



A University of Sussex EdD thesis

Available online via Sussex Research Online:

<http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/>

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details

**Parents', teacher's, and head teacher's perceptions of the Primary Education
Stipend Programme (PESP) in improving access and quality of primary education
in Bangladesh**

By: Md. Altaf Hossain

**Submitted for the Degree of International Professional Doctorate in
Education**

School of Education, University of Sussex

September 2016

Contents

CONTENTS.....	I
DECLARATION.....	VI
ACKNOWLEDGEMENT	VII
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS.....	VIII
THESIS SUMMARY	XI
CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.1 INTRODUCTION.....	1
1.2 RESEARCH AIM AND QUESTIONS.....	6
1.3 BRIEF DESCRIPTION OF OVERALL METHODOLOGY	7
1.4 STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT.....	8
CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY.....	10
2.1 INTRODUCTION.....	10
2.2 BANGLADESH: THE CONTEXT	10
2.3 EDUCATION SYSTEM IN BANGLADESH.....	11
2.4 MAJOR POLICIES, ACTS AND LEGISLATIONS IN EDUCATION	11
<i>2.4.1 COMPULSORY PRIMARY EDUCATION ACT, 1990.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>2.4.2 EFA NATIONAL PLAN OF ACTION (NPA) I AND II.....</i>	<i>12</i>
<i>2.4.3 NATIONAL NON-FORMAL EDUCATION POLICY.....</i>	<i>13</i>
<i>2.4.4 NATIONAL EDUCATION POLICY 2010</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>2.4.5 NATIONAL SKILL DEVELOPMENT POLICY.....</i>	<i>14</i>
<i>2.4.6 THE SIXTH FIVE-YEAR PLAN.....</i>	<i>15</i>
2.5 SPECIAL INTERVENTIONS	16
<i>2.5.1 FOOD FOR EDUCATION (FFE).....</i>	<i>16</i>
<i>2.5.2 FEMALE SECONDARY STIPEND PROGRAMME (FSP)</i>	<i>17</i>
<i>2.5.3 SCHOOL FEEDING (SF) PROGRAMME.....</i>	<i>17</i>

2.5.4 NGO INITIATIVES FOR EQUITY	18
2.6 PRIMARY EDUCATION SITUATION IN BANGLADESH.....	19
2.7 SUMMARY	21
CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW	23
3.1 INTRODUCTION.....	23
3.2 STRUCTURE OF THE LITERATURE REVIEW	23
3.3 BROAD THEORY BASE.....	24
3.4 BOURDIEU: SOME KEY CONCEPTS AND THEIR RELEVANCE TO PESP	24
3.4.1 PESP AND HABITUS.....	24
3.4.2 FIELD, CAPITAL AND PESP	26
3.4.3 HYSTERESIS AND PESP.....	26
3.5 CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER (CCT) AND PESP	27
3.5.1 CONDITIONAL CASH TRANSFER AND POVERTY REDUCTION: AN INTERNATIONAL PERSPECTIVE	29
3.6 PESP AND DEMAND FOR EDUCATION.....	30
3.7 PESP AND TARGETING EFFICIENCY	30
3.8 PESP AND LEARNING MATERIALS.....	31
3.9 ENROLMENT, ATTENDANCE, AND PESP.....	32
3.10 PESP AND QUALITY EDUCATION.....	32
3.11 PESP AND CLASSROOM CULTURE	34
3.12 SCHOOL VIOLENCE AND THE PESP.....	34
3.14 POVERTY, LOW ACHIEVEMENT AND PESP.....	38
3.15 PESP AND EQUITY IN EDUCATION	38
3.16 SUMMARY OF LITERATURE REVIEW	39
CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY.....	42
4.1 INTRODUCTION.....	42
4.2 PHILOSOPHICAL STANCE.....	42
4.3 RESEARCH APPROACH.....	43


4.4 CASE STUDY.....	43
4.5 SAMPLING	45
4.6 SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW SCHEDULES	47
4.7 DATA COLLECTION	49
4.8 USE OF PERSONAL DIARY	50
4.9 DATA ANALYSIS	50
4.10 ETHICAL CONSIDERATIONS	51
4.11 VALIDITY AND RELIABILITY	53
4.12 REFLEXIVITY	54
4.13 POSITIONALITY.....	56
4.14 LIMITATION OF THE STUDY	57
4.15 CONCLUSION.....	58
CHAPTER 5: PESP OPERATION IN BANGLADESH.....	59
5.1 INTRODUCTION.....	59
5.2 CATCHMENT AREA POLICY.....	59
5.3 PARENTAL ATTENTIVENESS IN BENEFICIARY SELECTION	62
5.4 SELECTION OF PESP BENEFICIARY	63
5.5 CONTINUATION OF PESP BENEFITS	65
5.6 CASH MONEY ATTRACTS NON-POOR FAMILIES.....	66
5.7 INADEQUATE STIPEND MONEY	67
5.8 CONDITIONALITY DISTORTION	68
5.9 CHARGING OTHER FEES FROM PESP MONEY	70
5.10 SOARING PRIVATE COST OF EDUCATION.....	70
5.11 ENHANCED ENROLMENT AND ATTENDANCE	72
5.12 POLITICISATION OF SCHOOL MANAGEMENT COMMITTEE (SMC).....	73
5.13 THE PESP DISTRIBUTION PROCESS.....	74
5.14 PESP POLICY PREFERENCE.....	75
5.15 SUMMARY	75

6.1 INTRODUCTION.....	79
6.2 PESP ATTRACTS UNDERAGE CHILDREN	79
6.3 ‘UN-TRAINABLE’ LEARNER.....	81
6.4 DISCRIMINATORY CLASSROOM SEATING ARRANGEMENT.....	82
6.5 INVITING VERSUS UNFRIENDLY CLASSROOM ENVIRONMENT	83
6.6 CROWDED CLASSROOMS.....	84
6.7 INADEQUATE LEARNING MATERIALS	85
6.8 LOW EXPECTATION OF TEACHERS	86
6.9 PESP AND CORPORAL PUNISHMENT.....	86
6.10 UNDERMINE TEACHERS.....	88
6.11 INADEQUATE CLASS TIME	89
6.12 CONCLUSION.....	91
CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS	95
7.1 INTRODUCTION.....	95
7.2 A GLANCE AT RESEARCH QUESTIONS	95
7.3 BARRIERS TO INCREASING DEMAND FOR EDUCATION THROUGH THE PESP	96
<i>7.3.1 BENEFICIARY SELECTION</i>	<i>96</i>
<i>7.3.2 CONDITIONALITY PROBLEM.....</i>	<i>97</i>
<i>7.3.3 INADEQUATE PESP MONEY</i>	<i>98</i>
<i>7.3.4 DISBURSEMENT DILEMMA</i>	<i>98</i>
7.4 IMPACT OF THE PESP ON CLASSROOM CULTURE AND SCHOOL PROCESSES	99
<i>7.4.1 OVERCROWDING CLASSROOMS.....</i>	<i>99</i>
<i>7.4.2 ATTRACT UNDERAGE CHILDREN</i>	<i>99</i>
<i>7.4.3 INCREASE NOMINAL ATTENDANCE</i>	<i>99</i>
<i>7.4.4 REDUCE ACHIEVEMENT</i>	<i>100</i>
7.5 DETERIORATING PARENT-TEACHER RELATIONSHIP AND SCHOOL OPERATION AND MANAGEMENT.....	101

7.6 THE IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS	101
<i>7.6.1 IMPLICATION FOR POLICY</i>	<i>101</i>
<i>7.6.2 IMPLICATION FOR FUTURE RESEARCH</i>	<i>107</i>
<i>7.6.3 PERSONAL REFLECTION ABOUT MY RESEARCH JOURNEY.....</i>	<i>108</i>
7.7 CONTRIBUTION TO KNOWLEDGE	108
REFERENCES.....	112
ANNEX 1	136
ANNEX 2	140
ANNEX 3	142
ANNEX 4	145
ANNEX 5	150
ANNEX 6	154

Declaration

I HEREBY DECLARE THAT THIS THESIS HAS NOT BEEN AND WILL NOT BE SUBMITTED IN WHOLE OR IN PART TO ANOTHER UNIVERSITY FOR THE AWARD OF ANY OTHER DEGREE.

SIGNATURE: 

MD. ALTAF HOSSAIN

Acknowledgement

I would like to thank my principal supervisor, Professor Yusuf Sayed for his intellectual support and help that I have had throughout my research work. Thank you, Sir, for believing in me so that the research could be carried out and the thesis completed.

I am grateful to my second supervisor, Dr. Nigel Marshall for his guidance and support to plan my thesis paper presentation consistent and communicable. Thank you, Nigel, for your suggestions and directives to make it happen.

Thanks also go to Dr. Benjamin Zeitlyn who had always been a guide to me with his vast knowledge of Bangladeshi culture and with his constructive criticism of my thinking processes. Thank you, Benjamin, for your support and help to take this present research issue into a positive direction.

Special thanks go to Professor Keith M. Lewin who encouraged me to enrol in the Doctoral programme and allocated me initial funding from CREATE research project to start off the programme. Thank you, Sir, for your support and help which has encouraged me to pursue the degree.

I would like to extend my heartiest thanks to Dr. Erum Marium, Director of IED-BRAC University for continuous support and help throughout the process of completing the thesis. Thank you *Apa*; without your help, I could not make it happen.

Above all, I am thankful to six parents, the teacher, and the head teacher who participated in the study. Thank you all, for your cooperation and help without that, this study would have been impossible.

List of abbreviations and acronyms

ADB	Asian Development Bank
ASPR	Annual Sector Performance Report
BANBEIS	Bangladesh Bureau of Educational Information & Statistics
BBS	Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics
BIED-BRACU	BRAC Institute of Educational Development- BRAC University
BNFE	Bureau of Non-formal Education
BRAC	Bringing Resources Across the Community
BTEB	Bangladesh Technical Education Board
CCT	Conditional Cash Transfer
CHT	Chittagong Hill Tracts
CREATE	Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity
DPE	Directorate of Primary Education
DFID	Department for International Development
ECCE	Early Childhood Care and Education
EFA	Education for All
FFE	Food for Education
FSP	Female Secondary Stipend Program

EW	Education Watch
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GMR	Global Monitoring Report
GOB	Government of Bangladesh
GPS	Government Primary School
IED-BRACU	Institution of Educational Development-BRAC University
IFPRI	International Food Policy Research Institute
ISC	Industry Skills Counsel
IQ	Intelligence Quotient
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MP	Member of Parliament
NFPE	Non-formal Primary Education
NER	Net Enrolment Rate
NFE	Non-Formal Education
NGO	Non-Government Organisation
NPA	National Plan of Action
NREL	Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory
NTVQF	National Technical and Vocational Qualification Framework
OECD	Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development

RED	Research and Evaluation Division
PESP	Primary Education Stipend Programme
RNGPS	Registered Non-Government Primary School
ROSC	Reaching Out of School Children
SMC	School Management Committee
SSC	Secondary School Certificate
TARC	Training and Resource Centre
TIB	Transparency International Bangladesh
UEO	<i>Upazila</i> (Sub-district) Education Officer
UPE	Universal Primary Education
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific, and Cultural Organisation
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
WB	World Bank
WCEFA	World Conference on Education for All
WFP	World Food Programme

Thesis summary

The Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) receives accolades and support from the government and policy partners (such as ADB, World Bank, DFID) in spite of deficiencies in its implementation. The general impression is that the programme is increasing equitable access to quality education for poor children. However, there is no study to understand how and to what extent PESP receiving children are benefiting and how it influences and affects the school.

This study was undertaken to understand the policy gap between the introduction and implementation of the PESP by examining parents' and teachers' perceptions of the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP and its effects on teaching and learning, and school management. These perspectives provide a broader understanding of the effectiveness of the programme in realizing its goals.

This study uses a qualitative case study approach and selects one rural primary school for in-depth investigation. Three groups of parents of children were interviewed: those who completed primary cycle; those who dropped out of school, and; those whose PESP benefits had been rescinded due to poor attendance and performance. Two parents were included from each group in this study. The head teacher and one assistant teacher are also included in this study to explore the effects of the PESP on the school-community relationship and school management processes.

The study found different types of deception in selecting beneficiaries. The strategy of not including more than one child from a single family is evident that results in many poor children's exclusion from the benefit. Conditionality is used to exclude low-performing children from the benefit which restricts access to education for a considerable number of poor children and many non-poor children receive the benefit. Thus, the PESP benefits the non-poor people. The amount of stipend money is also found insufficient for ensuring necessary learning materials for the poor children. Lower amounts due to unmet conditionality and other charges at times trigger discord and dispute and hamper children's learning. The stipend money increases private investment in education in the form of private coaching fees.

The PESP does not incentivize poor children to learn. In addition, it does not increase the teacher's confidence of their educability or increase children's confidence in their capacity to learn. Rather, a sense of the incorrigibility of poor children has been established and teachers allege deteriorating learning condition in crowded classrooms caused by the PESP.

With regard to the parent-teacher relationship, this study finds a bitter antagonistic stance brew between the two groups and creates unintended effects. The teacher and the head teacher accuse parents of not providing adequate support at home and parents allege the school for not providing required care and attention for their children. This mutual disregard affects the teacher-student relationship and undermines poor children's confidence to be educated equally with non-poor children.

As a consequence of the conflicting perceptions of the aims and objectives of the programme and the perceived inadequacy of the PESP policy in society, this thesis will look for new insights into the process of implementation and the effectiveness of the PESP policy. This may encourage policy makers to reflect upon the efficacy of the programme as a strategy to increase access and quality education for poor children.

CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION

1.1 Introduction

The role of the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme in ensuring education for poor children is well accepted worldwide (Bassett, 2008; Rawlings and Rubio, 2003). The Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) is considered to be an important part of the broader social safety net programme aimed at very poor people in Bangladesh (WB, 2006). The programme itself is similar to other CCT programmes currently available in many other Latin American countries.

Originally named as, the Food for Education (FFE) programme (started in 1993) the Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) was redesigned and renamed in 2002 due to food distribution problems. The aim of the PESP is to increase enrolment, attendance, progression, and performance of primary school-aged children from poor families by providing cash payments to targeted households (Tietjen, 2003). The eligible schoolchildren are those who come from families who are, i) headed by a destitute woman, ii) headed by day-labourers, iii) headed by low-income professionals (such as fishing, pottery, blacksmithing, weaving, and cobbling), and iv) headed by individuals owning less than 0.50 acres of land (marginal farmer or share-cropper). Under this programme, a family with one student gets Tk. 100/month (around US\$ 1.3) and a family with more than one student receives Tk. 125/month.

Initially 40 percent of the poor children are selected by the school management committees and teachers and approval is given at sub-district (upazila) level by the upazila education officer. However, the government has increased the proportion of cash incentive recently depending upon the prevalence of poverty in different geographical locations in Bangladesh. The PESP incentive is provided to the poor families to send their primary-age children to school regularly to avoid the risk of dropout and to get better education. To achieve the goal of women empowerment, mothers are authorised to collect the cash from the school premises through the banking channel (GOB, 2013a). The bank officers come

to the school to distribute the money quarterly. They check the papers and documents prepared by the teachers and ensure the money goes to the mothers by taking individual's signature on three sets of documents on the spot prior to disbursement. Because of the conditions (85 percent monthly attendance and 40 percent marks in the examination), some families get a reduced amount of money as their children fail to fulfil the conditions properly. The programme is now completely financed by the Government of Bangladesh with six categories of schools being covered, namely: government primary schools, registered non-government primary schools¹, community schools, satellite schools, NGO-run primary schools approved by the government (excluding BRAC primary schools) and Ebtedayee madrassa recognized by the Government of Bangladesh (GOB, 2013a). The second phase of the programme started in 2008 and continued until 2013 at the cost of US\$ 36 million for 4.8 million students (Morshed, 2009:7) and currently, 7.8 million primary students from 62,087 rural primary schools benefit from the programme (GOB, 2013a). The Government of Bangladesh is spending around 20 percent of its total primary education budget on the PESP.

From the start, the PESP implementation process was not transparent and fair. Several studies have shown that the distribution of stipends is marginally pro-poor (Tietjen, 2003; WB, 2006; WB 2008); nevertheless, the PESP is welcomed and receives support from people from all walks of life since there is a perception that the stipend programme ensures 'access' to education for many poor children in the country. In terms of quality assurance, the concept of 'access' has rarely been considered from the perspective of assessing the impact of the PESP, but rather enrolment and attendance are taken as the key indicators of access. The quality of education is expressed as an attainable outcome in the official documents, but rarely measured as an evidence of the effect of the PESP policy in Bangladesh.

Several studies suggest that the attendance rate has increased and school leavers rate decreased for the programme schools (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002; Wood, et al., 2002), which

¹In 2015, the government of Bangladesh has nationalized these registered non-government schools (RNGPS).

suggests that the PESP may have a positive impact on children's initial enrolment, attendance, and may contribute to reducing school leaver rates. However, evaluations also suggest that the programme has a leakage of over 20 percent due to the large number of intermediaries involved in selecting student and distributing stipend money (WB, 2006). Further studies point to the fact that the diverting of stipend money towards non-poor households appears to be widespread (Baulch, 2010; Dzhumashev et al. 2010; Hossain, 2009a; Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010; Tietjen, 2003) and diversion of the PESP resources prevalent (WB, 2006; WB 2008). This diversion of PESP money not only undermines the rationale of the programme to support poor families but also increases inequity in education by pushing those who are rejected from the benefit, out of school.

My professional background, as an education researcher of a largest NGO in the country (BRAC, Bangladesh), has shaped my mindset in favour of working with the poor children within Bangladesh. This work ethos has created a permanent attitude towards working for the disadvantaged families and children to help to improve their quality of life. As an education researcher and professional at the BRAC Institute of Educational Development-BRAC University, I have always dreamt of creating an equitable society by promoting schooling facilities for out of school children in the country. For that reason, any type of policy that supports bringing equity in education is of interest to me.

However, in informal discussions during data collection for *Education Watch*² studies (EW, 2003/4; EW, 2006; EW, 2011/12), I found that poor families were unable to retain PESP money for their children in spite of their efforts because of children's failure to fulfil the conditions of the programme. On the other hand, in CREATE³ research in Bangladesh,

² *Education watch* was initiated in 1998 by a group of members of civil society to regularly monitor the progress of basic education in Bangladesh under CAMPE, a supra-body of NGOs, working in the field of education. So far, *Education Watch* has produced a dozen reports on primary and secondary education and skills development in Bangladesh. I am one of the authors of the *Education Watch* study reports 2003/4, 2006 and 2011/12.

³ CREATE was a Consortium for Research on Educational Access, Transitions and Equity (CREATE) which operated over the period of 2006-2011 funded by DFID. The research programme assembled core partners from the U.K., Bangladesh, Ghana, India, and South Africa along with associates in China, Kenya, Malawi, Pakistan, and Sri Lanka. The partners worked collaboratively and generated unique insights into access to

I found that around 50 percent of the stipend money went to the non-poor households. This same study suggests that a large number of the PESP receiving children cannot complete the primary cycle and a significant proportion of them repeat the same grade before leaving school (Hossain, 2010). The study suggests that most of these repeaters, early school leavers, and low-achieving children come from poor families. This implies that the stipend programme fails to retain some poor children in the school and therefore does not provide them with the quality education it claims to give them. Therefore, this study will seek to understand:

- why government policies fail to reach all the poor families,
- how the PESP influences the education of poor children,
- how schools justify the diversion of the PESP money,
- why parents accept the situation as it is,
- how the stipend-receiving family uses the stipend money, and
- how the PESP helps to create equal opportunities in the classroom teaching and learning process.

The PESP wants to redress inequity in the society by ensuring poor children's meaningful access and participation in education and yet meaningful access includes sustained participation and completion of the full cycle of primary education with a minimum level of achievement. However, I found most of the studies highlighted enhanced enrolment and reduced school leaver rates as measures of success and a few studies dealt with cycle completion and learning achievements as a means of evaluation of the programme (Ahmed, et al., 2005; Hossain, 2010). As a result, regardless of huge government spending, many eligible children are not getting the benefit of PESP money, as they are unable to

education situation of different countries. It uses a common framework of zones of exclusions, an expanded vision of access that includes meaningful learning, sustained access, and access provided equitably. The programme produced 75 Pathways to Access Research Monographs, lots of policy papers, books, book chapters, journal articles, and country analytical review reports.

fulfil the conditions. Thus, one third of the primary school children drop out of the system, around 10 percent repeat and 30 percent remain as low achievers and most of these children come from the poorest families (Hossain, 2010). This has led me to explore the stakeholders' perceptions of how the PESP helps to ensure education for poor children and to what extent the goals of the programme are being met and how. The aim of the research thus emanates primarily from my desire to uncover ways to encourage and help poor PESP receiving children to complete the full cycle of primary education by removing barriers to the PESP and school participation.

Thus, there are three rationales guiding the present study. Firstly, the PESP policy has been introduced by the government to ensure equitable access to quality education and it is therefore important to review and examine the strengths and weaknesses of the policy in achieving goals of the intervention. This research thus enables policy makers and implementers to reflect upon the policy level changes, based on any conclusions arising from the study. Secondly, there is a gap in the knowledge as to how the PESP helps the programme participants and how they view it as a necessity from their own perspective. There are a few quantitative studies showing a trend in increasing enrolment and decreasing school leaver rates and lower performance of the PESP participating children as a result of the PESP. However, a limited number of qualitative studies review and examine how the programme ensures poor children's access to quality education, one of the important goals of the PESP using an in-depth qualitative research approach. This current study uses a qualitative case study approach to evaluate the programme from the perspective of the parents, teacher, and the head teacher of the sample school in order to gain new insights into the effectiveness of the PESP in ensuring equitable access to quality education. Thirdly, my personal desire and professional experience is another motivation for conducting this research. For a long time, I have been involved in the implementation and later evaluation of the education programme for the poor and disadvantaged children in Bangladesh. I organized a Non-formal Primary Education Programme (NFPE) at the field level and became a teacher trainer at the Training and Resource Centre (TARC) of BRAC. Later, I joined in the Research and Evaluation Division (RED) of BRAC and lately I have worked in the BIED-BRAC University as a researcher. Therefore, I have obtained experience of implementing an education programme for the poor children that gives me a

rich contextual knowledge of the research participants, and through teacher training, I have the perspective of the teachers as facilitator. All these experiences provide me with deeper insights into the social world where educational institutions operate and give me enough sensitivity to select the research issue. The present study is therefore an attempt to review the effectiveness of the PESP policy in ensuring quality education for the poor children from the programme participant's perspectives.

1.2 Research aim and questions

Given the context discussed earlier, the present study has been designed to understand further, the parents', teacher's, and head teacher's perceptions of how, and to what extent the PESP ensures quality education for poor children and what are the facilitating and restraining factors for achieving the goals of the programme. The aim of this study, therefore, is to explore what parents, teachers, and head teachers see as the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in terms of increasing the demand for, and ensuring access to quality education for poor children. In doing so, this study intends to capture contextual knowledge of the programme participants regarding their experiences of how the stipend money assists – or not in bringing about changes in the lives of children. The study has two main research questions:

Research Question 1: What do the parents, the teacher and the head teacher see as the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in increasing demand for education?

Research Question 2: How does the PESP influence classroom teaching-learning and school processes?

Although, the PESP has a clear objective of improving achievement level of the programme participant children, there is no clear strategic plan for improving classroom teaching and learning except for setting a condition to get 40 percent marks by the PESP receiving children in the examination.

To address two research questions, I have further divided these into following sub-questions:

- a. How effective is the PESP selection process and in what ways does this impact on the equity of access?
- b. In what ways does the school management committee participate in, and impact on the PESP implementation processes?
- c. In what ways do the conditions imposed by the PESP influence children's school and PESP participation?
- d. How do parents use the PESP money and how effective is it in influencing children's school participation?
- e. How effective is PESP in ensuring poor children's participation in classroom teaching-learning process to ensure quality education for them?
- f. How does the PESP influence the school operation and management process and the teacher-parent relationship?

The structuring of these questions shows my concerns about how the PESP operation processes are being helpful- or not in increasing demand for education and enhancing school participation and learning for the poor children. The knowledge gained from the study will lead to a better understanding of the factors affecting the effectiveness of PESP and therefore policy makers will be able to make more strategic, research informed policy decisions. Thus, this study will help in ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children by addressing a number of key gaps in our current knowledge.

1.3 Brief description of overall methodology

This study adopts a qualitative case study approach using semi-structured, in-depth interviews for data collection. Interviews were carried out with parents (n=6), one assistant teacher, and the school head teacher. Interview sessions lasted between 60 and 90 minutes and were all carried out in Bangla (local language), audio-recorded, and transcribed by myself. A rural government primary school, implementing the PESP was selected, with six parents from three specific groups recruited for further purposive sampling. The first group of parents had received PESP benefits for some time, but this was subsequently rescinded due to their children's poor performance and attendance, although they were continuing their education at the primary level. The second group of parents consisted of those who had received the benefit before their children dropped out of the school without

completing primary education. All the children who were excluded from the stipend benefit due to drop-out or poor achievement/attendance were in third grade (8-9 years old). The third group of parents received stipend money throughout the primary cycle for their children and the children were still continuing education in the secondary school at the time of fieldwork (March to April 2013). In addition, the assistant teacher was selected due to their involvement in the stipend programme, as well as the head teacher of the school.

1.4 Structure of the report

This thesis consists of seven chapters. This chapter has presented an introduction to the study. It has provided an overview, detailed the research aims, objectives, research questions, and the research methodology. Chapter 2 presents the context of the study, which includes a brief introduction to Bangladesh, its education system, the context of primary education as well as the background of the PESP in Bangladesh. Chapter 3 will critically review the relevant literature about PESP implementation. The role of conditionality on children's access and performance is discussed along with the use of the money in ensuring learning materials. This chapter also considers the effects of the programme on equity and the quality of education in Bangladesh. The influence of the PESP on the school operation system in general and classroom culture, in particular, are also outlined in this chapter. Chapter 4 presents the methodology used for the research. This chapter outlines the philosophical stance, the research approach, the sampling, and data collection process. The ethical considerations, reliability, validity, and limitations of the study are also discussed. Chapters 5 and 6 present and analyse findings of the research. Chapter 5 presents and discusses findings regarding the beneficiary selection process, the adequacy/inadequacy of the stipend money, the impact of conditionality, the use of stipend money and efficacy of the programme on access to quality education for poor children. Chapter 6 analyses the classroom environment, class size, learning materials, classroom management, and school operation in understanding the influence of the PESP on teacher-parent relationship and learning of the children. Chapter 7 concludes the report by summarising the main findings of the research and offers suggestions to researchers, policy makers, and implementers based on these findings. My reflections of the methodology and

knowledge generation process are also presented in this chapter. The chapter ends by emphasising the contribution to new knowledge.

CHAPTER 2: CONTEXT OF THE STUDY

2.1 Introduction

This chapter presents the context of the study. The socio-demographic conditions, education system, major policies, acts, and legislation as well as equity interventions, adopted by the government of Bangladesh in the last decade are presented in this chapter to contextualize the PESP.

2.2 Bangladesh: the context

Bangladesh emerged in 1971 after nine months' of bloody war against Pakistan to break away the economic, educational, and cultural discriminatory practices inflicted upon the people of what at that time was East Pakistan. The country is situated in the delta region and bounded by India on the West, the North and North East and Myanmar on the Southeast. Bangladesh has a total land area of 147,570 sq. km and the population is estimated at 156 million (BBS, 2014). It is a mainly mono-linguistic country (GOB, 2003). Nearly, 90 percent of the population is Muslim and around 98 percent of them speak Bangla (GOB, 2008). Bangla is the only national official language as per the constitution. However, the country is made up of different groups with more than 30 different language communities, but with Bangla as the main language (Breton, 1997). As a consequence, some of the smaller language communities (e.g. Chakma, Garo, Hajong, Khashi, Kokborok, Kurux, Marma, Paharia, Santal, etc.) are unable to access education due to a lack of learning materials in their own language (Mathura, 2016). The poverty and low quality education along with a large illiterate population weakens national development and progress. The national development strategy, therefore, pays attention to education and literacy as a major intervention strategy to break the cycle of poverty (GOB, 2003).

2.3 Education system in Bangladesh

Bangladesh has one of the largest primary education systems in the world with 6.74 million pupils enrolled in over 80,000 primary level institutions and taught by more than 395,000 teachers (BANBEIS, 2011). The structure of the education system in the country is diverse and complex. Education in Bangladesh has four major stages: pre-primary, primary, secondary, and higher education. The education system of Bangladesh starts with one year of pre-primary education offered usually by government primary schools as well as other private, kindergarten, and religious schools. Pre-primary education is a 1-year course for children aged 5-6 years.

Primary education is a 5-year cycle. The entry age of primary school is 6 years and there are 13 types of formal and non-formal primary education institutions in Bangladesh (GOB, 2012). Of the above types, the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) manages six types of schools including one type of non-formal primary school and serves 83.6 percent of total enrolled children (GOB, 2012). In Bangladesh, primary education is compulsory and free for all children.

Secondary education is a 7-year programme with three sub-stages: 3 years of junior secondary, 2 years of secondary, and 2 years of higher secondary. The junior secondary, secondary and higher secondary stages are designed for age groups 11-13, 14-15 and 16-17 years respectively. Higher secondary education is followed by baccalaureate level education.

2.4 Major policies, acts and legislations in education

In line with the constitutional obligation and the commitments made in international forums to achieve the EFA goals and MDGs, the government of Bangladesh formulated a number of policies, strategies, and initiatives in last two decades. The following six legislative, policy, and actions have guided education in the country since 1990:

1. Compulsory Primary Education Act 1990
2. National Plan of Action (NPA) I and II for EFA goals
3. National NFE Policy formulated in 2006

4. National Education Policy 2010
5. National Skills Development Policy 2011
6. The Sixth Five Year Plan 2011-15

2.4.1 Compulsory primary education act, 1990

Prior to the World Conference on Education for All (EFA) held in Jomtien, Thailand in 1990, the government of Bangladesh adopted the compulsory primary education act, 1990 (GOB, 2014a). The aim of the act was to fulfil the constitutional obligation for providing a free and compulsory basic education to all of its citizens and the act serves as driving force for legal and administrative measures to implement compulsory primary education. This law obligates the guardian of any child residing in an area to enrol child in a primary school in the vicinity of their home for the purpose of receiving primary education. No person can keep children engaged in such occupations as may prevent them from attending a primary education institute. According to the law, there must be a primary education committee for every ward of the union or municipal areas in order to ensure that all children in that area be enrolled and regularly attend the school. If any committee fails to accomplish these duties under this act and/or if any guardian fails three times consecutively to comply with the order, they must be fine of Taka 200 (around US\$ 2.6) individually (GOB, 1990). The entire country was brought under the compulsory primary education programme in 1993 along with the Food for Education (FFE) programme that I shall discuss later.

