively, having contact with British people within private domains may have a positive effect on well-being because the British majority members who visit them inside their own homes show interest in them and their culture.

Within the cross-sectional sample, H3 was supported too: the more public contact participants had with British majority members, the less negative they felt towards British people in general. More specifically, a public integration strategy was associated with the least negative intergroup emotions, which supported H4. Furthermore, the more discrimination people experienced, the more negative they felt towards British majority members, which is in line with H5.

Unexpectedly, perceived discrimination also interacted with public contact on intergroup emotions: when discrimination was high, intergroup emotions were less negative when participants had more public contact with majority members. Perhaps spending time with friends of British majority background compensates for the damage that discriminating majority members cause on intergroup emotions.

It is notable that the explained variance for well-being (full model R^2=.18) was substantially smaller compared to the explained variance for negative intergroup emotions (full model R^2=.37) (see Table 7). This was partly due to the fact that discrimination was a strong predictor of intergroup emotions but not of well-being, but it is also understandable that there are more factors in life than those measured here that may influence one's well-being than there are influencing one's attitudes to the outgroup. For example, being healthy, having a supportive network of friends and family, and being successful at work or in school are all likely to impact more on well-being than on intergroup relations.

However, when looking into longitudinal effects, the only predictor of well-being was public culture maintenance, meaning that only H1 held longitudinally. Although public maintenance was not a significant predictor of negative intergroup relations in the cross-sectional sample, it was in the longitudinal sample: the more participants maintained their culture in public, the less negative their emotions were towards the British majority. Why this effect only occurred longitudinally and not cross-sectionally is not entirely clear. There is a possibility that simply filling out the questionnaires may have had an effect. After all, although the questionnaire was filled out online, participants could have guessed from the name on the consent form that the researcher was not Muslim, but did have a specific interest in their

religion and their practices, which may have had an influence on this longitudinal link between their culture maintenance and their feelings towards the majority group. Alternatively, it is possible that they opened up about their religion towards the majority after filling out the first questionnaire, which created some positive intergroup interactions.

From the results, we can conclude that it is likely that only public culture maintenance has a potential causal effect on well-being and intergroup relations. The opposite pattern seems less likely: well-being and intergroup relations did not cause any differences in acculturation or perceived discrimination.

Since domain specific acculturation in relation to well-being and intergroup emotions is such a novel topic within acculturation research, we conducted a second study in the Netherlands, to explore the extent to which the results might be generalisable to Muslims in another European country.

Study 7

Method

Participants and design

Two-hundred and thirty Muslims living in the Netherlands filled out the questionnaire at the first time point (163 female, 67 male). Their mean age was 29.89 years old (SD = 10.67), ranging from 18 to 64. Seventy people filled out the questionnaire twice (50 female, 20 male, mean age = 32.11, SD = 11.09, ranging 18-64). The average time lag between the two time points in Study 7 was 50.61 days (SD = 4.68).

Materials

The questionnaires used in Study 6 were translated into Dutch by the experimenter, who is fluent in both English and Dutch. Aside from the items being adapted to the Dutch context, all items of all scales were the same as in Study 6. Cronbach's alphas for each scale are reported below.

Acculturation strategies. Public culture maintenance was measured with three items, α = .67 for the cross-sectional sample, for the longitudinal sample α = .77 at time 1 and α = .79 at time 2 (test-retest reliability (r) = .82, p < .001). *Public contact* (three items) in the cross-sectional sample: α = .70, longitudinal sample: α = .58 at time 1 and α = .55 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .67, p < .001. *Private culture maintenance* (3 items): α = .68 for the cross-sectional sample, and for the longitudinal sample α = .80 at time 1 and α = .84 at time 2; test-retest reliability (r) = .83, p < .001. And, finally, *private contact* (2 items): Cronbach's alpha for

the cross-sectional sample was α = .79, for the longitudinal sample α = .64 at time 1 and α = .70 at time 2; test-retest reliability (*r*) = .65, *p* < .001.

Well-being (5 items). The Cronbach's apha for the cross-sectional sample was α = .71, for the longitudinal sample α = .78 at time 1 and α = .64 at time 2 (test-retest reliability (*r*) = .74, *p* < .001).

Intergroup emotions (3 items). In the cross-sectional sample α = .78, in the longitudinal sample α = .80 at time 1 and α = .74 at time 2. The test-retest reliability was *r* = .56, *p* < .001).

Perceived discrimination (5 items). Cronbach's apha (α) was .83 in the cross-sectional sample, for the longitudinal sample α = .82 at time 1 and α = .86 at time 2. The test-retest reliability was *r* = .77, *p* < .001.

Procedure

The procedure in Study 7 was the same as in Study 6.

Results

Results will be presented in the same order as for Study 6 with cross-sectional analyses being described first followed by longitudinal analyses. Correlations, means, and standard deviations of all variables in the longitudinal sample are shown in Table 9.

A MANOVA showed that participants who filled out the questionnaire only once did not differ substantially from those who filled it out twice, with exception of two variables: public maintenance (F(1,228) = 5.32, p < .03) and private maintenance (F(1,228) = 5.28, p < .03). Those who filled it out once maintained their culture slightly more in both public (M = 4.45, SD = .58) and in private (M = 4.74, SD = .44) than those who filled it out at two time points (public: M = 4.23, SD = .83; private: M = 4.56, SD = .68). No significant differences were found on other measures, suggesting that participant attrition did not seem to be systematically related to most variables of interest.

Cross-sectional Analyses

To test whether well-being and intergroup emotions could be predicted from public and private acculturation strategies and discrimination within the cross-sectional sample, we conducted regression analyses with the same four steps as in Study 6. That is, the first step contained public culture maintenance, public contact, private culture maintenance, and private contact. In the second step, interactions between public maintenance and public contact, and between private maintenance and private contact were added. In the third step,

Table 9. Study 7: Correlations, means, and standard deviations of all variables in the longitudinal sample

		1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14
1	Public maintenance T1	1													
2	Public contact T1	-.40**	1												
3	Private maintenance T1	.74**	-.41**	1											
4	Private contact T1	-.19	.53**	-.23	1										
5	Well-being T1	.10	-.18	.12	-.12	1									
6	Negative intergroup emotions T1	.12	-.18	.17	.01	.03	1								
7	Discrimination T1	.14	-.22	.18	-.30*	-.01	.47**	1							
8	Public maintenance T2	.82**	-.50**	.66**	-.21	.07	.06	.07	1						
9	Public contact T2	-.29*	.67**	-.28*	.35**	-.14	-.13	-.10	-.33**	1					
10	Private maintenance T2	.80**	-.37**	.83**	-.24*	.10	.17	.18	.73**	-.21	1				
11	Private contact T2	-.06	.33**	-.11	.65**	-.06	-.09	-.18	-.04	.61**	-.05	1			
12	Well-being T2	.22	-.09	.14	-.15	.74**	.08	.16	.13	-.07	.22	-.05	1		
13	Negative intergroup emotions T2	.04	-.20	.04	-.05	.15	.56**	.37**	.03	-.25*	.08	-.16	-.01	1	
14	Discrimination T2	.21	-.33**	.28*	-.23	.07	.38**	.77**	.11	-.21	.26*	-.14	.12	.43**	1
	Means	4.23	3.68	4.57	3.39	3.82	1.70	2.79	4.25	3.54	4.59	3.45	3.73	1.73	2.59
	Standard deviations	.83	.68	.68	.82	.53	.69	.83	.81	.72	.67	.817	.46	.66	.80

Note: T1 = time 1, T2 = time 2, $^*p < .05$, $^{**}p < .01$.

discrimination was entered, and in the last step, interactions between public maintenance and discrimination, and between public contact and discrimination were added[9]. All independent variables were mean-centred before we conducted the analyses.

Predicting well-being cross-sectionally. The results of the analysis, including R^2 and R^2 Change for each step, are reported in Table 10 (left panel). The model was significant, $F(9,220) = 2.95$, $p < .01$. The hypothesised positive effect of public culture maintenance on well-being was significant, showing that the more the Muslim culture was maintained in public domains, the higher the reported well-being of the participant (H1). The predicted interaction between public culture maintenance and perceived discrimination was significant too: as shown in Figure 15, participants who perceived high levels of discrimination experienced more well-being when they highly maintained their culture in public, than when they maintained their culture to a lesser extent (H2). However, the buffering effect here was more pronounced than it was in the British sample: those who highly maintained their culture in public experience higher well-being when they perceived high discrimination than when they perceived low discrimination. What is more, public contact also

Figure 15. *Study 7: Interaction effect of public maintenance and perceived discrimination on well-being.*

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[9] As in Study 6, these steps were theoretically the most sensible. Again, the results were checked when adding private acculturation preferences and 3-way interactions (public/private maintenance * public/private contact * discrimination) to the analyses. These additional interactions were all non-significant.

Table 10. Study 7, cross-sectional analysis: Public and private acculturation and perceived discrimination as predictors of well-being/intergroup emotions (N = 230).

	WELL-BEING								NEGATIVE INTERGROUP EMOTIONS							
	Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 1		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4	
	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β
Public mainten.	.07	.21*	.07	.25**	.07	.25**	.07	.26**	.10	.00	.10	.00	.09	-.04	.09	-.05
Public contact	.06	.10	.06	.14	.06	.14	.06	.09	.09	-.23*	.09	-.23*	.08	-.16	.08	-.13
Private maint.	.08	.05	.09	.06	.09	.05	.09	.05	.12	.08	.13	.04	.12	.02	.12	.02
Private contact	.05	.00	.05	.01	.05	.02	.05	.02	.07	.10	.07	.09	.06	.15	.06	.14
Interaction Public maint.*Public con			.08	-.18	.08	-.18	.08	-.17			.11	.01	.10	.00	.10	-.01
Interaction Priv maint.* Private con			.08	.07	.08	.07	.08	.05			.11	.07	.10	.09	.10	.11
Discrimination					.04	.05	.04	.06					.05	.47***	.06	.47***
Interaction Public maintenance*Discr.							.06	.14*							.08	-.04
Interaction Public contact*Discr.							.04	.16*							.06	-.09
R^2		.06		.07		.08		.11		.04		.05		.25		.26
R^2 Change		.06		.02		.00		.03		.04		.01		.21		.01

interacted with discrimination on well-being. The pattern is shown in Figure 16: those participants perceiving high levels of discrimination reported higher well-being when they had ample public contact with Dutch majority members than those who had little contact with the majority. Again the effect is rather extreme: for those minority members having a lot of contact with the majority, their well-being was higher when they perceived to be highly discriminated against, compared to when they perceived low levels of discrimination.

Figure 16. *Study 7: Interaction effect of public contact and perceived discrimination on well-being.*

Predicting negative emotions towards the Dutch majority cross-sectionally. Results of the regression analysis can be found in Table 10 (right panel). The model was significant, $F(9,220) = 8.58$, $p < .001$. Participants who endorsed more public contact had less negative emotions towards majority members, which is in support of H3. Yet, there was no significant interaction between public maintenance and public contact on intergroup emotions, meaning that H4 was not supported. In addition, when perceived discrimination was entered into the model, the effect of public contact became non-significant, meaning that perceived discrimination was a more powerful predictor of negative intergroup emotions than public contact: the more participants perceived to be discriminated against, the more negative their emotions towards the Dutch majority were (H5). Private acculturation was not related to well-being nor to intergroup emotions.

As in Study 6, we cannot make any statements about directions of causality for any of the cross-sectional effects listed above. Hence, longitudinal analyses were conducted with data at two points in time.

Longitudinal Analyses.

Effects of acculturation and discrimination at time 1 on well-being and intergroup emotions at time 2 were analysed with regression analysis with the same five steps as in Study 6. The first step always included the dependent variable (DV) at time 1. Then, in step 2 public culture maintenance, public contact, private culture maintenance, and private contact were added. Step 3: interactions between public maintenance and public contact, and between private maintenance and private contact were entered. Step 4: discrimination. Step 5: interactions between public maintenance and discrimination, and between public contact and discrimination. Acculturation strategies and discrimination were mean-centred before creating interaction terms.

Predicting well-being longitudinally. Table 11 (left panel) shows the results of each step within the analysis. The model was significant ($F(10,59) = 11.12$, $p < .001$). Replicating the results of Study 6, the only significant predictor of well-being at time 2 (after controlling for well-being at time 1) was public culture maintenance, which had a positive effect on well-being (H1).

Predicting negative emotions towards the British majority longitudinally. Results are displayed in Table 11 (right panel). Although the model was significant ($F(10,59) = 3.60$, $p < .01$), none of the independent variables at time 1 predicted negative intergroup emotions at time 2.

Testing for opposite directions of causality. To test for opposite paths, we ran the same analyses as in Study 6. Neither well-being at time 1 nor intergroup relations at time 1 predicted any of the acculturation strategies or discrimination at time 2. Therefore, it is probable that well-being and intergroup relations do not precede acculturation or discrimination.

Discussion

In the cross-sectional sample, Study 7 replicated several findings of Study 6. To begin with, more public culture maintenance was associated with more well-being, supporting H1. Also, Muslims with high levels of perceived discrimination experienced more well-being when

Table 11. Study 7, longitudinal analysis: Public and private acculturation and perceived discrimination at time 1 as predictors of well-being/intergroup emotions at time 2 (N = 70).

	WELL-BEING								NEGATIVE INTERGROUP EMOTIONS							
	Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5		Step 2		Step 3		Step 4		Step 5	
	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β	SE	St. β
Well-being T1 / Neg. intergroup emotions T1	.07	.74**	.07	.72**	.07	.73**	.07	.74**	.10	.56**	.10	.56**	.12	.48**	.12	.49**
Public maint.	.07	.26*	.07	.28*	.07	.26*	.07	.25	.12	.02	.14	-.04	.14	-.06	.14	-.06
Public contact	.07	.17	.07	.20	.07	.20	.07	.18	.13	-.15	.14	-.18	.14	-.19	.14	-.24
Private maint.	.08	-.10	.10	-.01	.10	-.02	.09	-.04	.15	-.13	.18	-.06	.18	-.06	.18	-.06
Private contact	.05	-.12	.05	-.13	.05	-.08	.05	-.05	.10	-.01	.10	.00	.10	.06	.11	.07
Interaction Pub maint.*Pub con.			.09	-.10	.09	-.07	.08	-.05			.16	.11	.16	.15	.16	.15
Interaction Priv maint.* Priv con.			.08	-.07	.08	-.10	.08	-.08			.15	-.16	.15	-.18	.15	-.23
Discrimination					.05	.16	.05	.16					.10	.16	.10	.16
Interaction Public maintenance*Dis							.06	-.18							.11	-.01
Interaction Public contact*Discr.							.06	-.08							.11	.13
R^2		.59		.61		.63		.65		.34		.35		.36		.38
R^2 Change		.05		.02		.02		.02		.02		.01		.02		.02

Note: *p < .05, **p < .001

they highly maintained their culture in public, than when they maintained their culture to a lesser extent (H2). Neither in Study 6 nor in Study 7 did we found support for the mediation effect proposed in the rejection-identification model by Branscombe and colleagues (1999). McCoy and Major's (2003) view that discrimination will be *more* rather than less of a threat to the self for minority members who highly identify with their ingroup was not supported by the current two studies either. In fact, in Study 7, those participants who highly maintained their culture in public domains seemed to have even higher levels of well-being when they experienced high levels of discrimination compared to when they experienced less discrimination. A suggestion made by Leach and colleagues (2010) may help to explain this finding. They argued that highly identified minority members may interpret discrimination of their group as a challenge rather than a threat. It may be similar for the participants in the present study: those who highly maintained their culture in public and perceived high levels of discrimination may have perceived this discrimination as a challenge, or an opportunity to create a more positive view of Islam, which increased their well-being. In addition, we found a similar interaction of public contact with discrimination on well-being, meaning that in the Netherlands (but not in Britain), public contact may have the same buffering effect as public maintenance against discrimination. A plausible explanation for this effect is that enjoying oneself while spending time with Dutch majority members may compensate for the damage caused by (other) discriminating majority members.

As for effects on intergroup emotions within the cross-sectional sample, more contact was again related to less negative intergroup emotions, which is in support of H3. Since public maintenance and public contact did not interact on intergroup emotions, H4 was not supported, but H5 was: the more perceived discrimination, the more negative intergroup emotions. The interaction between public contact and discrimination on intergroup emotions found in Study 6 was not replicated in the Dutch sample.

Similarly to Study 6, the explained variance for well-being (full model R^2 =.11) was considerably smaller than the explained variance for negative intergroup emotions (full model R^2=.26) (see Table 10). This supports what we concluded from Study 6: that aside from the variables we measured here, there are more factors in life influencing one's well-being than there are influencing one's attitudes to the outgroup. Future research is advised to take these factors into consideration.

