Non-participants' support for protest violence: the role of the perceived political context

Volume 1 of 2

by

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I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

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Signature.....

“As long as there is resistance, there is hope”

Kong Tsung-gan

Contents (Volume 1)

Chapter 4: Beyond peaceful protest: When non-participants support violence against the police

Chapter 5: Solidarity with those who hit the streets: Public opinion and support for protesters' self-defence actions when the right to protest is restricted

Chapter 6: Discussion

Volume 2

List of tables

List of figures

Context statement

This thesis has been prepared as a series of papers for publication. The exceptions to this are Chapter 1 and Chapter 6, which serve as the introduction and discussion chapters respectively and are more similar to the traditional thesis formatting. In Chapter 1, I provide an overview of the thesis as a whole, a literature review of the main addressed topics, and a concise explanation of the methods employed in each study. Moreover, in Chapter 6, I present my main findings, discuss their theoretical and practical implications, as well as the limitations of my studies. Also, I make some suggestions for future research and remark the conclusions of my work.

Chapter 2 has been published; therefore, the text within this chapter is the same as that of the published paper. Chapters 3 and 4 are in preparation to be submitted to specialized journals, while Chapter 5 is in preparation to make it available on an open access pre-print service (PsyArXiv).

Each paper's reference is provided on the title page of each chapter. A single reference list for all chapters is provided at the end of the thesis. All figures and tables have been numbered so as to be consistent with the chapter numbers. When I refer to a chapter of this thesis within another chapter, I cite both the paper's reference as well as the corresponding chapter in this thesis.

Regarding the authorship of the papers included in this thesis, myself and Professor John Drury (main academic supervisor) are the authors of Chapters 2, 4, and 5. Chapter 3 was written by the authors mentioned above and Dr Matthew Easterbrook (second academic supervisor). It is

worth mentioning that Chapter 3 received feedback from anonymous reviewers in the context of two submission processes for academic journals.

I am the lead author on all papers included in this thesis. This means that I was responsible for data collection, conducted all the analyses, wrote the first and final draft of each chapter, and I am the corresponding author of the published paper.

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Last but not least, I want to thank my family for their continuous and unconditional support during my PhD journey. Even though I was thousands of miles away from home, I always felt they were with me all the time. In particular, I want to thank my mother, Maria Eliana, for teaching me the values of hard-working, discipline and self-improvement; my father, Luis, for show me the importance of kindness; my sister, Natalia, for being the bravest and the best of us; and my brother, Daniel, for his willingness to help me all the time no matter what.

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Non-participants' support for protest violence: The role of the perceived political context.

Summary

Psychological research on collective action has suggested that protesters may change their ideas about the legitimacy of protest violence when police actions are perceived as illegitimate and indiscriminate. However, no research has explored yet whether a similar process can be experienced by those who do not take an active part in protests, i.e., non-participants. In this thesis, I argue that non-participants may support protesters' violence against the police as a function of people's perceptions of the political context where protests take place: the restrictions imposed by authorities (the government and the police) and the legitimacy public opinion gives to protests.

Combining sociological and psychological theory and research, Chapter 2 describes the development and validation of a scale of measurement of people's perceptions of their political context (Subjective Political Openness, SPO-R). Then, in Chapter 3, employing SPO-R, I suggest that non-participants may support protesters' violence against the police following a rationale centred on the perceived restrictions imposed on the right to protest, and public opinion's legitimisation of protests.

In Chapter 4, I argue that the rationale stated above is based on a dilemma non-protesters face when supporting or opposing protest violence: advocating peaceful protest versus defending the right to protest against authorities' restrictions. The dilemma implies that non-participants may hold contradictory ideas about protest violence, and that its use can be legitimised as self-defence when protesters have to confront authorities who restrict the right to protest. Finally, Chapter 5 covers the idea that non-participants' support for self-defence actions may be considered as an act of political solidarity with those who hit the streets triggered by authorities' restrictions, public opinion's legitimisation of protests, and own opinions about the right to protest.

Chapter 1

Overview of research

1. Introduction

'Cuando al pueblo lo atacan con balas, no se va a defender con consignas' /

'When bullets are fired at people, people will not defend themselves chanting slogans.'

Anonymous Chilean guerrilla commander.

From 1973 to 1990, Chile was under the rule of a brutal military dictatorship (led by Augusto Pinochet) that systematically violated human rights and restricted fundamental civil rights, such as the right to protest. However, and unlike the reign of terror the military junta imposed throughout the country, the transition to a democratic regime started peacefully. Thus, in October 1989, in a national referendum that took place after years of protests (at that time unlawful) and negotiations between politicians and the junta, Chileans refused to be ruled by Pinochet for another eight years.

One of the unintended consequences of the referendum was the emergence of a historical myth that persists among Chileans, 'we defeated Pinochet in a ballot, with a pen and a piece of paper'. Although exploring the origin of this myth is beyond this thesis, its impacts on Chilean people's life encouraged me to research the relevance of the perceived political context on people's support for protest violence for two reasons. First, the myth assumes that the resistance to the dictatorship, and the subsequent triumph of democratic political forces, was mainly based on peaceful protests and a set of political agreements with the dictatorship. Even though this assumption has been reinforced by many people,

including politicians from all sides, and many scholars, it is only partially right. Despite the fact that since 1983 Chileans organised series of peaceful protests against the dictatorship, it is no less true that during the same events, university students clashed with the police, built barricades, threw stones and petrol bombs at police officers to fight against repression (see Salazar, 2006). In addition, people in the suburbs carried out more or less the same actions to confront military police incursions that were aimed at avoiding any attempt to organise protests (see Schneider, 1991). Thus, an accurate description of the Chilean resistance against the dictatorship should account for both peaceful and violent actions (including three revolutionary guerrillas) employed by Chilean people in self-defence (as in the opening quotation) and their potential impact on public opinion (see Salazar, 2012, for a discussion).

A second reason to be considered is the fact that after democratic authorities took over the country (in 1990), the same political leaders that some years before had taken to the streets to fight against the dictatorship, they looked down on any protests to maintain an organised country centred 'in the well-functioning of its institutions'. Consequently, although lawful, for many years politicians and a large portion of the population, considered protests as undesirable activities aimed at disturbing social peace (see Cummings, 2015, for a discussion). In line with this, protest violence (mainly carried out in the suburbs after commemorative rallies) was systematically depoliticised in news coverage and associated with mere criminality. Thus, based on the foundational myth about defeating a dictatorship following an institutional procedure (i.e., voting), protests in Chile were scarce during the first democratic governments. Protesters were stigmatised by both political authorities and public opinion.

Fortunately, the situation described above started to change in 2006 after a massive series of protests led by high school and university students that demanded structural reforms to the national educational system (see Salazar, 2012). In contrast to what happened to previous protests, public opinion granted strong support for the 2006 student movement and subsequent social movements despite government condemnation and police repression (see Grugel & Singh, 2015, for a review). Indeed, although some politicians have insisted in stigmatising protesters by using labels such as 'useless and subversive people' (see "Carlos Larrain: No nos va a doblar la mano", 2011), or 'barbarians' for those who joined protest violence (see Basoalto, 2018), currently a large portion of Chileans have reconsidered protests as political actions they have the right to carry out. Even though the current situation is much better than in the past, those Chileans who take part in protests have to face a difficult situation. On the one hand, protests are lawful activities with the only restriction being that government officials have to authorise their routes. On the other hand, police brutality is a constant that people, both protesters and non-participants, have to assume will occur once a protest takes place. In other words, while Chilean political authorities show tolerance to protests, police force actions go in the opposite direction – as has been already condemned in several international Human Rights reports (e.g., Human Right Watch, 2017).

The account presented above is useful to understand the roots of the work reported in this thesis on protest violence as self-defence actions, the relevance of the perceived political context, and non-participants' support for protest violence against the police as a function of authorities' restrictions to the right to protest.

1.1 Literature Review

1.1.1 Why do research on non-participants' support for protest violence against the police? Before explaining the importance of focusing this research on attitudes to protest violence against the police, I want to make clear what should be understood as a protest. As protests themselves are a type of collective action, it is crucial to define first what collective action is, and then differentiate protests from more complex phenomena such as social movements. From a sociological point of view, Snow, Soule, and Kriesi (2004) argue that collective action can be defined as "any goal-directed activity engaged in jointly by two or more individuals. It entails the pursuit of a common objective through joint action" (p.6). Despite the fact that this definition is useful to understand the basis of collective action, I agree with Wright, Taylor, and Moghaddam (1990), who, from a social-psychological perspective, hold that the understanding of collective action cannot be reduced to the number of people involved. Therefore, beyond considering joint actions as a requirement, individual actions carried out on behalf of specific groups should also be considered as collective action.

Although the definition of collective action may include an extensive set of human behaviours (e.g., flash mobs) protests are different from other types of collective action mainly because they are inherently political and contentious. This means that protests are aimed at advocate for changes in specific policies and living conditions at the societal level, while they seek to mobilise public opinion or other third-parties in their favour (see Lipsky, 1968).

Concerning their organisation, protests may be more or less structured, being coordinated by diverse political or non-political actors using various channels (e.g., the internet; see Kim, 2019), while the existence of formal leaders is not a requirement (e.g., Kim & Kim, 2009; Lee & Chan, 2018). Whatever the mechanisms of coordination and organisation are, protesters typically assembly in a specific point to take to the streets and raise their demands. Because of the latter, Della Porta (1999) considers that whatever the actions protesters carry out, protests always involve a disruption of public order and in most cases, police are involved in managing them. An exception for this definition are those new forms of protests that have emerged with the expansion of the internet, 'online protest' or 'online activism' (e.g., Lewis, Gray, & Meierhenrich, 2014; Micó & Casero-Ripollés, 2014; van den Broek, Langley, & Hornig, 2017). Even though protests that do not involve physical interaction among people and take place in virtual spaces instead of in the streets are exciting phenomena, I excluded them from my definition of protests because their particular dynamics are far beyond the scope of this thesis.

Regarding the difference between protests and social movements, it is worth noting that whereas protests are activities that social movements may organise in a specific time and place to reach their goals, social movements are broader phenomena which last longer than a single event, may coordinate diverse activities throughout time (e.g., rallies, boycotts, road blockades, occupy buildings), and employ varied strategies (i.e., peaceful, violent, or a combination of both) (e.g., Seidman, 2015; Snow et al., 2004, for a discussion). Furthermore, Rucht (1998) suggests two key characteristics that differentiate social movements from protests. First, social movements seek a new societal order instead

of being centred in solving specific issues (e.g., a tax increase) as protests do. Second, unlike protests, social movements are embedded in an extensive network of groups and organisations that may help them to reach the expected social change. However, similar to what happens in the study of social movements, there exist multiple voices and views concerning goals, expected success, and allowed actions among protesters. Accordingly, protests cannot be characterised as uniform entities. Thus, along with peaceful actions, protesters may also take part in protest violence (e.g., throwing stones at the police, damaging buildings) as a form of collective violence (see Tilly, 2003) that may result of either pre-planned strategies or spontaneous reactions to immediate adversities (e.g., police brutality).

Another similarity with social movements is that rather than taking place in a vacuum, protesters' actions are contextually and historically situated. Consequently, a proper definition of protests should acknowledge that the actions people may carry out and legitimate in a protest would depend on the type of regime (e.g., authoritarian or democratic), the actions other people carried out in the past, and the interactions between people and authorities in a specific time and place (see Koopmans, 2004b, for a discussion; Tilly, 2008).

As I have defined protests, a concise overview of how the psychological literature has addressed protests and protest violence, in particular, may be useful. At the time of writing, a considerable amount of psychological research has focused on protests (see van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013, for an overview). However, concerning the study of protest violence, two main social-psychological approaches should be distinguished. The

first of these approaches comprises those works whose primary theoretical reference is the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren, 2013; van Zomeren, 2016; van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2008). Those works have concentrated their efforts on exploring diverse antecedents for people's willingness to join or support different protesters' actions, such as group-based anger (e.g., Tausch et al., 2011), implicit theories about social change (see Shuman, Cohen-Chen, Hirsch-Hoefler, & Halperin, 2016), the efficacy of specific actions (see Saab, Spears, Tausch, & Sasse, 2016), and attitudes toward protests (see Sweetman, Maio, Spears, Manstead, & Livingstone, 2019). Indeed, most of these works shared a characteristic to evaluate people's actions: the use of a binary categorisation, normative (e.g., sign petitions) and non-normative (e.g., building barricades). It should be stressed that this categorisation is associated with the pervasive idea that to gain legitimacy protests should be (and remain) peaceful (see Wright et al., 1990). Consequently, in these works, protest violence (e.g., throwing missiles at the police) is considered as a non-normative action though not all the actions included in this category involve the use of physical violence or have the police as the main target.

With respect to the idea that protests should be peaceful, the right to peaceful protest is included in the universal rights of freedom of expression and assembly (see Howie, 2018, for a discussion). However, Jarman and Hamilton (2009, for a discussion) have pointed out that restricting the right to protest to peaceful actions is problematic because it ignores the potential existence of tensions during protests and people's reasons for taking part in violent confrontations. Indeed, from my point of view, this is the main problem of those works that include the binary categorisation normative and non-normative to evaluate protesters' actions. Unfortunately, rather than solving the shortcomings related to the

normative categorization mentioned above, some scholars have contributed to the stigmatisation of those who for whatever reason participate in protest violence by relating these actions to 'extremism' or 'radicalization' processes (e.g., Schumpe, Bélager, Giacomantonio, Nisa, & Brizi, 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014; Thomas, McGarty, & Louis, 2014).

The second social-psychological approach relevant to understanding protest violence is the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2018, for a review; Stott & Drury, 2000). Unlike SIMCA, ESIM seeks to explain crowd behaviour, including protests, based on social identity processes and intergroup dynamics. Thus, according to the ESIM, protest violence may be explained by the emergence of new norms of conflict due to changes in the relationship between protesters and the police (i.e., non-violence is conditional on the contextual situation). The latter means that (some of those) protesters who consider protests should be peaceful may change their minds if the police actions are perceived as illegitimate (i.e., put the right to protest under threat) and indiscriminate (i.e., non-selective use of force by police officers). As a result, people may start to see police officers as adversaries of the crowd (i.e., 'us' vs 'them') against whom it is now legitimate to use violence as self-defensive action or as collective retaliation.

ESIM's explanation (see Drury & Reicher, 2018) of the mechanisms through which violence may become a legitimate action has helped to dispel the myth that crowds (as protests) are inherently violent and irrational (e.g., Le Bon 1895/2002), while it has stressed that these conflicts are situated in a historical context where social identity plays

a crucial role. Also, ESIM has suggested that people may carry out different actions during protests depending whether they deal with police officers engaged in guaranteeing people's right to protest, or with police officers who carry out unfair procedures on protesters. Indeed, recent research has expanded the scope of ESIM by stressing the importance of social identity on people's judgments about the fairness of police procedures. In short, Radburn, Stott, Bradford, and Robinson (2018) suggest that people are more willing to cooperate with the police, the more that people perceive police procedures are fair and the more that people identify with police officers.

Considering the antecedents mentioned above, why study protest violence? In particular, why study protest violence against the police? A first tentative answer to this may be that even though ESIM has considered the historical context where collective action and protest violence takes place, social-psychological research has barely conducted a systematic study of both the political context in which protesters are immersed and the actors that shape this context (e.g., government officials, the police, and policymakers). More importantly, to my knowledge, no psychological research has addressed how either the restrictions or tolerance of the political context concerning protests may help protest violence gain legitimacy among non-participants. To put it differently, few psychological studies have considered protests (e.g., Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2003; Subašić, Reynolds, & Turner, 2008) and protest violence (see Drury, Ball, Neville, Reicher, & Stott, in press), as something more than a mere clash between two groups in conflict (e.g., advantaged and disadvantaged groups; protesters and the police) or have considered the measures imposed by political authorities on protests in their analyses protest violence. Moreover, why do research on violence against the police? The main reason for this is that police officers are usually the main representative of political authorities during protests (see

Lipsky, 1980, for a discussion), according to the specific arrangements (e.g., police autonomy) that exist between these actors in each country.

A second tentative answer to the question of why conducting research on protest violence against the police is necessary is related to the diverse interpretations people may give to the use of violence. On the one hand, some works have stressed that protesters may legitimise protest violence according to the actions the police carry out during a mobilisation process (see Drury & Reicher, 2018, for a review). On the other hand, social-psychological research has also suggested that police officers may interpret diverse protesters' actions as protest violence no matter whether those actions involve physical violence (e.g., throwing stones at the police) or not (e.g., disobeying police orders) (see Soares, Barbosa, & Matos, 2018; Soares, Barbosa, Matos, & Mendes, 2018). Despite the fact that the works mentioned above offer valuable contributions to the study of protest violence, it worth noting that only a few studies have addressed non-participants' perceptions of this phenomenon (e.g., Feinberg, Willer, & Kovacheff, 2017; Stuart, Thomas, & Donaghue, 2018; Wouters, 2018). Notwithstanding the foregoing, none of those studies have considered non-participants as active readers of collective action capable of evaluating the specific dynamic between protesters and the police, the political setting under which protests are carried out, and the opinion of others like them (e.g., public opinion). Indeed, that is the main objective of the studies reported in this thesis. However, before presenting the empirical works that tackle these issues, a brief explanation about the relevance of the political context and the role of non-participants in the interpretation and support for protesters' violence against the police is necessary.

1.1.2 Why is political context important? As it was stated above, protests do not happen in a vacuum, rather they take place in specific societal and historical settings. Thus, Tilly (2008) has suggested that the occurrence of mobilisation processes and the type of actions people can carry out, and legitimate, cannot be understood without studying the political conditions under which people are living. Specifically, Tilly argues that it is not only the immediate political context that surrounds any mobilisation process that scholars should look at but also the interactions people and authorities have had throughout time regarding particular claims and demands. Thus, performances (e.g., peaceful protests) that take place between a claimant (e.g., workers) and a target of the claims (e.g., government officials) are shaped by the relationship those actors had maintained in the past. Furthermore, the specific actions people might carry out during a performance (e.g., protest violence) are historically learned but also limited for these historical interactions. The latter means that within a particular society, protests may be permitted activities through which people could freely complain against the government. However, what is acceptable to do during protests is restricted by law, group norms (e.g., people can march peacefully but throwing missiles at the police is not acceptable), and a set of actions people have learned in a specific setting.

