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**POLITICAL ACTION IN A CAMPAIGNING DEVELOPMENT
NGO THROUGH A SOCIAL MOVEMENT LENS – THE CASE
OF ACTIONAID’S TAX JUSTICE CAMPAIGN IN NIGERIA
AND THE UK**

THESIS SUBMITTED FOR THE DEGREE OF DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

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BRIGHTON**

JULY 2016

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been, and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature _____

University of Sussex
DPhil (Development Studies)

**POLITICAL ACTION IN A CAMPAIGNING DEVELOPMENT NGO THROUGH A
SOCIAL MOVEMENT LENS – THE CASE OF ACTIONAID’S TAX JUSTICE
CAMPAIGN IN NIGERIA AND THE UK**

Summary

Campaigning has become an important area of work for development NGOs (NGDOs). How political, in terms of public mobilising to confront authority, has it become? What frameworks can we best use to study this? Based on precedents such as della Porta and Diani’s suggestion (2006) that social movement (SM) theory can be enlarged as a theory of collective action, I borrow six SM concepts – *frames*, *repertoires*, *networks*, *mobilising structures*, *identity* and *political opportunities-threats*. I then combine them with NGDO campaigning literature themes to explore those questions in a case study of ActionAid’s *Tax Justice Campaign* (TJC) in Nigeria and the UK.

ActionAid’s TJC operates through two campaign formats – a single-issue format with one international claim and a multiple-issue format with claims specific to each level. Both formats exist in tension for campaign resources, yet combine to expose international and domestic causes of poverty in low-income countries. This example illustrates ActionAid’s campaigning style: walking a tightrope to balance tensions and opportunities in its idea of ‘campaigning’. This style also includes embracing moderate and radical supporter views on poverty and a structure of sponsorship and service-delivery programmes with campaigning accompanying them. For example, financial supporters mobilise towards confronting authorities alongside direct campaigner recruitment. Other NGDOs share this, with other ActionAid campaign features, which together shapes an understanding towards the idea of NGDO political action.

I suggest that my findings contribute to both NGDO campaigning and SM theory. To NGDO campaign actors, SM theory provides a new vocabulary to study NGDO campaigning, particularly little explored dimensions in NGDO campaign literature such as state/authority confrontation and political identity. To SM theory, my findings offer an empirical contribution which helps position campaigning NGDOs as another type of contentious actor. At a practice level, ActionAid’s multiple-issue campaigning may help prevent local tokenism in international campaigns.

Key words: campaigning development NGO, social movement theory, frames, repertoires, networks, mobilising structures, identity, political opportunities-threats, Tax Justice Campaign, ActionAid, ActionAid Nigeria, ActionAid UK.

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In 1960, in a Spanish village called Cocentaina, my grandparents took out an insurance policy for their first car with the 'Mutua Madrileña' [Madrid friendly society]. My parents remained members and it is partly due to the length of that membership that the society granted me a two-year bursary for this PhD. So my first thanks go to my family lineage, their cars and the *Mutua*. I think, therefore, that I can rightly say that 1960 is the year when this thesis started.

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I dedicate this thesis to my mother, popularly known as 'la Mixu', the greatest local food smuggler you will ever find in the Cocentaina-to-Valencia Mediterranean region. She will say the contrary, as is usual practice between us both, but I would have found it very difficult to finish this thesis in time without her. I have no words of appreciation for her nor for the canine intellectual contribution provided by Cuqui, Lluna and Tato.

In 2015, two cancers took Vicente Cuesta and Paqui Llinares away. We miss them deeply and this thesis is to their memory.

Kas Sempere,
Camberwell, London,
July 2016

"If I were not African, I wonder whether I would realize that while African nations have a failure of leadership, they also have dynamic people with agency and voices" **Chimamanda Adichie, Nigerian writer**

"They sent me links and postcards, and I passed it on, like that Barclays thing, make sure you pay your taxes... I just started. I've never done the street, but I wouldn't mind" **AAUK sponsor, interview, 2013**

"A key challenge is... the need to connect research perspectives from both 'industrialized' and 'developing country' contexts to challenge the parallel-worlds problem and to engage more fully with the... international dimensions of non-governmental action" **David Lewis, UK academic**

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List of acronyms

ActionAid: ActionAid International Federation

AAIS: ActionAid International Secretariat

AAN: ActionAid Nigeria

AAUK: ActionAid UK

AU: African Union

BIR-Onodo: Ondo State Board of Internal Revenue

ECM: Extended Case Method

FAO: United Nations Food and Agriculture Organisation

FIRS: Nigeria's Federal Inland Revenue Service

IDS: Institute of Development Studies

IMF: International Monetary Fund

JDPC: Justice Development and Peace Centre

MSF: Médecins Sans Frontières

NGDO: Development NGO

OECD: Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

PA&R: Policy, Advocacy and Research

SAPs: Structural Adjustment Programmes

SM: Social Movement

TJC: Tax Justice Campaign

UN: United Nations

UNDP: United Nations Development Programme

UNECA: United Nations Economic Commission for Africa

WDM: World Development Movement

WSF: World Social Forum

WTO: World Trade Organisation

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Chapter 1 – Introduction: campaigning, a development NGO angle

In 2013, the development NGO ActionAid UK published a report about how Barclays bank promoted tax havens. Tax havens are jurisdictions used by multinationals to reduce the tax paid in the countries where they work (Provost, 2013). The OECD estimates that low-income countries lose more funds to tax havens than the amount they receive in aid each year while ActionAid found that almost half of all investment into these countries arrives through tax havens (ActionAid, 2015a). This is not only relevant for the annual multi-million dollar loss of financial resources for low-income countries but also for the qualitative fact that this offshore system has long existed as the conventional way of operating businesses (Palan, 2009).

Far away from London in Akure, the capital of Ondo State in Nigeria, market seller Amaka does not hear about the headline news published on investment. Hence, reports about Barclays or tax havens mean little to her. She does not have a bank account and rarely enjoys the good fortune afforded by the custom of saving. In the local market where she sells, it is tax harassment and corruption, an unequal tax collection system, and the recurring official and non-official tax payments placed on her goods that worry her most in the struggle to make ends meet. In 2013, ActionAid's partner association JDPC published a video unpacking Akure's unequal tax system.

Back in Nigeria's capital Abuja, the tax inequality manifests itself in a repeating pattern. ActionAid research suggests that the country has lost out on US\$3.3billion due to a ten-year tax break granted by the Nigerian government to three of the world's largest oil and gas companies: Shell, Total and ENI (ActionAid, 2016a). In 2013, ActionAid Nigeria's campaign manager had further complained that: *'to track what corporate bodies are doing, the first thing is to look at the annual report, how much profits they made and tax they paid. But [when] you get to the Corporate Affairs Commission in the registers of the companies in Nigeria supposed to have those documents... there is nothing. Either the files are missing or the docs are not there. Sometimes they have never been filed. Sometimes someone has removed them'*.

Protest and campaigning have come to represent an important area of work for development NGOs (NGDOs) with specialised strategies, departments and staff. At the same time, I felt it was undervalued in both the social movement and development research circles in which I was active. With regard to the former, most of the literature sees NGDOs as complacent charities, or as clumsy activists at their best; and in the latter, protest and campaigning did not appear as theorised as lobbying and advocacy.

Consider this first situation. It is October 2012. It is my second and last day at the 'Social Protest Conference' at the University of Kent in Canterbury (UK)¹. At the reception area I talk to a Spanish researcher studying the *Indignados* and squatter movements in Madrid. He asks me how I theorise activism. I tell him that I am looking at how NGDOs campaign. He mumbles 'NGOs' and makes a gesture of incredulity. 'Perhaps you are an anti-NGO person?' I burst out in complaint. In response, he objects by telling me that NGOs are not exactly the most radical actors. The conversation moves elsewhere.

That Sunday evening, during an idle moment on the train back to Brighton, I thought of the protest actors mentioned during the conference. Social movements were by far the most popular. Political parties, environmental NGOs and trade unions were covered once each in different panels. An Italian feminist researcher examined activism in personal spaces, in bed, or at home. The private sector, public policies and NGDOs were out of the picture. They were as 'out of the picture' as much as I was amongst the non-development disciplines in that conference. Yet, I reflected, why should I be 'outside'? Could I not contribute by exploring the overlap between social protest and NGDO protest on poverty? How could I defend the role of NGDOs within the radar of social protest theory?

Now, consider this second situation. It is May 2016. The UK *Development Studies Association* is organising a conference on 'Politics in Development' at the University of Oxford (UK). There is a panel on NGOs, politics and power² and none of the ten papers selected considers the study of NGDO campaigning as political. This is too little credit, I tell myself, for a phenomenon that has previously obtained a far from negligible impact on state behaviour (see the Jubilee 2000 case

¹ <https://taispcconference.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/conferenceprogramprint.pdf>

² www.nomadit.co.uk/dsa/dsa2016/panels.php5?PanelID=4592

below for instance). Campaigning is also a common means that NGOs have available in order to contend with states through claims, actions and by mobilising public support.

In 2012 during my 1st PhD year, a visiting PhD colleague had told me about contentious politics and social movement theory and how she was applying ‘master frames’ upon a Chilean movement. I knew nothing about ‘contention’ or ‘frames’ at that time but I was interested in theory that would help me understand the ways in which NGOs create contentious relationships with states and other decision-making opponents. Empowerment, citizen voice, advocacy theories – they did not quite work in aiding an understanding of this protest and campaigning. The rallying in the streets with claims on the government, the protest stunts in corporate general assemblies, the political identification with fighting poverty - how, I asked, could these best be read?

With these two motivations in mind, this PhD explores the nature of protesting and mobilising in an international campaigning NGO. I draw on social movement theory and, together with NGO notions, build on it as a theory of political collective action able to read diverse political actors. Taking the case of ActionAid’s *Tax Justice Campaign* in Nigeria and the UK, I ask the question: ‘how does political action happen in a campaigning NGO when seen through a social movement lens?’ This chapter has four sections – a research overview, a contextualisation of campaigning in Nigeria and the UK, a presentation of ActionAid, and a thesis outline.

1.1. Research overview

This section presents the research process and covers five areas: the research theme and founding concepts; the literature review, research question and conceptual framework; the methodology and case study selection; the research conclusions and anticipated contributions to knowledge; and, finally, I consider my personal links to the research including my interests, limitations and motivations.

1.1.1. Research theme and founding concepts

The key concepts of this thesis are ‘contentious collective action’, ‘campaigning’, ‘development NGOs’ and ‘ActionAid’. ‘Collective action’ involves individuals sharing resources towards a common goal (della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.19). Collective action becomes ‘contentious’ (I will use the term ‘political’) when it is *‘used by people who lack regular access to representative institutions, who act in the name of new or unaccepted claims, and who behave in ways that fundamentally challenge others or authorities’* (Tarrow, 2011: p.7). Contentious or political collective action (hereafter shortened to ‘political action’) differs from market relations, lobbying, or representative politics because it mobilises³ ordinary people into confrontation⁴ with opponents, elites, or authorities (ibid: p.8; also see della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.22-3).

Social movement analysis, which was initially applied to social movements, has gradually broadened to relate to neighbouring areas of research, such as the study of unions, voluntary action and nationalism (Diani and Bison, 2004: p.281-2). In that sense, talking about collective action at large, rather than social movements, makes *‘more – or at least as much – sense’* (della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.19; also see Tarrow, 2011: ch.9). Campaigning is one manifestation of political action (or contentious collective action) as described above. By studying it, one can see how a process involving public mobilisation and confrontation vis-à-vis the authorities unfolds.

Originally a military term (Gilmore, 2010: 2), ‘campaigning’ is now common in the media, market, electoral and political arenas. In this thesis, I understand a campaign, in a political sense, as a *‘sustained, organized public effort making collective claims on targeted authorities’* (Tilly and Tarrow in Tarrow, 2011: p.191). Unlike movements, campaigns imply purposeful mobilising for a concrete issue and, at least initially, have a clear timeframe (Alcalde, 2010). Campaigns may comprise public awareness, mass-mobilisation and protest actions and other elements like media pressure, research reports and lobbying. Campaigns have been undertaken by local groups (e.g. neighbours), social movements, trade unions, political parties, NGOs and campaigning organisations⁵. Born in the mid-20th-c, *development NGOs* have campaigned on poverty-related issues.

³ I understand ‘mobilisation’ as the process of activating others that are not yet campaigning.

⁴ NGDO lobbying and advocacy to governments without mobilisation could be understood as ‘political action’. Yet, for the purpose of this thesis, I narrow down the term as involving mobilisation and confrontation.

⁵ See http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/advanced_search for a historical database

‘Development NGOs’ (hereafter NGDOs) are international⁶ NGOs⁷ working to eradicate poverty and operating at least partly within the aid sector (Eyben, 2006; Lewis and Kanji, 2009: 8; Tvedt, 2006). Many large NGDOs were born during the Second World War to respond to European war-related poverty with the provision of supplies and services. These later shifted geographically to tackle poverty in low-income countries (see section 2.1.1). While NGDOs originated to deliver services, this distinction has now been blurred after the gradual integration of lobbying⁸, advocacy⁹ and campaigning into NGDOs’ work since the 1990s (ibid). I suggest using the term ‘campaigning NGDOs’ for those NGDOs doing public mobilisation and protest in their campaigns in addition to service-delivery, lobbying and advocacy. I distinguish them from ‘born-campaigning organisations’ (hereafter campaigning organisations) who were born campaigning and whose main approach towards achieving their mission is to campaign. Their budgets reflect this focus on campaigning, with other secondary activities such as research and fundraising feeding campaigning (see section 2.1). Thus, political parties would be excluded from this definition (see Diani and Donati, 1999, p.14, 30 for a categorisation of what they call ‘non-partisan’ political organisations mobilising on behalf of collective or public interests).

The potential for the influence of NGDO campaigning is not trivial. As part of the Jubilee 2000 campaign, a petition calling on the ‘3rd-world’ debt cancellation was recorded by the *Guinness Book of Records* as both the world’s biggest petition - with over 24 million signatures - and the one with the greatest number of countries (166) involved (Goldman, 2008). With substantial NGDO involvement, the initiative helped push for a partial debt cancellation of \$100 billion (Pettifor, 2013). The financial and geographic strength of NGDOs can also have impact on its campaigning. Financially, the world’s biggest NGDO, *World Vision*, had an annual budget of US\$2.8 billion in 2011, larger than the budget of all UN agencies combined excluding the *World Food Programme* (Morton, 2013: p.333). Geographically, *Save the Children*, *World Vision* and

⁶ See the Union of International Associations www.uia.org/yearbook for a definition of ‘international’ in FAQ > INGO. Smith et al. (1994: p.124) also add that they must focus on international politics.

⁷ ‘NGOs’ cover a wide spectrum of tax-exempt, non-profit organisations pursuing public benefits such as education, environment, animal care and local development, outside state and profit-led contexts. For a review on NGO definitions see Lewis and Kanji (2009: ch.1).

⁸ I understand lobbying as face-to-face advocacy, and advocacy as negotiation and representation political tactics.

⁹ While most NGDO literature takes ‘campaigning’ as one tactic within an ‘advocacy’ strategy besides lobbying, research, media work, etc., I have preferred to read ‘campaigning’ as the overall concept. ‘Advocacy’ does not imply protest or mobilisation to me in the way that ‘campaigning’ does but, rather, implies negotiation and representation. In contrast, I see a ‘campaign’ as generally mixing advocacy and disruptive tactics. The two notions were also strategised and incorporated at different moments in ActionAid – with policy advocacy in the 1990s and campaigning in the 2000s (see section 1.3). Ultimately, it mostly seems to me a matter of defining one’s perspective.

Oxfam operationally reached 120, 98 and 90 countries, again larger than many OECD official bilateral donors (ibid: p.326-7).

The case study for this thesis, *ActionAid International* (hereafter ActionAid) was founded in 1972 as a UK child sponsorship organisation (see section 1.3). ActionAid was amongst the world's largest NGOs by revenue in 2011, with US\$314 million income and 2,328 staff working in 45 countries (Morton, 2013: p.346-7). This NGO is also considered one of the five largest and most influential UK NGOs (Yanacopulos, 2016: p.13-7). Today, ActionAid has become a federation of organisations registered in different countries. These work on a large range of issues that change over time, and in some cases quite rapidly. When I mention 'ActionAid', I do so to mean the NGO as operating in the two ActionAid offices I studied, *ActionAid Nigeria* (hereafter AAN) and *ActionAid UK* (hereafter AAUK), which were both working on a particular tax justice campaign, at a particular moment in its evolution, 2013-14¹⁰.

1.1.2. Literature review, research question and conceptual framework

At first sight, it may not sound intuitive to apply social movement theory (hereafter SM theory) to an NGO, given the latter's differences with social movements as objects of analysis. Yet, literature exists setting out the position that campaigning NGOs and other contentious actors share similarities to movements and can therefore be analysed through SM theory (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Likewise, empirical studies examining NGOs exist that use SM theory and these would sustain this application as part of broader comparative studies that involve other NGOs and campaigning organisations (Kriesi, 1996; Smith et al., 1994) or larger campaign coalitions (Alcalde, 2010; Alonso, 2009; Gaventa and Mayo, 2009). Still others have focused on NGO/NGO frames and/or repertoires in transnational advocacy networks and campaign coalitions (Alcalde, 2010; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999; Stroup and Murdie, 2012), UN Conferences and World Social Forums (Clark et al., 1998; Pianta, 2001; Pianta et al., 2004) and Western European and US movements and organisations (Barakso, 2010; Diani and Donati, 1999; Kriesi, 1996).

¹⁰ I thank ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner for raising this point during the chapter feedback (2016).

My research question asks how political action takes place in a campaigning NGDO when seen through a social movement lens. At this point, the reader may question the benefit of using SM theory for NGDOs. I suggest that asking and answering this question through this lens provides a conceptual framework to read political relationships between campaigning NGDOs and states. Campaigning works as a platform upon which NGDOs make claims, perform actions, mobilise people, define identities and foresee political openings vis-a-vis states and other opponents. More concretely, a SM lens involves studying mobilising and confrontational aspects in ways that are new to NGDO theory, for instance, by paying attention to mobilising strategies and structures for campaigning *and* to disruptive repertoires like street actions (see section 2.3).

I have selected six SM concepts that provide insight into the campaign logics of an NGDO and the contentious context in which it is trying to have influence. This is based on the relational approach to the dynamics of contention presented in Tarrow (2011: p.183-4). Previous research on NGDOs have also made use of these SM concepts (see section 2.2.2). In the thesis, I have organised them in three parts – *performing*, *organising* and *envisioning* campaigning, which are now discussed.

I see ‘performing’ as the most public contending face of the NGDO, which includes ‘frames’ or ‘*action-oriented sets of beliefs and meanings that inspire and legitimate the activities and campaigns*’ (Benford and Snow, 2000: p.614; also see Snow et al., 1986; Snow, 2013b) and ‘repertoires of action/contention’ or the set of protest actions that a group can use to make claims, like a demonstration or a strike (Tarrow, 2011; Tilly, 1977, 1986, 1993, 2006; Tilly and Wood, 2012). Both frames and repertoires represent demands made upon states and other opponents who may in turn respond with their own frames and counter-repertoires. Chapter 4 narrates how different governmental and corporate bodies responded to the campaign.

Under ‘organising’, I include the networking and mobilising structures needed in order to contend. At the base, ‘networks’ are the sets of nodes linking individuals and/or organisations (della Porta and Diani, 2006: ch.5; Diani and McAdam, 2003; Diani, 2013) including supporters, coalitions and other collaborators of ActionAid. In this case study, ActionAid acts as the main ‘mobilising structure’ understood as the ‘*collective vehicles, formal as well as informal, through which people mobilize and engage in collective action*’ (McAdam et al., 1996: p.3; also see Davis et al., 2005; McCarthy, 2013; McCarthy and Zald, 1973, 1977; Zald and Ash, 1966). Chapter 5

shows how the NGDO organises and networks with others so as to carry out its public campaign, including sometimes with states and private sector allies.

Under 'envisioning', I look at the positioning that the NGDOs sets itself to occupy within its relationships and context. Here, I cover the study of identity and political opportunities and threats. 'Identity' (Melucci, 1996; Touraine, 1981; Van Stekelenburg, 2013) refers to the process by which collective actors recognise themselves (and are recognised by others) as a group as well as 'fabricating' opponents and audiences (della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.91, 94). Emotional attachments develop in the process. Collective actors build and rebuild that identity through shared feelings of belonging and solidarity, which can be manifest through slogans, symbols, practices, motivations and behaviours. In turn, 'political opportunities' are *'consistent –but not necessarily formal, permanent or national– sets of clues that encourage people to engage in contentious politics'* (Tarrow, 2011: p.32; also see della Porta, 2013; Eisinger, 1973; Kriesi, 1989; McAdam, 1982; McCarthy, 2013; Tarrow, 1989; Tilly, 1978) while 'threats' are contextual factors discouraging political action (Van Dyke, 2013). Chapter 6 looks at ActionAid's envisioning, in particular vis-a-vis states and official donors.

These concepts work together to understand how ActionAid campaigns, contends against the state and other opponents and links its campaigning to the political, economic and social context in which it is trying to have influence. There would be no coherent performativity of public campaigning without the organising and envisioning needed behind it – and no sense in organising and envisioning if it was not to campaign and influence in relation to the claims made.

At the same time, the fact that the case study focusses on a campaigning NGDO requires SM concepts to be accommodated to the particularities of the collective actor. NGDO literature is useful in orientating towards these and in blending with SM theory to shape the conceptual framework. An example here is the need to include non-campaigning parts of the NGDO in order to explore how they affect campaigning. Another example is the aid/development influence, such as the fact that donors may play a role in influencing NGDO campaigning that is equally as important as that undertaken by states (see sections 2.1, 2.3.2 and 2.4).

On a final note, this review does not cover literature on taxation and development or on taxation and activism. Rather, tax issues appear as empirical data to understand NGDO politics, not as part of the literature review or the theoretical framework.

1.1.3. Methodology and case study selection

My ontological and epistemological line is a mix of critical theory, constructivism and participatory paradigms (Bradbury and Reason, 2001; Lincoln and Guba, 2000). I believe that reality is constructed through relationships of power and that these relations are changeable, including change brought about through research. I thus take contending agents as the primary point of analysis and include structures, context and history as seen – and changed – by agents (see section 3.1.1).

In my methodological approach, I have chosen the ‘extended case method’ (Burawoy, 1998) for its emphasis on analysing power in a case study (see section 3.1.2). This method starts from people’s thoughts and experiences, as in the classical case study method, while including historical and comparative angles. To the case study, I have aimed to add some elements of collaborative research with the researched (see section 3.3). With this mixture, I seek to work with a case study approach mindful of power analysis and participatory elements in line with the ontology and epistemology I am working from. I believe that SM theory aligns with the epistemology and methodology as it takes contending agents in interaction as the primary point of analysis without ignoring context and structures as seen by activists (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011; Jasper, 2004, 2006; McAdam et al., 2001).

I have selected ActionAid as an extreme case of both potential strong protest and strong public mobilisation in the NGDO field (see section 3.2.2 for a justification). To explore this, I looked at ActionAid’s *Tax Justice Campaign* (hereafter the TJC)¹¹ in Nigeria and the UK. I chose the TJC for practical reasons as it was the first international campaign that ActionAid launched of the three that were planned by the federation’s strategy (2012-2017). Nigeria and the UK were selected as fieldwork countries for context comparability. After exploratory visits, the *Justice*

¹¹ The campaign was renamed ‘Tax Power’ by ActionAid when it turned federal after initial AAUK TJC work. AAN and AAUK currently use ‘TJC’. To simplify, I will use ‘TJC’ for all the actors. See www.actionaid.org/tax-power

Development and Peace Centre (hereafter JDPC) was the most advanced Nigerian partner regarding local tax work. Fieldwork took place in three sites, Abuja, Akure and London, between January 2013 and December 2014 (see section 3.2.2).

Data was collected through qualitative methods (see section 3.2.3 and appendix 1), which included participant observation, interviews (47), group discussions (6), informal conversations, review of historical archives and internal reports, online follow-up with interviewees and small comparative cases of other campaigning NGOs and organisations. Small cases consisted of a documentation review complemented with internal reports, observation and/or one key informant interview. I also drew on an internal survey about campaigning developed by ActionAid (Gilmore, 2011).

Informants were selected to be representative of groups internal and external to the campaign – ActionAid International Secretariat, AAN, AAUK, JDPC and other AAN partners, UK campaigners, *Activistas* (youth campaigners supporting ActionAid), staff from other NGOs, state actors and academia. A historical perspective was added to the case study through a review of archives, old reports and interviews on the country history. This helped locate current data and cover background and contextual gaps. For qualitative analysis, I used the free software *Sonal* (see section 3.2.4).

On the ethical approach (see section 3.3), I asked for consent to collect, record and use data and ensured confidentiality of those researched in data collection and analysis. Besides that, I aimed to apply the meaning of ‘ethical’ within all the research stages, i.e. by being cooperative and transparent – this ranged from trying out some short collaborative research with youth campaigners in Ondo State to sharing results with ActionAid and partner staff and integrating their feedback in the chapters. I also reflected on my role as a researcher, or positionality, and on the practical relevance of PhD results, namely on ways of further developing multiple-issue campaigns and local tax mobilising. In this respect, I designed a toolkit for ActionAid’s TJC to work at the local level in collaboration with ActionAid and partner staff (ActionAid, 2015b).

The hardest fieldwork challenge was accessing organisational data. Other challenges included difficulties in aligning fieldwork timing with the campaign’s own timeline and studying the

campaign ‘as it happens’, and doing ‘ethnography’ in two countries, three locations and three organisations – AAN, AAUK and JDPC (see section 3.4).

1.1.4. Research conclusions and contributions

The thesis has tested out a framework of SM and NGDO campaign theory on an NGDO to explore the elements that enable it to undertake political action through campaigning. A first set of findings relate to ActionAid’s ways of campaigning; a second set consider the similarities between campaigning NGDOs, and a third set look at the role of SM theory in understanding NGDO campaigning. Overall, I conclude that NGDO campaigning is a political action process which can be usefully analysed using SM and NGDO theory.

A first finding shows that ActionAid operates its TJC through two campaign formats. First, there is a ‘single-issue’ format, led by AAUK, that focused on one international claim at all campaign levels. Second, there is a multiple-issue format that emerged as the federal campaign developed with various claims original to each level (see Chapter 4). When analysed from a resource perspective, it is observed that both formats live in tension with each other as they have to share limited financial and staff campaign resources. Yet, the two formats also complement each other as they act to draw attention to different international and domestic causes of poverty in low-income countries. This is done by offering different mobilising structures to activists. In other words, the co-existence of two campaign formats means that ActionAid has different ways of contending with states and other opponents – what I have called ‘vertical and horizontal activism’.

This co-existence is also an example of a typical feature in ActionAid’s campaigning – a tightrope walking style that balances ‘tense opportunities’ not only in the different ways of understanding campaigning itself within the organisation, as seen with the two campaign formats above, but also by means of an identity that embraces moderate and radical views from supporters seeking to combat poverty. In this sense, while non-campaign elements, such as sponsorship and service-delivery programmes, sometimes restrict campaigning, nevertheless ActionAid also seeks to use these facets for the benefit of campaigning and, indeed, these elements have proved to contribute to new campaign skills and processes. For instance, unconventional ways

of mobilising unusual activists or people who do not often campaign, such as sponsors and programme participants, can develop from this configuration and these methods are concurrent with direct forms of recruiting campaigners. Also, there has been a development of a series of *campaign* images alongside more popular sponsorship images (see Chapters 5 and 6).

A second finding relates to ActionAid similarities with other campaigning NGOs reviewed. For instance, other NGOs share ActionAid's 'hybrid based campaigning' style, which is based on structures in which sponsorship and programme departments co-exist with campaigning. They also share militant discourses, action repertoires, networking formats and political identities based on beliefs about poverty in low-income-countries, and this is what shapes their political action vis-à-vis states and other opponents. Other campaign particularities shared include gradual processes of tailoring resources to campaigning such as funding and staff; a predominant but changing campaign 'developmental' identity that integrates nuances like environmental, human rights and UK poverty themes; and the influence of specific opportunities and threats originating in the aid sector that create particular campaign responses (see Chapter 7). Seen from a SM theory lens, I suggest that these common features position campaigning NGOs as another type of contentious actor.

Finally, I suggest that SM theory provides a double understanding of NGO campaigning, like a bifocal lenses. First, the use of single SM concepts can aid an understanding of discrete aspects within public mobilisation, confrontation and identity, which have until now been only moderately explored, I suggest, in NGO campaigning literature. Second, making connections between SM concepts in relationships of confluence, mutual influence or causation contributes to an understanding of an aspect and/or a more overall picture of NGO campaigning (see Chapter 7). Overall, it could be concluded that campaigning is a type of political process that can be understood by the combination of the different SM and NGO concepts.

In terms of research contributions, I suggest that my findings contribute to both SM theory and NGO campaigning (see Chapter 8). To SM theory, they offer an empirical contribution which helps position campaigning NGOs as an additional type of contentious actor. This empirical contribution may particularly interest social protest academics. To NGO campaign actors, my findings offer a new vocabulary to explore the campaign areas which, I suggest, have been little explored in NGO campaign literature, such as confrontation and identity, and to a lesser extent,

public mobilisation. This theoretical contribution may mostly interest NGDO researchers, practitioners and donors concerned with political action. This contribution can also serve NGOs to plan campaigns and to show campaign impact, for instance, in terms of what campaign frames best mobilise certain groups and force responses from certain state and corporate targets.

Finally, a practical implication for NGOs is ActionAid's development of multiple-issue campaigning, which may help prevent local tokenism in international campaigns. Some staff and Activistas suggested that a campaign that was only about international tax issues (tax avoidance) and which did not also include campaigning on local tax concerns made them feel that AAN and AAUK could be using supporters instrumentally. They said that this could lead to demobilisation (see section 5.1.1). Both single- and multiple issue formats include the participation of local people and protest targeted at states, yet only the multiple-issue format includes local people's *own* claims. While ActionAid already makes a substantive use of this multiple-issue format, more resources and incentives could be invested towards the development of this type of campaigning (see Chapter 8). The 'kite tool' (see Appendix 2) and the 'tax reflection-action toolkit'¹², developed in the process of researching this thesis, are suggested as practical tools to help plan multiple-issue campaigns afresh as well as from either single-issue international themes or locally-emerging themes.

1.1.5. About myself, interests, limitations and motivations

I was 17 when I first heard the acronym 'NGDO,' when my aunt Lola encouraged me to do some volunteering for *Doctors of the World* in my home city of Valencia, Spain. My first activity was an exhibition to denounce the situation of Afghan women's rights. It is this protest aspect that interested me – one that would expose structural causes of poverty and discrimination and that would claim the responsibility of specific individuals, groups and governments for the situation. As time passed by, I felt a growing interest in international issues. During my sociology degree, I remember choosing themes such as the negative social impact of international debt and the phenomenon of 'femicides'¹³ in Mexico for my essays. A few years later, I studied a masters

¹² www.actionaid.org/publications/tax-power-campaign-reflection-action-toolkit

¹³ www.unwomen.org/en/news/stories/2013/4/femicide-in-latin-america

degree in development and did some more volunteering abroad with NGOs in Angola and Burundi, with a national NGO funded by international donors and an international NGO.

My first contact with ActionAid was in 2009 through the international education team. I moved to South Africa to work with one of its national partners. In 2010, I started working as a development consultant, mostly for international NGOs – a job I still maintain including for ActionAid (see section 3.3.1, for a reflection on my positionality). Both positions as a staff member in a partner association and as a consultant gave me increasing insight into the ways of working in international NGOs, although from an outside perspective. This later helped me navigate ActionAid during my PhD, notably for contacts. However, undertaking the PhD research as a student (not as an AAN/AAUK staff member or consultant) was challenging in terms of both access issues and inside perspectives.

My MA specialisation was on development, not on social protest and SM theory. I am thus relatively new to the theoretical framework I am using for the PhD. Likewise, I did not know in detail what NGO ‘campaigning’ consisted of until I met the ActionAid campaign teams in Nigeria and the UK during my PhD fieldwork. My NGO experience was on local development and the only ‘advocacy and protest’ experience I had at that time was from student union work and other movements and from an internship with the *European Women’s Lobby* in Brussels. These experiences were different to campaigning in a large NGO, which was more directed than informal activism and more confrontational than NGO corridor lobbying. While I first conceived my lack of previous campaigning experience as a limitation, I began to feel that knowing other ways of being activist perhaps helped me be sympathetic to theories able to cover and explain the different ways of being an activist, in both movements and organisations, and enacted through negotiation and through protest.

My practical motivation for this research was to learn about international campaigns that mobilised and connected local and international levels. Having worked in local associations, I knew that many challenges stemmed from beyond the local, yet conversely many international campaigns often proved useless for us at local level. I wanted to see what ActionAid campaigning could offer. In this doctoral research, I had the chance to see how a multiple-issued format of international campaigning, with different claims at different levels, operated in practice.

My academic motivation is to stimulate dialogue between the disciplines of development studies and social protest. Development studies add a more ethnographic insight into local realities with an emphasis on studying the effects of any decision on the poorest that, in my opinion, is found less in other disciplines like international relations, sociology or political science. Development studies can contribute new insights to the latter, for instance, with research perspectives beyond the European/US contexts and anti-poverty political identities and struggles. In turn, social protest can give development politics more theoretical solidity and offer development studies more contentious readings.

1.2. Nigeria and the UK – the campaigning contexts

Nigeria and the UK have very different socio-political contexts, which influence the topics of activism and the capacity of activists to undertake campaigning.

In Nigeria, the first political parties were formed under British colonial rule between 1922 and 1951 (Ichoku, 2010). Since independence from the UK in 1960, Nigeria has been ruled by military groups except for the 1960-66 and 1979-83 periods. Democracy was regained for the third time through a transfer of power from the military to an elected government in 1999 (Mustapha, 1999). This arrived after Abacha's regime from 1993-98 in what has been considered the most repressive period in Nigeria's history with the detention, torture and/or murder of numerous pro-democracy activists (Ogbondah, 2000). International recognition of electoral fairness only arrived in 2011 (Nossiter, 2011).

Campaigning themes mirrored these political events. Until 1999, the priority was to end the dictatorship under the banner of the pro-democracy movement (AAN senior staff and NRG Institute/ThinkAct researchers, interviews, 2013-14). When formal democracy arrived, the activist energy moved towards constitutional and electoral reforms to deepen a 'democracy without democrats' (Aremu, 2016), including the battle for the right to an information law (AAN's ex-country director, interview, 2013).

Political passivity and activism have also been generated by a series of economic crises (Garuba, 2006) emphasises the role of structural adjustment programmes and of the 'post-adjustment

phase' on the impoverishment of rural dwellers. These, the author sustains, have responded with survival and coping strategies rather than activism. Conversely, economic activism has been particularly strong in the oil-rich Niger Delta region against the long-lasting abuses of oil companies like Shell and the complicity of Nigerian authorities (Osaghae, 2008). Oil-related activism has been a constant in the country, from environmental and livelihood issues to the lack of governmental accountability on oil revenues (Aremu, 2012; Okeyim and Bassey-Ejue, 2012). A Nigerian senior researcher dated 2007 as the moment when corruption started to gain strength as a rallying point and electoral issue with multiple public debates held around the political cost of state and corporate oil-related corruption (ThinkAct researcher, interview, 2014). The climax of oil-based activism was epitomised in the 'Occupy Nigeria' uprisings in 2012, where locals complained about fuel price rises and the removal of fuel subsidies (Habba, 2012; Okeyim and Bassey-Ejue, 2012). State repression, political opportunism in movements and associations and the role of religion characterised the *Occupy* movement (Aremu, 2016).

The 'June 12' pro-democracy movement in the 1990s and the recent Occupy Nigeria uprisings have been the largest movements in Nigeria to date (Aremu, 2016). The recent 'Bring Back our Girls' campaign in 2014, was internationally known and conveyed popular rejection to terrorist religious groups and to deficient governmental action (Adewunmi et al., 2014). Other campaigns in Nigeria can be consulted in AAN et al. (2007).

Political activism in the UK has likewise responded to its political and economic crises. While a mature democracy, the colour of the political party in power in the UK has historically defined the level of political openness available to organisations that wanted to campaign. For instance, the 1970s represented a moment of radicalisation of development agencies while the conservative Thatcher Government (1979-1990) intensified the legal barriers to campaigning (Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.106-9).

The main NGDO-led campaigns have been on economic justice (aid, trade, debt, tax), reflecting the role of UK governments and UK banks in the international economy. By the end of the 1970s, issues such as aid, trade and debt campaigning had already been covered by some UK NGDOs (ibid: p.83). Live Aid became the first large-scale campaign in the 1980s, followed by what have been considered the two most successful global justice campaigns, the *Jubilee 2000* on debt cancellation in the 1990s and the *Make Poverty History* on aid, debt and trade in the mid-2000s

(Yanacopulos, 2016: p.113-8). In 2013, the *IF* campaign showed a change in major campaigning interests towards highlighting tax avoidance, land grabs and investment opacity in low-income countries, besides aid (ibid). Some NGOs also played a role in the British Anti-Apartheid movement (1959-1994)¹⁴ in objection to the role of the UK government and UK companies and banks in South Africa¹⁵. Other national campaigns in UK can be consulted in Hilton et al. (2012)¹⁶.

UK international NGOs play an important role in the UK voluntary sector. Although the levels of public engagement have declined since 2005 in the UK (Darnton and Kirk, 2011: p.18-9), international aid and development is consistently Britain's top charitable cause (The Guardian, 2006). This is likely to play a role in providing UK NGOs with statutory power to access the government. In fact, the five largest international UK NGOs, which includes ActionAid, have long enjoyed broad access to leading policymakers, including the Secretary for International Development, through an informal working group called BOAG or 'British Overseas Aid Group' created in 1980. The BOAG is still active besides the official NGO umbrella group BOND or 'British Overseas NGOs for Development', created in 1994 (Stroup and Murdie, 2012; Yanacopulos, 2016: p.13-7). Despite this close state-NGO interaction, meetings with government officials can be hostile and BOND is viewed by its members as a location to plan joint campaigning (Stroup and Murdie, 2012: p.439). Today, other non-development voluntary organisations see BOND as 'the leading edge of campaigning practice' (ibid).

Additionally, some NGOs have been collaborating over a long time period, which gives them historical group identity, namely, since 1963 in emergency fundraising through the 'Disasters Emergency Committee', and since 1967 in a campaigning coalition called 'Action for World Development' (Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.61, see section 2.1.2). Likewise, UK NGOs have a large private donor base besides official funding and an international NGO sector that is three times that of the Western European average (Yanacopulos, 2016: p.3). On the other hand, UK NGOs could also 'die from success' since they have to compete for funds. This competition between themselves is likely to shape their political action as much as charity law and the dynamics of the aid sector (see section 2.1.2).

¹⁴ www.aamarchives.org/

¹⁵ See for instance www.oxfam.org.uk/blogs/2013/12/oxfams-response-to-the-death-of-nelson-mandela and www.christianaid.org.uk/pressoffice/blog/nelson-mandela-death-anti-apartheid-movement.aspx

¹⁶ Also see SOAS archives www.soas.ac.uk/library/archives/collections/ngo-and-charity-collections/

1.3. ActionAid – the integration of advocacy and campaigns

ActionAid was born as a sponsorship organisation in the 1970s but gradually turned into an advocacy organisation during the 1990s. A decade later, the NGDO introduced campaigning with elements of public mobilisation and confrontation. In the 2010s, international campaigning became a strategic priority. At the time of writing [2015], ActionAid operates three international campaigns, or multi-country campaigns as ActionAid calls them, including the TJC.

Founded in 1972 as a UK child sponsorship and service-delivery organisation, its initial goals included the overseas supply of medical staff and equipment, overseas support to children, and UK support to drug addicts and other young people – although the UK focus ended in the late 1970s (Newman, 2011: p.107-8)¹⁷. ActionAid showed few signs of campaigning during its first two decades of existence, like other NGDOs at the time, and kept expanding and professionalising its child and community sponsorship (Archer, 2010: p.611; Newman, 2011: p.110-1; Scott-Villiers, 2002: p.428).

The early 1990s saw the official integration of ‘policy advocacy’ into the organisation, meaning efforts to influence decision-makers through public policy research (ActionAid archives, 1990s). ActionAid’s 1994 international strategy emphasised the need to develop advocacy expertise to scale up local data and back up national advocacy (Newman, 2011: p.116). Again, this move mirrored NGDO debates in the sector at the time such as the ‘making a difference’ idea in the first Manchester Conference (ibid; Edwards and Hulme, 1992).

Initial internal support to advocacy work mostly came from ActionAid UK headquarters and higher organisational levels while many national programme staff saw advocacy as a distraction from service-delivery work (Newman, 2011: p.116). Eventually, African and Asian regional policy staff were appointed and policy advocacy gradually developed at the country level (ibid).

In the early 2000s, ActionAid started to adopt a series of innovations and began to attract peer and academic attention¹⁸. Four aspects of ActionAid have been stressed: participatory planning,

¹⁷ A historical account can be found in Newman (2011: ch.4). Also see Archer (2010) and Scott-Villiers (2002)

¹⁸ This was mostly by Harvard and IDS-Sussex universities. Here, I am not suggesting that the number of theses and articles on ActionAid exceeds those devoted to other major NGDOs. Oxfam, for instance, probably gains more attention and is cited more frequently. What I am suggesting is that much of the attention that ActionAid has attracted

learning and evaluation systems (Carroll, 2011; David and Mancini, 2004; Eyben, 2004; Guijarro, 2011; Newman and Archer, 2011; Scott-Villiers, 2002; Walsh, 2014); participatory-popular education methods (Archer, 2007; Newman, 2007, 2011); human rights approaches (Archer, 2010; Newman, 2011); and decentralised governance (Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010; Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013).

As with policy advocacy, some of these initiatives such as human rights and decentralisation followed NGDO trends at the time. What made ActionAid different in the eyes of academics and peer organisations was the radicalness with which these internal policies were applied (Newman, 2011: ch.5, p.156). For instance, ActionAid introduced a 'rights' approach as an organisational strategy in 1999 in line with others in an NGDO wave in the early 2000s (Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Molyneux and Lazar, 2003; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003). Yet, it did so with an approach based on local people and a solid power discourse about the state's responsibility to provide for these rights (Newman, 2011: ch.5).

Likewise, ActionAid had been devolving power from the UK to 'country programmes' since the early 1990s through 'partnerships' in which local work was transferred to local associations and 'regionalisation' with the setup of regional offices (Newman, 2011: ch.4). These processes were at first less ambitious than in other NGDOs (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.12). The breaking point arrived in 2003 when ActionAid turned into a 'federation' through its 'internationalisation' process (Newman, 2011: p.131-4).

Until 2003, 'ActionAid' had been led from 'AAUK', ActionAid's country founder since 1972. Deliberate efforts were made to separate ActionAid, as the Federation's headquarters, from AAUK to make the latter just one more country member with a vote (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.4). For instance, ActionAid registered as a foundation in the Netherlands and the International Headquarters partly moved from London to Johannesburg and other regional hub cities (ibid).

Gradually, 'country programmes' were 'nationalised' as autonomous associations with national assemblies and national boards accountable to the assemblies¹⁹. In 2008, ActionAid mirrored

is as a 'radical' case, which has granted it a bold reputation in the sector (e.g. Newman, 2011: p.71, 102, 226-7; Edwards, 2005: p.8; Shutt, 2009; Walsh, 2014). This fame has remained constant over time since the 2000s.

¹⁹ AAUK, ActionAid Ireland and ActionAid US do not have national assemblies (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.6)

the two-tiered –assembly-board– system already running nationally at the international level. In 2009, a Constitution was enshrined and the first annual international General Assembly took place. From this point onward, African, Asian, American and European national members could bring motions and directly shape the association’s future (Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010).

International campaigning was introduced in the organisation in 2005 with the international strategy ‘Rights to End Poverty’ (ActionAid, 2005) and the ‘Hunger Free Campaign’ (Gilmore, 2010: p.26-8) although the NGDO had previously joined campaign coalitions like *Jubilee 2000*²⁰. Two of the six organisational objectives related to campaigning, namely, ‘*strengthen our communications and campaigns*’ and ‘*increase our supporters and mobilise supporters and partners*’ (ActionAid, 2005: p.21-2). The strategy also identified, for the first time, six human rights as strategic priorities, implying that state responsibilities such as public education were to be fought for as part of ActionAid’s public position (ibid: p.5; Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.9).

In practice, campaigning had been developing earlier more informally and under other names (Gilmore, 2010: p.6, 31). ActionAid’s ex-policy and campaign director noted that campaigning was a new word in ActionAid but that the NGDO had been engaged in it for many years at local and national levels (video, 2010)²¹. This divergence of campaign experiences within the organisation probably influenced the notion that ‘campaigning’ was used interchangeably by staff for lobbying, advocacy, organising, awareness raising, activism and social action (see Gilmore, 2010: p.2-3, for a definition).

The term was not only loose but contested (ibid: p.6). For instance, internal debate existed on whether success should be defined by the achievement of campaign aims or by the number of people mobilised (ibid). An internal survey showed that most staff disagreed with only focusing on own-brand profile campaigns, or only on campaigns originating on issues identified by local partners, or even on pre-existing campaign coalitions (Gilmore, 2011: p.46). According to the internal survey, the idea of campaigning was generally welcomed by ActionAid staff (ibid: p.4). Yet, some also noted the tensions between campaigning goals and objectives of other

²⁰ www.actionaid.org.uk/news-and-views/cancel-debt-o-or-millions-will-die

²¹ www.youtube.com/watch?v=goHWA04QjTw&feature=youtube_gdata_player

departments, as well as the lack of resources supporting campaigning work (Gilmore, 2010: p.7; 2011: p.23, 32).

In 2010, Country Directors signed an official document in which two campaign types were described – the ‘organisational’ or international policy-led campaigns; and the ‘organic’ or locally-born ones (ActionAid, 2010: p.10). ActionAid's ex-policy and campaign director further clarified that ‘campaigning’ differed from ‘advocacy’ in its mass mobilisation and confrontational nature: *‘when the change that we want is very big or very radical or the opposition that we face is very powerful, then we need... more than just advocacy, and that something more is harnessing people’s power... campaigning... around a simple and powerful demand’* (video, 2010)²².

In 2011, the international strategy *People’s Action to End Poverty 2012-17* (ActionAid, 2011, 2012b) propelled organisational campaigning into becoming a strategic objective. In a previous review, ActionAid’s main self-critique of its campaigning model had been its focus on policy analysis and report-launching and that it was niche and technical with little mobilisation involved (Gilmore, 2011: p.4). The 2011 strategy now stated that the campaign’s core was the mobilisation of poor people (i.e. through popular education groups), and secondarily, their supporters, without losing a sense of strategy and multi-country work over a common objective (ActionAid, 2011, 2012b). In 2014, the campaigns signature backed up by ActionAid’s CEO reinforced that vision (ActionAid, 2014a). Three international campaigns were to be run by the Federation during those strategy years, amongst which was the TJC.

This section has aimed to put ActionAid’s campaigning in context as a relatively new process and as being part of what, some decades earlier, had been a pure sponsorship and service-delivery organisation. These features continue to be present and exert influence over campaigning, an influence that will be visible through the following chapters. Drawing on frames and repertoires, the next sections explore mobilisation of staff and campaigners and confrontations with authorities and other decision-makers in ActionAid’s TJC.

²² www.youtube.com/watch?v=goHWA04QjTw&feature=youtube_gdata_player

1.4. Thesis outline

Chapter 1 has presented the logic of the thesis. In Chapter 2, I give an argument for the theory of contentious collective action (shortened to 'political action') that I will be using to examine the ActionAid case, formed of SM and NGDO concepts. Chapter 3 presents an agent-based epistemology and a methodology that both seek to move in line with the theory. In Chapters 4, 5 and 6, I apply the theory to the case, using data from the perspectives of the activists and other interviewees. Chapter 7 (discussion) compares ActionAid's case with other NGDOs and revisits the framework to discuss the role of SM theory in understanding NGDO political action through campaigns. Chapter 8 suggests contributions and implications that arise.

The three empirical chapters about ActionAid (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) follow a presentation logic from the most to the least visible campaign elements. This logic could be seen as a theatre play. The frames or claim shaping, the repertoires or actions, and the campaign actors and campaign adversaries are what spectators first see of political action on the scenario. Behind the scenes, a series of other theatrical elements are required to make the performance work, e.g. scripting, casting, production, make-up. These less visible organisational and envisioning features enabling that campaign performativity are networking, mobilising structures and identity. Other actors external to the theatre company (police, legislators, donors) also influence the shape of the play (campaign) and the company (NGDO and its networks). In turn, the performance may influence these back-scene elements, for instance, through its success and/or the public's feedback.

Thus, I have organised the empirical chapters as follows: I start with a presentation of ActionAid's *Tax Justice Campaign* through an exploration of its actors, frames and repertoires – that is, the campaign performativity (Chapter 4). Chapter 5 then studies how ActionAid organises for that campaign. This covers campaign networks and mobilising structures – including campaign participants, coalitions and departments – as well as other networks and structures that were not originally conceived for campaigning purposes. These actors and features may, however, influence campaigning, namely, programme participants and partners, service-delivery programmes, sponsorship departments, decision-making structures, and financial, human and other resources. Finally, Chapter 6 explores how ActionAid envisions and positions itself for the campaign by defining its political identity vis-à-vis their staff, supporters, opponents

and audiences and by detecting political opportunities and threats in the campaign context. Opportunities and threats are mentioned throughout and revisited in Chapter 6.

The thesis has a total of 82,904 words. Footnotes and bibliography cover 9% of the total wording (8,041 words). Websites sources are cited in footnotes. All the hyperlinked footnotes were accessed and checked on the 26th December 2016 before submission.

Chapter 2 – Literature review and conceptual framework: campaigning NGDOs and social movement theory

Introduction

In the previous chapter, I suggested that campaigning could be seen as a theatre play in which activists seek to challenge authorities through provocative claims and actions. By the same means, they also seek to attract an audience exposed to the effects of those authorities' decisions but which lacks regular access to influence them. Behind the scenes, a series of organising and envisioning strategies take place from the campaigning NGDO. Campaigning is then a way in which the NGDO is able to act politically or contentiously. For the spectator seeing the play, I suggest that SM theory helps an analysis that can catch the interactions on stage and behind the scenes.

In this chapter, section 2.1 looks at the particularities of campaigning NGDOs as the main theatre players when compared to campaigning organisations. Sections 2.2 and 2.3 look at the precedents and usefulness of SM theory as a way to read NGDO campaigning. These three sections then feed into the conceptual framework, formed of SM and NGDO theory, and the research question, 'how does political action happen in a campaigning NGDO when seen through a social movement lens?', which are presented in section 2.4.