2.4.2 EFA National Plan of Action (NPA) I and II

Prior to NPA II (GOB, 2003), the first EFA national plan of action (1992-2000) was prepared as a follow-up to the Jomtien WCEFA. The goal of NPA-I was to enhance both the quantitative and qualitative dimensions of the programme to attain the EFA 2000 targets successfully (GOB, 2003). NPA II was prepared with the aim of designing a programme for implementing the EFA goals specified by the Dakar Framework for Action adopted at the World Education Forum 2000. The overall goal of NPA II is to ensure that every young person and adult receives quality basic education and their learning needs are met in a competitive world (GOB, 2015). NPA II contains specific targets for EFA Goal 1, Early Childhood Care and

Education (ECCE, formal and non-formal); Goal 2, UPE/Basic Education; Goal 4, Literacy; and Goal 6, Quality Education (in part) (GOB, 2003). The guiding principle of the NPA-II was to formulate a basic education policy based on the constitutional provision of ensuring free and compulsory education to all children. The other principles of the NPA were to facilitate comprehensive early childhood care and education, making available textbooks and other education materials free of cost to all primary school age children. Ensuring a basic minimum level of competency for the children completing primary cycle, adequate budget for education, no corporal punishment in the school, and involving all stakeholders in the policy making and implementation process of education were the other guiding principles of NPA-II (GOB, 2003). All these principles have guided the education implementation strategy and results in a higher enrolment in primary education.

2.4. 3 National non-formal education policy

National non-formal education policy was approved officially in 2006 in Bangladesh. The NFE policy provides a policy framework to guide activities and priorities in non-formal education for large numbers of out-of-school children and youth. By defining the scope and vision of NFE broadly, the new policy supports an expansion of activities to be offered to a wider range of potential NFE groups (Ahmed 2011; GOB, 2006). The broader NFE programme areas include early childhood care and education for the children between ages of 4-8, non-formal basic education for disadvantaged children of ages 8-14, non-formal basic education for adolescents and adults in the 16-24 and 25+ age groups, who never enrolled or dropped-out of primary school, continuing education for lifelong learning and technical and vocational education and training through non-formal channel (GOB, 2006; RDRS, 2015). Based on the policy priorities, the government has undertaken a large national programme called Reaching Out of School Children (ROSC) in the rural and urban areas to enrol disadvantaged children who have never been to school and who have dropped-out of the primary school. From the start of the ROSC project in 2004, it has provided second chance primary education to over 790,000 out of school children in more than 23,000 learning centres through 2012 (GOB, 2014b). The ROSC project has also

contributed a lot to provide a second chance for many poor children who dropped out of school in spite of the PESP benefit for them.

2.4.4 National education policy 2010

The national education policy, approved by the national parliament in December 2010, provides a framework for fulfilling the role of the educational system in the nation's human resource development. A key recommendation of the policy is a pre-primary education for all children and the extension of compulsory education to grade eight by 2018. It also suggests a common core curriculum and minimum standards of provision for different types of primary and secondary level institutions to effect equity in education however; the plan is not implemented so far. It proposes that teachers' recruitment, training, professional development and remuneration should be key elements of the strategy to improve the quality of education. A consolidated education law is proposed as the legal framework for education management in line with the purposes of the policy (GOB 2011a). Thus, the national education policy puts tremendous pressure on the school system to ensure equitable access to quality education.

2.4.5 National skill development policy

The national skill development policy was approved by the government in 2011. This policy attempts to address issues related to technical and vocational education and training in the country and proposes to strengthen the Bangladesh Technical Education Board (BTEB) as a quality assurance mechanism (GOB, 2015). The policy aims to address critical issues such as the provision of responsive training, quality assurance, recognition of prior learning and improved access for under-privileged groups in skills development programmes. The engagement of industry through the establishment of Industry Skills Councils (ISC) is a key feature of the skills policy (GOB, 2011b). To keep abreast of the changing demands of the society, a new National Technical and Vocational Qualification Framework (NTVQF) was developed in order to recognise the attainment of knowledge and skills through formal, non-formal, and informal education and training programmes. A student of general education can also receive a NTVQF qualification upon achieving the skills component of vocational education at secondary school level and beyond. The

Secondary School Certificate (SSC vocational) curriculum is a combination of general education and National Technical and Vocational Qualification level and students who fail to pass the SSC exam can attain NTVQ level 2 and 3 who passes grade nine and grade 10 consecutively. This is a change in the assessment and certification system to allow Technical and Vocational Education and Training (TVET) certificate for those who complete skills components of the secondary curriculum but fail to attain SSC vocational certificate. This is a part of the equivalency process in general and technical and vocational education system to bring people under a NTVQ framework to allow them to further education or take vocation according to their NTVQ level. There are also two pre-vocational levels of NTVQF to assist easy access to formal certification for poor and disadvantaged children who do not have adequate formal schooling but gain skills and knowledge from informal apprenticeship and non-formal ways. NGOs and Bureau of Non-formal Education (BNFE) are encouraged to use standards and materials developed and provided by the NTVQF authority (GOB, 2011b). In this way, skills policy does interconnect different policy domains of education and training. This policy encourages many poor children to enrol and continue education at secondary level to achieve skills qualification for finding a job and it enhances primary level enrolment and completion rate as a result.

2.4.6 The sixth five-year plan

The sixth five-year national development plan (2011-15) is expected to be a mechanism for implementing the national plan and programme of the government. The five year plan anticipates the achievement of universal primary education, extending the primary stage to grade 8; elimination of illiteracy; creating a new generation skilled in and equipped with technical and scientific knowledge; better remuneration for teachers; and overall improvement of quality and equity in education. A balance between incentives to the private sector and instituting regulatory policies for safeguarding public interest is seen as a major guiding principle of the policy and institutional framework of the sixth and the seventh plans (GOB, 2011c).

2.5 Special interventions

The key features of the above major policy statements focus on the achievement of EFA 2015 goals by ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children in Bangladesh. It requires a different set of interventions on the part of government focussing on target groups who need special support in order to access quality education. The success of such intended initiatives depends, along with others, upon effective monitoring and evaluation of the implementation process.

The government of Bangladesh has launched various equity interventions since the 1980s. In the 80s and 90s, the rate of school enrolment was very low amongst the poorest families. At that time, around 50 percent of the total population lived below the poverty line and most of those families could not send their children to the school due to poverty related reasons. The government of Bangladesh, in collaboration with other development partners (WFP, World Bank, DFID, USAID, etc.) launched different interventions for enrolling more children from disadvantaged families in increasing equity in education. Some of these interventions are presented below:

2.5.1 Food for Education (FFE)

In the late 80s, the government of Bangladesh conducted research on the rural rationing system and found that 70 percent of the subsidized food grains were going to those who were not poor (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002). The government introduced the Food for Education (FFE) programme in July 1993 as an alternative and deemed it a cost-effective means of transferring income benefits to low-income households (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002). The assumption was that poor children's schooling was affected by their malnutrition, the direct and indirect cost of education, and a lack of parental awareness. The Food for Education (FFE) programme was thus introduced to achieve the twin goals of improving food security and school participation. The FFE programme aimed to feed hungry children, as the hunger itself was seen as a barrier to school participation and learning (Ahmed and Babu, 2007). In contrast, the Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programme (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002) targeted poor households with school-aged children. These households received food support in exchange for a commitment to send their

children to school. This conditional food transfer programme was a shift from general subsidies to a more sharply targeted programme that aimed to improve human capital formation (UNDP, 2009). Due to food distribution problems, the FFE programme was redesigned and renamed as the Primary Education Stipend Programme (PESP) in 2002.

2.5.2 Female Secondary Stipend Programme (FSP)

The Female Secondary Stipend Programme (FSP) was piloted in six areas of Bangladesh in 1982 to help increase the enrolment and retention of girls in secondary schools. The pilot was deemed successful and subsequently extended in 1994 as a national programme. The specific objectives of the FSP are to increase secondary enrolment and retention rate, delay marriage, control fertility, generate employment, increase empowerment, and improve the quality of education of girls in Bangladesh (Raynor and Wesson 2006). In the 1990s, the focus of the FSP shifted from fertility control to improving girls' engagement in income-generating activities or taking up formal employment, both of which were linked to poverty alleviation. This scheme provides a monthly stipend to the guardian of the student who maintains a minimum of 75 percent class attendance and remains unmarried until the SSC exams. The stipend starts at enrolment in the sixth grade and continues up to 12-grade, subject to the conditions stipulated in the programme. The rate of the stipend varies from Tk. 300/year (around US\$ 4) to Tk. 720/year (around US\$ 9.6) based on the class of study. It also covers tuition costs, a yearly book allowance, and public examination fees. Under this programme, cash is transferred to the guardians of the beneficiary. (Morshed, 2009:7). One study reported that FSP has increased girls' enrolment substantially (Khandker, et al. 2003). In 2005, the Bangladesh government offered free education for the girls up to grades 12 with additional incentives (such as book allowance, SSC examination fees) that in effect boosted girl's enrolment in secondary schools from 1.1 million in 1991 to 3.9 million in 2005 (UNICEF, 2010).

2.5.3 School Feeding (SF) programme

As a pilot project in 2002, the government of Bangladesh and the World Food Programme (WFP) launched the School Feeding (SF) programme in areas in Bangladesh with chronic food insecurity. The objectives of the SF programme were to contribute to increasing

enrolment, attendance and reduce school leaver rates in government and NGO schools particularly, among children from food insecure areas. The school feeding programme provided a mid-morning snack to all children in the intervention schools containing a packet of eight biscuits weighing 75 grams and providing 300 kilocalories and meeting 75 percent of the recommended daily allowance of vitamins and minerals (Ahmed, 2004). Based on the pilot project, the government launched the national School Feeding Programme in poverty prone areas in 2011. This donor (Australia, Japan, Spain, and USDA) supported programme gets capacity building assistance from the World Food Programme and now serves 1.3 million children in 6,763 pre-primary and primary school children (WFP, 2012). This programme has increased enrolment by 16 percent and decreased iron deficiency (anaemia) in students by 12 percent when compared to students in non-assisted schools (WFP, 2012).

2.5.4 NGO initiatives for equity

It is useful to evaluate some of the equity interventions implemented by the NGOs to address the low achievement of poor children. A large number of poor children secure physical access to school, but many of them are unable to benefit from learning. The children's low performance is always seen as an outcome of poverty and the cause of continued poverty (Colclough, et al., 2000). Non-enrolment and school leavers from the early grades of primary school are often seen as demand side problems, as most of the children who are not in school, belong to the poorest families. As such, the high direct and opportunity costs of education act as a barrier (UNICEF, 2014). The 'opportunity' costs include, the 'income forgone' for the families as a result of sending their children to the school instead of sending them out to work and the real charges resulting from the operation of education system which do not include actual expenditures (Hallak, 1969). The NGO initiatives are founded on a set of assumptions that effective demand is a function of the effective and responsive supply of education. They, therefore, develop programmes considering both the demand and supply side constraints facing poor children. The primary education programme of BRAC is such an initiative where poor children enrol in the system but relinquish their PESP money (Sommers, 2013).

The *Amader School* (Our School) is a research project of *Concern Worldwide* dedicated to improving the learning achievement of the poorest and underachieving children at 150 government primary schools. The local NGOs are involved in the process of capacity building of the School Management Committee of the relevant schools with Concern Worldwide. The *Shikhon Club* (Learning Club) programme of *Save the Children* is also designed to support 16,000 low performing students through its 800 *Shikhon Club*. The *Shikhon Club* operates out of the normal school hours and helps children to achieve grade wise learning competency in Bengali, Mathematics, and English (Save the Children, 2011).

All these NGO initiatives also have contributed towards keeping school participation and performance relatively high amongst less well-off children.

2.6 Primary education situation in Bangladesh

Despite numerous initiatives, the education system of Bangladesh continues to grapple with some acute problems. The overall pupil-to-teacher ratio is about 47:1. Due to a lack of adequate teachers and classrooms, a double shift system operates in 90 percent of primary schools, reducing the number of contact hours between pupils and teachers. The first shift for grade II and I operates between 9.00 -11.30 am in the morning and grade III through V operates during the 12.00 to 4.00 pm slot. Official data on pupil contact hours in primary education place Bangladesh approximately 30 percent below the international average of 5,367 hours and the situation is even worse in some areas and schools (Ahmed, et al., 2005). The high school leavers rate, averaging 21.4 percent (GOB, 2014b) results partly from the dire poverty experienced by many families and partly from the perception of many poor parents and children that schooling is of little value (Ahmed, et al. 2005). The average attendance rates of those students who continue, remains low at 70 percent (GOB, 2012). These social issues therefore appear to lead to the early exclusion of children from primary education, as they cannot deal with the lack of learning competencies required for their grades brought about by their irregular attendance. Many take approximately 6.3 years to complete the 5 years' primary education cycle in Bangladesh (GOB, 2013b). The

‘gross enrolment ratio’⁴ is found to be 108.6 percent and the ‘net enrolment rate’⁵ is 97.3 percent in 2013, which appears to be successful in relation to targets (GOB, 2013b).

However, population projections for 2012 estimated that at least, half a million less children enrolled in the primary school. This suggests a huge number of over aged children are present in the primary schools and many of these children are presumably repeating in the same grade. On the other hand, only one quarter of grade five learners achieved at their grade level in Bangla in 2013 (GOB, 2013b). This suggests a higher initial enrolment at the primary level and reveals high school leavers, repetition, and low achievement problems in the education system. Numerous articles show a disproportionate drop-out of the poor children from primary education before completing the primary cycle (Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010; Sabates, et al., 2013). This disproportionate exclusion of poor children has resulted in inequity in the school system and in the society. The government of Bangladesh introduced the PESP to ensure poor children’s school participation by providing families with cash support as a condition for enrolment and regular attendance. The intention of the programme is to bring about change in the values and culture in present schooling practices and among the community. It is argued in the above discussion that the PESP has the objective of reducing educational inequality between rich and poor children (GOB, 2013a). However, a number of the studies mentioned above, indicate that poor children have higher exclusion rates from primary education compared to non-poor children despite the equity resource (PESP) allocated to them. In the literature review chapter (chapter 3), I shall further evaluate the evidence in terms of how PESP has contributed to bringing about equity in education.

⁴ Gross enrolment ratio: total enrolment in a specific level of education, regardless of age, expressed as a percentage of the eligible official school-age population corresponding to the same level of education in a given school year.

⁵ Net enrolment rate: enrolment of the official age group for a given level of education expressed as a percentage of the corresponding population.

2.7 Summary

From the examples above, we can see how Bangladesh has launched several interventions and adopted policies with the purpose of increasing access to education. The compulsory primary education act of 1990 was the first initiative to obligate parents and community people to send their primary school-aged children to school. This compulsory primary education act provided the legal support for community participation in education and parents were obliged to accept the role of the state in their children's education. The FFE programme was designed to transfer income benefits to low income families to feed hungry children and remove this particular barrier (hunger) to full school participation. However, the FFE programme was changed over to the PESP, due to food distribution and targeting problem. The female secondary stipend programme was introduced to increase enrolment and retention rate at the secondary level. The FSP has increased girl's enrolment substantially and the school feeding programme for chronic food insecurity areas has contributed to increased enrolment and attendance and reduced the school leaver rates amongst poor children. The NGO interventions have also provided a second chance of education to the huge number of early school leavers and never enrolled children through non-formal primary education, such as BRAC, and have also addressed the low achievement problems of poor and disadvantaged children. On the other hand, various national level policies and strategies were prepared by the government as implementation and follow-up mechanisms to achieve EFA and MDGs and to guarantee access to quality education for all children.

It is true that the enrolment figure of the country has increased significantly over the last two decades. However, limited work has been carried out which can further increase our understanding as to which of these policies have resulted in enhanced enrolment. As all programmes have been implemented simultaneously, the precise impact of each individual programme is unknown. On the other hand, the present education situation suggests that many poor children are not getting a good quality of education in spite of these interventions. Rather, the higher school leavers and repetition rates are prevalent in general and it is higher amongst poor children. However, a relatively limited number of studies have been carried out to explore the influence of the PESP in increasing access to quality

education. The present study aims to understand the effects of the PESP from the programme participants' points of view. In the next chapter, I shall review the literature, relevant to the research topics and my thesis statement, to explore all these issues in detail. The literature review chapter will strengthen the main argument, help generating the thesis statement focusing on the evidence, and relating my research questions to published literature.

CHAPTER 3: LITERATURE REVIEW

3.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the effects of the PESP in relation to a broader literature about Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) programmes globally. The PESP in Bangladesh is similar to the CCT programme in the Latin American countries and other CCT programmes around the world. This literature review chapter examines topics relevant to the present study, including operational aspects of the PESP and the effects of the programme. The review provides a context of the effects of the PESP in increasing demand for education which usually reflects through children's school participation in terms of attendance, school leavers and grade repetition, etc. This review also reports on previous work concerning the role of the PESP in improving the quality of education for poor children through enhancement of the classroom teaching and learning processes. Thus, this literature review ultimately provides an in-depth understanding of the PESP implementation processes and identifies reasons for misrecognition of some of those gaps and investigates the effects of the PESP on children's learning achievements. The whole literature review process thus provides a rationale for the present study by illustrating the limited level of work in the proposed area.

3.2 Structure of the literature review

This literature review chapter starts with a broad theory base to look into Bourdieu's distinctive sociological approach to understanding changes in the social world followed by an exploration of the general categories of CCT programme(s) worldwide and its possible effects on poverty, demand for education, enrolment, attendance, and targeting efficiency. Later, the chapter concentrates on the impacts the PESP may have on learning materials, the quality of education, the classroom culture, private tutoring, and equity in education. This review will ultimately provide a context and a basis for developing my research questions, taking into consideration any identified knowledge gaps.

3.3 Broad theory base

I will begin with a discussion of the work of Bourdieu (1977, 1986, and 1989); mainly his work of habitus, social field, different forms of capital and hysteresis and explore the possible impacts related to the PESP. My intention is not to develop a theory rather I look at my work from a theoretical perspective to argue Bourdieu's concept of habitus, social field, capital, and hysteresis are useful for analyzing the effects and efficiency of the PESP intervention.

3.4 Bourdieu: Some Key Concepts and their Relevance to PESP

According to Bourdieu, any type of change in practice is dependent upon the relationship between the individual's disposition (habitus) and position (capital) in a social arena (field) (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1989). These habitus, field, and capital are three main "interlocking thinking tools" of Bourdieu (Maton, 2008).

3.4.1 PESP and habitus

Habitus is one of the key concepts of Bourdieu's approach to social science knowledge. Habitus is defined as a property of any individual, groups, or institutions that live in and interact with other such agencies. This property is conceptualized as a "structured and structuring structure" (Maton, 2008). Habitus is structured by agent's past and present circumstances, such as their educational experiences and family background for example. It is continuously shaped by one's present and future conditions and practices so it is not static. Habitus is not random but rather it is ordered, it is a structure. This structure comprises a system of dispositions which generates practices, beliefs, perceptions, feelings, and appreciations in accordance with its own structure (Maton, 2008). According to Bourdieu, habitus does not act alone. In practice it is formed from a relationship between one's habitus and present circumstances. It is also the relationship between the physical and social spaces one occupies. However, habitus is a system of durable and transposable

dispositions (Bourdieu, 1977). This habitus also emphasizes structure of practices, which is reinforced by a “generative principle⁶.”

Habitus is conceived as a generative schema in which the forms of elemental social structures come, through the process of socialisation, to be embodied in individuals, with the result that people necessarily act in such a way that the underlying structures are reproduced and given effect (Nash, 1999:177)

Through the concept of habitus, Bourdieu provides a generative mechanism of structured social practice. Habitus is not static rather it contributes to the shaping of the field as a meaningful world (Bourdieu and Wacquant, 1992).

The PESP benefit receiving families and their individual members possess certain dispositions (habitus) and a position in the social field (capital). The government introduces the PESP (a new subfield) to enable the poor families to have better dispositions (habitus) and position (PESP money) to send their children to school to ensure a better education for them and to break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. It is expected that the PESP receiving families show better practices regarding their child's education and the children get a better education on the whole.

However, due to the genetic mode of thought, many of the PESP receiving poor families remain disassociated with the school because numerous stimuli shape their beliefs, their outlook, and their practices which impact on children's upbringing and ultimately these impacts upon their educational decisions (Bourdieu, 1993). Some of these impacts are explored by Zeitlyn (2010) through what he terms the ‘transnational field’.

⁶ Generative principles are the principles of distinct and distinctive practices. Habitus make distinctions between what is good and what is bad, between what is right or what is wrong, but not the same for all. Like, the same behaviour or even the same good can appear distinctive to one person, pretentious to someone else and cheap or showy to another.

3.4.2 Field, capital and PESP

According to Bourdieu, social agents are set in a game field, a battlefield, and field of knowledge where they use a different strategy to improve their own position in the competitive field (Thomson, 2008). The social field is like a football field, where players have set position with internal divisions and external boundaries and with preset rules and conditions for the game. In the battlefield, there is no level playing ground because, at the outset, agents who start with specific forms of capital hold better position and are able to 'reproduce' more of that capital. Bourdieu (1986) designates four principal forms of capital available in each field: economic capital (money and assets), cultural capital (knowledge), social capital (valuable interpersonal relationships) and symbolic capital (prestige and honour) and the type and volume of capital can determine the position of a social agent in the field. Each field has the distinctive logic of practice and operates semi-autonomously (Thomson, 2008). Occupants of a particular field position know how to behave in a setting and this understanding partly emerges from the common parlance (truths or doxa) of the field (ibid.). Doxa is a set of fundamental beliefs or opinions, accepted assumptions of an era which is closely linked to the field and habitus; it is pre-reflexive and inherited physical and relational dispositions fashioned by experiences (Deer, 2008). Social fields are not fixed and a group of people can occupy multiple social fields- economic, education, arts bureaucratic fields at a time and Bourdieu calls it the field of power. According to Bourdieu, a large field can be divided into subfields and new fields can also be created. However, new fields may have a negative impact on the lives of the poor and immigrant refugee families (Bourdieu, 1984). The PESP implementation can be taken as a sub-field of education field and it may have an equally adverse impact on the PESP participants due to the battle of transformation and preservation of the field by the dominated and dominant people. Here, dominated and dominant people do not represent the social and political class and identify; rather it indicates the categories and perception of the relations and disposition of the people in a specific field with existing capitals (Bourdieu, 1985).

3.4.3 Hysteresis and PESP

In the social conditions, reproduction of structures in habitus usually does not go well due to the structural lag between opportunities and dispositions to take them. Any type of field

change creates new opportunities. According to Bourdieu, the gap between the new opportunity and field participant's attitude and practices result in a disproportionate distribution of field position in favour of players of privileged family-background (Bourdieu, 1977). People who are rich in economic, cultural, and social capital first proceed to a new position. The working classes move to the position slowly when the profit tends to diminish. This is the hysteresis effect or inertia in the habitus that provides an opportunity for those who are already successful and less successful continue to misrecognize the field position.

The PESP is introduced as a state intervention to help poor people to accumulate capital (habitus) to get a desirable position in the field. The value of the PESP money is a symbolic capital to encourage changing relations between field structure and habitus; however, it is revealed from different studies that only some programme participants get benefit from this new field introduced by the government due to the hysteresis effects. One of the reasons being, the structures change, but the disposition (habitus) can take a longer time to change. Here habitus is not only considered of the poor participant families, but also includes the teachers and head teacher in the field of participants as implementers. Changes in one field can encourage change in a separate field and the hysteresis effects can be seen in both fields. Due to the introduction of the PESP, private tutoring increased substantially and the families incurred the huge amount of private cost of education (Ahmed, et al. 2005). Similarly, those who are rich in symbolic and economic capital also competing for access to the PESP benefit to winning the dominant positions in the new education field structures. Hysteresis provides links between nature of change (field transformation) and individual response to the change (altered habitus, Hardy, 2008). In the next section, I review relevant literature to explore the PESP implementation process, and the results of the programme to establish a rationale for the present research.

3.5 Conditional Cash Transfer (CCT) and PESP

CCT programmes are acclaimed worldwide. It is considered as a good way of improving nutritional condition, children's education and reducing poverty amongst the poorest families (Baez and Camacho, 2011; Bassett, 2008). The PESP in Bangladesh is not an exception and it receives accolades and support from policy makers because of the belief

that the PESP is bringing about equity in education by increasing enrolment amongst poor children. Discussion of CCT is often linked to both short-term poverty reduction (improvement in nutrition, health, and school participation) and long-term human capital development (Bassett, 2008; Ribas, et al. 2008). There is a general expectation on the part of policymakers that CCT programmes would break the intergenerational cycle of poverty. Based on these expectations/assumptions, many countries have adopted CCT programmes and allocated a large proportion of funding for them under education spending. This usually results in huge funding opportunities for CCT programmes and they assure about 8 percent of all education spending for several CCT implementing countries e.g. Mexico, Columbia, and Honduras (Reimers, et al. 2006). The key debate is whether these interventions result in education improvement for poor children or simply increase enrolment and decrease school leavers. Reimers et al. (2006) in discussing Oportunidades (former progresá) Programme of Mexico states

Providing financial incentives to continue in school will create pressures for parents and teachers to retain students in school, but does not directly address the conditions that undergird school failure, school leavers, and poor educational quality. The direct costs of providing high-quality reading material, classroom libraries and professional development of teachers focused on literacy instruction strategies are in all likelihood smaller than the costs of CCT programmes (Reimers et al. 2006, p.7).

Bangladesh expends significant amounts of money for the PESP as an educational policy option which competes for resources with alternative options to improve educational opportunity (Reimers et al. 2006). Bangladesh devotes the lowest share of its GDP (2.2 percent) in comparison with the average share of GDP devoted to education by other developing countries (4.5 percent) and South Asian countries (3.8 percent, Al Samarrai, 2007b). From this allocation, in 2004/05, around 19 percent of government primary education spending in Bangladesh goes to the PESP (Al-Samarrai, 2008:10). It is, therefore, important to explore and understand how efficient this PESP in Bangladesh is in influencing poor children's school participation and learning.

The conditionality of CCT programmes is an issue. In Bangladesh, the PESP has two conditions. One of the conditions is related to the entitlement of the benefit and another is related to the continuity of the benefit. The entitlement is related to the economic condition

of the family, which remains more or less unchanged within a short period of time, though this condition is also supposed to improve over time. Improvement of family nutritional conditions, reduction of household poverty and inequity are the cases in point and there is no penalty for failure in achieving any of these goals. However, the second condition (continuity of PESP benefit) is related to the student's attendance and their performance in the school. Breaching of these conditions results in the PESP benefits being rescinded and it overrides all other conditions (poverty, vulnerability, etc.). The debate is how the conditions of inclusion in PESP of the household (having school-age children) can be terminated (or denied) as a result of that child's low performance in attendance and achievements where schools are, in part, responsible for maintaining those. That is why this study seeks to understand perceptions of the stakeholders on these issues and how these can affect children's education and school operation system as a whole.

3.5.1 Conditional cash transfer and poverty reduction: An international perspective

Sustained access to meaningful learning is critical for long-term improvement in productivity, the reduction of inter-generational cycles of poverty and the improvement in equity situations among different groups of children (Lewin, 2007a; Lewin, 2007b). CCTs are found in several countries, including Argentina, Brazil, Colombia, Ecuador, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, and Turkey with the aim of encouraging parents to send their children to school (Attanasio, et al. 2010; Behrman, et al. 2005). CCT programmes in many countries are targeted at breaking the inter-generational transmission of poverty (Barrientos and DeJong, n.d.). Many of the Sub-Saharan African countries are also implementing conditional, unconditional and a mix of conditional and unconditional cash transfers programmes to address chronic poverty and vulnerability problem (Malmi, 2012; Scarlato and Agostino, 2016; World Bank, 2015). Many of these countries have successfully reduced levels of income inequality (Bastagli, 2010; Reimers, et al, 2006; Santos, et al. 2009; Soares, et al, 2007; UNDP, 2009; Zepeda, 2006). However, there are few similar studies available in Bangladesh to understand how far the PESP has been successful in reducing poverty in the country and what the perceptions of the programme participants are in this regard.

3.6 PESP and demand for education

Many of the policy makers and planners see the exclusion of poor children as a demand side problem and shift the responsibility to the family. However, demand for education is influenced by the direct and indirect costs of education which may arise both from household affordability as well as from the systemic problem of providing extra private tuition money (Laugharn, 2001). Valuing school education is another vital point which is related to the worth school has in children's lives. Education Watch 2003/4 revealed that one out of three who completed five years of primary schooling in Bangladesh remained non-literate or semi-literate and a large majority of them, mostly poor and disadvantaged, grew up without basic skills and preparation for life (Ahmed, et al., 2005). Poor parents who do not see the benefit of educating their children remain skeptical of the role of education in changing their children's lives. As a result, some children are excluded from education because of their socioeconomic background (GMR, 2009) and PESP money, in many cases, fails to ensure their school participation.

3.7 PESP and targeting efficiency

Studies show that education spending is "weakly pro-poor" in Bangladesh. Around 43.4 % of the enrolled children from the poorest and the second poorest quintile do not receive the stipend whereas 24.4 percent children from richest and second richest quintile secure the benefit (WB, 2008, p.19). One study identified that the absence of accountability; discretionary power and lack of transparency, monopoly of power and the influence of powerful people were the main causes of corruption in the PESP processes (UNESCO, 2001). However, a study about politics and governance in the social sectors in Bangladesh suggests that misunderstanding and lack of accurate information about the programme is a key to misperception of corruption and its practice in Bangladesh (Hossain and Osman, 2007).

The targeting inefficiency of the PESP was also identified in the household income and expenditure survey 2005 in Bangladesh (GOB, 2005). Moreover, irrespective of eligibility, one study suggested that 22 percent of the student who got the PESP experienced some form of harassment, and of those student who faced harassment, 74.6 percent of them had

paid bribes for securing the PESP benefit (Dzhumashev et al. 2010). Such evidence indicates a weak PESP policy implementation process.