Again, when investigating longitudinal effects, the only predictor of well-being was public culture maintenance, thereby supporting H1. The longitudinal effect of public maintenance on

intergroup relations which was found in the British sample was not replicated among Muslims in the Netherlands. Therefore, it is probably that only public culture maintenance has a causal effect on well-being. As the opposite causal directions were again not significant, it is safe to conclude that well-being and intergroup relations did not cause any differences in acculturation or perceived discrimination.

General discussion

The present studies provide a first impression of the effects of domain-specific acculturation and discrimination on well-being and intergroup emotions. Although most of our hypotheses were supported within the cross-sectional samples, public culture maintenance was the only longitudinal predictor of well-being for both Muslims in Britain and Muslims in the Netherlands: the more Muslims publicly maintained their culture, the better their well-being. In Britain, it was also a predictor of negative emotions towards the British majority: the more they publicly maintained their culture, the less negative their feelings were towards the majority.

It is important to note that no support was found for opposite causal directions in either of the studies, suggesting that acculturation may impact on well-being and intergroup emotions, but the reverse is less likely. Of course the data presented in the current studies is still correlational in nature, but considering the fact that it would be ethically and practically impossible to create an experiment in which we manipulate the acculturation strategies of Muslims, the longitudinal results provided in the present research are as close to causality as possible. That is, although these studies can never 'prove' causality, they do give stronger indications of causality than cross-sectional data.

Of course, our findings are limited to Muslims in Britain and the Netherlands, but yielding very similar results in these two samples makes it likely that similar patterns will be found for Muslims living in other Western countries. Future research will have to confirm whether this is indeed the case. Furthermore, the scales used to measure public and private acculturation were designed by the authors, and they sometimes slightly lacked internal consistency. As the results were rather consistent over the two studies, it is unlikely that this caused severe problems, but a replication of the current results with more stable acculturation scales would be desirable.

Although many researchers have pointed out a positive relation between an acculturation strategy of integration and better adaptation and intergroup relations (e.g., Nguyen & Benet-

Martinez, in press), the current research shows that the culture maintenance dimension of acculturation may be more predictive of well-being and intergroup relations than the contact dimension. More specifically, only *public* culture maintenance seems to have a predictive effect on well-being (in both countries) and intergroup emotions (Britain only). Private acculturation did not have any longitudinal effects on well-being nor on intergroup relations, not in Britain nor in the Netherlands.

This brings us to re-think the definition of integration. Berry's (1997) definition may lack specificity: did the studies which found positive effects of integration define integration as maintaining 100% of one's original culture and having only majority members as friends? Or is complete maintenance of one's culture combined with having one majority member as a co-worker still considered integration? Furthermore, since these researchers did not specify domains, it is curious whether assimilation in public combined with separation in private would also be considered successful integration in those studies. Given the results of the present research, we recommend investigating the two underlying acculturation dimensions rather than the four strategies. If items directly measuring separation, integration, assimilation, and separation had been used, as Berry does in most of his work (e.g., Berry et al., 2006), we may not have been able to discover that it was only the culture maintenance dimension that predicted well-being longitudinally. That is, each participant would have interpreted the integration item in their own way, meaning that the group identified as 'integrationists' could have contained people who highly maintain their culture and barely have any contact and vice versa, which would have influenced the results. In our opinion, measuring the two dimensions separately provides a much clearer view of what people actually prefer to do in terms of culture maintenance and intergroup contact.

In addition, since it was only *public* maintenance that had a longitudinal effect on well-being, our findings highlight the importance of specifying life domains or context when conducting acculturation research. Clearly, if we had not specified domains in the acculturation items, participants would have been able to think about a variety of domains, some thinking about how they live their lives inside their homes, others thinking about what they do in public domains. This would have confounded the results.

To conclude, public culture maintenance seems to have beneficial effects on well-being and intergroup emotions of minority members, it may even provide a buffer against the damaging effects of discrimination. Further research is needed to investigate why this is the case. Possibly, being Muslim is such a strong part of one's identity that it not beneficial for well-being when a

Muslim individual does not get a chance to practice Islam. However, previous research has shown that in general, ethnic minorities favour cultural maintenance more in private than in public domains of life (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003), which may be due to fear of not being accepted when maintaining their culture in public, or simply because they feel that they are not given the option to maintain their culture by majority members. We already pointed out in Chapter 1 that the majority group has more influence and on the process of acculturation in comparison to minority groups (Geschke et al., 2009). Of course, we cannot be sure whether this influences which acculturation strategies minority members endorse until further research has confirmed this. Chapter 5 aims to address these issues in a series of interviews with Muslims living in Britain.

In any case, intervention programs should focus on acceptance of minority members maintaining their culture in public. Policies that ban the burqua and/or niqab in public places prohibit public culture maintenance, and may consequently have damaging effects on well-being of Muslims and on attitudes towards the non-Muslim majority.

Chapter 5

Reasons behind public and private acculturation choices of Muslims in England

Previous chapters already discussed that attitudes towards Muslims in Europe have become more negative (Bleich, 2009). Many Muslims have to cope with prejudice and discrimination while living in Europe (Ameli, Elahi, & Merali, 2004; Strabac & Listhaug, 2008). Although there has been a substantial amount of qualitative research focussing on how *majority* members talk about issues such as racism and discrimination (e.g., Every & Augoustinos, 2007; Goodman & Burke, 2010), there has been a lack of research investigating how *minority* members talk about their experiences. Some scholars have pointed out that is important to give minority members a 'voice' (Goodman & Speer, 2007), and to investigate how minority members talk about experiences such as racism and discrimination (Verkuyten, 2005a). This is particularly important because minority members have a tendency to downplay their experiences of racism (Colic-Peisker, 2005; Kirkwood, 2012; Verkuyten, 2005b). For example, in his interviews with refugees, Kirkwood's (2012) participants were hesitant to make accusations of racism, and they emphasised the ambiguity of the situations by for example stating that other people, but not themselves, may have considered the event as being racist. In addition, Kirkwood noticed that many minority members attributed the causes of racism to ignorance or a perception of an unfair distribution of resources. He called attention to the fact that there is an interesting parallel between majority members avoiding to be explicitly racist or discriminatory on the one hand, and minority members being hesitant about making accusations of discrimination on the other hand.

This is highly relevant for the investigation of minority members' acculturation preferences. In Chapters 1 and 4, we touched upon the issue that minority members are not always free to endorse whichever acculturation strategy they would like. For example, Moghaddam and Taylor (1987) brought attention to the fact that maintenance of the heritage culture can be mediated by the feeling of being accepted or discriminated against by majority members. Majority members can have an influence on which acculturation strategies are available

to minority members, because their group has more influence and power regarding the process of acculturation in comparison to minority groups (Geschke et al., 2009). The majority group is larger and has often lived in the respective country for a longer period of time, therefore the country's policies are much more influenced by their culture than by minority cultures. Indeed, Van Oudenhoven and colleagues (1998) noted that the acculturation strategy endorsed by minority members may depend on the reactions these strategies evoke among majority members. However, most acculturation research has been conducted under the presumption that minority members are free in their acculturation choices (Rudmin, 2006). Rudmin (2006) highlights the need for research aimed at the investigation of potential harm caused by limiting minority members in their choices of cultural issues. In addition, Sayegh and Lasry (1993) proposed that researchers should examine obstacles influencing the acculturation process of minority members. They emphasised that acculturation is a process in which minority and majority members interact in their influence on cultural change. In fact, this is already embedded in the much cited definition of acculturation given by Redfield and collaborators (1936): "Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original cultural patterns of either or both groups" (p. 149). Yet, this interplay between the two groups has often been ignored in research. The studies described in Chapters 2, 3, and 4 of this thesis have shown how minority and majority groups influence each other regarding acculturation, but has not directly asked minority members how they experience these influences. The research presented in this chapter aims to address the lack of research by investigating how minority members talk about experiences of discrimination and examines whether these experiences have an impact on their acculturation strategies.

It is possible that high levels of discrimination influence the extent to which Muslims maintain their Islamic way of life and adopt the English way of life in public domains. For example, one might choose to show less of one's Islamic culture and more of the English culture to avoid discrimination, as Moghaddam and Taylor (1987) suggested. Yet, in Chapter 4 we did not find any longitudinal effects of discrimination on people's acculturation choices. There are several possible explanations for this. First of all, there is of course a possibility that perceived discrimination simply does not affect acculturation preferences. However, since we know that minority members have a tendency to minimise their experiences of discrimination when being interviewed (Colic-Peisker, 2005; Kirkwood; 2012; Verkuyten, 2005b), there is a chance that they also avoid making

accusations of discrimination when they take part in quantitative research, such as the research reported in Chapter 4. Another explanation is that minority members are not always aware of being discriminated against. Since people have a tendency to compare themselves to other members of the same group or compare events to past experiences, they often end up being unaware of their discrimination experience. In addition, if they are aware of it, then they often blame themselves (Major, 1994) or perceive that they personally experience less discrimination than their group does in general (Taylor, Ruggiero, & Louis, 1996).

Aside from discrimination, there are of course numerous other factors that could influence minority members' acculturation preferences. The previous chapters have provided some understanding about the antecedents and consequences of acculturation preferences of minority and majority members. Yet, one question has remained unanswered: why do minority members prefer certain acculturation strategies over others? Study 3 (Chapter 2) provided some insight about factors that may influence minority members' acculturation preferences. The acculturation attitudes of Muslim minority members were informed by acculturation preferences which they perceived the English majority to have. Zagefka and colleagues (2011) reported similar results for Mapuche minority members in Chile. The present research is aimed to find out which other influences have an impact on minority members' acculturation preferences by interviewing Muslims in England about their reasons for endorsing certain acculturation strategies.

Since all previous studies in this thesis provided evidence that the causes and consequences of acculturation preferences are different depending on life domain, we will again distinguish between public and private domains of acculturation in the present study. After all, the power that majority members have over the acculturation strategies available to minority members are likely to only play a role in the public domain, inside their homes minority members may feel much more free to do as they please.

As we pointed out in Chapters 3 and 4, Berry's (1997) classification of acculturation does not give us full insight in the acculturation process. For example, in Chapters 3 and 4, it was emphasised that using the four-statement method of measuring acculturation - i.e., using separate scales measuring separation, integration, assimilation, and marginalisation – can easily result in a loss of information about what exactly people's preferences are for the underlying dimensions of these four strategies. That is, the four-statement method does not provide enough information about what exactly people's preferences are in terms of culture maintenance and adoption. Another problem with commonly used methods looking into acculturation is that these often do

not take into account the thoughts and experiences of minority members, neither do they look at reasons for their acculturation choices, or at reasons why their behaviours may not be in line with their attitudes (Uba, 2002). It is likely that this is caused by the domination of quantitative research designs in the field of acculturation. Several researchers have suggested that acculturation research needs to include a greater use of qualitative methods (Castles et al., 2002; Donà & Berry, 1999; Strang & Ager, 2010). Therefore, in order to get a more complete view of the acculturation process, we interviewed Muslims living in England about which aspects they publicly and privately maintained and adopted, how much contact they had with the majority in both domains, and their reasons behind these acculturation preferences. In these interviews a strong focus was put on whether acculturation choices have been influenced by any external factors such as discrimination.

Study 8

Method

Participants

Participants were Muslims living in Britain who had been approached for Study 6 through various online Muslim communities. After participating in Study 6, respondents were asked to provide their email address if they were interested in participating in an interview on a similar topic. Fourteen participants responded to our email request. Six of them were female, eight of them were male, and their ages ranged from 21 to 37 (mean age = 24.93, SD = 5.05). Eight participants were born in England (with parents of various foreign backgrounds), whereas 6 were born elsewhere. Participants lived all over England and their professions varied from student to dentist. Due to far distances between the interviewer and the participants, and to guarantee anonymity of the participants, all interviews took place over the phone.

Content of the interview

To ease the participants into the interview, a range of simple background questions about their age and the cultural background of them and their parents were asked first. This was followed by a very general question about what their experiences were as a Muslim living in England. The goal of this question was to hear at least one particularly good and one particularly bad experience in order to find out whether participants would volunteer information about

discrimination, but also about other experiences that could possibly influence the acculturation process, which can of course also be positive. From then onwards, the interview consisted of three sections: one section regarding culture maintenance, one section regarding culture adoption, and one section regarding contact with non-Muslims in England, all of which will be called "their acculturation" in the description of the questionnaire below. Each of these sections was split into a part about the private domain and a second part about the public domain.

Each section started with the question whether the participant felt that their levels of acculturation were different at home compared to outside of their homes. This was followed by a question aiming to explore what the participant's level of acculturation was inside the home. Participants were then asked whether they felt if it was fully their own choice to decide to what extent they acculturated at home, or that there were perhaps any other factors or people influencing their choice. If the participant indicated to be free in his or her choice, we asked why he or she chose this particular level of acculturation. If the participants indicated that there were other factors influencing their choice, we tried to find out what these factors were, and how the participant would have liked to acculturate if there were no such factors present. In addition, it was asked why the participant pursued such a level of acculturation. The same was then repeated for the public domain. Since the interview was only semi-structured, the interviewer would try to gain as much information as possible by asking additional questions if the participant would mention something particularly interesting, or when he or she was not entirely clear. The interview schedule used during the interviews can be found in the Appendix on page 204.

Procedure

Participants were told that they would be interviewed about their experiences as a Muslim living in England. The interviewer – although not visible to the participants – was a white woman in her late twenties, with a Dutch-American accent. Due to the sensitive and personal nature of the topic of the interview, the interviewer ensured that there was a comfortable atmosphere before and during the interview. She listened closely, probed appropriately and sensitively, and was non-judgemental. Before beginning the actual interview, it was emphasised that there were no correct or incorrect answers, and that the results would be presented anonymously. Further, it was explained that names would be changed before adding quotes into the article. Finally, permission was asked to record the answers, and participants were given a chance to ask questions before and after the interview. Of course it is unlikely to not have any interview effects

(De Visser & Smith, 2007), but seeing how participants seemed very comfortable during the interview and spoke freely, we feel that the results will give us insight in the experiences of the participants.

Interviews were transcribed literally, and were analysed by means of interpretative phenomenological analysis (IPA: Smith, 1996). IPA looks into the subjective meanings people assign to experiences. Each interview transcript was read several times to identify emerging themes, and all transcripts were compared to point out overlapping and diverging experiences. Following this, four separate analyses were done. The first looked into general positive and negative experiences that participants had had as Muslims living in England. The other three looked into reasons and influences behind public and private acculturation: maintenance of the Islamic way of life, adoption of the English culture, and contact with non-Muslims. Analyses were conducted to examine which cultural aspects are publicly and privately maintained and adopted, what the reasons were behind public and private acculturation choices, and whether acculturation choices have been influenced by any external factors. During the analyses, no specific differences between men and women appeared, nor between first and second generation immigrants, therefore the results presented are of all fourteen participants rather than subgroups. The interviewer's questions and comments are printed in italics.

Results

Positive and negative experiences

The positive and negative experiences reported by participants have been summarised in Table 12. Participants did talk about being treated negatively and receiving negative attention from the English majority, however none of them actually mentioned the word discrimination, and many were rather hesitant towards talking about it. For instance, Amir expresses his experiences as follows:

> "It's quite alright, so yeah. Like, obviously, like most people I speak to, I don't know this is
> a bit different from... Because growing up in East London, there's a lot of Muslims,
> and most people that are not Muslims they know Muslims, and they know what they're
> about. But, in university, it's a bit... I wouldn't say ehm... People are a bit more... People
> that come from smaller towns or villages they don't know a lot of Muslims so they do have
> some misconceptions, quite often... But ehm, I think... When you generally, when you

Table 12. Study 8: Positive and negative experiences of Muslims in England

Positive experiences	Negative experiences
Being just like everyone else	Misconceptions
Opportunities to repair negative views of Islam	Receiving negative treatment/attention
Being different	Being different
Many other Muslims: a sense of community	Muslims living in separated communities
Understanding at work/school	Lack of facilities to practice Islam
High diversity in England	More negative experiences after terrorist attacks (9/11 and 7/7)

have a conve... When people aren't so ignorant, then you have a conversation with them, and they're quite open-minded, just in general... terms of the problem. So I think, on the whole, it's ehm, quite okay ehm, it's quite alright, but ehm, but sometimes you do get some ignorant people who are not well ehm... It's, it's... Okay, yeah."

Amir, 21 year old student (male)

Even though Amir had clearly encountered some negative experiences, he seems to have some difficulties communicating them. After trying to find the correct wording, he decides to focus on what happens when people are *not* ignorant.

Ignorance or misconceptions were mentioned most when describing negative experiences. Instead of focussing on how they had been approached negatively, participants spoke about how many people do not understand the religion. An example is Akram:

"It's a misconception within the media. There are some people who are following the media quite closely and... I won't say that it's brainwashing, but they look, you know, maybe give you a funny comment, you know... I have a beard, my wife a headscarf and stuff, you know, very rarely you might get a few stares or a silly comment, but it's nothing that... It's just ignorance, a lack of understanding that's the cause of it really."