2.1. Spotting the differences – campaigning NGDOs versus campaigning organisations

I understand 'campaigning organisations' restrictedly as those that were born campaigning and whose main approach towards their mission is to campaign – for instance, *Amnesty* and *Greenpeace*. Thus, I take 'campaigning organisations' as a smaller group than the set of organisations that may campaign amongst other goals. 'Campaigning NGDOs' are a type of organisation for whom campaigning is only a discrete part of their mission.

In this section I explore differences between campaigning NGOs and campaigning organisations. Since campaigning NGOs show organisational and contextual particularities from scratch, they are likely to campaign differently when compared to campaigning organisations. These constituent differences need to be taken into account in the conceptual framework.

Organisationally, campaigning NGOs present emergency, service-delivery and (sometimes) sponsorship structures in ways absent in campaigning organisations (see section 2.1.1). On the other hand there is shared ground. The presence of national partnerships is typical in NGOs but may also be present in campaigning organisations. Similarly, the mission goal of ‘global poverty elimination’ in campaigning NGOs may be shared by campaigning organisations. Contextually, differences may include a more restricted legal status for campaigning (for example, campaigning NGOs are ‘charities’²³ under UK law) and added limitations (and opportunities) from the aid sector, which campaigning organisations do not have (see section 2.1.2).

2.1.1. Differences in the organisational structure

Different stages have been suggested for the historical trajectory of the UK-based international NGO sector (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: ch.2; Saunders, 2009). In the 1940-50s, many NGOs focused on humanitarian relief and assistance. In the 1970-80s, there was increasing longer-term development orientation through service delivery. Since the 1990s, their advocacy and campaigns orientation gained weight.

Most of European and US NGOs were born as emergency responses to poverty impacts during the First and Second World Wars in Europe (Yanacopulos, 2016: p.11). After the European post-War period, these NGOs turned their operations towards low-income countries (Baglioni, 2001: p.222-5). Other NGOs which originated from the 1950s onwards directly addressed emergency and service-delivery in the world’s poorest countries²⁴. As part of this last group,

²³ For a definition of ‘charity’, see www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2011/25/section/1

²⁴ www.worldvision.org/about-us/our-history; www.msf.org/msf-history; www.akdn.org/switzerland; www.actionaid.org/who-we-are/history. Also see Hilton et al. (2012: p.48) for a list of dates of foundation of NGOs

ActionAid was created in 1972 to tackle poverty in low-income countries and in the UK, although work in the UK was eventually abandoned (Newman, 2011: p.107-8).

International NGOs boomed in the 1980s and gained a vast global presence in their service-delivery provision role (Carapico, 2000; Edwards and Hulme, 1995; Hickey and Mohan, 2004; Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Mitlin et al., 2007; Yanacopulos, 2016: p.3). Some were also child sponsorship organisations²⁵, like ActionAid (Newman, 2011: p.120-5). In the 1990s, many NGOs started to introduce international advocacy and campaigning while continuing to perform roles in relation to emergencies, service delivery, and sponsorship in some cases (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.97; Saunders, 2009).

Multiple reasons explain this NGO advocacy and campaigning turn. First, human rights ideas entered the development sector resulting in joint advocacy by human rights and development NGOs and in a reconceptualization of what had been seen as development needs into people's rights (Cornwall and Nyamu-Musembi, 2004; Molyneux and Lazar, 2003; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003). Added to this were increasing calls by low-income country partners for OECD NGOs to do more policy and campaign work. This was accompanied by a deeper understanding of the structural causes of poverty and of the limited effects of symptom-oriented projects. There was also a realisation that policy change needed strong domestic involvement and that low-income country NGOs were better placed to do that work directly (Chapman and Fisher, 2000; Coates and David, 2002; Lewis, 2005).

While most literature agrees that many NGOs incorporated advocacy and campaigning work into service-delivery from the 1990s (and this is the case in ActionAid, see section 1.3), Black (1992: ch.12) noted in his book about Oxfam that campaigning had co-existed with service-delivery work in some NGOs since much earlier. For instance, Oxfam campaigned for food supplies to be sent to starving population in enemy-occupied Greece during WWII²⁶. Together with other NGOs, Oxfam supported the FAO's *Freedom from Hunger* Campaign in 1960 (ibid: p.298; Hilton et al., 2012: p.46). Others locate Oxfam as part of the first UK antipoverty campaigning coalition set up in 1967 (GJN, 2016; Luetchford and Burns, 2003). Oxfam's

²⁵ Organisations that allow an individual, typically in a high-income country, to fund a child or a community in a low-income country until the child becomes self-sufficient.

²⁶ www.oxfam.org/en/countries/history-oxfam-international

'Campaigns Department' was established in 1979 and in the mid-80s, campaigning was a common notion in the NGDO (Black, 1992: p.252, 299).

Also, some NGDOs opposed the macro-economic and social instability caused by *Structural Adjustment Programmes* (SAPs)²⁷, for instance, as part of debt relief/eradication campaigning. Yet, many equally served to operate the donor funds used to alleviate the negative effects of SAPs (Bebbington et al., 2008: p.13-4; Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.53). Similarly, some point out how NGDOs had been political earlier than the 1990s in other ways besides their campaigning such as in supporting decolonising and anti-dictatorship struggles and movements (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.5, 147-8; Pratt, 2014). More recently, NGDOs have participated in and funded political events such as WSFs (e.g. Fisher in Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.149; Gautney, 2010: ch.3).

Overall, this history of campaigning NGDOs compares to campaigning organisations who were born campaigning and whose main approach towards their mission is to campaign. Campaigning organisations do not usually have historical emergency and service-delivery baggage in their organisational structures as NGDOs do²⁸. Older departments like those for service-delivery are often much larger than campaigning departments in NGDOs (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: ch.5). In other words, campaigning NGDOs have campaign and non-campaign elements while campaigning organisations features and resources are largely oriented towards campaigning. With the incorporation of campaigning into NGDOs, departments not initially created for campaigning – such as service-delivery programmes and fundraising/marketing – now have to relate to campaigning by either adapting to it or working in parallel. Campaigning organisations do not need to deal with these processes of internal accommodation as they were already born to campaign. How has this 'fitting-in' taken place?

NGDOs often publicise their service-delivery programmes in low-income countries as an advantage for campaigning. Programme participants can provide an authenticity footprint, transmit evidence of local needs and be part of local networks from which to mobilise. Oxfam for instance contends that it has '*a unique place among 21st Century campaigning organizations*' because its campaigns are built on real life evidence from its long-term

²⁷ SAPs consist of loans from the IMF and the WB given with conditionality clauses to countries in economic crises

²⁸ Some campaigning organisations may do projects on education and sensitisation related to campaigning themes but not service-delivery, e.g. www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights-education

development and emergency work²⁹. Similarly, ActionAid sees its: '*long-term relationship with communities living in poverty*' as a unique selling point that Avaaz, Greenpeace and Oxfam (sic) do not have (ActionAid, 2014a: p.1; Gilmore, 2010, 2011). In practice however, this integration is difficult given the different rhythms and working cultures of programming and campaigning. Also, international campaigns may cause conflict with local partners, likely to be more interested in local problems (e.g. Brown et al., 2012: p.1102 for Oxfam). Without conscious action, duplications, mutations and divisions may arrive – for instance, with NGDO departments doing parallel work and/or partners diverging from NGDO goals. ActionAid's current strategy prioritises the improvement of this connection (ActionAid, 2012b; also see Newman, 2011).

During the 1990s, international NGDOs began to work more through partnerships with local associations to implement emergency operations and service-delivery programmes (Ahmad, 2006; Lewis, 1998; Newman, 2011: p.118-20 for ActionAid). Coates and David (2002: p.532) suggest that this partnership structure has adapted for campaigning. They note that '*the traditional model of Northern NGO-led campaigns*' in which the entire campaign was operated from headquarters is changing so that such work is undertaken in partnership with national NGDOs, in recognition that most social change is only achievable through strong low-income country participation. Some campaigning organisations share this partnership organisational structure such as *War on Want*³⁰ (also see Smith et al., 1994: p.140 for peace campaigning organisations). The global poverty eradication mission of NGDOs may also be shared by campaigning organisations as is the case of *Global Justice Now* (see next section), although human rights, environmental and women's rights missions have historically been predominant in the campaigning sector (Keck and Sikkink, 1998: p.11-2).

Campaigning NGDOs and campaigning organisations share similar processes of fundraising. Yet, some differences can be noted regarding funding sources and expenditure. On the sources, NGDOs often draw on mixtures of official and private funding. Instead, campaigning organisations often reject official funds from states, multinational companies and multinational agencies and only accept income from members, such as Amnesty³¹, Global Justice Now³² and

²⁹ www.oxfam.org/en/our-work/campaigns/how-we-campaign

³⁰ www.waronwant.org/global-partnerships

³¹ www.amnesty-volunteer.org/aihandbook/ch5s4.html#Fund-raising; for alleged financial biases, see www.ngo-monitor.org/article/breaking-its-own-rules-amnesty-s-gov-t-funding-and-researcher-bias

³² www.globaljustice.org.uk/how-were-funded

Greenpeace³³. Thus NGOs compete for both official and voluntary funds, the latter of which is shared with campaigning organisations.

Diverse readings exist on the effects of the marketing needed to raise funds in campaigning. Some literature suggests that a process of mediatisation often takes place in which organisations strongly sell their own name or brand rather than their campaign mission (Chouliaraki, 2010; Darnton and Kirk, 2011; Vestergaard, 2008). Others have noted a marketisation of images of poverty for fundraising goals (Newman, 2011: p.122; Yanacopulos, 2016). Conversely, marketing and communications staff contend that more budget size correlates with more visibility, legitimacy and policy influence (Shutt, 2009: p.18) although this is at odds with a perceived conservatism in NGOs about official donors and voluntary supporters (ibid: p.34), making their fundraising little political.

On the expenditure, funds in NGOs are not all spent on campaigning but on diverse goals such as emergencies and programmes. In this sense, financial supporters of campaigning organisations are clear that they will be financing a political cause³⁴ while those in campaigning NGOs mostly donate to overseas charitable programmes³⁵.

2.1.2. Differences in the campaigning context

Besides organisational differences, the contexts in which campaigning NGOs and campaigning organisations operate their campaigns also diverge in some aspects – campaigning NGOs function under a charity legal status and, at least partly, under the aid sector logics. I explore these two differences next in UK and Nigeria. Other national campaigning contextual elements (see the past section 1.2) are likely to be shared with campaigning organisations.

The governmental regulatory body on NGO campaigning in the UK is the *Charity Commission*, whose inquiries into NGOs on political action date back to as early as 1972 (Luetchford and

³³ www.greenpeace.org/international/en/about/faq_old/questions-about-greenpeace-in/

³⁴ See, for instance, Amnesty's financial report (2013: p.22) where all funds go to campaigning and auxiliary activities

³⁵ For instance, 70% of AAUK funds go to programmes as compared to 5% for campaigns and education (AAUK, 2014a: p.15). Similarly, ChristianAid spends 68.4% on programmes and emergencies and 10.7% on campaigning, education and advocacy (2015), see http://learn.christianaid.org.uk/Other/help_5.aspx.

Burns, 2003: p.71). In 1979, the Commission published a report on the issue of charity involvement in politics (ibid: p.107). Registered 'charities' (which include NGOs) were not legally allowed to campaign in the late 1960s. Thus a number of international NGOs like *ChristianAid*, Oxfam, the UN association and War on Want created a non-charitable registered 'company' independent from governmental funding that functioned outside charity law to undertake activities such as collecting signatures (WDM staff member, interview, 2013). This first UK NGO coalition for campaigning against poverty in low-income countries was formalised in 1967 with the name of *Action for World Development*, which later became a membership-based campaigning organisation called the *World Development Movement* or *WDM*, and since 2015, *Global Justice Now* (GJN, 2016; Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.61)³⁶.

Nowadays, the 2006 Law states that a charity can campaign as long as campaigning is related to its charitable (public benefit) purposes and never to party political campaigning (Charity Commission, 2008: p.3). Campaigning cannot be the '*continuing and sole activity*' of the charity either (ibid: p.13). If that is the case, the charity should register under a different legal status such as that of a company (ibid: p.14). This is the status used by campaigning organisations. With this law, NGO representatives like Oxfam's complain that the Charity Commission controls, more than encourages, good charity work (Butler, 2013). In 2014, the UK Government tightened the 'Charities Act 2006' with the 'Transparency in Lobbying, Non-Party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Bill', popularly known as the 'Lobbying Bill'. The Bill, now a law, limits the amount that charities can spend on campaigning in the year before an election (Lansley and Tankerness, 2014: part 2).

The Charity Commission plays an important role in NGO campaigning but should not be seen as fully determining NGO compliance. Historic examples exist in which NGOs have kept political regardless of the charity's external regulation (Hilton et al., 2012: p.47). For instance, the Charity Commission investigated ChristianAid, Oxfam and War on Want in 1990 for their links with left-wing groups in countries such as Nicaragua and South Africa (ibid). More recently, around 150 organisations including AAUK campaigned against the Lobbying Bill. They claimed

³⁶ Notably, this coalition is nearly as old as the first UK NGO coalition for fundraising emergencies in 1963 (Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.51). Likewise, the birth of WDM as a development campaigning organisation in 1970 (GJN, 2016) was contemporary to the birth of other human rights and environmental campaigning organisations such as Amnesty in 1961 and Greenpeace in 1971 (see <http://static.amnesty.org/ai50/ai50-the-history-of-amnesty-international.pdf> and www.greenpeace.org/canada/en/About-us/History/)

that they were already politically restricted through Charity Law and Electoral Commission guidance during an election period (Pyle, 2014).

A similar situation took place in Nigeria. A 'Foreign Donations Bill' passed through the House of Representatives in 2014 to: *'regulate the acceptance and utilisation of finance/material contributions of donor agencies to voluntary organisations'* (Mbadiwe, 2013). The Bill stated that any foreign contribution should have the permission of a governmental body called the 'Independent Corrupt Practices and other Related Offences Commission'. While the legislation did not concern campaigning activity in particular, the Bill aimed to restrict NGO international funding in general, including campaigning activities. The Bill was justified by the government in terms of controlling terrorism and money laundering amongst other reasons. AAN governance programmes' manager publicly objected that there were already other laws that addressed those motives and that the law existed for: *'curbing the activities of civil society groups'* (Effanga, 2014). As with the case of the Charity Law in the UK, the Bill faced resistance from Nigerian civil society organisations (Nigeria Buzz, 2014). The Bill *'died a natural death'* and was not approved (AAN campaign manager, chapter feedback, 2016).

Another contextual difference between campaigning NGOs and campaigning organisations regards the aid sector as an external actor affecting NGO political action, to which campaigning organisations do not have to relate (since they draw their funds from members, rather than from official donors). The aid sector (Eyben, 2006; Lewis and Kanji, 2009: ch.8; Tvedt, 2006) was born after the Second World War agreements – although development assistance dates back to colonial times (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.165). Aid is given by bilateral donors from OECD and emergent countries, multilateral agencies like the UN and private philanthropists. Many NGOs receive funds from these while some operate outside the sector (ibid: p.181-3).

At least two factors may have had a positive influence on the freedom that NGOs enjoy for political processes such as campaigning. First, official donors increasingly adopted the political language of rights and governance in the late 1990s (Eyben, 2003: p.2; Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.165-6). In that line, a body of literature has put forward the need for donors to invest in the immaterial (Eyben, 2011). The idea is to nurture informal networks aligned with human rights through long-term relationships instead of relying on formalised structures and technical short-term results, e.g. number of schools built (Eyben, 2003, 2006, 2011, 2014). Second, donor

agencies like DFID, the OECD and USAID have shown recent interest in engaging with informal collectives such as movements, social networks and unregistered groups (Fernando, 2012; Fowler and Steinert-Threlkeld, 2013; Haider, 2009; Tembo et al., 2007), which may also be beneficial for NGDO political engagement.

These positive influences however happen in a context of complex security and the so-called 'war on terror', which paradoxically has brought renewed 'developmentalist and controlling' forms of working (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.181). Also, the bureaucratic nature of official donors makes this desired engagement with informal actors, some of them political, difficult (Wallace et al., 2006). Added to these are the tensions derived from being 'too close for comfort' (Hulme and Edwards, 1997; Twijukye et al., 2005) in terms of campaigning against one's own programme funder.

Opinions vary about the effects of accepting official funds on campaigning. An AAUK campaign staff member commented that DFID generally posed: '*no problem with any of our campaigns*' (pers. comm., 2014) while others see it as an inherent challenge to political freedom (e.g. Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.182-3). Qualitatively, donors may not directly influence specific political statements but may easily shape programme design and management, e.g. use of log-frames (Newman, 2011: p.239-40).

Nonetheless, NGDOs develop strategies to offset these tensions, such as being part of a broader network as indirect forms of political engagement to protect their financial relationship with the government (Twijukye et al., 2005). Others have noted how NGDOs create their own informal strategies despite donor demands, with a fracture between what is documented and what is done (Wallace et al., 2006: p.165-8). NGDOs also have other funding sources beside official donors, which gives them space for political manoeuvre. Even NGDOs with similar official funding may campaign differently. In a comparative country study, Stroup and Murdie (2012: p.444) maintained that UK NGDOs are as reliant as French NGDOs on their government for funding and yet less confrontational. Thus other reasons besides funding exist that explain the degree of confrontation in campaigning.

Likewise, governments may both support and limit political action in NGDOs at the same time. For instance, the British government provides support for research by INGOs, which is often

used to sustain both confrontational and cooperative action (ibid: p.445). Yet, they also apply initiatives such as the 2014 UK Lobbying Act.

Overall, legal regulations and funding sources such as official donors in the aid sector are highly relevant in shaping UK international NGDO political behaviour. Yet, as suggested for both cases, these should not be seen as fully determining NGDO compliance. The degree of such must be studied for each case.

2.2. Finding precedents – is there social movement theory on campaigning NGDOs?

With campaigning NGDOs defined, I am now interested in knowing about precedents to my intention of applying SM theory on NGDOs to understand their political action through campaigning. At first sight, it may not sound intuitive to apply SM theory to a campaigning NGDO since this theory was originally tailored for a different object of study, social movements³⁷. I explored, however, whether precedents existed in two ways, theoretically and empirically. That is, I first examined if any scholars had suggested that NGDOs could be seen through SM lenses and second, if any scholars had studied them in this manner. In the review, I found both theoretical and empirical precedents. These precedents, together with the NGDO particularities explored above, help set a conceptual framework to study NGDO political action as performed in its campaigning (see section 2.4).

2.2.1. Theoretical bridges between SM theory and campaigning NGDOs

Theoretical precedents exist that mention the potential of social movement and collective action theory to study other collective actors besides movements including voluntary organisations and NGDOs (della Porta and Diani, 2006; Gaventa and McGee, 2010; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). Others point at the analytical fluidity between NGDOs and movements (Hulme, 2008; Korten, 1990; Lewis and Kanji, 2009).

³⁷ For definitions of social movements, see della Porta and Diani (2006: p.20-2), Diani (1992; 2012), Diani and Bison (2004: p.303-5), Diani and McAdam (2003: p.5-6), and Tilly (1993). For the purposes of the thesis, I understand them as conflictual although I acknowledge that apolitical cultural movements also exist (Diani and Bison, 2004).

Della Porta and Diani (2006: p.19-20, 118) suggest that SM theory can be taken as a general theory of collective action and one that can be extrapolated to other collective actors like political parties, interest groups and voluntary organisations (also see Diani and Bison, 2004: p.281-2; Tarrow, 2011: ch.9). The authors sustain that any collective political actor, like a social movement, has to identify opponents, to attract and keep members, to elaborate cultural models and frame issues appealingly to supporters, to secure resources for action, to challenge dominant norms or lifestyles, and to adapt strategies to the political changing contexts. This reasoning seems plausible for campaigning NGOs since they have to create narratives and perform actions in their campaigning, mobilise supporters, etc., as any other campaigning organisation or social movement. At the same time, I do not read the argument as suggesting that all collective actors mobilise and protest as movements do, or even that they *should*. Rather, I read it that SM theory holds a history of studying varied forms of contentious or political processes, which grants the potential to explore diverse collective actors, e.g. formal and informal (see section 2.3.1) in nature.

Gaventa and McGee (2010: p.10-1) also suggest there is potential for SM theory to offer understandings of contention in citizen action. In assessing citizen voice, participation and advocacy literatures in policy change, the authors suggest that little attention has been paid to processes in which conflict over competing interests occur. This includes a lack of engagement with SM and collective action literature. They note the need to bring these approaches together to recognise the importance of contention in citizen processes that seek policy change. For this, they suggest three SM concepts – political opportunities, mobilising structures and frames (ibid: p.12-29; see section 1.1.2 for definitions). While the authors mostly refer to citizen-led campaigns (ibid: p.2-3), their reflexion on the role that SM theory brings to understanding conflict and disagreement could be similarly applied to NGO-led campaigns. From a different perspective, Lewis and Kanji (2009: p.51-68) have proposed SM theory as one of the approaches able to move beyond the modernisation and dependency ‘grand theory’ impasse of development studies in the late 1980s towards more pragmatic approaches.

A pioneering thinker in seeing NGOs as political actors, and as ‘movement-like’ ones, was David Korten. In his ‘four-generation theory’, Korten (1990) suggested that NGOs progress in four stages towards sustainability – from ‘relief-welfare’ to address immediate needs, to promoting ‘community development’ with small-scale and self-reliant local initiatives, to ‘sustainable

systems development' with the use of advocacy to influence wider contexts. The final 'people's movements' stage includes NGOs that link up with wider movements and political struggles and combine local, national and international action aimed at long-term structural change (see Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.13-6 for a summary of the theory).

While Korten's theory has been criticised as unidirectional, normative and idealistic (ibid; Lewis, 2005: p.203), the vision of NGOs as movement-like political actors was ground-breaking for its time. Even its division between the third and fourth generations, advocacy and people's movements, could be seen as pioneering. The different UK 'Manchester Conferences', a set of conferences on NGOs and politics held during the 1990s-2000s, reflected this evolution (see Edwards, 2005 for a review; Lewis, 2005: p.204, 206). The first conferences in the early 1990s studied the advocacy potential of NGOs in scaling up their local work to influence national politics (Edwards and Hulme, 1992). Linked to these were challenges on NGO advocacy effectiveness (Edwards and Hulme, 1995) and on their advocacy limits given their official funding sources (Hulme and Edwards, 1997). Later conferences in the 2000s shifted to look at NGOs as part of wider political networks, for instance, with a globalisation vision (i.e. Edwards and Gaventa, 2001) and as alternative agendas to neo-liberalism (Bebbington et al., 2008). The latter resonate with the idea of networking and movement-like organisations described by Korten in the fourth generation theory, together with recent literature on campaigning and coalitions (see section 2.3.2 below).

Lewis and Kanji (2009: p.65-8) similarly note the ambiguity of analytical boundaries between NGOs and movements when it comes to value-driven public action, a fluidity that is also mentioned by Hulme (2008: p.337), who deems this separation less important than exploring *'the relationships between entities that seem to have NGO or social-movement characteristics'*. While NGOs can vary from having more bureaucratic and isolated forms of campaigning to more 'movement-like' ones, organisations, by definition, can never be movements. They should be read as being *part of* movements (and/or as being inspired by and aiming to *be like* movements), not as being *the* movements. Thus analytical boundaries do exist despite the potentialities to get closer (see Diani and Bison, 2004 for this discussion).

2.2.2. Empirical cases of SM theory on campaigning NGOs

Besides the theoretical precedents seen above, empirical research exists that has applied SM theory on NGOs. NGOs have been explored through SM theory as part of comparative studies with other non-development NGOs/campaigning organisations (Kriesi, 1996; Smith et al., 1994) and more recently, as part of case studies on larger campaign coalitions (Alcalde, 2010; Alonso, 2009; Gaventa and Mayo, 2009). Another set of authors have studied frames and/or repertoires on NGO/NGDOs (e.g. Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999; Pianta et al., 2004).

The conceptual frameworks used by Kriesi and Alcalde are of particular interest as they relate several SM concepts in a way that I could draw on to shape my framework. I suggest that the framework presented in section 2.4.1 adds to these existent ones because it explicitly takes on the nuances of campaigning NGOs, or their distinctive dimensions vis-a-vis campaigning organisations, shown in section 2.1 above. For instance, the role of service-delivery programmes in campaigning is absent in current frames³⁸. With that said, the dimensions suggested by Kriesi and Alcalde can also be useful as ideas for the framework, given that campaigning NGOs share political features with campaigning organisations, movements and other collective actors (see sections 2.1 and 2.2.1).

Kriesi (1996) explores the organisation's growth/decline through historic indicators of size of financial resources and membership. Then he looks at internal and external organisational structures – internally, at the degree of formalisation and professionalisation proxied by paid personnel; and externally, at the types of relationship with constituents, allies (coalitions) and authorities. Finally, he looks at goal transformation and action repertoires, with the indicators of sources of revenue and types and evolution of repertoires (moderate/violent). One of his conclusions is that the French solidarity movement³⁹ has historically been more moderate than the French ecology movement, which he attributes to the state's support to solidarity actors (Kriesi, 1996: p.180-1).

³⁸ But see Minkoff, 2002 for the study of identity-based service provision and activism in the US of the 1960s.

³⁹ Kriesi understands the 'solidarity movement' as covering humanitarian aid, political refugees and prisoners, human rights and antiracism (Kriesi, 1996: p.158).

Alcalde (2010: p.47-73) takes three dimensions⁴⁰ to study international campaigns by NGOs – organisational forms (mostly resource mobilising theory) and strategies (mobilisation, repertoires and frames), which are controlled by the activists, and political opportunity structures, which are not controllable.

Findings on NGDOs in particular in these studies are either relatively small (in the comparative studies) or difficult to discriminate (when studied as coalitions). As noted above, the conceptual frameworks also do not cover nuances of campaigning NGDOs. A study with a conceptual framework that includes these nuances and that is applied specifically to a campaigning NGDO can bring new campaign insights and be complementary to this literature.

Finally, other authors have applied the notions of frames and/or repertoires on NGO/NGDOs in the contexts of transnational advocacy networks and campaign coalitions (Alcalde, 2010; Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999; Stroup and Murdie, 2012), World Social Forums (hereafter WSFs) and UN Conferences (Clark et al., 1998; Dingwerth et al., 2013; Pianta, 2001; Pianta et al., 2004; Szarka, 2013; Türkelli and Vandenhoe, 2012) and Western European and US movements and organisations (Barakso, 2010; Diani and Donati, 1999; Kriesi, 1996). Some of this research is descriptive in the way it characterises the types of narratives and actions found in a context and how they interact with those of authorities and other activists. Other studies include explanatory dimensions aiming to understand why frames and repertoires appeared as they did.

For instance, Barakso (2010: p.156-7) explores the relationship between identity and repertoires, suggesting that brand identity influences the choice of insider approaches (e.g. lobbying, testifying before legislative bodies) and outsider ones (e.g. petitioning, grassroots mobilisation, and protest). Repertoires are a manifestation of an organisation's brand identity. The author notes that repertoires remain stable over time since their alteration would imply substantial investment in changing or training the members and staff of the organisation that carries them on.

In turn, Stroup and Murdie (2012: p.444-5) study the effects of dimensions like types of states and national contexts in the degree of cooperation or confrontation in the actions of collective

⁴⁰ His framework covers the three independent variables cited here and a dependent variable ('success'). I did not consider the success variable given the early stages of the campaign when I studied it but this could possibly be added.

actors for umbrella organisations in the relief and development sector in France, Japan, UK, and US. While high levels of government funding are generally correlated with lower levels of confrontational activity, the authors note that this relationship is not perfect and that institutional factors, i.e. formal rules, informal practices, and/or internal factors to the organisations or networks may also play a role (see section 2.1.2 too).

These studies tend to locate identity and political opportunities and threats as explanatory factors of other SM theory elements such as repertoires. Identity is an entrenched, cultural lens for activists to understand who they are as a group, and how they are perceived. Political opportunities and threats also include broad historical and contextual elements such as power relationships with opponents and allies, a state's strength-weakness and a country's democratic-authoritarian history (della Porta, 2013: p.956-7). At the same time, identity and opportunities and threats are in constant flux and are also influenced by activists and their ways of political performing and organising. As in these studies, I aim to interrelate SM concepts into the conceptual framework (see section 2.4.1) and data analysis by looking at the way in which ActionAid campaigners perform, organise and envision their tax campaign.

Overall, I take two main lessons from these sets of literature. First, there is a need to tailor the conceptual framework to NGDOs, that is, to draw on existent frameworks used for NGOs/campaigning organisations (this section) but equally include nuances that NGDOs may bring into the analysis (see sections 2.1 and 2.3.2). The second lesson is to seek explanatory depth in the framework, by bringing in SM concepts that may not be as visible as frames and repertoires but that also have an explanatory potential, namely networks, mobilising structures, identity and political opportunities and threats.

2.3. Finding reasons – the usefulness of SM theory as a political theory to read NGDOs

In the previous section, I have listed theoretical and empirical precedents that serve as a base for the idea of applying SM theory to campaigning NGDOs. However, the fact that the idea may be logically feasible does not justify that it is useful. So why should I use SM theory? What would that add? I suggest that there are two main reasons. First, there is a potential for SM theory to

read public confrontation in the relationships between an NGDO and the state (and other decision-makers) that take place during campaigning. Second, through that reading, there is possible contribution that SM theory can give to current NGDO debates.

2.3.1. A mobilising and confrontational perspective on NGDO-state relations

The first reason which, I believe, shows where SM theory can be useful to NGDOs is in its potential to offer an understanding about the relationship between an NGDO and the state (and other decision-making opponents) from a public mobilisation and confrontational perspective. With SM concepts, one can study mobilising and disruptive aspects in ways that have arguably been little theorised before in NGDO theory. For instance, such theory can help us by paying attention to mobilising strategies and structures for public mobilisation and to protest repertoires like street actions in campaigning.

Under a contentious or political collective action perspective, the relationships between a collective actor and the state were defined as involving the public mobilisation of lay people and as challenging/confrontational in their claims and actions. This was defined under the notion of 'contentious' or 'political' action (see section 1.1.1 of definitions). Campaigning was then defined as a researchable process involving public mobilisation and confrontation of targeted authorities and is thus representing the notion of political action. SM concepts help read this mobilisation and confrontation from different perspectives, which are described next.

Framing theory has theorised about the role of claims in attracting public support. To create a frame effective for action, mobilisers may need to: (1) describe their grievances persuasively, (2) present a feasible solution, and (3) motivate for action (Benford and Snow, 2000: p.616-7; della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.74-9). That is, for individuals to mobilise, they need to feel aggrieved by a framed problem and optimistic that the suggested redress is possible (ibid). The idea of 'resonance', or the chance of frames to 'catch on', includes a frame that is both credible and salient (Benford and Snow, 2000: p.619-22). 'Credibility' in a frame gains from demonstrable facts, frame coherence, and the prestige of the frame articulator. 'Salience' involves whether the frame is useful, concrete and culturally appropriate to the audience.

Another useful concept to study public mobilisation is ‘frame alignments’ or the narratives that activists use to harmonise the thinking of potential followers and cultural codes with the movement’s ideas (Snow et al., 1986). Frames ‘align’ in four ways. ‘Frame amplification’ extends *existing* frames by clarifying and renewing them. ‘Frame bridging’ or ‘frame extension’ link to other unconnected frames that look ideologically congruent (bridging) or apparently divergent (extending). ‘Frame transformation’ is the construction of new frames. This happens when old frames do not resonate with activists, society and other frames any longer and get discarded for new ones. These alignments may enhance public mobilisation.

In turn, repertoires can be organised in three ‘logics of protest’ (della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.170-8, 192) – the logics of numbers, damage and bearing witness. The logic of numbers displays the numerical strength of a protest initiative. The logic of material damage draws on the capacity to interrupt daily routine. The logic of bearing witness demonstrates a strong protestors’ commitment to an objective judged vital for the general interest (ibid). These logics can help understand different types of public mobilisation with different degrees of involvement and anonymity by the activists. Both frames and repertoires help understand the way in which actors make daily explicit ‘strategic choices and dilemmas’ and implicit ‘tradeoffs’ and interact with other actors by attacking them and/or coalescing with them (Jasper, 2004, 2006). Examples are the ‘organisation dilemma’ (or the extent to which formal bureaucratisation helps or hurts movements) and the ‘extension dilemma’ (or the extent to which a movement’s expansion or alliances undermines identity coherence).

Mobilising structures also help an understanding of the profiles of public mobilisation, that is, who is it that engages in campaigning. McCarthy and Zald (1977: p.1221-2) distinguish between *beneficiaries* (I will call them ‘bases’)⁴¹ or those directly gaining from the success of a movement (or organisation) and *conscience adherents* (I will call them ‘supporters’) who believe in the cause but would not directly gain from it (also see della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.256, fn.4). Questions can be asked about what the proportion is between these two groups in the campaign, who frames and who plans/does the actions (NGDO staff, bases, supporters), whether the focus on mobilising the public is on the activists’ money or time (see Diani and

⁴¹ ‘Beneficiaries’ has negative connotations in the NGDO literature

Donati, 1999), and whether that mobilisation is paid, supported, e.g. with pocket money, or non-paid, induced or self-initiated.

The notion of networking helps us see public mobilisation in favour of the campaign as moving beyond the initial activists (staff, in the NGDO case) to include constituencies (bases and supporters) and also partners and coalitions. Two dimensions of networks are important to consider: their level of centralisation and segmentation (Diani and McAdam, 2003: ch.13). *Centralisation* is the degree of hierarchy in the network while *segmentation* (or, in a way, mediation) is the number of steps that a network actor needs to perform to reach another actor (ibid)⁴². I suggest that the less centralised and the less segmented a network is, then the less regulated and mediated the mobilisation of the public is, or is perceived to be. This is then likely to boost autonomous participation from different parts of the network beyond the NGDO.

As part of public mobilising, 'mediation' regards how activists are connected in networks at each level in an international campaign. Both narratives (frames) and people (mediators) can link campaign levels and parts of the network. A common campaign claim may be transmitted along the levels on its own, or, through bridging it to other claims. Alternatively, diverse campaign claims operating at each level can be further linked through bridging claims. Regarding mediators, Alonso (2009) distinguishes between 'globetrotters,' experts who spend most of their time traveling internationally, and 'hybrid activists' or activists able to be local and global at the same time. While both contribute to campaigning in different ways, the latter profile does so more in terms of mediation. 'Hybrid activists' resonate with Tarrow's (2005: p.29) 'rooted cosmopolitans' that are those activists able to move across levels and interpret between actors. Also related to mediation and levels is the idea of the 'boomerang pattern' of influence in which domestic NGOs may directly seek international allies to try to bring pressure on their states, the main targets, from outside (Keck and Sikkink, 1998, 1999). The ways in which multilevel framing and human mediation happen are likely to have two implications: first, for the ownership that activists at each level feel for their claims (frame resonance) and, second, for subsequent mobilisation.

⁴² The combination of these two dimensions form four different network types (see Diani and McAdam, 2003: ch.13). Here, I will only draw on the two dimensions.

Besides helping our understanding of public mobilisation, frames and repertoires also can help illustrate how disruptive or confrontational an NGDO is. The degree of resistance that a collective actor faces partly depends on the contentiousness of the frame it is claiming (Gaventa and McGee, 2010). A way to explore this is to consider whether the nature of the claim itself is reformist and related to social welfare, or rather, redistributive (affecting structural change) and supportive of previously marginalised groups. Directly challenging power-holder figures, such as the president of a country, or deeply entrenched cultural beliefs, like machismo, may also add radically to the claim (ibid: p.27). It is also likely that disruptive frames will require more protest actions and popular mobilisation (ibid: p.27-8). In turn, Tarrow (2011: ch.5) distinguishes three types of collective action through repertoires – *contention*, *disruption* and *violence* (ibid: p.99). Violent repertoires are generally limited to small group willing to risk repression (ibid). Contained repertoires are familiar and rather stable. They have the advantage of building on protest routines that people understand and authorities will accept and even facilitate (ibid). However, they institutionalise and end up lacking excitement. In between sit the disruptive repertoires, that temporarily break with routines yet without using violence, and that are prone to be regularised juridically and normalised culturally (ibid).

Public mobilisation and confrontation can combine in multiple ways. For instance, a collective actor that does not mobilise many activists can use lobbying tactics or be highly disruptive instead. Or the fact that a collective actor only does lobbying (e.g. an interest group) and not protest does not mean that it may not be participatory.

In this sense, Diani and Donati (1999) have questioned the bipolarity of ‘public interest lobbies’ (professional organisations mobilising money and using conventional tactics) and ‘classic grassroots social movement organisations’ or SMOs (membership-based organisations mobilising people’s time and using disruptive tactics)⁴³. The authors gave empirical examples of two other categories, ‘professional protest organisations’ and ‘participatory pressure groups’. Greenpeace illustrates the first, by being highly professionalised with little public engagement (beyond financial supporters) yet using disruptive tactics. *Friends of the Earth* and *WWF* are examples of the second, as membership-based organisations mobilising activists’ time yet

⁴³ Originally, SMOs were defined as organisations that make up, or identify with, a movement (McCarthy and Zald, 1977: p.1218; Zald and Ash, 1966: p.329) while ‘professional SMOs’ were understood as those that have a full-time leadership, weak or non-existent membership involvement, much of the resources originate outside the aggrieved group, and there is a goal of speaking for a constituency (McCarthy and Zald, 1973: p.20).

mostly using conventional tactics. In short, strategies involving either mobilising money or time from supporters (which in turn require more or less professionalised organisational forms) may influence but not determine the degree of radicalism, and vice versa.

While Greenpeace proves that professionalisation is not incompatible with protest, doubt can be cast on whether professionalisation is compatible with people's mobilisation (that is, mobilising both money and time resources). Summarising a popular tension in the SM literature, della Porta and Diani (2006: p.146) suggest that the more an organisation focuses on financial resources, the harder is its capacity to mobilise people. This is what could also be induced from Jordan and Maloney's study of 'protest business organisations' (Jordan and Maloney, 1997, 2007). Based on data from Amnesty and Friends of the Earth, the authors suggest that organisations that grow also change their emphasis from campaigning to self-sustaining organisational demands like funding, marketing and growth. One effect, the authors argue, is that protest businesses set very low membership demands to maximize their number of members. Activist participation gets limited to signing petitions, fundraising and a few demos while campaigns are controlled by a small professional elite without providing many opportunities for activists seeking active involvement. If more participation were introduced, membership would drop, weakening an organisation's capacity to influence. Eventually, this creates a *'bureaucratized form of activism'*, efficient in its reach but superficial in its depth (Hensby et al., 2012: p.811).

Supported by a case study from a UK organisation, Hensby et al. (2012) have criticised Jordan and Maloney's argument as normative and suggested that the degrees of member participation may still vary within the so-called 'protest businesses'. Equally, members may feel trust towards the organisation's expertise while being reflexive and demanding participants (ibid: p.820-1). The authors would thus suggest that professionalisation can happen with varying degrees of mobilisation. Trust in leadership expertise (e.g. Alonso's globetrotters) would echo the idea of 'frame resonance' introduced above as having a component of 'credibility' besides that of 'salience' that can help appeal audiences.

2.3.2. Contribution to NGDO literature debates

In the previous section, I have suggested that SM concepts help read relationships between an NGDO and a state characterised by public mobilisation and confrontation, as happens through NGDO campaigning. How does this relate to NGDO literature debates? I suggest that first, NGDO literature had already introduced debates on public mobilisation or engagement in campaigns (e.g. Darnton and Kirk, 2011) but that SM theory can further nuance this understanding with insights from the concepts presented in the previous section. Regarding confrontation and identity, I suggest that SM theory brings new insights to an NGDO literature that has theorised little on these themes.

Research on NGDO campaigning has developed since the 1990s probably influenced by the need to keep up with a rapidly evolving phase of NGDO practice – the growth of campaigning NGDOs (Alcalde, 2010; Alonso, 2009; Chapman, 2001; Chapman and Fisher, 2000; Coates and David, 2002; Covey, 1995; Edwards and Gaventa, 2001; Gaventa and Mayo, 2009; Lewis and Madon, 2004). Research also exists on NGDOs being part of larger networks and coalitions⁴⁴ (Alcalde, 2010; Alonso, 2009; Brown et al., 2012; Gaventa and Mayo, 2009; Murdie and Davis, 2012; Yanacopulos, 2005, 2016: ch.6). This literature has accumulated a wealth of perspectives on public mobilisation, namely through the study of networking and coalition-building and of attracting constituencies. For instance, Covey (1995) already noted the importance of having people's mobilisation as a campaign goal besides policy change goals.

One debate regards the tokenism with which low-income country local people are treated by NGO/NGDO headquarters and national elites in international campaigns (Chapman and Fisher, 2000; Collingwood and Logister, 2005; Covey, 1995; Earle and Pratt, 2009; Edwards, 2001; Shukla, 2009; WPF, 2013). Tokenism impacts negatively not only in ethical and formal accountability terms but also in campaign coherence and mobilising. A recent international seminar identified two types of campaign formats – 'solidarity' and 'professional' campaigning (Hogle, 2013; WPF, 2013). The solidarity type is led by independent affected groups from low-income countries with secondary international NGDO support. Success is measured by solving the problem of the affected groups. The professional type is led by NGO staff and aims to change

⁴⁴ I understand 'networks' as the NGDO relationships beyond its staff (constituency, partners, coalitions, and collaborations). I see 'coalitions' as more stable collaborations in external networking beyond contractual partners.

OECD/international policy issues often affecting low-income countries. Its success is measured in terms of policy change. The professional format has received most of the tokenist critiques (ibid).

A third campaign format could be identified in between led by NGOs too in which diverse but related issues exist at each campaign level. Some scholars have examined (and suggested the benefits of) this format in enhancing mobilisation (Alonso, 2009; Beardon, 2009; Chapman and Fisher, 2000; Coates and David, 2002; Covey, 1995; Gaventa and Mayo, 2009). For instance, Gaventa and Mayo (2009: p.26-34) highlight five key factors in operating a multilevel campaign related to organisational structures such as the existence of strong local organisations before the campaign, representative governance structures built upon them and attention to the distribution of funding and resources. Other factors include an intentional multilevel framing across actors and levels and the recognition of the differential roles played by activists at each level, especially of local actors. Gaventa and Tandon (2010: p.16-8) have further noted that the upward or downward campaign 'direction' operating between local, national and international levels further affects the nature of future mobilisation. SM insights on mediation can add to this literature in terms of how frames and mediators may influence public mobilisation at each level and prevent tokenism (see section 2.3.1).

A similar debate has been that of NGO and movement relationships, assessed as either positive or negative depending on the case studied. Positive roles have included NGOs as movement predecessors advocating on new issues, e.g. consumer rights; as supporting/being part of movements, e.g. anticolonial struggles, and as end-points following up on issues raised by movements (Lewis and Kanji, 2009: p.66-7). Negative roles are when NGOs are regarded as competitors to movements in terms, for instance, of support bases, and 'NGOisation' understood as processes of NGO domestication of grassroots movements (Alvarez, 2009; Choudry, 2010; Choudry and Kapoor, 2013). In turn, the 'marketing of rebellion' (Bob, 2005) denotes movements that, somehow altering their original goals, frame themselves according to international standards. This is to gain the attention of global NGOs or networks, themselves with limited resources for support. As a result, support may reach the most internationally appealing local groups rather than the neediest ones. All in all, reading positive or negative cases in isolation is likely to induce false generalisations, for instance, that NGOs domesticate/'NGOise' movements on any occasion they relate to them. Using wider concepts

such as networking and coalitions to embrace all possible positive and negative cases and to explain why variation in NGDO-movement relationships happens seems more convenient.

Another debate has turned upon the importance of attracting constituencies through 'positive frames'. Darnton and Kirk (2011: ch.3) introduced the notion of 'frames' in the NGO literature from a cognitive linguistics perspective as mental structures that help understand reality. The authors distinguish between 'surface frames' or everyday words that activate moral worldviews and 'deep frames' on which surface frames draw. Acknowledging the latter, they suggest, is important for a campaign analysis. Further, they call for a shift from 'negative' frames conveyed by words such as 'aid' and 'charity' to 'positive' frames such as 'justice'. SM frame theory can add to these by relating positive deep frames to their capacity to activate mobilisation. While other authors like Leach et al. (2010) have explored the influence of narratives in mobilising (see their notions of 'dominant and alternative narratives'), I believe that SM theory offers a more nuanced analysis through the notions of frame resonance and alignments (see section 2.3.1).

In addition to adding to the understanding of public mobilisation through SM theory, I believe that the idea of confrontation has been little explored in the NGDO campaign literature and can gain from SM theory insights. Darnton and Kirk (2011: p.29; also see Jordan and Maloney, 1997, 2007) call for a move from 'clicktivism' to more 'high-risk activism', which, they suggest, better challenges prevailing power structures. Yet, they have not developed the idea further beyond that call. The analysis of protest repertoires and their level of disruption can contribute to this area. Likewise, analysing the contentious content of frames may help too (see section 2.3.1).

A similar situation occurs for the idea of political identity, which I believe has been little explored in the NGDO campaign literature and can equally gain from SM theory insights. NGDOs use the identification with poverty eradication and development to attract campaigners. The notion of a changing identity, as presented by SM theory, can help provide an understanding of the ways in which this 'identity' may or may not be changing. This can be studied by paying attention to the nature of the campaigners' feelings about the idea of poverty eradication and of campaigning on it. For example, feelings of fulfilment may indicate compliance with the current common identity while feelings of discomfort may call attention to tensions and wishes for change in the NGDO identity positioning.

In short, this section has presented a series of theoretically grounded empirical debates on NGDO campaigning. I have suggested that SM theory can contribute to this NGDO literature by nuancing the public mobilisation debate from perspectives such as frame resonance and alignments, networking and mediation and by adding analysis on confrontation and identity. Further, the NGDO debates presented can add to SM concepts and contribute to build a conceptual framework to understand NGDO campaigning. This is explored in the next section.

2.4. Conceptual framework and research questions

This last section recaps insights from the literature reviewed in the past sections and how these feed the conceptual framework and research questions.

2.4.1. Conceptual framework

In this section, I present a conceptual framework that draws on both NDGO campaigning particularities and debates (see sections 2.1 and 2.3.2) and SM theory through the six concepts chosen (see sections 2.2 and 2.3.1).

In section 2.1, I compared campaigning NGDOs to campaigning organisations and pointed out their particularities. A first insight was that those NGDO features not made for campaigning – such as service-delivery, sponsorship and partner structures – need to be appreciated within a conceptual framework for campaigning NGDOs. These may act as constrainers and/or enablers of campaigning in ways that are absent for campaigning organisations that do not have these structures. Service-delivery and sponsorship can be taken as mobilising structures that affect campaign actions alongside NGDO campaign departments, as would occur in studies of any other campaigning organisation. Likewise, partners can be read as part of the campaign network with a role in campaigning. Finally, organisational human, financial, and cultural resources not initially contemplated for campaigning can also be susceptible to affecting campaigning. Thus departments, networks and resources that were not initially aimed for campaigning can be read politically by using SM concepts. These add to those mobilising structures in the NGDO specifically tailored for campaigns, such as campaign departments. In short, a conceptual

framework to study campaigning NGOs needs to consider the structures, partners and resources that existed before campaigning was added.

A second insight from section 2.1 was that the anti-poverty origins of campaigning NGOs may affect their campaigning. While this is not a specific NGO element (campaigning organisations may campaign to end global poverty), the next reflections pose the following questions: if anti-poverty is the NGO mission, any campaign theme is likely to be tailored, screened or rephrased in that particular perspective. On the other hand, if this anchoring is not possible, the theme is not likely to be included. At the same time, the original global poverty identity is not static and changes over time according to contexts. The notion of a political identity that is continually being constructed and reconstructed, as suggested by SM theory, may help a reading of these ideas.

A final insight from section 2.1 was the need to include the aid sector besides the national contexts in a framework for campaigning NGOs. In this case, SM theory contributes with the notion of opportunities and threats that can be applied to both the aid sector and the domestic contexts. The borders of the aid sector (Eyben, 2006; Lewis and Kanji, 2009; Tvedt, 2006; Wallace et al., 2006) develop according to a specific set of values based on poverty reduction and donor-defined rules like specialised language, money uses and timeframes. With donors as the main actors, incentives and punishments work through grant giving-refusal and compliance. Elsewhere, the borders of national politics, with states as the main actors, are defined by law and citizenship and ultimate punishments by law, policing and administration (Najam, 1996: p.213), such as the Charity Commission. The two contexts interact and may affect campaigning in merged ways, in a sort of 'overlap' of opportunities and threats. These two dimensions, the aid sector and the overlapping opportunities and threats, would be absent in campaigning organisations. Finally, analysing international, national and local levels of opportunities and threats is needed as the case study is an international campaign operating in different places.

Section 2.3.2 completed these NGO particularities with debates from the NGO campaigning literature. A key debate regarded solidarity and professional campaigning in which pro-poor actors made collective claims on other people's interests through challenging actions on decision-makers. Other literature involved debates on public mobilisation and a development/aid influence.

To take these NGDO insights further, I use six SM concepts for the framework to explore NGDO campaigning, namely frames, repertoires, mobilising structures, networks, identity and political opportunities and threats (see sections 2.2 and 2.3.1). They are related to each other in that they all help explain the performing, organising and envisioning of political action through campaigning. Performing would be disordered and directionless without previous organising and envisioning. In turn, organising and envisioning would be quite useless without bringing campaigning into practice. I chose these SM concepts because they had been used and related to each other in previous empirical studies and can further contribute to current NGDO debates. I see the conceptual framework as a pyramid whose base of envisioning, the identity and the context, strongly influence organising and performing. Identity and context are closely related to each other too. Secondly, organising also affects performing. At the same time, from the top of the pyramid to the bottom, campaign discourses, actions, symbols, behaviours, emotions may transform organising, and all of these, identity and contextual circumstances.

Other SM scholars from different traditions⁴⁵ have also progressed towards this blending of organisational, cultural and political dimensions⁴⁶ (see McAdam et al., 1996, 2001; Tarrow, 2011). Taking this combination of six SM concepts, rather than fewer concepts, has the advantage of showing a thorough picture of a collective actor's political action. Yet, it also limits the analytical depth that I can give to each concept⁴⁷.