3.8 PESP and learning materials

Ensuring the availability of learning materials for poor children with the PESP money is one of the key expectations of the policy in Bangladesh since many children do not attend school because their families cannot afford books (notebooks, guidebooks) and other learning materials (Ahmed et al. 2005). This is especially the case in the rural areas, where many children attend school without writing materials, such as pen/pencil, notebook, and without reading materials including textbooks. Children without learning materials grapple with classroom activities and many of them are considered as low ability children by the teachers and parents due to their low performance in the class (Hossain, et al. 2003). One study revealed that the children without school bags and geometry boxes were significantly lower attendees, low achievers, and high grade repeaters compared to the children who had those resources (Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010). One of the common understandings of the society is that the PESP money is given to the poor families to ensure that they provide the required learning materials for their children. However, studies show that the poor children are suffering from inadequate learning materials in spite of the PESP provision for them (Ahmed, et al, 2005; Hossain, 2010). It is therefore important to understand the perceptions of teachers and parents as to how the PESP money ensures learning materials and class participation of poor children.

On the other hand, the government of Bangladesh has introduced English as a compulsory part of the first grade curriculum of primary education in order to increase the number of people able to communicate in English to levels that enable them to participate fully in economic and social activities and opportunities (English in Action, 2009). However, there is an issue of unburdening children from the second language from the first grade since most of the parents of poor children are illiterate and cannot help them at home. However, well-off people want their children to become competent in English in order to pursue higher education, get good grades, good jobs, and communicate well in English. As a result, English is now a compulsory subject from grade one. However, one study reported that 81 percent of the teachers do not know the aims and objectives of teaching English at

primary level and 79 percent teachers have no training to teach English at primary level (Hossain, et al. 2015). This inadequate English teaching in the school promotes private tutoring and poor families need to rely partially on the PESP money to pay the fees for this because they cannot provide the required support at home. It is therefore important to know how parents use the PESP money and what their perceptions are in this regard.

3.9 Enrolment, attendance, and PESP

From the start of the FFE and redesigned PESP, some studies have been undertaken in Bangladesh which examined the effect of these programmes through gross and net enrolment and school attendance rates (Ahmed, 2004; Ahmed and Babu, 2007; Ahmed and Arends-Kuenning, 2003; Arends-Kuenning, and Amin, 2004; Baulch, 2010; GOB, 2011; GOB, 2013a; Hossain, 2009). A study on the food for education programme shows that the attendance rate of the programme school was 10 percentage points higher than a non-programme school and the school leaver rate is 9 percentage points lower for the programme schools (Ahmed and Ninno, 2002). IFPRI documented an increase in enrolment rate of 38.1 percent and attendance from 63.0 percent to 77.6 percent (Wood, et al. 2002). It also showed a reduction in the school leaver rate from 18.5 percent to 10.9 percent. A study carried out in Mexico, highlighted an increase in secondary school enrolment from 70 to 78 percent between the year 1998 and 2000 due to the CCT programme (Skoufias and Quisumbing, 2005). The same study showed a comparative higher attendance rate in school offering Food for Education (FFE) programme in Bangladesh (70 percent as compared to school not offering FFE 58 percent). These studies indicate that the PESP has a significantly positive impact on children's initial enrolment and attendance and encourages poor families to send their children to the school. However, these studies cannot inform how the poor children are performing in the school.

3.10 PESP and quality education

The impact of cash transfer programmes globally appears to be negative in terms of educational attainment. The 'Progresas' programme of the Mexican government was aimed at developing the human capital of poor households. The programme covered 2.6 million rural families in 1999 in its multi-sectoral package of education, nutrition, and health

services by providing a cash transfer to households (Schultz, 2001). One study showed that after almost a school year and a half of exposure to 'Progresa', there was no significant positive impact on the test scores for achievement, in the treatment group of children (Behrman, et al. 2000). It seemed that the impact of 'Progresa' on developing human capital, one of the major objectives of CCT, was inconclusive (UNDP, 2009). While the results of *Bolsa Familia* programme of Brazil indicated beneficiary children's almost four percentage points more likelihood than non-beneficiaries fail at school; however the study did not explore the reasons for programme participant children's higher failure rates (Soares, et al, 2007).

The PESP is intended to improve the quality of education in Bangladesh (GOB, 2011c). However, an IFPRI study on the medium-term impact of the PESP revealed a marginally significant ($p=0.09$) impact on grade progression; paradoxically lower among PESP beneficiaries compared to non-PESP beneficiaries in Bangladesh (Baulch, 2010: 18). Similarly, a study on school feeding programmes in Bangladesh revealed no effect on school cycle completion and transition to secondary school, as well as decreasing school leaver rates in the higher grades of primary school (Downen, et al. 2011). However, there are few studies that assess the direct effect of the PESP on learning achievement of the programme participant children, except for few examples of other equity interventions in Bangladesh (Ahmed and Arends-Kuenning, 2003; Assadulla et al. 2006, Schurmann, 2009). These results above indicate that many of the equity interventions have increased enrolment and decreased school leaver rates, but have not increased learning achievement of the programme participant children. Bangladesh is not an exception in this regard. Increased enrolment is not a strong indicator of the effectiveness of the PESP for improving human capital (Filmer and Schady, 2010; USAID, 2008). The PESP has changed the attitude of the families towards sending their children to the school, but it is not explored how much improvement the PESP has wrought on classroom teaching and learning process to enhance student's learning in general and girl's education in particular (Kane, 2004).

3.11 PESP and classroom culture

What effect the PESP has on classroom teaching and learning processes and how first generation learners are being treated and adjusted in the school is an under-researched area in Bangladesh. CCT in Colombia increases the number of children in the school, but it also causes exclusion of poor children by completely swamping supply and overcrowding the classrooms (Baez and Camacho, 2011; Berg, 2008). It is usually alleged by the teachers that they cannot manage and ensure learning for all children of a large class due to time constraints and it is found that the poor and first generation learners who have no one else to help at home usually lag behind in spite of the PESP benefit for them. It supports the theory that lack of quality education fails to ensure EFA goals because poor children suffer most when “quality of education is weak” (Berg, 2008). However, relatively little is known about the common concerns of the teachers and parents, a gap which this study addresses.

Ngware et al. (2013) noted that poor children usually sat in the rear benches which meant they received less attention from the teacher and subsequently performed badly. A study by Cox et al. (2012) offered support for this by highlighting a marginal improvement in overall course performance of low-performing students who sit in the front bench. In Bangladesh, there is no study showing parent and teacher’s reaction and expectation of the classroom organisation and role of the PESP money on the situation.

3.12 School violence and the PESP

The issue of violence against children in schools should be examined from a broader socio-cultural context that construct social norms, hierarchy, discipline, and agreement among the people (Antonowicz, 2010; Harber, 2004). Violence against children arises out of a complex socio-political and economic environment of a community and is reproduced in the school system (Antonowicz, 2010). School violence has a causal relationship with corporal punishment. The use of physical punishment increases the probability of violence in schools (Straus, 1991). However, I shall focus my discussion more on the corporal punishment in primary and secondary education system in Bangladesh rather than school violence as a whole.

The corporal punishment is normally accepted as a disciplining device and schools have been practising it with impunity. A study shows a declining trend of corporal punishment in Bangladesh from 79 percent in 2013 to 53 percent in 2015 (CAMPE, 2015). However, the same study shows the acceptability of physical punishment is still high at 95 percent in 2015 among the parent groups (CAMPE, 2015). In slum areas in Dhaka city, corporal punishment is widely practised in public schools and victimised students feel ‘mentally bad’ along with physical pain as other children poke fun at them (UNICEF, 2001). Bangladesh Legal Aid (2012) shows that 77.1 percent of students are punished either physically or psychologically or financially in their schools, while 34.9 percent teachers agree it happen in their school. A study shows around 91 percent of children in school experience physical punishment and poorer children face greater frequency and severity of corporal punishment than rich children (UNICEF, 2015).

Corporal punishment is unlawful in schools in Bangladesh according to a Supreme Court ruling. Nevertheless, corporal punishment in schools is still a serious issue in Bangladesh. There are various reasons for physical punishment in primary and secondary schools. First of all, teachers believe corporal punishment is an effective way of classroom management. Secondly, the persistence of school authoritarianism inflicts corporal punishment (Harber and Mncube, 2012). Thirdly, sometimes teachers use this strategy to prevent to be questioned in the classroom or sometimes to mask their own knowledge gaps to students. Fourthly, teachers use corporal punishment as a motivational tool to increase students’ study time at home. Fifthly, when teachers become impatient of the unruly behaviour of students, they resort to punishment to establish order in the classroom. Sixthly, some teachers are alleged to punish the students who refuse to receive private tutoring from them (Ahmed, et al. 2005). Seventhly, the level of violence in the home and the community also affects school-based violence and aggressive behaviour prevalent outside school is replicated inside school (Antonowicz, 2010). Eighthly, prevalence of corporal punishment happens due to systemic causes and deficiencies in the school system. Finally, a lack of knowledge about non-violent forms of discipline affects classroom

management capacity of teachers and results in school violence (Antonowicz, 2010).

Violence in school is dependent not only on the socio-economic context in which schools operate but is also linked to socio-cultural traditions and the strength and weakness of education systems (Antonowicz, 2010). Worldwide, corporal punishment in schools is unlawful in 117 states (UNICEF, 2011). However, almost universally, corporal punishment is accepted socially and culturally as a means of disciplining children at home and in the school settings (Naz, et al. 2011). Corporal punishment in schools is usually administered in the ‘best interest’ of children to induce ‘good behaviour’ in the classroom (Arif and Rafi, 2007). Students who are physically punished acquire negative attitudes towards learning and many of them learn aggression and lack empathy in their later lives (Mncube and Harber, 2013). These students develop low self-esteem and are hesitant to take part in learning. Corporal punishment instils conviction into students that force is justified to control unwanted behaviour and so it should not be used to maintain discipline (Ahmad et al. 2013). Many students in Pakistan fear attending school and many of those who seek admission later leave the school due to physical punishment (Arif and Rafi, 2007).

On the other hand, the social transformative role of education is appreciated by all. However, the open competition, achievement, and merit-based education system virtually reproduces and perpetuates inequalities in society (Harber, 2004; Harber and Sakade, 2009). In Mexico, men applied violence against women to reassert traditional control over women who became the primary breadwinner due to the conditional cash transfer programme (Heise, 2011). Perhaps, the PESP in Bangladesh puts those children who usually fail to meet the conditionality of the programme at higher risk of school violence. However, there is no study to examine the issue.

3.13 Private tutoring and the PESP

Private tutoring is now an established system in Bangladesh. Around 88 percent of government secondary school students and 43 percent of the government primary school students are found to receive private tutoring (Ahmed, et al. 2007). The average expenditure on private tuition by a student is 9.2 times the total tuition and other fees in the case of government schools and 3.1 times in the case of non-government secondary schools (Ahmed, et al. 2007). It is a common understanding among the teachers that the PESP money is given to the poor families to spend on private tutoring since non-literate parents cannot support their children at home. Some families who cannot afford to tutor throughout the year hire private tutors during particular critical times such as before annual examinations (Amin and Chandrasekhar, 2009). The achievement of learners without private tutors is poor. A study in Bangladesh shows that private tutoring plays a significant role in achieving basic education criteria for nearly a half of the children compared to 27.5 percent children those who did not (Chowdhury et al. 1999). An Education Watch (2007) study showed a 29 percent pass rate among children who had a private tutor against 15.6 percent amongst those who had not (Nath et al. 2008). Highly educated individuals obtain a better job as a result of the university degree and better English language proficiency. Families, therefore, invest more on education in the form of private tutoring to supplement courses in formal education to prepare their children using education as the gateway to well-paid services. The PESP money is seen as an opportunity for the poor families spend on private tutoring. However, in many cases, private tutoring can result in some form of retribution, with children being brushed-aside or given poor grades, who are not involved in coaching with the school teachers (Tietjen, 2003). This increasing private expenditure reduces government investment in education and deteriorates the quality of education (Bray, 2007). All these findings support the importance of an increased understanding of how parents see the role of the PESP money in increasing their ability to spend and what teachers consider the contribution of the PESP money in the increasing quality education of poor children.

3.14 Poverty, low achievement and PESP

Due to the socioeconomic background and inadequate support of the schools, certain groups of children are excluded from the school (Cohen and Bloom, 2005; Fahmi, 2007; GMR, 2010; Haugen, 2011; Pigozzi, 2004). The impact of poverty on low educational achievement is well documented globally (GMR, 2005). Poverty significantly affects both educational investments and the learning of children in rural China (Park and Brown, 2002). In Bangladesh, many studies have found a positive correlation between poverty and exclusion from education (Ahmed et al. 2005; Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010). In most cases, parents of these low performing children are illiterate and the poverty cycle continues for them for generations.

It is also found that where most children are poor and attend a poor quality school, they are disadvantaged compared to poor children who attend rich schools (Willms, 2006). Children in absolute poverty face an uncongenial learning environment at home, including a poor physical and learning environment, excessive work, and an absence of books. These adverse home environments reduce motivation to learn for these children. Not only in developing countries, but also in children from marginalized families of developed countries have lower levels of motivation for learning in the school due to their psychological alienation from the mainstream society (Berg, 2008). How lower educational achievement of the poor children affects the PESP benefit is an important issue to investigate.

3.15 PESP and equity in education

A World Bank report revealed that the impact of PESP on inequality in access between poor and non-poor children had not declined significantly between 2000- 2005 in Bangladesh (Al-Samarrai, 2007a). Equity in education is an attitude and commitment towards providing adequate resources and support services for disadvantaged learner groups. Equity is more than equality, which is ingrained in humanity and arisen from the 'fair play and compassion' (Arnold, 2005; NREL, 1997). The value of educational equity is more philosophical rather than legal and it should be considered from three different dimensions; equity in resources, equity in processes, and equity of outcomes (Arnold,

2005). This broader concept of educational equity establishes social justice and enhances the progress of the country as a whole when benefits of learning are widely shared and the gaps are minimised between the most and the least advantaged (Levin, 2003). At the school level, there are many activities to undertake to ensure equity in education. In many cases, the inequity problems increase since school participation can depend on a citizen's wealth (Sayed, 2008). Therefore, equity-based targets should be followed instead of national average targets to assure the development of competent human resources and lessen social costs (GMR, 2005, GMR, 2010, Norton, et al. 2005). It means that raising performance levels depends critically on the capacity of an education system to address the needs of poorly performing students and schools (Schleicher, 2009). How the PESP programme has been supportive to the process of equitable human resource development, creating equal opportunity in the classroom teaching and learning process, is, therefore, an important question to explore. Equity in education can also be seen from two different dimensions, fairness and inclusion, which are closely intertwined (OECD, 2008). Fairness is perceived as an uninterrupted development of educational potentials regardless of children's background and inclusion indicates attainment of a basic minimum standard of education by everyone who participates in the education system (OECD, 2008). The PESP contributes to maintaining fairness; however, maintaining a standard achievement level depends upon the school and classroom culture. However, a relatively limited amount of work has explored exactly how the PESP influences equitable access to quality education in Bangladesh and this present study aims at investigating the phenomenon through the adequacy/inadequacy of learning materials, participation in the classroom teaching and learning process, and performance of the PESP receiving children from teachers and parent's perception and perspectives.

3.16 Summary of literature review

The literature review suggests that CCT and PESP aim for short-term poverty reduction and long-term education development of poor families. CCT implementing countries in general spend a substantial amount of its education budget on CCT programme. Bangladesh also spends around one-fifth of its education budget for implementing the PESP programme. The CCT in many countries targets to break the intergenerational cycle

of poverty and some of these countries successfully reduce the income inequity and poverty. It reveals from different studies that, some of the very poor children are still not attending school in Bangladesh. It indicates that the PESP programme fails to create demand for education for them because the PESP implementation process is malfunctioning. Targeting efficiency is low, the beneficiaries are mishandled and obligated to pay bribes for securing the benefit; all the evidence suggests a weak PESP policy implementation practices prevail. It is a key expectation that the PESP programme will help to ensure necessary learning materials for poor children. Hossain and Zeitlyn (2010) argued that the inadequacy of learning materials of the PESP receiving children when compared to children who are not receiving the PESP benefit. Their study also suggested that children without learning materials are comparatively low achievers in their grades. However, there is no such study to examine why the PESP money fails to ensure learning materials for those children.

Normally, the effectiveness of the PESP programme is measured through gross and net enrolment and school attendance rates of the children. Studies show the initial enrolment and attendance rate of the PESP children increases significantly and school leaver rates decrease. However, little is known about how many PESP receiving children are completing the primary cycle with PESP money. In terms of educational achievement, CCT programmes show weak performance globally, although it appears that no study in Bangladesh that have attempted to measure the achievement level of the PESP programme participant children. An IFPRI study reveals the lower grade progression of the PESP beneficiaries compared to non-beneficiaries children in Bangladesh, however, it appears that no study has considered the effects of PESP on improvement in quality education. Understanding the effects of the PESP on classroom teaching and learning process is an uncharted area in Bangladesh. It is likely that the programme is causing some crowding the classroom, but how the PESP implementation process affect the school management and operation process and how it impacts on teaching and learning environment is not explored yet. Private tutoring as a social phenomenon arises out of a desire to translate wealth into educational achievement and create inequity in the education system. In Bangladesh, it is now an established norm to be successful in school. The PESP receiving families and the teachers see the money as an opportunity for obtaining private tutoring

and this opportunity brings in competition in this field. Poverty and exclusion from education is well documented in Bangladesh. The poor children, who continue in education, still obtain the lowest academic achievement and a lower proportion of them complete the primary cycle. The PESP money is presumed to be a motivating factor for the families and children to overcome some practical obstacles and to provide them with a sense of supports against psychological alienation from the society and from the school. It is important to understand how these assumptions work in the real life situation.

The review suggests that in spite of huge government spending, children from low-income families tend not to attend schools and those who do, and receive the PESP benefits tend to perform badly. The PESP implementation process suffers from targeting inefficiency, bribery, and mishandling of the beneficiaries. It reveals that the PESP provokes private tutoring and private spending, although it fails to provide adequate learning material for the poor children. However, there is currently, limited work enabling us to understand how this noble government effort turns into futility and why the beneficiaries accept it. The current study will contribute to this knowledge gap by providing innovative perspectives and perceptions of the PESP receiving families, the teacher, and the head teacher.

The study will contribute to knowledge in three main ways. First it will explore the perceptions of the beneficiaries about the strengths and weakness of the PESP operation and its impact on their own lives. Secondly, I shall explore how the PESP influences the classroom teaching and learning process through parents' perception and from the teacher's perspective. Usually, people see it unimportant to take parental views on classroom practices, but the reality is people keep an eye on these social institutions those who expect quality services irrespective of their background. This will bring a new aspect of investigating the effects of the PESP from the parent's perspective. Thirdly, it will be original because, I shall look into the research findings from a theoretical perspective. This theoretical assumption maintains that the function of the education system is to conserve existing social relations, inculcate a particular habitus and consecrate the current capricious scheme of meaning (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990:198). I used a qualitative case study approach as the research strategy and selected a rural primary school implementing the PESP as a unit of analysis.

CHAPTER 4: METHODOLOGY

4.1 Introduction

This chapter discusses the methodology used in conducting the research. The chapter focuses on my research position and the methodological orientation in conducting the research. It also discusses sampling and data collection processes and the techniques used. Discussion about data analysis, ethical issues, validity and reliability and limitations of the study are also included in this chapter.

4.2 Philosophical stance

The aim of my inquiry is to analyze socioeconomic and cultural structures that constrain the PESP implementation process. The nature of reality, in my perception, lies in historical realism where reality is shaped by social, political, cultural, economic, ethnic, and gender values crystallized over time (Guba and Lincoln, 1994). However, during the course of my research journey, I gained a constructivist philosophical position in examining and interpreting the experiences of the research participants. Thus, I realize ‘social realities’ are constructed under a set of structured value systems and with a set of concepts, those are usually explained in theories and without a theory nothing is to be researched (Silverman, 2005). My cognizance of social reality is a result of individual’s cognition, and ‘social phenomena’ are subjective and socially constructed (Cohen, et al. 2000). This epistemological assumption (the subjective reality of social phenomenon) has emanated from my ontological belief that objects are merely words and no independently accessible thing constitutes the meaning of a word (Cohen and Manion, 1994). In uncovering ‘social reality’, it is important to rely on knowledge that springs from experience, insights, and unique personal nature. Therefore, my primary responsibility is to describe phenomena as experienced and expressed by the respondents and focus on their interpretation. The purpose of this research is not merely to understand the present PESP implementation processes, but to change to ensure equitable access to education.

It is, therefore, necessary to understand the relationships between school and the PESP receiving parents in particular and the society at large to comprehend how schools perpetuate inequity. Policy plays a major role and serves as guiding principles for constructing and distributing ‘social realities’ which are accepted as ‘truth’ by many whose interests may not necessarily be served by accepting it (Apple, 2000). Exploration of those conflicting realities is possible only through ‘empathizing and identifying’ people to know how they see the reality imposed upon them and how they experience it. This essentially leads to understanding the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP programme in which they participate and how meaning and values of the programme are ‘read’ by them (Yanow, 1996).

4.3 Research approach

The theoretical assumption embedded in this study is that education reproduces socioeconomic power relationships by disfavours disadvantaged people and the PESP programme plays a countervailing role by supporting disadvantaged people with resources (GOB, 2011d). The focus of the study is to understand points of view of the PESP participants and teachers regarding the implementation of the programme and its effect on enhancing access to quality education. The qualitative research approach is adopted as it provides an in-depth understanding of the phenomenon under discussion. This research is the kind of social inquiry that focuses on the way people interpret and make sense of their experience and the world around them.


4.4 Case study

I use a case study approach as a research strategy in order to gain a ‘holistic impression’ of the PESP participants, teacher and head teacher of a PESP implementing school of the merits and demerits of the intervention (Punch, 2005). The case study gives information concerning people in their normal, natural, and real situations with the aim of yielding deep comprehension (Cohen et al. 2007). The present qualitative case study has maintained a constructivist philosophical position in interpreting the experiences of the programme participants (Yin, 2003) of the programme’s efficacy in children’s learning and school management in a particular context. I examined the differences in the social reality of

beneficiaries to achieve a holistic understanding of their experience (Merriam, 1998 cited in Brown, 2008).

In exploring the process and effects of the PESP policy, a rural primary school implementing the PESP is taken as a unit of analysis. The case study is thus a single school case study and it explores how the PESP is implemented and about how it produces desired outcomes (Yin, 2003). I wanted to explore the reality of the PESP, which is implemented in a certain social context and interpreted as a subjective reality of the programme participants. In doing so, I explored the phenomenon in a particular context using a variety of data sources (Baxter and Jack, 2008). In this sense, it is an embedded single case study design with more than one unit of analysis (Yin, 2009). The teacher, head teacher, parents of school leavers, low achievers, and children who completed primary school are taken as subunits of the school unit and so it is an embedded single case study design (Yin, 2009). The main unit is the school as a whole and smallest unit is the individual members (Figure 1).

Figure1: Subunits of the case study school unit



Unit of analysis is a central concept in understanding, preparing and implementing a case study (Yin, 2003). According to Patton (2002), deciding on an appropriate unit of analysis

is to decide what one wants to say at the end of the study. The perception of reality of the informants is embedded in their contexts of reality and it is influenced by researchers' knowledge of the transformability process and selecting case and unit of analysis (Grunbaum, 2007). This case study gave an intensive description and analysis of the strengths and weakness of the PESP and its effect on school and classroom management. This case study generates rich data and brings to light the context of the participants and processes of the intervention on the efficiency and impact of the intervention. A qualitative case study is an ideal design for understanding and interpreting educational phenomena as it reflects an in-depth understanding of the situation and meaning for those who are involved in the process. The present research was appropriate for case study approach because it sought better understanding of why different groups of children perform differently in response to the PESP; some completed the full cycle of primary education and some did not.

4.5 Sampling

According to the Merriam-Webster dictionary, a sample is a subset of a population whose properties are studied to obtain data about the whole population. With quantitative data, the essential requirement is that the sample is as representative as it is possible to be of the population from which it is drawn. However, in qualitative research, when a particular group is targeted in order to gain 'full knowledge' it is not necessary to represent the wider population and a non-probability sampling strategy can be adopted (Cohen, et al. 2000).

Purposive sampling is a non-probability sampling method in which researchers select a sample(s) based on their judgment about typicality of some appropriate characteristics required for the case (Cohen, et al. 2007). In the present research, a purposive sampling strategy was used by including a particular type of school which was implementing the PESP. The study school was a government primary school, located in the northern part of the country. The school was situated in a village, 6 kilometres away from a small town. It was a densely populated area fraught with poor people, mostly migrated in losing their home due to river erosion. Besides, most of the population who employed previously in the cartwheel making industries for the ages became jobless after the 90s due to the replacement of this traditional rural transportation. As a result, many children of these

‘skilled cartwheel makers’ turn into poor wage labourers in various informal economic sectors with meagre income opportunity. The study school is enrolling most children from these poor families. This is a one-shift primary school with around 700 students and 8 female and 2 male teachers guided by a female head teacher. This is more or less a typical primary school spread all over the riverine settlements and the school authority suggested selecting such a primary school situated on the bank of a river. I selected the present school from two given names supplied by the local school authority due to its better communication facility.

To gain a fuller understanding of the implementation process and its effect on the school, students, and community as a whole, the present qualitative study was designed. A rural primary school was selected because urban schools were excluded from the PESP. Data were collected from three groups of parents.

Group 1 consisted of parents (n=2) who were selected for the PESP but whose children could not meet the conditions (attendance and achievement) and their benefit was rescinded. Schoolteachers identified a group of such students studying in grades 3-4. According to the list, I went to those deprived parent’s house to consult with them to obtain their permission to be included in the research. I selected randomly two such parents from the list and fixed a date for the interview with them. These parents provided an in-depth understanding of the context and processes how the PESP operated in enhancing the learning of their children and improving school operation. The role of the PESP, as well as the role of the school in overcoming children’s probable exclusion from education, was also explored.

Group 2 consisted of parents (n=2) of children who were included in the PESP benefits with 3-5 years of schooling, but whose children dropped out without completing a full 5 year’s primary education cycle. Two such parents of school leaver children with PESP were selected maintaining the same procedure stated above. The schoolteachers considered children who have not attended school for more than 6 months as dropouts.

Group 3 consisted of parents (n=2) whose children had benefitted from the PESP, and completed a full cycle of primary schooling and had remained in school, were also selected. All interviews followed the same procedure.

The school-completed children came from the ‘less poor’ or ‘moderately poor’ households in comparison with school leavers and the PESP rescinded children’s family. This was expressed by the respondents during discussion sessions while they were explaining their social status, income, and occupations. It was also depicted through their housing and living conditions in terms of household assets, reading room facilities for their children, etc., that I observed during interview sessions in their house. The head teacher and an assistant teacher, who had been involved more with the PESP due to her local background, were selected for this study as respondents. The teacher and head teacher presented both supply and demand side aspects of the PESP and the reasons for any deviation of the PESP implementation process and efficacy of the service.

4.6 Semi-structured interview schedules

Bryman (2008) describes two main types of interview namely structured and unstructured. Unstructured interviews resemble everyday conversations and the researcher has little control over the interview process, although it allows a wide range of issues to be covered. Unstructured interviews often depend on the spontaneous social interaction between the researcher and the participant. According to Patton (2002), unstructured interviews are a ‘natural extension’ of the participant observation process. In the current study, completely unstructured interviews were not suitable because, my interviews were not an ‘extension’ of participant observation, rather I had specific research questions and a theoretical framework to look into the PESP participant’s realities which, unstructured interviews could not explore (Punch, 1998). It is also a fact that unstructured interviews can lead to very different types of responses with no real conclusion (Yin, 2009).

Semi-structured interviews were used for collecting data to obtain detailed insights into how respondents view the world (Bryman, 2008), the world in relation to the PESP and its effects on their children’s education. I believe that knowledge is situated and contextual, and therefore, the purpose of the interview is to ensure that the relevant contexts are

brought into focus so that situated knowledge can be produced. The semi-structured interview schedules for the teacher, head teacher, and parents included a list of topics related to the PESP implementation process, effects of the programme on school and students' learning and on the parent-teacher relationship. I developed and used five different interview schedules (annex 1-5) namely:

- for parents of primary school completed children who received the PESP benefit for five years,
- for parents of school leaver children who received the benefit before their children's school leaving,
- for parents of ongoing students those who were not receiving the PESP benefits anymore,
- for a teacher of the selected study school, and
- for the head teacher of the selected study school.

The interview schedules were developed considering the context of the parents and teachers. The language and concepts used were explained in a way that was easily understandable for them. I did a field test of schedules prepared for the parents before finalization to understand how much the concepts were understandable and how effectively these could be communicated to them. The concepts of 'quality' and 'equity', for example, were supposed to be difficult for the parents to understand; however, during field testing, I found that people understood the issues and put forward their own perceptions on those based on their own perspective. The logic for developing three different schedules for parents was to understand how and in what conditions, parents and their children associate or disassociate with the PESP programme and schooling as well, in spite of more or less similar background of the parents.

The parents who have experienced children's successful completion of primary education may be economically quite similar to the parents of early school leavers or low achieving children. However, their expectation and motivation towards their children's education can be different and influenced by other social, emotional, and educational aspects of their lives compared to parents of school leaver and low achieving children. The parents who

are still struggling to keep their children in the school, in spite of the adversities related to their children's education and cancelation of the PESP benefit require different approaches and issues to discuss.

Therefore, heterogeneity among parents compelled me to take three sample parent groups and my research topic also encouraged me to increase the number of interviewee groups. I wanted to understand the richness and complexity and different context of the PESP implementation process and this essentially pushed me to follow an idiographic approach in order to build a broader argument from an understanding of particularity. This led me to rely on enough variations of circumstances in interviewees and guided me in preparing three interview schedules for three different groups. At the same time, I used the interview schedule to collect basic information on the individual family as well as their child's education and school related information.