From a different approach, Piven and Cloward (1977) have also argued in favour of considering the political context for the study of social movements. According to the authors, working-class movements are constrained by the historically shaped features of the political system in which they are immersed. Thus, the reasons people have to mobilise, the specific actions they carry out (e.g., strikes), and the opportunities they have to reach their goals depend on the changes in the political structures people have to confront (e.g., electoral system, economy). Indeed, Piven and Cloward highlight three

interesting points regarding the influence of political structures in the development of working-class social movements. First, structures restrict people's actions. This means that instead of being purely random, poor people's actions would take place during periods of rapid and large-scale structural changes, allowing people from the periphery of the establishment to challenge the authorities. Also, authorities may impose restrictions, like repression, on those actions that might become highly disruptive for the system, while those less disruptive can stay unpunished. Second, political structures may deactivate protests forcing or negotiating with poor people the use of those traditional institutional channels that, unlike protests, are not usually available for them to change the system. Third, and more importantly, rather than significant revolutions or astonishing social changes, poor people's movements' achievements are limited by historical and social circumstances, as Piven and Cloward (1977) state:

> When people are finally roused to protest against great odds, they take the only options available to them within the limits imposed by their social circumstances. Those who refuse to recognize these limits not only blindly consign lower-class protests to the realm of semirational but also blindly continue to pretend that other, more regular options for political influence are widely available in the American political system. (p. 58)

A more comprehensive approach aims to study the influence of the political context on the appearance and development of social movements is political opportunities (see Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, for an overview). Along with resource mobilization theory (see Edwards & Kane, 2014, for a review; Edwards & McCarthy, 2004; Jenkins, 1983;

McCarthy & Zald, 1977) and framing processes (see Benford & Snow, 2000; Snow, 2004; Snow & Benford, 1988), political opportunities has been one of the most important approaches in the sociological study of social movements. The first developments of political opportunities were carried out separately by Eisinger and Tilly (see Meyer, 2004, for a review). In short, Eisinger (1973) suggests that the relation between the tolerance of the institutional system and the presence of protests would not be linear, but curvilinear. In other words, Eisinger holds that protests were less likely to occur in either extremely closed or highly open political systems, whereas their occurrence would be more frequent in cities where the authorities had some degree of responsiveness to people's complaints, and the political institutions show a combination of open and closed features concerning protests. Subsequently, Tilly (1978, 2008) systematically studied how both the features of the political system and repression may help to explain no only the occurrence of collective action, but also (as mentioned at the beginning of this section) the specific set of actions that people could employ in a particular political context (see Giugni, 2009, for a review).

Apart from the authors mentioned above, the works of McAdam (1982) and Tarrow (1994; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998) are crucial for the development of political opportunities. Indeed, Tarrow defines political opportunities as "those dimensions of the political environment which either encourage or discourage people from using collective action" (1994, p.18). Thus, the first dimension Tarrow considers, political openness, refers to the extent that political institutions allow the development of social movements in a specific place and time. Concretely, political openness implies that people can manifest their concerns and criticisms freely in the streets without fear of being repressed or persecuted for it, while authorities are willing to listen to them. In opposition to Eisinger's ideas,

Tarrow suggests that protests are more likely to occur the more tolerance a political system shows towards social mobilisation processes, whereas a constrained context would make the task more difficult for protesters.

Moreover, Tarrow's second dimension, the stability of political alignments, is focused on the stability of alliances among political parties at a specific time. In particular, weak or unstable alliances among the institutional actors of the political system might create new opportunities for the appearance of new voices from the street. As a third dimension, Tarrow argues that the presence or absence of elite allies might also play a critical role in setting the political context. In short, the latter means that to mobilise and to be successful, social movements may need help from allies/third parties (other collective subjects) to form a network of relations able to challenge the establishment. Furthermore, the same author suggests that the fourth dimension, division within allies, sheds light on the fact that within the alliances established among political actors, some disagreements can take place. Then, these disagreements may bring on the emergence of factions or new political orders that people may assume as a signal to start a mobilisation process and push the establishment for social changes.

Along with the dimensions mentioned above, another significant aspect that scholars have proposed to assess political opportunities is the presence of repression (Davenport, 1995, 2004; Della Porta, 1995; McAdam, 1996). Indeed, Della Porta (1996) argues that repression can be considered as a barometer of political opportunity by taking into account its direct and visible impact on social movements, and in particular, on a movement's behaviour. To understand what repression is in a broader sense, Tilly

provides a useful definition for it as "the cost of collective action to the contender resulting from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective actions..." (1978, p. 55). Regarding the implementation of repression, Tilly considers that governments could undermine collective action by carrying out standard repressive measures aimed at getting an indirect (e.g., mobilising influence or counter-protesters), or direct impact on protesters' activities such as controlling crowds through the police (i.e., policing protest), spies, or informers for infiltration. Because of this, repression always entails costs and adverse effects on protesters, therefore, it should be considered as inherently aversive (Opp & Roehl, 1990).

Whereas the main perpetrator of repression against protesters is not difficult to identify – the police – the effects of repression on social mobilisation processes are not. Thus, depending on the political circumstances under which repression is implemented, its effectiveness (see Davenport 2004, for a discussion), and the style of policing protests developed in each country (see Della Porta & Reiter, 1998, for a review), in some scenarios repression can restrict the participation of people in protests (Koopmans, 1997). However, in other political contexts, repression might encourage the engagement of citizens in public activities against the establishment (see Brockett, 1991; De Nardo, 1985, as cited in Opp & Roehl, 1990; Francisco, 1995; Opp & Roehl, 1990). To put it differently, the effects of repression on mobilisation processes are diverse according to the political scenario, while those who carry out repression are mostly the same almost everywhere (i.e., the police, spies).

The concise overview presented above explains the importance that the political context has for the emergence and behaviour of social movements from a sociological perspective. It is worth noting that the features considered as part of the political context are visible to different extents for the general audience. For this reason, it is useful to introduce here the general framework of the political process approach developed by Kriesi (2004). This framework (see Figure 1.1) is useful to understand that political opportunities work at different levels. Thus, macro-level structures comprise components more or less stable throughout time such as the international context, the legal and territorial arrangements among the institutional political actors within a country (e.g., political institutions), how society interacts with those who seek a social change (i.e., cultural models), and the conflicts among influential political actors (e.g., the church and civil society) within a context (i.e., cleavage structures).

Moreover, Kriesi places the relationship among different political actors (e.g., political parties), their conflicts and alliances in the second level of analysis (configuration of political actors). Indeed, three of the dimensions mentioned by Tarrow (i.e., the stability of political alignments, presence or absence of elite allies, and division within allies) can be referred to in this second level of analysis.



Figure 1.1. The general framework of the political process approach (Kriesi, 2004, p. 70).

Kriesi's third level of analysis, interaction context, could be considered as the main focus of this thesis. The interaction context concerns authorities' strategies to set up the political context where social movements take place, the opportunities and constraints those strategies impose on participants in social movements, and their effect on social movements' behaviour. In this level of analysis, it is possible to find dimensions mentioned above as the political openness (Tarrow, 1994), and the existence of repression in a particular context.

Although political opportunities may be useful to explain the emergence of social movements and people's willingness to participate in them, one of the main shortcomings of this approach is the lack of explanation for how people can *perceive* the structural opportunities that might encourage them to take part in collective action. Indeed, the issue is not just about how people can identify the conditions that make collective action

possible, but also how contextual 'hints' might be interpreted wrongly or even ignored by social movements' participants. In other words, even though Meyer and Tarrow (1998) have suggested that people may create opportunities through their actions or the actions of previous social movements, political opportunities do not explain how people may develop a 'subjective' understanding of the 'objective' political conditions that make collective action possible.

To address the issue mentioned above, scholars have developed ideas such as 'cognitive liberation' (see McAdam, 1982) and cultural framings (see Gamson & Meyer, 1996). Whereas the former approach proposes that participants in a social movement might identify vulnerabilities in the political system according to the 'clues' they can get from the responses that authorities give to other challengers, the latter is an attempt to include cultural elements by framing processes as subjective mediators of the 'objective' political conditions (e.g., Suh, 2001; Zdravomyslova, 1996). Apart from the theoretical criticism each of these approaches has received (e.g., Goodwin, Jasper, & Khattra, 1999), it must be pointed out that to date there is no systematic measure or strategy aimed at evaluating 'subjective' understanding of political opportunities. Nevertheless, Honari (2018b) has carried out in-depth interviews to develop a systematic study of the subjective views of what Della Porta identified as the main barometer of political opportunities, repression. More importantly, following Earl's (2011) arguments regarding the need to focus sociological research on micro-level (i.e., subjective views), Honari (2017, 2018a) has suggested turning the study of the mere presence of repression as a structural factor into the examination of people's perceptions of repression and the strategies people employ to cope with it.

Despite the fact that there is much sociological research aimed at exploring the importance of the features of political context for the emergence and development of social movements, psychological research has barely tackled the influence that political context might have on collective action and the legitimisation of protest violence. As mentioned above, notable exceptions for the absence of contextual features from the social-psychological literature are the works drawing upon ESIM as well as Subašić and collaborators' work on political solidarity. Nevertheless, at the time of writing, there is no approach aimed at incorporating people's perceptions of political opportunities and the presence of repression in the social-psychological analysis of protests.

1.1.3 Why should psychological research focus on non-participants? Similarly to what has been described regarding the study of features of the political context, sociologists (e.g., Gamson, 2004; McCarthy, Smith, & Zald, 1996; Neidhard & Rucht, 1991; Oegema & Klandermans, 1994) have conducted extensive research aimed at exploring the role of those who do not take part in collective action (i.e., non-participants), while social-psychological research has paid little attention to this topic (cf. Orazani & Leidner, 2019b; Stuart et al., 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Even though psychological research has explored the effect of collective action on encouraging people's future participation as well as on behavioural and attitudinal changes at individual level (see Vestergren, Drury, & Chiriac, 2018), evidence about what Neville and Reicher (2018) have called the 'impact of crowds beyond the crowd' is rather scarce. Fortunately, this situation has started to change thanks to some works that have explored the impact of protests on both those non-participants that share the same proximal physical space with

protesters as a university campus (see Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019a) and also on those who do not participate but may follow protests through mass media (e.g., Hou et al., 2018). In an interesting contribution, Selvanathan and Lickel (2019b) have suggested that non-participants can experience feelings of empowerment or threat in response to mass protests that may affect their identification with and support for a specific social movement. This means that rather than being passive receivers of information regarding protests, non-participants might actively 'read' and 'interpret' what it is going on in the streets. Accordingly, non-participants may play a crucial role in the success of protests by becoming protesters (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001, for a discussion); providing practical support for those who take to streets through financial aid, preparing meals, or elaborating informative materials about protests (e.g., "We die together", 2019); giving support for specific protesters' actions (e.g., "Public increasingly backing radical", 2019); or becoming sympathizers who might help protesters to gain public opinion support by participating in discussions within their communities and local politicians (e.g., Lieberfeld, 2009).

Although valuable, I have detected some limitations in current works on non-participants and the impact of protests on them that make conducting more research on this topic imperative. First, at the time of writing, no work has tackled non-participants' evaluations of their political context regarding the presence of protests. Despite the fact that Thomas and Louis (2014) have suggested that non-participants may endorse protest violence according to the presence/absence of corruption in a specific institution, neither this nor other social-psychological research has addressed non-participants' perceptions of those political actors directly involved in protest policing (e.g., the government and the police) and their impact on non-participants' support for protesters' claims and actions.

A second limitation is to confound people's support for a social movement with the support for specific strategies or protesters' actions (e.g., Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 2019b). Indeed, what is actually missing in collective action research is a psychological analysis of non-participants' support for specific protesters' actions (i.e., protest violence) without involving the support people may grant to an entire movement or protest (cf. Lee, 2018). To put it differently, while some literature has put together support for actions and the entire protest (or social movement) at the same level of analysis, I suggest these two factors should be analysed separately considering that protesters may carry out multiple actions within a single event. More importantly, researchers should keep in mind that non-participants' disagreement with specific actions carried out by protesters (e.g., throwing stones at the police) is not necessarily correlated with either people's support for protesters' claims or with the legitimacy granted to a protest itself. An excellent example of the latter point is the 2011 student movement in Chile. After months of continuous protests, some public opinion polls suggested that around 76% Chileans supported the student movement. However, only 49% of people supported protesters' actions, which usually included clashes with the police (see "Adimark: Apoyo al movimiento estudiantil", 2011). This example illustrates that people's support for protesters' claims do not necessarily correlate to the same extent with the support for specific protesters' actions.

In line with the idea of keeping separate the analysis of protesters' actions from the support for an entire social movement or protest, there is a need to explore non-participants' reasons to support or not support protesters' violence against the police

beyond the supposed social norm that protests should be peaceful to gain legitimacy from public opinion. The latter implies that researchers should challenge the notion that people are necessarily aligned with social norms against the use of violence, and also that people's thoughts on violence are consistent regardless of the political conditions themselves or others need to confront. In other words, what psychological research should address is whether non-participants' support for protest violence against the police is conditional upon those situations (e.g., government restrictions and police repression) under which other people like them (i.e., protesters) mobilise to achieve social change.

Finally, it is worth noting that many non-participants do not have the opportunity to see first-hand either the impact of the measures taken by authorities regarding protests or protesters' actions. Therefore, in most cases, non-participants' evaluations of these measures are via mass media (see Koopmans, 2004a, for a discussion). As media and communication research has demonstrated, mass media can implement deliberated biases in favour or against certain types of protests that may distort the idea non-participants get of protesters' actions (see Chan & Lee, 1984; McLeod & Hertog, 1992). Indeed, according to McLeod (2007), mass media tends to depict negatively those events in which protesters cause damage to buildings or use violence against either the police or counter-protesters. Consequently, the study of non-participants in collective action is deeply related to how authorities and protesters are portrayed in the mass media, and people's reactions to these depictions (see Cammaerts, 2012; Tang, 2015).

1.2 Methods and measures

In this thesis, I combined both quantitative and qualitative research methodologies to explore the influence of the perceived political context on non-participants' support for protest violence against the police. In this section, I will provide an overview of the methodology used in previous research on political opportunities and non-participants' perceptions of social movements and protests. In addition, I will provide a description of the criteria used to choose a specific research tool for the studies included in each chapter.

1.2.1 Research methods employed to study political opportunities. To study social movements and political opportunities, sociologists have mostly employed retrospective case studies based on the analysis of newspapers (e.g., Eisinger, 1973; McAdam, 1982, 1996) or comparative historical accounts (e.g., Brocket, 1991; Kitschelt, 1986; Rucht, 1998; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 2008). Although mainly based on secondary data, these approaches have been shown to be valuable for the analysis of those structural 'objective' political conditions that challengers to the status quo must confront to achieve their goals. Other advantages of these studies are the acknowledgement of the historical context where the social movements carried out their actions, the analysis of those dimensions of the political structures which are not directly visible for most people (e.g., political alliances), as well the comparison of the political structures among countries.

An exception to the analysis of the 'objective' political context regarding social movements from a political opportunities approach is Crozat's work (1998). In short, using secondary data from a large transnational survey, Crozat demonstrated that people

from Europeans countries had diverse levels of tolerance to protests. Although this work represents an advance in the incorporation of subjective views into the study of protests, its scope is minimal considering the employed questionnaire items were not explicitly designed (i.e., they were proxies) to measure either people's attitudes to the presence of protests or the subjective views of the political conditions under which protests may take place.

As previously mentioned in this chapter, one of the main criticisms to the political opportunities approach is its failure to explain people's *awareness* of the opportunities that may allow or impede the activation of mobilisation processes (e.g., social movements and protests) (see Gamson & Meyer, 1996, for a discussion). With the development of cultural frames, along with retrospective case studies (e.g., Diani, 1996), some scholars started to use in-depth interviews to explore people's interpretations of the political opportunities related to specific social movements and to include cultural elements in these interpretations (e.g., Suh, 2001). However, at the time of writing, the use of interviews to explore participants' or non-participants' interpretations of the opportunities has been scarce and represents an exception rather than a general turn of the sociological study on social movements and their political environment. Notwithstanding this, Koopmans and Statham (1999) developed an alternative approach to cultural frames, discourse opportunities (see Koopmans, 2004a, for a review), the main aim of which is to explore people's framing of political opportunities through mass media. Although attractive in its conceptualisation, this latter approach does not innovate in the research methods proposed to tackle the topic of interest. Indeed, most works that draw upon Koopmans's ideas have continued analysing data produced by third parties such as newspapers and official documents rather than exploring people's perceptions of political

opportunities first-hand (e.g., Koopmans & Olzak, 2004). Hence, it can be argued that even though different scholars have deployed considerable efforts to address people's interpretation of their political context, it seems none of them has developed a method or a tool that is able to capture peoples' perceptions of the contextual conditions.

Regarding the specific study of repression, the situation is slightly different. On the one hand, sociologists and political scientists have mainly used historical accounts (e.g., Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta, Fillieule, & Reiter, 1998; Reiner, 1998) and the quantification of 'objective' features of the political context where protests take place (e.g., economic indices; Davenport, 2007; Francisco, 2004; Zwerman & Steinhoff, 2004) to explain the presence or absence of repression against challengers of the status quo. On the other hand, scholars have started to criticize the excessive emphasis of sociological research on the macro-level (i.e., effect of repression on the existence of social movements) and meso-level (i.e., strategies carried out by social movements), claiming that new efforts to understand repression should be focused on people's perceptions of repressive measures carried out by state agents (Earl, 2011; Honari, 2017, 2018a). In line with this idea, Honari (2018b) has recently used in-depth interviews to explore how people perceive repression and its impact on people's future actions. Although this approach is particularly valuable because it sheds light on the importance that repressive measures have for people, the relevance of these interviews is restricted to the particular case of the studied Iranian movement and cannot be generalised to other political contexts.