Akram, 32 year old dental surgeon (male)

Like many others, Akram thinks that the majority of misconceptions have started within the media. He doesn't seem to be too troubled about receiving stares or comments, because he knows the cause: he thinks it is due to a lack of understanding. Akram and many other Muslims pointed out that they tried to repair these negative views of Islam. A good example is Kareem:

"Yeah, I mean, there's a bit of hostility towards you, and as Muslims it's our duty to clear that up. And ehm, it's obviously an extra duty that ehm, non-Muslims don't have, that we have during certain events that we've had in the past. But apart from that, I don't think ehm, in this society, we have much differentiation, or even if there is differentiation, they're very good at masking it in front of you... ...But there have been times that you kind of felt the hostility of vibes not being that positive, but again, that only gives an opportunity for you to clear it up... In terms of being differentiated, no I've not felt like ehm, I've been undermined in society."

Kareem, 21 year old student (male)

Like Amir, Kareem tends to downplay his negative experiences. Although he mentions to have felt hostility towards him, he says never to have been differentiated, which seems contradictory. He goes even a step further than Amir by seeing the hostility as an opportunity to clear up misconceptions about Muslims. Perhaps, since Kareem manages to change negative experiences into a positive opportunity, he no longer experiences these events as negative.

As shown in Table 12, there was a slight overlap between positive and negative experiences. For example, while some perceived being different as a positive experience, others felt it was negative. Faiza's narrative gives an explanation why; she sees it as both:

"Ehm, I think, well, it's quite varied, I mean, there is a lot of positive and a lot of negative. Ehm, mostly negative, as in there is a lot of racism. Ehm, people don't really understand what it is to be Muslim, really. They just, ehm, they just, you know, shout these words out or whatever. Ehm, in terms of positive, ehm, a lot of people kind of show interest, and they don't... They find you more interesting, because you're not just like a normal average English person. So ehm, you get ehm, kind of, I guess meet other interesting people as well. Ehm, because you're a bit different. "

So you stand out, is what you mean? You're different than other people and therefore people are more interested?

"Yes, yes. It can be a good thing, but it can also be a bad thing as well. "

Yeah, you said sometimes people just shout out things, could you give me some examples of the things that they say?

"Ehm, like, they call you a terrorist, or Paki, or ehm, yeah, just stuff like that, really."

Faiza, 23 year old pharmacy technician (female)

As Faiza describes, being different could be a positive experience when others perceive you as more interesting due to the difference, but when the difference turns to result in name calling, then it becomes a negative experience. In addition, she mentions that being different than others may cause one to meet more interesting people as well. Possibly, this is due to meeting more people who are also from a different background, which others, such as Ameena, felt was positive too. It is clear from Ameena's story that she embraces the ethnic and religious diversity in England:

"Like, growing up and things, I've had a group of mixed friends, as well as at University. I've got lots of friends from different backgrounds, who have different belief systems, and ehm, that is particularly good in the sense that I actually have more of an appreciation of what is out there in the world, rather than just sticking to like one cultural group, or one religious group."

Ameena, 23 year old medical student (female)

However, not all participants felt different. Some, when asked about their experience as a Muslim living in England, answered initially that it was simply "normal". As Ayesha describes:

"Ehm, well, there's not really much to say. Ehm, I just feel like, you know, I just fit into everywhere and... It's not really like, ehm, you know, oh I'm a Muslim and you're not, that's not really that kind of thing. I just feel like I belong here."

Ayesha, 20 year old student (female)

While Ayesha is one of the two participants who could not think of any bad experiences at all, others felt to have lived a "normal" life until terrorist attacks on the Western World which were claimed by Islamic extremist groups, examples mentioned were 9/11 and 7/7 (the London bombings). Saeed, for example, clearly noticed a difference after 9/11:

"Ehm, it's been, ehm, pretty normal as in, ehm... I think until 9/11, so September 11th, ehm, being Muslim was pretty normal. It was just like being, ehm, having any other religion. It didn't really come up in life, as much. Ehm, after, ehm, September 11th, obviously because of what happened, ehm, things did change. Ehm, things did change overall, but it terms of our school, ehm, I didn't really make much of a difference. Nobody really called me off on it or anything, and even in the community, but I did notice that overall, in the UK, there did tend to be... There was a lot more tension. Ehm... In terms of like... In terms of like the news mainly, and the atmosphere, ehm... "

Saeed, 21 year old economist (male)

Even though Saeed did not speak of any personal negative encounters after the terrorist attacks, he did feel a change of atmosphere, of general attitudes towards Muslims in the UK. In addition, he also mentions the media as a negative factor, just like Akram did above.

Another subject of overlap between positive and negative experiences is the fact that there are many Muslim communities in England. The reason why this is by some sensed as positive, while negative by others, is explained by Yasmina, who encounters these communities on a daily basis through her work:

"It's very interesting to kind of work with the Muslim community, and kind of see how they all sort of come together to help each other. Ehm, but that also works detrimentally sometimes, when the community really doesn't come together, and you'll see... I think most of the time, in the UK, that in areas... Most of the areas where Muslims are concentrated, are the poorest areas, they are the most ehm, the areas where illiteracy is quite high, you know, the health is really bad... All of those kind of things, so that's I guess one of those things that the Muslim community is trying to combat ehm, at the moment, yeah. "

Yasmina, 25 year old researcher (female)

At the same time, she personally received positivity out of the fact that she encounters many other Muslims every day:

"Tons of people ehm, that are, you know, quite obviously Muslim. Ehm, and it is quite good to... You know, when you see them on... When we see each other on the train, it's always like ehm, you know, we have a greeting, and ehm... We always say "Salam Alaikum", and that, that... You know, that kind of, when you pass somebody, that's something that they smile and say to you, even though you have absolutely no idea who that person is. But it's kind of a nice... It makes you feel like you belong to a community."

Yasmina, 25 year old researcher (female)

Although she acknowledges that there are problems within Muslim communities in terms of poverty and illiteracy, the feeling that she is not alone seems to give her a feeling of security, a sense of belonging. This is a very good example of how Muslims may benefit from maintaining the Islamic culture in public, an effect we found for Muslims in England and in the Netherlands in Chapter 4.

Finally, while it is, of course, not as easy to practise Islam in England as it would be in a Muslim country, as a result of there being fewer places to pray and less halal food available, a

number of participants spoke of positive experiences at work or at University, where majority members tried to accommodate to their needs as a Muslim. When Akram told about difficulties he faced due to him not drinking alcohol nor being able to be around people who drink, he explained how his work tried to facilitate the situation:

"So it can be a bit difficult in terms of work-wise, and maybe school functions... I mean, there maybe times that you can't attend, because of those issues."

And how do you experience that yourself? You say that you don't drink, but do you also not sit at a table with other who drink?

"Well, generally, I keep away from it. I mean, at work people are aware of it, so I wouldn't attend if there is alcohol, but they are quite accommodating. At times, they would accommodate me and maybe they'd keep their drinks until a lot later, you know, when I'm about to leave, and then they'd have their drinks then."

Akram, 32 year old dental surgeon (male)

Akram gives a good example of how majority members can invest in culture maintenance of minority members, a concept we investigated in Chapter 3. In this case, Akram would not have been able to attend if his colleagues had not invested in his culture maintenance, which highlights the importance of this novel concept.

From this range of positive and negative experiences of Muslims in England it appears that the way in which situations are interpreted and dealt with by both participants themselves and the people in their environment can make a large difference to the experience. The next question to answer is whether these experiences have an impact on participants' acculturation choices.

Private and public maintenance of the Islamic way of life

Since the aim of the present study was to find out whether there are different reasons for public versus private acculturation, the interviewer started by asking whether participants felt that they maintained their Islamic way of life to a different extent when they were at home compared to when they were out in public, such as at school or at work. The majority of participants did notice a difference, and stated that it was easier to maintain the Islamic ways at home (see Table 13). The most important difference was keeping to prayer times, which they experienced as more difficult due to time constraints at work or University, and as resulting from a lack of facilities to do their prayers. Other differences were that in public they were sometimes more or less forced by the situation to be around people drinking alcohol, or spend time with people of the other sex,

Table 13. Study 8: Experiences of maintaining the Islamic way of life of Muslims in England

Differences public/private	Private maintenance	Public maintenance
What is easier at home:	Influence private maintenance	Influences public maintenance
• Doing prayers on time	• Parents/family	• Parents/family
• Not being around alcohol		• The English environment
• No gender mixing	Changes over time	• The Muslim community
• Dressing traditionally*	• Parents/family used to be an influence, but now a personal choice	
		Reasons public maintenance
	• More religious over time	• It's a way of life
		• Believe in it
		• It's practical/functional
	Reasons private maintenance	• It's my identity
	• It's a way of life/purpose in life	• Want people to get accustomed to and understand Islam
	• Believe in it	
	• It's practical/functional	
	• Preconceptions led to studying Islam more	

*Only mentioned by or about women

both situations which would not occur in the privacy of their own home. Finally, two women felt that they adjusted their ways of dressing to a certain extent when going outside. Connecting this to the findings of Study 3 (Chapter 2), where we found that Muslims in England liked majority members the most and experienced the least threat when these supported integration in the public domain, but separation for the private domain, there seems to be an overlap. In the present study, participants also placed more emphasis on maintaining their heritage culture and religion at home than they did outside of their home.

However, not all participants felt that there was a difference. Some felt that maintaining their Islamic culture to a different extent in public compared to private would be lying to themselves, or a matter of hypocrisy:

"I don't... I think ehm (laughs), being different in home and outside home would be kind of like a bit of a hypocrisy kind of thing. But ehm, no I don't think... I think if one wants to, they can do it. Ehm, again, I think it comes down to your personal choice. You can say that there's barriers outside, but I don't think there is."

Kareem, 21 year old student (male)

Kareem felt that one could overcome the barriers, it was almost as if he saw them as a way to test his faith.

Those who initially reported that they did not sense a difference between the two domains, did however mention different influences on their level of maintenance in public and private. As Table 12 shows, the main influences on private culture maintenance were parents or family. This was often spontaneously mentioned when asking about differences between domains, whereas others only spoke about their family's influence after specifically being asked about influences on private maintenance of the Islamic way of life. For many, such as Abdul, it was self-evident that there was an influence from his parents, particularly when he was younger:

"And it was a gradual thing, like, when I was younger, a lot of it was kind of due to family influence. And of course it's going to be, I mean, my family care about me and they want to raise me in the way that they believe is good for me, so… When I was younger, yeah, of course. "

Abdul, 23 year old research assistant (male)

As Abdul makes clear, the Islamic way of life was a way of life that his parents considered as the correct way of life, and thus of course they will influence him in that. However, this does not mean that this is necessarily the reason why participants were holding on to the Islamic ways. Often, the influence of family became less over time, whereas the intrinsic motivation to be a Muslim increased. This was also the case for Abdul, who later on in the interview said:

"So yeah, but I kind of, I see it more as a guide in the right direction, and then I myself kind of ended up choosing to take that back, because it's been very easy for me, you know. As soon as I got older, you know, into sixth form, into University, you kind of leave all that behind. But I mean, I didn't, because it was... In fact, when I when to University I felt as though I wanted to be even more Islamic. "

Abdul, 23 year old research assistant (male)

Abdul saw his parents' influence more as a push in a specific direction than as a permanent influence. In his opinion, the decision to become more Islamic later on in life was his,

as he no longer lived with his parents at the time he made this decision. In fact, Abdul is one of several participants who became more Islamic than his parents. It is therefore important to note that influences on acculturation choices are not always the same as reasons for acculturation choices.

The list of reasons identified for culture maintenance in private domains is considerably longer than the list of influences. The most commonly stated reason for private maintenance was that being Muslim was a way of life for them. In Muhammed's words:

"Because, I don't know, it's... I always try to... It's a way of life. Otherwise I wouldn't really have a purpose in life. Like, ... I wouldn't be able to have a purpose in life."

So your religion gives you a purpose in life?

"Yeah, yeah. You know, it causes me to try to do better, when trying to do things in general. It sort of gives me a model to follow."

Muhammed, 21 year old student (male)

Just like many others, Islam is not just a religion to Muhammed. Instead, he views it as a way of life, and something that gives him a purpose in life. Several people mentioned the Islamic way of life to be a very practical and functional one. For example, Salma said:

"It is a way of life, it isn't something that you do or leave. It gives you faith as a person, you know, God is pretty much in the forefront of your mind. But also, it's a very functional faith, it's something that, you know, it's not just about being spiritual. It gives you a pretty good balance."

Salma, 25 year old dentist (female)

That is, even though many participants indicated having difficulties practicing their faith in public domains due to for example a lack of prayer rooms, they still considered their faith to be very functional. For others, it was simply something they believed in. Usaim, for example, words it very concisely:

"I think it's correct, I think... I thought about it a lot, and I have come to the conclusion that this is the way to live."

Usaim, 26 year old doctor (male)

The above reasons for private maintenance can all be considered to aim towards the contents of their religion. A number of people however mentioned a more external source of inspiration. Living in England, being confronted with misconceptions, with non-Muslims asking

questions about Islam, they were motivated to study their religion further, in order to clarify these misconceptions or to obtain answers to questions. This is how Yasmina experienced it:

"But here, when I moved here, I think ehm, having that resistance I think from other people, and having other people really ask you "But why do you do this?" and "What's that about?", and you know, those kinds of things really make you think. And a lot of those things, you know, I would already have the answers to, because I would know, and I... You know, there were questions that I had answered myself. But a lot of the things really made me think, and they really made me kind of learn even more about my religion. "

Yasmina, 25 year old researcher (female)

In Yasmina's case, her experiences in public domains motivated her to study her religion more in private, which shows that the two domains are not completely separate from one another.

Unexpectedly, although almost all participants identified their family as having an influence on their private culture maintenance, they did not feel that the influence of their family was the reason why they practised. Moreover, when asked to what extent they wanted to maintain the Islamic way of life if there were no factors influencing them, most of them would not want to change their current level of private maintenance. If they did, then they spoke only of very minor details, such as wanting to listen to music a bit more often, but then emphasising that they would still keep everything else the same. That is, when participants confirmed that they were influenced by their family, they were not unhappy with this influence.

Table 13 shows that the list of influences participants experience on their public culture maintenance is longer than those for the private domain. Generally, people will interact with a variety of people in public, which means there are additional influences. Aside from the usual family influence, the English majority, or more generally the English environment now plays a role too. Yasmina felt that at times this made it hard for her to maintain her Islamic ways in public:

"I do quite like personal space, particularly with other men, and then when you're on the tube in London, or... You know, things like that. I think personal space really goes out of the window, for example, at rush hour (laughs). And it's very difficult to, you know, be super Islamic or whatever, when you're kind of pushed up against someone in the tube, and you can't really... Do you know what I mean? It's not like you can say "Oh my god, I can't be, like, next to you" or anything, it's just... It's one of those things that you just have to get on with, and I think it's a compromise you have to make, because, you know, unless

you'd sort of sat there and wait until the tubes were empty, in which case you never get home (laughs), you know."

<div align="right">Yasmina, 25 year old researcher (female)</div>

Although personally, and from a religious point of view, Yasmina would prefer to keep a certain amount of physical distance between her and other men, using the underground in London makes this impossible for her. Yet, she does not seem to dwell on it, and calls it "one of those things that you just have to get on with". Other examples of the environment influencing the possibility to maintain the Islamic way of life included the necessity of interacting with people of the opposite sex in work or University settings, or restaurants playing loud music, serving alcohol, or not serving halal food. In contrast, people like Naima perceived that her Muslim ingroup rather than the outgroup had an influence on the extent to which she maintained the Islamic way of life in public domains:

> "I think I'm only more aware of my choices, for example the way I dress, because I live in a community which is predominantly Muslim, and they generally wear the full jubah, and the hijab, and that sort of thing. Whereas I'm happy to wear trousers, and just cover my hair, and that sort of thing. So, I'm more aware of how I dress, even the traditional way, but... And I suppose in a way it'd be kind of... It keeps me more conservative than not."

<div align="right">Naima, 31 year old solicitor (female)</div>

Naima lived in a neighbourhood with a high number of Muslims, and was very aware of the fact that she dressed more modern than most other women living in the same community, which motivated her to dress a bit more conservatively.