Overall, my framework consists of a theory of contentious collective action as defined in section 1.1.1, that is, the mobilisation of ordinary people into making claims and challenging opponents, elites, or authorities; and a theory of NGDO campaigning, defined by organisational and contextual particularities such as non-campaign elements (e.g. sponsorship and service-delivery

⁴⁵ For a summary of traditions, see della Porta and Diani (2006: p.1-22). These SM concepts were born in the European and US schools yet African, Asian, Middle East and Latin American theoretical perspectives also exist (e.g. Bayat, 2013; Broadbent and Brockman, 2010; Escobar and Alvarez, 1992; Larmer, 2010; Motta and Nilsen, 2011; Shigetomi et al., 2009; Tall et al., 2015; Thompson and Tapscott, 2010; Wignaraja, 1993). While acknowledging this literature, I have preferred to keep these concepts because they are more consolidated. Also, these schools have progressively showed more aware of other contexts, e.g. McAdam et al. (2001).

⁴⁶ In this sense, the term 'SMO' could seem a logical one to study a political organisation but is insufficient to study it fully. The term and its resource mobilisation school have conceptual tools to analyse a collective actor's organisational elements but lacks explanatory power for grasping other cultural and political ones.

⁴⁷ Andrews and Edwards (2004) offer an 'advocacy organisations' framework to jointly study interest groups, social movement organisations and non-profit organisations. They synthesise four elements out of the three literatures: membership and participation, organisational structures, resources, and inter-organisational networks and coalitions. While comparatively useful, I felt that confrontation/protest and identity dimensions were too diluted.

programmes), a development/aid influence as well as solidarity and professional claims from pro-poor actors and a public mobilisation element.

By using SM theory on an NGDO I do not mean that I expect the object of study to function ‘like a movement’. What I mean is that SM theory, taken as a contentious collective action theory, is wide enough to study a range of different collective actors, however they act politically. Broadly speaking, disruptive action, voluntary and mass public mobilisation are intrinsic of movements while negotiation, paid and non-mass action are more typical of bureaucratic actors. However, correspondences are not clear-cut and variations exist, e.g. Greenpeace is both bureaucratic and disruptive, and movements may negotiate and have some paid staff (see section 2.3.1).

Further, NGDOs may also seek to secure change through more discreet and less confrontational means sometimes in conjunction with campaigning activities – what I referred to as ‘advocacy’ (see section 1.1.1, footnote 9, for a definition). There may thus be a strategic interplay between ‘campaigning’ and ‘advocacy’ as studied in some literature (Carbert, 2004; Dalton, 2007).

By using SM theory, I do not want to imply either that the way in which movements contend is the best one (as could be inferred from Korten’s theory, see section 2.2.1). Rather, I think that different types of political action (professionalised, movements) may suit diverse situations and profiles of activists (see a case study illustration by Anheier and Themudo, 2002).

2.4.2. Research questions

The past section has presented a conceptual framework for the political action analysis of an NGDO through its campaigning. The framework aimed to link NGDO and SM theory to grasp findings that would probably be more difficult to find out were these theories taken in isolation. The research questions aim to link the SM concepts of the framework and to find similarities with other campaigning NGDOs towards an understanding of political action in a campaigning NGDO. My research question (RQ) and sub-questions (SQ) are as follows (see Figure 1):

Figure 1: Research question and sub-research questions

RQ: How does political action happen in a campaigning NGDO when seen through a social movement lens?

SQ 1: How do SM concepts relate to explain political action in the NGDO?

SQ 2: How similar is the NGDO's political action to other campaigning NGDOs?

Three key terms constitute the research question – political action, campaigning NGDO, and social movement lens. ‘Political action’ was defined in section 1.1.1 as the processes of public mobilisation and confrontational claim-making on authorities. ‘Campaigning NGDOs’ were defined in the same section as those NGDOs operating public mobilisation and protest in their campaigns besides other goals like service-delivery and advocacy. ‘Social movement theory’ has been reviewed in this chapter and six key concepts highlighted.

Sub-question 1 puts emphasis on asking about the interactions between the six SM concepts (see some literature precedents in section 2.2.2). A first hypothesis I suggest is that concepts may be connected by relationships of confluence (several concepts illustrating different aspects of a phenomenon, e.g. public mobilisation), mutual influence (two concepts explaining each other), and causation (one concept explaining another). In general terms, the campaign performativity (visible in frames and repertoires) could not coherently work without previous organising and envisioning. That means, namely, that the skeleton and the orientation support campaign performativity (as explored by networking, mobilising structures, identity and political opportunities and threats). In turn, the campaign performance gives sense and gradually influences organising and envisioning. The organising is also likely to be based on campaign envisioning, and the latter will be gradually affected by organising too. More specifically, I put special attention to the relationship between political opportunities/identity and frames, repertoires, networking and mobilising structures, assuming that the first elements have a stronger influence over the second ones than the other way around. This sub-question is dealt with in the empirical chapters (Chapters 4, 5 and 6) and, more explicitly, in section 7.2.3.

Sub-question 2 explores how similar the political action of the NGDO studied through campaigning is to those of other campaigning NGDOs and organisations (see literature precedents in sections 2.1 and 2.2). The aim is to situate the case study in a perspective that

looks towards a better understanding of that case and of the concept of 'campaigning NGDO'. A hypothesis I depart from is that the case study is likely to have some particularities but that, overall, a majority of commonalities may be found in sister organisations of the sector. Sub-question 2 is addressed in sections 7.1 and 7.2.2. Finally, the main research question is addressed in the three parts of section 7.2.

Chapter 3 – Methodology: the case study method

Introduction

This chapter looks at my ontological, epistemological and methodological approaches to the research (section 3.1). It then describes the research process, from the choice of theme, research questions and conceptual framework to the case study, data collection and analysis and interpretation, writing and dissemination (section 3.2). A review of the ethical process follows, including my positionality (section 3.3). The chapter ends with a description of the challenges and lessons I experienced as a researcher (section 3.4).

3.1. The research approach

This section has two subsections – the ontology and epistemology that introduce the critical, constructivist and participatory paradigms, and the methodology that introduces the extended case method.

3.1.1. Ontology and epistemology – critical, constructivist and participatory paradigms

Lincoln and Guba (2000) identify five research worldviews or paradigms: positivism, post-positivism, critical theory, constructivism and participatory. I sought a paradigm that helped me understand the ‘how’ of a phenomenon – collective political action in a campaigning NGDO – through an agent-centred, power-aware and transformative lens.

I thus opted for a mix of critical theory, constructivism and participatory paradigms (ibid). From critical theory, I take the view that the world is based on relationships of unequal power and that the ways of knowing and researching must include elements to uncover these power relationships. From constructivism, I take the notion that these power relationships are constructed by social agents. From the participatory paradigm, I take the belief that the

development of these unequal relations can not only be revealed but also possibly changed through research.

This is why I take agents as the primary point of analysis – without ignoring the importance of structures, context and history *as seen by agents*. This approach aims to avoid an ‘invisible hand’ perception of data and to adopt a dynamic, social-change perspective in which the reader knows *who* took (and could take) a decision or action at a given time to change or maintain a situation. This position aligns with that of key SM scholars who, following critiques of being ‘structuralist’ (McAdam et al., 2001), moved towards a more actor-oriented and constructivist approach where interactions among social actors are acknowledged as having force (also see Fligstein and McAdam, 2011; Jasper, 2004, 2006).

For instance, McAdam et al. (2001) suggested that we could see frames and repertoires not only as the cultural arsenal constructed by the challengers but also as the result of an: *‘interactive construction of disputes amongst challengers, their opponents, elements of the state, third parties, and the media’* (ibid: p.44) – for example, the media is engaged in filtering frames and counter-repertoires by opponents. Similarly, opportunities and threats are situational and subject to attribution, not abstract objective structures. Attribution relates to an actor-oriented perspective since: *‘no opportunity, however objectively open, will invite mobilization unless it is a) visible to potential challengers and b) perceived as an opportunity’* (ibid: p.43).

In this ‘seeing like an activist’, I aim to maintain the activists’ view at all levels of analysis – from micro to macro processes. For instance, I explore the emergence and development of activists’ frames as happening amongst activists in the NGDO but also how these interact with other dominant frames from opponents such as states and corporations (see Chapter 4). Similarly, I take political opportunities and threats not as existing ‘on their own’, but as they are seen by the activists interviewed. These are opportunities and threats only because they caught the activists’ attention⁴⁸ (see Chapter 6).

In terms of research quality, I have sought to reach a *systematic, traceable* and *reflexive* research. The first implies that the research process be internally coherent – for instance, the

⁴⁸ For an evolution of the term ‘political opportunity/political opportunity structure’, see della Porta (2013)

research question is aligned with the research problem, data collection and analysis, and limited enough to enable empirical research (Sumner and Tribe, 2008). Secondly, I have sought traceability (or the capacity to transparently explain the research process) by describing the research steps, challenges and lessons (see sections 3.2 and 3.4). Thirdly, I have aimed to be reflexive about my research position by selecting a methodology that takes power into account (see section 3.1.2) and reflecting on my positionality (see section 3.3.1). I also used respondent validation through feedback meetings and chapter revisions to detect possible biases.

I have also sought to include some participatory research validity elements, always within the limitations that a PhD format places on participation. By participatory research, I mean a paradigm that repositions the researched as co-researchers (Fals-Borda and Rahman, 1991; Freire, 1970). For instance, co-deciding research questions and fieldwork sites, forming a research group, co-collecting and co-analysing data, and co-designing dissemination materials. My attempts to include participatory elements are explained in more detail in the ethics section (see section 3.3).

3.1.2. Methodological approach – the extended case method

Since the research question is exploratory in relation to a particular phenomenon, it demands the maximum amount of depth in the data. I thus opted for the case study method, which is: '*an intensive analysis of an individual [e.g. NGDO] unit*' (Flyvbjerg, 2011: p.301). The case study was born in the ethnographic qualitative tradition, which is a grounded, visible, audible and touchable methodology (however, see Barrett, 2009 for case studies in quantitative research). In ethnographic case studies, the researcher stays for a relatively long period of time where the researched live, and becomes familiar with their discourses and practices as they happen.

Compared to surveys and historical documents, an ethnographic case study contributes detailed and contextualised accounts of a phenomenon, including its meanings, novelties, routines and contextual variations (Lichterman, 2013). These make the case study method particularly well suited to explore social and symbolic processes (ibid: p.428).

Within the case study tradition, I was interested in an approach that included the analysis of constructed power and of a participatory design in line with my ontology and epistemology. The 'Extended Case Method' (hereafter called ECM, Burawoy, 1998) includes the dimension of power more strongly than other approaches like post-modernist 'multi-sited ethnography' (Marcus, 1995) or constructivist 'grounded theory' (Glaser and Strauss, 1967)⁴⁹. Born in the school of critical theory, the ECM requires the researcher to analyse power, conflict and resistance in four ways (or 'extensions') – in the researcher-researched interactions, in interactions among the researched, and in the role of both context and theory.

Following the ECM, I have sought to unpack power relations in these four ways. For the researcher-researched interactions, I have reflected on my own positionality as a researcher, used personal diaries, returned findings to informants and included informants' feedback in the PhD account (see section 3.3.4). To consider power in interactions among the researched, I have made these explicit, hence for instance, I discuss the tensions among ActionAid staff during the first steps of the campaign (in section 4.2) and raise the challenges between staff, programme participants and supporters (in section 5.1.1). I also registered the weakest and most discordant voices, for instance, programme participants, rural 'Activista' youth campaigners, partners and ex-staff (see section 3.2.3). Finally, I sampled some governmental and academic voices beyond NGDO accounts to check on potential divergent perspectives (*ibid*).

The third way of analysing power aims to integrate contextual insights (beyond a more classical ethnographic exploration of the visible place) yet without assigning a false sense of inevitability to extra-local forces. This has been done by including contextual and historical accounts (besides accounts on current events) as experienced by the activists rather than as interpreted by myself. That is, the contextual elements presented as data in the empirical chapters were cited by activists in interviews and group discussions as opportunities and threats, like the influence of the global financial crisis in the tax campaign (see section 4.1) or on the historical role of donors in Nigerian activism (see section 6.2.2).

The fourth way of analysing power is through theory. The ECM asks the researcher to make explicit their (always present) theory before fieldwork. This exposes theories to constant healthy

⁴⁹ See Burawoy (1998), Lapegna (2009), Sempere (2012) and Tavory and Timmermans (2009) for a comparison of schools

revision. That is, if a case is found that nuances or contradicts a theory, it can generate a different theoretical vision. In other words, case studies can be useful either to keep building and nuancing a theory in construction or to refute it when the case proves unfitting. A major example of the latter is Galileo's rejection of Aristotle's law of gravity, which was not proved statistically across a wide range of survey cases but through a single case study (Flyvbjerg, 2006: p.225). Galileo's case exemplifies an often under recognised benefit of the case study besides the depth of data that it offers, which is its capacity to engage in 'theoretical generalisation' (Flyvbjerg, 2006; Snow, 2013a: p.169).

In the findings (see Chapter 7), I suggest that ActionAid as a 'campaigning NGDO' case (and, tentatively, campaigning NGDOs as a group) provides nuances and adds to the data available on campaigning organisations in SM theory. It does so by giving the theory a different development NGO angle (while being far from refuting or not fitting it). ActionAid's case helps '*to understand the limits of existing theories and to develop new concepts*' (Flyvbjerg, 2011: p.307). New concepts suggested to understand the phenomenon of NGDO campaigning include 'tense opportunities', 'contained disruption' and 'hybrid-based campaigning' (see section 7.2).

3.2. The research process

This section presents the research process as follows: (1) the choice of theme, framework and research questions; (2) the choice of case study and timeframe; (3) the sampling and collection methods; and (4) the choice of software and analytical methods. The dissemination is covered in section 3.3.4.

3.2.1. The research process backstage

I started my PhD with the idea of deepening my practical knowledge of popular education. I completed a first literature review on politics and education and planned to use ActionAid's popular education method *Reflect* in the case study as I had previously used that method before the PhD. Then an ActionAid colleague sent me the draft of ActionAid's forthcoming global

strategy, which gave emphasis to international campaigning. Like popular education, the strategy and campaigning attracted me for its political intentions.

Since the global strategy covered popular education, I narrowed down the PhD topic to study popular education in international campaigning. Once involved in fieldwork, however, I realised that popular education groups were not very active in campaigning in Nigeria. I thus shifted my PhD focus towards studying activist levels in international campaigning, with special attention to the local level, but without expectations that popular education methods would be integrated in a campaign.

As fieldwork progressed, the importance of the global strategy lost weight in my own mind-set. Daily routine showed me that most staff were unfamiliar with what was a new global strategy by then and that, in any case, it was only one factor amongst many guiding their international campaigning. I then realised how attached I had been to ActionAid's strategy. For instance, I was borrowing vocabulary from ActionAid's strategy for my preliminary chapters such as 'empowerment' and 'solidarity' rather than drawing on my conceptual framework.

I first heard about SM theory by chance, through the visit to the IDS (*Institute of Development Studies* at Sussex University where I study) of a visiting PhD colleague from Oxford University researching movements in Chile. We formed a lunch discussion group on contentious politics with two other PhD students, which got me interested in the potential of SM theory to explore campaigning. Three 1st-year courses at IDS-Sussex on 'unruly politics theories', 'ethnographic traditions' and 'participatory research' also helped me clarify the choice of theory and methods.

The literature review lasted until practically the final months of writing. Strategies included bibliography tracing (from a recent publication backwards and conversely from an old publication forwards), using the Google Scholar word search, a word-of-mouth search, peer academic feedback at IDS, and emailing leading NGO/SM theorists for recommended literature (I received responses from Hanspeter Kriesi of the *European University Institute*, Jackie Smith of the *University of Pittsburgh* and two staff members of *Harvard University* specialising in advocacy INGOs).

Setting the research questions was also an on-going process. I had to learn to move and choose between levels of theorisation, from the most practical to the most theoretical. For example, from ‘how can an international campaign be multilevel and bottom-up’ (the most practical option preferred by some ActionAid staff in London during preparatory conversations for fieldwork), to ‘how do mobilisation and protest happen in NGOs’ (mid-range), to ‘how useful is it to apply SM theory to NGO campaigns’ (more theoretical in nature). In a way, I have tried to keep these layers, a more theoretical one on political action theory, and a more practical one on the uses that this can have to explore and assess a campaign.

3.2.2. Case study and timeframe

An ‘extreme’ case study obtains: *‘information on unusual cases, which can be especially problematic or especially good... to understand the limits of existing theories and to develop new concepts’* (Flyvbjerg, 2011; also see the ECM’s 4th theory extension in section 3.1.2).

I have selected ActionAid as an extreme case of both potential strong protest and strong public mobilisation for several reasons. Although ActionAid expanded in the 1980s and 1990s like other NGOs, it later started to innovate on democratising internal organisational features through participatory processes, strong human rights-based local programmes and a decentralised, nationally-driven federation (Newman, 2011). As a result, ActionAid is known for being: *‘arguably the most radical large INGO’* (ibid: p.102) with a strong political analysis and practice (ibid: p.71, 226-7; Edwards, 2005: p.8; Shutt, 2009; Walsh, 2014).

Second, ActionAid stressed mass-campaigning in its global strategy seeking to work with organisations and movements on a large scale, e.g. to *‘mobilise more than five million youth by 2017’* (ActionAid, 2012b: p.85). ActionAid sets out a detailed theory of change consisting of ‘campaigning’ with the ‘empowerment’ of people living in poverty/injustice through popular education and other community work and the ‘solidarity’ of supporters and between groups of people living in poverty/injustice (ibid: ch.3-5). Two other NGOs reviewed that were also campaigning on tax justice in Nigeria and the UK, ChristianAid and Oxfam, cite ‘campaigning’ in

their global strategies too but do not locate it in such a central role nor detail its operative components⁵⁰.

These features could give ActionAid an advantage in creating more radical mass campaigns when compared to other campaigning NGOs. Assuming that this is the case, then ActionAid is the most fertile case with which to explore as many campaign dimensions as possible under SM theory.

In 2013, ActionAid launched its international *Tax Justice Campaign* or TJC. I chose campaigning to explore political action because ActionAid's strategy explicitly related it to street action and mass mobilisation: *'the strategy sets out ambitious targets in terms of profile raising and mobilisation, including increasing our supporter base to more than five million people and mobilising five million young people as key change makers. Our [multi-country] campaigning will be a key vehicle for making this a reality'* (ibid: p.92). I chose the TJC for practical reasons as the first multi-country campaign that ActionAid had launched of the three planned.

Four ActionAid country members from about twenty involved in the TJC offered their availability to host me as a PhD student. ActionAid staff and I selected Nigeria and the UK as fieldwork countries. My only prior demand had been to select an African-Asian country and a European one for comparability of campaigning contexts and in order to prevent the 'parallel-worlds' problem. As Lewis (2005) said concerning the latter: *'a key challenge is... the need to connect research perspectives from both 'industrialized' and 'developing country' contexts to challenge the parallel-worlds problem and to engage more fully with the... international dimensions of non-governmental action'*.

After visiting ActionAid partners in four Nigerian states (Kaduna, Kogi, FCT and Ondo) and talking to partner staff from two more states (Benue and Delta), AAN staff and I chose Ondo state for the fieldwork. This was because ActionAid's partner in Ondo, JDPC, was the most advanced partner in local tax actions at the time. The security and logistical conditions were also the best, e.g. existence of a Catholic nuns' hostel where I could stay. In the UK, I did fieldwork in London, where most tax actions happened (see Figure 2).

⁵⁰ www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/2012_strategy.pdf and <http://oxf.am/ZPbh>




Figure 2: Location of Abuja, Akure (Ondo) and London

Source: United Nations

Thus, fieldwork took place in three sites – Abuja, Akure (the capital of Ondo, 8 hours' drive from Abuja) and London between January 2013 and December 2014. The first fieldwork contact I had was with ActionAid in London in January 2013. The most intense period of fieldwork took place between May 2013 and April 2014, with two trips

to Nigeria (mid-May to mid-September 2013 and mid-March to April 2014) and follow-up on ActionAid and AAUK. Stays in Ondo (Akure) and other Nigerian states took place in May 2013, August 2013 and April 2014. Initial access to AAUK faced some challenges, with the country case study starting later, from November 2013 onwards.

The table below (Figure 3) shows the four sites of research – ActionAid London, AAN Abuja, JDPC Akure and AAUK London. Light grey boxes indicate online follow-up and email correspondence while dark grey boxes mark intense on-site fieldwork, such as participant observation and interviews. Dark grey overlaps in vertical (for the same time period) denote that the different organisations and I coincided in the same venue, i.e. AAN-JDPC in two workshops in May and August 2013 and AAN-AAUK in bilateral discussions in March 2014.

Figure 3: Fieldwork timeframe in the four sites

	2013				2014			
	Jan-Mar	Apr-Jun	Jul-Sep	Oct-Dec	Jan-Mar	Apr-Jun	Jul-Sep	Oct-Dec
ActionAid London								
AAN Abuja								
JDPC Akure								
AAUK London								

Source: compiled by the author

Fieldwork in Nigeria and the UK was very different. In the UK, I would go to the offices only for meetings, workshops, actions and interviews, as I had no assigned office space (for both ActionAid and AAUK). Online information was, however, rich and constant. I could not follow up on Nigeria from abroad as online news, blogs and resources were scarce. I needed to be present in the offices to do the research. An exception was Nigerian Activistas with whom I communicated through Facebook and email while away from Nigeria.

3.2.3. Sampling and collection methods

In ethnography, the researcher stays a relatively long period of time in the researched place. When ethnography takes place in multiple sites, this period is shared amongst the various locations that, together, would constitute the case study. In my case, I divided fieldwork time in cycles of several months moving between Abuja, Akure and London. In section 3.4.2, I refer to the challenges I found in performing ethnography in different sites.

In sampling, I followed the *principle of saturation* or data repetition (Baker and Edwards, 2012; Mason, 2010) when selecting the number of interviews, time of fieldwork and observation exposure. I combined this with the *principle of triangulation* (Snow, 2013a: p.168) or diversification of informants (internal and external to the campaign, namely ActionAid staff, AAN staff, AAUK staff, JDPC staff, Activistas, UK campaigners, state authorities and academics), techniques (participation observation, interviews, archives) and four sites to obtain the most varied perspectives before saturation. Since the campaign in AAN had not started targeting the private sector (as had been the case with state authorities), I did not include the private sector in my sampling. However, there is some secondary data for the UK on private sector views, e.g. AAUK-Barclays public exchange letters in section 4.3.

To avoid homogenising the group studied and silencing discordant voices (see the ECM's 2nd tenet on power, section 3.1.2), I used several strategies. First, the account on the emergence and development of the campaign in Chapter 4 mostly relied on a single key informant – an ex-staff member of AAUK. To offset this single-account-reliant data, I asked two other ActionAid staff who did not know the first informant for feedback once the chapter was written. Similarly, informants were mostly from ActionAid as the bulk of the data I needed for my research

question regarded internal campaigning. Yet, I also included state and academic voices in my sampling to avoid a single informant profile (e.g. civil society profile).

In the same way, I have noted respondents' consensus and dissent in the chapters of the thesis. I note the existence of consensus when I specify that data came from several interviews in the data source I provide in brackets, e.g. (AAN senior staff, interviews, 2013-14). Second, I note the existence of dissent with the inclusion of all the conflicting versions, with special attention to voices that may be less heard, e.g. dissent on the tensions between AAN staff and Nigerian Activistas over mobilisation (see Chapter 5), and between JDPC-AAN staff and state authorities over 'multiple taxation' (see Chapter 4).

As for the historical methods, most of my sampled readings and interview questions covered the campaign period (2012-2014). I used, as secondary time references, 1972 (ActionAid's foundation) and the 1940s (the period of establishment of most campaigning NGOs).

Voice recordings were taken of all interviews and discussions to ensure exactitude of quotations and research traceability. Recording also helped me to better hear responses and discussion threads that I had not been aware of while interviewing. In cases where recording was not possible, e.g. unexpected conversations, semi-public workshops and so on, I would take notes right afterwards or ask for permission to write something down while chatting. English was the language used except for interviews with local farmers, traders and schools in Ondo. In these cases, I either had the help of a Yoruba-English translator or of Activista young campaigners. The latter were paid as research assistants to do parts of the research themselves and report to me later.

For data collection, I drew on qualitative methods that included participant observation, 47 interviews, informal conversations, six group discussions and two-person/three-person interviews, internal reports and archives, online follow-up, an ActionAid survey on campaigning and comparative 'small cases' with other UK campaigning NGOs and organisations. The 'small cases' were particularly conceived to answer sub-question 2 while the rest of the methods focused on ActionAid, thus mostly answering sub-question 1. Each method is described in more detail below.

- Participant observation included my daily presence in AAN offices, attendance at meetings, workshops and street actions, and a number of visits to markets, villages, schools and Activista groups in Nigeria (see appendix 1). In the UK, I attended AAUK's campaign street actions, workshops and trainings and visited the offices when I had interviews or other appointments with staff. Online observation for ActionAid and AAUK (and sometimes AAN) also took place in monthly *TJC policy working group* Skype meetings. I also became an AAUK sponsor, an AAUK community campaigner and an AAN Activista. For AAUK Activistas, I tried to join the London group (at SOAS Institute) but it was not active at the time, so I opted to follow groups on Facebook. Besides AAUK Activistas, I was part of three more Facebook groups – *Activista AAUA-Ondo*, *Activistas Nigeria* and *AAUK community campaigners*.

With AAUK fundraising groups, I opted to make several interviews rather than observe groups, as I deemed the data that fundraisers could share with me was more secondary with regards to the theme of political action than that of campaigners. In fact, I felt that observation provided a deeper layer of analysis that complemented and triangulated data from reports and interviews. This was, first, because reports and interviews may say or interpret events in a way that does not respond to what the observer is seeing. Second, this was because observation serves to contextualise interview data, explore facts and daily practices more than discourses, and partly because it locates the social and power position that the interviewee genuinely occupies in her different contexts. This refers specifically to, for example, AAN campaign staff vis-à-vis other AAN staff in AAN offices; and vis-à-vis ActionAid and AAUK staff in online meetings or international events.

- Interviews covered exploratory interviews, informal conversations, semi-structured interviews, in-depth interviews and historic-contextual interviews (see appendix 1). The first three types normally gathered general and work profile-related data (e.g. by AAN programme staff, market trader opinions) while the last two types delved into particular topics. Interviews proved useful to study the campaigners' motives, beliefs, emotions and identities (della Porta, 2014), for example, why campaigners choose to campaign in ActionAid. Historic-contextual interviews in particular helped cover gaps in secondary literature such as the history of campaigning in Nigeria. I also felt that senior staff and ex-staff were more comfortable reflecting on internal organisational information during interviews than most current middle and junior staff. In fact, most in-depth key informant interviews were with these two profiles. I also learnt

to identify new staff members in order to let them settle in as much as possible before asking them for an interview.

- I also undertook group discussions. Unlike interviews, these were better suited to check on 'social truths' or common agreed ideas, e.g. the degree of AAN's confrontation, the challenges of local taxation, Activistas' alleged instrumentalisation. A small innovation was to try out some 'two-person interviews' or 'three-person interviews', a less known technique that sits between interviews and group discussions (Koole, 2011). Comparatively, I felt a different research atmosphere was formed, and one that was particularly useful – amongst other benefits – for socialising personal or sensitive data that would have probably been harder to share and agree in larger groups. For instance, an AAN staff member opined that AAN was not as militant now compared to how it had previously been.

- For secondary data, I drew on internal reports and archives, namely the AAUK's archives in London (now ActionAid's archives), which date back to 1972, and AAN's archives in Abuja with data since the 2000s. I likewise made an online follow-up of websites, blogs and the most recent reports, including textual analysis of some official publications and websites, e.g. AAN and AAUK sponsorship sites. Grey literature complemented the more public and recent online data – AAN had few documents online while AAUK uploaded a lot of information. Tracking AAN and AAUK online job alerts was also useful to keep up to date on the latest news and staff changes in the organisation. Secondary data and archives proved especially valuable for the historical analysis of frames and repertoires (although I did not have space in this thesis to include this data the conclusion chapter suggests ideas for intended further articles). Similarly, adding historical methods to ethnographic approaches through historic-contextual interviews and historical reports was useful for contextualising current data and covering gaps in background information.

- I also used an internal survey to more than 200 ActionAid staff about campaigning (Gilmore, 2011), which was part of ActionAid's past global strategy evaluation 'Taking Stock II'. The survey served as broad baseline data of ActionAid staff's own notions and expectations on campaigning as compared to what was observed to happen in reality (see Chapter 4).

- To help me zoom out of the case study (see Chapter 7), I undertook a number of ‘small case studies’ with other international campaigning NGOs and organisations. These consisted of a review of online documents, articles and books about the organisation, and in some cases, access to internal reports, observation and/or one key informant interview. I undertook small cases with Amnesty, ChristianAid, Greenpeace, Oxfam, War on Want and WDM. I chose these organisations because of their close networking and staff exchanges with ActionAid. This technique proved indispensable for gathering data and checking on ActionAid’s similarities with other campaigning NGOs (see section 7.1).
- Finally, I wrote fieldwork notes and a personal diary to reflect on my experiences in Nigeria and the UK. Fieldwork notes included listing activities and some initial analytical thinking. In the personal diary, I wrote how I felt about the daily activities. On those days where I felt especially sad or happy, I would write more and would try to understand the causes of those feelings (cultural distance, integration, power dynamics, etc.). The diary was also useful to remember the evolution of my own networking during fieldwork – that is, whom I met first and how that affected my research and further networking. I would also write about my power relations with the researched (sometimes I felt on the powerful side while other times I was in the disadvantaged position) and my views on the power relations between the researched themselves – see the ECM’s 1st and 2nd extensions in section 3.1.2.

Although I have not used the information emanating from all these techniques explicitly for my PhD writing, they often influenced the writing indirectly. For instance, I did not directly use workshop and consultancy data, yet results from the ‘kite tool’ in the Uganda workshop (see Appendix 2) showed that many ActionAid country members involved in international campaigns experienced similar problems in connecting campaign levels to those of the TJC. Data can also be used for future articles as with the historical accounts on frames and repertoires mentioned above, or data from the school visits.

3.2.4. Software and analytical methods

To assist myself with the analysis of data, I used the open-access software programme *Sonal* to assist in qualitative analysis. Sonal facilitates data organising by oral thematisation and by full

transcription. I used the faster audition option to organise all interviews by themes and the slower transcription option for in-depth and quotable interviews only.

Sonal also has two types of data coding strategies, a deductive one with predetermined dimensions based on the research framework (e.g. frames) and an inductive one with free tagging words spontaneously emerging from the interviews (see Figure 4). Both have been useful at different points of the research as I describe below.


1) The predetermined dimensions (deductive method): these are based on the research questions and conceptual framework, the researcher can define thematic dimensions (left side column of the picture) and thematise the interviews accordingly (right side). A mistake I initially made was to name dimensions following geography or campaign levels (e.g. campaigning, Nigeria, national), when I should have followed theoretical dimensions (e.g. frames, repertoires, identity). This is easier said than done, as the research is often an iterative process with changing questions and dimensions, e.g. I included 'identity' at a later stage of the research.

2) The loose tags (inductive method): this is where the researcher can tag the interview with words said by respondents that may or may not have to do with predetermined theoretical dimensions. Reviewing what I tagged, I found: (1) time, geographical, institutional or individual identifiers, e.g. 1982, Gambia, UN, Thabo Mbeki; (2) NGDO sectorial slang, e.g. empowerment; (3) words that sounded noisy or repetitive during the auditions-transcriptions, e.g. dictatorship.

Figure 4: Sonal software, deductive and inductive methods



Deductive method through 'dimensions-themes'
Source: compiled by the author



Inductive method through 'tags'
Source: compiled by the author

The more a word is repeated, the bigger the tag becomes in the software, enabling a gradual analysis. For instance, while writing about political threats (Chapter 6), I wanted to know who had mentioned 'colonialism' and 'dictatorship' in Nigeria. I looked up tags and found: colonialism (1 times); dictatorship (7 times).

Although time-consuming, coding data into software helped me organise, reflect on and analyse the information. The options of thematic visualisation, data searching and inductive tagging were some of the advantages I found as compared to not using software.

3.3. Ethics – beyond consent and anonymity

David and Sutton (in Sumner and Tribe, 2008: p.41) suggest that most scholarship has focused ethical attention on the data collection stage. A review of ethical guidelines shows a similar tendency to cover consent, confidentiality, transparency and risk prevention – for example, the Sussex and ESRC guidelines (ESRC, 2015; Sussex University, 2012). Other authors have expanded the ethics to other research stages with the inclusion of elements like power, ownership and data dissemination (e.g. the 'everyday ethics' in Banks et al., 2013).

Development studies also holds ethical specificities such as the assumption of a given idea of 'development' and large power relations between the (e.g. European) researcher and the (e.g. Nigerian) locals (Sumner and Tribe, 2008: p.38-9; also Brydon, 2006). Other authors highlight social movement research particularities, stressing the tension between researching 'about' and researching 'with' (della Porta, 2014: ch.18). These ideas come back to power and participation issues in ethics and to the need to cover ethics at all research stages (Sumner and Tribe, 2008: p.41).

In setting up my ethical framework, I have drawn on the ideas above and on my own research experience, and summarised it in the next four sub-sections. The first sub-section looks at my role as a researcher or *positionality*. The second sub-section explores reasons for the research and for me being the researcher, research beneficiaries and research limits – or *research justification*. This sub-section also reviews the collaboration with the researched in shaping research choices and the consideration of cultural ethical differences – or *research orientation*.

The third sub-section considers the awareness of gatekeepers and vulnerable groups, potential harm from fieldwork, the expectations of participants, consent and confidentiality and accessible data formats and local translations – or *research execution*. Finally, the fourth sub-section considers the researcher's responsibility in on-going communication and in sharing results, feedback data integration, and the use of free software, open-access academic articles and non-academic dissemination – or *research communication*.

3.3.1. Positionality of the researcher

I understand 'positionality' as the researcher's awareness about her position and power in the research process and with the researched. The researcher's perspective and power is influenced by elements such as her previous relationship with them, her professional background and her socio-demographic profile, 'identity' or social position (Sumner and Tribe, 2008: p.4-5, 43-6).

In Chapter 1, I mentioned my previous work with ActionAid as a national partner staff and consultant. This experience made me familiar with some of the education and participation ActionAid staff, which became my entry point for fieldwork preparation and for new contacts. A key new contact was ActionAid's research and policy coordinator, who became my main connection during the PhD and introduced me to other policy, advocacy and campaign staff.

I continued as a consultant twice for ActionAid and once for ActionAid India during my PhD fieldwork (2013-14). All of the consultancy was related to the PhD theme and it served as a space for me to share and apply preliminary results and to gain more insights about ActionAid (although I did not use these as PhD data). These consultancies were also crucial in building trust with some ActionAid staff.

Because of my community development background, I had a bias towards studying campaigns connected to community work. This interest in bringing community work and campaigning closer together helped me approach those in the campaign team that were interested in programme-campaign connections and what I could contribute.

My socio-demographic profile affected my relationships differently – disempowering me with ActionAid staff but giving me power with local people. Being a white European in ActionAid (thus a dominant professional profile), I was questioned under the organisation’s diversity culture. This meant, for instance, that I (and the ActionAid staff contracting me for the consultancies) had to justify why a white European was taken as an expert. I agreed with this policy and had myself questioned this ‘European gaze’ on development research and practice in a video sketch during my 1st year PhD defence in 2012⁵¹. Measures to mitigate this power-led European gaze include awareness about my position and power.

In my relationship with AAN staff, I did not feel that coming recommended from ActionAid headquarters looked like a Trojan Horse role, probably because they knew I was a PhD student, and not a staff member. I did however feel different as the only white in an organisation in which some staff prided the place for being fully black-staffed (informal AAN staff chats, 2013-14). In 2014, three Asian and European expats started working at AAN, which has mitigated this sentiment.

Finally, being white facilitated my research role in communities as I was received in a friendly manner as a foreign visitor. This was less pronounced in peri-urban areas than in rural ones. I tried to diminish this power by being informal in dress and speech, taking as little time as possible from respondents, clarifying service-delivery and funding expectations and talking to those who did not emerge as the dominant voices.

Overall, I felt I moved from being an outsider in campaigns before fieldwork in 2012, to becoming an insider during fieldwork in 2013-2014, and then back to being an outsider during the writing period in 2014-15. Being an insider helped me gather data. Being an outsider eased the writing process as I could feel I had ‘closed’ fieldwork and taken a distance in order to appreciate the general picture. Finally, I did not feel that being a woman or relatively young played a major role (probably because I was also European and university educated), although my Catholic upbringing helped me fit comfortably into Ondo’s religious culture.

⁵¹ www.youtube.com/watch?v=g6FsvWvuqsg

3.3.2. Research justification and orientation

In participatory research, *purpose validity* questions the reasons for the research (Bradbury and Reason, 2001). In this PhD, the interest in researching the theme of campaigning was mine, which could have conflicted with the perspectives of the researched. In reality, most ActionAid staff were fine about campaigning being the research theme although a few objected that campaigning, as it was done, was European-centred (AAN staff, interviews, 2013-14; see Chapter 6).

One might ask what justifies me undertaking the research rather than, say, a national researcher. I could respond that, firstly, I was not using funding that any Nigerian researcher could have used (my funding was from Spain and the UK). Secondly, I had ActionAid connections in the two countries, which aided this multi-country research. Finally, I tried to integrate Activistas as researchers and to make myself and the research useful to compensate for the institutional support received, e.g. editing AAN tax policy briefs, translating documents, using PhD results.

On the other hand, my profile also came with research limits, such as the lack of cultural awareness and language skills, meaning, for instance, that I had a bias for English-speaking local people and was not able to fully support Yoruba-led processes.

Although the research did not directly benefit the respondents I was with, the dissemination work I did about local level and multiple-issue campaigning during the PhD may help create debate on the way in which ActionAid deals with the local level and local people in future campaigning work. Equally, SM theory can serve as a new vocabulary for ActionAid staff (see Chapter 8).

As for the research orientation, *democratic validity* in participatory research questions the participation of the researched in all the research stages (Bradbury and Reason, 2001). In my initial contacts with ActionAid in 2012/13, I agreed on: the theme (local campaigning and linking campaigning levels); and the case study and the fieldwork sites with research and campaigns staff in Nigeria, the UK, and headquarters in London and Johannesburg through email and phone calls. Two staff members read and contributed to my 1st year PhD report.

Other elements, such as the research questions and the methodology, were more my choice, without consent or further communication with ActionAid staff beyond the broader thematic agreement. I however faced the challenge of finding a midpoint between the more practical questions that I knew were of interest to ActionAid staff (local campaigning; and linking campaign levels) and the more theoretical questions formally required for a PhD. Finally, there was some level of data co-collection and co-analysis during market and school visits in Ondo. Four Yoruba-speaking Activistas joined me as a research team. Sometimes they researched with me while at other times they undertook this on their own. We would then discuss data after the visits.

Before fieldwork, I agreed with ActionAid's research and policy coordinator to leave: *'(1) an option for countries to have a discussion with Kas [myself] to consider the implications of hosting a PhD researcher; (2) a clear process whereby countries involved have a role in signing off any of the materials-data used about them in the PhD; and (3) produce other pieces of work (TBC) during the PhD period [besides the thesis] so that there's value add for the country and for ActionAid'* (email communication, 2012). The three requirements were completed.

In terms of ethical differences, the only situation I found culturally inappropriate in Nigeria was to ask for written consent, especially with semi-illiterate or non-English speaking respondents but also in general with any respondent such as ActionAid staff. Instead, I asked for consent verbally and recorded it in audio format, which was more natural. I also ended up doing the same for UK interviews.

3.3.3. Research execution

To avoid being caught by gatekeepers in the choice of respondents, I asked different people as entry points on whether they knew anyone else that I could interview. I considered the participation of vulnerable groups but there was no group likely to be in that situation (e.g. children, physically impaired, fully illiterate). I also tried to minimise potential respondents' expectations by informing them that I was not part of any service-delivery project and that this study was to inform future ActionAid work.

I did not feel that my research could give rise to harm, tensions or exclusions. The only tense moment I recall was in the choice of paying research assistants individually or in a group. For my research in Akure, I hired four Activistas. Since I chose the assistants from the Activista group, this involved the challenge of creating tensions between those chosen and the remainder who were not chosen. I discussed with the Activista leader that some money could be kept for the Activista group and some for the Activista researchers individually, but eventually the decision was left to them. The Activistas also made their own selection of researchers. I only asked that there be at least half of women.

I did not have any sensitive questions in my interviews except for those related to money, which, I explained, could be answered in an approximate way or simply not answered. However, respondents in general had no trouble in answering these.

In terms of consent, I would introduce the research and myself to the interviewees and ask for verbal consent for the use of data, recording and photos. I also asked for permission when I recorded or took photos in semi-public places such as work meetings and workshops. With respondents, I explained that they could choose to be anonymous. Some did not mind having their names published, while others did. I thus opted to anonymise all respondents using only their professional roles, e.g. AAN campaign staff. Options to remove interview parts and/or to add clarifications and feedback were offered to in-depth interviewees.

As for confidentiality in data management, I archived email correspondence and fieldwork data under a personal PC password. I took special care with documents of a private nature, for which I also encoded the document titles and sources. I applied the same protocol to my hardware and online security copies.

For referencing purposes, I organised my data as of 'public', 'internal' and 'private' nature. 'Public' documents were those published that could thus be shared, quoted and referenced. These include 'unpublished' documents that are nonetheless public. Second, most documents internal to ActionAid could not be shared or quoted although I could read them, transmit an idea of the text and reference them. I named them 'internal'. Thirdly, there were a number of documents that were not only internal but also private. The data sharer explicitly asked me not to cite the document's source and gave no permission for sharing, quoting or referencing it. I

could use them for my own PhD framing but not for my overt PhD writing. At least five reports were of this ‘private’ type. Finally, I took care in respecting some campaign documents that were embargoed for a period before finally being published.

3.3.4. Research communication

For communicating research, I followed feedback and dissemination strategies. By ‘feedback’ I refer to sharing results with those who were involved in the research. ‘Dissemination’ is larger than feedback and refers to a general sharing of results. I aimed for this communication to be oriented towards *action validity* –or the usefulness of the research outside of academic theorisation (Bradbury and Reason, 2001). With this in mind, I paid special attention to making feedback meetings practical and that non-academic dissemination strategies existed as well as academic ones.

I had feedback with ActionAid, AAN, AAUK and JDPC staff through informal feedback, short presentations and written summaries. Debriefs were made to ActionAid research and policy coordinator (maternity cover), the (now ex-) AAN country director, the AAN campaign team, JDPC programme officer (with whom I also shared field stories on tax as requested) and two AAUK campaign staff members. An AAUK staff member noted that: *‘the feedback you sent was very helpful. It will help me to make an argument on other stuff I would like to do’* (email communication, 2014). I could not communicate feedback to local groups for logistical reasons but did share ideas with JDPC staff and Ondo Activistas during the research. More individually, I discussed ideas with other interested staff on particular points.

Besides feedback meetings, I received chapter revisions from three ActionAid and AAN staff. I added this feedback data into the PhD. One staff member mentioned the usefulness of reading the chapters as an input for a review of the federal strategy (email communication, 2016). I have also given ideas for the upcoming federal strategy based on the PhD. Feedback meetings and chapter revisions served as a contribution to both ethical standards and quality assurance.

Collaborations with staff also took place during fieldwork. In 2013, I was invited to co-facilitate a session on campaigning with an ActionAid staff member involved in the tax campaign during

an ActionAid international workshop in Uganda. We shared the idea of ‘multiple-issue campaigning’ with programme staff working with the *Reflection-Action* [popular education] method. We used a visual ‘kite tool’ (see appendix 2) to represent the idea that, like a kite, an international campaign can fly high but always touching and being directed from the ground. Four AAN senior programme staff members were present, tried out the tool and gave comments.

I also shared and applied ideas from the PhD in three consultancies in Tanzania, India and Uganda in cooperation with ActionAid staff. My local visits in Nigeria proved useful in conceiving the tax-related part of an unpaid care work curriculum in Tanzania (2013), which was later piloted in India (2014) in collaboration with ActionAid and ActionAid India women’s rights departments. A collaborative publication followed in June 2015, including a tax section in the ‘unpaid care work toolkit’⁵².

Similarly, the local visits, as well as my TJC insights from Nigeria and the UK, helped me in designing a ‘tax justice toolkit’ for local facilitators as part of the TJC⁵³. The toolkit was piloted in Uganda by ActionAid Uganda in collaboration with the ActionAid tax campaign team. It contains itineraries for local tax work and potential target populations to support (farmers, market vendors, educational bodies, youths, women). The toolkit drew on thesis findings such as the various local tax challenges found, the groups affected and likely to mobilise (farmers, vendors) and the ways in which local and national claims had been linked (frame bridging). An ActionAid staff member noted that the toolkit has had a ‘*really positive response*’ as staff were struggling to understand tax and work on it at the local level (email communication, 2016).

Before my second trip to Nigeria (2014), I was also asked by AAUK senior campaign staff to give a presentation about AAN and Nigeria to an AAUK policy, advocacy and campaigns team of eight people in London as an input for their future bilateral collaboration with AAN. During that second trip to Nigeria, I shared photos and videos with AAN communications team, e.g. from the Akure rally. On another occasion, an AAUK campaign staff member asked me for PhD data examples on ActionAid’s ‘*public campaigning capacity-experience*’ as data input for a European Union grant, which was eventually obtained (2014).

⁵² www.actionaid.org/sites/files/actionaid/redistributing_care_work_final_0.pdf

⁵³ www.actionaid.org/publications/tax-power-campaign-reflection-action-toolkit

Finally, the broader dissemination will be performed via three outputs: the PhD thesis, open-access academic articles and blogs (for non-academic dissemination). During my PhD, I always used free software, i.e. *Zotero* for citations, *Audacity* for recording and *Sonal* for qualitative analysis. Using free software means that I can now give suggestions to students, groups and institutions that cannot afford, or do not wish to afford, expensive software. Sharing the research tools and containers (software) freely is as important as sharing the research contents (results) freely for optimising research communication and availability.

3.4. Fieldwork challenges and lessons

Research methodology literature recognises that a researcher going into any organisation, especially as a PhD researcher, where there is no promise of significant direct gains for that organisation, must expect hurdles to navigate and gatekeepers to negotiate with. This section illustrates the specific fieldwork challenges I went through such as accessing data, dealing with fieldwork timing, and difficulties in undertaking ethnography in multiple sites. While some of the challenges were anticipated, I see their sharing as a way of making the research transparent and rigorous. A reflection about lessons relating to the PhD process closes the section.

3.4.1. Data-access challenges

Accessing data was the greatest fieldwork challenge when trying to access ActionAid as an organisation. This played out differently for Nigeria and the UK although some challenges were common. For example, I had no access to ActionAid's intranet and emails as I was not on the staff. This limited my knowledge about regular work dynamics like team meetings.

In Nigeria, the first contacts with AAN and the acceptance of my PhD proposal went smoothly. The challenges arrived once I landed in Abuja. These concerned different conceptions of planning, communication and documentation. For instance, I expected an induction, a meeting upon arrival to organise research and logistics, and some regular follow-up on my research. My first contact was however too busy for weeks, but I eventually found a second person. Overall, I

learnt about staff, departments and organisational procedures like monthly staff meetings and fieldwork visits mostly by introducing myself and by observation rather than by induction.

At the beginning, I had a slight feeling that information was kept away from me. With time however, I realised that this was rather a cultural feature. The 'on the go' planning of activities meant that these could not be communicated much ahead of time. Eventually, I learnt to keep asking what was happening 'on the go' too. There was also a cultural reason for the non-induction. For instance, I literally 'discovered' AAN's monthly staff meetings, no one told me they existed. With time I learnt that when I was not told about a meeting, it was probably not because they did not want me there, but because they assumed someone else had told me, had forgotten or were busy, or just thought those were logistic or thematic meetings of no importance to me.

With no access to the intranet and with only loose communication processes, my physical location in the office was vital to be in the loop of activities. This was not easy either. Because of lack of space, I changed office three times – to the health office, governance office and campaigns office. Even some AAN teams sat apart in different offices too. I found this 'chair politics' inconvenient at the start as I was not with the campaigns team. Again with time, I realised it proved useful to get to know other staff and activities, such as the successful national HIV/AIDS anti-stigma activist work by the health team. In my second visit in 2014, many meetings took place for the African Union Conference and for AAUK's visit so it became easier for me to just grab a chair and stay with the campaign team.

The lunchtime geography also changed drastically from 2013 to 2014, as AAN opened up an internal canteen where staff could eat and chat. Networking then became much easier than before when I would eat in a local bar outside the office with few or no AAN staff.

A final challenge was documentation. Although AAN had made efforts to centralise documents on the intranet, I did not find any uploaded documents when consulting this site with an AAN staff colleague. Rather, staff kept reports on their laptops. This had effects on my research. For instance, I could not obtain any monitoring and evaluation reports on Ondo's partner association before my visit. On another occasion, I had to navigate three levels of hierarchy just to get a one page description of partners. This took me about a month. It is only by experience that one

learns the informal power structure and who to ask for reports so, for example, junior staff would not feel entitled to share internal reports without approval.

In the UK, the case study leg with AAUK stayed on stand-by for the first months of the planned fieldwork. My first campaign staff contact showed reticence during initial conversations as the AAUK campaign team had little space or time for students. There was also some worry about the level of access I required and my initial interest was local campaigning, which was probably not amongst AAUK's priorities. Then, both my AAUK contact and my ActionAid contact (who had liaised between myself and AAUK) went on leave. Finding another liaison person in AAUK became hard and I decided to discard AAUK's case to focus on AAN.

A few months later, my supervisors encouraged me not to drop the case and to instead take a less formal approach to fieldwork in the UK. This meant that I started following AAUK's actions in London as a local campaigner (and as a local financial supporter), which helped me meet other AAUK campaigners and eventually AAUK staff. In 2014, some AAUK staff happened to come over to Nigeria while I was in Abuja to have bilateral conversations with AAN about campaigning. That unexpectedly rocketed me closer to AAUK campaign staff, and I finally took it as a case study. Agreement of collaboration with AAUK was verbal rather than through formal emailing as with AAN.

A challenge in the UK was my difficulty in interviewing AAUK campaigners, given that few campaigners knew each other and therefore could not refer me to other campaigners. Arranging this through AAUK was problematic due to privacy rights on databases. It was through my attendance at training sessions, actions and Facebook groups that I eventually got in touch with a number of them.

Another challenge in the UK was my capacity to interview staff in departments likely to exert influence over campaigning such as communications and sponsorship. I tried to set up interviews with international/UK sponsorship and engagement staff early in 2013 in London but I did not succeed. I was only able to interview a sponsorship staff member in Nigeria, which gave data on how sponsorship worked in Nigeria but not on strategic sponsorship-campaign relationships. I also accompanied sponsorship visits in Ondo and extracted my own conclusions about their relationship to campaigning.