Regarding the study of political opportunities from a social-psychological perspective, some cross-sectional studies have used measures for political cynicism, external efficacy,

and trust in the political institutions (e.g., Lee 2010; Lee & Chan, 2018; Sabucedo, Gómez-Román, Alzate, van Stekelenburg, & Klandermans, 2017; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018) as proxies to evaluate the political context where protests take place. Even though these works have included some features of the political context in the analysis of protests, they are not directly related to either the presence of protests in the streets nor the measures that authorities implement regarding these activities. In addition, the items used to measure the constructs mentioned above were elaborated ad hoc for each study and are not validated.

Concerning repression, or more specifically protest policing, studies based on the ESIM (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Gorringe, Stott, & Rosie, 2012; Stott & Drury, 2000) have employed participant observation as the most suitable technique to study the dynamic of protests in vivo (see Drury and Stott, 2001, for a discussion). In particular, these works have explored how people's perceptions regarding the (il)legitimacy of police actions can modify the context where the interaction between protesters and the police takes place. Although ESIM has demonstrated that participant observation is an appropriate technique to capture the dynamic of crowds, a tool designed to address questions such as the extent to which perceptions of repressive policing vary quantitatively across different contexts is still absent from the literature. Even though Radburn and Stott (2019) have argued for the need to combine studies based on trust in procedural justice and police legitimacy with ESIM, the experiments designed to address this topic (see Radburn et al., 2018) included ad hoc adaptations of pre-existing scales aimed at evaluating only general attitudes to the police.

Considering the lack of a standardized tool to account for the perceived features of the political context (e.g., police repression) in the works mentioned above, the use of questionnaires becomes very useful for the development and validation of a scale of measurement aimed at evaluating subjective views of the political context where protests take place (SPO-R, Subjective Political Openness Repression scale). One of the main advantages of developing a tool to quantify the perceived political conditions regarding protests (restrictions in the case of SPO-R) is that it allows the comparison of diverse scenarios. Besides, researchers worldwide may use SPO-R scale to incorporate the perceived political context into the psychological analysis of collective action without having to create new items.

1.2.2 Research methods employed to study non-participants' perceptions of protests. For the study of non-participants, social-psychological research has employed diverse methods to explore their importance for protests and social movements. Thus, correlational survey studies have been conducted to explore non-activist reasons to legitimate (see Jiménez-Moya, Miranda, Drury, Saavedra, & González, 2019) and support various social movements (Orazani & Leidner, 2019b). In terms of non-participants' support for specific actions carried out during protests, Gerber and collaborators (2018) have explored people's support for violence carried out by both the police and indigenous protesters in Chile. Taking advantage of the fact that cross-sectional studies enable us to explore simple relations among diverse variables and that perceived features of the political context regarding protests had not been tested before, in Chapter 3, I conducted a cross-sectional questionnaire survey study using structural equation modeling (SEM) to make inferences employing SPO-R scale. This study included samples from the UK and Chile, making possible the comparison of the same

predictive model across samples and weighting the relevance of each SPO component to explain non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police.

Considering that protests take place in the real world, research on non-participants' perceptions should include people's exposure to actual protests (e.g. Schwartz, 2016; Selvanathan and Lickel, 2019a). However, the main difficulty of incorporating exposure to a real protest in the study design is the availability of a protest that can be used as a reference to the potential participants of the study. Indeed, even when a protest is available, people's direct exposure to this event is difficult to coordinate. Time and monetary restrictions, as well as the spontaneity and unpredictability of protests, are difficulties that researchers might struggle to address.

To solve the issues mentioned above, researchers may use vignettes in their experimental designs to simulate protest events and explore people's reactions to diverse situations (see Hughes & Huby, 2004, for a discussion). Indeed, vignettes may be especially useful for the study of non-participants' perceptions of protests by taking into account that because most people do not have the opportunity to experience protests first-hand, both authorities' measures regarding protests and what happens with protesters in the streets are necessarily shaped by mass media representations (see Cammaerts, 2012, for a discussion). Thus, in Study 2 reported in Chapter 3, the use of vignettes allowed me to explore whether people perceive the features of political context differently according to the 'objective' political settings they were exposed in comparison to a neutral scenario (i.e., control condition).

In Chapter 5, I decided to use vignettes again in two experiments. However, instead of describing diverse political contexts regarding authorities' tolerance to protests, this time the vignettes were employed to portray public opinion's legitimisation of protests both in the UK (Study 1) and in Catalonia (Study 2). For this type of experiment, vignettes became a useful resource to provide information similar to an actual news article. Indeed, in addition to including an informative text about the protests mentioned above, each vignette incorporated two different characterisations of public opinion concerning mobilization processes to improve their realism: quotations of bogus interviews from ordinary people, and a pie chart accounting for the results of an opinion poll on people's legitimisation of protests (see McLeod & Hertog, 1992, for discussion). Moreover, along with the vignette, and following Radburn and collaborators' (2018) idea to evaluate police procedures during protests, I incorporated footage showing police brutality against peaceful protesters for two reasons. First, to improve the realism of the scenario depicted in the vignette by supplementing this information with a visual stimulus displaying what has happened to protesters in the streets. Second, to go beyond the 'the static' elements described in the vignette by incorporating a resource capable of showing the 'dynamic' of protest and the changes in the interaction between protesters and the police.

Despite the advantages of survey and experimental designs in the study of non-participants' perceptions of protests, there are two main limitations. First, because the items included in these studies are aimed at measuring specific dimensions, it is not possible to explore in-depth what people think about protests, the political conditions under which protests occur, or protesters' actions. Second, both surveys and experiments are tools designed to eliminate individuals' inconsistencies – making researchers assume that people have unique and fixed opinions about social phenomena, whereas people may

actually have multiple and contradictory thoughts concerning them (see Stimson, 1995, for an overview; Zaller, 1992, for a discussion). Indeed, Billig and collaborators (1988) have suggested that one of the main shortcomings of extensive opinion polls is that in those studies people do not have the chance to experience or at least imagine scenarios that might represent a challenge for dominant ideologies. Moreover, I suggest that due to their focus on testing change using the same restricted measures as used in cross-section designs, even quantitative longitudinal designs cannot account for people's contradictory ideas about specific topics.

Recently, Stuart and collaborators (2018) have employed interviews and thematic analysis to explore non-participants' perceptions of protests and their identification with various types of protesters. Similarly, in Chapter 5, I employed interviews and thematic analysis as an analytic strategy to explore non-participants' reasons to support protesters' violence against the police. Although the study reported in Chapter 5 was not aimed at analysing discourse styles, the linguistic expressions (e.g., Condor & Gibson, 2007), or delve in the discursive rhetoric deployed by the interviewees (e.g., Billig, 1991; Condor, 2011), I decided to combine thematic analysis with the ideological dilemma approach (see Billig et al., 1988) to explore people's sometimes contradictory views regarding protest violence. Thus, the ideological dilemmas approach became useful to explore how societal 'maxims' (e.g., 'protests should be peaceful') may collide with other such beliefs (e.g., the need to defend the right to protest) under specific circumstances (see Gibson, 2011, and Towns & Adams, 2009, for discussions). To put it differently, the incorporation of the ideological dilemmas approach allowed me to go beyond the de-contextualised individual decisions between supporting or not supporting protest violence against the

police to focus on the contradictions people may hold regarding protesters' actions within a particular political context.

1.3 Overview of the chapters

In Chapter 2 of this thesis, I report the development and validation of a measurement scale for a novel psychological construct, subjective political openness (SPO). This construct was developed to include features of social structure into the analysis of collective action drawing upon sociological research on social movements (see van Zomeren, 2016, for a discussion). Specifically, this chapter describes how SPO is conceptualised as a psychological parallel of three structural factors previously addressed in the sociological literature as critical in setting up the political context for the development of social movements: political openness (see Tarrow, 1994), presence of repression (Davenport, 1995; Della Porta, 1995), and public opinion (see Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991; Rucht, 2004). Thus, SPO initially sought to understand people's perceptions of the political context where protests take place focused on the actions of the government (government openness), the police (perceived repression), and public opinion (perceived legitimisation of protests) regarding these activities.

Through two studies, including samples from the UK and Chile, I establish SPO as a bifactor model comprising two out of three proposed dimensions (government openness and perceived repression). In Chapter 2, I also explain the reasons to rename SPO scale as SPO-Repression (SPO-R), test the measurement invariance of the full scale and its components using multi-group analyses and stablish its convergent validity using the Trust in Police Procedural Justice scale (see Jackson, Huq, Bradford, & Tyler, 2013) as

the main criterion. Furthermore, I discuss the current limitations of SPO-R and provide some practical guidelines that may help researchers to employ the scale in future studies.

In Chapter 3, I employ SPO-R to make statistical inferences using both a cross-sectional study and an experiment. In the first of these studies, which includes samples from the UK and Chile, I explore whether in both countries the features of the perceived political context regarding protest (SPO-R) can predict non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police. Taking advantage of structural equation modeling (SEM) and the configuration of SPO-R as a bifactor model, I also test whether the obtained effects are comparable between countries and if there are differences in the importance that British and Chilean people give to the actions of the government and the police. Furthermore, in the cross-sectional study, I explore the role of the perceived public opinion's legitimisation of protest as a mediator for the relationship mentioned above.

In Chapter 3, I report an experiment aimed at testing similar hypotheses to those tested in the study described above but comparing people's exposure to diverse political scenarios. Thus, I tested how the support for protest violence against the police may vary depending on authorities' measures regarding protests. In addition, I check the effects of these simulated contextual conditions on both the subjective restrictions to the right to protest (SPO-R) and the perceived legitimacy public opinion may grant to protests.

Having found evidence about the importance of the perceived political context and the legitimisation given by public opinion to protests, I tried to delve into non-participants' reasons to support protesters' violence against the police by going beyond the limitations

of quantitative methods. Thus, in Chapter 4, through a set of interviews to non-participants with diverse previous experience in protests, I explore people's support for protest violence when the well-known maxim 'protests should be peaceful' clashes with the need to defend the right to protest in the face of authorities' restrictions against protesters' actions. After conducting my analyses, I suggest that rather than a de-contextualised individual choice, non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police reflects an ideological dilemma people have to face considering the political conditions under which protests take place: protests should be peaceful versus defend the right to protest. The latter implies that, notwithstanding the existence of the pervasive societal norm that states that protests should remain peaceful, similar to what happens to actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2000, 2005) non-participants may hold contradictory ideas about the use of violence in protests, and therefore, support protesters' violence against the police as self-defence actions when authorities undermine the right to protest.

Besides the ideological dilemma non-protesters may have to confront regarding protest violence, Chapter 4 also sheds light on the importance that non-participants have for the psychological study of collective action as active readers of protests. Thus, I suggest that even though non-participants are far away from where a protest takes place and receive fragmented information through mass media, they would still be able to find out the rationale behind protesters' actions against the police. In other words, non-participants may evaluate government measures, and police actions during protests to support (or not support) protest violence instead of attributing it to the alleged 'irrationality' of protesters as some scholars have suggested (e.g., Simpson, Willer, & Feinberg, 2018). Moreover, in the light of my analysis, at the end of the chapter, I criticize the use of the dichotomy

‘normative’ vs ‘non-normative actions’ (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) to judge protesters’ actions and the alleged superiority of peaceful methods to reach social change present in the mainstream psychological literature on collective action (e.g., Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 2019b; Schumpe et. al., 2018; Thomas & Louis, 2014).

In Chapter 5, I report two experiments aimed at expanding the scope of my previous studies on non-participants’ support for protest violence against the police by manipulating the legitimacy that public opinion grants to protests in political scenarios (the UK and Catalonia) where authorities implement harsh restrictions to the right to protest.

In these experiments, I explore the role of solidarity with protesters as a mechanism that mediates the relation between public opinion’s legitimisation of protests and non-participants’ support for protest violence. In particular, the experiments examine whether different extents of public opinion’s legitimisation of protest may differently affect the feelings of solidary that British adults may show towards those protesters with who do not share precisely the same social category, namely British students and Catalonian protesters. Moreover, in this Chapter, I argue that to explain non-participants’ support for protest violence against the police, scholars should consider people’s own opinions about the right to protest and their interactions with the perceived political context (i.e., authorities’ restrictions and public opinion’s legitimisation of protests).

Finally, in Chapter 6, I present an overview of the main findings reported in this thesis, while their theoretical and practical implications are discussed. I also explain the main

limitations of the studies reported in each chapter, provide guidelines for future research, and list the main conclusions for this thesis.

Chapter 2

Including political context in the psychological analysis of collective action: Development and validation of a measurement scale for Subjective Political Openness

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2.1 Abstract

Sociological and Political Science research has argued that political conditions affect both the occurrence of protests and the actions protesters choose. However, an approach that considers people's perceptions on these conditions is still absent in the social psychological literature. Subjective political openness (SPO) is a new construct which fills this gap by incorporating features of political context into the psychological analysis of protests. We propose that SPO comprises perceptions relating to three dimensions: government actions to allow/restrict protests, police measures to actively prevent them, and the extent that public opinion legitimizes protests. We conducted two studies in the UK and Chile to validate scales created for each proposed dimension, test their measurement invariance, establish SPO's configuration, and demonstrate its convergent validity. Participants in Study 1 were university students (n_{UK} = 203; n_{Chile} = 237), whereas in Study 2 a general population sample from both countries was included (n_{UK} = 377; n_{Chile} = 309) with the purpose of generalizing the results. Both studies consistently showed that SPO is a multidimensional construct configured as a bifactor model comprising the dimensions associated with perceptions of the government and police actions to confront protests. Although we tested two different measurement scales for the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, results demonstrated this dimension is not part of SPO. The SPO configuration has implications for both our understanding of collective action and how we study it.

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2.2 Introduction

In this paper, we describe the development of *SPO (subjective political openness)*, a new construct aimed to incorporate subjective views about political conditions for protests into the study of collective action. SPO draws on three main ideas. First, political conditions affect the development of collective action. Second, the psychological literature has barely included analysis of political conditions in the study of collective action. Third, people actively build and interpret these conditions according to the interactions they have had with the authorities in relation to protests (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher, 1996b).

Political conditions that make collective action possible (e.g., through the use of repression against protesters) have been widely studied in sociology and political science, either through case studies (e.g., Brockett, 1991; Della Porta, 1995; Kurzman, 1996) or quantitative analyses based on macro-level measures (e.g., Davenport, 1995; Regan & Henderson, 2002; Shadmehr, 2014), under the umbrella of Political Opportunity Structures (e.g., Brockett, 1991; Kriesi, 2004; Kurzman, 1996; Meyer, 2004; Tilly, 1978). The Political Opportunity Structures approach suggests that the conditions of a particular political context influence the emergence and development of social movements (Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Shadmehr, 2014). One of the key dimensions identified under this framework is *political openness* (Tarrow, 1994). Political openness refers to the extent to which political institutions set up the political context to allow protesters to express their concerns and criticisms without fear of being repressed or persecuted (Dalton, Van Sickle, & Weldon, 2009). According to Tarrow (1994), an open political system is correlated

with a higher presence of protests in the streets, whereas the opposite situation would make the task more difficult for protesters.

Along with political openness, scholars have argued that the *presence of repression* is another significant aspect that should be considered when assessing political opportunities (see Della Porta, 1995; Earl, 2011; McAdam, 1996; Tilly, 1978). Specifically, repression can be considered as "the cost of collective action to the contender resulting from interaction with other groups; as a process, any action by another group which raises the contender's cost of collective action..." (Tilly, 1978, p. 55). Following this definition, we can recognize two main characteristics of repression. First, repression is inherently aversive to protesters because it entails costs and negative effects for them (Opp & Roehl, 1990). Second, governments might threaten collective action through the mobilization of different groups (e.g., counter-protesters, riot police, or informers for infiltration) which can act directly or indirectly on protesters (Tilly, 1978). However, despite the fact that a large body of literature in sociology and political science has addressed the presence of repression, most of this work has analysed it at a macro-level (e.g., by country) and only a few studies have considered how repression might affect individuals (micro-level) (Earl, 2011). This is important because objective repression carried out by state agents (at the macro-level) might not necessarily match with people's evaluations of repression, and they can even be unrelated (Kurzman, 1996). In line with this, Honari (2017, 2018a) has argued that social movement research should consider a subjective approach to explore people's responses to repression, whilst it is also necessary to distinguish between the actual experience of repression (experienced repression), and how state agents are perceived as threats or obstacles for political participation (*perceived repression*).

Although political opportunities approach goes further than a mere bipolar conceptualization of social movements (mobilized people vs the state), the role that other actors within a society can play in social movements' dynamics has been neglected by the sociological literature (cf. Gamson, 2004; Jenkins & Perrow, 2015; Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991; Rucht, 2004). One exception is the work of Rucht (2004) which has considered the public (i.e., sympathizers, bystanders, and counter movements), control agencies, interest groups, and mass media as reference groups (in the political context) from which social movements can gain support and legitimacy, as well as opposition to their aims, activities, and goals. However, despite the important inputs provided by all these accounts, the literature has barely included an analysis of either people's *perceptions* of those political conditions under which social movements take place (i.e., political openness and repression) (see Honari, 2018a; Kurzman, 1996) or the legitimacy public opinion can give to protests.

With respect to the analysis of political conditions of protest in the psychological literature, two approaches should be mentioned: social identity theory (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and the elaborated social identity model (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury, Reicher, & Stott, 2012, for a review). The first has addressed the influence of certain key social structural variables that shape intergroup relations: permeability of group boundaries, status (il)legitimacy, and status stability on the occurrence of collective action (see Ellemers, 2001; Turner & Brown, 1978). Moreover, ESIM proposes that people interpret their own context (including the extent to which protest is possible and legitimate) based on previous interactions with other groups (e.g., the police). However,

neither of these approaches have addressed the impact that the broader political context or other groups beyond those groups directly in conflict (e.g., political authorities, public opinion, and laws) might have on protests. Therefore, despite the conditions described in SIT as optimal for collective action being met (illegitimate and unstable intergroup status differential) and the important inputs ESIM gives us in understanding the intergroup dynamics during protests, we think the analysis might be incomplete if we exclude the reactions the political authorities and public opinion might have regarding the occurrence of protests. This argument is in line with the need to consider advances in the analysis of social movements carried out in other social sciences (e.g., sociology and political science) in the psychological study of collective action (see van Zomeren, 2016).