A number of reasons to maintain the Islamic way of life in public, were the same as the reasons to maintain it in private. This is not very surprising, as when one believes in a certain faith at home, this is unlikely to change when they step out of the door of their home. However, there were two additional reasons why people maintained their Islamic ways in public domains. The first one is to affirm their identity. In Abdul's case, who was at the time of the interview more Islamic than his parents, this created conflict with his parents:

> "I wanted to ehm, let my beard grow, and my parents, they've actually caused some ehm… kind of a few arguments. In that, I actually wanted it, to kind of let my beard grow. Partly for religious reasons, partly as a kind of affirmation of my identity, because you know, I'm of Syrian background, but I don't look very ehm… Well, as it is, my friends mistake me for a white person or an English person and I want something, you know, open

and outwards as a kind of affirmation of, you know, of the faith that I love. So it's partly

for religious reasons, partly for affirming my identity, but it has caused problems with my

parents who want me to ehm, shave my beard, or at least trim it very short. Ehm, so yeah,

there are certain aspects of factors where I felt that I've been ehm, more strict in that

sense. "

Abdul, 23 year old research assistant (male)

Abdul looked "too English", he wanted people to recognise his cultural and religious

background, and wanted to affirm his identity by growing a beard. However, his parents did not

agree with this decision, which is why Abdul feels he is stricter in following his religion than his

parents. For a number of other participants, it was not just a matter of expressing their Islamic

identity, they also ensured to maintain their culture in public in order to correct misconceptions or

improve the generally negative views of Islam. Muhammed phrased it as follows:

 "I suppose to set an example to other people, you know. I try to... Possibly, the Muslim

image has been painted by the media and stuff, so I'd say that that's one of the main

reasons, you know, that's the reason why. And I feel like I'm possibly, like a hypocrite if I'm

doing that at home and not doing that outside."

Muhammed, 21 year old student (male)

Like many others, Muhammed hints towards the negative image of Muslims that has been

created by the media over the past years. He feels that by maintaining his culture in public, visible

to the English majority, he may be able to show them that the image painted by the media is

incorrect.

Once more, influences on public culture maintenance were not mentioned as reasons why

people publicly maintained their culture. When asked to what extent they wanted to maintain the

Islamic way of life if there were no factors influencing them, most of them would not want to

change anything, although a few would have liked to maintain their Islamic ways more in public.

Private and public adoption of the English culture

Again, the interviewer started by asking whether participants sensed that there was a

difference in the degree to which they adopted the English culture at home compared to outside

of their home. Almost all participants felt that they had adopted the English culture to a greater

extent in public than in private. As can be seen in Table 14, differences that were recorded were

Table 14. Study 8: Experiences of adopting the English way of life of Muslims in England

Differences public/private	Private adoption	Public adoption
What is adopted more in public	Influences private adoption	Influences public adoption
• English food	• Parents (and their culture)	• Family
• Terminology/language	• English people/society	• English people/society
• Gender mixing		• Muslim community
• Being around alcohol	Reasons private adoption	
• English TV/Multimedia	• Nothing wrong with it as long as it fits within Islam	Reasons public adoption
• Clothing*	• Like it/comfortable with it	• Nothing wrong with it as long as it fits within Islam
• Individualism		• Like it/comfortable with it
		• To fit in
		• To make things easier

*Only mentioned by or about women

adoption of English food, the way of talking, mixing with people of the opposite sex, being in the presence of alcohol, the use of English media, clothing, and finally, some felt they had become more individualistic in public domains in order to adapt to English society. Again, this provides further support for the findings of Study 3 in this thesis: Muslim minority members in England prefer to endorse a separation strategy at home, but combine their heritage culture and the dominant culture in public.

The main influence on the level to which the English culture was adopted at home was again the participants' family and their culture. In Amir's words:

"I think that there are factors, because obviously, well... My parents, they don't mind... But, because obviously my parents grew up in another way, that definitely influenced the amount that we practise the English culture within our own household."

Amir, 21 year old student (male)

Since Amir's parents grew up in a different country, he felt that the English culture was practised to a lesser extent in their home. Amir was born in England, but surprisingly, similar arguments were made by a fair number of first generation immigrants, who felt that they were

more English than their parents because they went to school in England whereas their parents did not.

Another influence on private adoption was English people, or merely living in English society. According to Faiza, it is unavoidable that an individual will adopt some aspects of the majority culture:

"Ehm, well, we're living in this country, so it's gonna happen. You can't live, say, completely Islamic life, like, in this, ehm, in this country. You can't just isolate yourself, so it's bound to happen."

Faiza, 23 year old pharmacy technician (female)

Unless you completely isolate yourself, Faiza stated, one would automatically adopt aspects of the English culture, irrespective of domain.

Though English society has been pointed out by several participants as having an influence on the amount of Englishness they adopt in their home, they generally did not have any problems with this influence, and were often happy that they did have a certain level of private culture adoption. This is reflected in the main reason for their level of private adoption: the majority of participants adopted the English culture in private to a certain extent, because they did not find that there was anything wrong with the culture, as long as the aspects which were adopted fitted within Islamic principles. Akram gives a good example of how his family adopts the English way of life without breaking any rules of their religion:

"As long as the source is from what we call the halal source, we have a Sunday roast, that's not a problem. We have, you know, anything that we've grown up with eating in school and things like that. We kind of have it in a halal manner, I guess we do adopt those kind of things, that's not a problem."

Akram, 32 year old dental surgeon (male)

Others gave similar examples about (non-religious) Christmas dinners with their families including a halal turkey.

Muhammed, and others too, gave a very simple reason for adopting the English culture at home: he feels comfortable with what is for him the optimum combination of his original culture and the English culture:

"I think it works, and I think it's about the optimum you know, the optimum compromise between like, my culture, and the English part of it."

Muhammed, 21 year old student (male)

In the public domain, the English majority had an even larger influence on people's adoption. A rather negative example of this is Yasmina's story:

"Ehm, I think that how people would behave would influence me, and I think that given, sort of, ehm... With EDL[10] and certain incidents of racist attacks and things like that... Like, my aunt has been through one as well. It... It... I think when I'm in certain areas, it would really really influence my decision, for example. Ehm, you know, I'd try to dress as, you know, as modern as possible. I'd still always wear the headscarf, but I'd just try to adjust it as normally as possible, in certain areas where I know there is potential for trouble, basically. Ehm, otherwise, I don't really see it ehm, as a problem basically. I think I just... It's one of those things where I just kind of get on with it really. But yeah, I guess that's one of the examples."

Yasmina, 25 year old researcher (female)

Yasmina has felt the scare of a racist attack within her family, and she now dresses as modern as possible in areas where for example the English Defence League may be active. However, other participants faced pressures from the opposite group: the Muslim community. An example:

"Ehm, I think... Probably other factors, I think. Ehm, my family and friends that I've got from like the mosque and my community. Ehm, because, I mean when they're around, obviously you, you can't... You're gonna be judged if you act too English, you know."

Faiza, 23 year old pharmacy technician (female)

Faiza finds that she needs to limit the degree to which she shows English behaviour, in order to avoid being judged by friends and family in the Muslim community. The difference between Yasmina's and Faiza's example clearly show how each individual situation can be very different in terms of effective acculturation.

In addition to the same reasons as mentioned for private adoption, many participants spoke of wanting to fit in, as a reason to adopt the English culture in public. Kareem explained how he did not only want to fit in; he also liked the English culture:

"Ehm, I think it's just necessary to be with people properly, and to fit into the society, I think you need to adopt the English way of life, or you need to adopt something near it, ehm, to be... I mean, when you're living here, when you're outside, when you're dealing

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[10] English Defence League – a far-right movement which specifically opposes Islam.

with the people, you can't, you view in a totally different, you know, view things in a totally different approach, it's just not gonna work. So I think I chose it, because I found that it wasn't going to work, ehm, with people, and, you know, living in society and interacting with people, that I had to adopt this way of life. And, like I said, it's not like I had to adopt it, it was also a good way of life as well. Ehm, because there's nothing wrong with it. So it just made sense to adopt it."

Kareem, 21 year old student (male)

Kareem thought it was necessary to adopt the English culture in order to fit in, to function properly in English society. He emphasises that it was still his choice to make, and that he partly adopted aspects of English culture simply because he found that it was a good way of life. Not all participants liked the English culture as much as Kareem did. A fair number adopted the English culture to make their lives easier. Take Naima, for example:

"It's hard to find a balance when you're out, because obviously you're... You live in England and ehm, whatever culture has a clause to prescribe to, whatever we are, wherever we come from, it's English, and that's how people get through the day easier. So I suppose, in a way, I wouldn't actually, I do adopt a level of English culture, just really to make things easier."

Naima, 31 year old solicitor (female)

Naima is very clear about why she adopted the English culture: just to make things easier. She feels that her life would be more difficult if she chose not to adopt the culture at all, and she was definitely not the only participant to feel that way.

In both domains, there was no overlap between influences on and reasons to adopt the English culture. In addition, the vast majority of participants felt that they would not change their level of adoption if they were completely free from external influences, meaning that most of them were comfortable with the extent to which they had adopted the English culture.

Private and public contact with non-Muslims

The last part of acculturation about which participants were interviewed was their contact with non-Muslims. Once more, the interviewer asked whether there was a different in the amount of contact participants had with non-Muslims inside versus outside their homes. Almost all participants said to have less contact with them at home (see Table 15). When participants spontaneously came up with reasons for this difference, two main reasons appeared: First, when

Table 15. Study 8: Experiences of contact with non-Muslims of Muslims in England

Differences public/private	Private adoption	Public adoption
What creates most differences between domains: • Living with parents • Meeting more non-Muslims in public domains (e.g., work)	Influences private contact • Parents/family Reasons private contact • Irrelevant if they are Muslim • Like meeting different people • At home, there is a cultural difference • Different interests	Influences public contact • Availability Reasons public contact • Irrelevant if they are Muslim • Like meeting different people • When non-Muslims meet there is often alcohol involved • More in common with Muslims • So that non-Muslims can learn about Islam

participants lived with their parents, they felt that it was not up to them to invite their friends into their home. Second, it was often a matter of availability: they saw their Muslim family members mostly at home, whereas at work or University they met many non-Muslims. These two things were also mentioned when participants were asked if there were any factors influencing the amount of contact they had with non-Muslims. For instance, the main influence inside the home was once more one's family living in the same home. This seemed to create somewhat of a barrier, withholding many participants from inviting non-Muslims into their homes. In Kareem's stuation, his mother immigrated from Pakistan relative late in life and therefore he perceived her as still very much having a Pakistani culture. He was sensitive to this when considering inviting guests into their home:

"From a religious perspective she [my mother] would respect them [non-Muslims] as she would respect anyone else, but I think that's largely due to the cultural thing. That "Oh, they're a bit different than us. Ok, how are they gonna react?", and you know what. So I

think ehm, if I was to bring them home, it would be... Like, I would obviously have to discuss it with other people in the home. Ehm, that maybe I wouldn't have to do with my Muslim friends, but I think that's influenced by culture, not religion. "

<div align="right">Kareem, 21 year old student (male)</div>

Interestingly, Kareem found it important to emphasise that what withheld him from inviting non-Muslims was a cultural difference, not a religious one, even though he did mention he would not have this issue when asking Muslims into their home. The Pakistani culture of his mum appeared to be intertwined with the Islamic culture. That is, although a lack of Islamic practice was perhaps not a concern when inviting non-Muslims, their lack of familiarity with Islamic culture was. Many other participants went through similar dilemmas at home.

As for reasons why participants had private contact with non-Muslims, the most frequently mentioned reason was rather straightforward: it did not matter whether someone was Muslim or not. As many others, Yasmina explained that she did not take religion into consideration when deciding who to invite into her home:

"Ehm, I guess it's just the fact that ehm, I mean, we're very open-minded in the sense that ehm, the people who we choose to be our friends are basically ehm, you know, people who... I mean, if they share our kinds of values and if they ehm, if we connect with them, in a way that we would with any other friends, I mean, Muslim friends. Then they become our friends, ehm, and we don't really take religion into consideration, ehm, very much. I mean, it's just the fact that they are other people, and you know... We're not very... I mean, we're very passionate about our own religion, but it's not something we impose upon, like, our friends or anything like that."

<div align="right">Yasmina, 25 year old researcher (female)</div>

Instead of focussing on religion, Yasmina explained that as long as people share her values, and connect with her, they were likely to become her friends. For her, an individual's faith did not play a role in a friendship. She also pointed out that although her and her husband were passionate about their religion, they did not feel the need to impose their religion upon their friends.

Other participants specifically liked being in close contact with people of non-Muslim backgrounds. When the interviewer asked Usaim why he liked having contact with non-Muslims in the private domain, he answered:

"Yeah, so the alternative situation that I could think of would be if I lived in a Muslim country for example, or a Muslim majority country, where most of the people I'd interact with are Muslim. I think if that were the case, I'd be much less, ehm... I would have less insight to what it means to be Muslim, because it would just be normal, and I would... I'd worry that I would just, that Islam for me would just be a default state. So I wouldn't consider why I am Muslim, or why in particular. Whereas now, ehm, there's enough Muslims there that I can kind of have a, you know, I can express my Islam to more than just myself. But ehm, but there's plenty of other variety too."

Usaim, 26 year old doctor (male)

Usaim liked having a mixed group of close friends, he liked the variety. In addition, he found that having close friends who were non-Muslim gave him more insight in what in meant to be Muslim, because it made him realise why he chose to be Muslim. This seems to be somewhat similar to one of the reasons participants mentioned for private maintenance of the Islamic way of life: misconceptions about Islam made them study Islam more, in order to answer questions that were raised by the English majority. In both cases, being a minority member made them appreciate their faith more rather than less.

Some participants were somewhat hesitant to inviting non-Muslims into their homes due to the cultural differences playing more of a role in their home. Amir for example, clarified that he was worried that non-Muslims would feel uncomfortable with certain cultural practices, such as having to take their shoes off when entering his home:

"I mean, in terms of general outside the house I wouldn't care if they're Muslim or not Muslim anyway, but at the same time, I would say like... Sometimes ehm, just little things, it's not that I wouldn't feel comfortable bringing them to my house I think just eh... For example, I don't know, just ehm, taking your shoes off, and some people feel... I don't want to put... And also, I've seen some people who felt uncomfortable before, like with taking shoes off etcetera. Little things that ehm like, I don't know, almost like they're connected to me within my own household ehm, some people will feel uncomfortable... Like, some... None of my close friends actually, but some people in like University, what I'm doing, they're not comfortable with such things, so I wouldn't be so inclined to readily invite them over to my house, because I wouldn't want to put them in an awkward position more than anything, really."

Amir, 21 year old student (male)

It becomes clear from Amir's story that he was afraid that non-Muslims would feel awkward or uncomfortable being in the culture he keeps inside his home. His fear seemed to be based upon past experiences.

A reason why some participants did have contact, or had very little contact, with non-Muslims was because there was a lack of similar interests. For most, this was less of an issue when they were younger, but started to play a larger role around adolescence. For instance, when Faiza was asked why she did not have much contact with non-Muslims inside her home, she answered:

"I did when I was younger, but then, like, when I went to University and stuff, you just have different kind of lifestyles, so they wouldn't really... They wouldn't be my friends anymore, and I made friends with people who didn't drink, and a lot of them turned out to be Muslim, so..."

Faiza, 23 year old pharmacy technician (female)

Like many other participants, Faiza hinted at the fact that one of the interests of her non-Muslim friends involved drinking alcohol, which created a barrier between her and them, because she did not drink.

When contact took place in public areas, family or parents of participants no longer had an influence. Instead, participants reported to mostly be influenced by the availability of Muslims and non-Muslims in the public domain. That is, the amount of contact they had with non-Muslims in the public domain depended on the number of non-Muslims they encountered on a day-to-day basis. As Usaim explained:

"Ehm, I have very little contact with non-Muslims inside my home, ehm, and I have a huge amount of contact with non-Muslims outside my home. Ehm, the difference is that, ehm, obviously I work in the NHS, I went to University, and to lots of different courses, so day-to-day of course I meet mostly non-Muslim people."

Usaim, 26 year old doctor (male)

The reasons for having contact with non-Muslims in public were partly similar to the reasons participants listed for private contact. Again, for most participants it did not matter whether someone was Muslim or not. Also, enjoying friendship with people of different backgrounds was a reason to have contact with non-Muslims in the public domain. However, in the public domain, alcohol very clearly was a reason standing on its own for why participants chose to limit the amount of contact they had with non-Muslims. Abdul suggested that sometimes non-Muslims did not leave him much of choice:

"Well, I suppose it's mostly my choice, but also I think partly the choice of non-Muslims in that they prefer to, I think... It's their choice that their social events seem to be involve mostly around kind of, sort of, drinking, or going out clubbing, or going to the pub, or again, something to do with alcohol, something un-Islamic, so... When I used to hang out with them, like I said, when I was at University I had a lot more non-Muslim friends, but as they started ehm, you know, going out and drinking. Even some of my friends from school, you know, that's what they, kind of, that's their social kind of stuff."

Abdul, 23 year old research assistant (male)

Abdul and many other participants pointed out that when non-Muslims socialise, they often go to places where alcohol is served, which excluded him from numerous social events.