The limited number of interviews with AAUK staff in London – mostly confined to staff working on campaigns – constrained the potential for a deeper analysis of the ‘identity’ problematic connected to the tensions between the campaigning, programming, fundraising and communications sections of AAUK (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). Triangulation of staff perspectives was not therefore possible.

Instead, I covered this gap with secondary literature reflecting on these departmental relationships, e.g. Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010, Shutt, 2009. Similarly, I also compared AAN and AAUK’s official publications and websites through textual analysis, and observed AAUK’s activities, which were two more methods with which to explore identity and potential tensions in campaigning (see sections 6.1.1 and 6.1.2). Finally, I also interviewed sponsors who had become campaigners (see section 5.2.1). Altogether, these methods show that opportunities exist alongside tensions (see the idea of ‘tense opportunities’, or the campaign tightrope symbol, in section 7.2.1).

3.4.2. Other fieldwork challenges

Other challenges have included fieldwork timing challenges and performing ethnography in multiple sites. While timing challenges can be regarded as common in fieldwork, especially in low-income countries like Nigeria, I share some illustrations that happened in my case. The start of the campaign, in mid-2013, presented a fieldwork timing challenge. On the one hand, my access and interviewing were more complicated because the teams were still building up the strategy and needed their own space. On the other hand, this allowed me to attend the exciting preparatory steps in a campaign such as the TJC launch in Nigeria. Overall, studying a campaign ‘as it happens’ has the challenge that data changes swiftly. Conversely, the positive part of it is that one can contribute ideas as the campaign develops.

A second timing challenge was my third visit to Ondo in 2014, which I had prepared on the phone with ActionAid’s partner coordinator several months earlier. Just a few days before the visit, I was told in AAN that the partner JDPC was fully involved in sponsorship visits and that it was not a good time for me to go. This was confirmed by JDPC on the phone. I decided to go in any case as I was soon leaving Nigeria. I did so with the support of Activistas Ondo rather than via JDPC.

The story ended well, as I eventually visited JDPC offices to greet staff and was kindly invited to join the sponsorship visits and an upcoming advocacy workshop.

Undertaking 'ethnography' in two countries, three locations and four organisations (AAN, AAUK, ActionAid and JDPC) was hard to juggle. I share Hage's (2005) critiques about the way short-term stays lose the classical thickness of ethnography – by the time I got familiar with people and processes, I was already leaving the place. These stays in different locations are also based on elitist travelling logistics only manageable by established academics (ibid) or by grant-holding PhD students like me. On the other hand, being in all these places twice proved very valuable as I was able to compare processes not only geographically, but also chronologically from 2013 to 2014. Since campaigns have low and high periods of activity, I was able to plan trips accordingly – for instance, the 2014 Nigerian trip covered the high-activity period of the African Union Ministerial conference and the AAN-AAUK internal campaign discussions.

Researching several sites also had effects on my writing. I sometimes found it difficult to compare countries on occasions when the Nigerian data I had for one particular topic was larger than UK data and vice versa. Second, having two country cases rather than one made it harder to go into depth with country contexts. Third, I found it challenging to start analysis and writing while still collecting data during the second part of my fieldwork in 2014. Each required a different mind-set and work setting. I thus arranged data (transcribing, mapping data) more than writing during the last months of fieldwork. I feel this choice affects the researcher's positionality, since one may write differently during fieldwork than after, when data can start to be regarded as a closed whole.

3.4.3. PhD lessons

Finally, some of my PhD research lessons are concerned with: (1) shifting from a consultant to an academic mind, and from a descriptive to an analytical one; (2) understanding that data access is 50% luck – and that so is participatory research; and (3) being cautious about glossy annual reports and country information from NGDO headquarters.

A first difficult shift was to detach myself away from being evaluative, as in past work consultancies, and towards being academic. A strategy was to keep returning to my research question and to check whether I was responding to it. A second strategy was to create a blank document in which to park my 'recommendations' and free my mind for analysis. Another difficult shift was changing the thread of my PhD argumentation from a descriptive one that responded to 'what' and 'whether' questions and towards an analytical one looking at 'hows' and 'so whats'.

Second, I learnt that access to information often happened by chance. For instance, I once fortuitously received a relevant international report on partners from an AAUK staff member. To my surprise, JDPC and Ondo were one of the case studies selected. I did not receive these reports from AAN staff, perhaps because they did not know about it, or possibly because they did not make the link between my research and this document. Further, sometimes I met people by chance that turned out to be key in the research. For instance, I met one of my key informants at ActionAid's offices in London while waiting for the receptionist to bring me the requested archive boxes. This also shows the importance of informal spaces in research.

My expectations about participatory research also ran the same unexpected path. The first year I wanted to do the most elaborate participatory PhD research. After all the challenges I experienced during fieldwork, I wanted to never hear about 'participatory research' again. Yet, some collaborations did work out in the end and, reflecting back, I can eventually say that I have engaged in some sort of participation as part of the research (see section 3.3).

Finally, I have learnt about the need to complete fieldwork views from annual reports and material from NGDO headquarters. The glossier an annual report or strategy, the more one probably needs to mistrust it. Even internal reports and headquarter views on fieldwork realities may sometimes be incomplete or outdated, for instance, the mention about the strength of the participatory local budget method *Elbag* in Nigeria that was no longer true by the time I visited.

Chapter 4 – Performing in ActionAid: claiming and acting in the tax justice campaign

Introduction

Campaigning is a process by which we can read political action. Other manifestations of political action exist in ActionAid such as reactive protests to inter-governmental events and participation in World Social Forums (WSFs), and these are also based on public mobilisation and confrontation with authorities. I chose campaigning to study ActionAid's political action because it was the easiest observable option about which I could collect data over a sustained period. In section 1.1.1, political action was defined as a process that mobilises ordinary people into confrontation with opponents, elites, or authorities. This chapter focuses on how ActionAid publicly performs this process. The political action nature in campaigning is observable by the use of claims and actions that call for public mobilisation and openly challenge governmental and private sector opponents. The chapter shows examples of 'day-to-day' choices by ActionAid actors, illustrating how these daily strategic actions and interactions are fundamental to protest alongside resources, culture and other dimensions (Jasper, 2004). For instance, there was the choice of betting to campaign for tax after the fall of Lehman Brothers, of starting to coalesce with tax-minded groups, and of choosing particular types of frames and not others (see sections 4.1 and 4.2).

Over more than 40 years, ActionAid has evolved from being a service-delivery organisation to including advocacy and then, campaigning traits (see section 1.3). This blend means that, first, ActionAid plays out its claims and actions in relation to campaigning like campaigning organisations do. This is explored in this chapter by presenting ActionAid's *Tax Justice*⁵⁴ *Campaign* (or TJC) as the case study (sections 4.1 to 4.4). Second, it also means that, while the NGDO does campaign, it still has parts in its structure that were not originally designed for this purpose and this has implications for the campaigning role. These elements will be the focus of other empirical chapters. A summary of findings closes this chapter (section 4.5).

⁵⁴ 'Tax justice' is generally understood as progressive, pro-poor systems for taxing, e.g. www.taxjustice.net/cms/upload/pdf/TUIYC_2012_FINAL.pdf

4.1. Thinking of a Tax Justice Campaign (2005-2007)

This section presents the emergence of ‘tax justice’ as a campaign theme – from the time it arose as a result of the initial African and Asian push; then through periods of internal division and resistance; and on to the point where there were contextual openings that facilitated the full launch of the campaign.

The first internal discussions about tax in the Federation started in 2005. An AAUK ex-staff, involved in the process at the time, pointed to internal reasons as the main push to take up tax issues: *‘The idea to go with tax was one that really came from the South to a certain extent and then it was really taken forward by the North... there were some very progressive voices in the organisation from Africa and Asia saying... “we don’t want to be working on aid any more... on making aid more effective, more honest”’* (interview, 2013).

One reason that pointed to the discontent was the limited advocacy capacity of the aid narrative. AAUK ex-staff member reflected: *‘at times you were wondering... why aren’t countries in the South picking it [aid] up... the reason is that they wanted to hold their countries accountable, not the UK government accountable. That was AAUK’s job, not the[ir] job’* (ibid). Contrarily, tax justice was seen to better enable African and Asian staff to hold their governments to account: *‘There is a lot of [political] support for this tax campaign in a way that there wasn’t for aid or for debt... from Country Directors in the South because they really see this as something they can hold their government to... while they were always sort of in between, sort of sitting on the fence when it came to aid or debt’* (ibid).

The move from aid to tax shrank governments’ room for manoeuvre to blame other international actors. As the interviewee noted: *‘the IMF would always say to us, “oh well it’s not us, it’s the government” and then the government would say to us “it’s not us, it’s the IMF”. At least with tax, when it comes to tax holidays, harmful tax incentives, it’s no one else but the government... who signs these contracts. And the World Bank is not mentioned in these [tax] contracts so in many respects there is a lot more that you can [do]... there aren’t as many players’* (ibid). Similarly, one could say that governments do not have power (or do not want) to challenge multinational corporations. Yet, that still begged the question of why that power was absent (or not used) and what could be done as a region or globally. The ball continued to fall on

governments to organise, and that was another reason why African and Asian country staff liked tax as an issue (ibid).

Besides these strategic advantages, African and Asian country directors were morally uncomfortable with supporting aid campaigns that paradoxically paralysed their governments' autonomy. Their push for tax also responded to a will for financial sufficiency. As a report later clarified: *'Our staff and partners in developing countries... believe that developing countries should themselves be able to finance more of the services that are essential to tackling poverty, through tax revenue'* (AAUK, 2009: p.2).

Moreover, aid-centred activism was causing some internal divisions. Staff from Italy and the UK were conscious of the counter-arguments yet defended the importance of aid claims to keep holding European governments accountable (Newman, 2010; ActionAid head of policy advocacy and research [hereafter 'PA&R'], chapter feedback, 2016). Other staff agreed to seeing the aid approach as an opportunity, but only as a method suitable for European staff vis-à-vis their governments, not for others in the Federation (Newman, 2010). The European-driven management of aid advocacy was also reinforcing 'North-South' power relations in ActionAid while aid was considered a distraction from the real challenges of development financing (ibid). By 2010, an internal report consolidated a distancing from aid by stating the need to move from a past of aid and a present of development financing (including tax justice) to a future of 'global redistribution' (Hall in Newman, 2010).

The oldest country member and main financial bastion in the Federation, AAUK, welcomed the idea of tax. The UK development sector was experiencing some fatigue at the time with previous financing development campaigns like debt and trade. AAUK also needed a campaign angle in which they could blame a UK target –be it a multinational or the government– responsible for development problems. That angle existed for tax – to expose the poverty effects arising in African and Asian countries from the alleged tax avoidance by UK corporations (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). The UK is also responsible for a large percentage of *tax havens*, territories where taxes are low and secretive (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016).

The road towards tax campaigning was not without internal resistances. UK's role in tax havens created a constant tension with AAUK fundraising (ibid). Small but affluent ActionAid groups in

Guernsey and Jersey⁵⁵, themselves tax haven territories with the complicity of the UK government, withdrew funding when they heard of the campaign. The gesture created concern about how far such withdrawals could stretch, fearing a donor domino effect (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). The effect did not eventually materialise apart from a few donors, and many in ActionAid deemed AAUK fundraising department's (and some other country members too) fears about donor withdrawal misplaced (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016). Discussions on the potential loss of funding eventually led to an ethical debate on financial sources. Lots of major donors, which were also potential ActionAid donors, kept their money as Trust Funds and family savings plans in tax havens. These were part of an unjust tax system that ActionAid was precisely aiming to criticise in its forthcoming campaign (ibid).

Externally, ActionAid's first campaign steps coincided with a rise of tax justice civil activity. Born in 2003, the *Tax Justice Network* (TJN) was composed of senior and retired bankers with a will to change the global financial system they had previously worked in (ibid). Despite its professional origins, the TJN envisaged itself as an NGO and wanted to play a part alongside other NGOs (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016). The TJN had extensive inside knowledge yet little linkages with African and Asian organisations. This is what NGDOs like ChristianAid (and ActionAid later on) were in a position to offer – financial support and access to partners combined with the policy space built from previous work on economic justice issues such as debt, trade and aid (ibid; AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). The TJN-Africa was founded in 2007.

NGDOs like ChristianAid and the *Norwegian Church Aid* had already been working together on tax for some years. The thinking on tax was opened up by work done by Charles Abugre and Sony Kapoor at ChristianAid – which they referred to as 'plugging the leaks' – as well as John Christensen at TJN (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016). In 2008, ChristianAid and the Norwegian Church Aid published a cutting-edge report on the effects of the international tax system in an African country and the elusive roles of gold mining multinationals and the Tanzanian state (Curtis and Lissu, 2008). ChristianAid had not only data and experience but also strong technical capital. One of its staff, a previous academic, proved crucial for data credibility: '*ChristianAid came up with this figure... Alex Cobham... he knew how to take these calculations*

⁵⁵ Another view is that it was rather the Government withdrawing funding (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016)

from his... technical background that none of us at ActionAid had' (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).

The UN Conference on Financing for Development held in Doha, Qatar, in 2008⁵⁶ gave a push to the already growing coalition of international development actors interested in tax: *'that was an opportunity for all of us to kind of meet in person and it's through those connections that we consolidated a group of international actors... it [tax] was very new and I think we sort of needed each other'* (ibid).

At least two other external factors propelled the emergence of tax as a campaign issue – a saturation of previous campaigns on development finance in ActionAid and other NGOs and the advent of the global financial crisis. The saturation with previous campaigns opened the space for a new theme to fill the gap: *'Before, that space was completely saturated with trade, debt and IMF conditionality... and those campaigns kind of came to an end, almost maybe to a natural end'* (ibid).

In a way, this natural end referred to the different active and passive cycles of a campaign: *'Debt reached a stopping point for many with the 2005 Gleneagles G8 meeting; after the 2005 Hong Kong Ministerial⁵⁷, most people decided the WTO was nicely stalemated (true until quite recently [2016]); and with the IMF, we'd gotten concessions on conditions, and there was movement (although not swift) in a positive direction after the financial crisis and Strauss-Kahn became managing director'* (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016). ActionAid staff read the situation as an opportunity: *'there was a feeling of "I don't want to do IMF conditionality anymore, it doesn't necessarily take us anywhere", and debt had already been done and trade negotiations were on hold... [tax] seemed like the logical place to go. And then because there was this request from the South[ern country members]... things aligned in a certain way'* (ibid).

In 2008, the global financial crisis hit and opportunistically lined up with ActionAid's internal tax moves, the emerging tax justice international coalition, and the sector's saturation with other campaigns. The interviewee remembers: *'I was in the office in August the day that Lehman Brothers went bankrupt... we all just sort of looked at each other and thought... "this is it, this is*

⁵⁶ Doha was a follow-up conference of the *Monterrey Consensus* on Financing for Development held in Mexico in 2002

⁵⁷ This refers to the Sixth Ministerial Conference of the World Trade Organisation

the perfect time for the tax campaign” (ibid). The financial crisis and the need to find liquid revenue positioned taxation as a topical campaign focus. Moreover, the tax narrative was inherently powerful as calculations showed that a reformed tax international system would be able to collect much more than the amount ever reachable through aid or trade means (ibid). At the end of an agitated period, favourable factors offset the internal funding concerns against tax issues. The TJC was ready to start and AAUK took the lead within the federation.

Overall, this first period of the campaign was one of deciding about frames. ActionAid moved towards a tax claim that was more radical, in terms of financial redistribution, than aid. Aid demands, such as increasing international aid, are based on an assumption that high-income countries transfer more money to low-income countries than the other way around. Instead, the tax claim was suggesting the opposite – that more wealth was flowing from low-income countries to high-income countries than the other way around, even when aid flows were taken into account. Tax, as an issue, equally seemed to have more followers within the files of ActionAid than aid, or even debt and trade. Some staff welcomed tax as a substitute for aid. In practice however, aid claims have remained and co-existed with tax ones. For instance, AAN ex-country director noted that: *‘dependence on aid has become unsustainable. Nigeria only receives 1% of GNI in aid... while [it]... has sufficient funds easily attainable from tax... yet, the use of that 1% of aid is functioning’* (TJC launch, Abuja, 2013). AAUK’s Manifesto (AAUK, 2014b: p.2) also stated that ending poverty required an end to ‘aid dependency’ yet asked for the 0.7% and aid effectiveness.

Frames help understand the importance of narratives to keep and widen the people mobilised. Transforming or bridging the aid and tax issues affects the range and type of staff and supporters attracted – more European staff supporters were interested in aid while more African and Asian staff supporters preferred tax (see Benford and Snow’s ‘resonance’ in section 2.3.1). There is probably a tension between gaining new supporters without losing those already mobilised by aid claims. Old claims like aid also help new ones like tax ‘resonate’ with the public – for instance, with this linking in AAUK’s website: *‘developing countries lose three times more to tax havens than they receive in aid each year’* (2015)⁵⁸. In a way too, aid claims partly sustain the financial mobilising structures of ActionAid that in turn promote tax redistribution issues.

⁵⁸ www.actionaid.org.uk/campaign/tax-pays-get-involved-in-the-global-campaign?slide=2

4.2. First steps of the Tax Justice Campaign (2008-2011)

The first TJC steps were led by AAUK with a tax avoidance and corporate-targeting perspective. Yet, this approach attracted tensions during its initial execution in several countries, and during the planning period, to scale it up at the federative level.

AAUK was the first country member in the Federation to work on tax. The first research on the topic was published in 2008⁵⁹ and public campaigning followed soon after. AAUK campaigns operate through bilateral agreements with other African or Asian country members. Consecutive one-year in-depth case studies took place targeting single corporations or banks. Since 2008 until now [2016], the campaign case studies have shared a ‘tax avoidance’ line in which the tax procedures of a UK company or bank are traced back to check how they affect tax collection in an African or Asian country⁶⁰. ‘Tax justice’ is thus understood as fighting ‘tax avoidance’, that is, the legal arrangements within companies in a multinational group purposefully created to reduce their tax payments.

For instance, the first AAUK public tax campaign reported the tax operations of South African beer brewing multinational SABMiller in countries like Ghana, India and Mozambique (2010). After that, AAUK targeted the Anglo–Swiss trading and mining multinational Glencore (2011), Africa’s largest sugar factory Zambia Sugar as part of the multinational Associated British Foods (2013), Barclays Bank tax policies in Africa (2013-14), and, more recently, oil and gas companies in Nigeria (2016).

At the time AAUK started campaigning, other country members like Bangladesh also showed interest in taking up tax issues but they: *‘didn’t have the time in their work plans... [to get] the campaign going... imagine just the disparity between AAUK having three [full-time] people working on it [tax] and countries having a quarter of the person’s time’* (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). As a result, AAUK staff would travel to the African or Asian country to research the case study and compensate for the lack of national staff available: *‘case study gathering... can be really extractive and, to be honest, I think that is how the campaign was initially because*

⁵⁹ www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us/research-and-publications/tax?keys=&page=2

⁶⁰ An exception being Nigeria’s case study, which focused on ‘tax incentives’ (see this section for a definition)

we needed the public spending side of it, we needed the image of the girl going to school... to show that taxes were important to development and to developing countries' (ibid).

The disparity between AAUK staff availability and that of other country members, as well as AAUK campaign expertise, meant that the initial campaigns were driven by AAUK's corporate perspective. This was initially welcomed by other country members: *'the campaign started being heavily driven from a MNC [multinational corporation] angle, and I don't think that posed any challenges for [ActionAid] countries' (ibid).*

However, the corporate tax avoidance take soon faced practical challenges and, by 2009-10, a need showed to 'nationalise' this international angle. Most African and Asian national governments did not have the resources to manage that complex topic and had other priorities: *'we also needed to say something about African countries particularly but also South Asian countries' lack of capacity to monitor taxation and MNCs and do anything about transfer pricing [tax avoidance]... we then tried to have a bit more focus on the policy demands around building the capacity of African... or Southern Revenue Tax Authorities to be able to track situations of transfer pricing' (ibid).*

For AAUK to keep its corporate narrative while keeping other ActionAid country federation members and their national administrations interested at the same time, it was necessary to nationalise the tax avoidance discourse and advocate for a stronger governmental role against tax avoidance. The adapted claim gradually gained strength: *'it is a strand of work that is getting stronger and stronger now [2013], so we've been engaging at the African Union level on tax and with African Tax Revenue Officials' (ibid).*

Besides the adaptation of the tax avoidance discourse to create a focus on governmental capacity and resources, a stronger second claim gained popularity between ActionAid staff during the first bilateral campaigns in 2010-11, namely, that of harmful tax incentives. Tax incentives are tax privileges granted by governments to multinationals to attract their investment. ActionAid denounced the gratuity of many incentives that further created a perverse snowballing competition amongst countries to gain investment.

As compared to tax incentives, tax avoidance⁶¹ claims have international or supra-national targets, which are multinationals (and secondarily the G20/OECD/UN and governments). Instead, tax incentives⁶² claims mostly target national governments offering harmful tax incentives (secondarily, they can also target supranational bodies like the African Union with power to challenge the tax competition created regionally).

These two tax justice claims existed in tension. On the one hand, African and Asian country staff preferred to work on tax incentives: *'African and Asian governments are powerless against transfer pricing [tax avoidance] regulation. Those rules are all decided in international forums that they are not a part of. So it was not at all empowering to governments to say "stop transfer pricing"... what was in their control were the tax incentives, and a lot of the Southern colleagues were saying that's what they want to work on'* (ibid). In 2010, the TJN-Africa had sponsored a meeting to agree on a campaign frame able to both respond to international interest on tax policy and to mobilise people in Africa. The majority agreed on selecting tax incentives, including ActionAid. Further research work on tax incentives followed by ActionAid and TJN-Africa in five Eastern African countries in 2011-2013 (ActionAid head of PA&R, chapter feedback, 2016).

On the other hand, the UK government had no role on tax incentives granted by third party countries. Thus for AAUK, tax avoidance was the only claim with a UK angle to campaign on. Additionally, the global crisis was too much of an opening to miss the train with regards to tax avoidance (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).

While these first bilateral tax avoidance campaigns led by AAUK continued to take place, internal discussions started in ActionAid to scale up the TJC to the federation level. A working group was formed to draft a campaign proposal as an input for the 2012-17 new Federation strategy. If the first bilateral campaigns had raised discussions about tax avoidance-tax incentives options, debates in the drafting group rather turned around the role of local level participation. This interest partly responded to the goal in the Federation strategy of reaching 5 million supporters and 5 million young people (ActionAid, 2012b: p.93): *'there was a need [in the ActionAid Federation] which maybe wasn't so pressing when AAUK was leading the campaign, which was*

⁶¹ Aka *tax dodging*. Includes *tax havens*, *transfer pricing* and *double taxation treaties*.

⁶² Aka *tax breaks*. Includes *tax holidays*, a type of tax incentive by which companies do not pay tax for a period and the *tax competition* that is created amongst neighbouring countries to attract companies.

now to connect it to the local... the [federation's] strategy has very ambitious targets about the number of people we want to mobilise' (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013).

Logistically, these numerical targets required local mobilising and participation: *'if you want that many people mobilising, then it can't just be your national coalition of partners who are just national NGOs... and it can't just be our Northern supporters who, you know, come out for the G20 event and protest... those people are in the local rights' programmes... we don't have them at the national level in capital cities' (ibid).*

AAUK ex-staff member remembers how the initial proposal aimed to build national-level coalitions that would link up with the local (ibid). Yet, the likely addition of more tax claims, such as VAT problems (see Figure 5), was seen as risking fragmentation in the campaign message, coherence and coalition-building: *'we don't want to make the campaign too broad... so that it looks very different in different countries... if the tax coalition[s] decided that in Bangladesh the issue of VAT would really be the thing they wanted to talk about, then it would look really different from South Africa who wanted to look into transfer pricing [tax avoidance] or Zambia that wanted to look into tax competition [tax incentives]. So how are we... going to engage locally but have some common demands and image internationally and even nationally? (ibid).*

Figure 5: Competing narratives on tax justice

Claim	Tax avoidance Multinational stratagems to avoid tax payments in African and Asian countries weaken their public financing	Harmful tax incentives Many tax privileges given to multinationals by governments are unnecessary and create an unhealthy competition amongst countries	VAT / other local tax issues VAT is disproportionate; VAT sharp increases are locally damaging, etc.
Target	International Multinationals (also G20/OECD/UN and governments)	National Governments (also regional bodies, e.g. African Union)	National-Local Governments
Promoter	AAUK (initial narrative)	African and Asian ActionAids/ActionAid	African and Asian national/local coalitions

Source: compiled by the author

The TJC drafting group interest in prioritising local-to-national coalitions did not eventually materialise and led the federation's TJC to gravitate towards international and national levels (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). Instead, ActionAid's federation voted to integrate the local level by bridging corporate tax claims to the potential financing of local public services with the slogan '*progressive taxation for progressive spending*' (ActionAid, 2012b: p.137). Another similar bridging tactic compared corporate tax to tax paid by small-traders suggesting that the former pay proportionally less than the latter (AAUK, 2012: p.7). These are frames that can function as standard for most countries and that talk to the realm of international policies where international NGOs operate (see Smith et al., 1994 for the functioning of 'transnational social movement organisations'). The strategy reminds of the notion of 'marketing of rebellion' in which local demands are adapted to international NGO needs (Bob, 2005).

If the past section showed that ActionAid used both a pure tax frame and a mixed aid-tax frame to mobilise a variety of staff and activists, this section notes how the initial tax avoidance frame had to integrate other ideas like tax state capacity and tax incentives to satisfy more ActionAid staff at the international and national levels. The next section will explore the application of the bridging of frames proposed in the strategy at the local level and if, and how, they mobilised activists at that level in the campaign. Overall, the sections have aimed to show how frames are related to campaign mobilising, and how certain frames mobilise certain activists and not others.

A final note on frames and mobilisation regards the role of ActionAid in bringing in a new 'low-income country' perspective or amplification to current tax claims. In the UK, tax avoidance is commonly related to framings that do not explicitly mention low-income countries, such as tax avoidance being 'unethical' and a 'social responsibility' (Foster-Back, 2013), leading to a loss of 'citizens' trust' (Hurst, 2014), or leading to UK public cuts (Chu, 2011). With ActionAid (and other NGOs, see section 7.1.1), new tax claims appear that value the role of low-income countries in global wealth-creation (through corporate tax avoidance in their territories) and/or that are more relevant to low-income countries. Some of these claims were raised by staff from low-income countries, thus resonating strongly with them, such as complaints about the state's administrative tax capacity and transparency (a less necessary claim in administratively sound European countries). Other frames, like linking multinational tax avoidance to the lack of public services in low-income countries appeals to UK audiences sensitised in global poverty such as AAUK campaigners using the tax-public service frame in AAUK's TJC (see sections 4.3 and 5.1.1).

4.3. Federalisation of the Tax Justice Campaign (2012-2014)

The 2012-17 ActionAid strategy set up the TJC as one of the three international campaigns of the Federation, together with land and women's rights campaigns. In 2013, the TJC was officially launched and started to function in several countries including Nigeria. By then, the TJC had integrated tax avoidance, tax incentives and transparency as the three campaign demands: *'[tax incentives] had to come through because people did not just want to work on transfer pricing [tax avoidance]'* (AAUK ex-staff member, interview, 2013). Corporate tax incentives became the focus of the federation's campaign launch (ActionAid head of PA&R/ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016). These were all international and national claims – yet, what happened at the local campaign level where the NGDO was to mobilise beyond capital cities to reach its numerical targets and campaign goals?

In July 2013, the campaign launched in Nigeria (while it continued in the UK). During my two stays in 2013 and 2014, AAN covered international, national and local tax issues (AAN campaign team meetings/observation, Abuja, 2013-14). During my stay in 2013, tax incentives occupied most of AAN's attention. Targets included the federal investment authorities and politicians, which were those directly granting tax incentives (TJC launch, observation, Abuja, 2013). Some supportive evidence existed about the secrecy and discretion in which tax incentives were granted and of companies that had changed their name to receive tax incentives again (TJC launch, NANTS speech, Abuja, 2013). Meanwhile, AAN worked on a paper on the subject of tax treaties [tax avoidance] between Mauritius and Nigeria. Also, AAN has sometimes bridged tax to other stronger mobilising frames such as the monopoly of oil revenue in public money collection and anti-corruption claims in public money expenditure (AAN senior staff/NRG Institute-ThinkAct researchers, interviews, 2013-14), for instance, in the TJC launch in Abuja.

A year after during my second stay, an *African Union Finance Ministers Conference*⁶³ (hereafter AU Conference) took place in Abuja in March 2014. ActionAid, AAUK, African ActionAid offices and African tax justice coalitions had come over for the event. A report on illicit financial flows [tax avoidance] was to be presented by former South African President Thabo Mbeki to the Ministers. The potential for regional advocacy and campaigning about the role of tax treaties in enabling corporate tax avoidance was evident. AAN targeted their own finance minister, as she

⁶³ www.uneca.org/pages/about-conference-1

was also part of the AU High Level Panel on illicit financial flows. Slogans on tax holidays [tax incentives] also remained present in actions during the AU Conference.

At the same time, the AAN campaign team had undertaken tax work at the state (sub-national) and local levels. Before the national TJC launch in Abuja (July 2013), AAN had organised a series of 'budget and tax justice' workshops with four partners and allies in the states of Benue, Delta, Kaduna and Ondo (workshop reports/observation, Abuja, 2013). A common local tax problem mentioned during these workshops was the 'multiple taxation' faced by market vendors (ibid). Multiple taxation refers to a situation in which a taxpayer is taxed more than once for the same item. This could be due to crime or corruption (fake or corrupt tax collectors) and/or to a lack of tax collection harmonisation between administrative levels or sectors. When the TJC was launched nationally, two policy reports were presented that already dealt with both tax incentives and multiple taxation claims (AAN tax policy reports, Abuja, 2013).

By the end of 2013, both AAN and AAUK were campaigning on tax locally⁶⁴. They did it in different ways. In Ondo, mobilisers were local partner staff who had identified a number of local tax challenges such as multiple taxation while in London the message used by AAUK staff at the local level regarded the local-level impacts of tax avoidance. In Nigeria, some tax activities held by partners started before the Nigerian TJC had been launched. ActionAid Ondo's local partner, JDPC, recorded a local action research video with local vendors and tax administrators on 'tax justice' to be launched on its regional TV programme 'JDPC ½ hour' (JDPC tax video, Akure, 2013). In words of JDPC coordinator, three key challenges found were: the lack of tax statistics and transparency, a poor tax administration and the multiplicity of tax payments – or 'multiple taxation' in the NGDO vocabulary (ibid). These claims targeted local, state and national administrations.

Most market vendors interviewed in the video were keen on paying tax but declared themselves unhappy to do so because of the government's alleged tax inefficiency, corruption and harassment and the lack of public services that should be provided as a result of tax. Interviewees added problems inherent to the presumptive tax⁶⁵ collection methods in the

⁶⁴ AAUK had done local tax work before 2014 in other tax justice bilateral campaigns. Here I am referring to AAUK tax local work *as part of* ActionAid international TJC campaign.

⁶⁵ Presumptive taxation is a collecting tax method in the informal sector that uses indirect estimation of the income on which tax should be levied. See <http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.2040-0209.2013.00429.x/pdf>

informal sector, such as corruption in unions charged with collecting tax and untailored flat tax rates. Flat tax rates derive from ballpark calculations on the size of a business place or a product sold rather than on the exact income that market vendors make and were thus deemed unjust (market visits, Ondo, 2013-14). Multiple taxation work has also included poor farmers – the AAN campaign manager noted that smallholder women farmers have, especially and gradually, become stronger as part of the national Nigeria *Tax Justice and Governance Platform* (chapter feedback, 2016).

Paradoxically, what had been avoided at the federal TJC level – having too many tax claims to prevent confusion (see section 4.2) –, was reproduced locally in Akure (see Figure 6). JDPC and Ondo Activistas ended up operating the three campaign claims: tax avoidance, tax incentives and multiple taxation. Added to these was a further bridging frame that was suggested by ActionAid about ending tax avoidance and incentives to finance local public services.

Figure 6: Diversity of tax claims in an Akure rally



This variety of claims at the local level is likely to dilute mobilisation and probably calls for some strategy in local campaign framing. As seen above, local people's own tax claims related to multiple taxation, steep local tax increases and presumptive tax challenges. Instead, corporate framing (tax avoidance and tax incentives) appeared less appealing (observation, Abuja/Akure, 2013-14), arguably, because no visible and direct causation with their livelihoods (and no evident solution) existed in the same way that existed for their own tax claims. AAUK ex-youth engagement manager noted that: *'a lot of people who work in our local rights programmes say, well, I can't go to the community that are desperately poor, that really need an irrigation system, and be like: "you should be lobbying the government to stop tax breaks [tax incentives] for big multinational companies"... and where? And what?'* (interview, 2013).

Analysed from a frame resonance perspective, even ActionAid's suggested local bridging of corporate frames with local realities –linking larger company taxation to the financing of local public services and comparing multinationals and local unequal tax payments– are more indirect and difficult to 'activate' than local people's own tax frames, which have clearer local targets and actions. For example, campaigning locally for public services would require, as per the frame, that the previous step of raising tax nationally takes place. Similarly, the multinational-local tax comparative may not have the same resonance in all contexts. Ondo is a farming and civil service state with no industrial, multinational activity (TJN-Ondo, group discussion, 2014) which increases the difficulty of physically and culturally identifying with a nearby corporate target.

In the UK, the local level narrative presented the local-level effects of international tax avoidance in both low-income countries and the UK. In the recent *'Towns against tax dodging'* campaign⁶⁶ (December 2014), AAUK asked Councillors [local administrations] to pass a motion so that their own national parties voted against tax avoidance. While keeping the same claim on tax avoidance, the target had moved from the international and national (UK companies and UK government) to the local level (UK councils). Still, the ultimate target was national, as councils could not possibly make policy changes on the basis of the tax avoidance claim.

Overall, reading the local campaign level through frames can help activists reflect on two issues: first, whether having multiple claims *at the same level*, as happened in Akure, enhances or

⁶⁶ www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2014/09/08/towns-against-tax-dodging-a-draft-motion-on-tax-abuse-any-council-could-adopt/

reduces mobilisation; second, whether international claims taken to the local level, as seen for Ondo and the UK, gain high take up. Findings on this particular point are mixed – while localising tax avoidance in the UK seemed to work during the *‘Towns against tax dodging’* campaign, some Ondo activists, such as those interviewed from the *Tax Justice Network* (TJN-Ondo), noted that corporate targets are not likely to catch on in a region that has no multinational activity.

Frame theory also enables us to see how prioritising the most resonant claim *at each level* (others claims may come later) is likely to be conducive to greater mobilisation in the campaign, especially to ‘break the ice’ in places where no tax mobilising has happened before. In the TJC, prioritising the most resonant claims at each level opened up spaces for engagement with opponents at each level. This is arguably because one reason for a claim to resonate with people in the TJC is the closeness of the opponent targeted and the extent to which that opponent has authority to solve the problem. Consider these three situations at the different levels of the TJC:

Internationally, there was a series of public exchange letters between ActionAid and the multinationals and banks targeted by the NGDO in which the meaning of ‘tax avoidance’ was disputed (see section 4.4). In the AU Conference, Liberia’s Minister of Finance mentioned how ActionAid showed that treaties were unfair while the Mauritius representatives told an AAUK staff member that they should be *‘having a word’* (pers. comm., 2014). Post-AU event meetings were held between AAN and the Nigerian Minister of Finance assistant for AAN to join an upcoming tax stakeholder group (AAN staff member, pers. comm., 2014).

Nationally, the national tax authorities’ (FIRS) representative nuanced the term ‘tax incentives’ as having *‘their good and their bad side’* in the TJC launch (observation, Abuja, 2013). This obliged AAN to qualify tax incentives with ‘harmful’⁶⁷ to avoid the easy debunking of the campaign’s rationale – that is, accepting that there may be cases where tax privileges for multinationals are justified (and turning FIRS into an government ally with this frame extension). Reducing the number of tax incentives, or the way they are dispensed, is one of the easier unilateral actions that a national government can take (ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016), thus being a claim worth campaigning for nationally.

⁶⁷ ActionAid had already defined ‘harmful’ tax incentives in the ‘Give us a Break’ report on corporate tax incentives used for the international TJC launch in 2013 (ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016)

Locally, Ondo's tax authorities (BIR-Ondo)⁶⁸ and JDPC-AAN debated the meaning of 'multiple taxation'. In a JDPC and Activista visit to the BIR-Ondo, an official denied the existence of multiple taxation by referring to the current tax harmonisation regulations between federal, state and local governmental tiers and attributed this term to the confusion that locals allegedly made between 'tax', 'rate' and 'levy' (Activista report, 2013). A month later, the AAN campaign officer exposed the legal loopholes, corruption and insufficient application of the referred tax harmonisation in a workshop attended by BIR-Ondo (observation, Akure, 2013). The JPDC coordinator added during that workshop that: *'tax or rate or levy we are dealing with humans. Money is dripping from my pocket... the local government, they don't give flat rate but arbitrary bills... multiple taxation... comes from the same income, that of the poor person'* (ibid).

The three situations described illustrate that activists (and authorities) engage with the issues that are familiar and viable to them. In the third example, for instance, Ondo's tax authorities have little power over changing tax avoidance issues while they have more voice in terms of multiple taxation.

At the end of 2014, this variety of claims led to a situation in which two international campaign formats existed. An initial single-issue format, led by AAUK, operated one international single framing (tax avoidance) campaign aimed at a primary single international opponent (e.g. a multinational corporation or bank) targeted from all levels. As the federal campaign developed, a second, more multiple-issue format was introduced, with diverse activist claims at each level. Both campaign formats linked local, national and international activist levels, thus they were both multilevel, but they did so in different ways. This seems important for two reasons – because each campaign format gave different complementary framings on the causes of poverty and because each came with different models of mobilisation.

In terms of highlighting the causes of poverty, the first approach – the single-issue international format – is robust in that it exposes international poverty structures or global systems of wealth and poverty creation like tax avoidance and other international issues like debt, trade and arms. This framing is especially useful for questioning the role of the UK and other OECD donor countries in low-income countries. Hence, it points to the way that the causes of poverty

⁶⁸ Or Ondo State Board of Internal Revenue www.jtb.gov.ng/state-boards-internal-revenue

originate in high-income country companies, and with the governments of these states, and that this negatively affects people in low-income countries. The second approach – the multi-issue format – tackles the causes of poverty that originate at national and local levels, for example, multiple taxation, VAT rates or tax-for-public-services. These inequalities do not have international causes.

A single-issue format can be seen in the image of a cascade or waterfall of a poverty cause taking place internationally that produces national and local effects. On the other hand, the framing of the multi-issue format follows the image of a wardrobe with separate drawers. That is, I understand a multi-issue format as inherently encompassing national and local level issues. In this sense, the TJC deals with several international cascading issues such as tax havens, transfer pricing, double taxation treaties (see section 4.2, footnotes). Nevertheless, all these elements that explain international causality (tax avoidance) originate at the international level. Thus, I would see those cascading issues as being part of the same single-issue framing with a view to making claims and achieving change at the international tax policy level only (see section 2.3.2 on the professional format).

In terms of activism, these two formats bring different types of mobilisation. In the single-issue format, people from different countries are mobilised against the same international claim, a sort of ‘vertical activism’ for issues that cannot just be changed nationally. The benefit of sharing an international theme is that claimants are united with a multi-country voice for bigger impact. For example, Barclays Bank may be localised by targeting its local branches in different countries. Instead, the multi-issue format has no *causal* cross-targeting from one country to another. There could be multi-country activism – activists from different countries may decide to campaign together if they happen to be fighting the same claim nationally, e.g. VAT. Yet, this relationship is not causal with actions in one country affecting outcomes in another. Hence, it would not imply that responsibility for a successful campaign that was aimed at a target in one country could also be attributed to positive results achieved by activists against similar targets in another country. For example, UK activists cannot strategically write to Nigerian officials about a Nigerian national issue like VAT but they can tackle a UK company headquarters (or UK’s embassy) in Nigeria on a causal claim –one country affecting the other– like tax avoidance. The benefit of this ‘horizontal activism’ with various claims is that these are chosen contextually and adapted to opportunities at each level. Activists then may have more capacity to challenge

relatively accessible targets in each context, as seen above with JDPC versus Ondo's local tax authorities on multiple taxation.

These insights shown through frames could throw light upon two NGDO debates (see section 2.3.2). First, they add to the public engagement debate on moving towards 'positive frames' that unveil causes of poverty (Darnton and Kirk, 2011). This is especially so for international framing through the single-issue format – in 2009-10, DFID's tracking surveys suggested that the UK public sees the causes of poverty as internal to low-income countries, like famine; war; natural disasters; bad governance; over-population; with corruption often considered the main cause by over 50% of respondents. The only significant external causal factor identified was international debt, cited by around 10% of respondents (Glennie et al., 2012: p.6). In turn, national and local tax justice interpretations in the multiple-issue format (tax incentives and multiple taxation) would suggest that, tax-wise, the causes of poverty are both internal and external to low-income countries. Moreover, frames add to an analysis of the capacity of these different 'positive frames' to activate mobilisation.

Campaign format insights could also add to the debate on campaigning and tokenism, suggesting that, in the case of the TJC in Nigeria, multiple-issue campaigning prompted more mobilisation and response from the authorities at each level than when the single-frame of tax avoidance was reproduced at all levels (for example, see the three situations describing different authorities above). This may have to do, for the TJC, with the distance that the international single-frame had to the work of domestic authorities, especially at the local level. For example, Ondo's tax authorities have little power over changing and offering solutions against tax avoidance. More research would be needed to elucidate whether tax avoidance claims would have been deployed in Akure if the multiple-issue framing had not been in place. A hypothesis that could be explored further could be whether the multiple-issue format opened up activist spaces and attracted authorities at each level, within which, subsequently, tax avoidance issues were secondarily played out. Having the multiple-issue format in place first would be likely to create less tokenism, as no international claims would be unfolded before local claims are dealt with.

Overall, frames theory, as applied to a multilevel campaign – by identifying campaign formats as single-issue or multiple-issues – could help activists reflect on the different effects that these

are having on showing poverty causes and aiding mobilisation. Activists could then opt for single or multiple formats or both accordingly.

4.4. The repertoires – protest actions in the campaign

The previous sections have presented the history of the TJC case with an emphasis on the claims that AAUK, AAN, JDPC and ActionAid (at the international secretariat) have put forward. Frames theory helped explore the shape of these claims, or demands, in mobilising people. We saw this, for example, in the way there was frame bridging (or linking) of two different claims related to aid and tax; or in the international single-issue angle by the way in which the claim of tax avoidance was presented. This section now centres on the protest actions that these same actors took forward during the campaign.

Different repertoires of activist performances were found in Nigeria and the UK. AAUK and AAUK campaigners: undertook stunts; collected petitions; visited government-MPs; attended party conferences and corporate AGM protests, organised mass rallies and handed out local leaflets in shops and banks (see Figure 7). AAUK staff were also in charge of writing public corporate letter exchanges, shadow reports, manifestos and undertook internal lobbying. AAUK also utilised local media campaigning adverts, research and shadow reports (or alternative visions to an official report), and watchdog inventories of companies and banks, e.g. those companies said to be using tax havens⁶⁹.

Figure 7: Examples of AAUK repertoire of action



Source: AAUK/ActionAid

⁶⁹ www.actionaid.org.uk/latest-news/ftse100s-tax-haven-habit-shows-need-to-tackle-a-hidden-obstacle-in-the-fight-against

In Nigeria, AAN staff actions with AAN campaigners covered marches, rallies, online/mobile actions, tweet conferences, popular theatre and other art-based protest and government pressure through visits and workshops. AAN staff also covered research and policy papers, high-level lobbying visits, for example breakfast meetings, and media work like passing campaign messages on to news outlets as well as radio and TV shows (see Figure 8). ActionAid's partner in Ondo JDPC undertook a number of state-level initiatives on tax, including a tax TV documentary (displayed in a regular JDPC TV show called 'JDPC ½ hour'), 'market storms' (see description below), advocacy visits to tax authorities, tax workshops between farmers and government officials, tax rallies and a tax study (also see Figure 8).

Finally, ActionAid TJC teams at the international secretariat⁷⁰ supported national activism (for example, alerting them to regional opportunities such as the AU Conference, April 2014) and coordinate online, email and SMS actions (Internal ActionAid TJC Team Newsletters, Feb2013-Dec2014). Actions included a 'tax pays for' photo petition, in which people filled up a note for a photo with the public service they would most appreciate to have financed in their area through tax. These were then handed in to local and national campaign targets, used in exhibitions, and uploaded with the hashtag #taxpaysfor⁷¹.

Figure 8: Examples of AAN and JDPC repertoires of action



Source: Kas Sempere/Akinola Adekunle

⁷⁰ TJC-related international secretariat teams include the tax power campaign (TJC) team, the advocacy team and the mobilisation team on digital campaigning among others.

⁷¹ <http://taxpaysfor.tumblr.com/>

In this section, I suggest that repertoire theory helps us read mobilisation in the campaign, as well as frames. The cultural resonance of actions with campaigners, the numbers of participants in the actions and their disruptiveness help us understand how campaign mobilising operates.

First, actions work best when they are culturally appropriate and familiar to campaigners. For instance, AAN campaign staff use theatre-sketches while AAUK draws on stunts (observation, Abuja, 2013-4). Although apparently similar, the AAN campaign officer noted that: *'in Nigeria... you could not follow the formats of Europe. For instance, the stunts (wearing masks or costumes that make you look like animals)... because we have a theatre culture based on using masks and imagery and symbols. When we start using stunts, it becomes just part of the theatre and the message will be lost'* (interview, 2013).

Popular theatre dates back to the mid-1970s as an activist performance in Nigeria, and back to anti-colonial struggles in other African, Asian and Latin American countries (IHRLG, 2003: p.9-10). During the TJC launch, Activistas [ActionAid youth campaigners] performed a *theatre sketch*⁷² putting forward the challenges of multiple taxation and tax harassment faced by local market vendors. This was done in the presence of high-level decision-makers and civil servants amongst which were the *national tax authorities* or FIRS⁷³ and the *national investment authorities* or NIPC⁷⁴ (observation, Abuja, 2013). Other art-based actions included protest songs and street marches with singing, dancing and/or running.

In the UK, Luetchford and Burns (2003: p.157) date the use of stunts by UK development organisations back to 1987. Stunts are one of AAUK's commonest actions. They are media-oriented, involve a small group of people and are characterised by the use of costumes, symbolic objects, scenarios and singing. Stunts resonate with a UK history of theatre and TV in terms of humour and satire. They are assessed by how well they create the right sort of provocation. Since 2005, AAUK campaign stunts have included two big bananas (2007); a digger (2008); maize dressing-up (2013); beer bottle dressing-up (2010); a Father Christmas with tax singing carols (2013); and a tax island (2014)⁷⁵. AAUK stunts are non-obstructive, non-violent and law-abiding.

⁷² www.youtube.com/watch?v=BO_NBw03O6o

⁷³ Or the Federal Inland Revenue www.firs.gov.ng

⁷⁴ Or the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission www.nipc.gov.ng

⁷⁵ AAUK website www.actionaid.org.uk

Even older actions in the UK (and rest of Europe), are petitions, which were used in the 19th-C during abolitionist struggles (Contamin, 2001; Huzzey, 2014). Online petitions are a recurrent action in AAUK (and other NGDOs), varying in format (for example, photo petitions, hashtag petitions, pledges) and scope (global, national and, less commonly, local council petitions). Petitions were preferred to motions (when targeting political parties) or to boycotts (when targeting banks, by for example closing down an account). In Nigeria, AAN online petitions did not show much follow-up – 134 signatures were once gathered for an AAN tax petition as compared to AAUK's average collection of +10,000⁷⁶. *SMS petitions* were often used instead (observation, Akure, 2014). JDPC works less with online/mobile petitions than AAN and prefers to work with popular theatre, radio and TV shows. Unlike UK and urban Nigeria, the areas where JDPC operates have little or no connectivity and electricity, thus internet and mobile phones operate with limitations.

AAN's access to national government advocacy was common – e.g. during my stay, AAN staff had visited ministries several times (observation, Abuja, 2013-14). However, the AAN campaign officer noted the barriers to reaching Nigerian governmental targets: *'in Europe, you know that if you send a letter to your MP with 1,000 signatures it is going to go to him [sic] and it is going to create some level of impact in the way he responds... here, he may not even see those letters... a classic case in a system that is not accountable'* (interview, 2013). This compares to the UK in which a certain number of petitions reached legally forces the government to respond and make a public response to the claim – if a petition receives 10,000 signatures, the government will respond; if it reaches 100,000, the theme will be considered for debate in Parliament⁷⁷.

In the UK, other frequent actions are mass visits to MPs (Members of Parliament) and actions at party conferences. Examples are the 'Take tea with your MP' action⁷⁸, and the attendance of conservative, labour and liberal democrat conferences in past years⁷⁹. Actions in these spaces are often accompanied by stunts. In Nigeria, by comparison, AAN resorts more to street actions in the form of marches and rallies, mixed with pressure through a national media presence on TV, radio and newspapers (AAN campaign manager, interview, 2013).

⁷⁶ Average on-line petition responses range 10000-50000 adherents, i.e. AAUK Barclays petition had 53000 signatures (community campaigners internal emailing, 2014).

⁷⁷ <https://petition.parliament.uk/>

⁷⁸ www.actionaid.org.uk/news-and-views/gallery-highlights-from-teatime-for-change

⁷⁹ www.actionaid.org.uk/blog/campaigns/2014/10/10/tackling-tax-dodging-at-the-lib-dem-party-conference

Another action that is more developed in AAUK is its stronger corporate targeting, with customised actions like open letter exchanges, local postcard hand-ins and activist speeches in corporate AGMs. Actions directed at company shareholders were noted to have been used by UK development organisations since 1974 (Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.79). In the open letter exchange, AAUK sends a public letter to a campaign target exposing its research results. Potential responses from the target are shared online. An example was AAUK's correspondence with Barclays Bank (2013)⁸⁰ about putting an end to the African tax havens that the bank allegedly uses as investment gateways. Through hand-ins, AAUK staff and campaigners gather in targeted local stores or bank branches and give employees their signed postcards to be delivered to the company's decision-makers. This was the case with the Barclays' local branches action (2013)⁸¹. An example of an activist speech took place in a recent Barclays General Assembly⁸².

ActionAid head of PA&R notes that, in Africa: *'there is not the same anti-corporate sentiment found in the North and there is very little inclination to corporate campaigning'* (chapter feedback, 2016). That does not mean that there is opposition to corporate campaigning but it does not resonate either, he suggests (ibid). As with the government, this might be because, historically, the UK public's expectations of corporate actors' responsiveness are considerably higher in the UK than in Nigeria. Overall, repertoire theory prompts us to look at the history of actions in a country and at their cultural resonance, an insight that would arguably be less pronounced were notions such as 'tactics' used instead for the analysis.