With the aim of developing a measure able to capture people's insights into the reactions from the government, the police, and public opinion regarding protests, we created and validated a scale for subjective political openness (SPO) in two studies carried out in the UK and Chile. In Study 1 a set of items was used to measure each proposed dimension, test their measurement invariance, and establish SPO as a multidimensional construct (using a bifactor configuration) in a sample of students. In Study 2 we aimed to increase the generalisability of our results using a sample from the general population of each country, while a set of new items was introduced to improve the configuration of the SPO scale. Moreover, in both studies we established the convergent validity of SPO with a pre-existing scale associated with the evaluation of the police behaviour, *trust in police procedural justice*.

Before describing the studies and their implications, it is necessarily to clarify three aspects. First, how public opinion can grant legitimacy to protests. Second, the theoretical definition of SPO and its dimensions. Third, the relevance of construct validity and measurement invariance in the development of SPO. Fourth, what a bifactor model means. Fifth, the conceptualization of trust in police procedural justice and its relationship to SPO.

2.2.1 Legitimacy of protest

Public opinion is one of the actors able to give legitimacy to social movements (Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991). This might be especially relevant in advanced democracies where different forms of protest have been routinized and accepted as a permanent element of modern life (Tarrow, 1994; Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Within public opinion, sympathizers have received a lot of attention in the psychological literature mainly through the study of the role of sympathizers in collective action (see Blackwood, Terry, & Duck, 2015; Chayinska, Minescu, & McGarty, 2017; Klandermans & Oegema, 1987; Subašić et al., 2008; Thomas & Louis, 2014; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013). However, both the sociological and psychological literature have barely explored the role of public opinion in the legitimization of protests as valued activities (cf. Crozat, 1998; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019).

But what is legitimacy? From common sense, legitimacy can be defined simply as 'what is right' in term of actions (e.g., protesting or beliefs within a specific context). In line with this, it is necessary to stress that the (de)legitimization of specific social norms (e.g., the use of violence to bring about social change) is a dynamic process through which a community might accept certain actions previously considered illegitimate. Therefore,

we agree with Kelman (2001) in relation to the argument that social norms and legitimacy should not be confounded in the analysis of social psychological processes. In addition, it is necessary to point out that people, organizations, policies, and entire social systems can also be invested with legitimacy that is supported by legal systems, conventions, and other people's behaviour (Tyler, 2001; Weber, 1918/1968).

In relation to who invests people, norms, or actions like protests with legitimacy, we suggest that recent psychological research on collective action has confounded the legitimacy given to protests by society with the legitimacy individuals might grant to these activities (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017). Here, we want to make the case that these two levels of legitimacy (collective and individual) are different, taking into account that some aspects of social behaviour are collectively determined by rights and obligations rather than by personal preferences (Kelman, 2001). This is in line with Weber's multilevel approach to legitimacy, where the legitimacy of a social order ('validity') is given by convention or by law (thus at a collective level) through a process independent of personal acts and beliefs (individual level) (Weber, 1918/1968). In practice, this means that, at least, in democratic societies the right to protest exists and guides people's behaviour independently of individual personal agreement with specific protests. A psychological parallel for this multilevel approach to legitimacy can be found in the theory of planned behaviour (Ajzen, 1991), where people's attitude (individual level) and subjective norms (collective level) to a specific behaviour (e.g., protesting) are considered as two independent inputs people process to evaluate and carrying out that behaviour.

2.2.2 Subjective political openness (SPO)

SPO is proposed as a novel construct for measuring individual evaluations of the (in)tolerance levels shown by the political system and public opinion towards protests, based on the notions of political openness, perceived repression, and the multilevel approach to the legitimacy given to protests. Thereby, SPO encompasses three dimensions related to different political actors: the government (government openness), the police (perceived repression), and public opinion (legitimacy of protests). The first of these, government openness, indicates the perceived extent to which the government allows the occurrence of protests. Low scores on this measure mean that people perceive more reluctance from the political authorities to accept protests, whereas higher scores imply people think the government accepts protests. The second dimension, perceived repression, is in line with Honari's (2017) conceptualization of the same construct, but it is limited to protests as a specific form of collective action and is focused on police actions. Despite Honari's original definition of this construct considering 'the state' as a general agent of repression, we decided to delimit our understanding of repression to police actions. We take into account that the level of dependency and accountability between different agents of the state (e.g., the police and government officers) might change by country. Thus, from our perspective, perceived repression is defined by police transgressions (e.g., excessive use of force) that civilians perceive as existing in their immediate political setting in relation to protests. Here, the term 'repression' is focused on the perceived frequency that police officers act against people, rather than their capability in terms of equipment (see Brockett, 1991). Higher scores on this scale suggest that people perceive a more frequent use of indiscriminate force against protesters by the police. The third component of SPO, legitimacy of protests, incorporates the role of public opinion as a source of legitimacy and support for protests. Accordingly, this dimension

indicates the extent to which people perceive that public opinion validates protests (legitimacy at a collective level) rather than referring to their personal preferences (legitimacy at an individual level) (cf. Chayinsca et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019). Higher scores here indicate that people think that public opinion legitimizes protest.

2.2.3 Measurement invariance

Measurement invariance is an important property of psychological instruments, checking that a proposed configuration of indicators associated with a construct and their meaning are invariant throughout time, groups, culture, or tasks (see Messick, 1989, cited in Dimitrov, 2010). Thus, measurement invariance can be tested at successive levels of complexity: configural, weak, strong, and strict (Brown, 2015; Dimitrov, 2010). The configural level can be established if a construct maintains the same factorial structure (numbers of factors and pattern of indicators) across groups or conditions, while the equality of factor loadings implies reaching the next level of invariance (weak). Moreover, strict level of invariance can be assumed if both the intercepts (strong level) and the residual variance demonstrate to be equal.

2.2.4 Bifactor model

In recent years, bifactor models have been rediscovered by researchers to test multidimensional constructs where a general factor and a set of specific subdomains coexist under some basic rules: (1) each indicator shares variance with a general factor and with only one subscale at the same time; (2) the subscales are orthogonal; and (3) a zero correlation exists between the general factor and each subdomain (Chen, West, & Sousa, 2006; Reise, 2012). One of the main advantages of this type of model is the

capacity to distinguish between the variance indicators share with a common factor, and the amount they share with a specific subscale (Reise, Morizot, & Hays, 2007). On the one hand, this capacity allows researchers to get less ambiguous interpretations of the results and scores of their constructs. On the other hand, the effects of a bifactor model on an outcome variable can be disaggregated and considered as a consequence of either the general factor or one specific subscale (Chen, Hayes, Carver, Laurenceau, & Zhang, 2012). Despite these advantages, bifactor models are not very well established in psychology for two reasons. First, their use has been almost exclusively associated with research on intelligence. Second, researchers have preferred higher-order models to test constructs that include a general factor in their structure (Chen et al., 2012; Reeve & Blacksmith, 2009).

2.2.5 Trust in police procedural justice

According to the literature, the legitimacy of authorities can be focused on outcomes (e.g., effectiveness to prevent crime) or on procedures (e.g., fair treatment by police officers). In line with the latter, Jackson and collaborators (2013) developed the trust in police procedural justice scale to evaluate if police treatment and decision-making are perceived as fair, impartial, and adjusted to the law (see Gau, 2014, for a review). Subsequent research has demonstrated that higher levels of trust in the procedures carried out by the police are positively associated with the legitimacy given to them (Gau, 2014; Hough, Jackson, Bradford, Myhill, & Quinton, 2010; Jackson et al., 2013; Sunshine & Tyler, 2003), compliance with authorities (Bradford, Hohl, Jackson, & MacQueen, 2015), and the support for the use of violence by the police in a context of intergroup conflict (Gerber et al., 2018).

Although procedural justice theory has inspired a substantial amount of research in different fields and scenarios, its applicability to policing of protest is still undeveloped (cf. Radburn et al., 2018). Since there are no other validated scales to assess the perceived (in)tolerance of the political context in relation to protests, we adapted some of the items created by Jackson and collaborators (2013) to measure trust in police procedural justice during protests as a proxy for people's perceptions of the police behaviour before demonstrations. Therefore, we expect these adapted items to maintain at least a medium correlation with SPO as a general construct as well as with perceived repression as a dimension specifically oriented to assess police conduct during protests.

2.3 Overview of Studies

With the aim of creating and validating the SPO scale, we carried out two studies using different samples from the UK and Chile. These countries were chosen mainly because of their history; both have experienced massive protests where their political context played a crucial role in the development of the events. Thus, in the last decade the UK has seen events such as 2010 student protests (Lewis, Vasagar, Williams, & Taylor, 2010) where police actions against protesters were associated with the legitimation of violent tactics by protesters. However, most protests in the UK are not violent. Chile faced a harsh and violent dictatorship, leading people to use violence during some protests to confront the military junta (Salazar, 2006). The protesters experienced a demobilisation process in which people were forced by political elites to put aside their rights to protest on behalf of maintaining a weak democracy based on technocracy and the negotiations

between political parties and armed forces (see Cummings, 2015; Hipsher, 1998; Mayol, 2012). However, since the early 2000s Chileans returned to the streets to claim their rights and demonstrate their discontent with the political elites (see Salazar, 2012; Somma & Medel, 2017). Thus, Chileans have transformed protests and demonstrations into routine political acts throughout the country to complain about diverse issues (e.g., quality of education, reforms to the political system, indigenous people's rights) using different tactics (e.g., peaceful or violent) (Garretón, Joignat, Somma, & Campos, 2017).

It is worth noting that despite the UK and Chile being democratic countries with similar legal contexts, restraints, and planning procedures in relation to protests (e.g., protesters need to give notice in advance including details about the time and route of the protest), they present substantive differences regarding policing protest. British police are well-known by their 'friendly' approach to protests management mainly based on cooperation and communication with protesters (see Della Porta et al., 1998), restrictions on the number of police officers authorized to carry firearms, and the rare use of tear gas during protests. Conversely, the approach of the Chilean police (Carabineros) is guided by an intimidation strategy. Thus, Carabineros have become notorious for deploying riot police during peaceful protests, their indiscriminate use of water cannons, tear gas, and excessive force against protesters. Because of this, human rights organizations have condemned police brutality in Chile in successive years (Amnesty International, 2016; Human Right Watch, 2017).

Another comparison between the UK and Chile is how police forces are organised and the status of their relationships with political authorities. While Carabineros are a national

force with a centralized chain of command whose lead authority (General Director) is directly answerable to a government minister (Minister of the Interior), British police are organized in autonomous regional police services and keep some independence from the Home Office.

Bearing these antecedents in mind, we designed two cross-sectional studies to elaborate and validate a scale of measurement for SPO considering the main three components or phases (substantive, structural, and external) identified by Loevinger (1957) and then updated by Flake, Pek, and Hehman (2017) in relation to construct validation. Thus, Study 1 was conceived to carry out a literature review, elaborate a theoretical definition for SPO, government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests at a collective level, as well as to create a set of items for each of these dimensions (substantive phase). In Study 1, we also analysed the designed items, tested the configuration of each proposed dimension, tested their measurement invariance, and established the structural configuration of SPO as a bifactor model (structural phase). Moreover, Study 2 aimed to replicate and generalize the results from the first study (structural phase) using samples from the general population of the UK and Chile. Furthermore, this study sought to confirm the convergent validity between SPO and trust in police procedural justice scale (External phase) and to compare those items created to measure legitimacy of protests in Study 1 with a new set of items using different wording.

2.4 Study 1

2.4.1 Method

Participants. Two different samples of undergraduate students from the UK and Chile participated in the study. The sample size was based on the rule of thumb of getting at least 200 observations to run a confirmatory factor analysis (CFA). In addition, a Monte Carlo simulation determined 200 as the minimum sample size to get a statistical power of .80 and unbiased parameters in a bifactor model with three dimensions assuming non-missing data, a normal distribution of the variables, and factor loadings equal to .65 for the general factor and .45 in each sub dimension (see Muthén & Muthén, 2009; Wolf, Harrington, Clark, & Miller, 2015).

From the total of participants recruited, 39 cases were removed because they completed less than 50% of the survey. Thus, the final samples size were 247 British students (68% Female; Age: M = 19.81, SD = 3.30), and 219 Chilean students (73% Female; Age: M = 19.00, SD = 2.85). Regarding previous participation in protests, only a few participants (UK = 15%; Chile = 30%) reported having taken part in any protest during the 12 months prior to the date they filled in the questionnaire.

Procedure. First, sets of at least eight items were created to measure each of these dimensions. Afterwards, the match between the theoretical definitions and the items were assessed by a panel of experts comprised of our Chilean collaborators (named in the

acknowledgements). Once we received the feedback from the panel, we assembled a questionnaire including all the items for SPO dimensions, an adapted version of the trust in police procedural justice scale (see Jackson et al., 2013), and a set of items to measure general political attitudes and demographics from the participants. All the mentioned items were in English (see all the items in Appendix 1), so a back-translation process (English-Spanish-English) was carried out by native speakers to check out possible divergence and get a Spanish version of our instrument (see all the items in Appendix 2). As a result, we obtained two comparable questionnaires.

With respect to the data collection process, in both countries the participants filled in an online version of the questionnaire after being invited during classes. A small portion of British students opted to use a paper and pencil version of the questionnaire.

Measures. Participants responded on Likert-type scales ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) for the 12 items measuring perceived government openness (e.g., 'this government hinders participation in marches and protests'). For the eight items measuring perceived repression (e.g., 'in this country, the protests are dispersed using violent methods') a frequency scale was utilized (1 = *never*, 2 = *rarely*, 3 = *sometimes*, 4 = *often*, 5 = *always*). The 10 items for legitimacy of protests at a collective level (e.g., 'people of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action') were evaluated using a scale of typicality from 1 (*very untypical*) to 5 (*very typical*).

In addition, we adapted three items from the trust in police procedural justice scale (Jackson et al., 2013) to a scenario of protest. For this, we included the phrases 'in a protest' or 'during a protest' before each original item of the scale mentioned above (e.g., 'In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone'). These items were assessed using a Likert-type ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) (see all items in English in Appendix 1 and in Spanish in Appendix 2).

2.4.2 Analysis

We carried out CFA in MPLUS 7 using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) as the estimator to select the best indicators for each dimension and estimate the structure of SPO by country. The internal consistency and reliability of each dimension was calculated using the Omega coefficient (ω), an indicator recommended by the specialist literature on latent variables when the main assumptions of traditional Cronbach's alpha (unidimensionality and tau-equivalence) cannot be adopted (Dunn, Baguley, & Brunsden, 2014; Gignac, 2014; Widhiarso, & Ravand, 2014).

In a subsequent step, we evaluated the configuration of each SPO dimension in both countries (measurement invariance) following the guidelines of Dimitrov (2010) and Hoffman (2014). Thus, the resultant models were contrasted against nested models using a chi-squared difference test to specify their corresponding levels of invariance. After finishing the analyses by dimension, we assessed if SPO actually was a multidimensional construct by including a first-order general factor (SPO) and three orthogonal dimensions: government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests at a collective level (see Figure 2.1).

Figure 2.1. Original bifactor model (1 general factor + 3 subscales).

Finally, to assess the convergent validity of SPO and its dimensions, we correlated the adapted version of the trust in police procedural justice scale with both the SPO as a general factor and the perceived repression as a specific dimension aimed to evaluate perceptions of police suppression of protests.

2.4.3 Results

The CFA demonstrated that each proposed dimension for SPO was formed by four items (the rest were not considered further due to their low factor loadings). The items for each dimension, their respective descriptive statistics and standardised factor loadings by country are reported in Table 2.1. The internal consistency reliability and fit indices obtained for the dimensions in each country are detailed in Table 2.2.

Table 2.1. Descriptive statistics and standardised factor loadings of items per scale.

Dimension	Code	Items	UK (*n* = 247)		Chile (*n* = 219)	
			M *(SD)*	Factor Loadings	*M* *(SD)*	Factor Loadings
Government openness	Go1	The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests	3.06 (0.97)	.71	3.14 (1.12)	.73
	Go2	This government hinders participation in marches and protests	3.14 (0.96)	.80	3.28 (1.15)	.84
	Go3	The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests	3.18 (1.04)	.62	2.79 (1.16)	.70
	Go4	Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government	2.60 (1.12)	.58	3.26 (1.24)	.56
Perceived repression	Rep1	In this country, the protests are dispersed using violent methods	2.72 (0.80)	.64	3.74 (0.81)	.77
	Rep2	The police use an indiscriminate violence against the protesters	2.82 (0.90)	.76	3.45 (1.05)	.90
	Rep3	Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these are immediately attacked by the police	2.66 (1.04)	.61	3.05 (1.02)	.73
	Rep4	In my country, those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police	2.75 (1.06)	.66	3.51 (0.97)	.80
Legitimacy of protests	Leg1	People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action	3.61 (0.87)	.76	3.52 (0.89)	.63
	Leg2	Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns	3.23 (0.98)	.63	3.13 (1.02)	.78
	Leg3	People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	3.48 (0.92)	.74	2.75 (1.10)	.65
	Leg4	The people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	3.47 (0.88)	.62	2.95 (0.97)	.53

The results showed that in both samples all the scales achieved an acceptable level of internal consistency reliability ($\omega > .70$) and reached a good fit with the data according to Brown's (2015) recommendations. In terms of the scales' content, we need to highlight that the government openness scale comprises only reversed items. This means the selected items capture the extent to which people perceived the government try to hinder protests. Thus, as perceived repression, those items associated with government openness are reporting negative attitudes and actions from the political authorities towards protests.

Table 2.2. Internal consistency reliability indices and model fit statistics for each subscale by country.