4.7 Data collection

Social research is about the collection of data with a view to enhancing knowledge of particular social phenomena (Pole and Lampard, 2002). A naturalistic approach to data collection is believed to keep natural events, participation, relationship, and interactions uninterrupted during field investigation (Patton, 1990). As a researcher, I collected data from the participants of the study of my own and before collecting data, I contacted the parents, teachers, and head teachers personally to obtain their permission for their participation in this study. During the interviews, the schedules were not followed rigidly but guided by the issues. Due care and attention were taken in ensuring that all interview topics were covered. In some cases, questions were either re-formulated or extended to include issues which emerged during the session. Before interview sessions, I visited the place on the previous day to make sure that the place where we would sit for interviews was safe and suitable for dialogue. I reached the interview place early to make all the arrangements. I read out the informed consent documents for the parents who could not read. I took some time to seek their consent after reading the consent documents, so that, the participants could have enough time to decide about their participation in the discussion sessions and upon their consent, I started the discussion. To reproduce data accurately, I also sought permission from the participant to record it using a tape recorder.

An interview is a socially constructed event, which results in a collection of information about particular social phenomena involving particular people at a particular time and in a particular place (Pole and Lampard, 2002). The knowledge, therefore, that the interview yielded was inevitably constrained and shaped by the circumstances in which the interviews were conducted. I took account of the extent to which the interviews might have been influenced (Pole and Lampard, 2002) and maintained my personal diary for recording this information to explore the issue later from a different group of informants. I used the schedule in such a way that respondents had sufficient time to explore their own ideas in response to my invitation to talk. I also asked follow up questions in order to clarify certain issues which I could not initially understand.

4.8 Use of personal diary

An important part of data collection is effective documentation and retention of collected data. There are numerous factors that can misrepresent the data and blur the meaning due to language and communication problems of both the interviewer and interviewees. However, people do not communicate all information through oral language. Additional information comes through body language and other signs that are particular to the context, such as head nodding, hand waving and being reticent in a certain moment. To capture all those non-verbal expressions of the respondent, I maintained a personal diary throughout the data collection period. I recorded such significant events during interview sessions and recorded observations of particular situations and my feelings of a particular event (Koshy, 2005). This reflective process of writing a personal diary, contributed much to review my own queries and ambiguity of any information during the data collection period and beyond (Bell, 2005).

4.9 Data analysis

“The qualitative data analysis involves organising, accounting for and explaining the data; in short, making sense of data in terms of the participants’ definition of the situation, noting patterns, themes, categories and regularities” (Cohen, et al. 2007: p. 461). The approach to data analysis in this study was interpretive, a reflexive interaction between my conception and the social phenomenon (Cohen, et al. 2007). This study explores

conceptions of the PESP beneficiaries and teacher and head teacher of the study school to understand the effectiveness of the intervention from their own perspectives. In explaining the perceptions of the programme participants, I followed a systematic analysis of the data that carried through transcription and summarisation, excerption of relevant concepts, and integration of descriptions from different interviewees (Rubin and Rubin, 2012). I emphasised personal perceptions of individuals rather than shared social construction in understanding the efficacy of the PESP processes (Moustakas, 1990). To keep the essence of the original data, sometimes I used direct phrases and sentences of the programme participants in analysing data (Cohen, et al. 2007).

I organised the analysis by research questions to draw together all the relevant data. The data analysis took shape as a composite summary of all the interviews and enabled the capture of the essence of the facts (Cohen, et al. 2007). The analysis provided a rich context and basis for further critical policy studies and its effective implementation.

My data analysis followed a reflexive process in order to gain an insight and to develop meaning through an inductive approach. ‘Inductive analysis means that the patterns, themes, and categories of analysis arise from the data; they emerge out of the data rather than being imposed on them prior to data collection and analysis’ (Patton, 1980, p. 306). However, patterns, themes, and categories do not emerge on their own; and therefore the resulting interpretation was obviously influenced by what I wanted to know. The interpretations and analyses were also influenced by the theoretical framework, the ontological and epistemological positions, and by my professional knowledge and integrity, which led to a subjective interpretation of the PESP processes. The process was highly reflective and continually sharpened by my iterative process of identifying gaps in my understandings of the issues I analysed and in this process; I always went back to the data to get the significance of it (Srivastava, 2009). My personal diary also helped me to keep my ‘interpretive crisis’ limited.

4.10 Ethical considerations

Research participants are the rich source of information about their own situation since they are living with the circumstances and spending their time and money and other

resources for their children's education. Some of the parents belonged to vulnerable dependent groups, especially those who lost their PESP benefits due to their children's exclusion from the school and not fulfilling the conditions of the PESP.

Considering the sensitivity of the situation, appropriate care was taken throughout the research process. I completed the ethical application form and took permission from the ethical review committee of the University of Sussex where all the consent forms for all research participant groups were examined, reviewed and accepted (Annex 7). To safeguard the vulnerability and dependency of the research participants I took necessary steps to minimize the risks related to the study. First the consent form was read to all participant parents with due emphasis placed on their voluntary participation and their right to refuse to respond to any question and their right to withdraw. Second, my sympathetic views of the access and equity issues were reflected in my mannerisms thus encouraging participants to be more open in sharing their feelings regarding decisions about participation in the study as well as in the PESP.

All social research involves ethical issues (Punch, 2006). I followed the general protocols and procedures for interviewing by obtaining consent from the participants. I also provided them with full information about the research, including reasons for selecting a particular group of participants. I also assured them that their privacy, confidentiality, and anonymity would be guaranteed. I explained orally the information sheet to the parents of excluded children to get oral consent. The ethics process followed was oral, not written. Protecting the welfare of the parents and safeguarding other important concerns such as respect for autonomy, rights, and personal dignity, I carefully formulated questions where parents' knowledge of the issue was given priority which I personally believed should have been.

Special care was taken to safeguard all information given by parents. I did not divulge the information to anyone. In addition, all data were securely stored on password protected media and in a lockable cabinet.

The analysis and write-up of data maintained participant's anonymity throughout. During the interview session, I used identifiers to keep data separate depending on the participant's background and children's access and participation status in the school as well as their

involvement in the PESP. Subsequently, all identifiers were removed and all participants were assigned pseudonyms. All participants were informed of their right to withdraw from the study at any point, without giving reason. A high level of ethical behaviour was observed throughout.

4.11 Validity and reliability

Lincoln and Guba (1989), argue that the term validity is not applicable to qualitative research. However, they do recognize that some systematic measures are needed to ensure the neutrality, consistency, applicability, and truth-value of the research findings. Maxwell (1992) describes five types of validity in qualitative research and these are descriptive, interpretive, theoretical, and evaluative validity and generalisability (cited in Cohen et al. 2000). The validity of qualitative research is often referred to as ‘trustworthiness’ or ‘credibility’. The ‘trustworthiness’ of research findings is always under question for any qualitative research and the common methods for assessing validity is suggested through consistency checks. The term understanding gives more importance for qualitative research than validity. Thus, there is a preference for understanding what is occurring rather than convincing the audience of the outcomes (Wolcott, 1994).

On the other hand, Spencer et al. (2003) emphasised listening more than talking, recording accurately, and beginning writing early and sharing ideas with others, reporting fully, seeking feedback, trying to achieve a balance through rigorous subjectivity, and writing accurately in producing valid qualitative research. The aim of social research is to offer the reader a richer and more in-depth data analysis in addition to the probable clarification of similar events (Cohen et al. 2000). To understand others’ situation in the similar circumstance, I tried to generalise the findings within the respondent groups and beyond. In qualitative research, it should also be assured that another researcher investigating the same issue or working with the same dataset would derive the same findings. Stenbacka (2001) argues that since the reliability issue relates to measurement it has no relevance in qualitative research. Golafshani (2003) also maintains that the concept of reliability is not relevant in qualitative research, but later he agrees with the need for reliability and trustworthiness in qualitative research.

In my view, quality is an integral part of qualitative research and I believe that the reality or social reality is not single and it cannot exist separately from our perceptions. I see the notion of reliability and validity as one of the ‘quality concepts’ in my research which can be upheld and sustained through trustworthiness and can be called as a ‘proper research’ (Stenbacka, 2001). This ‘proper research’ or ‘trustworthiness’ can be attained by establishing confidence in findings which is shaped and influenced by my perspectives and propositions about social phenomenon in which the PESP operates (Lincoln & Guba, 1985). To maintain trustworthiness of my research, I disclosed clearly my research approach and epistemological position, socio-cultural context of the participants, and research settings to the readers. This methodological clarity, epistemological position, and background of the PESP participants put forward a context of the results and ensure trustworthiness of the study. On the other hand, I discussed the objectives of the research with participants and also built a relationship of trust and candour with them to understand their experiences. In analysing the data, I read the field notes several times carefully to find out the meaning and experiences that the participants tried to communicate through language and non-verbal expressions.

Power relations, due to the position of the researcher may influence and change respondent’s behaviour and can generate inaccurate information. For example, my similarity with the educated teachers could be explained to the respondents as one of them as a class and colour. However, my professional and personal experiences gave me a deeper sensitivity of the issue; reading of relevant documents and studies of various kinds sensitised me of the phenomenon. I looked at the situation which was changing during interview sessions and recorded all the changes regarding the settings of the research and changes in the behaviour of the research participants to interpret the changing research context. My outsider status in the school and the community increased reliability and trustworthiness of my research by ensuring an unthreatening environment and encouraging respondents’ frankness.

4.12 Reflexivity

As the researchers are primary data collection instruments in the qualitative study, reflexivity is considered crucial. Reflexivity helps to understand the phenomenon under

research and the research process itself (Watt, 2007). It is an ability of the researcher to acknowledge that the researchers themselves influence inquiry and research findings in various ways. Reflexivity is an anatomy of the researcher by the researcher to validate his or her own research process and findings. A researcher reflects continuously on how their own actions, values, and perceptions can affect data collection and analysis (Lambert et al. 2010). As a co-constructor of meaning, the researcher approaches to subjectivity by “bracketing” and “monitoring of self” (Peshkin, 1988). Phenomenologists have coined the term *bracketing* to describe the process of becoming aware of one’s implicit assumptions and predispositions and setting them aside to avoid having them unduly influence the research (Husserl, 1931, cited in Morrow, 2005). Horsburgh (2003) examines reflexivity as the researcher’s acknowledgement of his or her own actions and decisions that inevitably impact upon the meaning and context of the experience (cited in Lambert et al. 2010).

Reflexivity can be seen from different points of view: systemic reflexivity, methodological reflexivity and epistemological reflexivity (Ryan, 2005). Epistemic reflexivity deals with the researcher’s belief system and it tests theoretical and methodological presuppositions. My epistemological reflexivity encourages me to rethink continuously of my research questions as to how it fit into my overall research design, what if I investigated research questions differently, and how it would be translated into the interview schedules. The first reflexive exercise I engaged in was to look at my reasons for researching this particular topic. I also continuously returned to my theoretical assumptions and broad theoretical base through which I explored the social reality.

This continuous reflection reminds me to adjust and readjust my research questions, research methods, assumptions, and personal beliefs at the initial stage of my research (Mruck & Breuer, 2003). On the other hand, I was aware that I am going to work with a group of people who are different in their belief system, behaviour and background and it always push me to think of how I will start and continue the discussion and what will be my strategy if I fail to place my issue on the table and what if I myself fail to understand their responses. These, in effect, encourage re-thinking strategies, changing instruments, and understanding cognitive cultures in line with respondent’s perspective and needs.

In the field investigation, I used a researcher's journal to maintain my reflexivity keeping records of my thoughts, feelings, related to the interview process that helped me to be self-aware of the process (Lambert, et al. 2010). This journal helped me to be more introspective of my biases, feelings, and thoughts by taking stock of consistency and by reflecting on my interactions with the respondents.

The most difficult part of the reflexivity was to detach myself from the emotional attachment with the topic I selected primarily for this study, which was fashioned by my working background and my reading of the literature for the second phase of my doctoral coursework.

4.13 Positionality

Qualitative research stands for collaborative meaning making process shaped by both researcher and participants. Therefore, the perceived identity of both researcher and participant play an important role in the research process. The perceived identity places people in the specific social field and they act according to the rules of that field. Bourdieu indicates that people can be placed in more than one field at a time, which acknowledges the possibility of having multiple identities and positionality of the researcher and participants. People make meaning from various aspects of their identity and so positionality is one of the important parts of reflexivity. Reflexivity continuously examines researcher's systemic, epistemological, and methodological reflexivity, but reflexivity does not examine participant's belief, assumptions, presuppositions, which also important issue to be investigated to get the 'legitimate truth'. According to Denzin and Lincoln (2000), qualitative methodology faces a triple crisis of representation, legitimation, and praxis (cited in Day, 2012).

Positionality can play an important role in the knowledge creation process. The process of the social scientific method within which the researcher is positioned, creates the problem for the subjective researcher. Bourdieu (2004) argues that the "reformist reflexive" analysis goes beyond explaining researcher's experience and the steps taken in the research process rather it helps them understanding their own position within a field and how academic universe obstructs knowing this reality. To deal with this positionality problem, I also take

resort to reflexivity as the main tool. People tend to gravitate towards whom they feel some level of similarity. My professional background, as an education researcher for the largest NGO in the country, has shaped my mindset in favour of working with the poor children in the country. This working ethos has created a permanent attitude towards working for the disadvantaged families and children to improve their condition. This positive attitude and empathic notion became obvious through my behaviour and I believed poor people took me as one of them. My rural background also helps me to understand the power relation, position, and dispositions of the participants and I usually humble myself during the interview session, which I believe solves the positionality problem from both my part and from the part of the participants.

4.14 Limitation of the study

There are a number of limitations of the case study approach as a research strategy. The case study approach has been defined as an in-depth investigation of a single case that enables the researcher to access to a holistic view of the phenomenon under the study. This single case study was taken as a typical or representation sample that increased its reliability in investigating the reality (Yin, 2003). However, it is generally accepted that case study findings cannot be generalized to a population beyond cases similar to those studies (Yin, 2009). The snapshot or cross-sectional case study focuses on cases at a particular point in time (Cohen et al. 2007). Unlike a longitudinal study, a snapshot case study attempts to collect all relevant data at a point in time. This increases possibilities for a researcher to fail to fully understand the research context. To minimize the limitation, I have taken multiple sources of data by including three groups of parent and teacher and head teacher of the study school that gives me a rich and diversified content and context on a relevant issue under discussion. Moreover, I spent a considerable amount of time in the field that provided me with the opportunity to collect repeated information on key issues from various participants. Although, the study took adequate measures to understand the social reality of participants in their own context, some other limitations are likely. One of the influential barriers to communication during interview session was the colloquial language or local accent of the participants, which varies from one area to another in Bangladesh. In addition, in many cases, body language differs from place to place. In such

cases, I talked to teachers and head teachers about the meaning of such differences and later tried to understand the meaning. In a few cases, I checked with parents to clarify from the meaning of their gestures.

4.15 Conclusion

I have discussed in this chapter the methodology of this study, including my epistemological and ontological position. I have also discussed the rationale for selecting a single case as a unit of analysis and subunits of the school unit (individual members) as an embedded single case study design. The implications of my sampling and data collection process are also discussed. My approach to data analysis is presented to explore research participants' individualized contexts and their personal understanding of the reality. This chapter also discussed ethical issues related to protocols and procedures as well as the limitation of the study. The next chapter presents findings of the study.

CHAPTER 5: PESP OPERATION IN BANGLADESH

5.1 Introduction

This chapter analyses and presents the data collected from all participants in the case study school. All the interviews were transcribed and the analysis was carried out in several stages.

In stage 1, the recorded interviews were listened to in their entirety on a number of occasions; this included bracketing my own interpretation to enter the unique world of the individual interviewee. Multiple listening also enabled a sense of the whole to be gained, which later helped me to understand the context of the emerging specific units of meaning and themes. In stage 2, a general sense of context of the participant was acquired through verbal and non-verbal gestures and the units of general meaning of the participant were identified and noted. In stage 3, initially identified general units of meaning were reduced to units of meaning relevant to the research questions.

Whilst in stage 4, the lists of relevant meaning were prepared eliminating redundancies. Then, the units of relevant meaning naturally cluster together, were grouped for determining some common themes. In stage 5, following an iterative process, a series of general themes emerged for the entire 8 interviews into which all data could be assigned. However, in analysing and understanding participants' perceptions of the PESP policy, I also examined the individual's perspective, personal construct and their negotiated meaning from an interpretive approach.

This chapter presents 13 themes arising from the data analysis process and will begin to respond to the first research question: *'what do parents; teacher and head teacher see as the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in increasing demand for education?'*

5.2 Catchment area policy

To increase access to education and school participation for poor children, the Directorate of Primary Education (DPE) developed and adopted several strategies and policies. The

demarcation of the school catchment area is one such strategy that ensures that the designated school within a geographical area takes all the responsibility for serving all the school-aged children in that area. It is expected that all the primary school age children within a school catchment area attend the government primary school and those who are relatively poor receive the PESP benefit. It is also expected that the government primary schools ensure equal opportunity for getting quality education for all children resident in their catchment area. On the other hand, the PESP policy proposes an equal proportion of poor children to be included from all school catchment areas irrespective of its socioeconomic and demographic conditions.

The head teacher reported that, according to the school catchment area policy, no other schools were allowed to operate within the school catchment area, all the primary school aged children were supposed to enrol in this school. However, there was one religious school, one kindergarten, and one NGO school in the study school catchment area which were not included in the PESP programme, the head teacher said.

No matter what the catchment area policy, two parents (mother of a school leaver and a PESP rescinded child) wanted to send their children to the NGO school in order to benefit from its better performance although they had to give up PESP money. However, due to a shortage of seat capacity they could not enrol them in the NGO school. In reply to a question of why poor families prefer the NGO school where there is no PESP money, the teacher responded:

The children need not go to the private tutor, as there are only a limited number of children that a teacher can take care of. This imbues most of the poor parents with preferential affection for NGO schools (interview #7).

The NGO schools are established basically for the poor early school leavers (from grade 1 and 2) or children who have never enrolled in any school at the age of eight to provide them with a second chance education opportunity. These poorest NGO school children are being deprived of the PESP benefit partially due to the PESP policy and partially due to the catchment area policy where they lose their legitimacy in other school catchment areas.

Sommers (2013) found similar findings that very poor parents prefer ‘quality education’ for their children and not the stipend money and found PESP had little to do with increasing demand for education among the poor families. The head teacher also admitted to the comparatively better quality of NGO schools noting as follows:

Due to large class size, the government primary school is unable to provide ‘quality’ education as the NGO school is providing (interview #8).

It suggests that the inability of the government primary school to meet the educational needs of all children in the catchment area due to unjustified large catchment area with large number of school age population.

As mentioned previously, the catchment area of this study school is thickly populated with relatively poor people of the *union* (smallest unit of local government) due to river erosion and resettlement. However, due to the general policy, all the rural primary schools were instructed to select 50 percent of children from poor families and thus the study school also had to select PESP beneficiaries accordingly. This created huge problems since most of the parents were poor and it was difficult for the school to differentiate poverty based on their household assets or income. According to the teacher:

Earlier, 40 percent of the enrolled children got the PESP benefit. This year it has been increased to 50 percent by the government. However, the main problem is that most of the families deserve the PESP benefit since the rate of poverty is very high in this location. Almost all the parents expect PESP benefit for their children and I think we should give at least 80 percent of our children PESP card if the economic condition is taken into consideration. Many of the rickshaw pullers even are being excluded from the programme because we cannot give it to more than 50 percent of the enrolled children (interview #7).

This means, equal amounts of PESP beneficiary selection from all school catchment areas, irrespective of its economic vibrancy and food security status, may leave some people in need when compared to less poor people in other comparatively well off school catchment areas. The head teacher described her school catchment area as a highly food insecure area and expressed her concern for not including all the poor children in the PESP.

According to head teacher:

The general rule for providing 40/50 percent children with PESP benefit is not applicable to all areas. Especially, this is a very poor area with the less cultivable land. Most of the people are day labour or rickshaw/van puller. Who will you include or exclude (interview #7)?

This perception of the teacher suggests that all the school catchment areas have their own socioeconomic and demographic characteristics which should be taken into considered in any type of large scale education policy implementation. Excluding NGO school children from the PESP benefit is a discrimination against poor families and an error of the catchment area concept.

5.3 Parental attentiveness in beneficiary selection

Based on the findings of the study, the PESP beneficiary selection process can be divided into two broad categories. First, the selection at the entry grade of primary schooling, when children enrol in the school and the second is the allocation of the PESP benefit to children based on their performance from second through fifth grades of primary school. This study shows that the children, who have continued their PESP benefit throughout their primary grades, came from relatively less vulnerable families compared to the families who lost the PESP benefit. Specifically, families of one low performing girl and one school leaver boy reported they were so poor that they could not provide enough food for their children. Interestingly, both of the less poor (not vulnerable) mothers reported that they went to different persons for ensuring their candidacy and receiving the money. A mother of a primary school graduate girl said:

I went directly to the Upazila Education Officer (UEO), one of my classmates, for pushing him to allocate 'PESP card' for my daughter. The UEO assured me of allocating the card since he was the ultimate signing authority for the benefit. In this manner, the name of my girl was included in the PESP list and approved by the school committee later (interview #2).

It is true that the family met the criteria for the PESP benefit since she is a moderately poor widow living in her brother's house. Maybe she was afraid that her daughter would not get the benefit if it were distributed fairly since there were many other poorer children in the

school. Alternatively, she may have had doubts about the fair distribution of the PESP benefit that prompted her to appeal to the higher authority to ensure her right to the benefit. Alternatively, maybe she saw no harm in using classmates for influencing decisions regarding allocation of the benefit. Whatever the perception, the way she secured the benefit was improper and the local education officer could have encouraged her to apply properly. In contrast, a mother of another primary school completed boy stated:

I went to the head teacher to insist her in allocating PESP benefit to my son. I also went to a local influential person (political leader) for imploring him to convince the SMC of my indigence. Doing ‘so many things’, I manage the ‘PESP card’ for my child (interview #3).

Here, “so many things,” she described as expending time for helping their household activities and taking part in their political rallies. This family had a political ally with that ‘influential’ person (recently this person was serving as a SMC member) and worked for them during local government election, the mother said in the discussion session. That is, she secured the benefit by working with the official. In both the cases, the families were comparatively ‘well-off’, and the school teacher was not willing to give them PESP ‘card’, as she mentioned. However, their network and social capital helped them to obtain the benefit. While, the school leavers and low performing children came from poorer families compared to the families of school-completed children and none of these parents went to the teachers or other people to secure the PESP benefit as they knew their initial entitlement could not be rejected due to their abject poverty.

5.4 Selection of PESP beneficiary

The study suggests that teachers, in general, had a minimal role to play in deciding which child would be selected for the PESP benefit. According to the head teacher:

The ‘local’ schoolteachers in concurrence with the School Management Committee (SMC) prepare the list of probable PESP beneficiaries where school survey report plays an insignificant role (interview #8).

Here she indicated ‘local’ school teachers as the teachers who would reside in this school catchment area and most of the female teachers (including the head teacher) of this school resided in the town nearby and knew little about the socioeconomic background of

students. Most of these ‘outsider’ teachers were unable to contribute to the PESP beneficiary selection process and the ‘local’ teachers had to take the decision for selection. It is worth mentioning here that most of these local female teachers were also ‘outsiders’ in a true sense because they came from other areas. In this context, the PESP beneficiary selection process was influenced by the SMC who claimed to know the children well. The head teacher usually endorsed the decision of the SMC. The head teacher opined:

The SMC plays a key role in selecting the PESP children since they know the children very well (interview #8).

This indicated her minimum contribution to the beneficiary selection process and she could not justify or refute exclusion and inclusion of individual children in the PESP. This dependence on other local teacher who was mostly influenced by the SMC created unwanted problems in the school operation and management process. According to the head teacher:

In many cases, the selection goes awry due to lack of authentic information about the families and it takes huge time and energy to correct it. Because, the stipend ‘card holders’ try to sustain the benefit using all possible measures (interview #8).

It implies that selection of the PESP beneficiaries for newly-enrolled children at the first grade did not go very well in this school. On the other hand, the lack of clear-cut criteria for measuring poverty encouraged most of the parents to claim the PESP benefit. According to the teacher:

Everybody considers himself as a poor person since there is no single measurement of poverty (interview #7).

This is complicated by a general perception and impression that ‘good students’ get the PESP benefit. According to a teacher:

The parents of good students from well-off family background also expect PESP money for their children and children who are very good in their class also claim PESP benefit in spite of their better-off background (interview #7).

The data suggests that the ambiguous perceptions of the purposes of the stipend programme greatly influenced the PESP beneficiary selection process in this study school.

5.5 Continuation of PESP benefits

It was noted that the beneficiary selection criterion changed as children progressed to the upper classes. The teacher stated:

The first priority is given to the child's family background in selecting PESP beneficiaries. However, for the next grades, academic performance comes to the fore (interview #7).

This suggests, at the initial stage, the PESP beneficiary selection process was guided by the SMC and the selection criteria depended on the intensity of the poverty. However, the teacher took control over the process in collaboration with SMC after one year, when attendance and performance criteria were introduced as a condition for continuation of the benefit. However, selecting wealthy children in the successive years remained a decision for discussion with the SMC. The SMC defended the school's decision by convincing poor people in explaining the rules of the PESP and using their influence who lost the benefit to wealthy children and thus the school got support from the community to maintain the process.

In the upper grades, selection and continuation of PESP beneficiaries depends on children's academic performance and regular school attendance. As a result, the selection and continuation of PESP beneficiaries mostly rely on their children's ability to perform well in the examination and the selection process becomes biased towards well-off children due to their better results in the upper grades. It is clear from the study that the poor are not receiving the full benefit; rather, many well-off families also have access due to their children's better performance. The school also bestows PESP benefits to some of the 'very good' students (first, second and third position holders of each grade) irrespective of their family background. This confuses the children and other beneficiaries. All these irregularities in the beneficiary selection process create an impression that the poor children with low educational achievement are 'incompetent' and the families are penalized by rescinding their PESP benefits. This cessation of stipend money is

demoralizing for all the low-achieving children and their school performance gradually is reduced to incorrigibility and results in early school leaving.

5.6 Cash money attracts non-poor families

It is important to understand why wealthy people are interested in taking the PESP money which is not for them. The teacher reacted to the question of why affluent people took delivery of the PESP money by saying:

PESP provides cash money. Everybody loves to get money. Getting money is not a bad thing at all. When well off parents see their children are doing well in the school examination, one of the potent conditions for getting the benefit, they cannot but claim the money. (Interview #7)

This view indicates that the teacher dislikes this cash for education system of the PESP as it creates extra demand from relatively wealthy people. She also compared cash for education with the food for education approach and reported that the relatively less poor people would not come to claim the benefit if it were in kind (wheat for example). She said:

If it were food, instead of money, people had to fetch it in front of everybody. It diminishes well off people's social status; however, cash money can be consigned into the pocket before becoming ashamed. Besides, many non-poor parents feel proud of their children's good performance in school and take the money as the reward (interview #7).

This indicates that even wealthy people do not feel ashamed to claim the benefit even though it is not intended for them.

Thus, the school faces tremendous pressure from the expectant parents and due to this weight of expectations; distribution of PESP benefits usually has gone awry. Cash was introduced instead of food as a cost-effective substitute at the design phase to prevent misappropriation of food at different stages of distribution tiers. However, this study shows that the cash stipend is becoming more expensive due to the diversion of the resource to the non-poor (Gentilini, 2007).

5.7 Inadequate stipend money

At the early stage, when the Food for Education (FFE) programme was introduced in 1993, the target household got 20 kilograms of wheat for sending their children to the school. At the present market price, the value of the wheat is around 500 taka per month. However, in 2002, the PESP was introduced and the amount of money was set at TK. 100 for one child per month. This was a sharp reduction in the real value of the stipend amount and the amount is now one fifth of the previous cash value of wheat. On the other hand, adjusting for inflation, the real value of that TK. 100 stand at TK. 50.51 in 2012 and in terms of rice equivalents, the real value of stipend has decreased from 7 kg of rice to 3.7 kg (GOB, 2013a). By both measures, the value of stipend has declined by half since it was introduced in 2002 (GOB, 2013a). Educational expenses, in particular, have increased significantly in the last decade after introduction of cash for education in 2002. Consequently, the PESP amount does not meet educational needs. As a result, all of the participants who took part in the interviews were vociferous about the inadequacy of stipend amount. As one mother of a school leaver boy said:

I spend 1,000 taka per month to stump up private coaching fees for three of my children, what is the worth of 100 taka here? Government is paying and we are just taking it; it does not help much for our children's education (interview #1).

The teacher also reported on the inadequacy of the PESP money to meet the opportunity cost of very poor children:

Many children who received PESP benefits left the school because their parents thought that the child could earn 100 taka per day. Why would they keep him/her in the school for 100 taka per month (Interview # 7)?

This suggests that the amount of PESP money is around 3.3 percent of the average monthly income of a child. Arends-Kuenning and Amin (2004) also showed that a child, who was involved in FFE programme, needed to work between 2 and 4.5 days a month to earn the equivalent value of what s/he received. These facts indicate that most of the poor parents consider that the amount of PESP money is not important for them, given the direct and opportunity costs of education.

5.8 Conditionality distortion

The data suggest that none of the poorest children was excluded from the benefit initially, but when conditions were imposed, such as regular attendance and exam results, some poor children were unable to fulfil these and consequently they had to accept a reduced stipend amount and some even resigned their stipend benefit. The teacher said:

The rule is, if any PESP beneficiary child stays out of school for 3 days in a month, s/he will not get the full amount of stipend for that month. Teachers calculate attendance figure for each month of a quarter and accordingly give requisition for money for that quarter. The children who remain absent more than 3/4 days in a month are subject to get a reduced amount of money for that quarter (interview #7).

However, the calculation system creates huge confusion among the parents about the use of the amount deducted. Most of the parents believe that the teachers misappropriate the money. Teachers are also aware of this parental allegation. However, the teacher, and head teacher state that they do not know what the government does with the deducted amount. The head teacher said:

It is not clearly spelled out in the policy that what will happen to the money which has been penalized by the school. We are penalizing the student by slashing their PESP amount and alienating them from the school, but we do not know where the money goes (interview #8).

The data also suggests that the teachers also face problems with this condition. Although they deduct the money, they do not know what happens to it.