Another reason why some participants limited their contact with non-Muslims is that they did not have enough in common to build a friendship, and at times, not enough to have a good conversation. Farid, for example, spoke about how at his work, his English colleagues and his Arab colleagues had a tendency to sit separately when having coffee or lunch:

"But, you know, ehm, English people, or Arab also, have their own culture and their own subjects. Sometimes actually, I don't understand the subject that they are talking about, because we don't know it. So and I think they have the same reason. They don't know what we are talking about, it is a totally different culture. I think this thing makes the barrier between two groups. Ehm, although, sometimes I feel I really want to learn this, I want to talk about something. I feel actually happy, you know, when some people here, English people, start to chat about something and I enter in that discussion and I learn something. But this is very rare, not always, for the reasons I told you."

Farid, 37 year old PhD student (male)

While Farid felt that he would like to have more interactions with non-Muslims, he felt that he was not able to, due to a lack of common subjects to talk about. Examples mentioned by other participants were being interested in going to Islamic talks or lectures, while non-Muslims were not as much interested in going to such events.

Finally, the last reason why participants wanted contact with non-Muslims was very similar to one of the reasons why they maintain their Islamic culture in public: to give non-Muslims an opportunity to learn about Islam. Akram said that he preferred to keep in contact with non-Muslims in public domains for this reason:

"Ehm I think it's very essential, especially in the day and age that we live in, because of such negative media portrayal of Islamic religion that we have to... We kind of have to show people that we have similar values and aims, like, you know, any other religion and culture. "

Akram, 32 year old dental surgeon (male)

Once more, there was a desire to correct misperceptions created by the media. Akram highlighted that he wanted people to see more similarities between Muslims and non-Muslims, and therefore he chose to have much contacts with non-Muslims.

As was the case with choices for culture maintenance and culture adoption, influences on the amount of contact and reasons to have a certain amount of contact were not the same. Furthermore, most participants were content with the amount of contact they had with non-Muslims in both domains, and would not change it if they had no external factors influencing their choice, although a small minority of participants would have liked to have more public contact.

Discussion

The present study was the first qualitative research looking into the reasons behind minority members' public and private acculturation preferences. In addition, the question whether there was a link between these reasons and the positive and negative experiences members of the minority culture had while living in the host country guided this study. Previous research had concluded that minority members have a tendency to downplay their experiences of discrimination (Colic-Peisker, 2005; Kirkwood; 2012; Verkuyten, 2005b). The findings of the current research are in line with those findings. Despite being quite open about their negative experiences, none of the participants actually used the word discrimination. In addition, they had a tendency of downplaying the severity and negativity of their experiences. It is certainly possible that participants simply did not perceive certain situations to be as severe as an outsider would. As Taylor and colleagues (1996) pointed out, minority members are inclined to perceive that they personally experience less discrimination than their group in general. Another interesting point to note is that negative experiences were often ascribed to a lack of knowledge about Islam on the side of the perpetrator. That is, ignorance, not understanding, misconceptions, etcetera, were mentioned in almost every interview. This is very much in line with what Kirkwood (2012) found in his interviews with refugees, who ascribed the causes of racism to ignorance.

Yet, 12 out of the 14 Muslims being interviewed did have negative experiences. These ranged from negative comments to very obvious negative treatment or even exclusion. A lack of facilities to practice Islam was also mentioned, although some people mentioned that majority members in their environment tried to accommodate to their needs. A very good example is the case of Akram, who mentioned that his work colleagues sometimes started their social outings without alcohol, to ensure that Akram could participate during the first part of the outing. Alcohol consumption was avoided until after he had left. This shows how majority members can invest in helping Muslims to maintain their culture while living in England. For the studies described in Chapter 3, we designed a questionnaire measuring majority members' investment in culture maintenance of minority members and their investment in contact with minority members. Although in the English study in that chapter there was no major difference found between majority members' investment in acculturation and their acculturation preferences, the present study highlights the importance of this novel concept and calls for further investigation of this idea of investment on the side of majority members. First of all, it will be interesting to explore whether majority members investing in culture maintenance of minority members would have an effect on the well-being of these minority members and on intergroup relations. If this is indeed the case, then this would provide a range of opportunities to create prevention and intervention programmes encouraging majority members to part take in such an investment.

Other positive experiences were the high cultural diversity in England; participants enjoyed having friends of different backgrounds, but also enjoyed having many other Muslims around. The daily encounters with other Muslims gave them a sense of belonging and community. This may explain the consistently positive effects of culture maintenance on well-being which were found in Chapter 4 among Muslims in England and the Netherlands. However, to ensure whether this is indeed the case, further research will need to be done with minority members who belong to a minority group that is of relatively small size.

Another positive experience mentioned by several interviewees was that living in England gave them an opportunity to correct negative views of Islam. For example, they would explain to majority members what Islam is about, and try to correct misconceptions caused by the media. This was sometimes mentioned in conjunction with a negative experience. We can link this back to the fact that negative experiences were often ascribed to a lack of knowledge on the side of the perpetrator. Verkuyten (2005b) suggested that explanations for discrimination such as these may act to allow for a sense of personal responsibility and control on the side of minority members,

and that they could function to create possibilities for social improvement and change. The interview results reported here support this view. This may provide an explanation for the buffer effect found in Studies 3 and 4 (Chapter 4), where maintaining the Islamic way of life worked as a buffer against the damaging effects of discrimination on well-being. If Muslims view public maintenance of their culture under conditions of high discrimination as an opportunity to improve the majority's negative views of Islam, then this could be what increases their well-being. That is, doing something good for the ingroup and for intergroup relations, even when (or especially when) being discriminated, can make an individual feel good about him or herself. This is in line with Leach et al.'s (2010) suggestion that highly identified minority members may interpret discrimination of their group as a challenge rather than a threat. This theme returned when interviewees were asked about their contact with non-Muslims. That is, many Muslims made public contact with non-Muslims to ensure that non-Muslims could learn about Islam, which could explain the buffer effect of contact among the Dutch Muslims found in Study 7 (Chapter 4).

It is very interesting that the current study further supports the buffer effect of culture maintenance against the negative effects of discrimination, because this makes McCoy and Major's (2003) hypothesis even less likely. They proposed that highly identifying minority members would experience *more* threat by discrimination than those who identify with their ingroup to a lesser extent. It seems like Leach and colleagues (2010) suggestion, that identification with the ingroup should provide a minority members with resources to cope with stressful events such as discrimination, is a very plausible argument. Of course, it is important to keep in mind that culture maintenance rather than identification was examined in the studies presented here, however this seems to be a promising concept to further investigate in future research.

Regarding maintenance of the Islamic culture, it was found that Muslims generally maintained this more at home than in public, mostly because it was easier to maintain Islamic ways at home, often due to a lack of facilities in public to do their prayers. In addition, public situations would sometimes call for them to be around people of the other sex or to sit at the same table as people who are consuming alcohol. This is in line with the findings of Study 3 (Chapter 2) in this thesis, but also with findings by Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver (2003; 2004), Phalet and collaborators (2000), and Sodowsky and Carey (1988), who all found that minority members commonly placed more of an emphasis on their heritage culture in the private domain, while both cultures were about equally favoured in the public domain.

The main influence on the degree to which Muslims maintained their Islamic way of life in public was the responses of the English majority, however family and the Muslim community were an influence on this too. This supports the idea suggested by Van Oudenhoven and colleagues (1998), who pointed out that the acculturation strategy endorsed may depend on the reactions these strategies evoke among majority members.

When asking whether participants had adopted the English culture to a different extent at home compared to outside their homes, almost all participants felt that they had adopted the English culture to a greater extent in public than in private. Again, this provides further support for the findings of Study 3 (Chapter 2) in this thesis: Muslim minority members in England are most comfortable with a separation strategy at home, but with a combination of their heritage culture and the dominant culture in public. Although several factors had an influence on their culture adoption, with English society being the main influence, most participants indicated that they did not mind adopting the culture, that there was nothing wrong with it, as long as they adopted only those aspects of the culture which did not clash with their religious beliefs.

Regarding contact with people who are not Muslim, all participants except for one reported to have much more contact in public than in private. This was often the case because they lived with their parents, which limited their freedom as to whom they could invite, but is was also simply a matter of availability. To many participants it did not matter whether an individual was Muslim or not, it was not something they considered when deciding who to be friends with. However, many noted the fact that non-Muslims meet up over an alcoholic drink as well, and felt that this created a barrier to become friends with them. This, again, brings to the attention that majority members could make more of an effort, or invest in making acculturation of minority members slightly easier, for example by creating and engaging in social events where alcohol is not necessarily involved.

The fact that many participants felt limited in their freedom when living in their family home is something we had not considered in our previous studies. This is particularly relevant for Study 3, where we investigated the public and private acculturation preferences of Muslim college students, who were all likely to still live with their parents. We may have been too quick to assume that our Muslim participants were free to adopt any acculturation strategy inside their home. The heritage culture of Muslims is likely to be of a country that scores relatively high on collectivism as defined by Hofstede (2001). This means that they may attach high value to being loyal to their family members. This is certainly an issue that needs to be taken into account when interpreting

results and conducting research investigating the private acculturation preferences of Muslim minority members.

It is interesting to note that family influenced all acculturation choices in private. Yet, this does not necessarily mean that family forced our participants to acculturate in ways that they did not want to. When looking at the tables, the external influences that participants mentioned to have an influence on their acculturation preferences did not overlap with participants' reasons for their levels of acculturation. Furthermore, when participants were asked how they would have preferred to acculturate if there were no external factors influencing their choices, participants generally stressed that they were comfortable with their levels of acculturation, and that they did not necessarily wanted to make any changes. That is, despite being influenced by external factors such as family at home, and English majority members in public, participants had their own reasons for their acculturation choices and were generally content with it, although there were of course a few exceptions.

All participants in the present study maintained a certain level of the Islamic culture, which they combined with a certain level of adoption of the English contact and/or contact with non-Muslim people. Rudmin (2006) noted that that virtually all acculturation studies show that people are bicultural in their acculturative preferences. He explained that participants rarely, if ever, give consistent and extreme answers in favour of uniculturalism and therefore suggested that acculturation researchers should investigate *degrees* of integration instead. We followed Rudmin's suggestion in Chapter 3, where we introduced a new way of investigating integration by looking at two continuous dimensions of culture maintenance and culture adoption. The results of the present study support the view that such an approach is the most comprehensive and detailed way to examine acculturation preferences.

In addition, it may be worth to add a third acculturation dimension: one measuring contact. In previous work, the culture maintenance has been complemented by some with a dimension measuring contact (e.g., Berry, 1997) and by others with one measuring culture adoption (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997). The results of the qualitative interviews reported here show that adoption and contact are clearly viewed as different concepts by minority members, and they have very different reasons to endorse each. Therefore, to create a complete picture of acculturation preferences, it may be necessary to examine the interplay of culture maintenance, culture adoption, *and* contact.

A limitation of the present study is that the interviewer did not ask participants directly whether they felt that experiences of discrimination influenced their acculturation. Since participants were hesitant to talk about experiences of discrimination, they may have avoided mentioning it as having an influence on their acculturation preferences as well. However, this was done to create an open approach, and steer the interviewees as little as possible in their answers.

The tendency of minority members to downplay their negative experiences calls for caution when interpreting research about discrimination. For example, if research is done by organisations or media who benefit from minimising the occurrence of discrimination, they may select only those quotes from interviews which support the view that there is barely any discrimination in their society or organisation. In addition, if minority members also avoid making accusations of discrimination when they take part in quantitative research, where researchers do not get to hear their tone of voice or hesitation, then this has the potential to skew the results of such research.

As stated earlier, Kirkwood (2012) noticed an interesting parallel between majority members avoiding to be explicitly racist or discriminating on the one hand, and minority members being hesitant about making accusations of discrimination on the other hand. Although on the side of minority members, this may function as a tool to create possibilities for social improvement and change, there is also an important downside to this notion. That is, if both minority and majority groups are downplaying the occurrence of discrimination, then it will be harder to detect it and intervene where it does occur.

As Rudmin (2006) pointed out, most acculturation research has been done under the presumption that minority members are free in their acculturation choices. Yet, in the present study, there was not a single participant who mentioned not to have had any external influences on their acculturation process. Although these influences were not the sole reasons why they acculturated in a certain way, researchers and policy makers need to keep in mind that acculturation is not an isolated concept. The acculturating individual, members of the ingroup, and members of the outgroup all affect the process. In order to fully comprehend the complex interplay of this variety of factors, it may be necessary that acculturation researchers move away from the heavy focus on quantitative research, and include qualitative elements in their research, too. After all, if the reasons behind the acculturation preference have not been heard, it will be very hard to find out whether this is the most advantageous strategy for that particular individual.

In conclusion, the present study has provided insight into why Muslims in England choose to acculturate in certain ways, and opens up new ideas for acculturation research.

Chapter 6

Conclusions

In sum, the research combined in this thesis brings attention to the complexity of the acculturation process. Among other things, it shows that people's acculturation preferences are dependent on the attitudes of other groups, on ingroup norms, and on life domains. In this concluding chapter, I will first summarise the main findings of the research projects described in this thesis. I will move on by identifying strengths and weaknesses of the research done, and will give suggestions for future research in the field of acculturation. Finally, I will stress the implications and relevance of the findings for multicultural societies.

Summary of the main findings

Chapter 2 aimed to find an answer to the first research question: "What is the role of domain specificity in the effects of meta-perceptions of acculturation on own acculturation preferences?" In three separate experiments, two with English majority members, and one with Muslim minority members in England, a perceived outgroup preference for public integration increased liking of that outgroup and own preference for public integration. For majority members, but not for Muslims, the same perception also increased own preference for private integration, which could be an indication that the integration preferences of majority members differ less between the two domains than those of minority members do, but this hypothesis did not hold up when Muslims were perceived to strongly adopt the English culture inside their homes. That is, when majority members perceived Muslims to assimilate in private, they wanted Muslims majority members to maintain their original culture in other (public) domains more than when they were perceived to integrate or separate in private. This effect could be explained by the English majority having a need for distinctiveness (e.g., Brewer, 2001; Jetten & Spears, 2004). When Muslims are living their lives completely as English people, even inside their homes, the English may find that they become too similar to the majority. Therefore, to compensate, they prefer them to retain more of their Muslim culture in public domains.

When focussing on adoption of the English culture only, Muslims generally followed the wishes of majority members for public domains. However, this was not the case for the private domain: when majority members were perceived to want Muslims to assimilate at home, this lowered the amount to which Muslims desired to adopt the English culture in their homes, which suggests that Muslims were resisting the pressure to become 'more English' when at home.

Finally, we learned from the studies described in Chapter 2 that Muslims felt the least threatened when they thought that majority members wanted them to separate in private combined with integration in public, which is also when they like those majority members the most. Majority members however, felt the least threatened when they perceived Muslims to assimilate in private, combined with separation in public.

The combined findings from studies 1, 2, and 3 indicated that it is likely that the most beneficial combination of acculturation preferences to encourage is integration in public and separation in private (or whichever strategy the minority member prefers in private). However, the results of Chapter 3 raised some questions about the concept of integration. The purpose of this chapter was to find an answer to the second research question: "How do domain-specific ingroup norms regarding acculturation influence own acculturation preferences of majority members?" Among majority members in both England and in Chile, ingroup norms about public and private acculturation preferences for minority members did not affect their own preferences for public or private integration taken singly. Yet, after inspecting the means for all acculturation preferences, it appeared that the difference between their preference for maintenance and their preference for adoption *did* change depending on experimental condition. It is possible that the way people's preference for integration was investigated in the first three studies did perhaps not provide as much understanding of the acculturation effects as it could have. That is, if people's preference for integration does not change, while their relative preference for maintenance compared to their preference for adoption does, then it is possible that the concept of integration is too unclear. Since participants were asked to what extent they wanted minority members to combine both cultures, it did not specify what kind of combination participants preferred (e.g., 99% Muslim culture combined with 1% English culture or the opposite). Therefore, data were examined from a different angle in Studies 3 and 4: it was investigated whether public and private acculturation norms in the ingroup affected their relative preference for maintenance compared to their preference for adoption.

In addition, Studies 3 and 4 included a new measurement of acculturation: investment in culture maintenance and investment in contact. As opposed to the commonly used acculturation measures, which usually tap into a rather passive attitude towards acculturation, the investment measures look at the initiative a person takes to make culture maintenance or contact possible.

In general, these two studies showed how different people's acculturation preferences can be for different cultural groups. In Chile, we looked at majority members' acculturation preferences regarding the indigenous Mapuche population, whereas in England, acculturation preferences of the English majority regarding Muslim minority members were studied. Since Chile is more collectivistic than England, we expected to find a greater effect of ingroup norms on own acculturation preferences and investment in Chile. This was however only the case for perceived ingroup norms regarding investment in contact: if Chileans perceived their peers to want contact, then they invested more in contact, too. Investment in culture maintenance, preference for maintenance, and affective reactions reflected the political climate in Chile better than it reflected their level of collectivism. That is, as described in the introduction of Chapter 3, in Chile there is currently a strong focus on the improvement of the Mapuche's situation and there is official recognition of the Mapuche identity and the central role that the Mapuche have played in the history of Chile (Pehrson et al., 2011). This was reflected in the results of Study 5, because Chileans showed resistance when they perceived their ingroup members to want Mapuche to assimilate: when this was the case, they heightened their investment in culture maintenance and their preference for maintenance, and they also liked their ingroup members less. In England, English majority members only followed ingroup norms regarding acculturation preferences for the private domain, which may be due to the fact that people are more likely to conform to group norms in situations that are novel or ambiguous (Sherif, 1936).