UK									
Subscale	ω	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA	
								LL	UL
Government openness	.77	1.80	2	1.00	1.00	.01	.00	.00	.12
Perceived repression	.76	1.71	2	1.00	1.00	.01	.00	.00	.12
Legitimacy of protests	.78	3.94	2	.99	.96	.01	.06	.00	.15
CHILE									
Subscale	ω	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA	
								LL	UL
Government openness	.80	2.48	2	.99	.99	.01	.00	.00	.14
Perceived repression	.84	4.60	2	.99	.97	.01	.07	.00	.17
Legitimacy of protests	.75	0.70	2	1.00	1.00	.01	.00	.00	.09

Once the structure of each subscale was established, we tested their measurement invariance at successive levels of complexity (the results in detail can be found in Appendix 3). Thus, the government openness scale obtained total weak invariance (equal factor loadings). However, because equality between all indicators means (intercepts) could not be assumed, an alternative model where the intercepts of items 'go3' ('the government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests') and

‘go4’ (‘those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government’) were calculated as free parameters. This alternative model fitted well to the data, reaching partial strong invariance, and, in a subsequent step, the partial strict invariance for this subscale. Moreover, we carried out the same procedures to test partial strong and partial strict invariance in the scale for perceived repression where only the factor loadings were equal across countries (weak level of invariance).

Regarding legitimacy of protests at a collective level, it reached total weak invariance. Although the equality of the factors loadings across samples was demonstrated, the fit of the model diminished when we tried to constrain all the intercepts simultaneously. An alternative model where the intercepts of items ‘leg3’ (‘people think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient’) and ‘leg4’ (‘the people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system’) were calculated as free parameters demonstrated partial strong invariance. Subsequently, a set of new models showed partial strict invariance, and partial structural invariance equalizing the latent factor variances and means of this dimension respectively.

Once the measuring invariance was tested for each proposed SPO dimension, the next task was to determine the relation between the three proposed dimensions and SPO as a general factor. For this, we tested four possible configurations: three independent first order factors; a hierarchical model with three dimensions and SPO as a second order factor; a bifactor model with three dimensions (the original bifactor model); and a bifactor model with two dimensions (alternative bifactor model). Apart from the hierarchical

model which did not converge in any sample, a summary of the fit indices obtained for each configuration is reported in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3. Model fit statistics and close-fit indices associated with CFA models by country.

UK								
							90% CI for RMSEA	
Model	χ^2	*Df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL
Three first order factors.	96.28	51	.93	.91	.05	.06	.04	.07
Original bifactor model.	65.27	43	.96	.95	.04	.04	.02	.06
Alternative bifactor model.	19.21	13	.98	.97	.03	.04	.00	.08
CHILE								
							90% CI for RMSEA	
Model	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL
Three first order factors	70.03	51	.97	.97	.05	.04	.01	.06
Original bifactor model.	40.20	43	1.00	1.00	.03	.00	.00	.04
Alternative bifactor model.	17.81	13	.99	.98	.01	.02	.00	.08

The results demonstrated that the original bifactor model fitted the data better than the three first order factors in both countries. However, despite its good global fit indices, the main issue with the former model was that the items for legitimacy of protests did not load onto the general factor (SPO). The latter involves breaking a basic assumption of bifactor models, that indicators must share variance with a general factor and with only

one subscale, as well indicating that the legitimacy of protests scale might not be part of SPO. This problem was also reflected in two issues regarding the reliability coefficients obtained for the original bifactor model.

First, despite the consistency of the SPO scale considering all the sources of variance were acceptable in both samples (UK: ω_t = .77, 95% CI [0.70, 0.81]; Chile: ω_t = .88, 95% CI [0.84, 0.90]), the internal consistency for SPO as a general factor was low (UK: ω_h = .51, 95% CI [0.41, 0.59]; Chile: ω_h = .65, 95% CI [0.57, 0.71]). Second, the high proportion of unique internal consistency associated with legitimacy of protests (but not with SPO) in both the UK (ω_s = .77, 95% CI [0.69, 0.82]) and the Chilean sample (ω_s = .71, 95% CI [0.64, 0.77]), while government openness (UK: ω_s = .19, 95% CI [0.09, 0.30]; Chile: ω_s = .14, 95% CI [0.07, 0.24]), and perceived repression (UK: ω_s = .48, 95% CI [0.36, 0.61]; Chile: ω_s = .39, 95% CI [0.22, 0.53]) shared their loadings and most of their variance with the general factor (SPO).

Considering the results described above, the alternative bifactor model (see Figure 2.2) was tested excluding the items for legitimacy of protests. In addition, since the item 'go4' ('those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government') only loaded on the general factor in both samples, we set it as a SPO indicator without being associated with any specific subscale.



Figure 2.2. Alternative bifactor model (1 general factor + 2 subscales).

The analyses demonstrated that in both countries the alternative bifactor model fitted better in comparison to other alternative models (see Table 2.3). Moreover, it is important to stress that multi-group analyses were conducted to test measurement invariance across samples using the alternative bifactor model. These analyses compared the model without restrictions as a baseline (χ^2 (26) = 36.984; p = .075; CFI = .99; TLI = .98; RMSEA = .04; SRMR = .02) against successive constraints. The obtained results suggested that only equal factor loadings of the indicators over the general factor and on their respective subscales (weak level of invariance) can be assumed when SPO is used in the UK and Chile.

In terms of the interpretation of SPO, it is worth noting again that the items selected for government openness are reversed and indicate the extent that the political authorities are perceived as hindering protests instead of supporting or facilitating these activities. Thus,

the original valence of this construct is similar to perceived repression. Therefore, to correctly interpret the scores of these dimensions and SPO as general factor we want to introduce two practical suggestions. First, to ensure that the scores are coherent all the items should be reversed. This means that higher scores in SPO would be associated with more perceived openness to protests, understanding openness as the absence of repression against protests. Second, the current version of SPO should be named SPO-R (i.e., SPO-Repression version) to take into account that the proposed items refer to measures the government and the police can take to repress protests.

Finally, we found that trust in police procedural justice during protests maintained a positive medium correlation with SPO-R as a general factor in both countries (UK: r = .26, p = .008; Chile: r = .54, p < .001), as well as negative medium-high correlation with perceived repression (UK: r = -.34, p = .001; Chile: r = -.59, p < .001). Although the direction of the correlations is a factor should be taken into account when we test construct validity (Swank & Mullen, 2017), we expected a negative relationship between trust in police procedural justice and perceived repression considering the valence of the wording used for each of them (positive for the former and negative for the latter).

2.4.4 Discussion

Study 1 demonstrated evidence for the substantive and structural phases of construct validation (see Flake et al., 2017). Thus, we created theoretical definitions for SPO, government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests at collective level. Then, a panel of experts assessed these conceptualizations and the items developed to measure each proposed dimension. In a subsequent step, we carried out quantitative

analyses to explore the psychometric properties of each dimension (factor structure, internal consistency, and measurement invariance) as well as the configuration of SPO as a bifactor model comprising only two dimensions, government openness and perceived repression. Moreover, we suggested that considering the valence and the content of the items related to these two dimensions (absence of repression), henceforth, this version of the construct should be called SPO-R (i.e., SPO-Repression).

Trust in police procedural justice during protests correlated with both SPO-R and perceived repression (external phase). However, an unresolved issue is the relation between SPO-R and legitimacy of protests. For this, two different hypotheses should be considered. First, the items' wording (i.e., length and redundancy of information between the anchors and the items) for legitimacy of protests at collective level might affect the results for this scale and its relationship with SPO-R. Second, SPO-R and legitimacy of protests might be unrelated because people might consider what public opinion has to say about protests and the behaviour of political authorities at different levels of analysis. We tested both hypotheses in Study 2.

2.5 Study 2

2.5.1 Method

Participants. We recruited general population samples from the UK and Chile. Two Monte Carlo simulation studies based on the results of Study 1 (assuming normal distribution of the variables and the same pattern of missing values) determined that 300 observations was the optimal sample size to replicate the bifactor model with two dimensions, or to calculate the original factor model with three dimensions if the legitimacy of protests indicators had factor loadings equal or greater than .60 for the general factor (SPO-R), and equal or greater than .45 for the specific dimension. A total of 377 British (59.69% Female; Age: $M = 34.82$, $SD = 11.89$), and 309 Chilean (64.72% Female; Age: $M = 27.33$, $SD = 11.06$) adults comprised the final sample of this replication study. Unlike in Study 1, most Chilean participants (54%) reported having participated in protests during the twelve months previous to the data collection, although the percentage of British adults that had taken part in protests (11%) remained more or less the same as those in the first study.

Procedure. Participants completed a modified version of the questionnaire used in Study 1. This instrument included wording amendments to some items, a set of new items aimed to increase the number of indicators available for each SPO-R dimension, as well as a simplified version of the scale created for legitimacy of protests at a collective level in Study 1 (see all the items in English in Appendix 4 and in Spanish in Appendix

5). Furthermore, to make the new items comparable between samples, we carried out a back-translation process following the same procedures as in Study 1.

We used different methods in each country for data collection. All UK participants completed a version of the questionnaire hosted on Prolific (a paid online platform). In Chile, data gathering followed quota requirements based on the economic structure and gender composition of Santiago de Chile. There, participants were recruited through social media (Facebook and Twitter) or by a research assistant. In both cases, Chilean participants could choose between filling in the paper-and-pencil or the online version of the questionnaire. However, no statistical control was carried out to compare both versions due to the fact that only 15 participants completed the paper-and-pencil questionnaire.

Measures. As in Study 1, participants responded on a Likert-type scale (1 = *strongly disagree* to 5 = *strongly agree*) for the 10 items (five used in Study 1 and five new) associated with government openness (e.g., 'the government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests'); on a frequency scale (1 = *never*, 2 = *rarely*, 3 = *sometimes*, 4 = *often*, 5 = *always*) for those items (seven items; five used in Study 1 and 2 new items) which measured perceived repression (e.g., 'one of the primary objectives of the police is to prevent the development of any political demonstrations'); and on a typicality scale (1 = *very untypical* to 5 = *very typical*) for the seven items for legitimacy of protests at a collective level (e.g., 'citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns'). A typicality scale was also used to evaluate the six statements included in the simplified

version of the scale to measure legitimacy of protests at a collective level (e.g., 'protests are a valid action'). Moreover, we included the same three items we adapted from the trust in police procedural justice scale in Study 1.

2.5.2 Analysis

After testing the factor configurations obtained in Study 1, alternative models including previous and new items proposed for each dimension were compared. In addition, CFAs using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) were carried out to estimate the configuration of the simplified version of the legitimacy of protests scale and test its relationship with SPO-R.

Once the previous and new scales were configured, we calculated their internal reliability using Omega coefficients and tested their levels of measurement invariance using multi-group analyses. Then, as in Study 1, we compared four types of models to confirm the SPO-R configuration (SPO-R dimensions as independent first-order factors; SPO-R as a second order factor; SPO-R as a bifactor model with three dimensions; SPO-R as a bifactor model with two dimensions). We also contrasted those models which included the original scale of legitimacy of protests at collective level against those which used the simplified scale for the same construct. Finally, we used bi-variate correlations to examine evidence for convergent validity of SPO-R and perceived repression with the trust in police procedures scale in both samples.

2.5.3 Results

As in Study 1, each proposed dimension was made up of four items in both samples. The items associated with each dimension, their respective descriptive statistics by country, and standardised factor loadings are reported in Table 2.4.

Table 2.4. Descriptive statistics and standardised factor loadings of items per scale.

			UK (*n* = 337)		Chile (*n* = 310)	
Dimension	Code	Items	*M* *(SD)*	Factor Loadings	*M* *(SD)*	Factor Loadings
Government openness	Go1	The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests	2.42 (1.11)	.84	2.95 (1.25)	.77
	Go2	This government hinders participation in marches and protests	2.55 (1.11)	.85	3.21 (1.30)	.81
	Go3	The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests	2.69 (1.21)	.83	2.92 (1.33)	.80
	Go4	Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government	2.15 (1.22)	.70	3.03 (1.33)	.64
Perceived repression	Rep2	The police use an indiscriminate violence against the protesters	2.34 (0.86)	.80	3.62 (1.11)	.89
	Rep3	Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these are immediately attacked by the police	2.07 (0.92)	.74	3.16 (1.14)	.77

	Rep4	In my country, those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police	2.31 (0.87)	.79	3.44 (1.18)	.84
	Rep5	To disperse a protest, police officers commonly hit demonstrators	2.42 (0.89)	.76	3.55 (1.11)	.91
Legitimacy of protests (original scale)	Leg1	People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action	3.84 (0.89)	.78	3.64 (1.10)	.70
	Leg2	Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns	3.48 (1.00)	.76	3.32 (1.12)	.73
	Leg3	People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	3.62 (0.91)	.77	2.97 (1.16)	.78
	Leg4	The people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	3.67 (0.97)	.67	3.17 (1.11)	.60
Legitimacy of protests (simplified scale)	Pleg1	Protests are a valid action	3.91 (0.89)	.87	3.58 (1.08)	.72
	Pleg2	Demonstrations are fine even if they are inconvenient	3.42 (1.07)	.78	2.94 (1.13)	.70
	Pleg3	Demonstrators are threat to public order	2.49 (1.02)	-.58	2.98 (1.17)	-.50
	Pleg4	Protests are an important part of our democratic system	3.61 (0.98)	.74	3.24 (1.13)	.83

While the government openness and legitimacy of protests factors consisted of the same items as in the previous study, perceived repression maintained just three of its original items including a new one for both samples (see Table 2.4). This new item ('to disperse a protest, police officers commonly hit demonstrators') was introduced in the questionnaire as an improved version of 'in this country, the protests are dispersed using violent methods'.

In terms of the adjustment to the data, each proposed dimension reached acceptable fit indices in both samples (see Table 2.5). An exception to this is the RMSEA obtained for legitimacy of protests (original scale) which was higher than the recommended threshold (.08) in the Chilean sample. However, we decided to maintain the configuration of this construct following the recommendations of Kenny, Kaniskan, and McCoach (2014) on the artificial overestimation of RMSEA in models with small sample size and low degrees of freedom.

Turning now to measurement invariance testing by dimension, results suggested that government openness just reached a partial strict invariance (the detailed results of each dimension can be found in Appendix 6). As in Study 1, model fit indices became weaker when all intercepts were assumed to be equal, but their values were acceptable when the intercepts and the residual variance of two of the items were unconstrained.

Table 2.5. Internal consistency reliability indices and model fit statistics for each subscale by country.

UK									
								90% CI for RMSEA	
Subscale	ω	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL
Government openness	.88	3.14	2	.99	.99	.01	.03	.00	.11
Perceived repression	.85	2.30	2	.99	.99	.01	.02	.00	.10
Legitimacy of protests (original scale)	.83	5.13	2	.99	.97	.01	.06	.00	.13
Legitimacy of protests (simplified scale)	.63	2.17	2	1.00	.99	.01	.01	.00	.10

CHILE									
								90% CI for RMSEA	
Subscale	ω	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL
Government openness	.85	5.48	2	.98	.96	.01	.07	.03	.15
Perceived repression	.92	6.73	2	.99	.97	.01	.08	.02	.16
Legitimacy of protests (original scale)	.80	8.57	2	.96	.90	.03	.10	.04	.17
Legitimacy of protests (simplified scale)	.58	5.31	2	.98	.94	.02	.07	.00	.15

Having determined the level of invariance showed by government openness across samples, it is now necessary to discuss the other dimensions. According to the results,

equal factor loadings, intercepts, and residual variance could be assumed for perceived repression. With respect to legitimacy of protests at a collective level, both versions of the scale reached different levels of invariance. First, the original scale had equal factor loadings across samples. Second, we demonstrated that only items 'leg2' ('citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns') and 'leg4' ('the people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system') had equal intercepts (partial strong variance) and residual variances (partial strict variance) across countries. Moreover, the simplified version of the legitimacy of protests scale reached a full strong level of invariance, which implies that the factor loadings and intercepts of all its indicators were equal across samples.

Regarding the structural configuration of SPO-R, all the models tested in both countries fitted to the data apart from the hierarchical models (SPO-R as a second order factor) which did not converge (as in Study 1). Nevertheless, despite the good results demonstrated by almost all the alternative models, the bifactor model including just two sub-dimensions - (UK: ω_h = .83, 95% CI [0.80, 0.86]; Chile: ω_h = .76, 95% CI [0.70, 0.81]), government openness (UK: ω_s = .07, 95% CI [0.23, 0.42]; Chile: ω_s = .12, 95% CI [0.32, 0.52]) and perceived repression (UK: ω_s = .12, 95% CI [0.08, 0.31]; Chile: ω_s = .41, 95% CI [0.06, 0.19]) - was always the better alternative (see model 5 in Table 2.6).

With respect to the role of legitimacy of protests in SPO-R, those bifactor models which included the original version of the legitimacy of protests scale in the Chilean sample and those that used the simplified version of the latter construct (in both samples)

demonstrated a good fit (see models 3 and 4 in Table 2.6). However, these models were rejected because the items in both versions of the legitimacy of protests at a collective level scale (original and simplified) presented high factor loadings for the subscale but very low loadings (<= .20) for the general dimension (SPO-R).

Table 2.6. Model fit statistics and close-fit indices associated with CFA models by country.

	UK							
							90% CI for RMSEA	
Model	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL
1) Three first order factors (legitimacy of protest based on meta-perceptions)	74.12	51	.98	.98	.03	.03	.01	.05
2) Three first order factors (legitimacy of protest based on perceptions)	80.05	51	.98	.97	.04	.03	.02	.05
3) Bifactor model (three dimensions) using legitimacy of protest based on meta-perceptions	54.34	43	.99	.99	.03	.02	.00	.04
4) Bifactor model (three dimensions) using legitimacy of protest based on perceptions	54.92	43	.99	.99	.02	.02	.00	.04
5) Alternative bifactor model (two dimensions	13.23	13	1.00	1.00	.01	.00	.00	.05

CHILE								
							90% CI for RMSEA	
Model	χ^2	*df*	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL
1) Three first order factors (legitimacy of protest based on meta-perceptions)	111.17	51	.96	.95	.04	.06	.04	.07
2) Three first order factors (legitimacy of protest based on perceptions)	118.88	51	.95	.94	.04	.06	.05	.08
3) Bifactor model (three dimensions) using legitimacy of protest based on meta-perceptions	89.19	43	.97	.95	.03	.05	.04	.07
4) Bifactor model (three dimensions) using legitimacy of protest based on perceptions	94.85	43	.97	.95	.03	.06	.04	.07
5) Alternative bifactor model (two dimensions)	27.42	13	.98	.97	.02	.06	.02	.09

Considering these results, we suggest that legitimacy of protests at collective level does not belong to SPO-R and the latter is a multidimensional construct comprising two dimensions that refer to the extent to which people perceive government (government openness) and police openness (perceived repression) in relation to protests. However, as mentioned in Study 1, this openness should be understood and interpreted in terms of the absence of repression against protesters rather than authorities' willingness to allow or facilitate protesters actions. Accordingly, the version of the scale tested in this study should be named SPO-R.