Academic achievement is another condition for getting the PESP money and minimum requirement for continuation of the PESP benefit is 45 percent marks on average. However, in 2013, the minimum mark was set at 33 percent, since most of the PESP receiving children could not achieve the target. According to the teacher:

To protect low-performing children's elimination from the PESP, last year the school authority has reduced the target marks to 33 percent. However, the reality is, most of the children cannot even obtain that reduced target marks (interview #7).

The head teacher in conversation revealed:

Although, many of the low achievers, who do not perform well, are not relinquished from the benefit rather, out of compassion, many of them are given grace marks to keep up their entitlement and the benefit (interview #8).

This quote supports the teacher's claim that most of the PESP receiving children are not getting a minimum education, which is one of the major objectives of this intervention.

The head teacher also explained:

These low achieving children are just increasing enrolment figures of the school in exchange of PESP money (interview #8).

The above findings are consistent with other studies and support the weak targeting and 'lightness' of the conditionality of the PESP. For example, Hossain (2009) argued that the school often "adjusts" the eligibility criteria and school attendance records to ensure that "deserving" students receive the PESP. On the other hand, to sustain the same percentage of students to receive the stipend, school leavers and low achievers are usually replaced by comparatively less poor and high achiever children of the class. As a result, many of the low achieving children, eligible for the PESP money, are not getting the benefit, as they cannot fulfil the conditions (Hossain, 2010).

The data suggested that the teacher was initially concerned in selecting the PESP beneficiaries who were poor children, which was a primary criterion for the programme. However, as time goes by, it becomes easier for the teacher to exclude poor children who fail to meet the performance criteria. This indicates that the PESP uses the first criteria of poverty for ensuring the enrolment of poor children and second criteria of performance for excluding the poor and some low performing children. As a result, around 43.4 percent of the children enrolled from the two poorest quintiles do not receive the stipends, whereas 24.4 percent of children from the two richest quintiles do obtain the benefit (WB, 2008). As a consequence, the conditionality permits other rich children to access the PESP resource and without banning conditionality the PESP system cannot but help children from privileged backgrounds (Bowles and Gintis, 2002; Rumberger, 2010).

5.9 Charging other fees from PESP money

Parents, in general, see the deduction of the PESP money as a punitive measure for not fulfilling the conditions. A mother of a school leaver child noted in the interview:

The school is now swindling with us. It is giving us the money with one hand and taking it away by another hand (interview #5).

The parent also complained against teachers for charging other fees in the name of book transportation costs, sports fees, and fees for observing various national days. A mother of one school leaver child alleged:

We had to contribute to stump up community teachers' salary too (interview # 5).

This indicates that the excess private cost of education annoyed the parent. In reply to my question regarding such deduction for community teacher's salary, the head teacher said:

This school has employed a community teacher to handle big class size in the lower grades. All the teaching staffs, in concurrence with the school management committee, introduced this system by convincing the local education authority in support of such provision. Initially, the plan was that the money would be stumped up from the rent that the school would earn from a commercial building constructed in its own land and rented out to some businesspersons flanking to the school. However, due to the problem with the tenants, the school is unable to pay the salary of that community teacher from its own source. Therefore, we decide to collect the money from PESP receiving families (interview #8).

5.10 Soaring private cost of education

The head teacher perceived that the role of PESP money was to increase spending ability of poor parents on education. According to her:

The government is paying stipend money to meet the cost of education, including the cost of the private tutor (interview # 8).

This is not only a perception of the teacher, rather, all the parents informed me that the PESP money should be spent on children's education, especially on private tutoring that is what they had been instructed by the school. This misperception increases the private costs of education by competitive spending on private tutoring. A mother of a low achiever girl said:

The family, which has the ability, are employing more than one teacher and some are providing one teacher for each subject (interview #6).

This, in turn, increases the cost of education, enhances competition among the households phenomenally, and reduces teacher's sympathy for the poor and low-performing children with less private investment. A mother of a school leaver boy stated that she spent more than 100 taka per month on her child's private tutoring. According to her:

Most of the families, those who are very poor and receiving PESP money, like us, are spending more than 100 taka per month as private tuition fees. The stipend money alone cannot meet only one-third of the amount we spend per month for my child's education (interview # 5).

Thus, demand for education is influenced by the family's expectation from their children as well as their ability to meet the systemic seepage of provisioning extra private tutoring costs (Laugharn, 2001). The parents alleged that the private spending increased tremendously due to the provision of the PESP money and they felt excessive pressure from the teacher to employ private tutors to sustain the PESP benefit. The teacher on the other hand, complained that the families are not spending PESP money on their children's education.

From the study, it seems that the major cause for unequal household resource allocation for children's education is the cost of private tutoring. The mother of the school leaver boy stated as follows:

We cannot afford one private tutor, but other people are sending their children to three to four private tutors at a time. Can our child do like theirs (interview #5)?

Through this question, the mother actually raised another important question of social inequality and class differences and impact of this inequality on children's education. The

apparent assertion is that the wealth influences access to education and the implicit question is; should it be at this early stage of schooling? The mother put forward the point very poignantly:

We know that teacher's responsibility is to teach all of their students in the school. However, the reality is that they do not help our children to learn, as we don't send them for private tutoring. We cannot afford private tutors and so our children will not learn. This is the reality (interview #5).

This was the direct allegation made by the mother of school leaver boy. When this mother of school leaver child was indicating the school and the teacher, she was maintaining 'they' and the poor people as 'us'. It suggests to the fact that she was assuming the teachers under 'they', as educated and well-off community and 'us' as poor and illiterate people and the PESP money failed to transform 'us' into 'they'; or dream into reality.

5.11 Enhanced enrolment and attendance

One immediate effect of the PESP is the number of first generation learners who enters primary schools. According to the head teacher:

The only positive aspect of the PESP is that poorer children are now coming to the school and without the money many of these poor families may not send them to the school (interview #8).

The teacher and head teacher of this school informed me that the attendance rate of this school went up due to the PESP benefit. According to the head teacher:

The single benefit that the stipend programme has wrought in the schooling system is the regular attendance of the children (interview #8).

However, a mother of a school leaver child reported:

It is my duty to send the child to the school; I am not sending my child to the school for PESP money. Since the government is paying the stipend money for the poor children and since we are the poor, we are taking the benefit. It does not mean that without the money, I would not send my child to the school (interview #1).

On the other hand, some very poor families seem to still need the PESP support or, at least, it motivates them to send their children to school in order to get the money. One mother of such a school leaver child said:

The PESP money initially attracted me for sending my son to this school, but it went in vain due to the school and my child's low brain capacity (interview #5).

It appears from the discussion that the very poor families with little or no education consider PESP benefit and free books as a strong motivation for selecting a government primary school. The mother of a school leaver boy commented:

We chose the government primary school since we will be getting the free book. It relief my spending on books and we will also get the 'PESP card' from the school to pay private tuition fee (interview #5).

This indicates that the PESP benefit is still a motivation for some poor families for sending their children to the school.

5.12 Politicisation of School Management Committee (SMC)

Hossain (2009) found in her study that the SMC chairpersons were often members of the local elite, with political careers to nurture. This politicisation of the SMC is now formalized in the primary education system by the fact that one of the SMC members is always nominated by a local Member of Parliament (MP). Accordingly, one of the committee members in the case study school has recently been selected by the local MP of the ruling party and this member is in effect the guiding force of the committee's activities. Due to his connections with the ruling party, this member is much more influential than the chair of the SMC and controls the entire decision-making process. A teacher noted:

This politically employed person is influencing PESP beneficiary selection process and now the committee is recommending many non-poor children and teachers have to accept those (interview #7).

5.13 The PESP distribution process

The head teacher and teacher unequivocally put forward disbursement of PESP money as an ordeal for the whole school staff. They see the payment day as a horrendous day for teachers as well as for the parents since 300 parents come to the school at the same time to receive the benefit. The teacher spoke out in the interview session:

It is a huge task to prepare three sets of disbursement documents which need checking all the children's attendance records for the last three months (interview #7).

It was reported that the teacher had to carry out a huge amount of administrative responsibilities at the disbursement date other than preparation of distribution documents. The teacher noted this as follows:

On the disbursement date, bank officers come to the school with their documents and the mothers need to put signatures on three different sets of paper, and we need to countersign on it. It is a huge job to get nine hundred signatures from three hundred parents where many of whom cannot do the job well (interview #7).

It is understandable that 300 rural mothers, most of whom are illiterate or semi-literate, putting signatures on three sets of papers under the guidance of 10 teachers with accuracy is a difficult task. The teacher explained the task of disbursement of PESP money as a very complicated task and the school remained closed for that day. According to the teacher:

This is a 'complex process' and lots of efforts, energy, and time the teachers need to invest in preparing these documents. Above all, when parents get the truncated amount of money, some of them become very furious and get into skirmishing (interview #7).

The 'complex process' includes maintenance of the appropriateness of the documents as well as keep up a "lightness" of the conditionality. This lightness requires lots of accurate calculations and recalculation of the attendance, and achievements related information about the children.

5.14 PESP policy preference

According to the policy, a poor family gets 100-taka stipend money for one child and for two children the family receives 125 taka if both of them enrol in the same primary school (Baulch, 2010). The policy is subject to the criticism that it discourages sending two children to the same primary school as it pays only an additional 25 TK. for the second child. Whereas, both the direct and opportunity cost of education for the family with two children is much higher. Nevertheless, the policy was not maintained in this school and in three cases (one school leaver, one low achiever, and one primary school completed child's family); the parents alleged that they did not get 125 taka for two children. On the other hand, while one of two children left the school, the second child of the same poor family was not awarded the PESP money. The mother of the boy who left school stated:

When my boy was expelled, I went to the school and requested the teachers to allocate the 'card' for my daughter who was studying grade one in the same school, but the teacher did not pay heed to my appeal (interview #1).

The head teacher responded on this issue:

The policy of this school is to cover more families in the benefits; poverty is not the first consideration in allocating the PESP money (interview # 8).

Although, it is a gross violation of rules, there is nobody to challenge the decision and the monitoring system of the government does not pick this up. On the other hand, due to the lack of participation in the decision-making process, poor people are unable to claim the benefit as their right. The teachers and school management committee along with the school authority thus divert the resources to non-poor.

5.15 Summary

The findings presented in this chapter inform my first research question: what do parents; teacher and head teacher see as the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP implementation process in enhancing demand for education. The discussion below reflects how the programme operates and how it satisfies its objectives.

The data suggest that the school catchment area is demarcated for assuming responsibility to the government primary school to bring all the children to the school in that catchment area. The poor families who live in the catchment area and do not send their children to the school have provided the PESP money to compensate their direct and opportunity cost and motivates them to keep their children in the school. However, the study suggests that the government primary school does not serve all the children, rather many other schools are operating in the same catchment area. Many poor families prefer to send their children to those non-government schools which have no PESP facility. It implies the PESP cannot satisfy educational needs of all the poor families and it fails to create effective demand among the target group. While, the policy of providing all the catchment area with the same proportion of PESP benefit emerges as a problem for very poor catchment areas. This means, the equal amount of PESP beneficiary selection from all school catchment areas, irrespective of its economic vibrancy and food security status, may leave some needy people compared to less poor people in other comparatively well off school catchment areas.

The study reveals that the unwarranted interference of the SMC comes in two different ways. One is the traditional social power relations, network, habitus and influences of capital as described by Bourdieu (1977) and another is through the introduction of political appointment of an SMC member by the local Member of the Parliament (MP). Due to good connection with the ruling party, this political selectee influences the PESP selection process duly and unduly. The study highlights that all the very poor families get the PESP benefit at the entry level and none of the very poor respondents alleges their initial exclusion from the process. However, when the selection from the upper tier of the poor families is called into question, the data shows both the parents of primary school completed children influenced the selection process. It means, relatively less vulnerable families use their social network as well as their personal habitus, and dispositions to get and secure the benefit. Although, it seems the beneficiary selection process is fairly unbiased, however from second through fifth grades, many of the very poor children are found to lose their PESP benefit to the non-poor and high achieving children.

To prevent the system loss in different tiers of food distribution, the government of Bangladesh introduced the cash for education provision. However, the study shows the teacher is against this cash transfer process for two basic reasons. First, because it creates a universal attraction to money and everyone wants to get it. Second, their personal involvement during the distribution time tends to create face to face wordy altercations with the parents. The present study reveals that the cash for education programme becomes more expensive than food for education programme due to its huge diversion to the non-poor families.

The study shows the inadequacy of PESP money has lost its appeal to the poor families as a significant contributor to their children's education. The conditionality of PESP, on the other hand, plays a key role to allow high-achieving non-poor children to the PESP benefit. All these infiltration of rich families, deduction of the PESP money and antagonistic attitudes of the teachers drives out very poor and low achievers from the benefit as well from the school. The conditionality also dampens the morale of the poor children as they think their substandard mental ability to achieve only bare minimum pass marks (33 percent) in compared to others. There is a provision for deducting money from the PESP (other than unmet conditionality reasons) which has been criticized by the parents. Recruitment of community teachers with the PESP money is such an unethical example and employing these low-cost and untrained community teachers to the lower grades is damaging children's education. The study also reveals that the poor families do not get the extra 25 taka for their second child who attend the same school or who later enrol in the school. This happens basically to spread the PESP benefit to most families which may be a good intention, however, the very poor families who need more support for sending two children to the school are being deprived for the system. The most important issue here is that the poor people who are subject to deprivation of this system cannot stand against the rule as the whole society supports this practice. The parents allege that the PESP invites higher private spending as the teachers encourage them to spend their PESP money on private tutoring. Now, the whole community is in the competition to get better performance by investing more capital and the PESP is partly responsible for it. The utilisation of the PESP benefit of relatively well-off children creates inequality in the society. The non-poor households are spending four times as much on private tuition in

comparison to poor households in effect improving their chance of completion and progression (Al-Samarrai, 2007a). The present study has given a deeper understanding of the mechanism and the sociology of redistribution of the PESP resources and the reasons for social acceptance for it. Teachers are getting incentives to teach poorly and earning extra money through private tutoring and part of the money is coming from the PESP. Parents usually come to terms with the ‘tutoring’ seeing as their children’s inability to ask questions in the classroom what is possible during private tutoring (Nath and Chowdhury, 2009). Thus, the PESP money spelled lots of unwanted concepts and practices which excluded many poor children who could not afford it.

This unfair distribution of PESP benefits has created a perpetual value system in the society where genuinely qualified families are taking their ineligibility for granted. Over and above, the society is accepting good students’ entitlement of the resource irrespective of economic background as time goes by. This acceptance of good students’ greater access to the PESP benefit is legitimizing the illegal distribution of the PESP resources and accepting the role of the school in the social separation processes. Therefore, weaknesses of the PESP are not only in the implementation process, rather it is embedded in the conceptual ambiguity in giving the responsibility of maintaining conditions of the PESP on the families rather than the school. The strategy of allowing well-off and good children with PESP benefits in the higher classes of primary school is demoralizing and discouraging poor children of their ability to progress to the higher grades. The PESP benefit is a kind of “non-cognitive reward” to the poor children at the same time it is awarded to the rich and meritorious children for their cognitive ability (Bowles and Ginties, 2002). Interestingly, none of the stakeholders, including parent, teacher, and the head teacher put forward so much about the strengths of the PESP implementation process although they were invited to speak on this issue.

CHAPTER 6: EFFECTS OF PESP ON CLASSROOM CULTURE AND SCHOOL MANAGEMENT

6.1 Introduction

This chapter explores the impact of the PESP on the classroom teaching and learning process as well as on the relationship between school and community in general and the beneficiary parents in particular. Thus, this chapter answers the second research question of the present study. The findings discussed below emerge from the interactions with the teacher, head teacher, and parent groups during the fieldwork, most of which concerned the negative impact of the PESP. This chapter presents 10 themes arising from the data analysis process (discussed in detail in the chapter 5) and answers the second research question of the present study: how does the PESP influence classroom teaching-learning and school processes?

6.2 PESP attracts underage children

One of the negative impacts of the PESP, mentioned by both the teacher (s) and parents, is age incongruence in the classroom. The official age of entry at grade 1 is six in Bangladesh. It is expected that the children will be promoted to Grade 2 in the following year at the age of seven and in subsequently move to Grade 3 at the age of eight and so on. However, due to the PESP, this official age of entry and progression and promotion to the next grade has not been implemented as intended. This is partly because poor families feel they are entitled to have the PESP benefit irrespective of the age of their children and send them to the school one year earlier. In many cases, this prevents children from meeting the conditions for progression to the next grade due to their unequal developmental stage with other children. The mother of a low performing girl said:

I enrolled my daughter a year earlier than the official age of enrolment. Many other parents are also sending their children to the school at the age of five to get the PESP money (interview #6).

The statement reflects the fact that she is aware of sending her child at an early age. She also indicated that other parents acted similarly. Another low achiever girl was also

enrolled at an early age due to her mother's enthusiasm for seeing her as a doctor in future and got early educational support from the school. These findings suggest that there may be many underage children in the classroom. The mother of a school leaver boy also enrolled her son one year earlier than the official age of entry. On the other hand, a mother of a school leaver boy reported that she enrolled her son a year later than the official age because of his slow physical growth. She said:

My son looked very small at the age of six. He grew in a very slow space and I thought he would not become normal. Therefore, I did not enrol him at the age of six. However, when he was seven, he started to grow again and I enrolled him in the school (interview # 5).

This reveals the important role that health and nutrition play in children's delayed enrolment (Ghuman et al. (2006). This study shows that 3 out of 4 school leavers and low achieving children repeat in the same grade once in their schooling period. Another study on 511 households in rural Bangladesh also reports similar findings where more than one-third of the PESP receiving children are found in the wrong age group (Baulch, 2010). Research shows that the effect of being the oldest child in the cohort is generally estimated to yield between 10-27 percent standard deviation higher test scores than the youngest child (Strom, 2004, cited by Sprietsmaa, 2008). Accordingly, teachers usually grapple with this wide age-range of children in the classroom, which often results in higher rates of grade repetition for some children. To reduce wide age range in enrolment, some NGOs like BRAC have established pre-primary schools to enrol 5 years old children from poor families. This study indicated that children who had a chance to be enrolled in pre-primary school progressed well in the primary school. The mother of the primary school completed boy claimed:

I enrolled my boy in the BRAC pre-primary school and there he completed one year's course. After completion of one year pre-primary, I enrolled him in this primary school in grade one (interview #3).

This indicates that families which enrol their children in a pre-primary school show increased levels of performance later.

The mother of a primary school graduate girl said that she enrolled her daughter in the school at the right age. In both these cases, mothers enrolled their child at age 6 in grade 1 and the children transited to secondary school successfully. In contrast, those who enrolled their children early (three children) or late (one child) tended to experience a lower performance level for their children. Thus, children who enter earlier or whose progress is delayed by repetition become over aged, and perform less well than those who enter at the correct age. A teacher interviewee expressed the problem as follows:

A large proportion of underage children come from relatively low-income families. These underage children attend the school intermittently and perform worse and most of them are PESP ‘cardholders’ (interview #7).

6.3 ‘Un-trainable’ learner

In most cases, the teacher and head teacher complained about the low “school readiness” of poor children in relation to homework preparation, understanding the subject matter, and obeying teachers’ behests. According to the teacher:

Poor children usually come to school without minimum preparation because parents at home do not give them smallest amount of support. As a result, these ‘un-trainable’ children usually break the rules in the classroom (interview #7).

This quote suggests that PESP beneficiary families fail to meet teacher’s expectation. It also suggests that teacher wants children to be prepared at home so that they can practice appropriate behaviour in the classroom settings, thus creating a good learning environment. However, the teacher and head teacher frequently complained about the lack of such support from the PESP receiving families. Although, this was not claimed to be a direct result of the PESP, teachers attribute these problems to the programme indirectly. The claim is poor children do not get school readiness training at home as usually wealthy children receive from their parents and relatives. The teacher considers the PESP is responsible for attracting these poor and ‘un-trainable’ learners to the school that hampers classroom teaching and learning process and quality education as a result.

6.4 Discriminatory classroom seating arrangement

Parents of the PESP receiving children see the classroom organization as a barrier to learning for poor PESP beneficiary children. A mother of a low achiever girl says:

Due to large class size, our children sit in the backbench and remain unnoticed (interview #4).

Parents of the PESP receiving children indirectly attribute the fact that their children are usually placed at the back of the classroom, to the programme. As one of the mothers of a low performing girl put it:

I went to the school to exhort the teacher to place my child in the front bench and once or twice, I went to the classroom and placed my daughter on the front bench. I also advised other girls who usually sit in the backbench with my daughter to sit in the front bench so that they might get teachers' attention, but it did not work. According to the norms of the classroom, my daughter along with other poor children relapsed into hind areas of the classroom (interview #4).

However, this pattern does not equally apply to talented poor children who receive the PESP money. According to the mother of one primary school completed boy:

Those children who are good at study usually sit in the front bench and my child never sits in the last bench (interview #3).

This reflects the fact that high achievers usually sit in the first bench. The mother of primary school completed girl reported that her daughter faced huge resistance from other students as well as teachers to accommodate her in the front bench. The mother of school completed girl stated:

While my girl was in grade one, once the teacher said, what did you eat, grass? The teacher indicated my daughter's head is full of cow dung. The teacher ordered my daughter to sit in the backbench. At that day I replied, sir, there may be a fire under the ash. Later the teacher realized and placed her permanently in the front bench (interview #2).

This story represents one girl who was able, and the teachers named her as a successful PESP beneficiary child. Most of the poor PESP receiving children are placed in the backbench but some of them have broken such norm due to their better performance.

Seating can have an important effect on learning. A study of two elementary schools in Brazil shows a significant association between student performance and seating position. Students sitting near the blackboard perform significantly better than those do sit at the back (Tagliacollo, et al, 2010). In this respect, this study added support to the findings from the study by Ngware, et al (2013).

6.5 Inviting versus unfriendly classroom environment

The mothers of school leavers and low learning children stated that they were dissatisfied with the classroom culture and blamed teachers for their children's low learning levels. One of the mothers stated:

Where children feel comfort, enjoy their participation, and explore new knowledge is the best classroom environment, but my child does not want to go to the school. What my child say you know, "I shall not go to this school, let me admit into any other school", does not it raise the question of the quality of the classroom environment, quality of teachers (Interview #1).

Her comments suggested that the classroom environment negatively affected her child's learning in the classroom. The quote also suggests a difference of view among parents and teacher concerning the benefit of the PESP in relation to their children's performance. A friendly and congenial school environment and the warm parental relationship are important to ensure children's participation in the classroom. However, parents and teacher (s) indicated a lack of such a situation. The head teacher specifically blamed the PESP beneficiary children for a negative classroom environment. According to her:

The PESP receiving children in general are scary, whenever they are asked to study; they panic, and try to memorize without understanding. This in many cases perplexes us (Interview #8).

This suggests that the children are too psychologically stressed to grasp the classroom teaching and understandably, the PESP money is one of the reasons they are under duress to perform a desirable level, both from the classroom teachers and from the parents at home. A lack of which, they know, would start a permanent commotion and skirmishing between school and family, and they become the target of that attack. This scary and

fearful thinking impacts negatively on the spontaneity of the poor children and creates an artificial and uncongenial classroom environment for them.

Equity in education aims at creating equal opportunity for different groups of children in the classroom. Creating equal opportunity requires equal learning opportunity in the classroom as well as in extra-curricular activities in the school. School planning can create and maintain an equitable learning environment for all children where poor children can have additional educational support and services (NREL, 1997, Levin, 2003). However, the teacher and head teacher admitted that they could not ensure equity in learning. According to the teacher:

Due to lack of pre-planned activities and large class size, the classroom environment never becomes congenial to learning for poor children. We cannot take extra care for the poor children (interview #7).

It is clear from the statement that the teacher feels that additional attention and care are required for poor and first generation learners with PESP money. However, it is not in the PESP policy that could help the teacher receive extra training and motivation to create a favourable classroom teaching and learning environment for these first generation learners.

6.6 Crowded classrooms

In Bangladesh, the average teacher-student ratio in the government primary school is 1:46 and the average class size is 55 (GOB, 2011e). However, the study school shows much higher amount of students in the classroom. The head teacher claimed that the PESP was responsible for such huge class sizes. She opined:

In our school, 65-70 students are reading in a classroom in general and I think the PESP is responsible for the so big classroom (interview #8).

The teacher also provided a similar reason regarding overcrowded classrooms:

The PESP has created ‘extra pressure’ on this already crowded school. Now we can fulfil less than 50 percent of children’s learning needs. If there were no PESP, the children could achieve more (interview # 7).

This ‘extra pressure’ is related to the inability of the teachers to pay equal attention to everybody in such a big classroom during teaching. The head teacher was vocal against the introduction of the PESP and asserted:

More children in the classroom do not mean more access to education. We cannot follow standardized teaching learning process due to a huge number of students and cannot assess them all for remedial teaching due to time constraints. The PESP gives us children but the authority does not tell us how to manage them (interview #8).

This quote suggests that teachers and head teachers hold a negative view about the role of the PESP in regards to increasing class size and the bad impact this has on learning.

6.7 Inadequate learning materials

Data from the current study suggests that both the poor and the PESP receiving children face a shortage of learning materials. One of the major objectives of the PESP is to subsidize the purchase of learning materials. However, for several reasons, this does not happen. The teacher, head teacher, and parents all noted that the poor and PESP receiving children in general have an inadequate number of ‘books’. Interestingly, these ‘books’ represent guidebooks and notebooks excluding textbooks which are freely supplied by the government. The mother of a school leaver boy complained:

We are not able to buy all the notebooks and guidebooks referred by the teachers and so our child cannot do well without those in the classroom. How can I buy those expensive books with this little stipend money (Interview #5)?

The teacher and head teacher also criticized the PESP beneficiaries for not ensuring adequate learning materials for their children. They also blamed the parents for not spending all the PESP money on learning materials. According to the head teacher:

Many of the PESP receiving children attend the school without pen and copybooks. They usually lag behind the others and PESP money fails to ensure their participation in the classroom activities (interview #8).

The head teacher alleged that most of the parents do not use the PESP money for education purposes. The data indicate that the PESP recipients face a shortage of learning materials

in the classroom compared to wealthier children and this hamper their participation in classroom activities.

6.8 Low expectation of teachers

Equity in attitude is important in bringing about equity in education. The children who come from the lower socioeconomic stratum deserve extra care and attention from teachers as well as a belief that all children have the ability to succeed. The teacher in the interviews expressed her belief that poor PESP receiving children were not capable of enhancing their performance compared to wealthier children. This view contradicts the belief of equality independent of wealth or background. It also did not support the learning of marginalized children. The teacher stated:

I do not think PESP money can improve classroom teaching and ensure all children's learning rather it is dependent on parental awareness and their ability to invest in children's education (interview #7).

This suggests that teachers do not expect PESP beneficiaries to perform well since their parents are not able to spend the required amount of money for their children. This low expectation results in a negative attitude towards poor PESP families and their children's education. However, some studies suggest that social status and economic privileges are not reproduced by the genetic inheritance of IQ; but rather by the environment (Bowles and Nelson, 1974; Tucker-Drob, et al. 2011). Besides, in the determination of human intelligence, genetics and environment appear to interact, with environmental factors and culture playing an important role (Stuppia, et al. 2010). This current study shows some poor children in this school, do perform better than other school leaving children and low achieving children from similar equal socioeconomic backgrounds and their class positions (roll number in the class) can be better than other wealthier children. This demonstrates that poor children can achieve increased levels of performance if the school culture and home environment work together.

6.9 PESP and corporal punishment

Ahmed et al., argue that a teachers' normal expectation is that all students will achieve most of their learning at home (from private tutor) and teachers will guide them and correct

their homework in the school (2005). It is true that the children from the lower socioeconomic background are more vulnerable in the classroom as a result of the limited support they receive at home and the absence of learning materials. It is expected that all these inadequacies be taken into consideration by the teacher during the teaching and learning process to bring them out and participate in learning. This current study illustrates that mothers of a PESP beneficiary boy and a beneficiary girl who have completed primary education were satisfied with the classroom teaching processes. However, mothers of school leaver and low achiever children who have lost the PESP benefit alleged that the teachers usually dealt with their children heavy-handedly in the classroom and referred them as ‘bad students’. A mother of a school leaver child explained:

The teachers used to beat the child, castigate him, insult him by keeping him standing up holding ear by hand, and putting his head on the bench or in his own thighs at times. All these abuses and inhuman punishments have broken my child’s heart and now he is unwilling to attend this school (interview #1).

This child was branded by the teacher as ‘incorrigible’ and expelled from the school and his mother was looking forward to enrolling him in some ‘soft religious school’, where there was limited corporal punishment and less academic pressure. It seems that the school inflicts corporal punishment to increase attention and attainment on the PESP beneficiary children. A mother of another school leaver boy said:

My son does not go to school in fear of whacking. Once when my child fails to respond to a question of a teacher, she beat him so severely the boy terrifies and miss the school for several days. Yes, I have given my child to you to learn and you have every right to discipline him, but should not there be a limit for that? It is true that you are paying stipend money for my child, but how much can you beat for that little amount (Interview # 5)?

The study reveals that teachers are under pressure to ensure that the performance of the PESP beneficiaries is adequate to sustain the receipt of the stipend as per the conditions. They prefer corporal punishment as a strategy to motivate children to pay more attention in the classroom and spend more time on their studies at home.

However, a mother of a low achiever girl reported that beating was the reason for her daughter's low motivation:

My daughter was not so bad at the study and did well in the early grades (grades 2 & 1) in spite of our abject poverty. However, when she was promoted to grade three, it seemed to me that she felt the study rather burdensome. Once she came home crying and said that she would not go to school anymore because the teacher beat her severely in front of others. After that day, my daughter became irregular in the school, inattentive in the study and in cases, she even turned down her father's behest to study at home or go to the school (interview #6).

To evade corporal punishment, some of the PESP beneficiary children do not attend school timely and regularly. According to a teacher:

Presently, many of the children, mostly PESP holders and low achievers, leave the school during lunch break but do not come back in the classroom after the break (interview #7).

The head teacher also stated:

Overall, school attendance has increased due to the PESP but during school hour, some of these children are resorting truancy to mask low performance and to evade punishment (interview #8).

This indicates that children attend the school just to record their attendance, as it is a requirement for receiving the PESP grant. However, they are not interested in staying in the classroom rather they play in the village or roam on the bank of river with other school leavers and come back home after school hour. This suggests that physical access as a condition for the PESP is emphasized over learning.