Second, another aspect of public mobilisation is the number of participants in the actions. AAN, AAUK and JDPC offer activists the choice of participating as time-intensive campaigners (a 'bearing witness' logic or actions with few but trained activists) and/or as mass campaigners (using a logic of greater numbers). AAUK follows a witness logic in street mobilising, for example, stunts in Barclays' branches, activist speeches in corporate AGMs, and local postcard hand-ins. The logics of numbers is less common in the street but frequent through online actions like petitions or social media. Mass-rallies in the streets are less common than stunts, in part given that they are harder to organise, for example they are more expensive, and there are more

⁸⁰ www.actionaid.org.uk/campaign/campaign-blog/2013/12/10/barclays-respond-on-tax-havens-but-it-dodges-the-big-question

⁸¹ www.actionaid.org.uk/blog/campaigns/2013/12/16/tax-justice-campaigners-get-barclays-attention-with-giant-christmas-cards

⁸² www.actionaid.org.uk/blog/campaigns/2014/04/28/campaigners-take-on-barclays-at-the-banks-agm

people to mobilise, especially in highly competitive activist contexts such as London. AAUK often does organise mass rallies in coalition with other NGOs and organisations – for example, the ‘IF’ campaigning marches.

In Nigeria, online mass actions were done through tweet conferences. *Tweet conferences* are online conferences operated through the *Twitter* platform. These were recurrently used by AAN staff at events – such as campaigns, programmes and international days – and proved very popular. They gather both campaigners and government representatives and activist slogans are shared. In street actions, there is more balance between the two logics, and coalitions do not seem as essential for the logics of numbers as in the UK. For instance, AAN mobilised more than 300 youth for a summit during the AU Conference days, provided that transport stipends were given (observation, Abuja, 2014). Unlike AAN, AAUK does not provide stipends to campaigners.

Alternating both logics of action seems relevant for ensuring wider participation and mobilising. Having both logics is useful to attract different activist profiles. Even the same campaigner with life changing circumstances may shift between one and another logic. One can start with signing petitions (what would be considered ‘shallow participation’ in the protest business sense) to then move towards more demanding actions if desired (see section 5.1.1 on AAUK’s pyramid of campaign participation).

A third and final insight that repertoires can offer is how the disruptiveness of actions may influence mobilisation. Most TJC actions, such as marches, petitions, and MP visits, are *identifiable* as actions, or ‘contained’ in Tarrow’s terms (2011). Yet, there were other less familiar actions such as leaflet hand-ins, tweet conferences and ‘market storms’ for which campaigners (including myself) required some prior support and training (observation, Abuja/Akure/London, 2013-14), and this made the mobilisation process longer. Market storms are local action research and informative visits to markets and other local places like motor parks and bus stops. Vendors are interviewed about their problems and, resources permitting, their responses by voice or video are recorded. They are also sensitised and given TJC leaflets. Market storms were performed by Activista youth campaigners in varied places like Akure, FCT Abuja and Lagos (Activistas records and observation, Akure, 2013-14). Training was given by AAN and JDPC. Market storms can be part of street marches or stand-alone (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). Contained actions like marches can be an entry-point for campaigners to get

initiated into less popular actions like market storms, or more radical, name-and-shame ones like AGM protests and personified actions. For example, AAN once led a photo caricature contest with the image of Finance Minister Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala (AAN report and photos, Abuja, 2014). At the same time, less popular actions can attract campaigners for their novelty, and can be gradually scaled up and diffused, e.g. videoing market storms.

A particular 'contained disruption' strategy was observed in rural Nigeria. In this strategy, JDPC drew on service-delivery programme spaces for its actions and had frequent contact with (and even participation of) the governmental authorities in the actions. This is a strategy quite different to head-on AAN and AAUK activism, arguably because the latter could lead to sanctions and punishments and thus make mobilisation more difficult in a place like Ondo.

A first feature of this 'contained disruption' was that many actions were cushioned in previous programme work and spaces – a sort of 'programme-based repertoire'. For example, the *free holiday lessons* project included education on tax justice for children in schools linked to JDPC (observation, Akure, 2014). Other actions, such as rallies and market storms that were independent of programmes, were tempered by inviting government authorities to participate in them. Still, one could say that they are protest actions because they include contentious, pro-poor redistribution claims and hint at direct governmental responsibility, even if disguised and tempered. For instance, JDPC invited the Ondo's state tax inspector and other tax governmental roles to a rally and a market storm in Akure. The tax authorities participated in the actions, carrying the same placards as JDPC and Activista youth campaigners (Activista report and photos, Akure, 2013; see Figure 9). While market storms can be seen as informative-mobilising actions with market vendors, they turn out to be political when governmental authorities are invited to the action so that they can be challenged to hear about market people's tax challenges first-hand.

The preparatory tempering work with state tax authorities prior to this particular rally-market storm is worth detailing. First, a documentary was recorded about local tax problems from market vendors, with tax authorities included as interviewees. Then, the documentary went live on a TV programme run by JDPC-Ondo. An advocacy visit to the tax authorities followed some days later. After that visit, the rally took place in central Akure (ibid). This activist sequence moved gradually vis-a-vis the authorities, from sensitisation, to advocacy, and on to protest (see

Figure 9). This may not be a planned strategy by JDPC, but it is an organic, adapted way in which they are used to operating.

Figure 9: Example of a 'contained disruption' strategy



Source: Akinola Adekunle

It could be argued that 'contained disruption' works in a way as to create a cushioned space against potential governmental hostility, giving minimised 'excuses' for repression. It would seem harder for the authorities to afford punishing an NGDO for government-critiquing actions if these take place in the very service-delivery spaces the state needs the NGDO to run. Likewise, the presence of authorities both legitimates the actions and makes them confront first-hand evidence on what is being campaigned for. Hence, for example, data from market storms pushes the state justifications to be sharper at the very least. This creates a safe space for people to participate in campaigning in ways that are disruptive yet contained.

4.5. Summary of results

This chapter has suggested ways in which frames and repertoires may help understand public mobilisation of campaigners and confrontation vis-à-vis authorities in the TJC. Frames and repertoires have power in their performativity and a capacity to become popular and appealing to current and prospective activist audiences and to opponents.

In terms of public mobilising, the choice of one or another frame or repertoire affected which staff and activists were attracted and which ones were not. For example, the notions of frame resonance and alignments, the logics of protest and the levels of disruption were ways of

relating claims and actions to the mobilisation of different groups. Those groups included programme participants, aid activists, tax activists, activists interested in low-income country poverty, and activists who like risky/mass actions, etc. Frame and repertoire choices also described confrontational engagement with the authorities and the opening of new discursive and political opportunities at each level. ActionAid's choice of one or another issue (e.g. between aid and tax) made claims more or less confrontational as well as more or less resonant. Repertoires, in particular their disruptiveness (or innovativeness), also described ways in which ActionAid confronts and surprises authorities. A key indicator by which ActionAid could be deemed to have been confrontational or not is by looking at its repertoires of action.

Finally, two campaign formats were observed in ActionAid's TJC – an earlier single-issue tax avoidance campaign led by AAUK and a multiple-issue format that developed during the TJC's federalisation. The single-issue campaign format proved useful to show an international system of poverty creation while the multiple-issue format unveiled poverty challenges originating at each level. Thus, these vertical and horizontal formatting of campaigns are complementary in showing different confronting demands on tax vis-à-vis the authorities and different mobilising patterns. Differently, the multiple-issue format proved more resonant in mobilising local people and in provoking reactions from authorities at national and local levels since claims were identifiable and solutions more feasible.

Chapter 5 – Organising in ActionAid: campaign networking and mobilising

Introduction

The past chapter explored the public performance of ActionAid's Tax Justice Campaign (TJC). This chapter studies the ways in which ActionAid organises towards performing or achieving that campaign. Up to this point, ActionAid would look like any other campaigning organisation that exposes claims and actions in a campaign to mobilise audiences and confront opponents. However, ActionAid was not born as a campaigning organisation and so, alongside this role, it drags NGDO 'baggage'. When analysing ActionAid's networks and mobilising structures – the main theme of this chapter – we will see that this baggage becomes visible. That is, ActionAid operates with networks and through organisational structures tailored for campaigning as well as for other purposes unrelated to it, such as sponsorships and service-delivery programmes. This hybrid nature requires us to pay attention to how all these aspects relate to campaigning in ActionAid (see conceptual framework in section 2.4.1).

Moreover, practitioner and academic literature has highlighted a process of democratisation in the NGDO. This has taken place through processes such as the integration of popular education and participatory methods (mostly in local programmes) and a strong application of human rights agendas through decentralised governance, planning, learning and evaluating (see previous sections 3.2.2 and 1.3). These were conscious attempts to democratise and politicise parts of the organisation. This chapter focuses on two of these aspects⁸³, human rights and decentralisation, and how they relate to the TJC. While these have been studied as innovative features in ActionAid, less has been said on how they interact with campaigning.

This chapter has two main sections – ActionAid's campaign networking (see section 5.1) and its mobilising structures (see section 5.2). Parts of these networking and structural matters will resemble those of campaigning organisations including campaign constituents, campaign

⁸³ These were the two areas where I collected most primary and secondary data related to campaigning and that, as per interview mentions and my own observation, seemed to have impacted the most on campaigning.

coalitions and campaign departments. At other times, NGDO particularities will emerge such as having service-delivery programme participants as campaign participants and contracted partners as internal campaign networkers. This chapter reads non-campaign structures as potential mobilising structures, including sponsorship, service-delivery programmes, decision-making and resource-distributing structures. Likewise, time/money issues, images, mediators and paid personnel could all serve as potential campaign resources (Edwards and Gillham, 2013). The first two, sponsorship and service-delivery programmes, have not been studied as 'mobilising structures' in the frameworks reviewed in section 2.2.2. A summary of findings closes the chapter (section 5.3).

5.1. Campaign networking

This section explores ActionAid's networking beyond internal staff in three sub-sections. This includes its constituencies (local groups, campaigners and financial supporters/sponsors), local partners, and external coalitions. The ways in which mobilisation happens (induced by AAN/AAUK or self-initiated by campaigners, seeking time or money from campaigners) is also explored. As with frames and repertoires, the notions of networking and mobilising structures in SM theory can help read aspects of public mobilisation in ActionAid's campaigning. This will be, in turn, coloured by NGDO particular features.

ActionAid's campaign network is shaped by 'old' and 'new' actors. The NGDO draws on previous sponsorship and service-delivery programme networks – local groups, sponsors and partners. It also draws on new campaign networks that were already born with activist goals – including campaigners and coalitions. Unlike the former, campaign networks are not financially driven. Networking in ActionAid is thus a hybrid process. Including all of these old and new network actors, and studying how they interact, is vital to gaining an understanding of the specific nature of NGDO campaigning.

Before describing each actor in detail, I show a general picture of ActionAid TJC's network. A central skeleton includes ActionAid International Secretariat (hereafter AAIS), AAN, AAUK and JDPC (see Figure 10, grey zone). Other actors – constituents (bases and supporters), partners

5.1.1. Internal networking – bases and supporters

In its global strategy, ActionAid aimed to grow *‘our base of committed individuals campaigning together and to shifting ourselves towards a movement of activists’* (ActionAid, 2012b: p.84). This sub-section looks at small-holder farmers, market vendors, Activistas, community campaigners and financial supporters as the constituents mobilised by AAN, AAUK and JDPC in the TJC. These already form a mix of NGDO actors who existed before campaigns started (bases or programme participants) and new campaign actors or supporters (since campaigns started).

Based on McCarthy and Zald (1977: p.1221-2), I distinguish between bases (or those directly affected by the campaign cause), and supporters (or those that back up the cause without directly gaining from it) as seen in section 2.3.1. In the TJC, smallholder farmers and market vendors mobilised by AAN and JDPC could be identified as bases as they are the most affected (and those portrayed to be the most affected) by the campaign theme, tax-based inequalities⁸⁴. Supporters include AAUK campaigners, *Activistas* or youth campaigners and financial supporters. Rural Activista groups in Ondo could sit under the profile of bases as they live in local communities, although these were less than a majority of university Activistas (see below).

Findings on networking with constituents indicate: (1) that the mobilising relationship is induced and led by AAN, AAUK and JDPC and that the constituents’ informal networking is sparse; (2) that supporters are more mobilised than the bases; and (3) that mobilisation leans more on money resources than time resources (see Diani and Donati, 1999, for the mobilisation of money and time resources). On the first finding, inducement showed in the fact that TJC claims came from the NGDO and that those claimed by local people were secondary or unofficial in the campaign. Equally, most actions were driven by the NGDO and partner more than by constituents. Thus, the constituency is ‘mobilised by’ AAN, AAUK and JDPC and invited to organised events rather than supported in their own actions.

For instance, AAN mobilised smallholder farmers and market vendors by inviting them to events like the TJC launch in Abuja and workshops in Benue, Delta, Kaduna and Ondo states (AAN reports, 2013; observation, Abuja/Kaduna/Akure, 2013). Similarly, JDPC recorded the action

⁸⁴ Publics service users, especially in education, are also portrayed as bases by ActionAid and seem to have been mobilised in other TJC country contexts (ActionAid internal newsletters, 2014).

research tax video with vendors and authorities (see section 4.3). In these activities, AAN-JDPD played a mediation role between bases and authorities. In Ondo's workshop, women farmers revealed their tax problems to tax public officials (observation, Akure, 2013). Similarly, the tax video included official and local voices and was later shared with tax authorities (Activista report, Akure, 2013). Some networking took place amongst the bases during the events yet the mobilisation was still initiated and led by the NGDO and the partner.

A tax action found in Wasimi village (Ondo) was started by farmers, who took the initiative to restart the payment of community tax when public water services reached the village (farmers, interviews, 2014). Likewise, some vendors in Isikan market had visited authorities to complain about the steep rise in local taxes (interviews, Akure, 2014). A group of cloth seller widows complained that their visit had been to no avail and support from JDPC was requested during the interview (ibid). Other sellers had locked up shops and markets and prevented tax collectors from performing their tax duties, as in Akure and Kaduna (TJN-Ondo, group discussion, Akure, 2014; vendor interview, Kaduna, 2013). Still others would arrange (e.g. cut) taxable products to pay less to tax collectors (FCT market interviews, Abuja, 2014).

These actions initiated by farmers and vendors, i.e. voluntary tax payments, tax visits to authorities, tax street revolts, were not being supported by JDPC or AAN at the time of the fieldwork. This would have pointed at a more organic mobilising relationship. Reasons for non-support may relate to the NGDO culture of working through pre-defined project activities and to the fact that some actions like tax revolts and closing down markets were too drastic for the more contained partner's repertoire (see section 4.4). Similarly, some vendors and rural farmers defended tax ideas incompatible with the TJC such as that of *non-tax-payment* (workshop interviews, Akure, 2014). Differently, the more compatible multiple taxation claim was taken up by JDPC-AAN.

When inducement on mobilisation and networking is too strong, it may turn instrumental. This was the view of some staff and campaigners interviewed regarding the use of African local people in photo campaigns and of Nigerian Activistas as 'foot soldiers'. The first example regards the photos taken by AAUK staff for campaigns in their visits, such as Ghanaian small-shop seller

Marta Ludgrodt (see Figure 11), pictured and interviewed for the AAUK SABMiller campaign in 2010, before the launch of the multi-country TJC⁸⁵.

The ActionAid ex-women's rights coordinator (interview, 2013) emphasized the negative effects that taking photos may have when there is no programming on tax set-up behind it. That is, Marta feeds organisational communication efforts without any further action strategy planned with her apart from her nominal mention in the campaign:

'We have the image of a woman who is a tax payer... [myself prompting: Marta?...] Marta, we have Marta exactly... [and] what did we do with Marta? We took her a picture and we asked her a few questions and then we've never gone back to speak to Marta. We haven't organised her into a group interested in tax. We haven't supported her, given her further information about the campaign... so Marta was just an image... [myself: Marta may be part of a market organisation...]... and if she is not then we could encourage her to be part of one'.



Figure 11: Ghanaian shop seller Marta, as pictured in an AAUK's report

Source: AAUK

Others see the case study method as giving voice to an ordinary citizen and as illustrating a gross inequality between national taxpayers and companies not paying tax (ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016). This tension is not new to ActionAid or specific to campaigning (see Newman, 2011: p.237).

Bridging efforts from ActionAid/AAUK to include the local person in the campaign have, to date [2015], stayed at the level of communications more than at mobilising. This lack of local mobilising leaves space open for tokenism, which resonates with the NGDO literature (see section 2.3.2). ActionAid tax campaign staff have taken steps to develop campaigning locally, such as contacting ActionAid *Reflection-Action* [community groups] staff since 2013 and developing a local tax justice toolkit in 2015 for staff that draws on local tax people's priorities. TJC strategic steps also pointed at building national tax-education coalitions (ActionAid internal

⁸⁵ Other examples can be found on www.actionaid.org.uk/tax-justice/real-lives-affected-by-associated-british-foods

newsletter, 2014) although this role was still unclear by the time I left Nigeria [April 2014]. From a SM theory perspective, the case of Marta could be illustrative of the dilemma of 'stigmatised identities' (Jasper, 2010), that is, the process of mobilising to change or eliminate an identity, e.g. 'poor', yet doing so by using that same identity to mobilise people thus running the risk of strengthening the label one is fighting for.

Another case of tension mentioned during the interviews was at the national level with Nigerian Activistas. *Activistas* is an international youth network supported by ActionAid that campaigns on ActionAid themes⁸⁶. In Nigeria, groups exist in universities and rural areas, e.g. Activistas in Ondo have six university cells and two community cells (Activistas Ondo, group discussion, 2014) while the UK covers university groups (AAUK campaign engagement manager, interview, 2014).

In Nigeria, some Activistas shared the feeling of being AAN 'foot soldiers'⁸⁷. This comment was shared after protesting in an AAN-organised rally at Abuja's Hilton hotel during the AU Conference (Activistas, interviews, 2014). They noted that AAN calls Activistas for centralised AAN-prepared actions but is less available to support Activista-led local ones. Some dated this feeling back to the Activista network creation in 2007 and linked it to the frequent dropouts and scarce number of Activista groups (ibid). On its side, AAN tax campaign staff acknowledged this feeling but noted that they did not want to create financial dependency with Activistas (feedback meeting, Abuja, 2014).

Similarly, in the UK, Activistas choose which campaign action to do but not the theme. AAUK ex-youth engagement manager mentioned that: 'I can do participatory sort of training and activity planning but I can't allow the young people... to decide what campaigns we are going to run... the policy and campaigns team decides what are going to be the key issues' (interview, 2013). Campaign groups often have to communicate actions to the NGDO and know each other little beyond AAN/AAUK mediation, although this has evolved (observation, Akure/London, 2013-14).

Efforts have been made in both countries to decentralise mobilisation and enable more informal networking. Besides organising national actions like the *Hilton rally* and the *annual Activista*

⁸⁶ www.actionaid.org/activista/who-we-are

⁸⁷ The 'soldier' term appears in a former evaluation of Activistas (Ronneberg-Møller, 2012). In her chapter feedback, ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner (2016) nuanced that Activistas have a diverse relationship with ActionAid across the world, sometimes being independent, sometimes within the national ActionAid office.

campaigning trainings, AAN supports local actions led by Activistas in their areas with pocket money. Yet, according to some Activistas (interviews, 2014), influence over decisions and limited accompaniment and incentives still exist. Likewise, AAUK devolved some networking power in 2014 to ‘community campaigners’ (activists of any age supporting AAUK in specialised street actions). When I became a community campaigner in 2013, the activism officer coordinated contacts through emails and a Facebook group. In 2014, AAUK campaign team piloted a voluntary role of ‘local organisers’ who would recruit and coordinate other campaigners by geographic area⁸⁸. That enabled campaigners to liaise more freely with the assigned local organisers without AAUK mediation, yet the groups’ room for manoeuvre still has to be read within AAUK’s selected campaigns.

Inducement and network control also have a positive reading in the degree of sophistication and efficiency of campaigns. Section 4.4 noted the choice between mass and time-intensive actions offered by ActionAid to campaigners. AAUK in particular has an elaborate pyramidal approach to locating campaigners along these choices (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014).

In the pyramid’s base, most AAUK campaigners get involved in easy-to-do actions like emailing their MPs. Of a total of 60,000 AAUK campaigners (AAUK campaign engagement manager, interview, 2014), an average of 15,000 take frequent online action (AAUK staff member, pers. comm., 2014). Staff gradually ask campaigners to take up physical action, including specialised actions requiring training and rehearsal like street stunts. Symbolically, this means climbing the pyramid. The more specialised actions a campaigner does, the higher s/he is located in AAUK’s pyramid. Community campaigners, on average numbering about 30 (ibid), undertake the most specialised actions and sit at the top of the pyramid. The pyramidal strategy provides AAUK a steady pool of potential time-intensive campaigners to perform specialised street mobilisation.

Besides the choice between mass and time-intensive actions, supporters can decide between contributing their time or their money resources – which widens out the mobilising profiles. Even the same campaigner may do both or swing between these two options depending on age and life circumstances, for example, they may be workers with some extra money or retired people with some free time, according to some of those interviewed (community campaigners,

⁸⁸ www.actionaid.org.uk/blog/campaigns/2015/04/23/5-reasons-to-apply-to-be-a-local-organiser

interviews, 2013-14). AAUK has 165,000 financial supporters, including sponsors, regular givers and fundraisers and 60,000 campaigners (AAUK campaign engagement manager, interview, 2014)⁸⁹. Campaigners give their time rather than their money, although some do both: *'Last time we ran stats, it was 20% [doing both]'* (ibid).

In AAN, a community sponsor programme started targeting Nigerian well-off individuals and corporates as financial supporters in 2015, the first INGO in the country to do so according to ActionAid (2016b: p.74)⁹⁰. Except for that, no other bases or supporters are asked for financial support. In fact, they may be supported with travel per-diems to attend campaign actions given the poverty context. While Nigerian Activistas do not fundraise for AAN as UK Activistas may do for AAUK, they are encouraged to raise money for their local actions besides any AAN pocket money given for logistics.

A final insight on mobilising and networking concerns ActionAid's larger engagement with supporters than with the bases, even when financial supporters are excluded from the comparison. AAUK's unique constituent profile is that of supporters, namely Activistas, community campaigners, sponsors and fundraisers (although an ActionAid senior staff member suggested that some, e.g. low-income sponsors, could be considered bases – pers. comm., 2013). For AAN and JDPC, collaboration with supporters (university Activistas) has been more common than with the bases (farmers, vendors and rural Activistas). This resonates with Bob's (2005) affirmation that NGOs tend to devote themselves to the challenger whose profile most closely matches their own requirements and not necessarily to the neediest group. For instance, Activistas participated in every action that AAN-JDPC had with the bases while the converse did not happen (photos, archives and observation, Abuja/Akure, 2014). Although collaboration between Activistas and farmers-vendors exists, the existence of fewer mobilised bases reduces its potential.

This sub-section has explored mobilising relationships between AAN/AUUK and constituents in the TJC network. These were induced roles rather than centred on the constituents' initiatives (their own claims and actions). Excessive inducement reduces the quantity and quality of activists participating, e.g. feelings of instrumentalisation, while if balanced, it can bring

⁸⁹ Unlike AAUK, there is no conclusive absolute data on how many bases and supporters are mobilised by AAN

⁹⁰ www.youtube.com/watch?v=0aB0f8g6BtY&feature=youtu.be_gdata_player; www.actionaid-ngr.org/

mobilising sophistication and efficiency and choices for activists on how to participate (for example, between giving time and money, between time-intensive or time-low activism). Several concepts from the mobilising structures literature, e.g. bases/supporters, activist money/time resources, aid our reading of these relationships.

5.1.2. Internal networking – partners

The next two sections explore ActionAid’s mobilising relationships with partners and coalitions. Partners (this sub-section) differ from coalitions in that they receive a money transaction from ActionAid in exchange for activities. An NGDO feature highlighted in the conceptual framework were the non-campaign elements (see section 2.4.1). Based on this, I explore two angles with partners. The first looks at how the TJC (and international campaigning in general) may have affected networking with non-campaign partners. The second explores how partners in turn may have affected international campaigning. I take a similar approach in relation to coalitions in the next sub-section.

AAN has 12 sub-national partners that implement local work in 12 Nigerian states. One of these is JDPC, which has been based in Ondo state since 2005 (AAN internal partners brief, 2014). Most partners are community-based organisations doing ‘empowerment’ and ‘capacity building’ activities with people living in poverty, and some public-service advocacy (ibid). JDPC is a paradigmatic case of this semi-political nature, with tasks of sponsorship and service-delivery under a rights-based ethos. Officially, the three JDPC staff positions (admin, programmes and sponsorship officers) relate to child sponsorship and service-delivery activities (JDPC-Ondo, 2011, 2012). Yet, both AAN and JDPC’s other funder *Misereor*⁹¹ cover socio-economic rights programmes on education, food and governance and legal and civil rights work with prisoners, widows and electoral rights⁹². This translates into having advocacy in both sponsorship and service-delivery programmes, such as programme participants and authorities meeting through JDPC’s mediation.

⁹¹ A German Catholic Bishops’ organisation www.misereor.org/about-us.html

⁹² For source reference, legal and civil rights are called ‘human rights’ by JDPC-Ondo while socio-economic rights are called ‘local rights’ (JDPC-Ondo annual reports, 2011, 2012)

Adding to the rights ethos and public-service advocacy, new activities – when compared to the activities cited in past JDPC-Ondo annual reports (*ibid*) – seem associated with the arrival of international campaigns to AAN – the *Hunger Free Campaign* in 2007 and then the TJC. First, there were AAN training sessions on campaigning to partners. Second, there was more street mobilisation in JDPC. A final effect has been a diversification of partner structures. Until 2013, JDPC was both the programme and the campaign partner. In 2014, AAN started to fund a new local campaign partner, the *Tax Justice Network Ondo* (TJN-Ondo). The TJN-Ondo is an ad-hoc coalition of about 30 local associations, including JDPC, created around AAN funding (TJN-Ondo, group discussion, 2014). A reason for this shift pointed at JDPC's overload in responding to programme responsibilities (AAN staff member, pers. comm., 2014). Thus, for the case of JDPC, the addition of campaigning activities to advocacy ones may have not worked towards a clear, integrated 'insider-outsider' strategy (see Carbert, 2004; Dalton, 2007, in section 2.4.1), but rather towards a diversification of AAN partners. On the other hand, the training and street practice of campaigning may have effects on the advocacy-driven partner and its local collaborators in future. However, this is not observable at the moment.

Conversely, the nature of previous partners may in turn affect international campaigning. Section 4.4 noted one such effect – how JDPC used its service-delivery spaces to gain activist manoeuvres for international, national and local campaign claims. TJN-Ondo, the new campaign partner, had not yet started activities by the time I interviewed the Secretariat in 2014, but they shared planned activities with a similar *modus operandi* to that of JDPC in which the partner leads on actions and invites constituents. These activities included: sensitisation; a capacity building workshop; review of existing laws; taking part in radio and TV programmes; advocacy visits and citizen dialogues in local government areas (TJN-Ondo, group discussion, 2014). Thus, the entry of the new campaign partner has not come with more confrontational action or actions led by local people as compared to the old partner, JDPC, nor with an explicit vision of insider-outsider strategies (see Carbert, 2004; Dalton, 2007, in section 2.4.1).

The only difference with JDPC is that the TJN-Ondo includes new relationships with urban vendors and informal market unions as constituents, namely, artisans like tailors, hair dressers, and business outfits like pure water producers (*ibid*). To date, JDPC had worked with schools and rural women farmers. In this sense, the group profiles mobilised have widened with the entry of the new campaign partner.

Networking through partners seems to play a key role in sensitising and organising people in poverty contexts in which people-led mobilisation is limited. As the AAN campaign manager put it: *'there is... fatigue, particularly in those communities where people struggle day by day and live on day income... survival takes precedent. But where they don't have challenges of surviving for the next day, they tend to be more active, because there is this yawning for a better tomorrow. [Then] it is easy to mobilise with communities'* (interview, 2013). State corruption also plays out in demobilisation: *'if people are hungry, they are easily bought over by the state, rather than getting angry at the system that is putting them under that situation. They are ready to take anything'* (ibid).

In the UK, AAUK has no local partners. Rather, AAUK staff themselves cover local activities besides national ones with the support of AAUK's network of community campaigners and Activista groups. This 'network of supporters' seems to better respond to AAUK's need to maintain its visibility than a 'network of partners'. As AAUK ex-youth engagement manager explained: *'there have been lots of discussion about it [AAUK working in partnerships] and that's never really happened and the reason being is that... when we work in partnership it's very hard to sacrifice our visibility in a way that we can do in the South, where it doesn't matter if our rally has an ActionAid logo and another logo, and it sounds picky, but... it is a big issue for organisations in the UK'* (interview, 2013).

One reason why AAUK needs visibility relates to its specific organisational goals of campaigning and fundraising (ibid). Building a name helps raise funds. This is key to the Federation as AAUK is its major fundraising member (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.8). Campaigns help achieve fundraising by gaining media attention and sectorial status. The AAN ex-country director summed this up as follows: *'[European affiliates] are looking for campaigns that can raise funds'* (interview, 2013).

Building up a name and a niche takes place in a challenging UK-international context with strong NGDO sectorial competition: *'[There are] a lot of international development organisations and to some degree we are in competition with each other because we are all trying to get the same market, the same portion of the population that are going to support Oxfam, ActionAid, Save the Children or ChristianAid or CAFOD or any other... so much of our work is go out and sell ourselves'* (AAUK ex-youth engagement manager, interview, 2013).

The competition does not only turn on obtaining official and sponsor funds but also on recruiting campaigners. Anti-poverty sympathisers form a limited pool from which all NGOs compete to take ‘their’ activists. In turn, the number of recruited campaigners also counts for having impact and for growing a media profile (ibid).

Overall, AAUK works with supporters while AAN does so with supporters and bases (through partners). Each networking suits particular organisational needs and socio-political contexts. That is, a wide and adaptable network of supporters responds well to UK’s competitive context of high-level politics and fundraising while partner and supporter structures respond to both Nigerian poverty contexts and high-advocacy national campaign and media actions.

5.1.3. External networking – coalitions and collaborations

Several types of coalitions⁹³ exist in the TJC. The longest and commonest coalitions are with other NGOs. They precede and outlast single thematic campaigns like the TJC and give solidity to campaigning. Coalitions with non-development organisations including NGOs and unions tend to depend on the length of campaign topics. Yet, they bring an element of learning due to their different ways of thinking and working. Coalitions with formal organisations are more common than with informal groups and social movements. When collaboration takes place with these groups and movements, it does so outside the campaign and work office dynamics.

Coalitions with other NGOs are very common⁹⁴ and often outlive the passing of thematic campaigns. This may be due to the fact that NGO coalitions are based on a common underlying mission (end of poverty) that enables them to collaborate beyond particular topics, e.g. tax justice. Similar organisational working cultures, e.g. being donor-supported, may also help long-term coalescing of campaign teams despite the sectorial competition, noted above, experienced by fundraising teams of the same NGOs. Coalitions with non-NGO actors like unions and the

⁹³ I see coalitions as a temporary engagement of organisations (Diani and Bison, 2004: p.284). They are more stable and formal than occasional collaborations.

⁹⁴ For example, ActionAid, ChristianAid and the Norwegian Church Aid coalesced at the TJC start in 2008 (see chapter 4). ActionAid, ChristianAid, Oxfam and others coalesced in the international *IF* campaign (2013), the UK *Tax Dodging Bill* campaign (2015) and the Nigerian *Tax Justice and Governance Network* [coalition]. The *Network* is formed by four international NGOs (ActionAid, ChristianAid, Oxfam and Publish What You Pay), two national NGOs (CDD, CISLAC) and two state-level NGOs (Benue’s *Bengonet* and Kaduna’s *Know your Budget*).

state may be recurrent in consecutive campaigns but tend to be with different unions or state bodies according to the campaign theme. For instance, the TJC involved both traders' unions and tax authorities (TJC launch observation, Abuja, 2013) while the *Global Campaign for Education* coalesced with teacher unions and *UNESCO* (Culey et al., 2007).

What coalitions with actors other than NGOs seem to contribute is an element of learning. An example is the early coalition in the TJC between ActionAid (and other NGOs) with the Tax Justice Network (see section 4.1). The TJN is as a non-development, research-led and activist organisation born in Porto Alegre's WSF in 2003 and the alter-globalisation group *Attac* (TJN, 2005: p.2). Collaboration with NGOs gave the TJN more local access to African and Asian organisations while an African take on tax and development is also discernible, e.g. the *African Tax Spotlight* series⁹⁵. Conversely, ActionAid gained on tax expertise.

In the TJC, AAN has worked together with NANTS, the *National Association of Nigerian Traders* in Nigeria (TJC launch observation, Abuja, 2013). NANTS contributed with a new national-to-local frame to the TJC. In the TJC launch (observation, Abuja, 2013), NANTS' President gave a speech on how tax incentives affected small traders and producers, thus linking a national technical issue with its effects on local people. NANTS was formed in Lagos by a group of traders in 1997 to fight the traders': '*arbitrary harassments, arrests, and intimidation in the hands of uniformed men who sometimes carted away their goods with impunity*' during Abacha's military regime⁹⁶. This resonates and grants repertoire historicity to current market vendors' claims on tax harassment (JDPC tax video, Akure, 2013).

ActionAid's early coalition with *Education International* and teacher unions during the *Global Campaign for Education* also showed that, despite the difficulty of NGOs and unions working together, this mixed coalition brought learning and changes to ActionAid's thinking and practice (Culey et al., 2007; also Gaventa and Tandon, 2010: ch.7). For instance, the unions questioned ActionAid's precarious practice of paying voluntary teachers as unfair competition to the teachers' ability to secure training and decent salaries (Archer, 2010: p.614, 616). The learning

⁹⁵ www.taxjusticeafrica.net/en/resources/downloads/newsletters/

⁹⁶ <http://nants.org/about-us/>

percolated through and the TJC now asks for tax to pay for public services, including teacher salaries⁹⁷.

Collaboration and coalitions with membership organisations and social movements were the least common types to be heard from AAN and AAUK. Informal coalescing episodes often operate outside paid work or planned campaigns such as the TJC. Collaborations with movements included that of AAN with the *Nigerian Social Forums* (e.g. Moru, 2005) and the *Occupy Nigeria* movement (Abdu, 2012; Habba, 2012; Haruna, 2012) and participation in WSF meetings by ActionAid and AAUK staff (AAUK, 2015; Campolina, 2015; Gautney, 2010; Maliha, 2015).

The AAN campaign manager reported aspects in which AAN was useful for the case of *Occupy*. Five months before the street rallies started in January 2012, NGDOs played a role in sensitising about the implication of fuel price increases for food security through press conferences (AAN campaign manager, interview, 2013). AAN and other NGDOs supported meetings with: *'different campaign platforms we called "bluff" referring to the federal government's refusal to negotiate* (ibid). During the rallies, AAN's role moved to: *'moderate the temper so that it did not become a bloody event'* (ibid). AAN closed offices to identify with the *Occupy Nigeria* strike and asked staff not to stay at home (Aremu, 2016). AAN's daily ways of working, like hierarchy through team leaders, and access to social media, served to ensure staff's safety and to provide updates on protest actions (ibid). In collaboration with associations of doctors, barristers and the media, an emergency plan was set up to deal with potential arrests and casualties arising from the movement's actions (ibid).

One barrier that could explain the scarcity of coalitions with informal groups is that donors require registration for their funding (AAN-ActionAid ex-human security advisor, interview, 2014). Organisations have adapted by networking in a way in which registered organisations cover up for unregistered ones: *'many of the conventional NGOs are led by activists who actually then fund these other organisations... for example, you want to do a rally, they will then say, "ok let's do [it] jointly". They [NGOs] provide the funding for it but the organisation is led by you [unregistered membership organisation]'* (ibid). In the UK, a similar situation takes place where

⁹⁷ www.actionaid.org/nigeria/img/tax-pays-education-0

donor requirements for money tracking and financial accountability make it harder for AAUK to work with informal groups. AAUK activism officer noted: *'I'd be interested in us trying to support local movements on tax regardless... if anyone is affiliated to an organisation or not... if they're just interested in working on tax... but it's quite hard to have money for that because it is quite hard to be accountable about what that has achieved'* (interview, 2014).

Organisational reasons add to donor reasons regarding the difficulty in collaborating with informal groups and movements. As with partners, informal coalitions are also affected by AAUK's, and to a lesser extent AAN's, organisational need for visibility and decision-making (see section 5.1.2). Equally, ActionAid's induced mobilisation differs from that of informal organisations and movements – a more organic mobilisation. However, attempts exist to integrate non-planned and more informal coalescing as a normalised activity – for instance, by demanding that ANN's campaign team makes provision for unanticipated campaigns in their annual plan and budget (Aremu, 2016).

In short, exploring external networking can help us understand the nature of public mobilisation through coalitions, for example, whether that happens through organisations or movements; through NGOs or other organisations; the different audiences it may thus reach (such as trade unionists and public workers); and the learning extracted from coalescing relationships regarding campaigning.

Overall, this section has presented different ways of networking on the TJC. Induced, or actively encouraged, mobilisation is stronger with partners and supporters and weaker or absent with coalitions, especially with membership organisations and movements. Also, ActionAid holds strategic control over partners, e.g. choosing which partner to work with, despite partners' relative autonomy on action plans. This compares to coalitions that are not based on financial agreements but, at least in the case of *Occupy Nigeria*, on complementarity and mobilisation support. In between, supporters and people living in poverty may receive pocket-money to participate in the NGO actions and/or carry out their own actions.

5.2. Mobilising structures

The past section has looked at networking. This section turns to study ActionAid as the main network mobiliser. Campaign departments in AAN, AAUK and ActionAid constitute the logical, visible mobilising structures that ActionAid uses for campaigning. These would be similar to the mobilising structures of any other campaigning organisation. Besides this visible structure, other structures not initially created for mobilising may also serve that aim indirectly – namely, the departments of sponsorship and service-delivery programmes (see section 5.2.1) and the decision-making and resource-delivering structures attending to general organisational goals, which include, but are not exclusively, campaign departments (see section 5.2.2).

Conventionally seen, sponsorship and service-delivery programmes create dependency between ActionAid and the beneficiaries while decision-making and resource-delivery structures can be seen as bureaucratic and limiting to campaigning. However, ActionAid has aimed to democratise these structures with a human rights approach over the past decades following trends in the sector, for instance, by decentralising decision-making structures (see section 1.3). How do these affect campaigning? This section suggests that new skills and processes are observed in campaigning caused by these non-campaign organisational elements, but that they happen under persistent tensions and restrictions – which could be seen as the ‘tense opportunities’ of this hybrid-based campaigning.

5.2.1. Local mobilising structures – sponsorship and service-delivery programmes

The gradual politicisation of ActionAid in the 1990s and 2000s through human rights, advocacy and campaigning created a hybrid structure with multiple and often conflicting departments (Gilmore, 2011; Newman, 2011). NGDOs became spaces that contained sponsorship; service-delivery; policy; advocacy; and campaigning all in one structure. This sub-section explores two of these organisational hybridities – that of sponsorship and campaigning and that of service-delivery programmes and campaigning.

Sponsorship and service-delivery are problematic entry points for campaigning – they create dependency, which represents exactly the opposite to an autonomous mobilising ethos.

Creating mobilising structures in local areas in which a sponsorship and service-delivery culture has become absorbed takes time and can send contradictory messages. Sponsorship funding adds a layer of comfort. That is, ActionAid has an additional financial structure that allows (and obliges) it to spend funds in the same areas for a period of about ten years (such as those locations where sponsored children live)⁹⁸.

At first sight, this long-term stay could be seen as ideal to develop progressive mobilisation and networking in the same place with the same people. Yet, it can also bring a relaxation in the communities and the NGDO staff who may feel comfortable because they are 'covered' for 10 years through the selected child. (The child sponsored has to be the same person over the period to fulfil the one-to-one relationship of sponsorship with the paying sponsor). Also, if mobilisation and networking take place, they must adapt or compete with the predominant sponsored child-centred logistics and mentality (observation, Ondo villages, 2014).

Over the years, ActionAid has taken steps to close this gap through the integration of human rights. This has included sensitising sponsors, sponsored children and programme participants on campaign themes. A first effect of this move has been the public mobilisation of some of these constituents. Other observed campaign elements deriving from hybridity include programme-based repertoires (see section 4.4), images gathered as mobilising resources and programme-campaigning mediating roles. These are now explored in turn.

A first campaign feature emerging out of hybridity is the development of 'unusual' activists. The conventional way of mobilising activists in campaigning organisations is the direct recruitment of campaigners. ActionAid shares that feature with the recruitment of Activistas and community campaigners as seen in section 5.1.1. Given its hybrid structures, ActionAid also has the potential to attract people who are not activists at the outset such as sponsors (and sponsored children) and programme local participants, as shown below.

A first group that has been partly mobilised are sponsors and other financial supporters. Most of them donate to AAN/AAUK because they are attracted by their community-work financial

⁹⁸ Given ActionAid's double-financing from sponsors and official funding, AAN offices in Abuja have two local-oriented departments, one deals with sponsorship funds and long-term partners (called 'LRPs') and another organises shorter, officially funded programmes (called 'programmes'). This was a surprising finding for me as a visitor.

appeals (campaign-based financial appeals hardly exist⁹⁹). A way of changing this trend has been to ask senior sponsors to allow for their contributions to be used more flexibly beyond a child's community (this is called 'next steps' in ActionAid, see Walsh, 2014: p.131). These contributions may include the financing of lobbying and campaign activities.

An AAUK sponsor recalled how, during her sponsorship visit to Pakistan, she was told about actions like national lobbying to the parliament and the government as stemming from her support (interview, 2013). She added another example: *'the villages have no laws or regulations. Nothing is written down on paper. A piece of land passed down by generations by generations... and this landlord came to take it away from them saying "it is not yours", and ActionAid has helped them campaigning to get their land back'* (ibid).

As potential activists, sponsors are also sent campaign bulletins and news besides sponsoring information and are invited to participate in campaign actions. I myself, as a 1st year sponsor, received TJC materials and was introduced to campaign targets and invited to sign petitions. In NGOs, this is called the 'supporter journey' that aims to move sponsors and other financial supporters to become campaigners (Clifton, 2013; Darnton and Kirk, 2011; Yanacopulos, 2016: p.124).

The abovementioned AAUK sponsor, now also a campaigner, remembers when she was invited to her first campaigning workshop: *'the 1st meeting I've ever been to is the meeting I met you [PhD student] at... this one is the first I was invited... they sent me links and postcards, and I passed it on, like that Barclays thing, make sure you pay your taxes... I just started. I've never done the street, but I wouldn't mind'* (interview, 2013).

Conversely, campaigners can be prompted to give money. As the AAUK campaign engagement manager explained: *'we've got an ongoing programme on cross-selling... we [AAUK campaign team] set targets with the fundraising team... we probably go out maybe three or four times a year with offers back and forth to link the financial and the campaigning supporters trying to engage them to do the other thing'* (interview, 2014).

⁹⁹ Some initiatives however exist such as where AAUK once asked campaigners to donate for a campaign bus outside an Annual General Meeting action (ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016)

For 2013, she noted that: *'we had targets last year with 4,000 financial supporters to start campaigning with us and I think it was 500 campaigners to start supporting ActionAid financially for the first time... and I think it was about a 1,000 and 1,500¹⁰⁰ who started support ActionAid financially'* (ibid). This finding would resonate with the idea presented in section 2.3.1 that professionalisation (and a correspondent focus on financial resources) can be compatible with people's mobilisation. Considering the data above, these can at least converge to a certain degree.

Transitions between sponsors and campaigners do not always function for other networks, such as with AAUK fundraising local groups (these are different from sponsors in that they organise in groups to fundraise). AAUK campaign engagement manager explained that: *'they've been part of ActionAid for a long time since quite soon [after] the organisation started... they will do more like community events, to raise money in their local communities. And because they have done the same activities for many years... when we started campaigning, there wasn't a lot of interest from these groups to get more involved'* (interview, 2014).

All in all, the sponsor-to-campaigner mobilising pattern works well for attracting profiles of people who would not initially see themselves as activists but who may gradually consider themselves to be so. These transitions between financial supporters and campaigners do not exist in AAN, which started domestic fundraising in 2014 and had until then operated sponsorship at the sponsored child end only (observation, Akure, 2014). A more incipient mobilising itinerary is that of former sponsored children, although only anecdotal data exists in Bangladesh of sponsored children that have become Activistas (AAUK ex-youth engagement manager, interview, 2013).

A third mobilising itinerary is with local participants of ActionAid programmes. This itinerary is possible as part of the programmes-campaigning hybridity (whereas the previous two do so as part of the sponsorship-campaigning hybridity).

ActionAid has tried to strategize service-delivery programmes towards demanding the fulfilment of human rights by states. As seen in section 1.3, ActionAid is said to be distinctive from other

¹⁰⁰ This high number (compared to initial expectations) is due to the typhoon Haiyan emergency donations (AAUK campaigns' engagement manager, interview 2014)

NGDOs integrating rights in its bottom-up perspective and a solid power discourse on the state's responsibility to provide for rights (Newman, 2011: ch.5). In practice, this means that local people have voice in defining and prioritising the rights to be claimed and that states are involved in, and must take over, ActionAid's service-delivery activities. Thus, ActionAid locates service delivery programmes as a means towards developing local people's mobilisation and demands to the state, rather than being an end in itself. This is called 'gradual fulfilment' in ActionAid. When successful, these processes lead to lobbying and campaigning aimed at the states based on problems previously identified in programmes (see examples in Gilmore, 2010: p.31).

In the TJC, a programme network of women farmers from Wasimi and other villages integrated tax ideas into their own contextual situations, e.g. demanding tax receipts in exchange for their tax payments and exposing tax problems to tax public officials in a workshop (see section 5.1.1). However, in other villages local groups were weak or non-existent and only sponsorship activity operated (observation, Ondo villages, 2014). More research would be needed to explore how much programme networks, i.e. women farmer groups in Ondo, operate with campaign issues.

The mobilisation of programme participants was also observable in other AAN activities outside the TJC. Programme-based campaigning, or campaigning emerging out of local programmes, was visible in AAN's HIV/AIDS anti-stigma work. In its call for an anti-stigma national bill, advocacy and campaigning activity drew on previous HIV/AIDS programming, with local people becoming advocates and mobilisers themselves, including actions in the streets (AAN internal reports/AAN staff interviews, Abuja, 2013-14).

Advocacy-driven mobilisation by local people was also found in JDPC's work – for instance, in electricity demands by some communities to the local authorities in the village of Wasimi (interviews, 2014). While specific research would be needed, a local leader suggested that JDPC-supported discussion circles had helped in the process of mobilising for electrification (ibid). Similarly, JDPC builds and manages schools with local people under a 'gradual fulfilment' protocol so that it will hand these facilities over to the state once the school has been built (JDPC-Ondo, 2011, 2012)¹⁰¹. The protocol goes from initial government visits to a final

¹⁰¹ An internal report gives other cases in the federation yet notes that, in general, 'gradual fulfilment' is: '*not well known and understood amongst staff and partners*' (ActionAid, 2013: p.10)

community ceremony in which responsibilities are symbolically transferred through a bilateral signing. Communities are left with the task of checking on state responsibilities (ibid). While these examples are not part of the international TJC, they illustrate public mobilisation and claims on the state at the national and local levels. As for mixing advocacy and campaign strategies, the examples found indicate more alternation at the national level than locally. This may be partly due to the higher risk of acting radically in local contexts as there is less anonymity.

In short, the existence of sponsoring and service-delivery programmes enables at least two alternative mobilising strategies when compared to the direct recruitment of campaigners – through financial supporters/sponsors (and possibly sponsored children) and through programme participants.

Besides these mobilising strategies, three other campaign skills facilitated by the programmes-campaigning hybridity consist of: programme-based repertoires; image mobilisation and politicisation; and campaign mediation. As seen in section 4.4, actions in Ondo often drew on programme spaces to operate, turning them into mobilising spaces. These ‘programme-based repertoires’ could be read as a way of legitimising and softening confrontation in controlled and coercive contexts through linking campaigning work to previous service-delivery or sensitisation work.

Another hybrid-based campaign skill is the mobilisation of images with constituents (bases and supporters) carrying campaign messages. Two examples were shown in previous chapters. First, the photo-hashtag repertoire action in which people wrote ‘tax pays for’ on a paper followed by the public service they most wanted financed in their area. These can be used for street actions where the photos were taken and for online actions uploaded on the hashtag #taxpaysfor (see section 4.4). Second, the case of Ghanaian market seller Marta whose image portrayed the effects of tax avoidance on people living in poverty (see section 5.1.1).

Having a programmatic structure in AAN permits this action with local programme participants. Pictured people are mobilised through images, and they may also (or may not) actively campaign in their areas. On the other side of the campaign, images of programme participants approach the UK public about a distant reality with campaign messages. That is, image mobilising in campaigns enables an ‘image politicisation’ that goes from images of African malnourished

babies, or photos of sponsored children without campaign messages, to images of Africans complaining and demanding their rights (ActionAid archives/website, 2013-14). These images may be in the form of programme participants posing as case studies to illustrate a campaign story (Marta's case, or image 1 in Figure 12) or programme participants with banners and other activist devices (see the image of two children in Figure 12). This adds to images of campaigning supporters from low-income and high-income countries (see bottom images in Figure 12).

Figure 12: Types of campaign images



1. Programme participants as case studies
(by ActionAid, Zambia)



2. Programme participants with banners
(by ActionAid, unknown)



3. Low-income country campaigners
(by Kas Sempere, Abuja)



4. High-income country campaigners
(by ActionAid Australia, Brisbane)

Source: ActionAid, Kas Sempere

Finally, the programmes-campaigning hybridity also facilitates the hybridity of staff. 'Staff hybridity' refers to profiles familiar with both programmes and campaigning realities (akin to Alonso's 'hybrid activists', 2009, presented in section 2.3.1). The TJC had at least three hybrid staff profiles – AAN campaign staff (in frequent touch with programmes), JDPC staff (local frontline staff with international and national inputs) and Nigerian Activistas (in touch with AAN campaign staff, partner staff and programme participants).

Hybrid staff are natural mediators across campaign levels. To do so, they tend to speak the local language and English, with two cases of staff (from AAN and JDPC) shifting between pigeon and formal English depending on their audience (observation, Abuja/Akure, 2014). They also often know how to respond to different cultural protocols, from a community visit to a Hilton breakfast (ibid). In section 2.3.1, I suggested that mediation happens through narratives (frames) and people (mediators). It is partly thanks to these mediators that frames move along campaign levels. For instance, local claims were learnt from local research led by JDPC and Activistas through action research videos and market storms (see section 4.4). Then AAN campaign staff brought multiple taxation and other local matters to the national eye through policy briefings and public claims (observation, Abuja, 2013-14). Activista youth campaigners also carried multiple taxation messages across different spaces, e.g. from local markets to the national TJC launch in Abuja with a self-made theatre sketch (ibid).