With respect to SPO-R's measurement invariance in a bifactor model configuration, multi-group analyses demonstrated that equal factor loadings (weak level of invariance) in relation to the general factor (SPO-R) and its dimensions (government openness and perceived repression) can be assumed. These results confirm those obtained in Study 1, where SPO-R intercepts and residual variances differed between samples.

Finally, we found evidentiary support for the claim that SPO-R correlates well in both countries with trust in police procedural justice during protest (UK: $r = .62$, $p < .001$; Chile: $r = .42$, $p < .001$), while the perceived repression shows at least a negative medium size correlation with the latter construct in the UK ($r = -.27$, $p < .002$), and a medium-high correlation in the Chilean sample ($r = -.61$, $p < .001$).

2.5.4 Discussion

The results of Study 2 confirm that government openness, perceived repression, and legitimacy of protests reach different levels of measurement invariance across the UK and Chile. This is an important finding for two reasons. First, items are highly correlated with their respective factor, no matter the specific political context that participants come from. Second, and the results are replicable independent of the specific characteristics of the samples. However, the fact that neither all intercepts nor residual variances were equal in both studies suggests that at some level the hypothesised dimensions might be affected by specific phenomena associated with each country involved in the project. Thus, we can suggest that further research should explore the role of police brutality against protesters in Chile (Cummings, 2015; Human Right Watch, 2017), as well as the routinization of protests and the disconnection of political elites with social movements

in this country (Somma & Bargsted, 2015) as potential antecedents that might help to explain the differences.

Moreover, Study 2 confirms that government openness and perceived repression are components of the same general dimension (SPO-R). This suggests that alongside the 'objective' facts associated with statistics, macro-economic drivers, laws, or some political measures, researchers should give heed to people's perceptions regarding authorities' behaviour (the government and the police) in the evaluation of political context openness in relation to collective action. Despite these results, we need to reaffirm that in our current work the term 'openness' exclusively referred to the perceived lack of repression against protesters' actions. We believe that the scale should be developed in the future to also measure the perceived extent to which the political context supports protests, and the extent people perceive the authorities carry out specific actions to facilitate protests. Thus, we think there should be different versions of the SPO scale according to the three main possible actions authorities may carry out in relation to protests: SPO-R (repression); SPO-C (consent); SPO-F (facilitation).

Regarding the relation between the legitimacy of protests and SPO-R, we confirm that none of the versions of the scale (original and simplified) elaborated to measure the former construct can be considered part of the SPO-R as a general factor. This means that when people evaluate the attitudes and behaviour of other political actors regarding protests, public opinion and authorities might be considered separately without a continuum or correspondence existing between them.

2.6. General discussion

The contribution of the studies reported in this paper to the fields of collective action and social movement studies is two-fold. First, theoretically, this paper contributes the subjective or psychological counterpart to the social structural affordances regarded as key predictors of social movement activity by Political Opportunities Structures theorists. In the last 20 years, social movement theories have moved to an increased recognition of the role of the subjective and psychological points of view (e.g., Honari, 2017, 2018a; Jaspers, 2017; Kurzman, 1996; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2013; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018). The present work is part of this development, and as such it builds a bridge between sociological social movements approaches and psychological collective action approaches (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; van Zomeren, 2016).

The second contribution is practical, as this study has served to produce an instrument that can be used by different researchers and which we believe will enhance future empirical work on social movements and collective action. Instead of having to elaborate ad hoc measures for the subjective perception of political conditions in relation to protests, future researchers can draw upon a validated measurement scale: the SPO. In terms of their practical use and in consideration of its multidimensionality, we recommend that those who want to use the current version of the scale (SPO-R) should incorporate the eight items (i.e., four for each dimension) we reported in this paper into their questionnaires to obtain and interpret the scores accurately.

Researchers can use any version of our scale to measure the legitimacy of protests because this construct does not belong to SPO-R. We think a possible explanation for the latter might be that people consider the opinion of authorities and other citizens at different levels of analysis and importance. This is in line with Rucht's (2004) conceptualization about social movements' groups of reference, where in spite of being part of the same political context, the politico-administrative system and general public appear as different players that can establish unique and particular relations with social movements. Certainly, the clarification of the role of public opinion in the evaluation of political conditions is a relevant topic that should be considered in further research.

Finally, we want to highlight three main points that future research should address to develop the current version of SPO and extend its scope. First, despite SPO's contributions to the field of collective action, it is essentially limited to the perceptions of actors that are usually directly exposed to public scrutiny (the government and police). Due to this, new research should make efforts to incorporate perceptions of other actors are not so visible to public opinion (e.g., law or courts of justice) but still might impact people's evaluation of their political context. Second, as discussed above, we think different versions of the SPO scale need to be developed according the dimension of 'openness' researchers want to assess. Specifically, we called our version SPO-R because our items specifically address the (lack of) repression against protesters, instead of the mere authorization (SPO-C, consent) or the active facilitation of protests by authorities (SPO-F, facilitation). Last but not least, new studies should provide more evidence for the external phase of construct validation (see Flake et al., 2017). This means researchers need to test if SPO-R and its dimensions are capable of predicting relevant attitudes (e.g., willingness to take part in protests) or (actual) behaviours in relation to collective action.

Furthermore, future research should explore the convergent/divergent validity between SPO-R's dimensions and other constructs that have been used in recent literature to assess the political context where protests take place, such as perceived political cynicism, external efficacy, and political trust (see Lee 2010; Lee & Chan, 2018; Sabucedo et al., 2017; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018).

Chapter 3

Support for protesters' violence against the police: The role of public opinion and perceived restrictions on protests

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3.1 Abstract

Examination of non-participants' reasons for supporting protest violence against the police has been neglected in the literature. We carried out survey (Study 1; n_{UK} = 377, n_{Chile} = 309) and experiments (Study 2; n_{UK} = 141, n_{Chile} = 262) in the UK and Chile showing that people are more willing to support protesters' violence against police when they perceive that the government and police try to restrict the presence of protests. In addition, Britons also consider the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests in their endorsement of protest violence. These findings highlight the importance of non-participants in the legitimisation of protesters' actions. The inclusion of both the perceived restrictions imposed on protests and the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests represents a significant advance in the psychological study of collective action.

3.2 Introduction

Why might non-participants support protesters' violence against the police? Since the psychological literature has turned its attention to collective action, most studies have concentrated on describing the roles of social identity, collective efficacy, group-based anger and moral convictions on the intentions, or actual behaviour related to collective action (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Morgan & Chan, 2016; Tausch & Becker, 2013; van Zomeren, 2013, van Zomeren, Postmes, & Spears, 2012; van Zomeren, Postmes, Spears, & Bettache, 2011). However, researchers have neglected the reasons non-participants might support the use of physical violence during protests (cf. Bohler-Muller et al., 2017; Gerber et al., 2018; Saab et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Exploring non-participants' reasons to support protest violence, and in particular violence against police, is an essential issue if we consider episodes where protesters have used violence with different levels of support from public opinion, such as the 2010 student protests in the UK (Lewis, et al., 2010), the anti-Trump protests in the US (Ellis & Marco, 2017), anti-government demonstrations in Venezuela in 2017 (e.g., "Venezuela crisis", 2017), and the recent protests carried out by indigenous people in Chile (e.g., "Chile activists burn bus", 2017). Thus, the importance of the present study is rooted in the identification of those social-psychological factors that may help to explain non-participants' support for protest violence against the police.

Although previous research has argued that implicit theories about social change (see Shuman et al., 2016), group-based anger (see Tausch et al., 2011), and system-justifying beliefs (see Jost et al., 2012) might be antecedents of willingness to carry out different

actions during protests, most of these studies have classified protest violence as illegitimate (i.e., non-normative actions) by default. Conversely, in the present study, rather than using a priori normative criteria we consider protest violence as a subset of collective action which can gain legitimacy depending on people's perceptions of authorities' restrictions to the right to protest and public opinion.

3.2.1 What leads to the use of violence during protests?

In a speech in 1967, Martin Luther King Jr argued that riots were the language of the unheard (i.e., those who had been ignored by society) and the only way to prevent violence during protests was the implementation of social justice on behalf of African-Americans in the US (Veterans of the Civil Right Movement, n.d.). Although King did not explicitly support the use of violence to reach the goals of his movement, he offered a potential explanation for why African-American people used violence, based on the illegitimacy of group inequalities. This argument is in line with social identity theory (SIT) regarding those social structural conditions are necessary for collective action (Tajfel & Turner, 1979). In addition, other scholars have also suggested that feelings of contempt (see Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Tausch & Becker, 2013; Tausch et al., 2011), relative deprivation caused by injustices and inequalities (see Kawakami & Dion, 1995), identification with their own group (see Hogg, Meehan, & Farquharson, 2010; Jiménez-Moya, Spears, Rodríguez-Bailón, & de Lemus, 2015), the perceived inefficacy of alternative action paths to reach social change (Wright et al., 1990), and the lack of control to change unfavourable conditions (see Wright & Tropp, 2002, for a review) are factors that people may consider to carry out violent actions during protests.

From a different point of view, the elaborated social identity model (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Stott & Drury, 2000, 2017) suggests that the interaction between protesters and the police is a critical factor that can legitimise protest violence (Stott & Drury, 2000; Stott et al., 2018; Stott, Drury, & Reicher, 2016). The latter is particularly relevant for those who initially were not willing to be involved in violent actions but who came to both defend themselves against perceived police violence, and to punish police officers for their illegitimate actions against protesters (e.g., Drury & Reicher, 2018; Maguire, Barak, Cross, & Lugo, 2018). Hence, coming back to our historical example and following ESIM, it could be argued that the structural injustices they were suffering and the quality of police-protesters interactions might partially explain African-Americans legitimisation of violence during the 60s.

Despite the fact the arguments presented above offer a plausible explanation for the legitimisation of protest violence, they are limited to actual protesters' behaviour and do not address either non-participants' reactions to the occurrence of violence during protests nor the reasons to support violent actions against the police. Therefore, the question now is when do non-participants support protest violence - and in particular, violence against the police? This question is crucial considering that to achieve desired social change, protesters need to seek out support from broader society for their specific demands and the actions they carry out on the streets (e.g., Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019b; Teixeira, Spears, & Yzerbyt, 2019). To answer it, we suggest that two factors should be considered: features of the political context and public opinion.

3.2.2 Features of the political context and protesters' violence

Political opportunities approach (Kriesi, 2004; McAdam, 1982; Tarrow, 1994) has established that the tolerance (i.e., openness) of the political system to the presence of social movements is decisive to understand people's participation and support for protests (e.g., Brockett, 1991; Eisinger, 1973). However, one of the main shortcomings of this approach is its failure to explain which type of actions people are willing to perform and support during protests (see Meyer & Minkoff, 2004, for a discussion). In an attempt to solve this issue, Goldstone and Tilly (2001) propose that political opportunities should be considered along with two factors: levels of repression (see Della Porta, 1995; Della Porta & Fillieule, 2004; Opp & Roehl, 1990; Tilly, 1978) and the type of regime that people need to confront (e.g., democratic or authoritarian). Thus, people might support violence when they are under an authoritarian regime characterised by a low acceptance of protests and high degrees of repression (Goldstone & Tilly, 2001). In addition to this, Tilly (2008) suggests that the actions people might carry out and support during mobilisation processes cannot merely be explained by the immediate context (i.e., political opportunities and repression) because each society would manage a limited range of actions which may be performed during mobilisations processes (e.g., protests). These actions would rely on past interactions between actors (e.g., protesters and police officers) and the relationship between these actors and broader structures of power (e.g., political system) in a specific historical setting. As we will show, this is a central idea to interpret and understand differences between countries concerning the type of protest actions people may (or may not) support. In line with this, we agree with Tilly's (2008, p. 41) statement on those who conduct transnational comparisons: "analysts of political phenomena should not be searching for broad transnational empirical generalisations but for the causal mechanisms

and processes that in different combinations, sequences, and initial conditions produce political variation and change".

Although sociologists have produced a considerable literature on the role of political contextual features in the dynamics of social movements, an integration of these features in the psychological analysis of collective action is still lacking (van Zomeren, 2016, for a discussion). To put it differently, while psychological research has explored the role of some contextual features regarding protests as the perceptions of risk (Ayanian & Tausch, 2016), trust in the political system (van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018), and presence of corruption (Thomas & Louis, 2014), just a few works have examined the relevance of people's perceptions of the measures taken by the police (e.g., Radburn et al., 2018) and governmental officials regarding protests (see Drury et al., 2012).

To tackle the issue mentioned above, Saavedra and Drury (2019b) suggest a novel construct (subjective political openness, SPO) and a scale of measurement aimed at evaluating the perceived political context regarding protests based on authorities' behaviours (SPO-Repression, or SPO-R). Embedded with a broader move seeking that social movements research pay more attention to people's response (micro-level of analysis) to the macro-level conditions (i.e., structural conditions) in relation to mobilization processes (see Earl, 2011, for a review; see also Honari, 2017, 2018a), SPO-R is a psychological tool aimed at measuring people's perceptions of government openness/restrictions and police repression. It is noteworthy that SPO-R was validated in the UK and Chile as a bifactor model comprising a general factor (subjective political openness regarding protests) and the two dimensions mentioned above.

3.2.3 The role of non-participants and public opinion

Apart from the features of the political context, sociological research has pointed out that non-participants are fundamental to understand the dynamics of social movements. This is because non-participants are part of the reference groups that movements have to interact with to create alliances and links of cooperation to reach social changes (Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991; Rucht, 2004). Moreover, psychological research has demonstrated that no-participants can play a crucial role in collective action by potentially becoming protesters (Saab, Tausch, Spears, & Cheung, 2015; Subašic et al., 2008), validating different tactics (see Gerber et al., 2018; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Saab et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014), or giving legitimacy to protests (see Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019). Thus, non-participants could become a source of legitimacy for the actions carried out by protesters. The African-American Civil Rights Movement is an excellent example considering that it received support from diverse communities and groups which were not directly affected by racial discrimination (e.g., white communities and civil society groups) (Andrews, Beyerlein, & Tuker Farnum, 2015; McAdam, 1982).

Despite the fact that legitimacy has been shown to be an essential factor in the development of protests, hitherto research has equated the perception of protests as a legitimate political act with own opinions (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019) and attitudes towards protesters' actions (e.g., Sweetman et al., 2019). Consequently, we suggest these approaches should be complemented with a perspective that acknowledges the construction of legitimacy around protests at a collective level (i.e., given by other non-participants). This collective construction might be based on both the

legitimacy given by convention to protests in democratic regimes and meta-perceptions (i.e., perceptions of other people's perceptions) about this convention. Regarding meta-perceptions, we suggest their normative component that refers to knowledge of other people's impressions about ourselves or our group (Carlson & Barranti, 2016; West, 2016) might be expanded to include other people's thoughts about protests in a specific context. Although based on a normative component, we need to clarify there is a distinction between our understanding of meta-perceptions and the well-known concept of injunctive norms (see Cialdini, Kallgreen, & Reno, 2003, for a review). While the latter refers to the perceived acceptance/rejection of specific behaviours by others (e.g., participation in protests), the former concept addresses how people perceive the opinion or the position of others in relation to a specific phenomenon (e.g., protests as acts of worth in a democracy) at different levels of analysis (i.e., country, community, interpersonal; e.g., Swim, Geiger, & Lengieza, 2019).

Following the above distinction, the use of meta-perceptions could help us to understand two issues related to the role of non-participants in collective action. First, meta-perceptions could help to get a better understanding of the relationship between legitimacy, collective action, and social change that so far has been mainly restricted to the nature of intergroup conflicts (SIT; Tajfel & Turner, 1979) and people's motives to defend the status quo (Jost, Becker, Osborne, & Badaan, 2017; Jost et. al., 2012). Second, perceptions of other people's thoughts (public opinion) could be considered as a source of legitimisation of protests as well as of the (violent) actions carried out by protesters. This means that the legitimacy of protests might depend upon a collective construction (public opinion), allowing us to extend ESIM taking into account that normative change

in protests (e.g., the legitimisation of violent actions employed by protesters) might be endorsed by people not directly involved in them (i.e., non-participants).

Moreover, an unexplored issue in the literature is the potential relationship between the two factors mentioned above, the perceived features of the political context related to authorities' measures and collective legitimisation of protests. To put it differently, we still do not know if people's perceptions of authorities' restrictions imposed on protests have any impact on the extent to which people perceive that others (de) legitimise protests in a specific time and place.

3.3 The current research

The aim of the present research is threefold. First, test the impact of the perceived restrictions on protests on non-participants' support for protest violence against the police. Second, explore if these perceived restrictions on protests affect how people perceive that public opinion legitimises protests. Third, examine the influence of perceived legitimacy of protests on non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police.

For the two studies reported in this paper, we compared samples from the UK and Chile. Whereas Study 1 is a cross-sectional study where the Subjective Political Openness Repression (SPO-R) scale was employed to measure the perceived restrictions regarding protests, Study 2 is an experiment where the *objective* political scenario in which a

hypothetical protest took place was manipulated. It is worth mentioning that we selected the UK and Chile considering their long tradition of protests and divergent styles of protest policing. In line with Tilly's (2008) idea about transnational comparisons, before going through our studies, we offer a concise overview of the current political situation of both countries; their policing protests; the occurrence of protest violence; and the relationship between protesters and authorities.