The substantially different patterns of results for these two countries clearly emphasise that we cannot generalise findings regarding acculturation from one country to another, or from one minority group to another. I will elaborate on this at a later point in this chapter. There were however also some similarities between the countries: in both England and Chile, majority members liked their ingroup members the least when they wanted the respective minority members to assimilate in public, or when they wanted them to assimilate in private. This means that, overall, there is somewhat of an agreement that pushing minority members to assimilate is not an acceptable thing to do.

Moving on to the third research question, "What are the longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation strategies of minority members on their well-being and intergroup relations?", this was answered in Chapter 4 for Muslim minority members in two countries: Britain and the Netherlands. That is, where the previous chapter focussed on two very different countries and minority groups with the intention to show that we cannot generalise acculturation data for different cultural groups, the studies in Chapter 4 were intended to test whether the findings hold for the same minority group in two fairly comparable Northern European countries, which are neighbouring one another.

Chapter 4 gave us a first impression of the effects of domain-specific acculturation and discrimination on well-being and intergroup emotions. Public culture maintenance emerged to be the only longitudinal predictor of well-being for both Muslims in Britain and Muslims in the Netherlands: the more Muslims publicly maintained their culture, the better their well-being. In Britain, it was also a predictor of negative emotions towards the British majority: the more they publicly maintained their culture, the less negative their feelings were towards the majority. I did not find any opposite longitudinal effects for either study, meaning that acculturation may impact on well-being and intergroup emotions, but the reverse is less likely. The reason why it is only culture maintenance, and specifically public culture maintenance, that has such positive effects has yet to be confirmed by further research, but the qualitative study reported in Chapter 5 does offer a possible explanation: maintaining Muslim habits in public serves as a way to set an example, to reduce misconceptions about Islam, and it affirms their identity. We know from Social Identity Theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) that affirming one's social identity can be beneficial for self-esteem. This would also explain some of the cross-sectional results of the same studies: these showed that public culture maintenance may provide a buffer against the damaging effects of discrimination on well-being, which is in line with the rejection-identification model (Branscombe, Schmitt, Harvey, 1999), which states that the generally negative consequences of perceived discrimination can be diminished by identification with the minority group.

The final empirical chapter, Chapter 5, was focussed on answering the fourth and final research question: "Why do minority members choose certain acculturation strategies over others in public and private domains?" This was investigated using semi-structured interviews on a small sample of Muslims in England about their public and private acculturation experiences. With the aim to gain more insight in the buffering effect of public culture maintenance, the qualitative chapter was partly intended to explore why Muslims would still publicly maintain their culture

even under conditions of high discrimination. More specifically, one of the goals of the study was to shed light on whether individual reasons for maintaining their culture in public would explain the buffering effect found in Studies 6 and 7.

It turned out that the interviews did indeed provide an explanation for the buffer effect. The results of this interview study showed that Muslims had a tendency to downplay the severity of their negative experiences in England, and that negative experiences were often subscribed to a lack of knowledge about Islam on the side of the perpetrator: ignorance, a lack of understanding, or misconceptions. This, combined with several participants mentioning that they maintained their culture in public because they wanted majority members to get accustomed to and understand Islam, may provide an explanation for the buffer effect found in Chapter 4. As explained in the discussion of Chapter 5, if Muslims view public maintenance of their culture under conditions of high discrimination as an opportunity to improve the majority's negative views of Islam, then this could be the reason for increased well-being. This is also in line with Leach et al.'s (2010) suggestion that highly identified minority members may interpret discrimination of their group as a challenge rather than a threat.

However, the qualitative study did not only provide an explanation for the buffer effect of maintenance of the heritage culture, it also clarified why we found a buffer effect of contact against discrimination in Chapter 4. Many of the interviewed Muslims explained that they made public contact with non-Muslims for a similar reason as why they maintained their culture: to ensure that non-Muslims could learn about Islam. That is, as long as there is contact with non-Muslims, discrimination may be seen as a possibility to change the negative views about Islam.

So far, what can be learned from the present findings is that people's acculturation preferences are dependent on whether they belong to a majority or minority group, on acculturation preferences they perceive the outgroup and their fellow ingroup members to have, and whether the acculturation takes place in the public or private domain. In addition, which acculturation strategy is most beneficial will probably depend on the individual circumstances for each individual, but for Muslim minority members specifically, maintaining one's original culture in public seems to have the most beneficial consequences for well-being and intergroup attitudes in the long run.

Limitations and directions for future research

This section focuses on the flaws and strengths of the research discussed in this thesis, and these, in combination with the results, will be used to suggest directions for future research.

One of the weaknesses lies in the measurements used in the present acculturation studies. For instance, Studies 1 to 3 were mainly designed to find out how we could predict an acculturation preference of integration, because this strategy had been shown by a range of previous research to be related to the best psychological, socio-cultural, and health outcomes for minority members, as well as more favourable intergroup attitudes (Berry, 1997; Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, in press; and see Brown & Zagefka, 2011). In these first three studies, we measured integration as having a preference for Muslims to combine their Muslim culture with the English culture. One-item measures were used (one item for the public domain, and one for the private domain), and, encouragingly, we found fairly consistent results over three separate experiments. However, the initial results of Studies 4 and 5 made us realise that perhaps we did not use the most comprehensive way to investigate preferences for integration: we noticed that although ingroup norms regarding acculturation did not affect majority members' preference for integration, yet they *did* affect their preference for maintenance *relative to* their preference for adoption. This opens up a new way of thinking about integration. Looking at the graphs showing these relative effects, it becomes clear that participants' preferences for maintenance and adoption never really comes close to the lowest point on the scale. Since their preferences are measured on 1 to 5 Likert scales, this means that in all of the experimental conditions people preferred at least some amount of culture maintenance and culture adoption. Depending on how one would define integration, it could be concluded that people always had somewhat of a preference for integration, but with differing combinations of amounts of culture maintenance and adoption. The same can be said about participants in all other studies described in this thesis.

What does this mean? Going back to Berry's (1997) acculturation model, his argument for developing the model was that acculturation needs to be measured on two continuous dimensions rather than only one going from unacculturated to assimilated. Although he suggested a dimension of culture maintenance and a dimension of contact, many researchers replaced this second dimension with one measuring culture adoption (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997). Irrespective of which two dimensions are used, when Berry's (1997) suggestion is followed to cross these two dimensions to find out whether people have a preference for separation, integration, assimilation,

or marginalisation, we are no longer looking at continuous dimensions. Instead, people are classified into one out of four categories. There are several ways of arriving at these categories. They can be measured directly with different items for each category, or they can be calculated by looking at combinations of answers to questions referring to the underlying dimensions, and then categorising people based on whether these answers fall above or below the midpoint of a Likert scale, or above/below the median or mean (see Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2007). When looking at integration only, it is also possible to multiply people's preferences for culture maintenance and culture adoption and in this way form a continuous scale measuring integration (Zagefka et al., 2007). Yet, none of these conceptualisations show people's preferences on the two dimensions separately, meaning that a lot of information is lost, and making it impossible to look at people's relative preferences on these two dimensions. In addition, it could mean that people could be assigned to a different category when perhaps they should not. For example, person A would normally prefer Muslims to integrate in public, scoring a 4 out of 5 on both the preference for culture maintenance and the culture adoption scale. However, after reading that other members of person A's ingroup prefer Muslims to integrate as well, person A slightly lowers his or her preference for maintenance to a 3 out of 5, while the preference for culture adoption stays the same. In the case when the researcher uses the mean of the group as a cut-off point to divide people into the four acculturation categories, and the mean in person A's group happened to be 3.5, then person A has now been classified as having an assimilation preference instead of one supporting integration. Is this necessarily the case? I think that it is highly unlikely.

This reveals how unclear and complex the construct of integration really is. After all, which amount of culture maintenance needs to be combined with which amount of culture adoption or contact to create integration? It is often impossible to combine 100% both cultures due to conflicting values between the two cultures. For example, it is very unlikely that one would manage to practice premarital virginity and premarital sexual indulgence at the same time, or drive on the left and the right side of the road at the same time (Rudmin & Ahmadzadeh, 2001). For that reason, I think it will be more useful to compare scores on the underlying continuous acculturation dimensions rather than categories. This way, we would be looking into people's varying levels of integration. The analytic approach used in Studies 4 and 5 shows how it is possible to look at relative comparisons between both continuous dimensions of acculturation at the same time, without having to categorise people into supporters of separation, integration, assimilation, or marginalisation. Although much previous research has drawn the conclusion that

integration is the most beneficial acculturation strategy (Berry, 1997; Nguyen & Benet-Martinez, in press; and see Brown & Zagefka, 2011), the vagueness of the concept makes it very difficult to establish whether this is indeed the case. Future research would benefit from moving away from the four categories, and look instead at comparisons between the two continuous dimensions of culture maintenance and culture adoption.

The results of the qualitative study (Study 8) supports this dimensional way of thinking about acculturation. All Muslims interviewed for this study maintained a certain level of the Islamic culture, which they combined with a certain level of adoption of the English contact. None of them mentioned picking a specific combination. Instead, most of them adopted a bit more of the English culture when outside of their homes compared to when they were at home, and they sometimes maintained a bit more of their Muslim culture in private compared to public domains. I think it would be premature to conclude that they separate at home and assimilate in private. In addition, the outcomes of the qualitative study indicated that it may be useful to add a third acculturation dimension that measures contact. As discussed in Chapter 1, in previous acculturation research, the culture maintenance has been complemented by some with a dimension measuring contact (e.g., Berry, 1997) and by others with one measuring culture adoption (e.g., Bourhis et al., 1997). The qualitative study looked into both, and the results showed that adoption and contact are clearly viewed as different concepts by minority members, and they have very different reasons to endorse each. Therefore, to create a full picture of acculturation preferences, it may be necessary to look into culture maintenance, culture adoption, *and* contact.

The two longitudinal studies described in this thesis underline the importance of looking at the underlying dimensions of acculturation too: Studies 6 and 7 focussed on culture maintenance and contact and showed that culture maintenance may be more predictive of well-being and intergroup relations than the contact dimension. More specifically, only *public* culture maintenance had a longitudinal effect on well-being among Muslims in Britain and in the Netherlands, and in Britain only, it had an additional effect on intergroup emotions. Private acculturation did not have any causal effects on well-being of Muslims nor on their intergroup emotions, neither in Britain nor in the Netherlands. It is possible that if we had measured participants' acculturation preferences categorically, or without specifying life domains, we would have failed to discover this importance of public culture maintenance. In addition, the fact that only public culture maintenance had a positive effect on well-being is somewhat worrying since

previous research has indicated that minorities maintain their culture more in private than in public domains of life (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003). Based on what was found in the qualitative study, it seems like the reason why Muslims sometimes toned down their culture maintenance in public was because of a lack of facilities to practice their religion. This draws attention to the importance of investigating majority members' investment in the culture maintenance of minority members. This concept was introduced in Chapter 3, where we developed a scale measuring majority members' investment in culture maintenance of minority members and in creating contact with minority members. The qualitative study emphasises the importance of this novel concept and calls for further investigation of this idea of investment in acculturation on the side of majority members. It would be particularly interesting to investigate how minority members respond to majority members' investment. It is possible that minority members would welcome this as an opportunity to maintain their cultures more in public, which may in turn lead to a heightened well-being. In addition, it may improve their views of the majority, which in turn could lead to more contact and better intergroup relations. There are many ways for majority members to invest in culture maintenance, ranging from small gestures such as inviting a Muslim neighbour over for a halal dinner, to large-scale policies such as making it obligatory for companies to have a multi-faith prayer room for their employees. If the effects of investment are as positive as I think they may be, then this would open up a variety of possibilities for encouraging interventions.

The concept of investment calls the standard conceptualisation of acculturation (e.g., Berry, 1997) to some extent into question, as it mainly focuses on ways in which minority members acculturate in the dominant society. Perhaps acculturation research should move away from investigating acculturation as this one-sided process, and start seeing acculturation as a process in which both minority and majority members need to make changes to create a successfully functioning multicultural society. Ager and Strang (2004) already moved into this direction by suggesting that integration is a goal that should be strived for amongst all members of society, meaning members of both the minority and majority group. Therefore, the field of acculturation research would benefit if it would modernise this conceptualisation to one where we focus on ways in which both minority and majority members invest in the creation of a fully integrated society.

The studies reported in this thesis also highlight the significance of looking at domain specificity. As stated above, in Chapter 4 we found that it was only *public* culture maintenance that

had a longitudinal effect on well-being among Muslims in Britain and in the Netherlands. Furthermore, the qualitative study (Chapter 5) showed that Muslims in England had different reasons for and influences on their private acculturation than for their public acculturation. Studies 1 until 5, covered in Chapters 2 and 3, showed that people also respond differently to perceived public acculturation preferences compared to private ones. Particularly Study 3 suggested that Muslims in England may be most comfortable with a combination of both cultures in public domains, but more of a focus on the Muslim culture at home. The qualitative study further supported this idea: participants generally said to place more of an emphasis on their heritage culture at home, whereas a combination of both cultures was endorsed in the public domain. This is in line with what several other acculturation researchers have found (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003; 2004; Phalet et al.,2000; Sodowsky & Carey, 1988). Yet, the bulk of acculturation research has been done without specifying life domains or contexts in which acculturation can take place. Therefore, it is recommended that future acculturation research takes a closer look at domain specificity.

One weakness that all experiments in this PhD project (Studies 1 - 5) had in common was the use of one-item constructs to measure the acculturation preferences and affective responses. The reason for this is that the participants of these experiments were relatively young and there were time restrictions imposed by the schools where the research was conducted. This meant that our questionnaire needed to be simple and short. Yet, particularly the first three experiments still created consistent findings which are in line with theoretical reasoning. Nonetheless, future research would gain from using more items per scale, as was done in the longitudinal studies.

Another limitation of the set of studies presented here is that 7 out of 8 studies investigated attitudes of or towards Muslims. However, Chapter 3, which focussed on cross-cultural differences, showed that people can respond very differently to certain acculturation preferences depending on the type of minority group or country: effects of ingroup norms regarding acculturation on own acculturation preferences were rather different for majority members in Chile and their attitudes towards the indigenous Mapuche than they were for English majority members and their attitudes towards Muslims. Other researchers have also pointed out that majority members' attitudes might differ toward different minority groups (Berry et al., 1992; Berry et al., 2006; Montreuil & Bourhis, 2001). It would be very useful if acculturation research from different countries would be compared in order to establish whether there is an interaction taking place between acculturation preferences and societal context. For example, when

describing the acculturation literature and results described in this thesis, it became clear that there are contradictory findings regarding which acculturation strategy may be the most beneficial one, regarding the role of discrimination, regarding feelings of threat, etcetera. Therefore, it would be constructive if researchers were to take a multi-level approach to investigate whether these contradictory findings are caused by the societal settings in which the research has been conducted. Looking at the contradictory findings regarding which may be the "best" acculturation strategy, it would be important to conduct a meta-analysis comparing the vast amount of studies on the effects of acculturation preferences on well-being. Although Nguyen and Benet-Martinez (in press) aimed to do that, they did not take into account the cultural settings in which each research was conducted. Considering how relevant the concept of culture is in acculturation, it is rather surprising that no research has looked into contextual moderators yet, as it is essential to understand the interplay between culture and acculturation.

On a similar note, different minority groups may endorse different acculturation strategies depending on their cultural or religious background. In our longitudinal studies, we did find very similar results for Muslims in Britain and the Netherlands, which makes it likely that similar patterns will be found for Muslims living in other Western countries, but these findings can certainly not be generalised to other countries or minority groups. Since the designs of the studies in this PhD project were all rather novel, it is essential to replicate them with other cultural or religious groups.

Of course there are always limitations to the amount of variables and effects that can be studied within one project. For example, the range on reasons for endorsing certain acculturation strategies over others as identified in the qualitative study shows that there are many other predictors of acculturation preferences than just perceived acculturation preferences of own and other groups. Berry and Sam (1997) also indicated that there could be numerous other variables influencing acculturation, such as national acculturation policies, social support, and residential concentration. Furthermore, income, education, occupational status, and socio-economic status have all been shown to be positively correlated with having a preference for integration (e.g., Ataca & Berry, 2002; Berry, Kalin, & Taylor, 1977; Lim, Heiby, Brislin, & Griffin, 2002). Since most of the participants of the studies presented in this thesis were comparably highly educated (attending college, university, or working in a profession for which higher education is needed), this may have skewed out results somewhat. Moreover, Rudmin (2006) suggested that social desirability may influence people's answers about their acculturation preferences. Considering

that there is an increasing call for multicultural understanding in Western societies (Smith & Bond, 1998), the research discussed here would have increased in validity had it included a scale measuring a tendency to give socially desirable answers.