Differently, people with professional profiles in ActionAid and AAUK campaign teams work on campaigns, not programmes, and are specialised in moving across international tax policy spaces – like Alonso's 'globetrotters' (2009) or experts spending most of their time traveling internationally (see section 2.3.1). These work less as mediators across departments and levels and more as experts about policy, research and advocacy (TJC policy working group observation, online, 2013-14). Their technical knowledge adds robustness and legitimacy to the TJC through training and supervisory, quality-checking roles.

Hybrid activists and globetrotters can form an informal leadership line across levels through which ideas can move and be legitimated. In 2014, Henry Malumo (ActionAid tax justice advocacy coordinator) joined the AU Conference and was in touch with UNECA and Mbeki's offices. He then worked closely with Tunde Aremu (AAN campaign manager) on the national appeal on the Mauritius-Nigeria tax treaty. Aremu visited Ondo often and passed on these ideas. Father Patrick (JDPC coordinator) and Akinola Adekunle (Ondo Activista coordinator) then translated and made tax avoidance and tax incentives digestible to locals and linked them to local tax issues. This line also works 'upwards', as noted above with multiple taxation, although this was less common and only reached the national, not the international, level. Hybrid activists probably play a key role in bringing local claims 'up' the campaign ladder in an NGDO structure whose incentives tend to support the converse direction (see Newman, 2011: p.244-53 for examples).

Overall, using notions of mobilising structures and resource mobilisation on sponsorship and service-delivery programmes departments does help bring to light hybrid campaign skills and processes emanating from non-campaigning features in the NGDO. It also can do this alongside those activities taking place in campaign departments, such as direct recruitment of campaigners. These skills and processes, however, exist in tension. For instance, campaign messages did not always thrive with all groups, as happened with AAUK local fundraising groups. Similarly, images of poor people can be useful in transmitting campaign messages and mobilising activists but may also run the risk of objectivising programme participants (see section 5.1.1).

5.2.2. National mobilising structures – decision-making and distribution of campaign resources

Besides hybridity, other non-campaigning organisational aspects that can affect campaigning are the level of decentralisation in decision-making and the distribution of resources. As seen in section 1.3, ActionAid sought to democratise its decision-making through decentralisation. This section looks at the ambivalent benefits that this has had in campaigning. Equally, it looks at the relationship between campaigning and resources. As in the previous section, findings point to both tensions and opportunities, or ‘tense opportunities’.

A first effect of decentralisation is that campaign planning, like other planning processes in ActionAid, is decentralised to the country level. In her review of ActionAid’s campaigning, Gilmore (2010: p.11) dates this nationalising of campaigning to 2010 when campaigning turned towards a greater alignment with country strategic plans and policy support. Under the ‘campaign nationalising’ approach, country members plan their own national campaigns (which later feed into federal campaigns) and decide which federal campaign/s (at least one) they will join (ActionAid, 2012b: p.91; observation, Abuja, 2013-14). Certain ActionAid country offices lead the federal campaign strategy and governance – the TJC was particularly led by ActionAid Bangladesh and ActionAid Uganda (ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016). Country offices can further add national and local themes to national campaign plans (ibid).

This approach can be compared to the international governance level: *‘the international staff does not implement campaigns, we facilitate coordination between national campaigns, and for*

national staff to coordinate at regional and international opportunities on what may help national campaign[ing]... we have almost no power (very little finances, very little peer pressure or historic power, no governance control) over ActionAid offices... what [we] may exercise is some capacity power (2 dedicated campaign staff members) to generate ideas for 24 countries' (ibid). Significantly, ActionAid calls its federal campaigns 'multi-country' rather than 'international' since the latter are often understood to function uniquely at the international space (ibid).

Autonomously, both AAN and JDPC, at some point in time, made use of other financial resources not directly coming from the TJC for its campaign activities. For example, AAN used a UN-millennium funded governance programme to carry out tax justice workshops with farmers, vendors and tax authorities (workshop reports, 2013) while JDPC used funds from its other funder *Misereor* to record the local action tax research video (JDPC tax video, Akure, 2013). Likewise, both have developed tax incentives and multiple taxation claims directed at targets in their respective levels besides the original tax avoidance international claim (see section 4.3).

Decentralisation (nationalisation) has been seen by some as better positioning ActionAid to advance its campaign agenda. ActionAid Uganda's Country Director maintained that initiatives like a national anti-corruption campaign called *Black Monday* would not have been possible had ActionAid been perceived as a 'foreign NGO' (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.9-10). That is, a national legal status provides more legitimacy to deal with sensitive issues, engage with others in the national civil society and access domestic policy makers (ibid). This position is not always shared. A study in Sierra Leone suggests that it is precisely ActionAid's international status that can open up access to national policy makers and that, despite the national legal status of country members, governments still regard ActionAid as an international NGDO (Beardon, 2009).

These two findings do not seem necessarily incompatible as it is arguably this dual international-national status that may make ActionAid politically stronger. For instance, in the AU Conference, an AAN campaign staff member noted how it was more powerful to protest to a Minister with other ActionAid countries and give a pan-African impression than to open up domestic dialogue (pers. comm., 2014) in a sort of Keck and Sikkink's 'boomerang' strategy (1998, 1999). Similarly, informal contact was held with the Nigerian Minister of Economy Ngozi Okonjo-Iweala by at least an AAN and an AAUK staff – all leading to further contacts between AAN and the Nigerian

government after the AU Conference (ibid). The dual international-national status is however hard to balance. Gilmore (2011: p.29) found out that, to some, ActionAid's national-centric structure leads to equally national-centric views of the world that are in tension with the federation's regional and international thinking.

All in all, two elements, decentralised campaign planning and a dual campaign status, are effects of ActionAid's decentralisation of campaigning roles. The remainder of the section will look at how these two elements live in tension with other organisational features such as bilateral relations within the federation and campaign resource differences between AAN and AAUK. The latter lead to a campaign gravitational effect or inertia towards AAUK¹⁰².

In a study of ActionAid's organisational structures, Jayawickrama and Ebrahim (2013: p.13) noted that bilateralism operated underneath ActionAid's official decentralised structures. Most country members still depend financially on high-income country members who access funds. This happens even when all members are autonomous legally and in decision-making processes and when efforts already exist to develop financial decentralisation, e.g. national fundraising in Brazil and India (ibid: p.8)¹⁰³.

The authors attributed this bilateralism to the gradual rise of official funding in ActionAid as compared to the historically predominant sponsorship funding. They suggest that high-income country members can choose low-income country 'favourites' (ibid: p.13) known for being efficient at meeting donor requirements through official funding. A relatively weak supporting grants management capacity from ActionAid's International Secretariat, the authors say, does not offset this trend either (ibid). Does the same situation happen in campaigning?

As with programmes, bilateral relations in the TJC have existed between AAUK and African country members since 2008 (see section 4.2 for South Africa, Zambia and Nigeria). AAUK bilateral campaigns function in parallel with the federal multi-country campaign. For instance,

¹⁰² ActionAid's Tax Justice Campaigner (chapter feedback, 2016) took a nuanced view of AAUK support for AAN with major initiatives chosen at AAN national campaign strategy, e.g. AU Conference meeting, Mauritius-Nigeria treaty report. According to her, this would not suggest a centralisation towards the AAUK. My view is that, even if used for AAN's benefit, campaign resources remain concentrated on AAUK. She also noted the benefit of bilateral campaigning for AAUK in the improvement of staff's understanding of diverse national contexts.

¹⁰³ By 2015, five non-high-income countries had started mobilising committed income in the Federation – Brazil, India, Nigeria, South Africa and Thailand (ActionAid, 2016b: p.102).

the preliminary talks that I attended in Abuja between AAN and AAUK to discuss bilateral TJC collaboration happened without the presence or intervention of ActionAid campaign staff (AAN-AAUK internal meetings observation, 2014).

The parallel functioning of bilateral campaigns brings both challenges and opportunities for AAN. A challenge for AAN being involved in both bilateral and federal campaigning is that its limited staff (see below) have to attend both AAUK and ActionAid TJC staff. While AAN is not obliged to join bilateral campaigns, AAUK comes with an income budget for campaigns and programmes¹⁰⁴. AAUK also provides strong policy and research, campaigning expertise and support, and their bilateral campaigns are respected and useful for the federation as a whole.

AAUK expertise is also supported by a wealth of campaign staff and resources that AAN lacks. Differences in campaign resources were visible in the shape of departments, the number of campaign staff and the scope of each staff duties. In terms of departments, AAUK is more specialised in campaigning than AAN (see Figure 13). Since the internationalisation process began, AAUK has stopped implementing programmes in order to concentrate on policy, advocacy, campaigning and fundraising. This contrasts with AAN core goals, which are centred on sponsorship and programmes.

Consequently, while AAUK has separate policy, advocacy and campaign teams forming a 'PAC' unit, AAN has one team covering the three tasks – the 'PACC' or 'policy, advocacy, campaigns and communications' team. The AAUK 'communications and media' department is separate from AAUK PAC whereas communications sits within the PACC Unit in AAN. AAN PACC team is, in turn, part of a larger department covering programmes and local partners (see sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1) – an element absent in AAUK (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). Thus, in terms of mixing advocacy and campaign strategies, both AAN and AAUK have discriminated those elements in its organisational structure, and AAUK has done so even departmentally. In AAUK's visit to AAN, for instance, there were specialist staff members from the policy, advocacy and campaigns units (whereas these roles were held by the same staff in AAN).

¹⁰⁴ Campaign funding may come from both official and untied funds (see below)

Figure 13: Campaigning specialisation – AAN and AAUK organograms compared

ActionAid Nigeria			ActionAid UK			
Finance & Operations	Human Resources & Organisational Effectiveness	Programmes	Fundraising & Public Relations (& sponsorship)	Central Resources	Comms and Media	PAC Unit
Finance	Human Resources	Local Rights & Partnerships Unit				Policy Unit
Sponsorship	Logistics and Front Desk	Programmes Quality Unit				Advocacy Unit
		PACC Unit (including comms)				Campaigns Unit

Source: AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014

Regarding staff numbers, the AAUK policy team has 20-25 staff, the advocacy team has four and the campaigns team has nine. In AAN, the PACC team (covering policy, advocacy, campaigns and communications) consists of 3.5 staff¹⁰⁵ – a manager, an officer, a communications person and a part-time administrator (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). The Nigerian-UK staff ratio working on PAC themes is thus of 33-38/3.5.

This ratio is tempered by two facts – first, AAUK has more overall staff than AAN (175 versus 88 staff; ActionAid, 2012a: p.30); second, many AAN programme staff also do advocacy and campaigning within their programmes (AAN staff interviews, Abuja, 2013-14). In fact, most of the ActionAid staff campaigning on national tax justice across the federation are programme staff, usually governance staff (ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner, chapter feedback, 2016). AAN is among the few country members with specific campaign posts and a campaign team.

Regarding staff duties, AAN PACC team is responsible for the TJC internationally, nationally and locally (as is AAUK). They also support advocacy and campaigns nationally, for instance, with the governance team on parliamentary sessions and budget issues and with the women's team on the women's rights international campaign (AAN campaign staff meetings observation, Abuja, 2013-14). Other responsibilities involve promoting the Nigerian Activista youth network, liaising with sponsored areas and partners for local campaigning and dealing with the media (ibid). All

¹⁰⁵ An ActionAid Denmark staff initiative facilitated two consultants, a Canadian journalist and a UK-born Nigerian lawyer, to join the PACC team during the second half of my research [2014] to assist on digital media and tax/legal issues for a two-year period. I have not counted these as regular staff (observation, Abuja, 2014).

these responsibilities are concentrated into two job positions, the manager and the officer, helped out by the communications officer and a part-time administrator. The AAUK campaign team also liaises with UK Activistas and community campaigners but has no partners (see section 5.1.2). Media relations are managed by another department, enabling AAUK PAC staff to focus on policy, advocacy and campaign roles.

These differences in departments, staff numbers and staff duties affect the implementation of the TJC. AAUK has more staff and time to lead on processes and specialised capacity to gain expert knowledge and campaign on a particular topic. An example was shown in section 4.2 in which the lack of staff availability in Bangladesh led to the predominance of tax avoidance claims as led by AAUK during the first steps in the campaign. Likewise, AAN has fewer staff and time and is more specialised in being generalist and hybrid, which on the other hand, gives AAN more capacity for mediation between programmes and campaigning, and also between campaign levels (see previous section 5.2.1).

AAUK's specialisation capacity can be observed in its units. The policy unit dedicates about '2.5 *policy people per campaign*' (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). The advocacy unit in turn has specialised staff to liaise with parliamentarians and multilateral organisations as well as a recent post created in 2014 devoted to corporate advocacy (ibid). Finally, the campaign unit has dedicated staff for international, national and digital campaigning and one staff member for street activism – the 'activism officer' (AAUK activism officer, interview, 2014).

With that said, moves towards considering staff and financial resources devoted to campaigning have taken place in the Federation. In a review of staff recruitment in the UK NGDO sector, Newman (2011: p.222-7) noted that while ActionAid recruits from the same pool as other NGDOs, deliberate attention is given to recruiting policy and activist profiles through recruitment companies specialised in human rights, legal and advocacy backgrounds. Newman also notes ActionAid's pull effect on people with activist-employable profiles due to the public radical reputation it has gained in the sector (ibid: p.226). ActionAid's country diversity in its international board, federation voting geography and staff could be added to these, as this diversity is a political statement in itself (see section 6.1.1 for more). Despite this progress, Newman (2011: p.228-30) described a human resource shortage of activist profiles, especially at the country level. Where candidates with those profiles were found, the author suggests, they

had little programmatic experience and/or local presence. However, for the case of Nigeria, AAN presents a number of activists with senior profiles (some coming from the pro-democracy movement, see section 6.2.2) as well as national staff with connections and familiarity with local realities (the hybrid staff presented in section 5.2.1).

Similarly, several initiatives in ActionAid exist to tailor financial resources towards campaigning. First, there is the search for official funds¹⁰⁶ specifically for financing campaigning – for instance, AAUK campaigns team currently [2015] enjoy European Commission funds to finance a project on campaigning in European and African countries, including Nigeria and Zambia (TJC internal newsletter, December 2014). ActionAid also has a rule that no more than 50% of the total budget of an ActionAid member can come from any one governmental or private actor other than ActionAid (Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010: p.21). Another strategy has been to transform restricted funds into discretionary money, which could then be used for campaigning. As the largest fundraiser in the ActionAid Federation, AAUK has gradually converted its committed sponsorship pool into unrestricted giving and has recruited a new general-fund of regular givers (ibid: p.7). ActionAid head of PA&R (chapter feedback, 2016) noted that they are considering membership donations, and more funds from major donors and (cautiously) corporates, which are often unrestricted or less restricted. AAUK campaign staff have advocated for the option of sponsoring ActionAid campaigning activities. Yet, this has not taken place due to reasons such as reluctance from the fundraising team (AAUK staff member, pers. comm., 2014). To date, one can only sponsor a child (which is restricted to spending on local programmes) or give donations (which is unrestricted money that may or may not fund campaigns). A final strategy has been the transitioning of financial supporters towards becoming campaigners (see section 5.2.1).

Overall, decision-making and resource-distribution structures appear to have similar ‘tense opportunities’ to those of campaigning derived from sponsorship and service-delivery programmes that were seen in section 5.2.1. Decentralisation creates new campaign skills and processes, such as decentralised national campaign planning and execution and a dual international-national status. Yet, limitations and tensions exist since decentralisation co-exists with strong feelings towards national identity in staff (as compared to dual international-

¹⁰⁶ The proportion of funds raised by child sponsorship has gradually declined while official income has more than doubled since 2007 to a proportion of 31% of total income in 2013 (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.8) and 35% in 2015 (ActionAid, 2016b: p.6). In both 2013 and 2015, ActionAid’s major official funders were the government of Denmark, the government of the UK and the European Union (ActionAid, 2014b: p.4; ActionAid, 2016b: p.86).

national ones); and AAUK-led bilateral campaigning and AAN/AAUK country differences in campaign resources. Despite these differences, ActionAid has made efforts to adapt staff and financial resources to campaigning.

This section has suggested that, frequently, ActionAid's non-campaign organising elements constrain and strain campaigning but that, on other occasions, they also enable particular features and ways of campaigning. Our understanding of these issues can be improved by reading them through SM concepts of mobilising structures and resource mobilisation. That is, namely, that sponsorship; service-delivery programmes; and decision-making and resource-distributing structures can be explored as potential indirect structures influencing campaigning alongside conventional campaign structures, for example, campaign departments. This offers new insights and covers a more comprehensive reading of ActionAid's overall campaigning.

5.3. Summary of results

In organising its campaigning, ActionAid operates a complex juggling operation. The NGDO takes advantage of all the campaigning options it has to attract constituents and confront opponents. This brings both opportunities and tensions, or 'tense opportunities'. In a structure with multiple layers (sponsorship, programmes, campaigns), this exhausting of campaign options may lead to a need to control the general coherence and stability of the work and to an increased workload.

First, varied ways of networking were noted, from more induced approaches to more autonomous (see section 5.1). Overall, they shared a solidarity and professionalised decision logic, with staff, supporters and partners more prominent than bases and coalitions, especially informal ones. Second, workload was particularly intense within AAN and JDPC structures. With more limited resources than AAUK, they play mediation roles across campaign levels, deal with the confluence of programme and campaign tasks, and manage federal and bilateral campaigns with other ActionAid country members. Besides this dense internal organising, they network with other non-ActionAid actors through coalitions and collaborations (see sections 5.1 and 5.2).

This chapter illustrates a number of NGDO campaign features revealed in the conceptual framework (see section 2.4.1). First, there is the solidarity and professionalised decision-making

just mentioned. Second, there is the development/aid influence in campaigning such as poverty contexts, poverty-related images and sectorial competition around funding (see sections 5.1.2, 5.2.1 and 5.1.3). Finally, there is the influence of non-campaign networks and structures in campaigning (see sections 5.1 and 5.2). SM concepts support the understanding of these features and how they get tailored to advancing public mobilisation of audiences and the confronting of authorities. For instance, this latter aspect includes an understanding of the role played by money and time resources in defining the shape of public mobilisation; or the identification of the nodes of the network that initiate confrontation with authorities, which are mostly the central skeleton of the network (ActionAid International Secretariat, AAN, AAUK and JDPC).

Chapter 6 – Envisioning in ActionAid: defining identities and finding opportunities and threats on campaigning

Introduction

Behind the performing and organising of a campaign lays an envisioning that sets its direction. ‘Envisioning’ is not necessarily rational, it could be emotion-led. What I mean by this term is that NGDO staff depart from a position – a self-given identity and a contextual perspective from which they dream of and to which they orientate their actions (for the role of emotions, see della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.13-4; Goodwin and Jasper, 2004; Jasper, 2011).

This envisioning involves positioning one’s identity and choosing opportunities to make use of, and threats to beware of, in campaigning. This chapter explores the ways in which ActionAid defines itself as a campaigning actor vis-à-vis others such as authorities and the public (section 6.1) and the way in which the NGDO situates itself in a context of opportunities and threats for its campaigning vis-à-vis other actors, namely states and official donors (section 6.2). A summary of findings closes the chapter (section 6.3).

Identity and context shape and influence the way in which campaigns are performed while, at the same time, campaign discourses, actions, symbols, behaviours, emotions and organising may transform identity and contextual circumstances. Identity and context are closely related to each other. Amongst other issues illustrated in the chapter, an example is provided of the politicisation of ActionAid’s identity. This is understood as an adaptation to the campaigning side of the NGDO in the past decades as a result of the introduction of the practice of public campaigning and other organisational and contextual changes (see section 6.1.1).

6.1. The political identity

How is identity built and how does it influence campaigning? The first part of this section looks at the evolution of ActionAid’s identities, from the original identity based on its charitable origins

to a newer face used to attract campaigners. Potential tensions are explored (see section 6.1.1). The second part explores a situation where two political identities co-exist that both support campaigning – a major one being the familiar ‘developmental’ identity, and another minor one defended by a minority of staff interviewees that looks towards integrating broader ‘global justice’ ideas (see section 6.1.1). A reflection follows on the way in which these two political identities influence campaigning in the NGDO (section 6.1.2).

6.1.1. Evolution of identities in ActionAid

ActionAid’s mission, like other NGDOs, is poverty elimination¹⁰⁷. An apolitical identity based on short-term and non-institutionalised solutions to poverty, such as sponsorship, has existed since ActionAid’s inception. With the arrival of human rights, advocacy and campaigning perspectives, a more political version of this identity broke through that wanted to look at structural causes of poverty and the responsibility of states (and other secondary actors) in these matters. This politicisation of ActionAid’s identity can be observed in at least two processes. First, there has been the accumulation of thematically-diverse research, advocacy actions and campaigns since the 1990s that all share a pattern of condemning structural causes of poverty in low-income-countries and put a face to those deemed to be responsible. Second, ActionAid’s pro-equality daily practices in the organisation since the introduction of a human rights vision in the 2000s.

Firstly, the poverty identity has politicised through the accumulation of research, advocacy actions and campaigns. ActionAid has campaigned on issues such as insufficient aid; excessive foreign debt; trade injustice; land grabs; women’s oppression; climate change; and tax avoidance. All these campaigns have, underneath their respective diverse thematic weavings kept a similar implicit ‘grammar’ about structural causes of poverty in low-income-countries. This has arguably helped build a long-term identity that goes beyond research, advocacy and campaign efforts themselves (Diani and Bison, 2004: p.287). Campaigners generally campaign for ActionAid to eradicate poverty, and they will be relatively comfortable in taking up any campaign theme meant to eradicate a particular manifestation of it, like land grabbing or tax avoidance. Causes of poverty in these research, advocacy and campaign efforts may be international or national, that is, seen as external or internal to the low-income countries in

¹⁰⁷ For a review of ActionAid’s mission, see the evolution of global strategies in Newman (2011: ch.4)

question. Yet, they are all structural and not seen as created by the poor themselves, and demand changes on the side of authorities and other decision-makers.

Secondly, an AAN staff member suggested that some of ActionAid's organisational practices could be read as symbolising and mirroring a political identity – from the consciously sought diversity of the international board's members to the larger decision-making power granted to ActionAid low-income country members (pers. comm., 2015). Country directors and international board members (originally British nationals) have gradually indigenised and diversified over ActionAid federation's history (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.2-3, fn.5). Likewise, the ActionAid federation's voting geography has changed to give more decision-making power to African, Asian and Latin-American countries. In 2010, 8 out of 15 of the *affiliates* (members who double-vote) were high-income countries while 7 were African, Asian and Latin-American. The affiliate status was formerly reserved to high-income country members. Likewise, half of the 10 *associates* (members who single-vote) were African, 3 Asian and 2 European (Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010: p.20)¹⁰⁸. In 2015, the number of affiliates had risen to 21 (11 of which were non-high-income countries from Africa, Asia and Latin-America) while the 6 associates, that is, potential future affiliates, were all non-high-income countries from Africa and Asia too (ActionAid, 2016b: p.8)¹⁰⁹. Newman (2011: p.227) notes a similar process for policy development in ActionAid, which is internationally negotiated rather than 'Northern led'. Most of these requirements, amongst others, were pushed as part of ActionAid adoption of human rights approaches in the 2000s.

In AAN too, pro-equality statements can be seen, according to the AAN staff member (pers. comm., 2015), in aspects such as agreed ethical codes to visit poor communities, e.g. dressing modestly, and formal budget limits set in AAN human resources policy on hotels, per diems and consultant rates. The latter also affects partners through AAN partnership policy.

Despite the development of ActionAid's political identity, the old apolitical identity still predominates in the organisation, often living in tension with the more political understanding. Discussions exist over the depth of this tension. For some, the large pool of sponsors financing

¹⁰⁸ This distinguished ActionAid from other NGOs like CARE, Oxfam, and Save the Children at the time (Jayawickrama and Ebrahim, 2013: p.8).

¹⁰⁹ This compares, for instance, to the current [2016] 19 members in Oxfam, all of which are from high-income countries except for India, Mexico and South Africa, see <http://oxf.am/6va>

ActionAid is clearly attracted to the organisation based on the older identity. Research by Newman (2011: p.123) about comments from ActionAid's child sponsors¹¹⁰ showed a personal interest in knowing about a particular child and no positive mentions of human rights or campaigning (Newman however notes that there could be a bias on the type of sponsors that responded, *ibid*, fn.22). This hints at a majority of sponsors that regard poverty from a charity perspective rather than as a human rights structural issue.

A contrary view comes from research by AAUK on supporters, which suggests that this tension is not as large as it is generally thought and that the non-political and political identities that motivate fundraisers, sponsors and campaigners to join ActionAid are not that different from one another: *'we did a value-based audience research... there wasn't a real difference between a lot of fundraisers and campaigners. They were all coming from the same values' base'* (AAUK campaign engagement manager, interview, 2014). This argument would be partly supported by the fact that a thousand campaigners were recruited out of the financial supporters' pool as seen in section 5.2.1, even if the percentage in the sample is not high (1000 out of 165000 financial supporters).

Differently, a series of examples point at the relevance of this tension between non-political and political understandings of poverty¹¹¹. In ActionAid's 2010 General Assembly, ActionAid Greece submitted a motion to reduce the financing of national and international campaigning suggesting that ActionAid: *'should spend at least 50% of its global income on local program implementation in Southern countries instead of spending money on national advocacy campaigns... or trying to influence global institutions like the United Nations and the World Bank'* (Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010: p.2). Departments also argue over which poverty message must be selected to attract financial or campaigning supporters – by either portraying sponsors as having a strong impact in ending poverty with their financial contribution or, rather, emphasising a more complicated picture of the structural causes of poverty (Shutt, 2009: p.20-1).

¹¹⁰ Retrieved from ActionAid's intranet for April and August 2009

¹¹¹ Few AAUK staff were interviewed, which limits a deeper analysis of the 'identity' problematic connected to the tensions between the campaigning, programming, fundraising and communications departments in AAUK. Instead, secondary literature, e.g. Ebrahim and Gordon, 2010, Shutt, 2009, the analysis of official publications and websites, and observation, have been explored as methods (see section 3.4.1).

An analysis of AAN and AAUK's websites and official publications also shows differences in the narratives used to build up identity within the NGDO. For instance, AAN's slogan presents ActionAid as a *'global movement of people working together to further human rights and defeat poverty for all'*¹¹² whereas AAUK does so as a *'charity working... with the poorest women and girls in the world'*¹¹³. Thus, there are diverging presentations of ActionAid as either a 'movement' led by people or a 'charity' supporting the poorest.

Another impression from the webpages is that AAUK's reading slightly leans more on emphasising poverty and the poorest than AAN's: *'our local staff provide immediate, hands-on support to women and children living on the margins of survival'* or *'ActionAid is changing the lives of the poorest, most disadvantaged women and children in the world – for good'* or *'not accepting survival as enough'*¹¹⁴. Instead, AAN adds 'poverty' to a wider list of goals and explicitly mentions inequality: *'we focus on the people that others forget. People in poverty. People who face discrimination. People whose voices are ignored'*¹¹⁵.

Finally, a look at research and publications shows how AAUK focuses on international matters that can be of use to other countries besides Nigeria, e.g. tax treaties, tax dodging¹¹⁶, whereas AAN publishes national-related topics focused on Nigeria only, e.g. corruption and poverty, tax incentives, and the taxation treaty Mauritius-Nigeria¹¹⁷. ActionAid has also published a research piece on Nigeria, *'Leaking revenue: how a big tax break to European gas companies has cost Nigeria billions'* (ActionAid, 2016a). Identity-wise in terms of poverty, all of these publications talk about causes of poverty, with some emphasising external causes to the low-income country such as tax dodging and others emphasising internal causes such as corruption (see section 4.3 on evidence about UK public perceptions of poverty causes leaning more on internal causes).

These publications differ from sponsorship messages in the official webpages that do not talk about causes of poverty systematically. On AAN's sponsorship page, the few references about causes of poverty refer to 'communal clashes' or natural disasters like floods¹¹⁸. The lack of and

¹¹² www.actionaid.org/nigeria

¹¹³ www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us

¹¹⁴ www.actionaid.org.uk/about-us

¹¹⁵ www.actionaid.org/nigeria

¹¹⁶ www.actionaid.org.uk/policy-and-research/research-and-publications/tax-justice

¹¹⁷ www.actionaid.org/nigeria/publications

¹¹⁸ See the eight rotating slogans on the main page <https://actionaid-ngr.org/>

low quality of schools for children is mentioned and described but not the causes that lead to children not having proper education¹¹⁹. Only a tweet in a twitter window at the bottom of the sponsorship webpage notes that better taxation to multinationals could pay for better schools. In turn, the two case studies about Kaltume¹²⁰ and Murdiya¹²¹ on the webpage describe the challenges of children with disabilities but not the more structural causes that create those challenges. The same pattern is repeated in the case study of Aniker¹²² on AAUK's sponsorship page. However, on AAUK's sponsorship page, there is a direct link to campaigns 'get involved > campaign' together with the option of 'get involved > donate'.

Another situation regards the use of the 'ActionAid' name as a logo for fundraising. In an AAUK training, we community campaigners were invited to a professional photo session for communication purposes. We were offered several group photos with a 'tax justice' slogan and then several more with an ActionAid logo without campaign messaging added. Most campaigners felt happy with both versions. Others, a minority, felt uncomfortable with the NGDO branding, logo side (AAUK campaigners, pers. comms., 2014). This divergence is also visible in AAUK joint coalition rallies where ActionAid (and other NGDOs) logos and t-shirts are made visible alongside campaign claims, as in the IF campaign¹²³. Some see these organisational symbols as damaging a common voice in a coalition (Nash, 2008; Yanacopulos, 2016) while others may see them as complementary and not hurting a common banner shared by all organisations, e.g. IF messages.

Overall, it seems that the tension exists in contexts in which marketing and fundraising (linked to the apolitical identity version) is active *alongside* campaigning (linked to the political identity version). A practical suggestion deriving from these insights is that these organisational tensions could be alleviated if it was possible to find fundraising solutions based on political identities, such as sponsoring a specific campaign and/or campaigners (rather than children and communities). Yet, this is not taking place as seen in the analysis of financial resources in section 5.2.2.

¹¹⁹ See video on the webpage <https://actionaid-ngr.org/>

¹²⁰ <https://actionaid-ngr.org/take-action/case-study/caption-help-children-like-kaltume-keep-their-hope-alive/>

¹²¹ <https://actionaid-ngr.org/take-action/case-study/help-children-like-murdiya-fulfil-their-quest-for-education/>

¹²² www.actionaid.org.uk/donate

¹²³ www.actionaid.org.uk/bollocks-to-poverty/blog/2013/06/24/video-what-you-achieved-with-the-enough-food-for-everyone-if

A second dimension in the evolution of ActionAid's identity regards the agreement or disagreement of staff and supporters over the inclusion of UK poverty in ActionAid's overall notion of poverty. This dimension cross-cuts the apolitical-political identity dimension of poverty seen above. That is, a UK poverty eradication mission could be taken into practice by either doing service-delivery in the UK (apolitical identity) or by campaigning on UK poverty (political identity). I will focus on the latter – the cross-cutting approach with the political version.

By definition, ActionAid is a development organisation and focuses on low-income poverty and not UK poverty. This could be called its 'developmental' identity. Logically, the NGDO works within the regulations that define it as such and it is not part of its mission to try to campaign with the UK poor and marginalised. Thus, UK campaigning is orientated towards having impact on low-income poverty elimination, not on UK poverty itself.

However, during the interviews a few critical AAUK/ActionAid staff voices explicitly questioned this default position in ActionAid's developmental identity. They suggested that, under this model, certain forms of mobilising in the UK are undermined, for example, UK campaigners mobilising for UK poverty besides low-income country poverty; or UK poor people mobilising with their own claims. Rather, interviewees suggested what could be called a more 'global justice' model that includes an 'all-countries' version of poverty, regardless of whether a given country is in a low-income or high-income category.

Looking back, a precedent of this 'global justice' model could be seen in the initial mission after ActionAid's creation in 1972, which included social work in both low-income countries and the UK (Newman, 2011: p.107-8). Yet, this was from a charity, non-political perspective of helping the poor. Charity work in the UK was eventually abandoned by the end of the 1970s (ibid). ActionAid's general idea of 'poverty' turned into 'low-income country poverty'.

Yet, why was this developmental model questioned by the interviewees and what reasons did they suggest for the 'global justice' identity being thought of as somehow better? Initially at least, one could say that both developmental and global justice identities include campaigning and networking with activist organisations, groups and movements. In defence of this model, an interviewee summarised that it is more adapted to current times and a new global geography of poverty and more coherent for campaigning. On the adaption to the current context, the

interviewee commented that: *'as poverty moves... there is so much poverty in middle-income countries, lots of the previous wealthier countries are doing really bad in the recession, the gap between the rich and the poor is growing massively... I would like to work on structural issues to tackle global inequality and poverty wherever it is'* (AAUK staff, interview 2014).

On campaign coherence, the interviewee added: *'I really want to be working on development and I love the tax campaign as it is structural... [but] I would like us to link more UK and development issues with the tax campaign... when we are talking about tax, tax pays for important stuff in developing countries, well it pays for important stuff here as well. It has an impact too in the UK, all over the world... the framing of things in a development way, I understand why ActionAid needs to do it but I would like to frame them as... these are the structures of the world that are causing problems for everyone... our campaigning... [is] an act of global justice and an acknowledgement that we are all affected'* (ibid).

Building on the interviewee's first reason – adapting to the global crisis and the changing geography of poverty – I would further suggest that tensions between both identities are related to moments of economic crisis and recession in the UK. This is when UK poverty levels may rise and become more blatant, and when the UK political panorama gets tense, thus putting NGOs at an identity, and financial, crossroad. It is probably then that the fact that the developmental model does not include certain forms of mobilising – such as campaigning on UK poverty or working with the UK poor – surfaces and creates tensions. It is probably at these moments when NGOs and governments most feel obliged to justify why a state's budget is allocated for overseas poverty while cuts are being felt domestically (Green, 2015). In that sense, a global justice identity would be better adapted in times of a UK recession.

It is also probable that the 'we are the 99%' approach from recent Global Justice and Occupy movements may have helped question the vision of a North-South world with neat divisions between rich and poor nations upon which the developmental identity has rested. The 99% frame argues that there is a 1% rich elite versus a 99% of poor people in the world and asks for the poor of all countries to become united against that global elite¹²⁴. This idea is similar to the one hinted at by the interviewee earlier. On the other hand, the debate about the inclusion of

¹²⁴ See, for instance, <http://wearethe99percent.us/>

UK poverty in developmental discourses and practices is not new. In the early 1970s, public debate in the UK international development sector already discussed the commonalities and contradictions between *'poverty here and poverty there'* (Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.81-2). This has stayed vivid today in the sector beyond ActionAid: *'any international development NGOs that I've worked in, there is this great discussion about how to tie up these things together, but it's still quite tricky...'* (AAUK staff, interview 2014).

Whichever the reasons, the integration of a global justice identity went unquestioned in most of the interviews/chats held with ActionAid staff. Only few voices did raise the issue. If prompted, the common thinking would be 'why should a developmental NGO address UK poverty?'. Yet, this debate is not new in the sector, as just seen above. In Jasper's words (2004, 2006), this could be seen as an implicit tradeoff or tacit non-choice within the organisation.

Additionally, there is arguably much more UK governmental resistance to claims about austerity that directly tackle politics 'at home' rather than the effects of UK politics overseas. This was the case of Oxfam's 'Perfect Storm' initiative in 2014 that criticised the austerity policies of the UK government. The NGDO was rapidly criticised for being 'too political' by a conservative MP and this was followed by an inspection by the Charity Commission (Williams, 2014). A similar case can be observed in Paton (2012) for Save the Children. Together with this opposition from formal institutions when messages get more direct, a tradeoff also exists between keeping internal coherence and goal effectiveness and broadening one's identity, e.g. mixing apolitical and political supporters, mixing developmental and global justice expectations. This is what Jasper (2004) termed the 'extension dilemma' (see section 2.3.1). However, findings showed a variety of ways in which this identity extension was strategised. An example was the more moderate, dependent linking of developmental and global justice identities by AAUK/ActionAid versus a more radical linking by Oxfam where these identities functioned independently from each other.

In short, the evolution of ActionAid's identity is shaped by at least two dimensions – first, the co-existence of an older apolitical identity and a new political one, which live in certain moments in tension with each other, arguably, when fundraising is involved. Second, there is a debate on what the role of ActionAid (and other NGDOs) is in protesting against UK poverty, given that they are developmental organisations with a low-income country poverty elimination remit.

Using identity theory helps understand the underlying tensions that shape campaigning. While many identity theories exist, SM theory brings a political reading and relates to other concepts explaining campaigning such as frames, coalitions and mobilising structures (see section 6.1.2). In the next section, I explore to what extent ActionAid has included a global justice perspective in its developmental identity and the role played by the two political identities in relation to campaigning.

6.1.2. Influence of political identities in campaigning

The gradual politicisation of ActionAid's poverty identity seen in the past section has enabled the NGDO to join campaign coalitions and spaces in ways that it did not do decades ago – for instance, coalitions with other campaigning NGDOs and other non-development organisations. In these collaborations, it is the political version of ActionAid's identity that glues the organisation to others. This has historically moved ActionAid from being in one set of coalitions and spaces (i.e. still existent, emergency coalitions, state-NGDO service-delivery work) to also joining other more politicised locations.

Equally, the fact that ActionAid now has a political identity through campaigning opens up spaces to recruit staff from campaigning organisations working outside the aid sector, which may bring different perspectives on campaigning – some of the ActionAid/AAUK current campaign staff come from campaigning organisations like Amnesty, Greenpeace and War on Want besides those staff coming from other campaigning NGDOs like CAFOD, Concern, Eurodad, Oxfam and Save the Children (ActionAid/AAUK staff, interviews, 2013-14).

In this section, I suggest that the two versions of ActionAid's political identity shape the type of campaigning that the NGDO engages with in the UK. In particular, I look at the extent to which ActionAid has included a global justice/UK poverty angle and the effects this has had on campaigning.

In the previous section, Oxfam's 'Perfect Storm' initiative was mentioned. In it, Oxfam claimed that: *'lifting the lid on austerity Britain reveals a perfect storm - and it's forcing more and more people into poverty'* and that: *'1% of Britons own the same amount of wealth as 54% of the*

population. RT [retweet] if you think this is unacceptable' (Williams, 2014). These slogans resonate with the 99% global justice perspective described above. Moreover, they talk about UK poverty autonomously without referring to low-income country poverty. Other examples exist – Oxfam Scotland supported a 'No Evictions for Bedroom Tax' petition organised by a partner organisation, targeted at the Scottish Parliament for a housing law amendment (Eyre, 2013). Likewise, Oxfam asked UK Councillors/local councils to: *'fight against cuts to frontline services and to ensure the financial sector pays for the damage that it has caused the British economy and beyond'* in its Robin Hood Tax international campaign¹²⁵.

AAUK's take is slightly different to that of Oxfam – the NGDO makes allusions to UK poverty in its campaigning by integrating them into existent developmental frames (during my fieldwork, I did not come across claims like those of Oxfam that were independent and not bridged to low-income country poverty ones). For instance, AAUK local campaign 'Towns against Tax Dodging' went with the message: *'your [UK] local council has to juggle resources to pay for the essential services in your community, while big companies get away with dodging billions. It's the same in countries like Zambia'* (2014)¹²⁶. This 'ask' from the campaign frames tax justice from both a developmental and a global justice perspective. The framing connects both. The first sticks to the mission of a developmental organisation that receives funding for work in, and on, low-income countries. The second possibly enables a collaboration and coalescence with non-

developmental groups in the UK – that is, this frame bridging is important because it opens up options for collaborations and coalitions beyond NGDOs and the aid sector in the UK.



Figure 14: Example of a global justice/UK poverty angle
Source: taxdodgingbill.org.uk

For instance, the latest TJC chapter in the run-up to the UK elections in 2015, the 'Tax Dodging Bill' campaign, was taken up in coalition by development aid organisations like AAUK and Oxfam, and UK national organisations like the *National Union of Students* and the *High Pay Centre*. As a slogan read in the campaign: *'we need a Tax Dodging Bill to make tax fair and to raise funds to fight poverty in the UK and developing countries'*

¹²⁵ <http://robinhoodtax.org.uk/bringrobinhome>

¹²⁶ <https://jpschremsbury.files.wordpress.com/2012/09/njpn-north-west-justice-and-peace-e-bulletin-september-2014.pdf> (p.4, the original website is no longer available)

(see footnote¹²⁷; also see Figure 14 for another example). This coalition was arguably feasible thanks to a common underlying all-countries poverty or global justice identity in which UK poverty is acknowledged. An exclusive developmental view could have been read as an either-or issue, especially in times of recession, as noted earlier.

However, there are limitations to the extent to which this merging of identities can stretch. When it comes to more demanding coalitions, actions and resource mobilising, choices need to be made between assigning resources to one or another identity. As AAUK activism officer reflected: *'there've been quite strong links between them [UK Uncut, a UK grassroots movement] and ActionAid... but they're much more focused on the UK and services being cut, and we can't really talk about that... we do quite a little bit but... our mandate is to work on development issues, that means overseas'* (interview, 2014). In AAUK, actions are also reserved for deploying a developmental poverty identity. For instance, under the developmental identity, a Zambian activist came to the UK to say how tax injustice affected the poor in Zambia rather than, say, having a dialogue on how tax injustice is affecting both Zambia and the UK (Activista 2013¹²⁸; 2015¹²⁹).

Likewise, mobilising structures in AAUK follow a developmental poverty identity – the human resources invested in UK activism, such as the 'activism officer' (see section 5.2.2), are oriented towards supporting actions focused on low-income country poverty. This compares to Oxfam, which has gone further in implementing staff posts and structures around UK poverty. For instance, Oxfam has a specific UK poverty press officer role¹³⁰. Oxfam organigram has also included food bank programmes and partners in the UK for more than 20 years (Butler, 2013; also see Paton, 2012 for Save the Children). These have involved some level of mobilising and campaigning (ibid). For its part, Save the Children has asked the public to donate specifically to a UK poverty programme – although it is not specified how much of it went to campaigning (ibid). Differently, AAUK does not have programmes in the UK to deal with poverty domestically.

¹²⁷ www.bvsc.org/news/tax-dodging-bill-campaign (the original website is no longer available)

¹²⁸ www.actionaid.org.uk/bollocks-to-poverty/blog/2013/10/23/i-realised-as-a-young-person-i-can-speak-out-and-make-a

¹²⁹ www.actionaid.org.uk/bollocks-to-poverty/blog/2015/02/10/i-support-the-tax-dodging-bill-do-you-from-zambia-with-love

¹³⁰ See www.oxfam.org.uk/scotland/blog/author/david-eyre versus www.actionaid.org.uk/news-and-views/media-contacts which does not show to have the same role

In this sense, AAUK's ex-youth engagement manager noted the difficulty of mobilising UK youth from marginalised backgrounds, working youth and school and college students: *'if you want to reach young people outside the university then you have to invest in more of a LRP [local rights programme] way, right, and that is not something that in the UK we are set up to do'* (interview, 2013). However, in her chapter feedback (2016), the ActionAid Tax Justice Campaigner noted that ActionAid Italy does have these structures set up and that more may develop in the future in high-income country members. These changes in Europe and beyond, she notes, will go hand in hand with a shift to fundraising in low-income country members (ibid).

In future, this move could play a role in the weight given to campaign formats (see section 4.3). The single-issue campaign format is not designed to encapsulate UK poverty, as UK mobilisation is oriented to low-income country poverty causes. The global justice model inclusive of high-income poverty could however be operated through the multiple-issue campaign format – that is, campaigning for UK poverty in the same way that it currently campaigns for Nigerian poverty.

Overall, this section has studied how AAUK has, to a certain extent, included a global justice perspective in its developmental identity. This has arguably enabled a coalescence with domestic associations active on UK poverty. No campaign resources however are assigned to actions or mobilising structures to deal with UK poverty beyond campaign slogans.

In short, AAUK defines its political action through campaigning vis-à-vis UK authorities with a developmental lens – this compares to the example of Oxfam seen above, which confronts UK authorities in terms of both low-income country poverty and UK poverty. In this section, I have aimed to show how ActionAid positions itself in relation to UK authorities, campaigners and the public in terms of identity. Its analysis helps a reading of the internal tensions between departments and staff and the norms and feelings behind these, as well as the influence of identities in campaigning. Another way to analyse the self-positioning of the NGDO is through the opportunities and threats that ActionAid staff perceive in their campaigning environment – a theme that I now turn to explore in the next and final section.

6.2. The role of external actors – states and official donors

Besides elements such as sponsorship, service-delivery, decentralisation, resource distribution and identity, the context in which ActionAid operates also regulates and shapes its campaigning. In this section, context is explored by looking at the role of two main actors external to the organisation – states and the national context (see section 6.2.1) and official donors and the aid sector context (see section 6.2.2). This includes observing the effects that the combination of states and official donors has on ActionAid’s campaigning choices (see section 6.2.2).

While states and official donors are not the only sources of opportunities and threats to NGDO campaigns, they were the most cited in the interviews. Other sources of opportunities and threats have also been noted in past chapters, such as those by financial supporters/child sponsors, for example funding campaigning and becoming campaigners versus campaign disinterest (see sections 5.2.1 and 6.1.1), and other NGDOs involved in, for example, building campaign coalitions versus competition for funding and campaigners (see sections 5.1.3 and 5.1.2).

	OPPORTUNITIES	THREATS
STATES	X	X
OFFICIAL DONORS	X	X

Figure 15: Opportunities/threats from states and official donors to NGDO campaigning **Source:** compiled by the author

In SM theory, the contextual influence is described in order to manifest ‘opportunities’ or contextual openings and ‘threats’ or contextual limitations. Paradoxically, threats may function as openings sometimes and further trigger political response (Van Dyke,

2013: p.1340). This section introduces a series of opportunities and threats for ActionAid’s campaigning from states and official donors (see Figure 15) and also looks at how ActionAid has responded to these by either resisting or adapting. The section also recaps opportunities and threats that were previously described in Chapters 4 and 5.

6.2.1. Opportunities and threats by states

Through the empirical chapters, a series of state opportunities and threats have been noted. This section briefly recaps on these and moves on to present other opportunities and threats to ActionAid's campaigning highlighted by the interviewees.

A number of opportunities for ActionAid were identified in earlier chapters related to states. Early tax mobilising developed around inter-governmental events such as the UN Conference on Financing for Development and, later on, an AU Conference (see sections 4.1 and 4.3). In turn, AAN campaign efforts over national and local tax justice claims helped open up spaces to engage with Nigerian national and local authorities – creating multilevel discursive and political opportunities (see section 4.3). As part of state structures, universities have constituted a major place from which AAN and AAUK have drawn resources and supporters such as Activistas in both Nigeria and the UK (see section 5.1.1).

Regarding threats, a demobilising factor in Nigerian campaigning was connected with Nigeria's poverty contexts and the role that states played in terms of corrupting people in poverty (see section 5.1.2). Legal restrictions were also mentioned, including the recent 'Foreign Donations Bill' in Nigeria and the 'Lobbying Bill' in the UK (see section 2.1.2), as well as the resistance faced by Oxfam's 'Perfect Storm' initiative in the UK (see section 6.1.1).

In the remainder of this section, I look at new opportunities and threats. Opportunities include AAN, AAUK and JDPC collaborations with Nigerian tax authorities and UK local councils. Threats include the state control exerted on campaigning through the use of policing and administrative bodies in Nigeria.

In campaigning, the state is often seen as the opponent upon which confronting claims are exerted. Yet, they can also play a role as allies. Coalescing with the state in the TJC would not seem logical at first sight since these are also direct campaign targets for ActionAid. Yet, a closer look shows that many actors exist within the public and private sectors with differing interests, making the coalition game possible. For instance, governmental bodies disagreed about their position on tax incentives during the Nigerian TJC launch (observation, Abuja, 2013). While the

Nigerian investment authorities' speaker¹³¹ defended tax incentives, the Nigerian tax revenue authorities' representative¹³² asked for larger state control on them. AAN has taken advantage of this cleavage and the Nigerian tax authorities have now become AAN's main governmental ally on tax incentives.

This internal state tension was cited by an AAUK ex-staff member to be present in other countries in which ActionAid operates the TJC: *'Often what we found in the countries is that tax revenue officials felt disempowered because there was the Investment Bureau or Department that signed these contracts and they were left with no tax revenue from these big companies and so the alliances that we built had been much more with the revenue authorities than obviously with the investment department'* (interview, 2013).

Yet, ActionAid coalitions with like-minded tax revenue authorities exist in tension. For instance, both parties can be allies on tax incentives but clash when it comes to harmonising the national tax system, a direct responsibility of tax revenue authorities. An AAUK ex-staff member also noted an ActionAid-state tension on tax avoidance versus tax incentives: *'it's strange because you build alliances [with national governments] on the one hand around tax avoidance [of multinationals to states] but you are also challenging them around harmful tax competition [promoted by states themselves]'* (interview, 2013). Equally, tension exists in the perspectives set on tax collection. While tax authorities simply want people to pay, with messages like *'set your country free – pay your tax'* or *'pay your tax, it is your duty'* (street posters observation, Akure, 2013), AAN does not only claim for tax collection but for that tax collection to be *progressive*, meaning more taxation upon the rich and less on the poor.

The collaboration thus risks excessive public identification and a subsequent loss of nuances in ActionAid campaign messages. In fact, AAN had initially had difficulty in detaching its own *progressive* tax collection claims from those of the national tax revenue authorities. AAN ex-country director noted: *'since the campaign started, people call me, people in forums ask me – Why am I doing this? Why are we [ActionAid] working for the government? There is the government that collects tax and now we have become tax collectors, asking people to pay tax'* (interview, 2013).

¹³¹ Known as *Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission* or NIPC www.nipc.gov.ng

¹³² Known as *Federal Inland Revenue Service* or FIRS www.firs.gov.ng

In Ondo, JDPC also collaborates with state and local tax authorities and, similarly, the danger of co-optation applies. As with 'progressive tax collection', tension over the existence of the state-created problem of 'multiple taxation' was palpable in a TJC workshop, with authorities denying the issue (see section 4.3). Equally, the fact that Ondo's tax authorities were invited to attend a market storm (which were research and mobilising visits to markets by campaigners) or a street rally with JDPC and Activistas (see section 4.4) may convey contradictory readings for people, as noted above by the AAN ex-country director.