Regarding the UK, like in other western advanced democracies, (peaceful) protests have become routinised activities and considered as an intrinsic part of the democratic system through which different groups can freely express their concerns and complaints. In line with this, protest violence, as well as the deployment of riot police officers, are relatively rare on British soil (see Reiner, 1998). Indeed, in some areas, police officers have received specialised training (Police Liaison Officers) to promote dialogue with protesters (see Gorringe et al., 2012, for an overview). In contrast to this sometimes called *friendly* approach to policing protests (see Della Porta et al., 1998 for a discussion), Chilean authorities have maintained a coercive approach based on the use of riot police (e.g., "Chile: Clashes erupt", 2018) and paramilitary forces to manage public order (e.g., Bonnefoy, 2018). As a consequence, Chilean police (Carabineros) have been internationally condemned in successive years due to their systematic abuse of power and brutality against protesters (e.g., Human Rights Watch, 2017). Thus, and unlike the UK, protesters' clashes with Carabineros may be considered as a commonplace of the Chilean political scene.

Moreover, to compare protests and protesters' violence in both countries, two important phenomena should also be taken into account. First, while the UK has kept a stable democracy, Chile went through a transition process (from a dictatorship to democracy) that lasted until the early 2000s. During that period, Chileans put aside their right to protest to no jeopardise the stability of the new democracy, favouring a system mainly led by professional politicians and technocrats (see Hipsher, 1998). In practical terms, this meant that protests were despised until a few years ago when people started to come onto the streets and protest on behalf of different causes (see Garretón et al., 2017, for a review). Furthermore, according to Cummings (2015), the latter might imply that older generations (those who suffered repression during the dictatorship and those who were young during the first democratic government) could have a less favourable view of protests in comparison to those who were born into democracy and do not have to fear for the same constraints than their parents and grandparents. Second, the relationship between police forces and political authorities are far from being similar between these two countries. While the Carabineros is a militarised force organised at a national level under the direct subordination to the Minister of Interior, British police forces are relatively autonomous from the government and organised by jurisdictional areas. A direct consequence of this might be the lack of accountability of Carabineros' actions during protests due to the strong support they have continuously received from political authorities (see Fuentes, 2006, for a discussion).

3.4 Study 1

The main hypotheses for this study are summarised in the theoretical model presented below (see Figure 3.1), and can be stated as follows: the more non-participants perceive their political context as restricted to protests, the more willing they will be to support protesters' violence against the police (H1). Considering that previous research has not examined the relationship between perceived restrictions and perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, we propose two ad-hoc hypotheses for it. On the one hand, the *resistance hypothesis* would suggest there is no continuity between perceived authorities' restrictions and public opinion legitimation of protests. The latter means that non-participants think that public opinion supports protests as a reaction against imposed restrictions. Accordingly, the more the authorities try to hinder protesters' activities, the more non-participants think that public opinion legitimises protests (H2).

On the other hand, we propose the *alignment hypothesis*. This hypothesis would assume the existence of a potential continuity between non-participants' perceptions of authorities' restrictions and public opinion's legitimisation of protests. In other words, non-participants would perceive that public opinion gives less legitimacy to protests the more restrictions authorities implement, and vice versa (H3).

Concerning the relationship between the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion and support for protest violence, we suggest that the more legitimacy public opinion gives

to protests, the more likely non-participants are to support protesters' violence against police (H4). Moreover, considering that SPO-R scale has two components in a bifactor model configuration (perceived repression and government restrictions), we can propose specific hypotheses for each of them. First, because repression always represents a threat to protests, we expect that perceived repression will be directly related to non-participants' support for protesters' violence (H5). Second, we will explore whether the relationship between perceived repression and perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests is coherent with either the resistance or alignment hypotheses (H6). Third, due to the less visible role of the government (compared to the police) in the handling of protests, we propose that non-participants' perceptions about government behaviour regarding collective action might have no direct effect on their support for protest violence against the police. Alternatively, we put forward that perceptions of government actions might have an indirect effect on the support for protesters' violence against the police via its influence on the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests (H7).



Figure 3.1. Theoretical model of Study 1.

3.4.1 Method

Procedure and participants. Ethical approvals for this study were obtained from the Cross Schools Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex in the UK, and from the Comité Ético Científico en Ciencias Sociales, Artes, y Humanidades of the Pontificia Universidad Católica in Chile. Participants in the UK were randomly recruited through Prolific, a platform that hosted an online version of the questionnaire, while in Chile a research assistant carried out face-to-face recruitment using information about the socioeconomic status and gender on Santiago de Chile population as a proxy for a quota sample.

The sample size from each country was calculated using a Monte Carlo simulation based on the results from a validation study of the SPO-R scale (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019b). The analysis suggested that 300 observations are required to use structural equation modeling (SEM), including a bifactor model with two dimensions. Thus, 377 British people (59.69% Female; Age: M = 34.82, SD = 11.89), and 310 Chileans (64.72% Female; Age: M = 27.33, SD = 11.06) with different rates of participation in the 12 months prior to data collection (British people: 10.61%; Chileans: 54.84 %) took part in this study.

Measures. A questionnaire developed in English was translated and back-translated to and from Spanish to get comparable instruments in both countries.

The items associated with each SPO-R dimension were included in the questionnaire. Thus, participants read the following stem 'thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below' before responding on a Likert-type scale ranging from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*) to four items related to government restrictions (e.g., 'the government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests'). The stem 'thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the streets of the UK (Chile), please indicate how common are the following situations' preceded the four items to measure perceived repression (e.g., 'the police use indiscriminate violence against the protesters') based on a frequency scale (1 = *never*, 2 = *rarely*, 3 = *sometimes*, 4 = *often*, 5 = *always*) (see all the items in Appendix 7).

We also included three items developed and validated by Saavedra and Drury (2019b) as measures of the perceived legitimacy given by others to protests (meta-perceptions) at country level (public opinion). Thus, participants read 'taking into account what people of your country think about the presence of social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of public opinion' as a stem before to each statement (e.g., 'people of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action') on a typicality scale (1= *very untypical* to 5 = *very typical*).

Regarding support for protest violence against the police, we created four items depicting police transgressions during protests for this study (e.g., 'when police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation'). These items were preceded by the following stem 'when is the use of physical violence by protesters justified?' and

measured using a frequency scale ranging from 1 (*never*) to 5 (*always*) (see all the items in Appendix 7).

Finally, we included one item to measure people's identification with their current government (e.g., 'how represented do you feel by the British/Chilean government?'), as well as sociodemographic measures like gender, age, and total income (all considered as control variables in the analyses).

Analysis. We used MPLUS 7.11 (Muthén & Muthén, 2012) to analyse both samples. In a first step, we evaluated the latent structure of each construct mentioned above and the SPO-R configuration as a bifactor model. To facilitate the interpretation of SPO-R in our models as restrictions on protests we decided to keep the (negative) valence Saavedra and Drury gave to their original items. In addition, considering that the original items for government openness refer to government actions to hinder protests, we relabelled this dimension as government restrictions. Thus, high scores in SPO-R mean participants perceive more restrictions on protests from authorities (the government and the police) in their respective countries.

In a second step, we calculated the internal reliability of the scales included in this study through the Omega (ω) coefficient. We selected this indicator for two reasons. First, unlike Cronbach's alpha, ω does not assume either the tau-equivalence or unidimensionality of constructs (Dunn et al., 2014). Second, the use of ω is highly recommended to measure the reliability of multidimensional constructs assuming that a scale could be part of a more complex structure (e.g., bifactor model) and its reliability

can be disaggregated after controlling for the general factor (see Gignac, 2014; Reise, Bonifay, & Haviland, 2013).

In a third step, we demonstrated that in both samples perceived legitimacy of protests, support for protesters' violence against the police, and SPO-R (configured as a bifactor model with two sub-dimensions) were independent factors. Subsequently, structural equation modeling (SEM) using Maximum Likelihood Robust (MLR) as estimator was conducted to test the theoretical model (see Figure 3.1). In addition, we used multi-group analysis and Wald Test to check the differences between Chilean and British samples.

In a fourth step, we took advantage of the similar proportion of Chileans with (54.86%) and without (45.14%) previous experience in protest to run a multi-group analysis and test whether the relations included in our theoretical model were affected by previous participation in protests.

3.4.2 Results

The analyses conducted to calculate the reliability of the scales demonstrated that all of them reached acceptable levels of internal consistency (> .70) in both samples; see Table 3.1.

Table 3.1. Reliability of the scales using coefficients Omega (ω).

Variables	UK	Chile
1. SPO-R	.92	.91
2. Government restrictions	.89	.85
3. Perceived repression	.86	.92
4. Perceived legitimacy of protests	.86	.79
5. Support for protesters' violence	.89	.92

On the question of the independence of the latent factors, we demonstrated that the proposed model (three independent factors, one of them in a bifactor configuration) fit the data well in both the British (χ^2 (76) = 82.05, p = .297; *RMSEA* = .01; 90% CI [0.00, 0.03]; *SRMR* = .02; *CFI* = .99) and Chilean samples (χ^2 (76) = 110.91, p = .005; *RMSEA* = .03; 90% CI [0.02, 0.05]); *SRMR* = .03; *CFI* = .98).

Regarding the structural equation modelling, the proposed theoretical model fitted well to the data from the UK (χ^2 (130) = 210.00, p < .001; *RMSEA* = .04; 90% CI [0.03, 0.05]; *SRMR* = .07; *CFI* = .96) and Chile (χ^2 (130) = 219.68, p < .001; *RMSEA* = .04; 90% CI [0.03, 0.05]; SRMR = .07; CFI = .96), explaining 15.3% and 16.5% of the variance of support for protesters' violence against the police respectively. The correlations between all variables included in the model are reported in Table 3.2.

Table 3.2. Correlations among the variables included in the model. Coefficients between SPO and its dimensions are equal to zero due to the specifications associated with bifactor models.

	1	2	3	4	5
British sample (N = 377)					
1. SPO-R	1.00				
2. Government restrictions	.00	1.00			
3. Perceived repression	.00	.00	1.00		
4. P. Legitimacy of protests	-.42***	.21	.30**	1.00	
5. Support for protesters' violence	.27**	-.01	.03	-.01	1.00
6. Identification with the government	-.36***	.00	.00	.04	.03
7. Gender	.02	.00	.00	.00	.12*
8. Age	-.16**	.00	.00	.19**	-.09†
9. Income	-.01	.00	.00	.01	-.02
Chilean sample (N = 310)					
1. SPO-R	1.00				
2. Government restrictions	.00	1.00			
3. Perceived repression	.00	.00	1.00		
4. P. Legitimacy of protests	-.06	-.24†	-.16†	1.00	
5. Support for protesters' violence	.32***	.00	.13†	-.11†	1.00
6. Identification with the government	-.24***	.00	.00	.04	-.09
7. Gender	-.13	.00	.00	-.25***	.14*
8. Age	-.10	.00	.00	.10	.00
9. Income	-.12	.00	.00	-.03	-.09

Note: Significance of coefficients is indicated †$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

The results supported H1 demonstrating that in both samples, non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police was positively predicted by a political context perceived as more restricted to protests. With respect to the relationship between perceived political context and legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, our evidence provided support for the alignment hypothesis (H3) and not for the resistance hypothesis (H2). This suggests that both British and Chilean people may perceive that public opinion's legitimisation of protest depends on the extent that authorities restrict the presence of protests on the streets (see Figure 3.2).



Figure 3.2. Results of the SEM for both samples. The model was controlled by identification with the government, gender, age, and total income. Regression coefficients are the unstandardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated †$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Moreover, we found differences by country regarding the role of the perceived legitimacy given to protest on the support for the use of violence against police officers (H4). Whereas British participants supported protesters' violence the more they perceived

public opinion legitimates protests, the same relation was non-significant for Chileans (*Wald* χ^2 (1) = 2.76, p = .096). In a posteriori analysis, we confirmed there were no indirect effects of the perceived political context on support for protesters' violence via the perceived legitimacy given to protests by public opinion in the British sample (point estimate: -.04, *SE* = .02, p = .113).

In the case of the hypotheses related to SPO-R dimensions, we obtained different results by country. On the one hand, perceived repression was directly related to more support for protesters' violence against police officers for Chileans but not for British participants (H5). Nevertheless, these results must be interpreted with caution because the difference between the regression coefficients obtained in each country was not statistically significant (*Wald* χ^2 (1) = 4.73, p = .491). On the other hand, only British participants perceived that levels of repression against the protesters might be positively associated with a greater legitimacy given by public opinion to protests (*Wald* χ^2 (1) = 4.57, p = .032) (H6). This an interesting result considering that in the specific case of the police transgression, British participants provided support for the resistance rather than for the alignment hypothesis when they evaluated authority's behaviour in general. However, even though this last result might also suggest perceived repression has an indirect effect on support for protesters' violence against the police via perceived legitimacy of protests, we found that the indirect effects were non-significant (point estimate: .026, *SE* = .018, p = .146).

With respect to the relationship between government restrictions and the perceived legitimacy given to protests by public opinion (H7), we found no correlation between

these two variables in any sample. Therefore, the described path was not calculated in the final model reported in this section.

Finally, through a multi-group analysis, we found that our model works equally for those Chileans who had participated in protests and those who not (χ^2 (276) = 401.29, $p < .001$; *RMSEA* = .05; 90% CI [0.04, 0.06]; SRMR = .07; CFI = .94). The latter suggests that Chileans' support for protesters' violence against the police may depend on their perceptions of the restrictions imposed on protests regardless of their previous experience attending demonstrations.

3.4.3 Discussion

Our results are consistent with the idea that non-participants' perceptions of authorities' restrictions on protests might have a direct impact on their support for protest violence against the police. In addition, the results showed that people's perceptions of public opinion legitimisation of protests depend on the perceived restrictions authorities impose on protests. Thus, we suggest that people may see a continuity (alignment hypothesis) between how restricted is the scenario and the legitimacy given by other people to protests. Interestingly, this continuity collapses when British people evaluate police behaviour separately. In particular, British people may tend to perceive that public opinion gives more legitimacy to protest, the more the police repress protesters (the resistance hypothesis). Undoubtedly, further evidence is required to clarify these differences.

Taking into account the different results obtained in each sample, another point that needs clarification is the link between the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests and support for protesters' violence against the police. We might speculate that these differences can be attributed to the specific historical processes people in each country have gone through. Thus, it is plausible that Chileans do not relate public opinion legitimisation of protests to support protesters' actions because protests came back to the Chilean political scene as legitimate actions only a few years ago. Moreover, it seems the high levels of police brutality against protesters have been reflected in how Chileans might increase their support for protesters' violence when they perceive police repression during protests. In contrast, for Britons, public opinion legitimation of protests may act as an important factor to take into account before supporting protest violence against the police.

Overall, our results suggest that non-participants consider authorities' restrictions and public opinion to evaluate the political context where protests take place and support protest violence against police. In order to overcome the limitations of a cross-sectional study, we designed an experiment (Study 2) in which authorities' measures regarding protests (i.e., restrictions and facilitation) were manipulated. As in Study 1, similar procedures were carried out in samples from the UK and Chile to allow comparability, while we included the same constructs reported in the models above to maintain coherence between studies.

3.5 Study 2

The second study was an experiment aimed at examining non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police in different political scenarios. For this, the objective conditions of a political scenario were manipulated using vignettes in which the authorities (government and police) restricted or facilitated a bogus student protest.

The general design of this study combined the ideas developed in the political opportunities perspective about the role of objective (i.e., external to the individuals) political conditions on the occurrence of protests (McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1994; Tilly, 1978) with a *subjective* approach embedded within the concept of subjective political openness (SPO) (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019b). With this, we wanted to compare whether people's perceptions of the conditions they must confront could be as important as the objective conditions themselves.

On the one hand, the main hypotheses relating to the objective political conditions are the following: when people are exposed to favourable political conditions for protests people would perceive their political context as less restrictive, while the opposite would happen under a restrictive political context (H1). Based on the results of Study 1 concerning the alignment hypothesis, we also expect that the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests would have a close relationship with the objective conditions people have to face. Thus, people would perceive that public opinion grants less legitimacy to

protests when authorities implement restrictions on protests in comparison to scenarios where authorities do not implement such restrictions (H2). At the same time, we expect that a restricted objective scenario would lead people to increase their support for protest violence against the police (H3).

On the other hand, in order to corroborate our previous results, we tested similar hypotheses as those tested in Study 1. Thus, we expect that the more the people perceive their political context as restrictive to protests, the more willing people might be to support protesters' violence against the police (H4). In line with the alignment hypothesis supported in Study 1, we expect that, in a political context perceived as more restrictive, people might perceive that public opinion grants less legitimacy to protests (H5); and the perceived legitimation of protests by others might correlate with greater support for protesters' violence against the police (H6).

Moreover, we propose the objective political context (experimental conditions) might have an effect on support for protesters' violence against the police via the subjective perceptions about those conditions (H7) and the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests (H8).

3.5.1 Method

Participants. Ethical approvals for this study were obtained from the Cross Schools Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex in the UK, and from the Comité Ético Científico en Ciencias Sociales, Artes, y Humanidades of the Pontificia Universidad Católica in Chile. To calculate the sample size in each country, we followed

Boone's (2012) recommendation of around 200 participants to get a minimum statistical power (.80) in a model with multiple mediators. Thus, the overall sample comprised 141 undergraduates from a British university (75.17% Female; Age: *M* = 19.22, *SD* = 2.35), and 262 students from a Chilean university (60.68% Female; Age: *M* = 21.06, *SD* = 2.35). Regarding their previous experience in protests/demonstrations, British (12.1%) and Chilean (49.2%) participants for this study reported a similar rate of participation than those who took part in Study 1.

Design and procedure. Participants in both countries filled in an online questionnaire after being invited during teaching events by a research assistant (Chile), or through an online platform in the UK. In each country, after answering demographics items and general questions about protests and politics, all participants were randomly assigned to one of the experimental conditions (control, facilitated, and restricted).

In each condition, participants read a fictional news article announcing a student protest about government plans to increase university tuition fees. In the control condition, participants read a neutral article stating that a student protest would take place in the following days, while in the manipulations we added a description of the reactions of government and police authorities to this announcement. Hence, in the facilitated condition, the article described authorities accepting the protest as part of a democratic system, while they announced that the police would facilitate the protest by implementing traffic diversions wearing their traditional uniforms. By contrast, in the restricted condition, the authorities were against any public demonstration about the new university fees. Thus, in the article, authorities consider the student protest as a threat to public order

and the stability of the country. Also, authorities declare the riot police would be in the streets to conduct more *stop and search* procedures, as well as to use baton rounds and horses in case any protest took place (see all the vignettes in Appendix 8).