Another limitation to note is that only Chapter 2 investigated the same concept within acculturation from both the perspective of the majority and the minority. It would be useful to investigate the paradigms used in the other studies from the perspective of the other group, too. For example, since parents, family, and the Muslim community were all mentioned in this study as having an influence on acculturation, it would be interesting to study the effects of ingroup norms regarding acculturation preferences among minority members, instead of focussing only on majority members as was done in Studies 4 and 5. The same could be said about the longitudinal studies reported in Chapter 4: what are the longitudinal effects of public and private acculturation preferences of majority members on intergroup relations (and perhaps even their well-being)?

The final empirical chapter showed us that if it is unknown why a certain acculturation strategy has been chosen, it will be very hard to find out whether this is the most advantageous strategy for that particular individual. That is, what is functional will differ by person and situation. In addition, sometimes minority members may feel that they have no choice at all. For example, Berry (1997) already argued that people barely choose to marginalise, but can sometimes be forced by their environment to do so. In addition, Berry & Sam (1997) suggested that certain acculturation strategies may or may not be permitted by the dominant group. This is of course also the case for majority members. They can have various reasons for their acculturation preferences, and it is likely that there is a range of factors influencing these preferences too. Therefore, complementing acculturation research with qualitative data, not only among minority members, but also among members of the dominant group, is recommended for future research in this area.

Implications for society

The combination of the studies presented here stress the importance of domain specificity in acculturation research. More specifically, it highlights that minority members may be most comfortable if they have a chance to maintain their original culture, both inside and outside their own homes. Public culture maintenance in particular seems to have beneficial effects on well-being and intergroup emotions of minority members; it may even provide a buffer against the

damaging effects of discrimination. However, previous research has shown that in general, ethnic minorities favour cultural maintenance more in private than in public domains of life (e.g., Arends-Tóth & Van de Vijver, 2003), and this was also revealed by the qualitative study. The qualitative study also indicated that this was likely to be caused by a lack of facilities to practise in public domains, and a need to fit into English society. Therefore, intervention programmes should be developed and policies introduced that focus on creating a climate that accepts culture maintenance, and in the case of Muslims specifically, perhaps create facilities to make this easier. For example, restaurants could create some or extend existing halal options on their menus, or create a space in the restaurant where no alcohol is consumed. One of the participants spoke of a very good example of the work place accommodating to his needs by making work parties non-alcoholic for the first few hours. It is important to create awareness that limiting minority members in their religious and/or cultural freedom may well have damaging effects on well-being and intergroup relationships.

In addition, *all* minority members in all studies (Studies 3, 6, 7, and 8) adopted the majority culture to a certain extent when they were outside of their home. As came forth from the qualitative results, most Muslims in England do not mind adopting parts of English culture, as long as it fits in with their beliefs. They also indicated that this makes them fit in better, it makes daily life easier for them. This leads to a twofold of practical suggestions in multicultural societies. First, it means that it may be helpful to offer Muslims support with identifying aspects of the dominant culture that fit in with their beliefs or values, which could make their daily life in a non-Muslim country easier. On the other hand, majority members need to be encouraged to give minority members a chance to participate in the dominant society. Extreme examples of Muslims not getting a chance to adopt the English culture as much as they would want, is when they are blocked by prejudiced majority members from employment or from renting a house in a predominantly non-Muslim neighbourhood. It is important to educate majority members about the fact that it helps minority members to fit into society if they get a chance to participate, and it needs to become common knowledge among majority members that it is very well possible for minority members to adopt parts of the majority culture, while at the same time maintaining part of one's original culture, and that this may even be a very beneficial thing to do.

As was the case for culture adoption, the Muslims in the current studies always had some amount of contact with non-Muslims in public domains. This was however not necessarily the case for the private domain, because often they feared that cultural differences would be an issue. It

may be useful to stimulate minority members to invite majority members inside their homes for two reasons. First, it is known that contact often reduces prejudice (e.g., Allport, 1954), and contact at home could possibly create a closer friendship and therefore more contact. Second, spending time in a household that has a different culture will ensure that majority members learn about that culture and familiarize themselves with it, which could possibly reduce the misconceptions mentioned in the interviews. However, for this contact being possible, majority members of course need to be open to it. Therefore, interventions promoting contact between the different groups should target both majority and minority members.

Finally, there is one important implication for society that can be drawn from the findings regarding discrimination. The results of this interview study showed that Muslims had a tendency to downplay the severity of their negative experiences in England, and that negative experiences were often ascribed to simply a lack of knowledge about Islam on the side of the perpetrator. This in combination with the fact that Muslims often mentioned that they maintained their culture in public because they wanted majority members to get accustomed to and understand Islam, provides a connection to the 'buffer effect' found in the longitudinal studies. That is, if Muslims view public maintenance of their culture under conditions of high discrimination as an opportunity to correct the majority's limited and often incorrect knowledge of Islam, then this could be what increases their well-being. Although this is a very positive perspective to take for minority members, it also has its drawbacks. I am not the first to notice that minority members are hesitant in reporting events of discrimination. Kirkwood (2012) and Verkuyten (2005b) found similar results in their interviews with refugees, and as Kirkwood noted, this tendency makes it very difficult to identify racism and discrimination, and to intervene where it does exist. As a result, it is essential that minority members are made aware of where they can report experiences of discrimination, and that it is important to do so in order to be able to tackle discrimination.

In conclusion, the present research provided answers to a range of questions, but it also produced many questions regarding the investigation of acculturation. This work introduced novel designs, measurements, and analyses, and I hope that the issues I have touched upon in this project will inspire new directions in acculturation research.

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Appendix

Manipulations Study 1

Perceived public separation (Study 1):

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Tell us, you live in England, far away from your family's country and its customs, what does that mean for your original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place does it have in your education?

Amina: Well, I am going to a Muslim college, and I'm happy about that. I also have Koran lessons, where I learn everything about the rituals and history of Islam. Because of this, I have only Muslim friends, I don't have any white English friends. I hang out only with Muslims.

So you follow Muslim education, and you have only friends of Muslim background. Is that the same for you, Omar? And how do you spend your free time?

Omar: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school I often play football. I play in a team with only Muslim players, it's great fun!

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Amina: In my free time I stay tuned about everything that's new in the Muslim world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff. Actually, I'm sure that most Muslims in England live their lives in the same way as we do. Outside of our homes, we live completely as Muslims.

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Perceived public integration (Study 1):

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Amina: Well, I am going to an English college, and I'm happy about that. However, I also want to know about the background of my family, so I also have Koran lessons, where I learn everything about the rituals and history of Islam. Because of this, I have white English friends, but I also have Muslim friends. I hang out with both.

So you combine English education with education about Islam, and you have friends from both English and Muslim backgrounds. Is that the same for you, Omar? And how do you spend your free time?

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Perceived public assimilation (Study 1):

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Tell us, you live in England, far away from your family's country and its customs, what does that mean for your original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place does it have in your education?

Amina: Well, I am going to an English college, and I'm happy about that. I don't need to know about the background of my family, so I don't have Koran lessons or anything like that. Because of this, I have only white English friends, I don't have any Muslim friends. I hang out only with white English people.

So you follow English education, and you have only friends of English background. Is that the same for you, Omar? And how do you spend your free time?

Omar: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school I often play football. I'm the only Muslim on my team, all the other players are white English, it's great fun!

> 66 I have only white English friends, I don't have any Muslim friends. 99

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Manipulations Study 2

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Tell us, you live in England, far away from your family's country and its customs, what does that mean for your original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place does it have in your education?

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What about typical English and typical Muslim celebrations? Do you celebrate both at home?

Omar: No, at home we never celebrate English traditions like Christmas. But we do for example fast during Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. Muslim traditions have an important place in our home. We learnt to do our prayers at a young age and we go to the mosque, but we never do typically English things at home. For instance, we seldom eat traditional English food at home, and I don't eat pork. How about you?

Amina: My family is the same. Muslim traditions and habits have been an important part of my upbringing.

So you have been brought up with Muslim customs and traditions, but how do you see yourself in the future? Would you prefer a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim partner, and how do you think you will bring up your children?

Omar: I would definitely prefer having a Muslim girl! And I'd bring up my children in the same way I was brought up: I'd make sure they get for example Muslim education, and at home I'd also want my children to grow up as Muslim people, with Muslim traditions.

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Amina: My family is the same. Both English and Muslim traditions and habits have been an important part of my upbringing.

So you have been brought up with both Muslim and English customs and traditions, but how do you see yourself in the future? Would you prefer a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how do you think you will bring up your children?

Omar: It would definitely not matter to me if a girl is Muslim or not! And I'd bring up my children in the same way I've been brought up: I'd make sure they get for example Muslim education, but at home I'd want them to grow up as English and as Muslim people, with traditions from both cultures.

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Amina: My family is the same. Muslim traditions and habits have been an important part of my upbringing.

So you have been brought up with Muslim customs and traditions, but how do you see yourself in the future? Would you prefer a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim partner, and how do you think you will bring up your children?

Omar: I would definitely prefer having a Muslim girl! And I'd bring up my children in the same way I was brought up: I'd make sure they get for example English education, but at home I'd want my children to grow up as Muslim people, with Muslim traditions.

❝ At home we never celebrate English traditions like Christmas, but we do fast during Ramadan. ❞

Amina: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most Muslims in England live their lives in the same way as we do. Outside of our homes, we live the English way of life, but at home, we live completely as Muslims.

The BBC thanks Omar and Amina for their cooperation and for a very interesting interview.

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✉ E-mail this to a friend   Manipulation Study 2: Perceived public assimilation & private integration

British Muslims want to follow the English culture when in public, but combine English and Muslim cultures at home.

More and more research is showing that most Muslims in England want to live completely as English people outside their homes, while at home, they prefer to combine English and Muslim cultures. According to Professor Johnson, specialist in immigration, this is the opinion of almost all Muslims living in England. The reason why Muslims choose to live their lives this way is not clear yet. The BBC interviewed two Muslims living in England, to find out what this means for their daily lives. Omar (17 years old) and Amina (18 years old) are both Muslims, typical of many of their faith living in England today.

Tell us, you live in England, far away from your family's country and its customs, what does that mean for your original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place does it have in your education?

Amina: Well, I am going to an English college, and I'm happy about that. I don't need to know about the background of my family, so I don't have Koran lessons or anything like that. Because of this, I have only white English friends, I don't have any Muslim friends. I hang out only with white English people.

So you follow English education, and you have only friends of English background. Is that the same for you, Omar? And how do you spend your free time?

Omar: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school I often play football. I'm the only Muslim on my team, all the other players are white English, it's great fun!

❝ I have only white English friends, I don't have any Muslim friends.❞

Amina: In my free time I stay tuned about everything that's new in the English world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff.

What about typical English and typical Muslim celebrations? Do you celebrate both at home?

Omar: Yes, at home we always celebrate English traditions like Christmas. But we also for example fast during Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. Both English and Muslim traditions have an important place in our home. We learnt to do our prayers at a young age and we go to the mosque, but at the same time we do typically English things at home as well, for instance we often watch football on TV. Also, we eat food from both cultures at home. How about you?

Amina: My family is the same. Both English and Muslim traditions and habits have been an important part of my upbringing.

So you have been brought up with both Muslim and English customs and traditions, but how do you see yourself in the future? Would you prefer a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how do you think you will bring up your children?

Omar: It would definitely not matter to me if a girl is Muslim or not! And I'd bring up my children in the same way I've been brought up: I'd make sure they get for example English education, but at home I'd want them to grow up as English and as Muslim people, with traditions from both cultures.

❝ At home we always celebrate English traditions like Christmas, but we also fast during Ramadan ❞

Amina: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most Muslims in England live their lives in the same way as we do. Outside of our homes, we live the English way of life, but at home, we combine the English culture with the Muslim way of life.

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> **I have only white English friends, I don't have any Muslim friends.**

Amina: In my free time I stay tuned about everything that's new in the English world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff.

What about typical English and typical Muslim celebrations? Do you celebrate both at home?

Omar: No, at home we always celebrate English traditions like Christmas. But we never for example fast during Ramadan and we don't celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan, either. Only English traditions have an important place in our home. We never learnt to do our prayers, and we have never been to a mosque. Instead, we do typically English things at home, for instance we often watch football on TV. Also, we eat only traditional English food at home, and I eat pork as well. How about you?

Amina: My family is the same. English traditions and habits have been an important part of my upbringing.

So you have been brought up with English customs and traditions, but how do you see yourself in the future? Would you prefer a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how do you think you will bring up your children?

Omar: I would definitely prefer having an English girl! And I'd bring up my children in the same way I've been brought up: I'd make sure they get for example English education, and at home I'd also want my children to grow up as English people, with English traditions.

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Manipulations Study 3

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Manipulation Study 3: Perceived public and private separation

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Tell us, what do you think of Muslims in England, who live far away from their family's country and its customs? What do you think living in England should mean for their original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place do you think it should have in their education?

Alice: Well, I think it's OK if Muslims want to go to a Muslim college. I completely understand if they want to know about the background of their family, so they could have Koran lessons or something like that. If they have only Muslim education, they'll probably have mostly Muslim friends.

So you would like Muslims in England to follow Muslim education, and to have Muslim friends. Is that the same for you, Owen? And what would this mean for the way Muslims in England spend their free time?

Owen: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school, there are many ways to hang out with Muslim people. For example, there are many Muslim football teams, I've heard they're great fun to play in!

❝ I would like it if British Muslims have only Muslim friends. ❞

Alice: Also, in England there are possibilities to stay tuned about everything that's new in the Muslim world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff.

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Owen: No, I don't think it's necessary for them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home. But I definitely wouldn't mind if they'd for example fast during Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. I would understand if Muslim traditions have an important place in their home. I wouldn't mind at all if they'd pray and go to the mosque, but I don't think they need to do typically English things at home. Also, I'd understand if they don't eat much traditional English food at home, and if they don't eat pork. How about you?

Alice: I feel the same way. Muslim traditions and habits should be an important part of their upbringing.

So you would like British Muslims to be brought up with only Muslim customs and traditions, but how do you see them in the future? Would you prefer them to have a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how would you prefer them to bring up their children?

Owen: I would totally understand if they'd prefer to have a Muslim girlfriend or boyfriend. And I'd like them to bring up their children in the same way: I'd prefer them to get for example Muslim education, and at home I wouldn't mind them to grow up as Muslim people, with Muslim traditions.

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Alice: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most white English people have the same opinion as we do. Both inside and outside their homes, we prefer Muslims to live completely the Muslim way of life.

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So you would like British Muslims to be brought up with both Muslim and English customs and traditions, but how do you see them in the future? Would you prefer them to have a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how would you prefer them to bring up their children?

Owen: It would definitely not matter to me if they have a Muslim or a white English girlfriend or boyfriend. And I'd like them to bring up their children in the same way: I'd prefer them to get for example Muslim education, but at home I wouldn't mind them growing up as English and as Muslim people, with traditions from both cultures.

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Alice: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most white English people have the same opinion as we do. Outside of their homes, we prefer Muslims to live completely as Muslim people, but at home, we don't mind them combining the English culture with the Muslim way of life.

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Owen: No, at home I'd like them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas. But I don't think it's necessary for them to for example fast during Ramadan, or celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. I would understand if English traditions would have an important place in their home. I don't think they need to pray and go to the mosque, but instead they could do typically English things at home, such as watching football on TV. Also, I'd understand if they only eat traditional English food at home, and if they eat pork. How about you?

Alice: I feel the same way. English traditions and habits should be an important part of their upbringing.

So you would like Muslims in England to be brought up with only English customs and traditions, but how do you see them in the future? Would you prefer them to have a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how would you prefer them to bring up their children?

Owen: I would totally understand if they'd prefer to have an English girlfriend or boyfriend. And I'd like them to bring up their children in the same way: I'd like them to get for example Muslim education, but at home I wouldn't mind them growing up as English people, with English traditions.

❝ I would like them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home, but I don't think it's necessary that they fast during Ramadan. ❞

Alice: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most white English people have the same opinion as we do. Outside of their homes, we prefer Muslims to live the Muslim way of life, but at home, we don't mind them living completely as English people.

The BBC thanks Owen and Alice for their cooperation and for a very interesting interview.

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Manipulation Study 3: Perceived public integration & private separation

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So you would like Muslims to combine English education with education about Islam, and to have friends from both English and Muslim backgrounds. Is that the same for you, Owen? And what would this mean for the way Muslims in England spend their free time?

Owen: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school, there are many ways to hang out with people of both backgrounds. For example, there are many mixed football teams with both English and Muslim players, those are great fun to play in!

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The BBC thanks Owen and Alice for their cooperation and for a very interesting interview.