In the UK, AAUK has claimed there is a need to better finance local public services through more tax collection in the local TJC chapter of *Towns against Tax Dodging*¹³³. A number of local Councils went on board and asked their own parties to legislate against tax avoidance and improve local public services (p.1)¹³⁴. In turn, AAN and AAUK follow a similar divide-and-win pattern with the private sector than with the states. UK local businesses were asked to collaborate in the *Towns against Tax Dodging* campaign to ask their governments to fight corporate tax dodging (p.1)¹³⁵. A frame was used that compared small businesses' tax payments with those of multinationals, suggesting that multinationals pay as little as 5% in corporate taxes as compared to smaller businesses that can pay as much as 30% (p.2)¹³⁶. In Nigeria, Activistas did market visits and local businesses were mobilised. Thus, while large corporates are a key TJC's campaign target, market vendors and small-scale businesses in Nigeria and UK are invited to join the campaign as allies.

Turning to threats, interviewees mentioned two other state threats to campaigning in Nigeria besides the control exerted through corruption (in Nigeria) and legalisation (in Nigeria and the UK) as noted above. These are, namely, strong policing control and a weak administrative system.

In terms of policing, an AAN senior staff member, a former anti-dictatorship activist, noted that the African country is still influenced by the repressive culture of the dictatorial period: '*law is almost out of place... our government officials feel that people can be repressed and they get away with it*' (group discussion, AAN resource centre, 2014). The interviewee linked this threat

¹³³ www.taxresearch.org.uk/Blog/2014/09/08/towns-against-tax-dodging-a-draft-motion-on-tax-abuse-any-council-could-adopt/

¹³⁴ [www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/towns against tax dodging local media and shops action briefing.pdf](http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/towns%20against%20tax%20dodging%20local%20media%20and%20shops%20action%20briefing.pdf)

¹³⁵ [www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/towns against tax dodging local media and shops action briefing.pdf](http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/towns%20against%20tax%20dodging%20local%20media%20and%20shops%20action%20briefing.pdf)

¹³⁶ [www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/towns against tax dodging local media and shops action briefing.pdf](http://www.actionaid.org.uk/sites/default/files/publications/towns%20against%20tax%20dodging%20local%20media%20and%20shops%20action%20briefing.pdf)

to low confrontation levels in AAN: *'we are priding ourselves for doing confrontation but never crossed to the level of confrontation except for... the Hunger Free Campaign [international campaign preceding the TJC]... we were protesting at the Ebo Square at the Secretariat area [Abuja]... eventually the security people unleashed violence on us'* (ibid). AAN ex-governance officer further noted that: *'they [government] said that no permission was taken and that people were decimating the environment. A number of people were arrested from ActionAid and the partners. Plates were being distributed to people like "join us to cry for Nigeria, people are hungry"'* (ibid).

Policing control grows exponentially during election processes as with the run-up to the 2015 general elections in Nigeria (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). In young democracies, control also grows with any mobilisation that resembles electoral party politics (ibid). AAN staff noted how 42 ActionAid Zambia Activistas had been arrested in a march in Lusaka for wearing T-shirts with the slogan 'we want the new Constitution' and for being considered members of the opposition by the Government (Zambian Watchdog, 2014).

Intimidation also exists at the local level. The AAN campaign manager explained the strategy pursued with partners to mediate the first mobilising steps: *'you have governors in some states who are very intolerant of alternative views... [there are] cases of intimidation... it becomes a challenge for the partners. They will need us, from headquarters or ActionAid to raise it [the campaign issue] rather than them and get as many organisations and interest groups before we hand over to them to start leading'* (interview, 2013). This reminds of the subtlety followed by JDPC/AAN in Ondo's local campaigning (see section 4.4).

Policing was not mentioned in UK interviews – a threat less likely to be found intensively in UK's mature democracy. As an AAN senior staff member summed up: *'you don't have that in Europe... where you elect your leaders. But here, even in democracy, leaders are selected and you can still know how bad it was under the military'* (group discussion, AAN resource centre, 2014).

Differences also exist regarding the political culture. In Nigeria, interviewees note, AAN has to allow for other factors to make campaigning happen. As an AAN staff member put it for electoral times, AAUK can focus on influencing policy whereas AAN must first deal with issues like intimidation, as noted above, and voting education before even starting to think about

influencing through campaigns (AAN-AAUK internal meetings, Abuja, 2014). Campaigners in AAN do not only have to convey the message of a particular campaign as in any other context but also the very need for the act of campaigning itself – a right that is assumed in more mature democratic contexts like the UK: *‘what you are doing is try to convince the people about the necessity for those campaigns’* (AAN campaign manager, interview, 2013). An AAN senior staff member compared it to the mobilising context in Europe: *‘in terms of awareness, access to education, we are a gap away from Europe. And in every form of protest, campaign, you need an element of courage, built on education’* (group discussion, AAN resource centre, 2014).

Often too, it is not only the tasks of campaigning and defending the act of campaigning but also battling state counter-campaigns: *‘people are easily bribed and captured by the state not to respond to campaigns... for every campaign that comes up, for every issue that is raised, they [the state] also have their own NGO that can be easily mushroomed all over the place, and paying them out to counter what is being said’* (AAN campaign manager, interview, 2013).

A less visible threat, also seen to be more acute in Nigeria than in the UK, was the weakness of Nigeria’s administrative bodies. Interviewees stressed how a weak administration directly affected the format of campaigning chosen by AAN. Some suggested that it is precisely UK’s functioning administrative system that enables AAUK to operate single-issue campaigns and that these are not easily exportable to other contexts. Rather, Nigerian interviewees indicated that broader frames, targets and campaigns would work better in Nigeria given its weaker administrative system. These were seen as a less risky option than betting it all on one campaign card that may fail for one or another reason. This is what Jasper (2004) has termed as ‘the basket dilemma’ between aiming for one decisive engagement, winner-take-all, or spreading one’s risk over several smaller engagements.

For AAN ex-country director (interview, 2013), the idea of systematic, organised campaigns *‘driven by our European affiliates, AAUK, ActionAid Italy’* finds it hard to fit in a context like Nigeria with institutional procedures that are less clear: *‘the campaign, the target, the change [in Europe] is clear and specific. But that can happen because there, there is a system... you know where to go, what to approach. The institutional process is already structured. It is a, b, c... in this context [Nigeria], it is not the case. Even when it is a, it could still claimed to be b’* (ibid).

AAN campaign manager (interview, 2013) added the lack of official data on companies as another administrative weakness and challenge to taking up specific campaigns: *'when you want to track what corporate bodies are doing, the first thing is to look at the annual report, how much profits they made and tax they paid, but you get to the Corporate Affairs Commission in the registers of the companies in Nigeria supposed to have those documents... there is nothing. Either the files are missing or the docs are not there. Sometimes they have never been filed, sometimes someone has removed them'* (ibid).

An AAN senior staff member suggested a third reason that made efforts on a single campaign ask ineffective in a context like Nigeria – the lack of both activist capacity and sufficient people involved in the Nigerian civil society and AAN when it comes to face such complex administrative contexts (interview, 2013). All those administrative-related limitations – unclear institutional procedures, lack of official data on companies and lack of activist capacity and strength to face these threats– make single-issue and planned campaigning difficult.

A different perspective came from an AAN-ActionAid ex-human security advisor and *ThinkAct* research director who added cultural and historical reasons besides having a weak state administration that make single-issue campaigns unfitting for the Nigerian context: *'most of the campaigns coming from the North have been single-issue campaigns whereas the context for Nigeria was much more holistic... like several issues taken together... it is because of that context, that history... the majority of actors shaping the campaigning context in Nigeria now have their roots in the anti-military, pro-democracy, human-rights campaigning. Even when they are involved in single-issue campaigns they are always linking it to much broader societal transformation'* (interview, 2014).

He gave the example of 'Occupy Nigeria' in 2012: *'as a single-issue campaign, it was simply about the [decrease of the] price of fuel. [Yet] the campaign took on much larger and broader issues. It became about governance and corruption... even if you see Occupy Nigeria as a partial success with respect to the single demand [fuel price], the greater levels of change triggered are actually in... corruption... [with the government setting up] a series of investigative committees... as a direct result of that campaign. Although that wasn't part of the demand of that campaign, we now have... greater clarity because of those committees'* (ibid).

For the TJC, these administrative, cultural and historical reasons translate into some AAN senior and ex-staff preferring broader and more flexible campaign framings of tax justice as part of governance (e.g. including bridging tax with corruption and oil-based mobilising) than a single tax justice campaign line (interviews, 2013-14).

6.2.2. Opportunities and threats by official donors



Figure 16: NGDO opportunities-threats overlap notion

Source: compiled by the author

Campaigning in the aid sector adds opportunities and threats to those emanating from states and national contexts seen in the previous section. In particular, official donors take up a prominent role in their financial and regulative relationships with NGDOs, such as funding NGDO campaigns. Also, official donors may affect NGDOs through their relationships with states (see section 2.1.2).

This section reviews a few examples from other chapters on the opportunities and threats of official donors and then moves to analyse the role of European official donors in its interactions with the Nigerian state. Particular opportunities and threats may emanate not only from official donors but also from their relationships with states (see Figure 16; also see the conceptual framework in section 2.4.1).

In previous chapters, an example of an opportunity offered by official donors was the series of financial and technical resources exclusively available for campaigning, such as funds from the European Commission (see section 5.2.2). Conversely, interviewees highlighted how donor requirements for formal registration and accountability to receive funds restricted networking with informal groups in campaigning (see section 5.1.3).

The remainder of this section will focus on opportunities and threats that arise as a result of the interaction between official donors and states. A key example is the historically changing role of European donors away from confrontation and towards moderation in supporting activism

during dictatorship and democracy periods in Nigeria (AAN senior staff, interviews, 2013-14). While donors supported confrontational tactics against the state in dictatorial times, this shifted towards supporting states when democracy arrived. That is, what was before an opportunity for confrontational action (donor support) became then a threat, as donor expectations vis-à-vis activists changed to collaboration with the state towards democratising state structures.

During the dictatorial period, donors supported the pro-democracy movement that emerged as a response to the military authoritarian rule and the chronic crisis of structural adjustment by the mid-1980s (ibid). Initially, donors provided support from their head offices in Europe, including the period of European sanctions to Nigeria (1995-1998): *'many of them [donors] didn't have physical presence [in Nigeria] but they were operating financially from the head office'* (AAN ex-country director, interview, 2013).

After the period of the last dictator General Abacha [1993-98], the international community realised Nigeria's imminent arrival of democracy [in 1999]. Donor funding 'flooded' and international NGDOs launched country offices (AAN-ActionAid ex-human security advisor, interview, 2014). Since democracy, donors shifted strategies to work with the government to improve democratic structures from within: *'maximum support for government, minimum support to NGOs, which was completely different to what used to happen in the military [period] where donors were giving money only to NGOs... the donors now begin to influence civil society to start thinking how they can engage the government in the most structured manner and not in the typical anti-institutional approach that took place under the military'* (AAN ex-country director, interview, 2013).

Under these circumstances, Nigerian activists relying on official donors but wanting to keep active in protest, had to either accommodate or exit. This situation created a number of adaptive responses from activists, including NGOs, such as setting informal NGO coalitions; creating new associations to absorb funding; changing organisational structures; becoming NGO staff; and professionalising campaigning. These are all responses that stemmed from the renewed relationships between official donors and the Nigerian government.

An effect of the arrival of donors to Nigeria was the emergence of a distinctive mobilising 'sub-tissue' out of the national associative tissue to absorb funds. Lewis and Kanji (2009: p.38-9)

describe three associative levels in a donor arrival process: pre-donor domestic associations, pre-existing associations that adapt to be donor-receptive and new national associations specifically born to channel donor funds. In Nigeria, interviewees noted how some unregistered membership groups had not had direct relationships with official donors shielded behind informal NGO coalitions (see section 5.1.3). AAN was created in 2000 and fits Lewis and Kanji's third profile. Other organisations adapted by changing their internal structures to be half membership-based and half NGOs, as with Lewis and Kanji's second categorisation (ibid).

These membership-NGO organisations: *'tried to fuse the two traditions, the tradition of movement organising and having membership with the tradition of NGOs... [these] were the ones who became the most successful with advocacies and campaigns because they were able to blend and link to their own social movement, community organisations...'* (AAN-ActionAid ex-human security advisor, interview, 2014). Two examples were the *Civil Liberties Organisation* and the *Environmental Rights' Action* who envisioned an idea of NGOs with: *'mass membership so people could form chapters in different places... the National Secretariat would... [have] all the structures of an NGO, the professionals, desks and staff, but then the next National Secretariat you would have a mass-membership organised as structures that actually conduct elections that change their leaders'* (ibid). AAN has not used this adaptive response since AAN partners are not based on mass membership or hold elective processes.

Another adaptation has to do with activist biographies since pro-democracy activists started to work as paid NGDO staff in the aid sector (AAN senior staff, interviews, 2013-14). AAN is an example, with a number of senior staff, including the ex-country director, being former anti-dictatorship activists (ibid). For some, becoming staff has meant a more stable way of being activists while, for others, this has denoted a numbing of movements (ibid).

For instance, AAN-ActionAid ex-human security advisor appreciated that this move meant having an activist livelihood when the donor focus shifted to be collaborative with the Nigerian state. However, he noted that: *'it became more and more challenging for activists with conviction to remain in such structures without abandoning part of their ideas'* (interview, 2014). Influencing this feeling was a donor-led writing-report culture: *'when funding came and flooded in [around 1999], it became a distraction in the long-run in the sense that people started to be occupied with doing routine things like writing proposals... you don't even know when that*

happens because you need to meet this and that deadline and then activists simply just became careerists within the NGO structure’ (ibid).

Finally, AAN campaign manager suggested one more way in which the donor shift towards collaboration with the Nigerian state affected NGDO mobilising and campaigning: *‘NGOs before were volunteering, not professional. The form of campaigning was on resistance to the military rule... in 1992-98, funded, donor-supported NGOs started, and started to have a different type of campaigning, more professionalised, careerist’ (interview, 2013).*

In short, the analysis of opportunities and threats by both states and official donors explored in this section can help activists understand where the external options and pressures are coming from, including those influenced by arrangements between both actors. At the same time, it can help analyse the relative influence of the aid sector compared to states and other external actors, as a particular characteristic of campaigning NGDOs.

A lesson that can be drawn from interviewing data is that opportunities can turn into threats (such as allying with states and risks of being co-opted) in as much as threats can turn into opportunities (such as renewed activism against the restrictive ‘Foreign Donations Bill’ in Nigeria and the ‘Lobbying Bill’ in the UK). The fluidity between these two concepts reveals the uncertainty and the fine lines found in the contexts of campaigning. Similarly, activist responses to these opportunities and threats are fluid and can vary from resistance to adaptation.

Secondly, findings confirm the importance of emphasising threats as much as opportunities – a point already raised by McAdam et al. (2001) – in both mature and new democratic contexts. A final lesson is to note the *cultural, economic* and *social* opportunities and threats. Hence, in Nigeria, poverty and corruption and a historic culture of pro-democracy campaigning were all mentioned while in the UK it was child sponsor mindsets and NGDO coalescing/competition. In fact, these issues were cited as much as the more academically popular *political* opportunities and threats such as inter-governmental events and legal, policing and administrative restrictions. This would suggest the need to stress these type of opportunities and threats as much as the political or state-related ones.

6.3. Summary of results

Envisioning a campaign in ActionAid is no less complex than organising it as shown in Chapter 5. To cover its campaigning options, the NGDO has to juggle with a series of different identities and a number of external actors that can both play a positive and a negative role in mobilising people and confronting authorities – this is a sorting of the similar ‘tense opportunities’ seen in the past chapter. For instance, examples were shown in which ActionAid’s old charity identity limited the road towards campaigning. For a minority of interviewed staff, the UK poverty issue added questions around campaigning in a pure developmental way. Yet, in both cases, this also brought new opportunities by including the mobilising of people, network groups and coalitions that are attracted by the charity and global justice identities.

Overall, Chapters 4 and 5 had shown examples of NGDO campaigning features such as public engagement, solidarity and professionalised decision processes, development/aid influences and non-campaign networks and structures in ActionAid’s campaigning (see the conceptual framework in section 2.4.1). This chapter adds to these – ActionAid’s current identity was shown to have one side related, and one unrelated, to campaigning – and this resonated with other hybridity features seen in Chapter 5. The development/aid influence was also palpable in this chapter, perhaps most evidently illustrated in section 6.2.2 with the interviewee accounts about the opportunities and threats issued arising from official donors.

Chapter 7 – Discussion: understanding political action in campaigning NGOs through SM theory

Introduction

The past three chapters have explored how political action happens in a campaigning NGO. It has done so by exploring SM concepts in a single case under the rubrics of performing, organising and envisioning a campaign (sub-research question 1). Section 7.1 explores the question from a comparative perspective (sub-research question 2) by comparing ActionAid's campaigning to those of other international NGOs. I add this angle to seek for similarities in campaigning behaviour and to build on the concept of 'campaigning NGOs' beyond ActionAid. I also aim to explore further the mobilising and confrontational angles on NGO campaigning work. Section 7.2 moves to the discussion and revisits the research question and conceptual framework. The next and final Chapter 8 will conclude with the contributions and implications of this research for theory and practice.

7.1. ActionAid's comparison with other campaigning NGOs

A number of SM concepts were presented in the past three chapters to study ActionAid's political action as manifested through its campaigning. This section compares ActionAid results with other campaigning NGOs. In doing so, it seeks to find out which elements of ActionAid's campaigning work studied in previous chapters are also present in other campaigning NGOs. This is undertaken through the guiding ideas of the six SM concepts organised from a performative, organisational and envisioning perspective in sections 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 respectively.

To undertake this analysis, I drew on secondary data – NGO websites as well as NGO academic and grey literature. I also drew on primary data gathered from small case studies with a number of campaigning NGOs and organisations. These included internal reports, observation and/or

one key informant interview (see section 3.2.3)¹³⁷. My methodological strategy was to find at least one more NGDO example that operates like ActionAid to see it was possible to refute ActionAid's uniqueness in a particular SM category, e.g. frames. Therefore, this section is not a comparative analysis of how campaigning NGDOs function – for which I would have needed a different data collection method beyond a single major case study, for example, by means of a survey. The section is also not an attempt to generalise findings on ActionAid's campaigning to the wider NGDO sector. It does however point to, first, the existence of a number of NGDOs that do operate politically through campaigning in the sector; and, second, to the potential, at a practical level, for other NGDOs to draw on that practice.

7.1.1. Performing in campaigning NGDOs: public claiming and acting

Chapter 4 presented tax justice frames as part of ActionAid's ways of performing its political action through campaigning. ActionAid transitioned from aid to tax campaigning in 2008 (see section 4.1; also Newman, 2010). Two other campaigning NGDOs went through a similar process. ChristianAid moved from campaigns around debt and trade issues to tax justice in 2008-09 (Coulby and Bowen, 2011: p.13, 20), while Oxfam had campaigned on debt and trade before launching the *Robin Hood Tax Campaign* in 2009¹³⁸. This evolution from aid to tax was also present in major UK NGDO coalitions. Like ActionAid, this transition has sometimes come with tax claims framed on their own while on other occasions tax was framed as mixed with aid and other claims. For instance, the *Make Poverty History* campaign coalition (2005) had aid, trade and debt as claims while the latest *IF* campaign coalition (2013) already had hunger, aid, land and tax. More recently, the *Tax Dodging Bill* (2015) cited tax only (Yanacopulos, 2016: p.115-8).

Internally in the TJC, several types of tax justice claims emerged at the different campaign levels – tax avoidance, tax incentives and multiple taxation. Tax avoidance is a common international claim used amongst UK campaigning NGDOs and organisations, as seen with ChristianAid and Oxfam, and others like Ethical Consumer¹³⁹ and War on Want¹⁴⁰. This includes ActionAid's tax

¹³⁷ These methods worked to cover most dimensions, yet some data gaps exist for which other types of research would be needed, for instance ethnographic analysis to compare frame resonance. I note them during the section.

¹³⁸ www.oxfam.org.uk/get-involved/campaign-with-us/past-campaigns-and-successes and www.oxfam.org/en/campaign-with-us/robin-hood-tax/whos-behind-it

¹³⁹ www.ethicalconsumer.org/ethicalcampaigns/taxjusticecampaign.aspx

¹⁴⁰ www.waronwant.org/tax-justice-now

avoidance framing from a low-income country, developmental perspective, which is also common in other campaigning NGOs like ChristianAid¹⁴¹ and Oxfam¹⁴². Less common are national tax claims (tax incentives) and local tax claims (multiple taxation, tax harassment, presumptive tax) in the same NGOs. On tax incentives, ActionAid's TJC international manager suggested that: *'we [ActionAid] are more on the incentives than others, while they [other NGOs] it's primarily avoidance, transfer pricing, double taxation treaties'* (interview, 2013).

In Nigeria, ActionAid, ChristianAid, Oxfam, Publish What You Pay and other national and sub-national organisations recently created a 'Tax Justice and Governance' coalition with common training on various topics (tax avoidance, tax incentives, multiple taxation) but no other NGO had started organisational campaigning by 2014 beyond the coalition (observation, Abuja/Akure/Kaduna, 2014). While not yet campaigning locally, Oxfam and its Nigerian partner CISLAC had started a research and training project in 2012, which included research themes such as tax incentives, multiple taxation, presumptive taxation and regressive indirect taxation like VAT (Oxfam Novib, 2014: p.22-4; Oxfam Nigeria staff member, interview, 2014). The project includes prospective plans for a tax justice campaign with diverse multilevel claims (ibid)¹⁴³.

Besides frames, section 4.4 described ActionAid repertoires as another performing element in the TJC. To explore similarities, I compared website data on repertoires from ChristianAid and Oxfam (in the UK)¹⁴⁴, which are also involved in tax justice work in Nigeria and the UK. One of the most common performances in AAUK, the stunt, is frequently found in the other NGOs¹⁴⁵. For example, ChristianAid's campaign team visited the Mexican embassy in the UK with an antique suitcase full of action cards asking the President of Mexico to take action on tax haven secrecy (2012)¹⁴⁶ while Oxfam had a 'pop-up tax haven' and a poverty-free soup scenario (2013)¹⁴⁷.

¹⁴¹ www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/find-out-more/background-information/tax-justice-background.aspx

¹⁴² www.oxfam.org.uk/hidden-pages/all-blogs/2013/10/~media/ADF260BF56E74F32997DA71F67E5A0B9.ashx

¹⁴³ <http://maketaxfair.net/what/>

¹⁴⁴ Little or no data existed online for the Nigerian leg of these NGOs and other members of the Nigerian tax coalition

¹⁴⁵ See 'stunts' in their website tagging/search and campaign vocabulary www.christianaid.org.uk/search.aspx?q=stunt and www.oxfam.org.uk/get-involved/campaign-with-us/latest-campaign-news/tag/stunt

¹⁴⁶ www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/blog/feb12/mexican-embassy-tax-stunt.aspx

¹⁴⁷ www.oxfam.org.uk/get-involved/campaign-with-us/latest-campaign-news/2013/06/keeping-the-pressure-on

All three NGOs do international and national petitions¹⁴⁸. All three set up local petitions in the UK asking local councils to act against international tax dodging¹⁴⁹. ChristianAid and Oxfam are active on protest speeches in corporate general assemblies¹⁵⁰, actions in party conferences¹⁵¹, visits to individual MPs, exchanges of open letters, hand-ins of local postcards and hashtag activism¹⁵². While these actions are undertaken individually by each NGO, mass-actions such as marches, rallies and mass-visits to Members of Parliament are often performed in NGO coalitions. An example was 'Take tea with your MP', a collaborative initiative organised by several NGOs in London (ActionAid, CAFOD, ChristianAid, Oxfam, Save the Children and *Tearfund*) in which 1200 UK campaigners lobbied 131 MPs on aid and tax¹⁵³. Other examples of common mass-actions include the *Jubilee Debt initiative* (2000), the *Make Poverty History* (2005) and the *IF* rally events (2013).

In its current strategy, ActionAid acknowledges that the nature of their actions has been inspired by campaigning organisations, for instance, by Avaaz and Greenpeace for online repertoires such as SMS and mobile phone activism (ActionAid, 2012b: p.86) and by Amnesty for petitions and sending of letters (ibid: p.102-3). The campaigning NGOs studied use the same 'bearing witness' strategy (with actions like stunts, local postcard hand-in and protests in corporate general assemblies) present in some campaigning organisations. Witnessing is a Quaker tradition in which activists mark physical presence in the alleged original site of injustice to question an unjust situation and attribute direct responsibility (Hopgood, 2006 on Amnesty; Susanto, 2007 on Greenpeace; also see della Porta and Diani's logics of action, 2006: p.170-8).

In its most radical version, bearing witness may include civil disobedience or resistance to laws considered unjust as Greenpeace does when stealing GM crops, sabotaging petrol stations, blockading corporation offices and spoofing websites (Eden, 2004: p.606). This radicalness is absent in many campaigning organisations other than Greenpeace (e.g. see Diani and Donati, 1999 for a categorisation) and is also absent in ActionAid and the other two campaigning NGOs

¹⁴⁸ Oxfam has a global *Robin Hood Tax petition* with a 'European leaders' target to demand a financial tax on banks (robinhoodtax.org.uk/take-action). ChristianAid targets a national role, UK's Secretary Vincent Cable, on corporate tax avoidance www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/blog/june-2013/IF-petition-prayer-action-david-cameron.aspx

¹⁴⁹ <http://robinhoodtax.org.uk/bringrobinhome>; www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/tax-justice/

¹⁵⁰ <https://shareaction.org/every-penny-matters-morrisons-questioned-use-tax-havens/> and www.shareaction.org/successes (see Novartis)

¹⁵¹ www.christianaid.org.uk/aboutus/index/report-from-political-party-conferences.aspx and www.oxfam.org.uk/get-involved/campaign-with-us/latest-campaign-news/2012/09/join-oxfam-at-the-party-conferences

¹⁵² See their websites

¹⁵³ www.actionaid.org.uk/news-and-views/gallery-highlights-from-teatime-for-change

studied where the level of disruption to ordinary activity bearing witness is small with no illegality involved. An AAUK campaigner compared: *'ActionAid are more stunts, it's more a funny... family friendly... [Greenpeace] are so straight and so aggressive and they get a lot of criticism'* (interview, 2013). A reason given for the lack of direct action in ActionAid (and other NGOs) relates to its legal status of 'charity' under charity law: *'because we are a charity we couldn't directly support direct action like occupying places or shutting them down... we can't encourage people to be doing anything illegal or in the edge of charity law... a big part of Greenpeace is not a charity because, if it was, it wouldn't be able to support... direct actions. It's got like a charitable trust branch and then a [company?] one'* (AAUK activism officer, interview, 2014; also see section 2.1.2).

One has to go to the born-campaigning leg of NGOs, to a campaigning organisation like Global Justice Now (see section 2.1.2), to find examples of disruptive action like that undertaken by Greenpeace – for instance, giving logistical support to actions like occupying Heathrow airport and a power station, setting up eco-camps, or interrupting World Bank and UN speeches (GJN staff member, interview, 2013). Unlike campaigning NGOs like ActionAid, Global Justice Now receives no funds from governments or companies. With that said, direct action in Global Justice Now is only occasionally supported if suggested by member groups and it is not the daily, institutionalised repertoire as in Greenpeace (ibid). Rather, the Global Justice Now repertoire resembles those of campaigning NGOs with softer bearing witness strategies¹⁵⁴.

In conclusion, the campaigning NGOs studied have similar ways of performing campaigning through frames and repertoires, for example, frame bridging, mix of time-intensive and mass actions, thus, there are similar routes for mobilising the public to confront authorities (except for at the Nigerian local level).

7.1.2. Organising in campaigning NGOs: networking and mobilising

Besides their campaign public performance, similar ways of campaign organising are also shared by the campaigning NGOs reviewed, including their networks, mobilising structures and

¹⁵⁴ www.globaljustice.org.uk/campaign-successes

resource politicisation. Section 5.1 described AAN/AAUK's campaign networking with bases/supporters, partners and coalitions.

Regarding supporter networking (see section 5.1.1; see below for bases), ChristianAid has regular campaigners, 'campaign organisers' who motivate others to send postcards, sign petitions and organise stunts, and 'local lobbyists' who meet with/write to their MPs up to four times a year (Coulby and Bowen, 2011: p.27-8). ChristianAid also coordinates young Christian groups akin to ActionAid Activistas (ibid: p.35). In fact, the NGDO is recognised for mobilising large numbers of UK supporters (ibid: p.14). Decentralisation efforts on supporters made in AAN and AAUK towards more self-initiated participation were also found in ChristianAid, with the idea of 'reactive and mini campaigns' (ibid: p.17). These enable supporters to suggest small, short-term campaign issues alongside the major corporate campaigns developed organisationally. Oxfam also had evidence of supporter networks¹⁵⁵. What was not observable in ChristianAid or Oxfam was a network of campaigners in Nigeria like that of ActionAid Activistas (observation, Abuja, 2013-14). Similarly, campaigning organisations like Global Justice Now and War on Want set up campaigning groups on global poverty in the 1970s (GJN, 2016; Luetchford and Burns, 2003: p.88). Together with their financial supporters, Greenpeace has 'activists' undertaking legally risky direct actions and 'volunteers' undertaking general actions (Greenpeace staff member, pers. comm., 2015). This division resembles ActionAid's high-level and low-level pyramid of campaigners (see section 5.1.1).

Regarding networking with partners in low-income countries (see section 5.1.2), AAN partners like JDPC were semi-political (mixing service-delivery and child sponsorship with community organising, advocacy and campaigning). This format is also observable in partners from Oxfam Nigeria (e.g. Oxfam Novib, 2007), except for the involvement of partners in tax campaigning as noted above. National partners are also often 'shared' between international NGDOs such as ActionAid, ChristianAid and Oxfam – for instance CDD, CISLAC and NANTS (AAN partner interviews and observation, Abuja, 2013-14).

ActionAid's most recurrent coalitions were with NGDOs (see section 5.1.3). This resonates with quantitative findings by Murdie and Davis (2012) about international NGO coalitions, which

¹⁵⁵ www.oxfam.org.uk/get-involved/campaign-with-us/latest-campaign-news/2012/08/oxford-action-group-robin-hood-tax-stunt

concluded that NGDOs tended to coalesce amongst themselves as compared to the more diverse coalescing of other environmental, health and human rights NGOs. NGDOs were also the organisations with fewer links. The authors attributed these facets to competition for aid funds and/or lack of coalescing capacity (ibid: p.181). Likewise, the little/no coalescing with domestic informal groups and movements in AAN/AAUK resonates with literature on the challenges of informal networking in NGDOs (Earle, 2004, 2008; Earle and Pratt, 2009), including ‘NGOisation’ processes (see section 2.3.2; Choudry, 2010), which suggests that this is extensible to the sector. However, Nigerian NGDO/NGOs showed two ways in which they managed to build informal networking despite limitations – by shadowing unregistered, non-fundable groups through informal coalitions and by altering internal structures into being half membership-half professional (see sections 5.1.3 and 6.2.2).

On mobilising financial supporters for campaigning (see section 5.2.1), internal reports from ChristianAid note that campaigning and advocacy information is sent in fundraising materials to financial supporters (Coulby and Bowen, 2011: e.g. part II, p.6). Some staff have demanded greater emphasis on these tactics (ibid). Oxfam has strategies to mobilise financial supporters and transitions between financial supporters and campaigners, in what they call a ‘common social base’ of supporters (Oxfam staff member, interview, 2016). Those who sign petitions are asked to support financially and, conversely, those who support financially are asked to sign campaigns, become volunteers, and/or support specific actions. A special feature of Oxfam that is absent in ActionAid is the profile of ‘shoppers’ from Oxfam shops as part of that common social base (ibid).

Another campaign element issued from programmes-campaigning links was image mobilisation and politicisation (see section 5.2.1 and Figure 12)¹⁵⁶. The use of campaign images with poor people from low-income countries is found in other campaigning NGDOs – for instance, local people posing as case studies to illustrate a campaign story (ChristianAid¹⁵⁷), programme participants mobilising with banners (Plan¹⁵⁸), and images of campaign supporters in high-

¹⁵⁶ Other campaign elements deriving from hybrid mobilising structures such as the mobilisation of local poor people through service-delivery programmes, programme-based repertoires and hybrid staff cannot be compared with the data available and would need further research (see section 5.2.1). The same happens for the influence in campaigns of decentralisation and bilateralism and of country differences in the distribution of resources (see section 5.2.2).

¹⁵⁷ www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/tax-justice/inspiring-stories/inspiring-stories.aspx

¹⁵⁸ <https://plan-international.org/because-i-am-a-girl/decide>

income countries (Oxfam¹⁵⁹). While sponsorship photos are still mainstream, the existence of campaign images (ActionAid archives/website, 2013-14) speaks to the literature and suggests that development images can feed campaign goals besides the more researched purposes of NGO's/NGDO's branding and marketisation (see section 2.1.1). Similarly, AAUK's use of meticulous case study corporate research for campaigns (see section 4.2) can be found in other NGDOs, such as ChristianAid's first tax research report mentioned in section 4.1. The same happens with AAUK's use of stories with personal interest angle for campaigns¹⁶⁰.

Together with image resources, the adaptation of staff and financial resources to campaigning is also visible in other campaigning NGDOs (see section 5.2.2). On staff resources for campaigning, Newman (2011: p.222) suggests that variation exists amongst NGDOs – *CARE*, Concern and World Vision noted that advocacy remained a small part of their work, with few international policy staff and even fewer employed nationally. Instead, Oxfam and Save the Children-UK, like ActionAid, had given more importance to growing their advocacy staff, notably at Oxfam, which had grown its international and regional advocacy teams.

On campaign funding, Oxfam also makes use of campaign-oriented official funds, like ActionAid. For instance, Oxfam and the TJN's research and advocacy programme for fair taxation 'Craft' in Nigeria is partly funded by the EU¹⁶¹. Yet, finding public funds for campaigning is a limited option. Only large funders like the EU tend to grant funds to campaigns and where they do, it is only amid many restrictions, such as the need for stakeholders, for a European scope, and for organisational capacity able to absorb EU's large funding (Oxfam staff member, interview, 2016). According to the interviewee, Oxfam has heavy restrictions on funding from private companies, including funding for campaigning (ibid). As an unrestricted funding initiative, the NGDO took up a general online crowdfunding initiative to finance Oxfam as an organisation. Campaigns, amongst other strands of work, were publicised. This enabled it to use funds, at least partly, for campaigns and to compensate for the difficulty of obtaining public funds for this work. Indeed, 20-30% of Oxfam's campaign funding tends to come from public funds while the rest originates from self-funding and supporters (ibid). Oxfam has also internally debated formalising the 'finance a campaign' option for individual donors but, like ActionAid, this has not taken place,

¹⁵⁹ www.robinhoodtax.org/when-we-pass-robin-hood-tax-we-use-300-billion-generated-annually

¹⁶⁰ For example, www.christianaid.org.uk/ActNow/tax-justice/inspiring-stories/inspiring-stories.aspx

¹⁶¹ <http://maketaxfair.net/who/>

i.e. having this specific option for the public on the website (ibid). There are however a number of supporters who explicitly ask to finance campaigns, especially on issues of education – a demand that has been absorbed informally by the organisation (ibid). Finally, ChristianAid and Oxfam's strategies to mobilise financial supporters were noted above.

In conclusion, the campaigning NGOs studied have similar patterns of organising their campaigning work through networks, structures and resources. This would suggest shared patterns noted in the framework (see section 2.4.1), such as, first, solidarity and professionalised decision-making (e.g. inducement of supporters and decentralising efforts; predominant inter-NGDO and formal coalescing patterns). Second, would be non-campaign networks and structures (e.g. mobilising of financial supporters for campaigning, image, research/stories, staff and financial resource politicisation) and, third would be a development/aid influence (e.g. NGDO sectorial competition for funding, poverty-related images).

7.1.3. Envisioning in campaigning NGOs: setting identities and finding opportunities and threats

Campaigning NGOs share a mission and identity to eradicate poverty in low-income countries, which is visible, for instance, in their frames and repertoires. When new themes emerge, such as tax, a campaigning NGO will adapt them in terms of what added value they give to eradicating poverty. In this sense, original arguments are created. For instance, ActionAid's climate change vision links the pollution of rich countries to small-holder women farmers in the local South¹⁶² and gives a social and development angle to it. Similarly, Dingwerth et al. (2013) noted that Oxfam brought a 'poverty alleviation' perspective to environmental action in order to denote a reading of environmental demands from a human poverty angle. This compares to framing climate change as only environmental.

Some literature has explored how this 'developmental' identity (see section 6.1) has integrated and influenced other organisations, for example those working on environmental and human rights issues. Princen and Finger (1994: p.7, 16, fn.3) noted how developmental and environmental themes had gradually interacted since the 1992 Rio UN Conference. The authors

¹⁶² E.g. www.youtube.com/watch?v=F9TvwFwTRFY&feature=youtube_gdata_player

suggest that this has partly facilitated NGOs to initiate climate change work and environmental NGOs to adopt socio-environmental approaches. Likewise, many NGOs have adopted human rights agendas (Molyneux and Lazar, 2003; Nelson and Dorsey, 2003) while some human rights organisations like Amnesty have taken up poverty issues (Manzoor, 2010). Topping (2012) narrates how ActionAid ex-CEO – now [in 2015] Amnesty’s CEO, Salil Shetty – aimed to position Amnesty as a champion of economic, cultural and social rights, that is, a position closer to poverty issues, using the argument that ‘the ultimate torture is poverty’ (ibid). Before, Shetty had conversely championed the introduction of human rights in ActionAid (ibid).

These agendas’ influences on the primary identity of campaigning NGOs – poverty eradication – are important not only for the reformulation of perspectives and understandings, but also because they affect mobilising structures in campaigning NGOs and organisations. For example, Shetty’s intentions to tackle poverty in Amnesty were accompanied by a need to decentralise and launch regional organisational hubs closer to where human rights violations occur in a similar fashion to what he had previously done in ActionAid (Newman, 2011: ch.4). Similarly, the application of human rights in ActionAid has impacted on poverty campaigning, for instance, on the need for targets to include states alongside corporations, and on claiming state regulation processes rather than (or alongside) voluntary commitments from companies (ActionAid TJC manager, interview, 2013).

In turn, section 6.2 focused on how ActionAid’s campaigning strategised around opportunities and threats from both states and official donors. The influence from these two external actors could be extended to other campaigning NGOs, which also operate amid the opportunities and threats of these actors. However, more research would be needed to compare whether staff and campaigners from other campaigning NGOs *perceive* the contextual factors exposed in section 6.2 as opportunities and/or threats in the same way as ActionAid staff and campaigners, and whether they take similar actions to make use of them.

Equally, variation may exist in the influence from official and private donors to campaigning NGOs depending on their different combinations of official, voluntary and trade funding. For instance, in 2014, Concern¹⁶³ received 65% of their funds from institutional income while MSF¹⁶⁴

¹⁶³ www.alliance2015.org/fileadmin/Concern_Annual_Report_2014.pdf

¹⁶⁴ www.msf.org/msf-international-activity-report-2014

received only 9%; in that year 89% of MSF's income came from private donors. In between these extremes, ChristianAid¹⁶⁵ and Oxfam¹⁶⁶ received 41-43% from official funds, for 2013-14. Meanwhile ActionAid sat in a similar position with 31% of its funding coming from official funds, in 2013 (see section 1.3). On average, the UNDP estimates that large NGOs draw on official donors for nearly half of their budgets (Morton, 2013: p.334). In this sense, campaigning NGOs still share similar challenges as to how to retain independence from financial sources and how to tailor their financial resources to campaigning – as discussed above with the case of Oxfam (see section 7.1.2).

In conclusion, the campaigning NGOs studied have similar patterns of envisioning campaigning through identity and examining opportunities and threats, although some internal variations may exist. These include, for instance, some differences deriving from environmental and human rights influences, perceptions about opportunities and threats, and the different combinations of funding in NGOs. In particular, the claim of UK poverty as framed on its own without allusion to low-income countries (as undertaken by Oxfam) seemed to receive a faster categorical reaction from the UK government than those claims based on the developmental identity (see section 6.1.2), and this thus shaped political action differently vis-à-vis the UK government.

Overall, this section has reviewed ways in which NGOs share performing, organising and envisioning patterns of campaigning. These include a *development/aid influence* in campaigning, which is visible, for instance, in the influence of official donors (directly to NGOs, and indirectly to NGO-state relations) and the mobilisation of staff and the public to confront authorities in relation to the eradication of poverty in low-income countries. Nuances to this central developmental identity were also shared in NGOs, such as allusions to UK poverty, environmental issues and human rights approaches.

Similar *solidarity and professional decision-making processes* were also shared, such as a similar relative strength of internal networking with supporters and partners compared to limited and endogenous (between NGOs) external networking with coalitions. A final common feature was the existence of *non-campaign elements* in networks, structures, resources and identity that

¹⁶⁵ ChristianAid annual report 2013 www.christianaid.org.uk/Images/2012-2013-christian-aid-annual-report.pdf

¹⁶⁶ Oxfam annual report 2013 www.oxfam.org/sites/www.oxfam.org/files/oxfam-annual-report-2012-2013.pdf

served to influence campaigning and were, in turn, influenced by it towards a better campaign performance vis-à-vis the authorities. This includes, for example, the mobilisation of financial supporters who were originally only interested in non-campaign activities as well as the accommodation of image, staff, and financial resources to campaigning.

7.1.4. Methodological note – did ActionAid work as an extreme case study?

In Chapter 3, the thesis noted that ActionAid was chosen as an ‘extreme’ example because of its radical reputation and clear public campaign strategy. Sections 7.1.1, 7.1.2 and 7.1.3 then compared ActionAid to other campaigning NGOs. This sub-section reflects on whether, based on the thesis data, ActionAid was an ‘extreme’ case when comparing it to other campaigning NGOs. That is, did it mobilise more people politically than its counterparts? Was it more confrontational? Did it illuminate on any new concept absent in other NGOs regarding political action?

Overall, ActionAid may not be the international NGO that mobilises the largest number of people, but data in this thesis suggests that it is the one that mobilises more politically *outside the UK* and *internationally*. The notion of international ‘multiple-issue campaigning’, weaker in the other NGOs studied, is a reflection of it. In this sense, ActionAid offers data to build up a new concept as an extreme case, as suggested in section 3.2.2 – the use of extreme cases as unusual cases with which to develop new concepts.

(1) Numerically, i.e. number of people mobilised politically, many NGOs have a much larger number of followers and supporters than ActionAid does. For instance, Bastow et al. (2014: p.185) count at least 18 NGOs with a larger number of Twitter followers than ActionAid. In this case, the question would pose on whether the nature of this mobilisation is political or not; and second, on whether this mobilisation is concentrated in the UK.

In the UK, a number of observations from both ChristianAid and Oxfam question ActionAid as the extreme case. First, ChristianAid is known for having a stronger capacity to mobilise a much larger number of supporters in the UK than ActionAid (see section 7.1.2), and data in this thesis shows that ChristianAid adds a political filter to its mobilisation as ActionAid does, e.g. sending

campaign messages to supporters (ibid). Similarly, Oxfam enjoys a structure of shops in the UK with which shoppers can be mobilised into campaigners – a strategy unfeasible for ActionAid, which does not have shops. No data however was found on whether this mobilising pathway has been exploited by Oxfam.

(2) Qualitatively, i.e. level of radicalness, Oxfam proved to be the most outspoken NGDO vis-à-vis the UK government *in the UK*, claiming not only on UK's international development policies but also on its national ones (see section 6.1.2. on tax and austerity in the UK). National policies are not an issue ActionAid campaigns for unless they are linked to developmental work (ibid).

Outside UK however, ActionAid confirmed to be the best political actor in what concerns other NGDOs operating an international campaign on tax justice in Nigeria and the UK, ChristianAid and Oxfam. Different results support that ActionAid was better able to mobilise politically outside the UK. First, ActionAid went further in performing campaigning work at the Nigerian local level. Second, the autonomy of the federation's affiliates, both AAN and AAUK, to campaign at the national level was notable when compared to other NGDOs of the *Tax Justice and Governance Platform* in Nigeria. Moreover, the Activista supporter network in Nigeria, as a low-income country, also seemed unique to ActionAid.

Internationally, data in this thesis also confirms that ActionAid aimed, with challenges, to implement its organisational strategy on campaigning at the different local, national and international levels (as noted in section 3.2.2). This multi-level international campaign strategy does not exist in paper for ChristianAid and Oxfam (ibid).

Overall, I would still consider ActionAid as the best extreme case to study political action in NGDOs *internationally*, that is, the case that can offer most political data and observations on an international campaign as led by an NGDO. I would have *only changed the case study if my interest in campaigning had been UK-focused only*. In that case, I would have probably chosen either ChristianAid or Oxfam for reasons noted above.

Finally, it is to be noted that there is always the ‘black swan’ methodological challenge, or the problem of induction¹⁶⁷, to prove distinctiveness and thus extreme casing. That is, not because ‘all swans we have seen are white’ we can therefore reliably suggest that ‘all swans are white’. A black swan may appear at any moment that is not ChristianAid, Oxfam or any other NGDO reviewed in this thesis. Thus, I can never affirm that the elements found to be ‘distinctive’ to ActionAid *at this moment* are effectively so. All what can be said is that, so far, ActionAid proves the best case to study public mobilisation and confrontation until the opposite is proven.

7.2. Research findings and reflections

The past section has taken ActionAid campaign case and compared it to other campaigning NGDOs to find similarities. Thus, that section aimed to respond to sub-research question 2. In turn, sub-question 2 is based on the case findings from ActionAid presented in the previous chapters (Chapters 4, 5, and 6) which have aimed to respond to sub-research question 1.

In this section, I return to the overall research question (see Figure 1 bis) to explore how political action takes place in an NGDO as manifested empirically through its campaigning (rather than, say, through attending World Social Forums). Drawing on ActionAid’s case, and supported by the secondary comparative findings, I then reflect on what I think a ‘campaigning NGDO’ consists of. Finally, I consider how SM theory, namely its selection of six related SM concepts, worked together and assisted toward understanding the research findings. I also return to reflect on the conceptual framework formed of SM and NGDO concepts.

Figure 1 bis: Research question and sub-research questions

RQ: How does political action happen in a campaigning NGDO when seen through a social movement lens?

SQ 1: How do SM concepts relate to explain political action in the NGDO?

SQ 2: How similar is the NGDO’s political action to other campaigning NGDOs?

¹⁶⁷ <http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/induction-problem/>

7.2.1. ActionAid's tightrope – the idea of 'tense opportunities'

If I had to summarise ActionAid's campaigning in an image, that would be one of a tightrope walker. Juggling tensions and opportunities has been ActionAid's ongoing dynamics in its campaigning, as described throughout the three chapters providing the empirical work (see the summaries of results in sections 4.5, 5.3 and 6.3). The entry of campaigning in ActionAid often came into tension with what was already there – sponsorship, programmes, etc. The incursion of campaigning in Ondo did so through a 'contained disruption' found in JDPC's action repertoire. Other examples include the tension between old and new network partners and between old and new identities (see sections 5.1.2 and 6.1.1). While these non-campaign elements often restricted campaigning, they also proved useful in contributing new campaign skills and processes, such as mobilising itineraries for unusual activists. Other examples are found in section 5.2, which described the limitations – but also the opportunities – that emerged from sponsorship; service-delivery programmes; general decision-making; and resource-distributing structures vis-à-vis campaigning.

A second layer of 'tense opportunities' relates to the relationship between advocacy and campaigning. There are two ideas in terms of how ActionAid has dealt with linking advocacy and campaigning strategies. First, mixing advocacy and campaigning brought opportunities but also tensions. For instance, AAN mediated protests in the Hilton hotel together with the pressure led by staff indoors influenced the opening of further behind-door talk opportunities with high-level representatives from Mauritius and Nigeria (see section 4.3). On the other hand, the local integration of campaigning in Ondo led AAN to choose another local partner for campaign purposes besides JDPC – the Tax Justice Network Ondo (see section 5.1.2).

Second, there is a gradation of advocacy-campaign specialisation in the tax campaign actors, from AAUK (most specialised), to AAN, to JDPC and the Tax Justice Network Ondo (least specialised). AAUK has differentiated units dealing with advocacy and campaign strategies, which are aware of the option of working together for the best mixed benefit. Instead, local partners like JDPC and Ondo's Tax Justice Network have both strategies quite mingled, and mostly use advocacy actions. Thus, different degrees of integration of both strategies exist depending on the place and the context, even if 'advocacy' had been formally adopted in

ActionAid as a whole in the 1990s – a decade earlier than campaigning (see section 1.1.1, footnote 9, and section 1.3).

Once campaigning became settled as a practice within ActionAid, another layer of ‘tense opportunities’ was manifested in the different ways of understanding campaigning itself in the organisation. An example was observed in section 6.1.2 between different political identities of ActionAid (namely the ‘developmental’ and the ‘global justice’ identities), which, on the other hand, were complementary in that they satisfied different staff audiences and were better tailored to responding to different poverty contexts, e.g. North-South inequalities, UK recession contexts.

Perhaps the best exemplification of this tendency was the co-existence of two campaign formats (see section 4.3). These consisted of the initial single-issue format led by AAUK with one international claim, and a second multiple-issue format introduced as the federal campaign developed. In this instance, activist claims were specific to each level. These two campaign formats were seen to be complementary, yet living in tension. They were complementary because they responded to different grammars of poverty creation, namely international versus domestic causes of poverty in low-income countries. As a result, they unveiled different governmental and private bodies responsible for poverty. In other words, the existence of two campaign formats meant that ActionAid had different ways of contending with states and other opponents. The single-issue format worked best at showing international systems of inequality such as tax avoidance in which the UK government would be ultimately responsible for the effects of, say, activities of UK companies in Nigeria (what I called ‘vertical activism’). In contrast, the multiple-issue format worked best at denouncing poverty causes in low-income countries that have a domestic origin. They may be found to be similar in various countries but not *causally* (this is what I called ‘horizontal activism’). For instance, multiple taxation is partly due to insufficient governmental tax harmonisation. While this phenomenon may coincide, in that it takes place locally in both Bangladesh and Nigeria, one country is not responsible for what happens in the other.

The findings also pointed at tensions in maintaining the functioning of both formats. For instance, the use of resources was sometimes shared but sometimes subject to competition in the two formats, for example, when it was necessary to share scarce campaign staff and funding

resources. This was visible in the stress felt in AAN staff time as a result of having to attend to both campaign formats through bilateral relations with AAUK and multi-country relations with the federation (see section 5.2.2). Similarly, a comparison could be made between the resources that AAUK had for specialised policy research to support international and national campaigning as compared to the fewer resources available to develop local practice and policy research, such as JDPD's videos about tax problems in local markets (*ibid*).