6.10 Undermine teachers

The teacher and head teacher mentioned that arguments with parents occurred almost every day regarding the PESP and this impacted negatively on the learning environment and the management of the school.

The teacher said:

The impact of the PESP on school management is far reaching. Most of the teachers of this school are tormented with the stipend programme. Almost every day some kinds of problem and issues the teachers have to face related to this PESP (interview #7).

The teacher asserted:

The PESP beneficiary parents come to the school for trivial reasons and cannot behave well. They used to implicate teachers in thieving the PESP money in front of students. This damages the morale of teachers and affect classroom teaching negatively (interview #7).

This type of conflict resulted in a deterioration of the teacher-student relationship in the classroom. Mutual respect and trust is the key to success for facilitating children's learning. However, lack of such mutual trust and respect due the PESP distribution debate demoralised teacher to pay equal attention and take adequate care for all children and the children whose parents were involved in wordy altercation suffered most. This essentially inhibited equity in classroom teaching and learning process which requires more support for the low performing children from the teacher. This inequality in classroom teaching and learning is growing due to the unfair denunciation of the teacher regarding PESP money misuse.

6.11 Inadequate class time

A mother of a school leaver boy identified weaknesses of the classroom evaluation process as one of the major problems of learning. She said:

How can a school teach better where so many students in a classroom? One madam enters and exit and another madam come in. What a child can learn within this short period of time? How many children can prepare their study and how many of them can be assessed in this short period? What will you (the teacher) understand good and bad in this time (interview #5)?

Although, this is not directly blaming the PESP but indirectly she alleges that the poor children become victims of any adverse classroom situation. This mother is an illiterate

woman, but observed and indicated a key problem of the classroom teaching. The head teacher also similarly noted:

In this school, average class size is 60-65 and the class time is only 40 minutes. Therefore, the teacher cannot allow enough study time for the children to prepare their lessons in the classroom and the teacher cannot evaluate student's achievement by asking them individually, which allow some student's unpreparedness on the issues each day and on each subject area (interview #8).

This suggests that teachers cannot regularly assess and monitor children's learning achievement. They indirectly blamed the PESP money for the inadequacy. A mother of a school leaver boy posited a relationship between the PESP for this participation and low-quality education. She stated:

The poor families that have turned down the PESP benefit and enrol their children in the NGO school to get 'good' education. However, we are unable to relinquish the PESP benefit, enrol our children in this school, and now getting low-quality education compared to them (interview #5).

This suggests that she has relinquished the expectation of a quality education for the PESP benefit. The PESP enhances enrolment, but this does not improve the quality of education.

One of the major objectives of the PESP is to increase the learning achievement of poor children (GOB, 2011d). The head teacher and teacher unequivocally mention that the PESP receiving children lag behind in learning. The teacher said:

Most of the children who receive the PESP money come from relatively poor families and most of these children lag behind and perform low compared to the children who do not get the money (interview #7).

This quote suggests that the PESP has not resulted in the desired quality education for poor children. Another mother of a low achiever girl stated that:

My child cannot spell out words appropriately, but can read it when I ask to read. I guess she recalls it from her memory. She is now reading in class three, though should be in grade four, still she cannot recognize all the Bangla and English alphabets well (interview #4).

This poor performance of the girl is a reflection of poor classroom teaching and learning process and poor literacy skills development as a result for most of the children receiving the PESP money. The stipend money thus assures physical presence in the school but fails to guarantee access to quality education. The following quote by a teacher revealed learning exclusion of poor children receiving the benefit:

We do not have that energy to take individual care of all lagged behind students since we are to take 5-6 classes every day, and 20 out of 50 children lag behind. Most of them are the PESP beneficiaries who cannot learn equally and we cannot give them additional time (interview #7).

While, the parents claim that the school uses the PESP money as a coercive measure to control the family, it does not take good care of their children's learning. A mother of a school leaver boy mentioned:

Whatever happens, the school expects children's attendance must be ensured or else we have to go to school to inform that my sick child will not come to school today. The teachers always ask us to push our child to study hard at home. Well, what are the teachers' doing with our children in the school? We do not know (interview #5).

This quote suggests that parents are frustrated about the low performance of their children in spite of their regular class attendance. Having experienced such poor performance, the parents and teachers have taken for granted poor children's poor ability to learn and believe that poor children usually own less 'brain' or it usually remains 'non-functional'.

6.12 Conclusion

The chapter has presented the data which informs the second research question, 'how does the PESP influence classroom teaching-learning and school processes?' in ensuring quality education. The discussion below reflects how the findings fulfil and address my second research question.

The study suggests that many poor families send their children to school a year early in order to get the PESP money. This early enrolment creates a multi-aged classroom with different developmental needs that hampers normal teaching and learning. This mix-aged problem results in repetition for some children and this study found three out of four

children who left the school and lost the PESP benefit had repeated the grade. This mixed age problem appears to make the teaching and learning process more challenging for the teachers and results in low achievement for many. The study found that children who enrol at the right age do better than those who enrol one year early. The teacher and head teacher alleged that the poor children from the PESP receiving families usually lacked the required school readiness and these children are more disobedient. It is expected that the children learn some basic rules and regulations and some basic academic skills at home, taught by their parents, but the PESP receiving children are usually branded as ‘untrainable’ students.

One of the objectives of the PESP is to ensure the quality of education for the poor children. However, the PESP participant parents, in general, alleged their children’s disadvantaged seating position (backbench) in the classroom was a major barrier to their learning. One of the mothers tried to break this discriminatory classroom norm, but it quickly changed back. Here, social class, capital, and doxa - all worked together to keep up with the traditional norms to sustain social hierarchy and equilibrium. The study identified an antagonistic relationship between the PESP participant families and the teacher of the study school. The reason being, the parents believed their children are not treated or taught well in the classroom due to their poor background and lower achievement level.

The teachers were also disenchanted with the noncooperation of the PESP receiving families in terms of taking no care at home and the persistent low performance of those children. The lack of adequate training and provisions for additional support services for the low achieving children, lack of regular parent teacher formal meeting of the roles and responsibility of the parents and, lack of understanding of the needs for home-school partnership create mistrust between PESP receiving parents and teachers of the study school. The teachers complained of the large class size due to the PESP. However, there is no clear instruction from the school authority in terms of how to deal with this unmanageable number of children. The teacher acknowledged her limitations in addressing only 50 percent of children’s learning needs in the short class time, but rest of the children’s learning needs remain unaddressed. The supply side of education in such a way becomes weaker day by day and the teacher blamed the PESP, at least in part for this problem. The teacher further suggested a cause for the poor performance of the PESP

receiving children, in general, is that they suffer from inadequate learning materials. This study revealed these learning materials are basically the “notebooks” and “guidebooks” in addition to the government’s free textbooks which the school suggests buying from the market.

In some cases, the teacher also mentioned the lack of pen and copybooks which genuinely affect children’s learning in the classroom and the PESP money, in some cases, fails to ensure learning materials for some children. The teacher’s high expectations are also an important factor for student’s learning achievement in the school. However, the head teacher and teacher of the study school expressed their belief that poor PESP receiving students could not show equal performance as their rich classmates and the PESP money could not compensate their inability. This is the common social attitude towards poor children’s learning ability and definitely, it has implications for not improving the supply of education for the PESP receiving children. New government policy is in effect, but the struggles to improve the supply of education yet to achieve due to the hysteresis effect.

The study identifies that a complexity is gyrating around the expectation from the PESP that complicates the relationship between teacher and student which is unfortunate. In some cases, it took the form of rivalry between the PESP recipient student and the schoolteacher since both parties were humiliated by the family and school authority or vice versa regarding low performance and sustaining the benefit. Since, the teachers were located at the top of the hierarchy, sometimes they vented their anger by beating PESP receiving children who failed to perform well in the school. Sometimes it became excessive and in two cases (one school leaver boy and another low performing girl), the children left the school as a result of the excessive beating. Some other PESP receiving children resorted to truancy in order to evade corporal punishment and some others attended school irregularly. On the other hand, the study found that the PESP destroyed the teacher’s image in the community due to the continuous clash with the parents about misappropriation of deducted PESP money. Allegations of money theft in front of students damaged the morale of the teachers which in turn contributed to heavy-handed classroom management style or aversion to the PESP receiving children. Parents also alleged that the teachers spent very little time on task and assessment of student’s achievement which

hampered the student's learning as well as a teacher's understanding of the student's achievement level. These in effect, contained the supply of quality education for the PESP receiving children, although the teachers used the money as a controlling mechanism for school attendance.

This chapter has informed the second research question. The results above indicate that as a demand side financing initiative (Patrinos, 2005) the PESP increases demand for education in a very limited way. School attendance is increased due to the condition of PESP but the teachers show dissatisfaction for large class sizes. The differences in learning between PESP and non-PESP children depend on the economic, social, and cultural capital of the families and the PESP cannot mitigate such structural socio-cultural inequalities. Teachers' expectations for the poor children are low, and they suffer from contradistinctive expectations and the behaviour of the teachers. This discriminatory behaviour and severe beating discourage the PESP receiving children to attend the school and results in some children achieving low levels of performance, which again attracts more physical punishment and verbal abuse. These adverse school conditions and minimum learning achievements cause discontinuation of the PESP benefit which ultimately pushes the children out of the school. However, this limitation of the supply-side aspect of the PESP is hardly discerned by the teachers and head teacher of the study school although the parents raise their voice against such unaccountability.

CHAPTER 7: SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS

7.1 Introduction

The present study has explored the strengths and weaknesses of the PESP in increasing demand for and access to quality education for poor children. Bangladesh shows phenomenal success in enrolling children and bringing about gender parity in enrolment (GOB, 2012). The PESP policy as such is politically regarded as a mechanism by policy makers and stakeholders to increase poor children's access to education. Some studies show duplicity in the beneficiary selection process and non-poor families use a significant amount of the PESP benefit (Hossain and Zeitlyn, 2010; Tietjen, 2003). However, limited previous work has focussed on understanding the effects of the PESP from the perspective of beneficiary families. The present study therefore focused on the beneficiaries' perspectives of the policy. This chapter begins with a brief summary of the main findings and then discusses implication for policies in different levels, implication for future research, personal reflection, and it concludes with a discussion of the significant contribution to knowledge.

7.2 A glance at research questions

The lack of studies about the perceptions of stakeholders about the role of PESP in achieving equitable access to quality education motivated me to undertake this study. In order to guide the research the following research questions were developed:

Research Question 1: What do parents, teacher and head teachers see as the strengths and weaknesses of PESP in increasing demand for education?

Research Question 2: How does the PESP influence teaching-learning and school operation processes?

Concerning the first research question, the evidence suggests a number of barriers to poor family's participation in the PESP have caused divergence between policy and practices and influences little on demand for education.

7.3 Barriers to increasing demand for education through the PESP

The role of the PESP is to create a demand for education among the poor families who do not send their children to the school. However, this study reveals a number of weakness in the programme to create effective demand as discussed below:

7.3.1 Beneficiary selection

The present study explored stakeholders' perceptions of the PESP beneficiary selection process and found differing practices within the case study school. The PESP participant selection process was influenced mostly by the politicised and biased SMC members appointed by the local Member of Parliament (MP). Since, most of the teachers, including the head teacher, are outsiders to this community and reside in the nearby town, they know little about the beneficiaries and they usually do not stand against any biased decision.

The comparatively less poor PESP receivers, who have completed primary school successfully, request the 'PESP card' from the local education authority and members of the school management committee. However, the school leavers and low performing children's family got the benefit without request. Both the selections are within the regulation but using the network and their social power is predominant for comparatively less poor people and they do not see anything wrong with this. This suggests that socio-political power is used for obtaining the PESP benefits and it is widely accepted by the school community. Interestingly, very poor families are not excluded from the initial PESP beneficiary selection process, although most of these families cannot keep the benefit throughout their primary completion.

The PESP policy allows two children from one family with a reduced amount of 125 taka in spite of 200 taka. In general, the policy is contested as both the opportunity and direct costs for the family with two children attending school is higher but instead, they are required to accept a reduced amount. However, the rule of providing two children with reduced amount or giving PESP benefit to the second child of a family when the first one is not in school is not followed in this study school. The mother of a school leaver, a low achiever, and a primary school completed child report that teachers persistently refuse the additional 25 taka for their second child who also study in the same school. In two cases,

when their first child left the school, their second child was not included in the stipend scheme which is a violation of the PESP policy. Therefore, the existing rules and regulations for selecting PESP beneficiary are not maintained properly in this school and the respondents report it unhappily.

7.3.2 Conditionality problem

There is a conditional and unconditional cash transfer debate around the world. The study suggests that due to the unmet conditionality many families receive reduced amounts of money. This gives a wrong perception to the parents of their children's low ability and damages the morale of the children who receive a reduced amount of money. Here conditions are set to improve school participation and attainment of the children, but not to add extra value to the family well-being as oppose to general CCT programme. The aim of the CCT programme is to improve material well-being of the target families through alleviating poverty and improving nutritional conditions of the households. Here children's school participation is a condition for reaching the CCT benefit. On the other hand, the fulfilment of the conditions of PESP benefit (attendance and performance) depends basically on the performance of children although families have enough scope to play an ancillary role. Therefore, conditionality of the PESP cannot be equated to the conditions of the CCT programme.

This study suggests that conditions of the PESP are being used against poor children by penalizing and excluding them from the benefit and allowing other non-poor children to access the benefit. The deduction of money due to low attendance creates confusion among the PESP beneficiaries who think that the teachers are stealing the deducted amount. Yet the teacher and head teacher are not aware of what the government does with the deducted amount. This perversion of the conditions of the PESP reduces teacher's respect in the community. Thus, the minimum amount of stipend money, which covers part of the opportunity cost of poor families, is caught in the conditionality debates as to whether the conditions are helping in improving poor children's school participation or preventing them from receiving the benefit (Rawlings and Rubio, 2003). This case study suggests that the PESP in Bangladesh prevents some poor families to get the benefit and allows the middle class to exploit the benefit (Besley and Kanbur, 1990).

7.3.3 Inadequate PESP money

The insignificance of the stipend amount is asserted by all the parents and teachers who took part in the interview session, and none of the interviewee mothers admitted that the PESP money was the primary motivation for their children's enrolment. All of the parents unanimously assert that the amount of the PESP money is too small to make any difference to their children's schooling. Initially, in 2003, the PESP money was more than double the present value of the money. It is currently reported as being inadequate for poor families to support their children's education. It is also evident from the study that the school charges other fees directly from the PESP money, like, subscription for observing national and religious days, etc., which parents could not appreciate (Baulch, 2010).

7.3.4 Disbursement dilemma

The disbursement of the PESP money is a tiresome process involving a significant amount of work for the school to prepare disbursement sheets, check each child's documents, and prepare and maintain disbursement related documents on the day of payment. The most challenging aspect of disbursing the PESP money is to deal with the parents who receive deducted amount of PESP money and implicate in an altercation. To accommodate disbursement related activities and to avoid conflict between parent and teachers, the school remains closed for the disbursement day. Although, the school remains closed for 4/5 days in a year for disbursement purpose, however, the bitterness and tension between teachers and parents linger throughout the year.

The study suggests that the PESP increases teacher and head teacher's expectations that parent will spend some of the money on private tutors. The data suggest that the head teacher and teacher were disappointed with the poor parent's motivation to engage a private tutor. This pressure from teachers results in a competition among the parents for engaging tutors resulting in the 'marketisation' of education. This increase in the private cost of education and lowers the chances for very poor children to access to quality education in spite of their access to PESP money.

7.4 Impact of the PESP on classroom culture and school processes

Concerning the second research question, the evidence suggests that the PESP influences the school and classroom in different ways and results in a deterioration of the teaching and learning environment as well as creates an uncongenial parent-teacher relationship. These negative influences of the PESP on classroom environment are presented below.

7.4.1 Overcrowding classrooms

The school is caught in the dilemma of accepting high levels of regular attendance due to PESP which results in crowded classrooms. The teacher and head teacher note that increased enrolment has both a positive and negative impact on the school teaching-learning processes. It is positive in the sense that a majority of poor children enrol in school. The increase in teacher student ratio, due to the PESP, is mentioned as a negative effect of the increased enrolment. Overcrowding of classrooms is frequently raised by the teacher and head teacher as the main reason for a poor classroom teaching-learning environment.

7.4.2 Attract underage children

The teachers and parents mention that many underage children are enrolled in the school as a result of the PESP. According to the interviewed mothers, three out of four excluded children were underage when enrolled in the school and one was overage. This age in grade incongruent children creates many problems in the classroom due to their differential developmental stages and learning needs, according to the teachers. Very poor parents send their children to access their rights to PESP benefit as a poor household. These underage children perform less, repeat, and drop out of the system. This suggests the PESP may result in some children's low performance and school exclusion.

7.4.3 Increase nominal attendance

The poor PESP benefit-receiving children usually sit in the inaccessible rear part of the classroom and do not receive the attention of the teacher. As a result, most of them do not learn much. Therefore, to avoid corporal punishment, due to lack of preparation for class and homework, many of these low performing children attend only in the first period when

the roll call is done and stay absent for rest of the day. This increases nominal attendance of the children as per record but most of these PESP benefit-receiving children underperform. Teachers have a low expectation from the poor children and it reflects in the classroom seat arrangement and questioning of the children, and all these affect the PESP beneficiary student's class performance negatively. As a result, the PESP receiving students attend the school but do not engage in classroom activities and get the minimum benefit.

7.4.4 Reduce achievement

This study shows that the school leavers and children who have lost their PESP benefits are low achievers in their classes. The low ability of poor children is depicted as a usual scenario by all respondents. The teacher and head teacher state that most of the PESP receiving children perform lower than the non-PESP children. It is not directly stated that the PESP money results in poor performance, the teacher and head teacher mention that they believe that overall performance of the school has declined due to the PESP and poor children are suffering most.

This study shows that the low-performing girls and school leaver boys are unable to perform at the minimal level in the classroom in their respective grades. The study also reveals that the teachers give extra/grace marks to keep the entitlement sustained. This masks the actual achievement of the PESP receiving children. The study suggests that a large number of the PESP receiving children cannot complete the primary cycle and a significant proportion of them repeat the same grade before leaving school (Hossain, 2010). These repeaters are dampened with the presentation that they get the stipend for their destitution and they only need to achieve a bare minimum mark in the examination. This reduces them to the inferiority complexity and the 'softness' of the teachers (giving pass marks) even limits these children's confidence by letting them realize their insignificance in the hierarchal classroom. Clearly, without support from teachers in the classroom, any extrinsic cash for education/PESP cannot ensure quality education for poor children.

7.5 Deteriorating parent-teacher relationship and school operation and management

This study suggests that the teachers are very concerned about the PESP as it takes lots of time in administering the programme and dealing with the conflicts related to the PESP selection and distribution process. The teachers feel a loss of energy and motivation due to the conflicts about the management of the PESP which affect the classroom environment negatively. Parents also feel attitudes of the teachers affect their children's low level of motivation. This increases mistrust among the parents and teachers and they blame each other for the low-quality education for poor children. This blame game results in a poor relationship between school and parents and negatively affects the learning of the children.

It appears from the discussion of the two research questions that the programme participants (parents, teacher, and head teacher) are not satisfied with the PESP in terms of its policy as well as implementation process. Parents do not believe that the PESP policy supports their children's education. Whilst teachers do not believe it is an efficient programme that benefits teaching and learning. Both groups blame the PESP for the low-quality education for the poor and PESP receiving children. This raises the issue of how effective and useful this policy intervention is and whether should there be an unconditional support for it.

7.6 The implications of research findings

The findings of this study have implications for the policy makers and policy implementers, both at local and national levels and for the future research.

7.6.1 Implication for policy

The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) extended the idea of access to education requiring the completion of full-cycle of primary schooling by all children by 2015 (GMR, 2005). This wider international agreement has endorsed the wider concept of access as a means to keep children away from child labour and hazardous activities. Secure access to and participation in education can only be assured by creating a practical, universal, and a humanitarian value system among the children (Cohen and Bloom, 2005; Pigozzi, 2004). The role of PESP is to promote equal educational opportunity for all children and to ensure

quality learning for all children. However, due to the lack of such shared vision, the role of the PESP does not result in the secure enrolment of poor children and quality learning for them. In this context, the results of this study have future policy implications for the **school, teachers, students, parents and the PESP.**

Implication for school

There is a lack of trust and confidence among the school and the community regarding the PESP participant selection, management, and disbursement processes. The school should inform the parents of the selection criteria of the PESP and any type of negative influence of capital or symbolic capital on the selection process as well as on children's classroom participation and performance must be mitigated. A clear-cut policy about deduction of the PESP money must be formulated and disseminated clearly among the parents by the school. Ascribing rescinded PESP benefit to the non-poor good student is a detrimental policy adopted by the school. A school policy to improve poor children's performance level to meet the conditions of the PESP could enhance credibility of the school. Confiscating books from the PESP rescinded-children must be avoided to give them a chance for a second thought to starting school again; otherwise, it leads to a full stop.

The school should take appropriate action to address the issue of absence/truancy and low achieving children by providing them with adequate academic support by employing additional community teachers along with counselling services to enhance their motivation level to participate in the classroom activities and perform well. This will reduce the repetition rates and reduce the cost of education for poor families by shortening the number of years of primary schooling from 6/7 years to normal 5 years for those who repeat 1/2 times in different grades. Health related problem can cause developmental delay in the early life and without addressing such health and other poverty related problems through the school health programme, equal school participation for these poor children cannot be ensured. It appears from the study that this traditional approach to increasing quality of education by offering food or financial incentives to the family cannot be achieved. They often treat symptoms of inequality in education such as attendance, but fail to bring about equity in learning. The PESP aims at increasing "physical access" of the poor children, but

this has little to do with improving school quality and learning of the children. While, this PESP should not be treated as a scholarship programme for the best student rather it should be used as an equity resource to create a rich school and classroom culture to ensure equal opportunity for learning for all children. A rich school culture is dependent on many other extrinsic factors, and all of these aspects of education must be measured from a quality perspective.

Implication for teachers

The study revealed that the teachers were less involved in the PESP beneficiary selection process which implicates the higher role of the SMC and larger deviation in the selection process. To ensure proper distribution of the PESP benefit, all the teachers should be involved in the PESP beneficiary selection process. The study identifies low expectation of the teachers from the PESP benefit-receiving children that demoralises the children and lower their confidence level. Permanent placing in the backbench of the poor and PESP receiving children is a result of such a disparaging notion shared by both the student and teachers. Change in the perception of teachers is needed to allow congenial classroom sitting arrangement for the poor children to enhance their learning by means of placing them in the front benches at times when requires.

This study showed poor parent's concern over teachers' excesses in the classroom with the children who perform poorly. The teachers should treat all the children with caressing and caring manner in the classroom irrespective of their background and the PESP receiving parents should be given assurance that their children would not be punished. The teachers must stop promoting private tutoring by using the PESP money. The teachers should have an open discussion with the parents of the PESP receiving children who are supposed to get a reduced amount of PESP money and the parents must be informed of the diminution criteria properly.

Implication for parents

The PESP policy aims at improving demand for education and enhancing the expectation level of the poor parents of their children's education. However, the parents are not convinced that the PESP has anything to do with their motivation to send their children to

the school. Rather, they think, due to the conditions and teacher's negative attitudes many PESP receiving children are leaving school. Teachers, on the other hand, expect more cooperation and support from the parents to improve children's school readiness and developing their amicable behaviour at home. The parents therefore should be a part of the school readiness programme where available to bring these differing anticipations together. The parents are frustrated by seeing their children's lowest achievement in their grade and/or leaving school which they believe partially due to the PESP. Frequent parent teacher meetings can mitigate some of this mutual blame and the parents can play a supportive role in their children's learning. Use of the PESP money has always been an issue and the teachers usually blame the parents for not spending all the money on children's education. While, the parents reason that the PESP money is so little that it cannot help their children's education rather they spend more than the money they receive per month. It is true that the money itself is not sufficient to make a difference, but the parents should consider it as a motivating factor for children's education and should spend the money exclusively on education. On the other hand, the parents should show due respect to the teachers to create a good image of them which is a precondition for children's learning. The parents also should keep close contact with the schoolteachers to understand their children's individual learning needs to participate actively in their children's learning.

The study shows that many of the students are becoming victims of the PESP. Some of the parents are sending their children to the school one year early to get the PESP benefit. In most cases, these age-in grade incongruent children become the victim of castigation both from the part of teachers and from their own parents for not achieving minimum learning to keep the PESP benefit sustained. Many of these PESP receiving and low achiever children feel alienated from the classroom teaching and learning process and some of them resort to truancy to avoid beating and scolding. To avoid all these unwanted consequences, parents should be aware of the negative impact of early enrolment.

Implication for the PESP policy

For the poor families, the cost of education for more than one child is higher. The study reveals that the school is not providing money for the second child, which is a violation of

the PESP rule. The education administration should encourage the school to distribute the stipend to the poor and disadvantaged families according to the rules. The PESP should be taken as a part of equity intervention and it must be integrated into many other conditions of equity in education. The conditions are equity in access, equity in resources, equity in teachers' expectation, equity in learning materials, equity in access to the good teacher, and equitable transition to secondary school. Without fulfilling these conditions, PESP-money alone cannot improve access to quality education for poor children. The local education administration, in consultation with the school, should prepare a comprehensive plan to improve these equity conditions for PESP receiving children. The PESP aims at providing poor children with the necessary learning materials; however, none of the parents in this study felt that this is the case. The PESP policy should provide some essential learning materials to the PESP receiving children in addition to the direct grant monies.

Conditionality is found to be another weakness of the PESP which result in many poor children's' losing the stipend and consequently they need to repeat and leave the school. The programme should revoke conditions and let all the children continue up to primary cycle without the benefit rescinded and the money should go directly to the beneficiary mother's bank account to avoid disbursement related hazards. The study shows that the amount of PESP money is insignificant to the poor family to cover monthly costs of education, including private tuition fees requires continuing schooling with a minimum level of performance. It is therefore important to explore other benefits of the PESP such as poverty reduction, improvement in household nutritional level and women's empowerment which are also related to the objective of the PESP to understand the actual effects of the PESP. In that case, the PESP should be equated with other social security measures taken by the government of Bangladesh to protect the vulnerable group of people and the money should not be spent under education budget.

Looking back at Bourdieu in my work

I informed in the literature review chapter that my intention was to look into the reality of PESP programme participants regarding the impact of the programme on demand and supply of education through Bourdieu's key concepts of habitus, social field, capital, and

hysteresis effects. The study shows that due to certain dispositions and defined position in the society, newly introduced PESP benefits are not being utilised fully by the poor families. According to Bourdieu, habitus is structured by agent's past and present circumstance and the teachers and head teacher identified poor children's lack of school readiness, a big barrier to classroom participation, came from their family's lower position and disposition in the education field. The social field is dominated by those who start with a specific form of capital (economic, social, cultural, and symbolic capital) hold better position and reproduce more of the capital. The comparatively less poor families are found to have used their interpersonal relationship (social capital) to get access to the PESP benefit. The PESP is a sub field of the education field which was created by the government to change the fundamental beliefs or accepted assumption (doxa) that poor children cannot progress well in the education field. However, the study shows the wealthy people are also getting access to the PESP benefits which can be explained through Bourdieu's battle of transformation and preservation of the field by the poor and wealthy families. It was found that the poor families lagged behind in the battle due to their attitude and practices and lost the benefit to the children of privileged family-background and thus rich families with symbolic and economic capital won the dominant positions in this new education field structure. According to Bourdieu, in highly unequal societies, two social agencies are responsible for inculcating cultural capital: the family and the school. The implicit system of rewarding good performing student is accorded in the school system (institutional habitus) and thus agreed institutional success give the non-poor children access to the PESP benefit. This transfer of the PESP resource to the non-target household can be explained by hysteresis effect, a structural lag between opportunities and dispositions in reproducing structures in habitus. People rich in social, economic, and cultural capital, first pursue the new position and working classes move to the position slowly (Bourdieu, 1986).

Thus, the study shows an apparent conflict between educationally disadvantaged families, and the study school, regarding distribution and redistribution of the benefit, is common and sometimes, it takes the form of a severe beating of the poor low achieving and PESP receiving children. It seems from the study that the school and the parents' groups failed to acknowledge the reality of poor PESP receiving children and shifting the benefit to the

wealthy student with a disparaging notion to them. Permanent placing of the poor PESP receiving children in the backbench is also a result of such a disparaging notion. This disparaging notion (*habitus*) is inclusive of class, family, and individual experience and governs behaviour through unconscious perception of “what is reasonable to expect” (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Allocating continuous backbench sitting position for poorer children is a form of “symbolic violence” against them practiced by the teachers out of such reasonable expectation (Bourdieu and Passeron, 1990). Thus, this study sharpens our understanding about how the PESP benefit transfers to the non-poor families without any conflict between poor and non-poor families using some key concepts of Pierre Bourdieu.

7.6.2 Implication for future research

To generalize and confirm findings of this case study and to explore the role of PESP on household poverty reduction, long-term case studies are needed. The long-term case study may provide longitudinal data from the participating households and children that help in exploring the effects of the PESP on children’s school participation and achievement over time. Parental perception and participation in education and its effects on children can also be explored from those long-term case studies. In addition, future research could explore:

- Establishing relationships between the PESP and children’s performance; PESP and poverty; PESP and school completion, repetition and school leaving are crucial areas of investigation. A cross-sectional quantitative study, carried out with a fully representative sample, is imperative to establish those relationships.
 - An actual measure of student benefit including perception of the student about the benefit of the PESP in achieving quality education for poor children.
 - How an early school enrolment, in order to get access to the PESP money implicate high repetition rate owing to poor performance of the PESP receiving children.
- The effects of incongruent classroom on teaching-learning process and on student’s performance should also be examined using classroom observation technique to understand impact of the PESP on student’s learning.

These studies could help in understanding how inequalities are reproduced and how the PESP deals with those adversities within the existing social field (education).