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✉ E-mail this to a friend   **Manipulation Study 4: Perceived public assimilation & private separation**

English college students want British Muslims to follow the English culture when in public, but wouldn't mind them living completely as Muslims at home.

More and more research is showing that most English college students want British Muslims to live completely as English people when outside their homes, while at home, they don't mind them living the Muslim way of life. According to Professor Johnson, specialist in immigration, this is the opinion of almost all English college students. The reason why they prefer Muslims to live their lives this way is not clear yet. The BBC interviewed Owen (17 years old) and Alice (18 years old) to talk about this. They are both born and raised in England, and so are their parents.

Tell us, what do you think of Muslims in England, who live far away from their family's country and its customs? What do you think living in England should mean for their original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place do you think it should have in their education?

Alice: Well, I think it's OK if Muslims want to go to an English college. However, I don't think it's necessary for Muslims to know about the background of their family, so I think there's no need for Koran lessons or anything like that. If they have only English education, they'll probably have mostly white English friends.

So you would like Muslims follow English education, and to have white English friends. Is that the same for you, Owen? And what would this mean for the way Muslims in England spend their free time?

Owen: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school, there are many ways to hang out with white English people. For example, there are many English football teams, those are great fun to play in!

❝I would like it if British Muslims have only white English friends. ❞

Alice: Also, there are possibilities to stay tuned about everything that's new in the English world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff.

What about typical English and typical Muslim celebrations? Would you like them to celebrate both at home?

Owen: No, I don't think it's necessary for them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home. But I definitely wouldn't mind if they'd for example fast during Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. I would understand if Muslim traditions have an important place in their home. I wouldn't mind at all if they'd pray and go to the mosque, but I don't think they need to do typically English things at home. Also, I'd understand if they don't eat much traditional English food at home, and if they don't eat pork. How about you?

Alice: I feel the same way. Muslim traditions and habits should be an important part of their upbringing.

So you would like British Muslims to be brought up with only Muslim customs and traditions, but how do you see them in the future? Would you prefer them to have a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how would you prefer them to bring up their children?

Owen: I would totally understand if they'd prefer to have a Muslim girlfriend or boyfriend. And I'd like them to bring up their children in the same way: I'd prefer them to get for example English education, but at home I wouldn't mind them growing up as Muslim people, with Muslim traditions.

❝ I don't think they need to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home, but I definitely wouldn't mind if they'd fast during Ramadan. ❞

Alice: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most white English people have the same opinion as we do. Outside of their homes, we prefer Muslims to live completely as English people, but at home, we don't mind them living the Muslim way of life.

The BBC thanks Owen and Alice for their cooperation and for a very interesting interview.

✉ E-mail this to a friend   **Manipulation Study 4: Perceived public assimilation & private integration**

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More and more research is showing that most English college students want British Muslims to live completely as English people when outside their homes, while at home, they don't mind them combining English and Muslim cultures. According to Professor Johnson, specialist in immigration, this is the opinion of almost all English college students. The reason why they prefer Muslims to live their lives this way is not clear yet. The BBC interviewed Owen (17 years old) and Alice (18 years old) to talk about this. They are both born and raised in England, and so are their parents.

Tell us, what do you think of Muslims in England, who live far away from their family's country and its customs? What do you think living in England should mean for their original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place do you think it should have in their education?

Alice: Well, I think it's OK if Muslims want to go to an English college. However, I don't think it's necessary for Muslims to know about the background of their family, so I think there's no need for Koran lessons or anything like that. If they have only English education, they'll probably have mostly white English friends.

So you would like Muslims follow English education, and to have white English friends. Is that the same for you, Owen? And what would this mean for the way Muslims in England spend their free time?

Owen: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school, there are many ways to hang out with white English people. For example, there are many English football teams, those are great fun to play in!

> ❝I would like it if British Muslims have only white English friends.❞

Alice: Also, there are possibilities to stay tuned about everything that's new in the English world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff.

What about typical English and typical Muslim celebrations? Would you like them to celebrate both at home?

Owen: Yes, I would like them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home. But I definitely wouldn't mind if they'd also for example fast during Ramadan, and celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. I would understand if both English and Muslim traditions would have an important place in their home. I wouldn't mind at all if they'd pray and go to the mosque, but at the same time they could do typically English things at home as well, such as watching football on TV. Also, they could combine eating traditional English food with food from their family's country at home, but I'd understand if they don't eat pork. How about you?

Alice: I feel the same way. Both English and Muslim traditions and habits should be an important part of their upbringing.

So you would like British Muslims to be brought up with both Muslim and English customs and traditions, but how do you see them in the future? Would you prefer them to have a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how would you prefer them to bring up their children?

Owen: It would definitely not matter to me if they have a Muslim or a white English girlfriend or boyfriend. And I'd like them to bring up their children in the same way: I'd prefer them to get for example English education, but at home wouldn't mind them growing up as English and as Muslim people, with traditions from both cultures.

> ❝ I would like them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home, but I definitely wouldn't mind if they'd also fast during Ramadan.❞

Alice: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most white English people have the same opinion as we do. Outside of their homes, we prefer Muslims to live completely as English people, but at home, we wouldn't mind them combining the English culture with the Muslim way of life.

The BBC thanks Owen and Alice for their cooperation and for a very interesting interview.

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LIVE BBC NEWS CHANNEL

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✉ E-mail this to a friend   Manipulation Study 4: Perceived public and private assimilation

English college students want British Muslims to follow the English culture when in public, and also live completely as English people at home.

More and more research is showing that most English college students want British Muslims to live completely as English people both inside and outside their homes. According to Professor Johnson, specialist in immigration, this is the opinion of almost all English college students. The reason why they prefer Muslims to live their lives this way is not clear yet. The BBC interviewed Owen (17 years old) and Alice (18 years old) to talk about this. They are both born and raised in England, and so are their parents.

Tell us, what do you think of Muslims in England, who live far away from their family's country and its customs? What do you think living in England should mean for their original religion, the Islamic way of life? For example, what place do you think it should have in their education?

Alice: Well, I think it's OK if Muslims want to go to an English college. However, I don't think it's necessary for Muslims to know about the background of their family, so I think there's no need for Koran lessons or anything like that. If they have only English education, they'll probably have mostly white English friends.

So you would like Muslims follow English education, and to have white English friends. Is that the same for you, Owen? And what would this mean for the way Muslims in England spend their free time?

Owen: Yeah, it's exactly the same for me. After school, there are many ways to hang out with white English people. For example, there are many English football teams, those are great fun to play in!

❝I would like it if British Muslims have only white English friends.❞

Alice: Also, there are possibilities to stay tuned about everything that's new in the English world, like music, films, the news, all that sort of stuff.

What about typical English and typical Muslim celebrations? Would you like them to celebrate both at home?

Owen: No, at home I'd like them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas. But I don't think it's necessary for them to for example fast during Ramadan, or celebrate Eid, the end of Ramadan. I would understand if English traditions would have an important place in their home. I don't think they need to pray and go to the mosque, but instead they could do typically English things at home, such as watching football on TV. Also, I'd understand if they only eat traditional English food at home, and if they eat pork. How about you?

Alice: I feel the same way. English traditions and habits should be an important part of their upbringing.

So you would like Muslims in England to be brought up with only English customs and traditions, but how do you see them in the future? Would you prefer them to have a Muslim partner or a non-Muslim English partner, and how would you prefer them to bring up their children?

Owen: I would totally understand if they'd prefer to have an English girlfriend or boyfriend. And I'd like them to bring up their children in the same way: I'd like them to get for example English education, and at home I wouldn't mind them growing up as English people, with English traditions.

❝I would like them to celebrate English traditions like Christmas at home, but I don't think it's necessary that they fast during Ramadan.❞

Alice: It's the same for me. Actually, I'm sure that most white English people have the same opinion as we do. Both inside and outside of their homes, we prefer Muslims to live completely as English people.

The BBC thanks Owen and Alice for their cooperation and for a very interesting interview.

Manipulations Study 5

Translated example manipulation Study 5: perceived public integration and private separation

Young Chileans want Mapuche to combine Chilean and Mapuche customs when in public, and maintain the Mapuche culture at home.

A study by the Catholic University of Chile, with a sample of more than 1500 participants, recently revealed that young Chilean people prefer the Mapuche to combine customs and traditions of both Chilean and Mapuche cultures when they are outside of their homes, in a public context. At the same time, Chileans prefer Mapuche to maintain their Mapuche customs and traditions in their own home.

Patrick Muñoz, the principal investigator of the study, says that this opinion is shared by virtually all young people who participated in the study. Although the reasons underlying these preferences are not entirely clear yet, the study provides some evidence about it.

One of the participants of the study, Angélica González (22 years old), says: "I really think it's important that people of Mapuche origin should have the same education as all Chileans, but also combine it with lessons about their own culture, history, language ... It is also important for them to have Chilean and Mapuche friends." This was an issue considered to be important by the vast majority of the participants. Pedro Soto (23 years old), wrote: "I would like Mapuche to have many Chilean and Mapuche friends, to play football together... to hang out together, I don't know... I want them to be more connected. I would like them to freely express their traditions, and also to take on some of the Chilean traditions."

Yet, the young Chileans want the Mapuche to maintain their original culture and customs when they are at home. Angelica: "For example, it is good that the Mapuche are exposed to their own culture in their community and in the privacy of their homes, for example to celebrate Guillatún... I don't know. I do not think that it is really necessary for them to celebrate typical Chilean tradition such as Christmas, eat pies on the eighteenth of September, and so on."

This relates ultimately to the way in which children are raised at home, and relationships between Chileans and Mapuche. Pedro Soto says: "I really think it's fine if a Mapuche person wants a Mapuche partner, and I would like their children to be brought the same way ... to have customs from both cultures, Chilean and Mapuche, when they are outside of their homes, but it is fine if within their homes they raise their children to keep the Mapuche culture."

Acculturation measures Study 6

Please indicate how much you agree with each statement below by ticking the box which matches your opinion.	Disagree strongly		⇔		Agree strongly
	1	2	3	4	5
a. When I eat outside of my home, it doesn't really matter to me whether the food is halal or not	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
b. It is good to work together with non-Muslims	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
c. It is important that schools educate people about Muslim values/traditions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
d. When I am spending free time with friends at my home, I like to invite people who are not Muslim	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
e. I think it is important that Muslim children/students go to school together with non-Muslims	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
f. It is important to me that there is room for Muslim values/traditions in the work place	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
g. When I cook, I prefer to cook halal food	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
h. If I would have children, I would bring them up with Muslim values/traditions	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
i. When I am spending free time outside of my home, I like to invite non-Muslims to join me	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
j. I like to invite people who are not Muslim over for dinner	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
k. I like to celebrate Muslim traditions at home	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
l. I wouldn't mind having a non-Muslim partner	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Interview schedule used for Study 8

As you know, I approached you for this interview because you gave me your email address when you filled out my questionnaire online. I would like to thank you once more for participating in my previous study and for giving me the chance to interview you today.

As you might recall, the questionnaire was focussed on your religion, the English culture, and on relationships with people who are not Muslim. The questionnaire consisted of only multiple choice questions and this interview aims to find out more about your thoughts about these topics.

I will start with a few general questions about your background, and then I will move on to some more specific questions. I will record this interview, to make sure that I do not forget any details of your answers when writing the report. Are you okay with this?

Thank you. Let's start with some questions about your background.

1. What is your age?
2. What is your country of birth?
3. What is your father's country of birth?
4. Is your father Muslim? □ Yes   □ No
5. What is your mother's country of birth?
6. Is your mother Muslim?□ Yes   □ No
7. To start with, I would like to know what your experiences are in terms of acculturation. That is, what are your experiences as a Muslim living in England?
   a. Could you tell me something about particularly good or bad experiences? (try to get one of each)

The general topic of this interview is known in the literature as "acculturation". Acculturation is the process of the choices that minority members, in this case Muslims living in England, can make in terms of maintaining their heritage culture or religion, adopting the English culture, and being in contact with people who are not Muslim.

I will now move on to the more specific questions, which are about your own acculturation experiences. I will start with some questions about maintaining aspects of Islamic culture while you live in England.

8. First of all, I would like to know whether you feel that there is a difference in how much you maintain the Islamic way of life ***inside*** your own home, around your family, compared to and how much you maintain the Islamic way of life when you're ***outside*** your own home, such as at work or in school? *(if asked for clarification: maintaining aspects of Islamic culture, cultural habits, celebrating Islamic traditions, following the rules of their religion)*
   a. (only IF there is a difference) In what way is it different?

9. How much do you maintain the Islamic way of life **inside your own home**, around your family?

10. Do you feel that it was fully your choice to decide for how much you live the Islamic way of life ***inside*** your own home or do you feel that there were other factors or people influencing your choice?

➔ *If **not fully their choice***, then
a. Who or what has influenced your choice (further questions: why/in what way)?
b. How much would you choose to live the Islamic way of life **_inside_** your own home if there were no outside factors/people influencing you? And why?

➔ *If **fully their own choice***, then
c. Why did you choose to maintain the Islamic way of life **_inside_** your home for as much as you do?

11. Now, what about maintaining the Islamic way of life **_outside_** your own home, such as at work or in school. How much do you maintain the Islamic way of life there?

12. And do you feel that you were free to make this choice completely by yourself or do you feel that there were other factors or people influencing your choice?

➔ *If **not fully their choice***, then
a. Who or what has influenced your choice (further questions: why/in what way)?
b. How much would you choose to live the Islamic way of life **_outside_** your own home if there were no outside factors/people influencing you? And why?

➔ *If **fully their own choice***, then
c. Why did you choose to maintain the Islamic way of life **_outside_** your home for as much as you do?

So far, we have only spoken about maintaining the Islamic way of life. I will now be asking you similar questions about adopting the English culture.

13. I would like to start again by asking whether you feel that there is a difference in how much you have adopted English culture and habits **_inside_** your own home, around your family, compared to and how much you have adopted the English way of life when you're **_outside_** your own home, such as at work or in school? *(if asked for clarification: adopting aspects of the English culture, cultural habits, celebrating English traditions)*
    a. (only IF there is a difference) In what way is it different?

14. How much do you feel you have adopted English culture **_inside_** **your own home**, around your family?

15. Do you feel that it was fully your choice to decide for how much you adopted the English culture **_inside_** your own home or do you feel that there were other factors or people influencing your choice?

➔ *If **not fully their choice***, then
a. Who or what has influenced your choice (further questions: why/in what way)?
b. How much would you choose to live the English way of life **_inside_** your own home if there were no outside factors/people influencing you? And why?

➔ *If **fully their own choice***, then

c. Why did you choose to adopt the English culture ***inside*** your home for as much as you do?

16. Now, moving on to your experiences ***outside*** your own home, such as at work or in school. How much do you feel you have adopted the English way of life there?

17. And do you feel that you were free to make this choice completely by yourself or do you feel that there were other factors or people influencing your choice?

➔ ***If not fully their choice***, then
a. Who or what has influenced your choice (further questions: why/in what way)?
b. How much would you choose to adopt the English way of life ***outside*** your own home if there were no outside factors/people influencing you? And why?

➔ ***If fully their own choice***, then
c. Why did you choose to live the English way of life ***outside*** your home for as much as you do?

We will now move on to the last part of acculturation, which is about the contact you have with people in England who are not Muslim, and the relationships you have with them.

18. I would like to start again by asking whether you feel that there is a difference in how much contact you have with non-Muslims ***inside*** your own home, around your family, compared to and how much contact you have when you're ***outside*** your own home, such as at work or in school?
    (if asked for clarification: spending time with people who are not Muslim, having non-Muslims friends)
    a. (only IF there is a difference) In what way is it different?

19. How much do you spend with non-Muslim friends ***inside*** **your own home**, around your family?

20. Do you feel that it was fully your choice to decide how much time you spend with non-Muslims ***inside*** your own home or do you feel that there were other factors or people influencing your choice?

➔ ***If not fully their choice***, then
    a. Who or what has influenced your choice (further questions: why/in what way)?
    b. How much time would you like to spend with non-Muslim friends ***inside*** your own home if there were no outside factors/people influencing you? And why?

➔ ***If fully their own choice***, then
    c. Why did you choose to spend this amount of time with them ***inside*** your home?

21. Now, again moving on to your experiences ***outside*** your own home, such as at work or in school. How much time do you spend with friends who are not Muslim ***outside*** your own home?

22. And do you feel that you were free to make this choice completely by yourself or do you feel that there were other factors or people influencing your choice?

➜ *If not fully their choice*, then
   a. Who or what has influenced your choice (further questions: why/in what way)?
   b. How much time would you like to spend with non-Muslim friends ***outside*** your own home if there were no outside factors/people influencing you? And why?

➜ *If fully their own choice*, then
   c. Why did you choose to live spend this amount of time with them ***outside*** your home?

These were all the questions I had for you. Thank you very much for participating in this interview, I really appreciate. Do you have any questions or comments for me at all?