A final tension regarded the nature of the single-issue campaign format. Data suggested that the centralised international demand, to be pursued at all campaign levels, is prone to create feelings of instrumentalisation and tokenism if the tax claims of local constituencies have not also been prioritised at the same time. The two cases of instrumentalisation analysed can be seen as evidence of this assertion (see section 5.1.1). The use by AAUK of images from local people to make the campaign case for tax avoidance illustrate a cause of poverty but was also seen by some staff as likely to be instrumentalising those people depicted if they were not part of the mobilisation process in their local context. Equally, AAN demanded Activistas to campaign on tax avoidance for the Abuja Ministerial Conference, a centralised claim (and to a lesser extent, on tax incentives), without a previous clear investment in their own local priorities, as noted by some Activistas. While the multiple-issue format existed and pressed for the development of local campaign actions by Activistas, these did not seem to be enough to neutralise the above-mentioned feelings.

7.2.2. ActionAid's gang – the idea of a 'campaigning NGDO'

The past section has presented ActionAid as a tightrope walker balancing different aspects of campaigning on either side. Another aspect of ActionAid to consider, in relation to viewing it as a 'campaigning NGDO,' is that the NGDO is one of a broader group or 'gang' of NGDOs that share characteristics when it comes to campaigning (see section 7.1).

Some of these features were also found to be shared with campaigning organisations. These include, for example, single-issue professional international campaigns, bearing witness strategies and supporter networks (see sections 2.3.2 and 7.1). Yet, other features could, logically, not be expected to exist in campaigning organisations (see section 2.1). While further

research would be needed, I sketch here some features of campaigning NGOs. These include the following aspects (see Figure 17):

(1) A *political poverty identity* influencing the shape that the content of campaigning takes was shared in the NGOs reviewed. Campaigns in NGOs are shaped by this aspect because of their concern with eradicating poverty in low-income countries, whether or not this is politically effective vis-à-vis states and other opponents. Due to this ethos, frames make reference to low-income country poverty, mobilising structures will somehow take account of poverty, etc. Also, there is organisational involvement of low-income countries, or at least, mention of this in the campaign narratives. In other words, when themes such as the environment, human rights, or UK poverty are introduced in NGO campaigns, they do so through the filter of – and under the primacy of – the primary developmental identity (see sections 6.1.2 and 7.1.3). An exception was Oxfam, with UK-poverty campaign frames and structures standing alone (see section 6.1.2).

Examples of how this primary identity manifests itself can be seen in frames, repertoires and resources. For example, this is seen in the addition of a ‘developmental view’ to standard tax claims, the use of similar anti-poverty repertoires, and of poor-people’s images from low-income countries for resource mobilisation (see sections 7.1.1 and 7.1.2). Also, there is sharing of sectorial debates such as that of the historical ‘*poverty here and poverty there*’ debate and the evolution from aid to tax campaigning in major UK NGO coalitions (see sections 6.1.1 and 7.1.1). Some campaigning organisations also exist that share this identity, such as Global Justice Now (see sections 2.1 and 7.1.1).

(2) A particular feature of the reviewed campaigning NGOs is their ‘*hybrid-based campaigning*’, visible in networks, mobilising structures, resources and identities. These add organisational tensions which would be absent in campaigning organisations¹⁶⁸. At the same time, they also bring new campaign elements that include: programme partners in the network that have integrated campaigning in their work; non-activist audiences of sponsors/financial supporters that are reached; and images that are mobilised and adapted to campaigning. Campaigning NGOs also share a diversity of identities in constant evolution, as seen with charity, developmental and global justice identities (see section 6.1) and influences such as

¹⁶⁸ As noted in Chapter 2, some campaigning organisations may do projects on education and sensitisation related to campaigning themes but they do not involve service-delivery, e.g. www.amnesty.org/en/human-rights-education

environmental and human rights approaches (see section 7.1.3). These elements exist all in addition to the conventional campaign networks, departments, resources, and processes such as direct recruitment of campaigners.

Figure 17: Shared features in campaigning NGDOs

- 1 • A predominant political poverty identity
- 2 • ‘Hybrid-based campaigning’ in networks, mobilising structures, resources and identities
- 3 • A three-fold campaign network of supporters, partners and coalitions and processes of partner politicisation
- 4 • Need to politicise resources – funding/financial supporters, images and staff
- 5 • Donor opportunities and threats, overlap of state-donor opportunities and threats and overlapping campaign elements

Source: compiled by the author

(3) The campaigning NGDOs reviewed share a *tripartite or three-fold campaign networking* with supporters, partners and coalitions. External networking tends to be scarce when compared to other environmental, health and human rights NGOs and is commonly done with other NGDOs (see section 7.1.2). Other shared features included learning processes in intra-sectorial coalitions (e.g. NGDO-union) as well as strategies to liaise with more informal membership groups and movements – such as creating informal coalitions to support informal groups and creating membership-NGO organisations (see sections 5.1.3 and 6.2.2).

Particularly for partner networking, there may be a *politicisation of partners*. Campaigning NGDOs may liaise with local associations, collectives and cooperatives that are not necessarily political but that may become so through the integration of human rights approaches and local advocacy and campaigning. Besides the engagement with more politicised partners – for example – trade unions, movements and local activist groups, NGDOs could also be seen to integrate partners that have not mobilised or have done little work in this respect (see section 7.1.2).

(4) A need to *politicise funding and financial supporters for campaigning* is also common in the campaigning NGOs reviewed here. Unlike campaigning organisations, NGOs accept official funds to a greater or lesser extent, and share a format of mixed official-voluntary funding (see sections 2.1.1 and 7.1.3). Similarly, they work with charity-minded sponsors that need to be ‘politicised’, which does not happen in campaigning organisations, whose supporters are clearly understood to be financing a political cause. As a result, campaigning NGOs have to ‘double-work’ and set up strategies to accommodate their funding and financial supporters towards campaigning (see sections 5.2.2 and 7.1.2). In other words, while NGOs do not enjoy direct and dedicated campaign funding, they play within their own boundaries with varied strategies in order to tailor funding and supporters. Campaigning organisations, by definition, do not need to follow these strategies, as their funding and supporters are already ‘tailored’ for campaigning from scratch.

Similar *processes of resource politicisation* are also shared in NGOs regarding their images and staff. The campaigning NGOs reviewed worked with images such as local people posing as case studies to illustrate a campaign story, programme participants mobilising with banners, and images of campaign supporters protesting (see section 7.1.2). Similarly, some NGOs, like ActionAid, have gradually invested in advocacy staff teams (see *ibid*). Again, these efforts do not need to be undertaken by campaigning organisations, which, by nature, work with campaign images and staff.

(5) Finally, NGOs share specific *donor opportunities and threats*, an *overlap of state-donor opportunities and threats*, and *campaign elements* that emanate from this overlap. Logically, these features are not present in campaigning organisations that are not working with donors. There are at least two ways in which the role of official donors may affect the political action of campaigning NGOs vis-à-vis states. First, donors may have a direct influence in how NGOs campaign (see section 7.1.3). Second, donors may have an indirect influence in the relationships between NGOs and states. For example, the shifting state-donor relations in dictatorial and democratic times in Nigeria led to the creation of mixed coalitions of aid and non-aid actors (see section 6.2.2). These also add to the opportunities and threats deriving from private donors.

In sum, the commonalities found amongst the campaigning NGOs reviewed arguably make them a relatively homogeneous group within the broader family of campaigning organisations.

In addition, a number of historical conditions were noted in past chapters that enabled the emergence of NGDO (advocacy and) campaigning activities (see section 2.1.1 for NGDOs in general and section 1.3 for the case of ActionAid).

To conclude, the features enumerated in this section support the campaigning NGDO elements that were anticipated by the conceptual framework as derived from the campaigning literature (see section 2.4.1). These anticipated elements covered: solidarity/professionalised mobilisation; public mobilisation; an aid/development orientation; and the influence of non-campaign organisational elements. The features enumerated in this section can now be seen to relate to those of the conceptual framework. For instance, first, the developmental identity taken together with, second, the role of official donors in campaign opportunities and threats, both relate to the development/aid influence identified in the framework. Likewise, the idea of hybrid-based campaigning (which was visible in networks, mobilising structures, resources and identities) in the different campaigning NGDOs reviewed, would encapsulate the anticipated relevance of non-campaign elements for campaigning. These elements might play either restricting or enabling roles in relation to campaigning.

In addition, however, the past section also offered new insights that were not anticipated in the conceptual framework. One such insight was the effort, and the need, to *politicise* non-campaign NGDO elements, understood here as the process of tailoring these elements to campaigning in different aspects such as: partners, funding and financial supporters, staff and images. Results and analysis from the ActionAid case and the comparative work also shed further light on the nature of networking in NGDO campaigning, for example, that networking is tripartite in nature (involving constituents, partners and coalitions), and that it has a tendency towards the development of coalitions that are formal and endogamous (with other NGDOs).

7.2.3. Bifocal lenses – the usefulness of SM theory for campaigning NGDOs

In the past section, I have summarised a number of characteristics that build the idea of a ‘campaigning NGDO’ and that define the way in which these NGDOs act politically, when understood as mobilising the public for authority confrontation. In this section, I reflect on how SM theory adds to an understanding of that phenomenon. I suggest that there are two angles

from which SM theory has contributed to this understanding. First, the use of single SM concepts; second, the union or interrelation of SM concepts. Both of these can aid our understanding of a given situation in NGDO campaigning. This resembles a bifocal lenses that helps us see both the close-up details and the distant landscape of the same view.

First, I suggest that individual SM concepts helped nuance the comprehension of certain discrete processes of campaigning, such as public mobilisation, confrontation with authorities and political identity. While public mobilisation had been studied in NGDO campaigning theory, I suggested that other nuances were provided by SM theory. As for the confrontation and identity dimensions, I had proposed that these had been little studied in NGDO campaigning theory and that SM theory was particularly useful to understand them (see section 2.3.2). If we take the case of identity in particular, SM theory about identity helped provide an understanding of the ways in which this 'identity' might or might not be changing. By looking at the nature of the campaigners' feelings, some dissonant voices were raised over the established 'developmental' identity, with questions about the role of UK poverty. Moreover, the developmental identity of NGOs influenced, and was influenced by, identities in other environmental and human rights campaigning organisations. These are all important in understanding changes in identities.

Likewise, frames, as a concept on its own, offered insights about public mobilisation in campaigning. These could help NGOs reflect on practice. For instance, there was an accumulation of tax claims in campaign actions in Akure that were framed towards different state and private sector targets, which invites reflection about the pros and cons of this situation. Likewise, frames brought to light the difference between what was expected about public mobilisation in the international campaign planning for the local level (for example, framing local campaigning as 'tax for public service spending') and what organically took place in Ondo (for example, framing tax from a 'multiple taxation' angle). Section 8.2.2 in the next chapter proposes some practical implications arising from these and other findings.

Second, I suggest that SM theory has also proved useful when interrelating the six SM concepts to help us understand a certain process of campaigning, or the general picture of NGDO campaigning. Other authors had used this strategy of taking a number of SM concepts together to understand campaign processes among similar collective actors such as non-development NGOs, campaigning organisations, and in larger coalitions that involved NGOs (see section

2.2.2). SM concepts may relate to each other in relationships of *confluence*, *mutual influence*, or *causation*, and, in this sense, they add a layer of analysis to when such concepts are used in isolation. Below, I give several examples that illustrate how relationships between SM concepts facilitated the understanding of NGDO campaigning in these three ways.

Examples of conceptual confluence were visible in how *frames*, *repertoires*, *networks* and *mobilising structures* helped illustrate different aspects of public mobilisation and confrontation (see the summaries of results of Chapters 4, 5 and 6). For instance, the finding of different manifestations of NGDO-state confrontational relations is an example of how SM concepts converged to explain that particular aspect of NGDO campaigning. In studying frames, we saw NGDO-state relationships through narrative challenges – the interactive shaping of claims in campaigning through the government (and the private sector) responses to ActionAid’s claims. Likewise, responses from the government (and the private sector) to certain ActionAid repertoires helped illustrate which actions had more effects on the targets, and also aided an explanation of processes of repertoire shaping, for instance, the more effects a certain action has, the more it is likely to be repeated. An example of this was the Hilton rally which led to chances of negotiation with the government. Finally, the nodes of the network that initiate confrontation with authorities can also be identified, mainly ActionAid International Secretariat, AAN, AAUK and JDPC. At the same time, other SM concepts yielded findings in which NGDO-state relations were not connected with confronting decision-makers and organising to propel challenging claims and actions against them. These non-confrontational relations included being supported financially by states and forming coalitions and collaborations with them, as illustrated through other SM concepts such as mobilising resources and political opportunities. By putting all these findings together, the idea of tense opportunities, or the tightrope walking, noted above, is illustrated (see section 7.2.1).

An example of how SM concepts relate in ways of mutual influence could be seen in the tightrope found by AAUK when mobilising their financial resources. A look at AAUK’s financial supporters shows that there was a diversity between more moderate to more radical supporters (see section 6.1.1). As supporters were a key *financial resource*, this diversity was likely to affect the ways in which they were approached. Hence, they might be best engaged with more familiar *frames* such as ‘aid-to-tax’, rather than totally new frames like ‘tax’ presented on its own, and with gradual and hybrid *mobilising structures* rather than direct recruitment. In other words, a

softer take on social change could appeal better to those in the sponsoring/financing pool (and programme pool) who would not accept a radical campaign discourse and/or join as campaign members from scratch. At the same time, it is likely that an influence in the other direction also takes place. The progression from aid to tax narratives, and from indirect to direct forms of mobilising, may gradually change the financial base of AAUK. This was illustrated in section 5.2.1 with the case of a sponsor that had become a campaigner – as per her words, she would now seem comfortable with new campaign themes like tax and direct mobilising methods for street action. This, in turn, helps explain one of the processes of tightrope walking described as characteristic of the NGDO (see section 7.2.1).

Finally, a causal example could be observed in the finding concerning the lack of direct action in ActionAid (and other NGDOs) due to its legal status of ‘charity’ under charity law, unlike Greenpeace (see section 7.1.1). This was reached by discussing repertoires with the interviewee and asking her about potential organisational and contextual reasons for the lack of NGDO buy-in to direct action. Thus, in this case, charity law as a *threat* was a cause for the nature of *repertoire actions* in ActionAid, according to the AAUK staff member. In turn, this sheds light on the nature of NGDO campaigning when it comes to performing its political action, namely its aid/development influence (see section 7.2.2).

Another causal relationship was observable in the effect that *identity* had on operational aspects of campaigning (see section 6.1.2). For instance, ActionAid/AAUK had included a global justice perspective in its developmental identity, which enabled additional *coalitions* with domestic associations active on UK poverty alongside associations active on global poverty as well bridged campaign *slogans* between these types of poverty. However, the strength of that identity aspect was not strong enough so as to be accompanied by specific campaign *resources* assigned to *actions* or *mobilising structures* to deal with UK poverty, as was the case in Oxfam.

How do these types of relationships between SM concepts – confluence, mutual influence and causation – talk to previous literature? Authors reviewed that related SM concepts (see section 2.2.2) have done so in terms of confluence (e.g. Kriesi on ‘new social movements’), mutual influence (e.g. Barakso between identity and repertoires) and causation (e.g. Stroup and Murdie about state dimensions on repertoires).

While I did not specifically study relationships or models between SM concepts hypothesised by other authors, the two causation examples shown above talk to some previous literature. First, the fact that the legal status of ‘charity’ under charity law affects the lack of radicalness in repertoires (more concretely, the lack of direct action) talks to Kriesi’s (1996: p.180) conclusion that solidarity [poverty and inequality] protest is more moderate than protest in other movements, e.g. environmental, which is partly explained by political opportunities – the state’s support to solidarity actors. It also relates to Stroup and Murdie’s conclusion (2012: p.444-5) that high levels of government support are correlated with lower levels of confrontational advocacy but that this relationship is not perfect and that the deciding factor may be institutional and/or internal to the organisations or networks. TJC findings corroborate that institutional restrictions such as the Charity Law are as important as the nature of funding vis-à-vis protest levels. Further, other structures were created towards campaigning when institutional limitations to NGOs showed up, making the relationship between funding sources and confrontational practice more indirect and nuanced, e.g. the GJN as an alternative development campaigning organisation (section 2.1.2).

Second, findings in section 6.1 resonate with Barakso’s (2010) suggestion that brand identity influences repertoires (see section 6.1.2) while the contrary – repertoire change influencing identity – is less strong given the risk and the investment that the organisation would need to undertake. This does not mean that identity change does not happen, as seen in section 6.1.1, but it partly requires investment in organisational and staff change and navigation of internal tensions, e.g. sponsorship versus campaigns departments. Findings in these sections also built on Barakso’s relationship between identity and repertoires and expanded it to also explore relationships between identity and frames, coalitions, mobilising structures and resources. A finding noted that there is a gradation in the level of alteration that these elements go through – while altering frames and additional coalitions without changing the initial (developmental) identity is relatively feasible, altering other elements that require either/or choices on resources may turn more complicated, e.g. having mobilising structures for UK poverty only. In that case, choices need to be made between assigning resources to either one or another identity.

In short, SM concepts are useful when they are used together to understand processes and relationships in NGO campaigning, be these conceptual relationships that are confluent, mutually influent, or causal, in nature. All these conceptual strategies seek to study the ways in which the NGO has organised/mobilised, envisioned, and eventually performed

confrontational relations against the state and other decision-makers, and whether public mobilisation was involved – that is, the NGDO political action. Overall, SM concepts work well together and complement current NGDO campaigning theory as suggested in the conceptual framework (see section 2.4.1). Both, SM theory and NGDO theory together, help a reading of NGDO campaigning as a manifestation of its political action.

With that said, limitations also exist on the extent to which SM theory is useful to the analysis of campaigning NGDOs. NGDO findings in section 6.2 on the role of external actors were not fully explained by *political* opportunities and threats, which suggests a limitation of those SM concepts. *Cultural*, *economic* and *social* opportunities and threats may need to be stressed as much as political ones (see Jasper, 2004 for the importance of culture). Other findings in Chapters 4 and 5 corroborated this point for multilevel campaigning, which was not only driven by political considerations. To mobilise constituents, AAN and AAUK had to fit campaign claims with people's cultural, economic and social concerns as well as their political capabilities.

Empirical findings about 'tense opportunities' and 'hybrid-based campaigning' revealed that a campaigning NGDO retains non-political features such as sponsorship, service-delivery, non-campaigning resources, etc., and that those aspects influence and are influenced by its political side. SM theory in isolation may not fully account for these non-political aspects and the tensions that they create in an organisation that wants to campaign.

Similarly, Fligstein and McAdam (2011) criticise SM theory for stressing the understanding of change without explanations of stability and order. The authors also note that focusing on a particular actor such as social movements, organisations, political parties, states, or interest groups obscures the structure and nature of strategic collective action (also see Jasper, 2004, 2006). In that sense, there is a tendency to create the 'social movement', the 'organisation', and then assume that these can arrange networks to expand one's power. Rather, the theory these authors propose addresses the interplay of the actors and the interplay of contexts or 'fields' in the broader environment. For instance, the aid sector could be seen as an 'emergent field' (Fligstein and McAdam, 2011) born after the Second World War agreements with particular actors and ways of operating. This thesis has covered 'fields' under 'political opportunities and threats', which may have underplayed the role of stability and order and of other actors.

SM theory also has empirical limitations. The majority of SM findings relate to contemporary movements based in North America and Western Europe. This historical and geographical limitation had been acknowledged by major SM scholars (i.e. McAdam et al., 1996: p.xii-xiii) which consequently adapted some concepts (e.g. McAdam et al., 2001 for nondemocratic contexts). A burgeoning SM literature also exists on Africa, Asia, Latin American and the Middle-East although the efforts to consolidate these approaches are still relatively recent (see section 2.4.1). This may have in turn implied conceptual limitations when exploring the case of Nigeria. As the AAN ex-country director noted: *'I remember those in ActionAid saying there are no movements in Africa, and I said you are wrong, there are movements in Africa, but you want to see them the way they are structured in Brazil'* (interview, 2013). According to him, African movements take different shapes to those conventionally known under the idea of 'social movement', e.g. masses in the streets. This is why, from a theoretical perspective, the consolidation of new and/or nuanced concepts may be needed to better understand NGDO campaigning in Nigeria through a SM lens.

This section has suggested a series of findings, from the tightrope situations in which ActionAid has campaigned, to ActionAid's gang that defined a pattern of NGDO campaigning characteristics, and to the bifocal usefulness of SM theory for NGDO political action as seen through campaigning. These have all aimed to respond to the question of how political action happens in a campaigning NGDO when seen through a SM lens. The next and final chapter discusses how these findings not only contribute to the NGDO campaigning literature but also to SM theory. It does this by showing the empirical forms that SM theory can take in NGDOs, given their distinctive circumstances. Other practical notes are also considered.

Chapter 8 – Conclusion: contributions and implications

Introduction

In the past chapter, I concluded that ActionAid's campaigning, because of its nature, is characterised by campaign skills and processes that are in tension but come with new opportunities, like walking on a high tightrope. I also noted that ActionAid shares most of these skills and processes with other campaigning NGDO – its 'campaign gang'. Finally, I suggested that SM theory can be useful for helping our understanding of campaigning NGDOs in two 'short-sight' and 'long-sight' ways, like a bifocal lenses. This helps, first, to nuance the comprehension of certain political aspects, such as public mobilising, confrontation of authorities and political identity. Second, it enables us to grasp an overall picture of NGDO campaigning by interrelating the six SM concepts used, which link to each other in relationships of confluence, mutual influence or causation. Finally, I concluded that SM theory and NGDO campaigning theory together, as a conceptual framework, helped our reading of NGDO political action through campaigning.

In writing this chapter, I thought of profiles of people I met along the way during my PhD and how this thesis could be of use to them – my SM scholar colleagues; my NGDO scholar colleagues; my ActionAid and partner staff colleagues; and finally Amaka, the market seller in Akure, Ondo. I have divided this chapter into two sections dealing with contributions and implications. First, I suggest there are two main contributions of this thesis (section 8.1), namely, it offers an empirical contribution to SM theory and a theoretical contribution to NGDO studies (and practice). Second, the chapter concludes with a number of implications for future research and practice (section 8.2).

To SM scholars, the thesis could provide an empirical contribution to SM theory and the notion of 'campaigning' with new data from a campaigning NGDO. In other words, it would show how SM concepts have been applied to an NGDO (see section 8.1.1). To NGDO scholars, this thesis could be of interest to them as a theoretical contribution to NGDO campaigning literature, that is, how SM vocabulary may help our understanding NGDO campaigning (see section 8.1.2). Also,

SM concepts could offer NGDO staff new practical lenses by which they could self-analyse their campaigns. Similarly, some data can be subsumed to show campaign impact, although the thesis does not explore it directly (see section 8.1.3). Finally, ActionAid and partner staff may be interested in the practical implications and resources that can be extracted from the thesis to work with local people like Amaka (see section 8.2.2) and to develop potential research for ActionAid (see section 8.2.1). Academics, in turn, may feel more engaged with the suggested academic research directions (also see section 8.2.1).

8.1. So what – contributions to knowledge

In Chapter 1, I presented two stories about two conferences that took place in Canterbury and Oxford. I suggested that the first conference on ‘Social Protest’ ignored NGDOs while the second conference on ‘Politics in Development’ – with a panel on NGOs, politics and power – ignored campaigning in NGDOs. In writing this thesis, I hope to have provided a case demonstrating the importance of NGDO campaigning, as seen through a SM lens, to both conferences. In doing so, I also hope to have brought these two academic circles – social protest and development studies – closer together. I explore contributions to both of these academic circles in turn and then add a third section on practical contributions for NGDOs.

8.1.1. Empirical contribution to social movement theory

This thesis offers an ethnographic case study of a campaigning NGDO. This contribution is empirical and aims to locate campaigning NGDOs on the SM theory radar, as a new actor in this contentious classification. This reading of the thesis may be particularly useful for collective action and social movement academics.

ActionAid’s case contributes an NGDO angle to the concept of ‘campaigning’ (Tilly and Tarrow in Tarrow, 2011: p.191; also della Porta and Diani, 2006: p.188-191) and of organisations that campaign. While SM theory has been applied on non-development NGOs and (mostly environmental and human rights) campaigning organisations, less has been said on campaigning in NGDOs (see section 2.2.2). When NGDOs have been studied, it has usually been as part of

larger comparative studies or campaign coalitions. In particular, the case adds to the literature of NGO frames and repertoires by exploring these in an NGDO campaigning setting, alongside other settings studied such as UN conferences and World Social Forums (also see section 2.2.2).

In the past chapter, campaigning NGDOs were compared to campaigning organisations, and found to have certain campaign particularities. This may add to efforts of other scholars, which have studied the political specificities of other collectives – see Smith et al. (1994) for transnational social movement organisations; Keck and Sikkink (1998) for transnational advocacy organisations; and Lambelet (2014) when historicising the politics of philanthropic organisations. In this thesis, I have sought to explore the phenomenon of campaigning NGDOs.

The case also offers NGDO data which talks to SM concepts, offering new nuances to theory (see section 7.2.2 on the idea of a ‘campaigning NGDO’). For instance, sponsorship and service-delivery programmes had not previously been studied as ‘mobilising structures’ in the frameworks reviewed (see section 2.2.2). Another empirical contribution was the study of opportunities and threats coming from child sponsors/financial supporters, official donors and the overlap or interactions between states and official donors (see section 6.2.2). A final empirical note rests on highlighting the importance of image resources for NGDO campaigning, which emerged as a key cultural resource for the success of the TJC. This adds to more popular human and material resources in the literature (Edwards and Gillham, 2013: p.1098). An example of this was the mobilisation of Marta’s image from AAUK, rather than her time or money (see section 5.1.1). It goes without saying that ActionAid also mobilised time and money resources from staff, constituents, partners and coalitions, as noted mainly in Chapter 5.

Finally, I suggest that this case offers a methodological contribution to ethnography in SM studies (della Porta, 2014). While ethnography has gained space in SM research, it is still an under-employed method (Lichterhan, 2013: p.428-29). This vision is corroborated by Le Mazier (2011) in the particular case of repertoire theory where a more macro-structural tradition has prevailed.

8.1.2. Theoretical contribution to NGDO campaigning literature

Apart from this first contribution to SM theory, I suggest that this thesis also offers a new vocabulary by which we can understand NGDO campaigning (see section 7.2.3 on the usefulness of SM theory for campaigning NGDOs). This contribution is theoretical (offering an SM framework to campaigning NGDOs as objects of study) and may be of particular interest to NGDO researchers, NGDO campaign actors, and practitioners and donors concerned with political action.

As seen in Chapter 2, SM concepts such as *frames*, *repertoires*, *networks*, *mobilising structures*, *identity* and *opportunities/threats* are relatively new to the NGDO campaigning literature. Only a few authors, such as Alcalde (2010) and Alonso (2009), have applied these concepts to NGDOs. Section 2.3.2 raised the point that, although not directly related to SM theory, international campaigns have been studied in NGDO and development studies. So, building on the bifocal lenses idea about the usefulness of SM theory that was shared in section 7.2.3, what is the added value that SM theory gives to *concrete* NGDO debates in this area? This is considered below where I review examples noted throughout the thesis about the contribution of SM concepts to a series of NGDO campaign literature debates as they were presented in sections 2.1.1, 2.1.2 and 2.3.2.

(1) In section 4.3, I noted that the notion of frame alignments as applied to international campaigns offered a nuanced analysis to the public engagement or mobilisation debate on moving towards ‘positive frames’ that unveil the causes of poverty (Darnton and Kirk, 2011). This was in terms of identifying both international and domestic causes of poverty in low-income countries. The use of two international campaign formats, which were framed as both a single issue and as multiple issues, enabled this double unveiling. Moreover, the notion of frame resonance added an analysis of the capacity of these different ‘positive frames’ to activate mobilisation.

(2) In sections 4.3 and 5.1.1, I hinted that the notions of frame alignments and resonance, as applied to international campaign formats, could also add to the debate on international campaigning and tokenism. I suggested that, in the case of the TJC in Nigeria, multiple-issue campaigning prompted more public mobilisation and response from the authorities at each

level, including the local level, than when the single issue of tax avoidance was reproduced at all levels. All in all, tax avoidance also reached all the campaign levels as an issue. The role of ‘hybrid mediators’ (see section 5.2.1), as campaign resources, was suggested as key in bringing both multiple-issue and single-issue framing ‘up and down’ across the levels. In short, SM theory contributes to the literature of tokenism and the role of mediation in international campaigning through the notions of frames and resource mobilising (of staff resources, in this case).

(3) Overall, the TJC case from an SM perspective builds on the growing literature concerned with campaigning formats, in particular the concepts of multiple-issue campaigns, single-issue campaigns, as well as the complementarities and tensions involved, as seen through SM concepts, for example, tensions in sharing campaign resources like AAN staff time.

(4) In section 7.1.2, I noted that the finding of ‘campaign images’ (see section 5.2.1), through the reading of images as mobilising resources, adds a new perspective to the growing literature on the mediatisation and branding of NGDO images. It suggests, namely, that images can serve for campaigning purposes too.

(5) Similarly, the historical reference about how official donors supported the pro-democracy movement against the Nigerian dictatorship from abroad, and later moved to support the democratic government, as understood through opportunities and threats, adds to the literature on donor behaviour and influence over NGDO campaigning (see section 6.2.2).

(6) Finally, I suggested that the idea of confrontation has been little explored in the NGDO campaign literature, which has perhaps focused more on the dimension of public mobilisation (see section 2.3.2). Confrontation has been a vital element of ActionAid’s campaigning, as seen mostly in Chapter 4, and SM theory, mainly through the notions of disruptive frames and repertoires, provides a pathway into understanding this element.

(7) A similar situation occurs for the notion of political identity, which I believe has also been little explored in the NGDO campaign literature. Amid other elements, SM theory highlights the role of emotions in the idea of an always changing identity. In Chapter 6, attention to feelings of comfort and discomfort by supporters, campaigners and staff – about campaigning on poverty

eradication and about the notion of poverty itself – helped provide an understanding of the ways in which ActionAid’s identity has evolved and changed.

8.1.3. Practical contribution to ActionAid and other NGOs

In this section, I suggest that the theoretical contribution, the SM conceptual framework, as described in section 8.1.2, can have relevance for ActionAid and other NGOs practically. This is in terms of both offering new lenses for campaign *reflection* and showing campaign *impact*.

First, SM theory enables ActionAid to add a layer of campaign analysis. While far from suggesting that ActionAid has not done this yet, these concepts help in that effort by offering a reflexive or evaluative framework. The SM framework is easily decomposable into small parts that can serve as campaign indicators – for instance, checking on the adaptation of funding to campaigning, of staff, of images, of sponsorship, etc. These indicators can serve to check on, say, how each country member in the federation is performing in a given dimension. The concepts of frames, repertoires and networks serve well, in particular, to make visible and better understand power struggles in the campaign: between ActionAid staff internally; between ActionAid staff and the constituencies; and between ActionAid staff/constituencies and opponents (as seen mainly in Chapters 4 and 5).

It could be argued that the human rights approach used by NGOs already achieves this task but, as I suggested, SM theory adds a public mobilisation and confrontational perspective not necessarily present in human rights. Thus, for example, SM can help by: analysing which frame was first and to whom this frame belonged; understanding who decided on which protest action; who networks with whom; and the degree of disruption observed in actions, etc. Overall, SM theory could offer ActionAid (and other NGOs) a political analysis for its existing reflections if the NGO portrays itself ideally in terms of considering the following issues. For example: how does it want to contest using new challenging frames and disruptive repertoires with the targeted authorities; how does it develop campaign networking and resources; how does it mobilise others and with others beyond their own organisation and their donors? Further, how does it manage the hybridity of its campaign and non-campaign features; how does it reflect about its own identity; and how does it deal with the consequent opportunities and threats?

Second, particular examples using SM concepts in this thesis could serve to illustrate ActionAid's campaign impact, even if they were not initially reported for that purpose. For instance, government and private sector responses to ActionAid help us understand the interactive shaping of claims and actions in political action, as seen through campaigning (see section 7.2.3). At the same time, they can also be seen from an impact perspective – tax justice claims and actions entered the political and economic arena and engaged the authorities to either refuting or incorporating these ideas. For instance, Barclays refuted ActionAid's claim on 'tax avoidance' through public correspondence. The Liberian Minister of Finance mentioned ActionAid's report during the AU Conference. The Nigerian tax authorities reacted on the need to add 'harmful' to 'tax incentives' claims while Ondo's tax authorities denied the existence of ActionAid's notion of 'multiple taxation' (see section 4.3).

Similarly, the AU Conference and other actions led to post-conference meetings between AAN and the Nigerian Ministry of Finance (see section 4.3). Theoretically, these help explain processes of repertoire shaping as encouraged by ongoing campaign results (i.e. a stunt leading to further negotiations). Additionally, they can show the stepping stones of ActionAid's impact in moving forward its tax justice agenda. In this sense, SM concepts push impact analysis beyond policy towards a broader vision of politics. The different SM concepts explore variations taking place not only at the policy change level but also at the level of perceptions, discourses and political practice out of sight. Finally, impact could also be observed for SM concepts that help us better understand public mobilisation, such as those that analysed a potential growing/decreasing number of campaigners (e.g. frame resonance) and their deeper commitment to campaigning (e.g. logics of bearing witness).

8.2. Where next – implications for research and practice

This second and final section shares ideas for the future, including further academic research (see section 8.2.1) and practical suggestions for ActionAid, in particular, on the promotion of 'multiple-issue campaigning' in international multilevel campaigning practice (see section 8.2.2).

8.2.1. Ideas for further research

The suggestions for further research presented in this subsection relate, first, to expanding the topic of the thesis and, second, to developing themes that were raised during the thesis but that there was not sufficient time to pursue.

First, this thesis has focused on an ActionAid case study and looked for secondary NGDO examples that shared similarities with ActionAid (see section 7.1). More comparative research between campaigning NGDOs would be needed to study their shared campaign features. Equally, SM research could broaden out to compare campaigning NGDOs, campaigning organisations and other collective actors. This comparative research would help discern, for instance, how similar the campaign features of NGDOs may, or may not be, vis-a-vis those of other collective actors. Overall, this would contribute to the integration of NGDOs in SM literature. Similarly, while this PhD is limited to campaigning in NGDOs, a broader theoretical area to further develop could be that of linking social movement studies with development studies. This is not to say that politics has not been covered in development studies, for instance, through human rights, citizenship, globalisation and other political theoretical approaches (Kumar et al., 2009; Lewis and Kanji, 2009). It is, rather, to suggest that a fertile academic discourse could arise from further linking SM and development theory – for instance, by studying the historical role of donors vis-a-vis anti-colonial resistance, as seen briefly in the case of Nigeria (see section 6.2.2).

A second area of research concerns sub-themes related to the PhD that I have not been able to expand on or include in the thesis and that I would like to further write about in further articles/conferences/blogs. A first set involves expanding on themes such as the history of campaigning in Nigeria; the use of development images for campaigns; the role of the diaspora in campaigning for poverty in low-income countries; and the history of certain repertoires such as stunts, petitions and protest in general assemblies in the UK, and market storms, tweet conferences and activist popular theatre in Nigeria. Further, a monograph could be developed on NGDO repertoires in line with Contamin (2001) on petitions, Fillieule and Tartakowsky (2008) on demonstrations, and Le Mazier (2011) on general assemblies.

Other sub-themes emerging from the thesis refer to those themes that did not directly speak to the research question but, rather, to the taxation literature, such as community land taxation in Nigeria; market taxation in Nigeria; the role of market unions in Nigerian local markets; and taxation and economic citizenship. I have agreed with the ICTD, the *International Centre for Tax and Development* at IDS, Sussex University¹⁶⁹, that I will write one or two articles on these matters. Methodologically, a final aspect would be to explore ‘two-person interviews’, a qualitative technique sitting between interviews and group discussions that has been little researched to date (Koole, 2011) and which I used occasionally in the PhD.

In terms of research by ActionAid, the NGDO is well positioned to study cases of multiple-issue campaigning. Precedents exist with the *Global Campaign for Education* (Gaventa and Mayo, 2009) and, partly, the TJC (this PhD). Research could also be undertaken on hybrid-based mobilisation, in particular, on programme partners that may be interested in campaign issues and on the less known life-trajectories of former sponsored children becoming Activistas (see sections 5.1.2 and 5.2.1). Another research area to study further is ActionAid’s supporters. Previous studies suggested that identities between campaigners and financial supporters were gradually converging while some other research has questioned that (see section 6.1.1). More insights would be needed to know how many ActionAid financial supporters opt for a political or a non-political poverty identity and how many finally turn into campaigners¹⁷⁰. This would feed broader research on values in the UK development sector (Darnton and Kirk, 2011).

8.2.2. Ideas for ActionAid

A key suggestion that I would convey to ActionAid would be the niche that, I believe, the NGDO could have to develop, namely, ‘multiple-issue campaigning’ in its international campaigns. Contextually, the opportunity is open – NGDOs, including ActionAid, have often been criticised for using single-issue professional campaigns that leave behind the mobilisation priorities of local people in low-income countries (see section 2.3.2). Organisationally, ActionAid is already applying this campaign format (see section 4.3). Throughout its history, ActionAid has often

¹⁶⁹ See www.ictd.ac/

¹⁷⁰ Public data on ‘supporter journeys’ is scarce, even though the term is often used in the NGDO sector (e.g. Clifton, 2013). For instance, data on the number of financial supporters who transition into being campaigners and vice versa is hard to find in annual reports and, so far, stays internal to the organisations, i.e. ActionAid, Oxfam.

been a reference point in the NGDO sector for the execution of avant-garde ideas like participation, human rights and decentralisation (see section 3.2.2). With more resources and vision, ActionAid could elaborate on the idea of multiple-issue campaigns in its upcoming strategy and answer current critiques.



Figure 18: The kite tool and multiple-issue campaigning

Source: compiled by the author

The 'kite tool' (see Figure 18; and appendix 2) and the 'tax reflection-action toolkit'¹⁷¹ elaborated with ActionAid and partner staff during the PhD are practical instruments conceived to design multiple-issue campaigns. Other image tools can also be applied such as the 'bridge tool' for identifying campaign mediators and the 'dart tool' for prioritising frame resonance or identifying those claims deemed more feasible and useful by activists at each level.

These tools can be applied to current single-issue international themes (by finding related priority themes at national and local levels) and to locally-born themes (by moving from the local to explore related national and international claims). An example of the first option would be to find locally raised priorities related to tax avoidance. An example of the second option would be to explore the national policy demands of a locally raised theme such as the harmonisation of tax laws to prevent multiple taxation. That could mean that, the fact that international campaigns are started from headquarters or locally could be a secondary matter when developing multiple-issue campaigns as long as campaigns are adapted for each level.

Together with the development of multiple-issue campaigns that include local campaigning as defined by local people, three other practical suggestions were verbally shared with ActionAid staff and a formal one-page document will be sent after the PhD submission. The four practical suggestions deriving from the thesis are summarised below (see Figure 19).

¹⁷¹ www.actionaid.org/publications/tax-power-campaign-reflection-action-toolkit

Figure 19: Suggestions for improving ActionAid's Tax Justice Campaign

(1) Managing the challenges of instrumentalisation/tokenism. Applying a single-issue campaign without applying a multiple-issue campaign at the same time is likely to increase instrumentalisation and discontent in constituencies and staff. An example of this difficulty was seen in the case of some Activistas who felt they were campaigning for centralised claims while their own local campaign needs were not being supported enough (see section 5.1.1). One suggestion to enhance responsiveness and mobilisation is to have a multiple-issue campaign format in which constituents can prioritise their tax claims and actions and that this precedes, or at least operates at the same time as, centralised demands from ActionAid for them to campaign on claims that are in an international single-issue format, like tax avoidance. This includes claims that may be national but not felt as priorities for local constituents, like tax incentives. Local tax priorities may coincide with international ones, but this was not the case for the TJC and should not be taken for granted.

In order to move towards local campaigning, planned by locals, and multiple-issue formats, there would need to be better finance and incentives for the development of local networks and coalitions (see below). Further, the role of hybrid mediators for their capacity to bring local claims 'up' the chain would be important. Campaign formats also demand different strategies of training – single-issue formats involve training and toolkits in terms of making technical issues better understood while multiple-issue formats would rather involve the support of local studies to offer knowledge about what is already taking place.

(2) Making use of existing local campaigning. The existence of two strategies for local campaigning in the TJC – campaigning on public services and on local taxation – is important to acknowledge. The international campaign strategy for the local level promotes the first option (campaigning on tax for public service spending) while what has organically taken place, in Ondo state at least, was the second option (multiple taxation claims mainly). ActionAid may want to reflect on the implications that this difference has – between what was planned and expected and what unfolded in Ondo – in terms of local campaign flexibility. Eventually, reflections on this issue pose the question about which strategy takes less time to have effects locally. For instance, bringing up local multiple taxation complaints to the national level towards creating a law (or the implementation of an existing law) on tax harmonisation to prevent multiple payments, may

be considered more of a priority by local people than using campaigning for the financing of local public services through locally increased tax (which would require that more tax is collected in the first instance).

An implication of diversifying local campaign strategies for ActionAid is that it might also consider the potential and feasibility of diversifying local networking and coalitions according to existent local realities. That approach may be contrary to working by strategic default with public service/education networks and coalitions only. Such a departure would include: work with farmers; market vendors; women and youth groups; and others if they happen to be active as groups already in a given context, like market vendors in Ondo who engaged on multiple taxation issues (see the 'tax reflection-action toolkit' as a resource to sound out a variety of group options in each setting).

(3) Managing the challenges of duplication and/or work overload. The potential challenges of 'duplication' and/or 'work overload' in the web of partners needs to be considered. The entry of new campaign partners alongside programme partners can be seen as a *diversification* but could also mean an undesired *duplication* in the organisational structure. Similarly, if the programme partner takes up the tasks of campaigning, this is likely to create added *pressure* on partners who are poorly resourced and already operating sponsorship, programme and advocacy work. Financial and staff resource differences between AAN and AAUK did not mirror the required volume of campaign work expected from each (see section 5.2.2). Likewise, there was an accumulation of tax claims in campaign actions in Akure, coming from both other levels of the campaign (tax avoidance and tax incentives) and locally (including multiple taxation, presumptive tax challenges). ActionAid may want to look further at this to explore whether it plays for, or against efficiency in campaigning. Overall, given AAN and JDPC's workload, a practical implication would be to transfer more campaign capacity and resources to the overworked TJC mediating area, especially AAN and JDPC.

(4) Sponsoring campaigning. The option to consider developing fundraising solutions based on political identities is important. A tension existed in contexts in which marketing and fundraising – linked to the apolitical identity – was active alongside campaigning linked to the political identity (see section 6.1.1). A practical suggestion deriving from these insights to alleviate organisational tensions would be to find fundraising solutions based on political identities, such

as sponsoring a specific campaign and/or campaigners (which could include children and communities). This has seldom taken place as can be seen in the analysis of financial resources (see section 5.2.2). In NGOs, there are limitations to the level of funds that can be spent on campaigning. Eventually, this rests upon a deep reflection on ActionAid's own legal charitable status versus the company's status as a campaigning organisation such as Greenpeace (see comments by an AAUK staff member in section 7.1.1).

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Interviews, local visits and events attended

All interviews (2013-14)	Interviews	Group discussions; 2-3 person interviews
ActionAid	7	
AAN	9	1
AAUK	4	
JDPC	3	1
UK campaigners	7	
NG Activistas	4	4
TJN-Nigeria partners	5	
International partners	3	
Government	2	
Academia	3	
	47	6

Most cited interviews (all in 2013-14, face-to-face if not mentioned differently)	Respondents
AAN campaign manager	Tunde Aremu
AAN campaign officer	Kenneth Okoineme
AAN governance programme manager	Obo Effanga
AAN ex-country director	Hussaini Abdu
AAN ex-staff member	Anonymous
AAUK ex-youth engagement manager (phone)	Anella Wickenden
AAUK activism officer	Natasha Adams
AAUK campaign engagement manager (skype)	Eva Watkinson
AAUK ex-staff member	Anonymous
ActionAid ex-staff member	Anonymous
ActionAid TJN manager	Martin Hojsik
ActionAid ex-women's rights coordinator (skype)	Rachel Moussie
AAN-ActionAid ex-human security advisor and Coordinating director of 'ThinkAct Research'	Jaye Gaskia
ActionAid ex-policy & campaign director (secondary data)	Anne Jellema
ActionAid Uganda country director (secondary data)	Arthur Larok
JDPC coordinator	Father Patrick Adebayo

Rest of interviews	Respondents
AAN governance coordinator	Esther Agbon
AAN programme quality head	Tasallah Chibok
AAN partnerships and local rights programme advisor	Albert Pam

AAN communications coordinator	Onyinyechi Okechukwu
ActionAid research and policy coordinator (ex)	Sumathi Pathmanaban
ActionAid HRBA M&E advisor	Louise Clark
ActionAid lead youth policy and programmes advisor	Sarah Huxley
ActionAid coordinator for public financing for agriculture	David Adama
JDPC programme officer	Ayeni Olubukola
JDPC intern	Collins
TJN-Nigeria partner Abuja 'CDD'	Victoria Udoh
TJN-Nigeria partner Benue State 'Bengonet' (skype)	Justin Gbagir
TJN-Nigeria partner Kogi State 'PIBCI'	Victor Attah
TJN-Nigeria partner Delta State 'Publish what you pay'	Nwadishi Faith
TJN-Nigeria partner Kaduna State 'Know your budget' (ex)	Bonet Emmanuel
ChristianAid head of strategy implementation and internal communications	Kate Newman
Oxfam Nigeria programme officer	Celestine Odo
Oxfam Spain deputy director, campaigns and citizenship (skype)	Fernando Contreras
WDM [GJN] activism officer (ex) (skype)	Sarah Reader
Researcher, Natural Resource Governance Institute	Dauda Garuba
Research assistant Friedrich Ebert Stiftung (ex)	Hernán Cortés
UK community campaigners (7)	Names given on request
Nigerian Activistas (4)	Names given on request
Board of Internal Revenue in Ondo, tax administrator	Olurankinse Richard
Board of Internal Revenue in Ondo, tax director	Ogunmoyero Ebekezer


Group discussions and **two-three person interviews** with Ene Obi (AAN ex-governance officer) and Olugbenro Olajuyigbe (AAN human security manager); the TJN-Ondo Network; and the Activista Nyanya cell, Activista Alayere cell, Activista Akure University cell and Activista Abuja University cell. Other **informal chats** with journalists at the TJC Launch in Abuja, Nigerian academic at the Conference in Kent, AAN anti-stigma advocacy work at AAN, and other ActionAid, AAN and AAUK staff.

States	City / Village visited	Method
Kaduna	Kaduna city	Chats with market traders Visit to main market
Kogi	Lokoja outskirts	Chats with farmers/market traders Visits to farmers/traders' villages Interview with Elbag (local group) coord. Gerard
FCT (Abuja)	Jiwa & Gobue	Chats with farmers/market traders Visits to farmers/traders' villages
Ondo (state selected)	Akure, Akure outskirts Awali, Ose, Ute, Wasimi Ose, Wasimi	Chats with market traders and visit to markets Chats with teachers and visit to schools Chats with farmers Visit to farmers' villages

Event	Date	Location	My engagement
National Launch of ActionAid's TJC in Nigeria	April 2013	Abuja	Observer, photographer
Annual Activista training week	May 2013	Akure	Observer, participant
AA Reflection-Action (popular	July 2013	Kampala	Facilitated campaigns

education) workshop			section with AA campaign staff and in presence of AAN programme staff
National Development Strategy (workshops on tax at state level)	Aug 2013 Sep 2013	Various states NG	Observer, report writer
UK stakeholders Tax Justice day AAUK Tax Justice campaigners' day	Nov 2013	London	Observer, participant with AAUK campaign staff
Barclays community campaigning period	Dec 2013 Apr 2014	London	Observer, participant
African Union Ministerial Conference	Mar 2014	Abuja	Observer (outside building) and participant in rally
Bilateral meetings AAN-AAUK	Mar 2014	Abuja	Observer, occasional comments
AA Economic Justice workshop (included a module on taxation)	May 2014 Sept 2014	Arusha	Facilitated a local tools session in presence of ActionAid campaigns and programme staff and AAN programme staff
AA policy working group on tax	On-going (2013-2014)	London office / On-line	Observation
On-line discussion on tax justice and reflect-action	Oct-Nov 2014	On-line	Participation

Appendix 2: The 'Kite Tool' – rooting international campaigns



Description

Local mobilisation is essential for a meaningful international campaign, but very often the local level is forgotten, delayed or difficult to relate to the main topic of the international campaign. The kite tool helps assess how much strength the local level has in international campaigns, as well as how strongly it is connected to other levels.

Objective

1. To explore how much strength the local level has in international campaigns
2. To assess the upward and downward flows between levels.

Steps

1) Ask participants who among them has played with or seen a kite. Ask them to **draw a kite** on the ground or on a paper.

2) Introduce the idea that an **international campaign is like a kite**. If we want the campaign to be successful, like a kite flying nicely, we need:

- A **kite runner** (local people) managing the kite at the bottom
- A large **kite**, able to reach the international level
- A strong **kite string** that links local, district, national and international work

3) Present the **international campaign** that you want to analyse with the sky-reaching **kite**, e.g. tax power campaign. You may want to write it down on a label. Say what the main campaign theme/demand is.

4) **Discuss the kite runner** – whose campaign is it?

- What is done locally? How are those most affected by the issue involved in the campaign?

- Are the (inter)national issues identified useful for your local context?

5) **Discuss the kite string** – how do you **link the levels** in the campaign?

- **Themes:** What actions do you make at each level? Who makes them? How have you adapted the campaign theme into sub-themes relevant at each level? How do you connect sub-themes?

- **Targets:** Are there different targets at each level? Or is there a centralised international target? How does this affect local participation? How do you connect international and national targets to local demands and actions?

- **Communication/Documentation:** How have you ensured that local facts, opinions, questions and materials (e.g. analysis by local groups, LRP leaders) reach international and national spaces? How have you ensured that international and national written materials and ideas reach local spaces? How have you presented difficult ideas in simple words?

[Optional] Discuss:

- What happens when an international campaign is not rooted? And when the local level does not link with national and international levels? What effects do they have for making change happen?

Tip for facilitator: An effect of not practising campaign work at each level is that international campaigns may function in an extractive way asking for local 'stories' or 'photos' or 'leaders' to fit the international work. One workshop participant called this the 'anecdote approach to campaigning'. It is vital that the local level is strong so that it can accompany and even change national and international thinking. At the same time, local campaigning can be more powerful if it is linked nationally and internationally. This way, we give equal importance to activities at all campaign levels – local, national and international and how they connect.