7.6.3 Personal reflection about my research journey

If I look back into my journey in this research, it gives me a mottled and the meandering contour of a research issue selection, initially through developing research questions, taking a philosophical and methodological stance and analysing and writing this report. I had to shift and change my position frequently with the changes in my hypothetical position and suppositions as a researcher. The change in the social construction of equitable access to quality education due to the introduction of PESP was the main intent of my research in the very beginning. Later it was changed to focus on understanding the PESP participants and teachers and their views about the impact of the PESP in increasing equity in education and in the society at large. However, based on my supervisor's suggestion, I reflected on my issue systematically and understood the expanse of my research that included concepts of access, equity, and quality that are understood by parents, teacher, and head teachers in relation to the PESP. Later, I narrowed down the scope of my study and focused on the strengths and weakness of the PESP in assessing its effects in ensuring quality education for the poor children. Here, I had to shift myself from understanding long-term social changes to perceptual and phenomenal changes experienced by the programme participants due to the introduction of the PESP. In this way, varied adjustments were wrought depending on added knowledge about methodology, theoretical implications of research approaches and standardized research procedures. Selection of a case study method and selection of case and programme participants also went through a modification and changed with my increasing theoretical knowledge of research methodology. Moreover, in all the stages, I always relied on my reflexivity to give me new perspectives, insights, and an analytical strategy to conduct this research. The present knowledge which has come out of this research thus is procedural knowledge generated from the context and interpreted with reflection.

7.7 Contribution to knowledge

This study was initiated to understand perceptions of the teacher, head teacher, and parents of the PESP receiving children regarding how they saw the effects of the PESP and what were its strengths and weaknesses in achieving quality education for the poor children. Most of the studies on the PESP and Food for Education programme in Bangladesh show

around half of the benefits being used by non-poor families. However, it was not clear how the non-poor families were included in the selection process and why other people were silent about this unfair distribution. This study shows that in the first grade poor children are given the benefit but when conditionality is imposed in the upper grades, the poor children fail to meet the condition and the stipend goes to the non-poor families through their good performing children. The conditions play an important role to transfer the PESP benefit to the non-poor families and poor families had to accept the reality because of their children's perceived 'low ability' to sustain the benefit and parent's inability to spend more to compensate the 'low ability'. This is an important contribution to knowledge about how the PESP benefit transfers to the non-poor families with the help of conditions and how it is accepted in the society without any conflict between poor and non-poor families.

The second important contribution to knowledge is that the schoolteachers and the SMC want to spread the PESP benefit across the community to cover maximum families, even by breaking the existing rule to proffer two children the PESP benefit from a poor family if they study in the same school. This has happened partly due to the lack of understanding of the purpose of the PESP resource and partly because of the intensity of poverty in this area. This signifies the need for distribution of the PESP benefits based on the intensity of poverty in different parts of the country.

The most important contribution is the insignificance of the PESP in ensuring quality education for the poor children. The teacher, head teacher, as well as parents, mention the negative effects of the PESP on classroom environment, teaching and learning processes, and classroom management as a whole. Some parents see the PESP as a major cause of their children's estrangement with the school since they are unable to meet the competitive cost of private tutors that the school teachers recommend. It suggests that the school expects extra support from outside to ensure the quality of education for these PESP receiving poor children. This knowledge indicates the PESP money can attract some of the very poor children to the school, but it has the insignificant role in ensuring quality education for them.

Briefly, the PESP policy with its internecline problems, conditionality and undue influence of economic and symbolic capital, has failed to ensure quality education for poor children. However, the programme is used as a catchword for touting government's generosity and commitment towards providing equal opportunity for poor children, but in reality, it is not working well. Lack of materials, teachers' low expectations, lack of extra care in the classroom, and lack of compassion at home is alienating some poor PESP receiving children from the school, and the PESP resource shifts to the meritorious non-poor children. Thus, the PESP fails to ensure equitable access to quality education for poor PESP receiving children; rather it causes permanent social exclusion (WB, 2013) for some of these children and helps perpetuate social class system.

It is an expectation that the PESP money attracts poor children into the school and the school provides them with a quality education but this study suggests that the relationship is not so simple. It is found that the lower achievement targets and low expectation of teachers de-motivates poor children to learn and give the teacher a strong excuse for not being accountable for their low performance. Thus, a societal perception of the poor children's un-educability is established and it undermines the self-esteem and ambitions of poor children. The situation deteriorates further as a result of the lower level parent-teacher relationship due to the PESP allocation and distribution related conflicts that often end up with punishment for these children in the classroom. The study shows perfunctory school participation and truancy is emerging among the children who want to show their attendance only to sustain the PESP and those who want to avoid punishment and humiliation in the classroom. The study also revealed that the PESP invites private tutoring and competition for spending and it otherwise decreases public expenditure on education. Normally, perception of inequity in education is seen from the demand side perspective; however, the role of school and school system for bringing equity in education remains undisclosed and unattended. Finally, the study reveals that none of the parents, teacher, or head teacher acknowledge that the PESP money help provide quality education for the poor children and all these findings challenge the underlying principle of the PESP in Bangladesh.

In brief, the study argues that the PESP in Bangladesh fails to improve quality of education for the PESP receiving children; rather it spells sufferings for some children from the part of families as well as school as they cannot fulfil required conditions for the PESP. The PESP also increases private tutoring, decreases parent-teacher relationship and creates an unwelcoming classroom environment for the PESP receiving children. Therefore, the PESP of Bangladesh faces a serious question of why this programme should be continued and how this huge amount of spending on education can be justified.

REFERENCES

- Ahmad, I., Said, H., and Khan, F. (2013) Effect of Corporal Punishment on Students' Motivation and Classroom Learning, *Review of European Studies*; Vol. 5, No. 4. Published by Canadian Centre of Science and Education. Retrieved 26/12/2016 from www.ccsenet.org/journal/index.php/res/article/viewFile/.
- Ahmad, Q.K., Ahmed, K.S., Islam, M.S., Sinha, N.C., Banu, N., Majumder, M.H.K., Ullah, S.S.H., and Sultana, M.M. (2007) *Financing Primary and Secondary Education in Bangladesh*, Education Watch Report 2006, Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE) Bangladesh.
- Ahmed, A.U., and Babu, S.C. (2007) *The Impact of Food for Education Programmes in Bangladesh*, Case Study #3-8 of the Programme: Food Policy for Developing Countries: The Role of Government in the Global Food System. Retrieved 18/07/2012 from <http://cip.cornell.edu/dns.gfs/1200428158>.
- Ahmed, A.U. (2004) *Assessing the Performance of Conditional Cash Transfers for Girls and Boys in Primary and Secondary Schools in Bangladesh*. Working Paper, IFPRI. Retrieved 12/04/2012 from <http://www.lcgbangladesh.org/fsn/reports/ifpri.pdf>.
- Ahmed, A.U., and Arends-Kuenning, M. (2003) *Do Crowded Classrooms Crowd out Learning? Evidence from the Food for Education in Bangladesh*, Food Consumption, and Nutrition, International Food Policy Research Institute. Retrieved 02/03/2011 from <http://www.ageconsearch.umn.edu/bitstream/16415/1/fc030149.pdf>.
- Ahmed, A.U., and Ninno, C.D. (2002) *The Food for Education in Bangladesh: An Evaluation of Its Impact on Educational Attainment and Food Security*, FCND Discussion Paper No. 138, Food Consumption and Nutrition Division, IFPRI. Retrieved 02/03/2011 from <http://www.ifpri.cgiar.org/sites/138.pdf>.

- Ahmed, M. (2011) "Education in Bangladesh: Anatomy of Recent Progress" in Ahmed. M. (Ed.) *Education in Bangladesh: Overcoming Hurdles to Equity with Quality*. Dhaka: BRAC University Press and University Press Limited.
- Ahmed, M., Nath, S. R., Hossain, A., Kabir, M., Kalam, A., Shahjamal, M., Yasmin, R. N., Zafar, T. (2005) *Quality with Equity: The Primary Education Agenda*, Education Watch 2003/4, Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE), Bangladesh.
- Al-Samarrai, S. (2009) *The Impact of Governance on Education Inequality: Evidence from Bangladesh*, Public Administration and Development, Volume 29, Issue 3, pages 167–179.
- Al-Samarrai, S. (2008) *Governance and Education Inequality in Bangladesh: Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters*, Background Paper Prepared for the EFA Report, 2009. Retrieved 08/05/2013 from unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0018/001800/180086e.pdf.
- Al-Samarrai, S. (2007a) Changes in educational attainment in Bangladesh, 2000-2005. *Working paper prepared for the 2007 Bangladesh poverty assessment, World Bank*: 37. Retrieved 17/05/2013 from http://www.siteresources.worldbank.org/.../08_Changes-in-educational-attainment-in.
- Al-Samarrai, S. (2007b) Financing Basic Education in Bangladesh, *CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph, No. 12, University of Sussex: Centre for International Education, Brighton, UK.
- Amin, S. and Chandrasekhar, S. (2009) *Looking Beyond Universal Primary Education: Gender Difference in Time Use Among Children in Rural Bangladesh*, Working Paper No. 17, Population Council, New York. Retrieved 08/06/2013 from www.ungei.org/infobycountry/files/017.pdf.

- Antonowicz, L. (2010) *Too Often in Silence: A Report on School Based Violence in West and Central Africa*. Retrieved 21/12/2016 from https://www.unicef.org/cotedivoire/Too_often_in_silence_Report.pdf
- Apple, M.W. (2000) *Official Knowledge*, London: Routledge.
- Arends-Kuenning, M., and Amin, S. (2004) School Incentive Programmes and Children's Activities: The Case of Bangladesh, *Comparative Education Review*, Vol. 48, No. 3, pp. 295-317.
- Arif, M.S., and Rafi, M.S. (2007) Effects of Corporal Punishment and Psychological Treatment on Students' Learning and Behaviour, *Journal of Theory and Practice in Education*, Vol. 3(2): pp.171-180. Retrieved 21/12/2016 from files.eric.ed.gov/fulltext/ED502020.pdf.
- Arnold, R. (2005) Equity in Public Education, *Manitoba Association of School Superintendents*, Volume 2 Issue 1. Retrieved 18/05/2013 from www.mern.ca/reports/equity.pdf.
- Assadulla, N.M., Chaudhury, N., and Dar, A. (2006) *School Choice and Cognitive Achievement in Rural Bangladesh*, South Asian Human Development Sector, Report No. 15. Retrieved 25/01/2014 from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/bitstream/handle/10986/17821/380120BD0Schoolchievement001PUBLIC1.txt?sequence=2>.
- Attanasio, O., Fitzsimons, E., Gomez, A., Gutierrez, M.I., Meghir, C., and Mesnard, A. (2010) Children's Schooling and Work in the Presence of a Conditional Cash Transfer in Rural Colombia, *Economic Development and Cultural Change*, Vol. 58, No. 2, The University of Chicago Press. Retrieved 03/08/2011 from <http://www.jstor.org/stable/10.1086/648188>.
- Baez, J.E., and Camacho, A. (2011) *Assessing the Long-term Effects of Conditional Cash Transfers on Human Capital: Evidence from Colombia*, World Bank. Retrieved 02/03/2013 from www.econ.yale.edu/conference/neudc11/papers/paper_420.pdf.

- BANBEIS (2011) *Ministry of Education, Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh*. Retrieved 16/07/2013 from <http://banbeis.gov.bd/data/index.php>
- Bangladesh Legal Aid and Services Trust & Institute of Informatics and Development (2012) *Survey Report on Violence against Children in Education Institute Settings*, Institute of Informatics and Development.
- Barrientos, A., and DeJong, J. (n.d.) Child Poverty and Cash Transfers, *Childhood Poverty Research and Policy Centre*, CHIP Report No. 4. Retrieved 06/15/2012 from www.childhoodpoverty.org.
- Bassett, L. (2008) *Can Conditional Cash Transfer Programmes Play a Greater Role in Reducing Child Undernutrition?* SP Discussion Paper Number 0835, Social Protection and Labour, The World Bank. Retrieved 12/11/2013 from siteresources.worldbank.org/.../Resources/SP-Discussion.../0835.pdf
- Bastagli, F. (2010) *Poverty, Inequality and Public Cash Transfers: Lessons from Latin America*. The paper presented in the Conference on Experiences and Lessons from Social Protection Programmes Across the Developing World, Paris, 17-18, June, 2010. Retrieved 17/04/2015 from eprints.lse.ac.uk/.../Poverty%20inequality%20and%20public%20cash%20
- Baxter, P., and Jack, S. (2008) Qualitative Case Study Methodology: Study Design and Implementation for Novice Researchers, *The Qualitative Report*, Volume 13, No. 4, pp. 544-559. Retrieved 06/27/2014 from www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR13-4/baxter.pdf.
- Baulch, B. (2010) *The Medium-Term Impact of the Primary Education Stipend in Rural Bangladesh*, IFPRI Discussion Paper 00976, Poverty, Health, and Nutrition Division.
- BBS (2014) *Bangladesh Bureau of Statistics*. Retrieved 10/06/2014 from <http://www.bbs.gov.bd/home.aspx>.

- Behrman, R.J., Sengupta, P., and Todd, P. (2005) Progressing Through PROGRESA: An Impact Assessment of a School Subsidy Experiment in Rural Mexico. The University of Chicago. *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 54 (1): 237–275.
- Behrman, J.R., Sengupta, P. and Todd, P. (2000) *The Impact of PROGRESA on Achievement Test Scores in the First Year*. International Food Policy Research Institute. Retrieved 02/04/2016 from citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?rep=rep1&type=pdf...1.
- Bell, J. (2005) *Doing Your Research Project: A Guide for First-time Researchers in Education, Health and Social Science*, Open University Press.
- Berg, S.V.D. (2008) Poverty, and Education, Education Policy Series, 10, *International Academy of Education and International Institute for Education and Planning* (IIEP), UNESCO. Retrieved 12/11/2013 from www.iiep.unesco.org/fileadmin/user_upload/Info.../EdPol10.pdf.
- Besley, T. and Canbur, R. (1990) *The Principles of Targeting*, Working paper, Policy, Research and External Affairs, World Bank.
- Bourdieu, P. (2004) *Science of Science and Reflexivity*. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1993) *Sociology in Question*, R. Nice (trans.), London, Sage.
- Bourdieu, P., and Wacquant, L.J.D. (1992) *An Invitation to Reflexive Sociology*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Bourdieu, P., and Passeron, J.C. (1990) *Reproduction in Education, Society and Culture*, Sage Publications, London.
- Bourdieu, P., and Wacquant, L. (1989) “Towards a Reflexive Sociology: A Workshop with Pierre Bourdieu”, *Sociological Theory* 7(1), 26-63.

- Bourdieu, P. (1986) "Forms of Capital" in *Handbook of Theory and Research for the Sociology of Education*, edited by John, G. Richardson. New York: Greenwood Press.
- Bourdieu, P. (1985) The Social Space and the Genesis of Groups, *Theory and Society*, Vol. 14, No. 6. Pp. 723-744. Retrieved 11/05/2016 from https://is.muni.cz/el/.../BOURDIEU_The_social_space_and_the_genesis_of_groups.pdf.
- Bourdieu, P. (1984) *Distinction, A Social Critique of the Judgement of Taste*, Routledge, London.
- Bourdieu, P. (1977) *Outline of a Theory of Practice*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
- Bowles, S., and Ginties, H. (2002) Schooling in Capitalist America Revisited. *Sociology of Education*, Vol. 75, No. 1, pp. 1-18. Retrieved 21/01/2014 from www.santafe.edu/~bowles/SchoolCapitalistAmerRevisit.pdf.
- Bowles, S., and Nelson, V.I. (1974) *The Inheritance of IQ and the Intergenerational Reproduction of Economic Inequality*, The review of Economics and Statistics, Volume 56, Issue 1, pp. 39-51. Retrieved 19/06/2014 from <http://tuvalu.santafe.edu/~bowles/InheritanceIQ1974.pdf>.
- Bray, M. (2007) *The Shadow Education System: Private Tutoring and its Implications for Planners*, Paris, UNESCO.
- Breton, R. J.L. (1997) *Atlas of the Languages and Ethnic Communities of South Asia*, London: Sage Publications.
- Brown, P.A. (2008) A Review of the Literature on Case Study Research, *Canadian Journal for New Scholars in Education*, Volume 1, Issue 1. Retrieved 02/03/2013 from <http://www.cjnse-rcjce.ca/ojs2/index.php/cjnse/article/viewFile/23/20>.

- Bryman, A. (2008) *Social Research Methods*, Oxford University Press.
- Bureau of Non-formal Education (BNFE, 2006) *A policy Framework for Non-formal Education*, Dhaka.
- CAMPE (2015) *Report Card Survey on Primary Education in Eight Selected Unions of Bangladesh*, Dhaka, Bangladesh: Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE).
- Chowdhery, AMR., Chowdhury , R.K., and Nath, S.R. (1999) *Hope not Complacency: State of Primary Education in Bangladesh*, Campaign for Popular Education, The University Press Limited.
- Cohen, L. and Manion, L. (1994) *Research Methods in Education*, fourth edition, Routledge, London and New York.
- Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K. (2000) *Research Methods in Education*, 5th Edition, Routledge, Falmer.
- Cohen, J.E., and Bloom, D.E (2005) Cultivating Minds, *Finance and Development*, a Quarterly Magazine of the IMF, Volume 42, No. 2. Retrieved 25/03/2014 from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/fandd/2005/06/cohen.htm#author>.
- Cohen, L., Manion, L., and Morrison, K. (2007) *Research Methods in Education*. Routledge, London and New York.
- Colclough, C., Rose, P. and Tembon, M. (2000) Gender inequalities in primary schooling: the roles of poverty and adverse cultural practice. *International Journal of Educational Development* 20 (1), 5–29.
- Cox, J., Cody, J., Fleming, J., and Miller, M. (2012) *Seat Assignment Contribution to Student Performance in an Information technology*, Northeast Section Conference, Reviewed Paper, University of Massachusetts, Lowell. Retrieved 16/12/2013 from asee-ne.org/proceedings/2012/PM_3111.pdf.

- Day, S. (2012) A Reflexive Lens: Exploring Dilemmas of Qualitative Methodology Through the Concept of Reflexivity. *Qualitative Sociology Review* 8(1):60-85. Retrieved 29/12/2015 from http://www.qualitativesociologyreview.org/ENG/archive_eng.php.
- Deer, C. (2008) “*Doxa*” in Michael Grenfell (ed.) Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, Acumen Publishing Limited.
- Downen, J., Finan, T., Gomes, M., and Walters, T. (2011) *School Feeding in Bangladesh: A Mixed Method Impact Evaluation*, Tango International, Report number, OE/2011/024, Office of Evaluation, World Food. Retrieved 12/12/2013 from documents.wfp.org/stellent/groups/public/documents/.../wfp241997.pdf.
- Dzhumashev, R., Islam, A., and Khan, Z.H. (2010) *Non-collusive corruption: Theory and Evidence from Education Sector in Bangladesh*, Monash University, Department of Economics, Discussion Paper No. 38/10. Retrieved 07/05/2013 from <http://www.buseco.monash.edu.au/eco/research/papers/2010/3810noncollusivedhomashevislamkhan.pdf>.
- English in Action (2009) *English Competence among School Students, Teachers and Adults in Bangladesh*, Baseline study1.
- Fahmi, M. (2007) Equity on Access of Low SES Group in the Massification of Higher Education in Indonesia, Working Paper in *Economics and Development Studies*, Department of Economics, Padjadjaran University, Centre for Economics and Development Studies. Retrieved 07/05/2013 from lp3e.fe.unpad.ac.id/wopeds/200709.pdf.
- Filmer, D., and Schady, N. (2010) Does More Cash in Conditional Cash Transfers Always Lead to Larger Impacts on School Attendance, *Journal of Development Economics*. Retrieved 07/05/2013 from www.elsevier.com/locate/deve.

- Gentilini, U. (2007) *Cash and Food Transfers: A Primer*, World Food, Rome, Italy, Occasional Papers No. 18. Retrieved 20/02/2014 from http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/OP18_Cash_and_Food_Transfers_Eng%2007.pdf.
- GOB (2015) *EFA 2015 National Review Bangladesh*, Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, Report Submitted to UNESCO.
- GOB (2014a) *Millennium Development Goals, Bangladesh Progress Report, 2013*, General Economics Division, Bangladesh Planning Commission, Retrieved 18/05/2015 from www.bd.undp.org/.../banglades.
- GOB (2014b) *Impact Evaluation Study of Reaching Out of School Children (ROSC) Project of the Ministry of Primary and Mass Education*. Carried out by Implementation Monitoring and Evaluation Division (IMED), Ministry of Planning. Conducted by Bangladesh Institute of Development Studies (BIDS).
- GOB (2013a) *Bangladesh Primary Education Stipends: A Qualitative Assessment*, Directorate of Primary Education, PPRC and UNICEF, Retrieved 15/01/2015 from www.unicef.org/bangladesh/Bngladesh_Primary_Education_Sti.
- GOB (2013b) *Bangladesh Primary Education Annual Sector Performance Report (ASPR)*, Monitoring and Evaluation Division, Directorate of Primary Education.
- GOB (2012) *Bangladesh Primary Education Annual Sector Performance Report (ASPR)*, Third Primary Education Development Programme.
- GOB (2011a) *National Education Policy (2010)*, Ministry of Education.
- GOB (2011b) *National Skills Development Policy (2011)*. Ministry of Education, Government of Peoples Republic of Bangladesh, Dhaka.
- GOB (2011c) *Sixth Five Year Plan, FY 2011-FY 2015: Accelerating Growth and Reducing Poverty*, Part-1, Strategic Directions and Policy Framework.

GOB (2011d) *Stipend Projects for Primary School Students*, Ministry of Primary and Mass Education. Retrieved 10/03/2014 from http://www.mopme.gov.bd/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=426&Itemid=492.

GOB (2011e) *Perspective Plan 2011-2021*. Dhaka: Planning Commission.

GOB (2008) *Bangladesh EFA MDA National Report 2001-2005*. Ministry of Primary and Mass Education. Government of the People's Republic of Bangladesh, Agamoni Printing, and Publishing Co. Dhaka, Bangladesh.

GOB (2006) Non-formal Education (NFE) Policy, Ministry of Primary and Mass Education, Government of the Peoples Republic of Bangladesh.

GOB (2005) *Bangladesh Unlocking the Potential, National Strategy for Accelerated Poverty Reduction*, General Economic Division, Planning Commission, IMF Country Report No. 05/410. Retrieved on 16/09/2012 from <http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/scr/2005/cr05410.pdf>.

GOB (2003) *Education for All: National Plan of Action II, 2003-2015*, Ministry of Primary, and Mass Education. Retrieved 10/06/2014 from www.planipolis.iiep.unesco.org/upload/.

GOB (1990) *Primary Education (Compulsory), Act, 1990*. Act No. 27.

GMR (2010) *Reaching the Marginalized, Education for All*, UNESCO. Retrieved 10/05/2014 from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001373/137333e.pdf>.

GMR (2009) *Overcoming inequality: why governance matters*, EFA. Retrieved 20/03/2012 from www.unesco.org/education/gmr2009/press/EFA_GMR_complet.pdf.

GMR (2005) *Education for All, The Quality Imperative*. Retrieved 10/05/2014 from <http://unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001373/137333e.pdf>.

- Golafshani, N. (2003) Understanding Reliability and Validity in Qualitative Research, *The Qualitative Report*, Volume 8 Number 4, pp. 597-607. Retrieved 24/02/2013 from <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR8-4/golafshani.pdf>.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1994) *Competing Paradigms in Qualitative Research*. In Denzin, N.K. and Lincoln, Y.S. (Eds.), *Handbook of Qualitative Research*, pp.105-117. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
- Guba, E. G., & Lincoln, Y. S. (1989) *Fourth Generation Evaluation*. Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Grunbaum, N.N. (2007) Identification of Ambiguity in the Case Study Research typology: What is a Unit of Analysis? *Qualitative Market Research: An International Journal*; Vol. 10, No. 1, Emerald Group Publish. Retrieved 28/06/2014 from www.emeraldinsight.com/1352-2752.htm.
- Ghuman, S, Behrman, J. R. and Gultiano (2006) Children's Nutrition, School Quality and Primary School Enrolment in Philippines, *Working Paper Series*, Volume, 2006-24. Retrieved 24/02/2013 from wherehouse.icek.jp/user03/833_182_20110622112913.pdf.
- Hallak, J. (1969) *The Analysis of Educational Costs and Expenditure*, UNESCO, IIEP, the Netherlands. Retrieved 10/05/2016 from unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0007/000763/076370eo.pdf.
- Harber, C., and Mncube, V. (2012) Democracy, Education and Development: Theory and Reality, *The Journal of Education Alternatives*, Vol. 1, Issue 1. Pp. 104-120. Retrieved 02/01/2017 from www.othereducation.org/index.php/OE/article/download/6/16
- Harber, C., and Sakade, N. (2009) Schooling for Violence and Peace: How does Peace Education Differ from 'Normal' Schooling? *Journal of Peace Education*, Vol. 6, No. 2: pp. 171-187. Retrieved 21/12/2016 from <http://www.tandf.co.uk/journals/titles/17400201.asp>

- Harber, C. (2004) *Schooling as Violence: How Schools Harm Pupils and Societies*. London: Routledge, Falmer.
- Hardy, C. (2008) “*Hysteresis*” in Michael Grenfell (ed.) *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, Acumen Publishing Limited.
- Haugen, C.R. (2011) *Educational Equity in Spain and Norway: A Comparative Analysis of Two OECD Country Notes*, *Education Policy*, 25 (4) 688-715. Retrieved 10/08/2011 from epx.sagepub.com at University of Sussex Library.
- Heise, L.L. (2011) *What Work to Prevent Partner Violence? An Evidence Overview*, Working Paper. Centre for Gender Violence and Health, London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine. Retrieved 01/01/2017 from <https://www.oecd.org/derec/49872444.pdf>
- Hossain, N. (2009a) *Rude Accountability in the Unreformed State: Informal Pressures on Frontline Bureaucrats in Bangladesh*, IDS Working Paper 319. Retrieved 15/02/2014 from <http://r4d.dfid.gov.uk/PDF/Outputs/CentreOnCitizenship/Wp319.pdf>.
- Hossain, N. (2009b) *School exclusion as social exclusion: The practices and effects of a conditional cash transfer programme for the poor in Bangladesh*. CPRC Working Paper 148. Manchester, UK: Chronic Poverty Research Centre.
- Hossain, A. (2010) Age in Grade Congruence and Progression in Basic Education in Bangladesh, *CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph, No. 48, University of Sussex: Centre for International Education, Brighton, UK.
- Hossain, A. and Zeitlyn, B. (2010) Poverty and Equity: Access to Education in Bangladesh, *CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph, No. 51, University of Sussex Centre for International Education, Brighton, UK.
- Hossain, A. et al (2003) *Classroom Situation at Primary Level*, Research and Evaluation Division (RED) of BRAC, Bangladesh.

- Hossain, M.A., Nessa, M., and Kafi, M.A. (2015) Challenges of Teaching English Language at the Primary Level School in Bangladesh, *Banglavisian*, Volume 15, No. 1. Retrieved 27/04/2016 from bv-f.org/VOL-15/01.%20BV%20Final.pdf
- Hossain, N. and Osman, F. (2007) Politics and Governance in the Social Sectors in Bangladesh, 1991-2007, *Research Monograph Series* No. 34, Research and Evaluation Division, BRAC Bangladesh.
- Kane, E. (2004) *Girls' Education in Africa: What do We Know about Strategies that Work?* Africa Region Human Development Working Paper Series, Washington DC: World Bank.
- Khandker, S., Pitt, M., and Fuwa, N., (2003) *Subsidy to Promote Girls' Secondary Education: The Female Stipend Programme in Bangladesh*, World Bank, Brown University, International Rice Research Institute, Chiba University. Retrieved 07/07/2010 from <http://mpa.ub.uni-muenchen.de/23688/>.
- Koshy, V. (2005) *Action Research for Improving Practice: A Practical Guide*, Paul Chapman Publishing.
- Lambert, C., Jomeen, J., and McSherry, W. (2010) Reflexivity: A Review of the Literature in the Context of Midwifery Research. *British Journal of Midwifery*, Vol. 18, No 5. Pp. 321-326,
- Laugharn, P. (2001) *Negotiating Education for Many: Enrolment, Dropout and Persistence in the Community Schools of Kolondieba, Mali. CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph, No. 14, University of Sussex, Centre for International Education, Brighton, UK.
- Levin, B. (2003) *Approaches to Equity in Policy for Lifelong Learning, Equity in Education*. A Paper Commissioned by the Education and Training Policy Division, OECD, for the Equity in Education Thematic Review. Retrieved 21/08/2012 from www.oecd.org/edu/innovation-education/38692676.pdf.

- Lewin, K.M. (2007a) Improving Access, Equity and Transitions in Education: Creating a Research Agenda, *CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph No 1. Brighton: University of Sussex.
- Lewin, K.M. (2007b) Expanded Access to Secondary Schooling in Sub-Saharan Africa: Key Planning and Finance Issues *CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph No. 8. Brighton: University of Sussex.
- Lincoln, Y. S., & Guba, E. G. (1985) *Naturalistic Inquiry*. Sage, Newbury Park London, New Delhi, India.
- Lodhi, M.S., and Siddiqui, J.A. (2014) Attitude of Young Towards Corporal Punishment- A Case of Karachi, IOSR, *Journal of Humanities and Social Science* (IOSR-JHSS) Vol. No.19, Issue 12, pp. 85-89. Retrieved 21/12/2016 from www.iosrjournals.org
- Malmi, A. (2012) *Conditional Cash Transfers in the African Context: An Explorative Study on the Impacts of CCTs in Burkina Faso*. Retrieved 24.09.2016 from <https://se.linkedin.com/in/anna-helena-malmi-b754abb9>.
- Mathura, B.T. (2016) *Indigenous Language: Preservation and Revitalization: Articles 13, 14 and 16 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples*. The paper presented at the International Expert Group Meeting at the Department of Economic and Social Affairs, UN, New York. Retrieved 04/05/2016 from www.un.org/esa/socdev/unpfii/documents/2016/.../Paper_Mathura2.pdf.
- Maton, K. (2008) “*Habitus*” in Michael Grenfell (ed.) *Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts*, Acumen Publishing Limited.
- Mncube, V., and Harber, C. (2013) *The Dynamics of Violence in South African Schools: Report 2012*, UNISA, College of Education. Retrieved 28/12/2016 from http://www.unisa.ac.za/static/corporate_web/Content/Colleges/CEDU/Ima

- Morrow, S.L. (2005) Quality and Trustworthiness in Qualitative Research in Counseling Psychology, *Journal of Counseling Psychology*, Vol. 52, No. 2, 250-260. Retrieved 12.05.2015 from www.safranlab.net/uploads/7/6/4/6/.../quality__trustworthiness_2005.pdf.
- Morshed, K.A.M. (2009) *Social Safety Nets in Bangladesh*, UNDP.
- Moustakas, C. (1990) *Heuristic Research: Design, Methodology and Applications*, Newbury Park, CA: Sage.
- Mruck, K. & Breuer, F. (2003) Subjectivity and Reflexivity in Qualitative Research, *Qualitative Social Research*, 4 (2), Art. 23. Retrieved 18/03/2013 from <http://nbn-resolving.de/urn:nbn:de:0114-fqs0302233>.
- Nash, R. (1999) Bourdieu, 'Habitus', and Educational Research: Is It All Worth the Candle, *British Journal of Sociology of Education*, Vol.20, No. 2, pp. 175-187. Retrieved 14/07/2016 from <https://kabartersiar.files.wordpress.com/.../bourdieu-habitus-and-educatio>.
- Nath, S.R., and Chowdhury, A.M.R. (2009) *State of Primary Education in Bangladesh: progress Made, Challenges Remained*, Campaign for Popular Education (CAMPE), Bangladesh.
- Nath, S.R., Haq, M.N., Begum, U.S., Ullah, A., Sattar, M.A., and Chowdhury, AMR. (2008) *The State of Secondary Education: Quality and Equity Challenges*, Education Watch, 2007, CAMPE, Bangladesh.
- Naz, A., Khan, W., Daraz, U., Hussain, M., and Khan, Q. (2011) The Impacts of Corporal Punishment on Students' Academic Performance/Career and Personality Development Up-to Secondary Level Education in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa Pakistan, *International Journal of Business and Social Science* Vol. 2 No. 12, pp. 130-140. Retrieved 25/12/16 from www.ijbssnet.com/journals/Vol._2_No._12;_July_2011/15.pdf.

- Ngware, M.W., Ciera, J., Musyoka, P.K., and Oketch, M. (2013) The Influence of Classroom Seating Position on Student Learning Gains in Primary Schools in Kenya, *Creative Education*, Vol. 4, No. 11, pp. 705-712. Retrieved 27/01/2014 from <http://www.scirp.org/journal/ce>.
- Norton, G., Hanna, M.J., Josef, N., and Simon, F. (2005) *Equity in Education, Thematic Review, Finland*, Country Note. Retrieved 17/06/2012 from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/49/40/36376641.pdf.
- Northwest Regional Educational Laboratory (NREL, 1997) *The Fourth R: Responsibility, Ensuring Educational Excellence Through Equitable and Effective School Practice: An Equity Handbook for Learning Communities*, Centre for National Origin, Race and Sex Equity, Portland, Oregon.
- Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD, 2008) *Policy Brief, Ten Steps to Equity in Education*, OECD Observer. Retrieved 04/02/2012 from www.oecd.org/dataoecd/21/45/39989494.pdf.
- Park, A., and Brown, P.H. (2002) Education and poverty in rural China, *Economics and Education Review*, No. 21, 2002, pp. 523-541. Retrieved 18/12/2013 from www.researchgate.net/...Education_and_poverty_in_rural_China/.../e0b4.
- Patrinos, H. A. (2005) *Demand-side Financing in Education*, *The International Academy of Education*, The International Institute for Educational Planning (IIEP), Education Policy Series, 7. Retrieved 27/05/2012 from <http://www.smec.curtin.edu.au/iae/>.
- Patton, M.Q. (2002) *Qualitative Research and Evaluation Methods*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Patton, M.Q. (1990) *Qualitative Evaluation and Research Methods*, Second Edition, SAGE Publications.
- Patton, M. Q. (1980) *Qualitative evaluation methods*. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage.

- Peshkin, A. (1988) In search of subjectivity – one's own. *Educational Researcher*, 17 (7), 17–22. Retrieved 11/06/2015 from blogs.ubc.ca/qualresearch/files/2008/02/17.pdf
- Pigozzi, M. J. (2004) *Quality Education and HIV/AIDS*. Draft, June. Paris, UNESCO. Retrieved 07/10/2013 from www.ibe.unesco.org/.../ICE47/.../4-QualityEducationandHIV%20-E.pdf.
- Pole, C., and Lampard, R. (2002) *Practical Social Investigation, Qualitative and Quantitative Methods in Social Research*, Pearson Education Limited.
- Punch, K. F. (2006) *Developing Effective Research Proposals*, (Second Edition) SAGE Publication Ltd.
- Punch, K.F. (2005) *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*, SAGE Publication Ltd.
- Punch, K.F. (1998) *Introduction to Social Research: Quantitative and Qualitative Approaches*, Thousand Oaks, SAGE Publication Ltd.
- Raja, D.R. (2012) *Country Technical Notes on Indigenous Peoples' Issues: People's Republic of Bangladesh*, Retrieved 10.07.2016 from <https://www.ifad.org>.
- Raynor, J., and Wesson, K. (2006) The Girls' Stipend Programme in Bangladesh. *Journal of Education for International Development*. 2:2. Retrieved 08/07/2010 from <http://www.equip123.net/JEID/articles/3/Girls'StipendProgrammeinBangladesh.pdf>
- Rawlings, L.B., and Rubio, G.M. (2003) *Evaluating the Impact of Conditional Cash Transfer Programs: Lessons from Latin America*. Retrieved 06/01/2015 from info.worldbank.org/etools/docs/.../Dc%202003/.../dc2003/.../ccteval.pdf.

- RDRS (2015) *Citizen's Actions to Enhance Development Impact of the ROSC Project-II Project in Northwest Bangladesh*, Project Completion Report, Retrieved 12/07/2016 from ptfund.org/wp-content/.../CARTA-ROSC-Project-Completion-Report.pdf
- Reimers, F., DeShano da Silva, C. and Trevino, E. (2006) *Where is the Education in Conditional Cash Transfers in Education?* Montreal, UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved 15/10/2013 from unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001476/147635e.pdf.
- Ribas, R.P., Soares, F.V, and Hirata, G.I. (2008) *The Impact of CCTs: What We Know and What We Are Not Sure About, in Poverty in Focus, Cash Transfers: Lessons from Africa and Latin America*, International Poverty Centre, Number 15. Retrieved 04/05/2016 from www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCPovertyInFocus15.pdf.
- Rubin, H. J., and Rubin, I. S. (2012) *Qualitative Interviewing: The Art of Hearing Data*: Sage. Los Angeles/ London/New Delhi/Singapore/Washington DC.
- Rumberger, R.W. (2010) Education and the Reproduction of Economic Inequality in the United States: An Empirical Investigation, *Economics and Education Review*, Volume 29, pp. 246-254. Retrieved 19/06/2013 from <http://jrnetserver.shorensteincnte.netdna-cdn.com/wp-content/uploads/2011/08/EdInequality.pdf>.
- Sabates, R., Hossain, A., and Lewin, K. M. (2013) School Drop Out in Bangladesh: Insights Using Panel Data. *International Journal of Educational Development*, 33 (3): 225-232.
- Santos, V.F.D., Vieira, W.D.C., and Reis, B.D.S. (2009) Effects of Alternative Policies on Income Redistribution: Evidence from Brazil, *Development Policy Review*, 27 (5): 601-616. Retrieved 21/12/2013 from m.referencerepository.com/...5/jrnl:Development%20Policy%20Review.

- Save the Children (2011) *SHIKHON: Reaching Marginalized Children with Quality Education in Rural Bangladesh*. Research Report.
- Sayed, Y. (2008) *Education Decentralization in South Africa: Equity and Participation in the Governance of School*, Background Paper Prepared for the Education for All Global Monitoring Report, 2009, Overcoming Inequality: Why Governance Matters. UNESCO 2009. Retrieved 22/11/2012 from unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0017/001787/178722e.pdf.
- Scarlato, M. and Agostino, G. (2016) *The Political Economy of Cash Transfers: A Comparative Analysis of Latin American and Sub-Saharan African Experiences*. Retrieved 25.09.2016 from <http://www.gsdr.org/document-library/the-political-economy-of-cash-transfers-a-comparative-analysis-of-latin-american-and-sub-saharan-african-experiences>.
- Schleicher, A. (2009) *Securing Quality and Equity in Education: Lessons from PISA*, Prospects, 39: 251-263. Retrieved 17/03/2013 from doi: 10.1007/s11125-009-9126-x.
- Schurmann, A.T. (2009) *Review of the Bangladesh Female Secondary School Stipend Project Using a Social Exclusion Framework*, University of North Carolina, Chapel Hill, USA. Retrieved 09/11/2013 from www.pubfacts.com/author/Anna+T+Schurmann.
- Schultz, T.P. (2001) *School Subsidies for the Poor: Evaluating the Mexican Progresa Poverty Programme*, Economic Growth Center, Center Discussion Paper No. 834, Yale University.
- Silverman, D. (2005) *Doing Qualitative Research*. Sage Publications Ltd, London, UK.

- Skoufias, E. And Quisumbing, A. (2005) Consumption Insurance and Vulnerability to Poverty: A Synthesis of the Evidence from Bangladesh, Ethiopia, Mali, Mexico and Russia, *European Journal of Development Research*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 24-58. Retrieved 23/11/2013 from <https://www.amherst.edu/media/view/.../Skoufias%20and%20Quisumbin>.
- Soares, S, Osorio, R.G., Soares, F. V., Medeiros, M., and Zepeda, E. (2007) *Conditional Cash Transfer in Brazil, Chile, and Mexico: Impacts Upon Inequality*, International Poverty Centre, Working Paper No. 35. Retrieved 25/08/2013 from www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCWorkingPaper35.pdf.
- Sommers, C. (2013) Primary Education in Rural Bangladesh: Degrees of Choice, Access and Participation of the poorest, *CREATE Pathways to Access*, Research Monograph No. 75.
- Spencer, L., Ritchie, J., Lewis, J., & Dillon, L. (2003) *Quality in Qualitative Evaluation: A Framework for Assessing Research Evidence*. London: National Centre for Social Research. Retrieved 10/02/2014 from www.civilservice.gov.uk/wp.../a_quality_framework_tcm6-38740.pdf.
- Sprietsmaa, M. (2008) *Education Economics: Effect of Relative Age in the First Grade of Primary School on Long-term Scholastic Results*: International Comparative Evidence Using PISA 2003, Centre for European Economic Research, Mannheim, Germany. Retrieved 23/10/2013 from <ftp://ftp.zew.de/pub/zew-docs/dp/dp07037.pdf>.
- Srivastava, P. (2009) A practical Iterative Framework for Qualitative Data Analysis, *International Journal of Qualitative Methods*. Retrieved 20/05/2016 from citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.553.8985&rep=rep1
- Stenbacka, C. (2001) Qualitative Research Requires Quality Concepts of its Own. *Management Decision*, 39(7), 551-555.

- Straus, M. A. (1991) A Discipline and Deviance: Physical Punishment of Children and Violence and Other Crime in Adulthood: *Social Problems*, 38 (2): 205-206, cited in Naz, et al. (2011).
- Stuppia, L., Cieri, F., Antonucci, I., and Gatta, V. (2010) Gene Environment Interaction in the Determination of Human Intelligence and Behavior, *Official Journal of World Association of Cultural Psychiatry*, Reviewed Article. From where and when?
- Tagliacollo, V.A., Volpato, G.L., and Junior, A.P. (2010) Association of Student Position in Classroom and School Performance, *Educational Research*, Vol. 1 (6) pp. 198-201. Retrieved 13/11/2013 from interesjournal.org/ER/Abstracts/.../July/Tagliacollo%20et%20al.htm.
- Thomson. P (2008) "*Field*" in Michael Grenfell (ed.) Pierre Bourdieu: Key Concepts, Acumen Publishing Limited.
- Tietjen, K. (2003) *The Bangladesh Primary Education Stipend Project: A Descriptive Analysis: Bangladesh Primary Education Stipend Project: A descriptive Analysis*. World Bank. Retrieved 12/08/2010 from <http://siteresources.worldbank.org/EDUCATION/Resources/278200-1099079877269/547664-1099080014368/BangladeshStipend.pdf>.
- Tucker-Drob, E.M., Rhemtulla, M., Harden, K.P., Turkheimer, E., and Fask, D. (2011) Emergence of a Gene x Socioeconomic Status Interaction on Infant Mental Ability Between 10 Months and 2 Years, *Psychological Science*, Vol. 22, No. 1, pp. 125-133.
- UNDP (2009) *Conditional Cash Transfer Schemes for Alleviating Human Poverty: Relevance for India*, Lasting Solution for Development Challenges, Discussion Paper 1, UNDP India. Retrieved 14/12/2013 from www.undp.org/content/dam/india/docs/cct_dp.pdf.

UNICEF (2015) *Corporal Punishment of Children in Bangladesh*, Report Prepared by the Global Initiative to End all Corporal Punishment of Children. Retrieved 26/12/2016 from www.endcorporalpunishment.org.

UNICEF (2014) *All Children in School by 2015, Global Initiative on Out-of-School Children: South Asia Regional Study, Covering Bangladesh, India, Pakistan and Sri Lanka*, Retrieved 12/07/2016 from www.uis.unesco.org/.../out-of-school-children-south-asia-study.

UNICEF (2013) *Know Yours Rights: United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples for Indigenous Adolescent*, Retrieved 05/07/2016 from files.unicef.org/.../rights/files/HRBAP_UN_Rights_Indig_Peoples.pdf.

UNICEF (2011) *Tackling Violence in Schools: A Global Perspective*, Document Prepared for the High-Level Expert Meeting, Oslo, Norway. Retrieved 26/12/2016 from <http://srsg.violenceagainstchildren.org/sites/default/files/consultations/sc>

UNICEF (2010): *Basic Education and Gender Equality*.

UNICEF (2009) *Opinions of Children of Bangladesh on Corporal Punishment: Children's Opinion Poll 2008*, Dhaka: UNICEF & Ministry of Women and Children Affairs) (UNICEF, 2015)

UNICEF (2001) *Corporal Punishment in Schools in South Asia*. Report Submitted to the Committee on the Rights of Child Day of General Discussion on Violence Against Children. UNICEF Regional office for South Asia Kathmandu, Nepal. Retrieved 25/12/2016 from <http://www.crin.org/en/docs/resources/treaties/crc.28/UNICEF-SAsia-Subm>.

UNESCO (2001) *Transparency in Education: Report Card in Bangladesh* by Shahnaz Karim, International Institute for Educational Planning, Paris. Retrieved 18/03/2012 from unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0013/001390/139031e.pdf.

- USAID (2008) *Education from a Gender Equality Perspective* by EQUATE Project.
Retrieved 18/10/2013 from http://www.usaid.gov/our_work/cross-cutting_s/wid/pubs/Education_From_a_Gender_Equality_PerspectiveFinal.pdf.
- Watt, D. (2007) On Becoming a Qualitative Researcher: The Value of Reflexivity, *The Qualitative Report* Volume 12 No. 1, pp 82-101. Retrieved 10/05/2016 from <http://www.nova.edu/ssss/QR/QR12-1/watt.pdf>.
- Willms, J. D. (2006) *Learning Divides: Ten Policy Questions about the Performance and Equity of Schools and Schooling Systems*. UIS Working Paper 5, Montreal: UNESCO Institute for Statistics. Retrieved 23/09/2013 from unesdoc.unesco.org/images/0014/001470/147066e.pdf.
- Wolcott, H. (1994) *Transforming Qualitative Data: Description Analysis and Interpretation*, Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage Publications.
- Wood, J., Norley, A., Lansdown, G., Harding, P., Nasreen, M., Haq, N., and Saleque, A (2002) *Bangladesh Assessment of Primary Education Development Programme (PEDP)*, Education for Change, DFID, UK. Retrieved 02/05/2013 from www.efc.co.uk.
- World Bank (2015) *The state of social safety nets*. Washington, DC: World Bank.
Retrieved 25.09.2016 from <http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/415491467994645020/The-state-of-social-safety-nets-2015>.
- World Bank (2013) *Bangladesh Education Sector Review, Seeding Fertile Ground: Education that Works for Bangladesh*, Human Development Sector, South Asia Region, Report No. 80613-BD. Retrieved 08/05/2014 from <https://openknowledge.worldbank.org/.../806130ESW0BD0E00Box379>.

- World Bank (2008) Education for All in Bangladesh: Where Does Bangladesh Stand in Achieving the EFA Goals by 2015? *Bangladesh Development Series*, Paper No. 24, Human Development Unit, South Asia Region. Retrieved 12/24/2009 from www.worldbank.org.bd/bds.
- World Bank (2006) *Social Safety Nets in Bangladesh: An Assessment*. Bangladesh Development Series-Paper No. 9. Retrieved 18/10/2013 from www.worldbank.org.bd/bds
- WFP (2012) School Feeding Fact Sheet. Retrieved 09/05/2016 from <http://www.wfp.org/sites/default/files/SF%20factsheet.pdf>
- Yanow, D. (1996) *How Does a Policy Mean?* Interpreting Policy and Organizational Actions. Georgetown University Press.
- Yin, R. K., (2009) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, Applied Social Research Series, Volume, 5, Sage India, Pvt. Ltd.
- Yin, R. K. (2003) *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*. Applied Social Research Method Series Volume 5, Sage Publications, Thousand Oaks, London, New Delhi.
- Zeitlyn, B. (2010) *Growing up Glocal in London and Sylhet*, Anthropology Dphil Thesis, University of Sussex.
- Zepeda, E. (2006) *Do CCTs Reduce Poverty?* One pager No. 21. Brasilia, Brazil: UNDP International Poverty Centre. Retrieved 12/24/2011 from www.ipc-undp.org/pub/IPCOnePager21.pdf.

Annex 1

Interview schedule with the teacher of a selected primary school in Bangladesh

Access

- What is the enrolment policy of your school?
- What impact does the PESP/policy have on enrolment process?
- Do all the children of your school catchment area enrol in your school?
- What happens to the rest if not all enrol in this school?
- Who usually left out of the school?
- Why do (some) children fail to enrol in the school, in spite of PESP benefit for them?

Role of PESP in ensuring access to school resources (strengths and weaknesses)

- Do all the children of your school get free new books?
- Is there any relationship between getting PESP benefit and having old books?
- Do all the children have their required learning materials?
- Who usually lack the learning materials and why?
- How does the PESP ensure learning materials for the poor children?

Access to teachers in relation to PESP

- What is the teacher student ratio in your school? How PESP influence the ratio?

- Is there any policy to have additional teachers in accordance with concentration of more PESP receiving learners' in the classroom? How it work?
- Does PESP have any influence on seating arrangement of the children in the classroom? How it work?
- Do you have strategy to pay special attention to the PESP holder learners for better performance? How it work?

How PESP contribute to ensure quality education for poor children?

- Does PESP policy have influence on quality education? How it influence?
- Who are under the risk of low quality education from the school? Why?
- Do all the children in the same class learn equally? What are the reasons for differences in achievement?
- Who are the minimal achievers? Why?

Policy formulation process

- What is the goal and objectives of the PESP?
- How long your school is implementing PESP?
- How this PESP was initiated?
- What was the process of design of this PESP?
- Do you think it could be different if take opinion of the people before introduction of this PESP in the school? How?

Conditions

- What are the selection criteria for PESP beneficiary and how strictly were those imposed?

- What are the conditions of getting PESP benefits?
- How the students and parents are made aware of the conditions related to the stipend?
- Are girls given any preference for allocating PESP benefit?
- How attendance and achievement records are verified, checked, and preserved?
- What happen to the disqualified children?
- What happen to the money deducted from the children who cannot fulfil the conditions
- What was the community feeling about the conditions?
- What are the impacts of these conditions (enrolling children in different schools)

Disbursement/ Implementation

- What was the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money?
- Whom the money was disbursed and how was it verified?
- Why the money is given to mothers? What were the consequences of this condition?
- How do the parents take part in PESP disbursement process?

Advantages and disadvantages (impacts of PESP)

- How helpful was PESP for ensuring child's school participation (enrolment, attendance). How?
- How helpful was the PESP for ensuring child's quality education (achievements, grades, etc.). How?
- Was the stipend money enough to meet all the cost of education of the children?
- Do all illegible students get the PESP benefits? Who excluded, why?

- How can PESP be better functioning in ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children?
- What are your suggestions for improving equitable access to basic education for all children?

Annex 2

Interview schedule with the head teacher of a selected primary school in Bangladesh

Access

- What is the enrolment policy of your school?
- How does it influenced by the PESP policy?
- How does PESP help in ensuring all poor children's school enrolment and achievement?

How PESP influence the resource allocation process in the school?

- New books allocation
- Learning materials assurance
- Classroom facility distribution
- Teacher allocation (teacher student ratio)

Ensuring quality education for all children

- How PESP helps in ensuring quality education for all children?
- Is there any differential achievement level for different groups of children?
Who are achieving less from the school? Why?
- Has the PESP something to do with this differential school performance?

Equity in relation to PESP

- How PESP help in bringing about equity in primary school education?
- If not, what are the reasons? What else can be done?

PESP policy processes (policy formulation and implementation)

- What is the goal and objectives of the PESP?
- How do you implement the policy in your school?
- How much time do the teachers spend in implementing PESP?
- How do the community people perceive of the effects of PESP? Why?
- How does the PESP influence school community relationship and how do you resolve the conflict, if any?

Effects of PESP on Classroom culture

- What are the effects of the PESP on classroom teaching and learning process?
- How it influence classroom management and school operation as a whole?

Annex 3

Interview guide with the parent of primary school completed children with PESP (2 parents)

Introduction

- Family background
- Settlement (permanent or migrated/in/out)
- Family member, occupation, income, relative socioeconomic status

About the child

- Birth and infancy of the child (health history, immunisation)
- Adequate/inadequacy of attention (any types of physical or learning disabilities)
- Schooling age (how the child was enrolled and by whom, enrolment process)

Access in relation to PESP

- Goal and objective of the PESP
- Process of PESP involvement
- Why the child was enrolled in this (study) school (expectation of the parents)
- Has PESP anything to do with enrolling your child in this school? How/why not?

- Do all the children coming from all background get PESP benefit? Who get and why?
- Do you think there is a relationship between having new books and getting PESP? How?
- Do you think there is a relationship between PESP participation and getting teacher's special attention in the classroom? Why and why not?
- Is there any influence of PESP on seating arrangement of the children in the classroom? Why and how? Where did your child usually sit? Why?

Quality in relation to PESP

- Has this school provided expected quality education to your child? Why/why not?
- Is there any relationship between getting PESP money and getting quality education? How? If not, why?
- Who do better in the classroom performance, PESP holder, or non-PESP holder learners? Why?
- What are the ways of getting better quality education other than PESP?

Conditions of PESP

- What were the conditions of getting PESP benefits?
- How the students and parents are made aware of the condition related to the stipend?
- How do you see these conditions of PESP? Did your child consistently maintain the conditions? How? Why not?

Disbursement/ Implementation

- What was the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money?
- Whom the money was disbursed and how it was verified?
- Why the money is given to mothers? What were the consequences of this condition?
- What did you do with the money? (How money was spent?)
- How much money did your child get as PES? Was it transparent?

Effects of the PESP

- Was the stipend money enough to meet all the cost of education? How much money you had to pay per month in addition to the PESP money? Why?
- Do all illegible students get the PESP benefits? Who excluded, why?
- What are your suggestions for improving quality of education for all children?

Annex 4

Interview guide with the parent of school leaver children with PESP (2 parents)

Introduction

- Family background
- Settlement (permanent or migrated/in/out)
- Family member, occupation, income, relative socioeconomic status

About the child

- Birth and infancy of the child (health history, immunisation)
- Adequate/inadequacy of attention (any types of physical or learning disabilities)
- Schooling age (how the child was enrolled and by whom, enrolment process)

Access to education

- Why the child was enrolled in this (study) school (expectation of the parents)
- What were the requirements for child's enrolment (birth certificate, recommendations, catchment area, etc)
- Do you face any type of reluctance from the school's part in enrolling the child in this school? Why/why not and how it was overcome. (Regarding

age of the child, excessive enrolment pressure, merit of the child, or social class, etc)

- Had PESP anything to do with enrolling your child in this school? How/why not?
- If there was no PESP, would you enrol the child in the school? Why/why not?
- Do you think there is a relationship between having new books and getting PESP benefit? How?
- Has PESP anything to do with seating arrangement of the children in the classroom? Why and how? Where did your child usually sit? Why?
- Was your child treated equally in the classroom? Why?

Quality in relation to PESP

- Is this school providing expected quality education for all the children? Why/ why not?
- The children who get PESP money, are they all getting quality education? How? Who are/aren't getting quality education?
- What are the other means of getting better quality education other than PESP?

School leavers related

- Did your child get adequate teachers' attention before school leaving? Why? Why not?
- If your child did not get quality education, what was the point for continuing PESP for sometimes, or for such other children?
- Do all the children with PESP money are getting equal benefit from the school?

- What are the reasons for getting differential benefits from the same school?
- How all children can get equal benefits from the school irrespective of their background? Why it is important?

Selection process of PESP participants

- What is the goal and objectives of the PESP?
- How many years did your child get PESP money before school leaving?
- What were the selection criteria for PESP beneficiary?
- How your child was selected for the benefit?
- Do all the eligible poor children receive the stipend money?

Conditions of PESP

- What were the conditions of getting PESP benefits?
- How the students and parents are made aware of the condition related to the PESP?
- How do you see these conditions of PESP?
- Did your child consistently maintain the conditions?
- How many children were disqualified?
- How your child was disqualified?
- What happen to other disqualified children?

Disbursement/Implementation

- What was the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money?
- Whom the money was disbursed and how was it verified?
- How much money did your child get as PES?
- Did you get full amount of money for each tranche?
- How transparent the process of determining deduction?

Use of PESP money

- What did you do with the money? (How money was spent?)
- Was the amount adequate for your child's education?
- How much money you had to spend per month in addition to the PESP money? Why?
- How often were you consulted and asked to use the money for your child's education only? Who told you that?

School leaving process and PESP

- What are the reasons for your child's school leaving in spite of PESP involvement? Why PESP was unable to stop dropping out?
- Was s/he becoming irregular in attending the school?
- Was s/he repeated in the grade as a resultant?
- Did your child become low achiever in the class? Why?
- Was his/her school leaving something to do with the conditions of PESP?

Effect of the PESP on classroom culture

- Where did your child usually seat in the classroom?
- Did your child get extra care from the teacher?
- What teachers expected from you to improve your child's class performance?
- What is teacher's attitude towards your child's educational progression?

Effects of the PESP on parent teachers' relationship

- Do you think the relationship with the school/teachers has been affected due to the PESP? How?
- What effect of this deteriorated relationship impacted on your child's school performance?

Suggestions for improvement of PESP

- How can PESP be better functioning in ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children?
- What are your suggestions for improving access to basic education for all children?

Annex 5

Interview guide with the parent of low performing children (two parents) with PESP

Introduction

- Family background
- Settlement (permanent or migrated/in/out)
- Family member, education of family members
- Occupation, income, relative socioeconomic status (qualitative information not amount/number)

About the child

- Birth of the child
- Infant stages of the child (nimble, laggard, talking age, etc)
- Morbidity (health history)
- Adequate/inadequacy of attention (any types of physical or learning disabilities)
- Schooling age (how the child was enrolled and by whom, enrolment process)

Access and PESP

- Why the child was enrolled in the school (expectation of the parents)

- Do they face any type of reluctance from the school's part in enrolling the child? If yes, what types of grudging? How this restiveness was resolved? (enrolment history)
- How much were you encouraged by PESP money in enrolling your child?
- Have the child offered new or old books? What was the impact of old book on students' morality?
- Does the child have adequate learning materials? How does it influence child's school participation?
- Where do your child seat in the class, (first bench, last bench), why?
- Is your child treated equally in the classroom? If not, what were the reasons?
- Does the child have equal teachers' attention? Why is this differential treatment?
- Does economic and social status have influence on teacher's behaviour?

PESP and Quality of education

- Why did the parent choose this school for his/her your child?
- Is this school providing expected quality education to your child? The reasons for maintaining and not maintaining expected quality.
- Do all the children from all background participate in school equally?
- Do all the children get equal benefit from the school?

Low achievement

- Does your child learn equally in the school?
- How wide is the range of differences in achievement?
- What are the reasons for these differences in achievement?
- Do all the PESP receiving children remain such low achiever? Why? Why not?

- What is the impact of this very low achievement of your child on further education and on his/her life?

Primary Education Stipend Project

- What was the goal and objectives of the PESP?
- What are the selection criteria of PESP benefit?
- How your child was selected for the benefit?
- Do all illegible students were selected? Are they all receiving the stipend money? Why not?
- Who are presently getting this benefit?

Conditions of PESP

- What are the conditions of continuing PESP benefit?
- How the students and parents are made aware of the conditions related to the stipend?
- Could your child fulfil the conditions of PESP?
- Do you think these conditions are necessary? Why? Why not?
- What proportions of children usually are disqualified? Who decide who will be disqualified?
- Are these conditions helping in archiving expected goals of PESP?
- Are girls given any preference?

Disbursement of the money

- What is the schedule and process for disbursement of the stipend money?
- Whom is money disbursed to and how is it verified?
- Why the money is given to mothers?
- What do you do with the money? (How money is spent?)

- How much money does your child get as PES? Is the process of disbursement transparent?
- Is the stipend amount adequate to meet the cost of education of your child?

Impact of PESP on learning

- How your child is doing in the school in terms of achievement?
- Why does your child become low achiever in the classroom? How?
- Does s/he enjoy the school activities? How do you understand that?
- As an under achiever, is s/he becomes irregular attendee?
- Is s/he becomes at the risk of grade repeater or already repeated?
- Why the PESP money fails to ensure better learning for your child?
- How has it affected the overall learning situation of the school?
- Is PESP creating a differential effect on child performance from different background?
- What can make your child's education more effective and role the PESP can play in this regard?

Impact of PESP

- How has it affected the overall learning situation of the school?
- How can PESP be better functioning in ensuring equitable access to quality education for all children? (What are your suggestions for improving equitable access to basic education for all children?)

Annex 6

Interview number

1. Mother of a dropout boy
2. Mother of a school completed girl
3. Mother of a school completed boy
4. Mother of a low achiever girl
5. Mother of a dropout boy
6. Mother of a low achiever girl
7. A teacher of the study school
8. The head teacher of the study school