After reading the article, participants filled in the second part of the questionnaire, which included all the dependent variables of this study.

Measures. We included two items as manipulation checks: 'according to the article, to what extent did the authorities try to prevent the protest from taking place?' and 'according to the article, to what extent do police cooperate with the development of the protest?' Both manipulations were assessed using a scale ranging from 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a lot*).

To measure the perceived political context using the SPO-R scale, we included the same four items of government restrictions (ω the UK = .92; ω Chile = .95) and perceived repression (ω the UK = .93; ω Chile = .94) used in Study 1, adapting the anchor of these items to the scenario presented in the news articles (see Appendix 8).

We used three items (two from Study 1 and one new) to measure perceived legitimacy of protests (ω the UK = .82; ω Chile = .86), and four items (three items from Study 1 and one new) to measure support for protesters' violence against the police (ω the UK = .95; ω Chile = .96). We also included the same item as used in Study 1 to measure identification with the government (see all the items in the Appendix 8).

Analysis. We employed Rstudio for the descriptive statistics, to calculate the reliability of the scales, and for running multiple regressions in each dataset. Besides, we used Mplus implementing bootstrapping with 10,000 re-samples and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals to test our hypotheses.

In the first step of the analyses, we checked that the manipulations worked as expected. In a second step, we calculated the descriptive statistics (see Table 3.3) and the internal reliability of each scale using an Omega coefficient as in Study 1, although this time composites of the included variables were used instead of latent factors. We decided to use composites mainly because 500 observations is the minimum sample size required to use a bifactor model as a mediator and detect unbiased mediated effects (Gonzalez & MacKinnon, 2018). Therefore, taking into account our actual sample size, we calculated SPO-R scores as an average of the composites associated with government restrictions and perceived repression.

In a third step, we used path analysis (in Mplus) to test our hypotheses. As the focus of these analyses was to compare the effects of the contextual conditions on support for protesters' violence, we created two new dummy variables using the control condition as reference category to interpret the main results of our experiment. In addition, we used the joint test of significance (see Fritz & MacKinnon, 2007, for a review) along with bootstrapping to calculate the indirect effects (from simple and serial mediations) of our proposed model.

In a fourth step, in the context of a multi-group analysis, we conducted a Wald Test (using ML as estimator) to check differences in paths coefficients between both samples. Based on the results in Study 1, we paid particular attention to the effect of the perceived legitimacy of protests on support for protesters' violence against the police.

3.5.2 Results

Manipulation checks. We tested the effects of the manipulations using ANOVAs for each sample. We found a main effect of the manipulations on people's perceptions that the authorities would try to prevent the protests in both British, $F(2, 138) = 29.89$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .30$, and Chilean samples $F(2, 259) = 115.80$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .47$. In both samples, the authorities were perceived as more reluctant to allow protest in the restricted ($M_{\text{the UK}} = 3.47$; $M_{\text{Chile}} = 4.07$) than in facilitated ($M_{\text{the UK}} = 2.08$; $M_{\text{Chile}} = 1.83$) and control conditions ($M_{\text{the UK}} = 2.31$; $M_{\text{Chile}} = 2.13$). However, Tukey's post-hoc comparisons did not show significant differences between the control and facilitated conditions in either of the samples.

We also identified a main effect of the perceptions of the police's role as a facilitator in the protest for both British, $F(2, 138) = 19.03$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .22$, and Chilean participants, $F(2, 259) = 59.41$, $p < .001$, $\eta^2 = .31$. This means that people perceived the police as more willing to facilitate the protests in facilitated ($M_{\text{the UK}} = 3.74$; $M_{\text{Chile}} = 3.65$) than restricted ($M_{\text{the UK}} = 2.76$; $M_{\text{Chile}} = 2.01$) or control conditions ($M_{\text{the UK}} = 2.69$; $M_{\text{Chile}} = 2.06$). However, no significant difference was found regarding the role of the police between the restricted and control conditions after Tukey's post-hoc tests.

Descriptive statistics. Descriptive statistics of the scales included in this study by experimental condition are reported below (see Table 3.3).

Table 3.3. Means and standard deviations of the main variables included in the analyses by country and experimental condition.

	The UK						**Chile**					
	Control condition		Restricted condition		Facilitated condition		Control condition		Restricted condition		Facilitated condition	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
SPO-R	2.9	0.7	3.51	0.71	2.30	0.88	3.07	0.89	3.82	0.87	2.45	0.94
P. Legitimacy of protests	3.78	0.66	3.77	0.60	3.92	0.63	3.15	0.97	3.23	0.83	3.39	0.92
Support for protesters' violence	2.30	1.00	2.37	1.09	2.24	1.10	2.35	1.21	2.63	1.20	2.38	1.33

Main results. An overview of the results associated with the main hypotheses (H1-H8) is presented in Figure 3.3. The proposed model explained 14% and 7% of the variance of support for protest violence against the police for the British and Chilean sample respectively. Our findings show that in comparison with the neutral (control) condition, favourable objective contextual conditions were associated with less perceived restrictions on protests in both countries. Conversely, those who were assigned to the restricted objective conditions perceived their context as less favourable to carry out protests than those in the neutral (control) condition (H1). Regarding H2, our analysis

demonstrated that only those Chilean participants in a more restricted context perceived that public opinion gave more legitimacy to protests, although the difference between this and the same path for the British sample was not statistically significant (*Wald* χ^2 (1) = 2.56, p = .10). However, we want to point out that this was an unexpected result considering that our original hypothesis was that perceptions of public opinion legitimising protests would be in line with the objective political conditions. This result might suggest that some people perceive that public opinion grants more legitimacy to protests when authorities hinder protests in comparison to a scenario where authorities do not take any special measures (the resistance hypothesis). In addition, we found that a context where protests are facilitated or restricted did not have a direct effect on non-participants' support protesters' violence against the police in either sample as was proposed in H3 (UK = $F(2, 138) = .161$, $p = .851$, $\eta^2 = .002$; Chile = $F(2, 259) = 1.362$, $p = .258$, $\eta^2 = .010$).

Regarding the relation of the perceived authorities' restrictions with both the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests and support for protesters' violence against the police, our results are similar to those obtained in Study 1. Thus, for both British and Chilean participants, the more government and the police were perceived to prevent protests, the more the people supported protesters' violence against police (H4). In line with the alignment hypothesis supported in Study 1, results also showed that the more our participants perceived that the authorities restricted protests, they believed that public opinion granted less legitimacy to protests (H5). Moreover, we confirmed that British people supported protesters' violence against police the more they perceived that public opinion legitimised protests (H6), while for Chileans, this association was not significant (*Wald* χ^2 (1) = 6.51, $p = .010$).



Figure 3.3. Multiple mediation model controlled by identification with the government, age, and gender. Unstandardized estimates and significance of coefficients are reported, †$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Even though we did not find a direct effect of objective political conditions on support for protesters' violence, we tested indirect effects following both Hayes's (2018) criticism of the well-known causal steps strategy to establish mediation (see Baron & Kenny, 1986) as well as the idea that direct effects should not be a requirement to look for indirect effects. Thus, as it was expected (H7), we detected indirect effects of both objective conditions, facilitated (the UK = point estimate: -.19, *SE* = .09, 95% CI [-0.38, -0.06]; Chile = point estimate: -.18, *SE* = .06, 95% CI [-0.31, -0.07]) and restricted (the UK = point estimate: .19, *SE* = .09, 95% CI [0.05, 0.37]; point estimate: .24, *SE* = .08, 95% CI [0.12, 0.41]), on support for protesters' violence against the police via the subjective

perceptions of these conditions (SPO-R) in both samples. However, we found that legitimacy given by others to protests mediated the effects of the objective and subjective context conditions on support for protesters' violence for the British (facilitated condition = point estimate: .036, *SE* = .03, 95% CI [0.00, 0.11]; restricted condition = point estimate: -.036, *SE* = .02, 95% CI [-0.10, -0.00]) but not for the Chilean sample (facilitated condition = point estimate: -.003, *SE* = .01, 95% CI [-.03, .02]; restricted condition = point estimate: .004, *SE* = .02, 95% CI [-.02, .04]). In other words, while British and Chilean people may consider their own ideas about authorities' actions to support (or not) protest violence against the police, only the former group took into account other people's views about protests to support protest violence against police officers.

3.5.3 Discussion

This experimental study confirmed the results obtained in Study 1 regarding the importance of perceived restrictions on protests on non-participants' support for protesters' violence against police officers. This means the variables maintain a direct relationship with each other, and therefore, it is likely that non-participants support protest violence as a backlash against the restrictions authorities impose on protests.

In this study, we also confirmed the negative link between perceived restrictions and the perceived legitimacy given by others to protests. Thus, when people perceive that the authorities (i.e., government and the police) try to hinder protests, they might perceive that public opinion grants less legitimacy to protests as political acts. In other words, for British and Chilean people, public opinion might legitimise protests according to the measures authorities take to manage protesters' actions (alignment hypothesis).

Moreover, it is worth noting that the unexpected result for the direct link between the restricted scenario and public opinion legitimacy of protests may open the door to new research questions on how people can seek public opinion approval for resistance acts against authorities' restrictions (resistance hypothesis).

Finally, as in Study 1, we found that the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests plays a role in the support for protesters' violence only for British people. It might imply that British people's support for the use of violence against the police relies on the expected support public opinion may provide to the act of protest as well as on the restrictions imposed by authorities, whereas for Chileans only the latter factor plays a role. Although in the general discussion section we argue that particular characteristics of the British and Chilean political settings (public opinion approval for protests, different repertoires of protests, and prevalence of police brutality) might explain these different patterns, we propose that additional research combining psychological, sociological, historical, and anthropological contributions is necessary to confirm which interpretation is more accurate.

3.6 General discussion

The two studies reported here stress the relevance of non-participants' perceptions of authorities' restrictions to protests on support for protest violence against the police. Thus, extrapolating our findings to the initial example from the situation during the 60s in the

United States, we suggest that some people might justify the riots that took place in the American streets as well as violence carried out by African-American people not just because of the long-standing injustices these group suffered, but also as a response to the political authorities who failed to protect black people's lives from the attack of white supremacists, restricted the political participation of black communities, and punished with repression any public demonstration on behalf of the American Civil Rights Movement (see Bermanzohn, 2000 and Nimtz, 2016, for reviews).

The results of these studies can also be considered as a response to van Zomeren's argument (2016) for the necessity of integrating features of the political context into the study of collective action. Specifically, a new antecedent, the perceived restrictions imposed on protests (SPO-R), can be integrated into the literature, complementing previous findings that highlighted the role of social identity, group efficacy, procedural justice, and (in)efficacy of alternative actions on non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police. Nevertheless, a still unresolved issue is the divergence between the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests and endorsement of protest violence against the police by country. Thus, Studies 1 and 2 confirmed the same pattern of results for this association, positive and significant for British people but not significant for Chileans. We suggest this might be rooted in different levels of routinization and approval of protests in these countries, especially considering that protests were highly stigmatised and even criminalised by the Chilean dictatorship and the subsequent democratic governments. Consequently, it might be possible that Chileans do not look for the approval of public opinion to support protesters' actions because its a priori negative view of protests, while the opposite may be true for Britons. In other words, it seems Chileans and Britons interact differently with other actors (public

opinion) in their particular settings taking into account how these other actors have interacted with social mobilisation processes in the recent past.

From a different point of view, even though collective violence has taken place throughout both British (e.g., Metropolitan Police Service [MPS], 2012; Thompson, 1971; Tilly, 2008) and Chilean history (see Salazar, 2006, for a review), nowadays, these type of episodes are rare in the UK but still frequent in Chile. Consequently, we suggest that the high levels of police brutality against protesters it is a crucial factor that might explain why Chileans highlight the role of authorities' restrictions in their support for protesters' violence against police. This means that even though in both countries people might have learned to perform some types of physical aggression to resist police repression, the prevalence of police misconduct during protests might be behind the emphasis Chileans put on interactions with the police instead of others actors to explain their support for protesters' violence. Moreover, we also conjecture that Chilean police's lack of accountability can play a role in this phenomenon. However, we suggest further research should address this specific topic.

Regarding the limitations of our studies, we should acknowledge the fact that none of the research was conducted in a context characterised by high levels of repression and political violence (cf. Ayanian & Tausch, 2016). Even though we stressed police brutality in Chile and its differences with the British policing protest approach, it is necessary to recall these two countries have a democratic system where the actions of the police and government agents are limited by law and civil organisations that advocate on behalf of protesters' human rights. By contrast, we propose the results for the tested relationships

might be different if considering the real threats (e.g., being arbitrarily arrested, wounded, or killed by agents of the state) people living in repressive contexts (i.e., where democracy and the right to protest are not guaranteed) have to cope with every day.

Moreover, we need to mention two methodological limitations in Study 2. First, the use of composed instead of latent variables (as in Study 1) prevented testing specific hypotheses for each of SPO-R's dimensions (one of the main strengths of bifactor models). Second, there is the use of vignettes. Although vignettes are easy to implement, it is challenging to manipulate fictional political scenarios with this technique without participants considering their views about the actual political system to answer the questions. Even though the manipulations worked as expected, we think this problem was reflected in the manipulation tests where the control condition did not show relevant differences compared with the experimental conditions. In addition, it is worth mentioning that vignettes are not able to capture the dynamic of protests as processes that can include moments where participants adhere to the protocol set by the authorities as well as actions of resistance and even insurgency against the established order (see Day, Seedat, Cornell, & Suffla, 2018, for a discussion). Therefore, to expand the scope of results reported above, future research should be conducted in countries with reportedly high levels of repression against protests. Also, SPO-R should be used in its bifactor configuration as a mediator in experimental studies, while other materials (e.g., videos) might be considered to show changes in the conditions that protesters need to face during a protest.

Across two studies, we have provided complementary evidence about how non-participants might support protesters' violence against the police when they (non-participants) perceive the authorities (police and government) try to restrict protests. The latter can be considered a form of public backlash against restrictions imposed on the right to protest, and therefore, we suggest that authorities should be aware of the impact their actions might have on both people directly involved in protests and non-participants. In line with this, our results suggest that non-participants' support for protest violence against the police follows a specific rationale centred on the conditions offered by the political system to protests and what other people (public opinion) might think about these activities.

Chapter 4

Beyond peaceful protest: When non-participants support violence against the police

Cite as:

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4.1 Abstract

One of the most controversial issues related to protests is the use of violence by protesters. Although there is a strong social norm against protest violence, research has suggested that protesters' endorsement of non-violent actions can change according to the legitimacy of police actions during protests. However, both non-participants' support for protest violence and its relationship with authorities' measures regarding protests have barely been studied. To address this, we interviewed 17 British undergraduate students with diverse previous experiences as protesters about their views on protest violence. For the interviews, we used vignettes to describe two fictional scenarios, one where the government and the police actively restrict the right to protest and another where authorities facilitate protesters' actions. A thematic analysis incorporating elements from the ideological dilemmas approach was carried out to explore the range of arguments related to protest violence. We found that most participants articulated a variety of expressions that made up a recognisable cultural pattern: protest should be peaceful. However, when participants perceived that 'the right to protest' was threatened by state repression, those who earlier rejected protest violence argued that they would support the use of violence against the police as 'self-defence'. Our findings suggest there are pervasive frameworks for interpreting and responding to real contexts of political openness and repression, and reflective of people's ability to simultaneously hold contradictory views about the legitimacy of protest violence.

4.2 Introduction

Even though there is a recent global trend towards restricting the right to protest by some governments, one of the most recognisable characteristics of Western democracies (as well as an indicator of their strength) is to allow people to organise and take part in protests (Howie, 2018). Indeed, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UN General Assembly, 1948) supports the right to protest under the umbrella of the rights of freedom of speech and peaceful assembly. However, Jarman and Hamilton (2009) have pointed that restricting the right to protest to peaceful actions is problematic because it ignores both the existence of tensions during protests and people's reasons to join in violent confrontations. Indeed, although there is a pervasive and supposedly 'universal' norm to promote peaceful protests to reach social change (see Murdie & Purser, 2017, for a discussion), people have continued carrying out protest violence worldwide to challenge the status quo – for example, the summer 2019 protests in Hong Kong (e.g., Yeung, Sidhu, & Wright, 2019).

Considering that protest violence has occurred in various places, scholars of social movements and collective action have tried to describe the political conditions (e.g., Della Porta, 1995; Tarrow, 1994) and the social-psychological factors (see Drury & Reicher, 2018; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Tausch et al., 2011) that might explain people's willingness to carry out violent actions during social mobilization processes. However, non-participants' reasons to support protest violence by challengers of the status quo have received less attention (cf. Saab et al., 2016; Saavedra, Drury, & Easterbrook, 2019). The present study is an attempt to identify these reasons focused on protest violence against

the police and the political conditions under which protests take place. Following Neville and Reicher's (2018) idea of studying the impact of crowds (e.g., protests) on people outside the crowd, we interviewed a group of British university students to explore their support for protest violence in a political scenario where the right to protest is either harshly restricted or facilitated by authorities . To put it differently, our main aim is to explore if people's adherence to the societal norm that protests should be peaceful is conditional on the political context protesters have to face.

4.2.1 Violence during social mobilisation processes

One of the most well-known accounts of violence during social mobilisation processes can be found in the work of Gustave Le Bon. From Le Bon's (1895/2002) point of view, people in crowds are capable of carrying out violent and 'atrocious' acts due to the crowd's intrinsic irrationality. In particular, he argues that in crowds, individuals resort to violence due to their lack of both self-control and critical thinking. Indeed, in subsequent work, Le Bon (1898/1980) claimed that because of their inherent danger, authorities should prevent the occurrence of crowds and fight them to keep public order. Since then, scholars have tried to explain the occurrence of violence within crowds using diverse approaches (see Drury et al., 2012, for a review) like stressing its normativity (e.g., emergent norm theory; Turner & Killian, 1972), rationality (e.g., game theory; Berk, 1974), as well as the role of social identity (i.e., the social identity model of crowd behaviour, SIM; Reicher, 1984).

Based on the SIM, the elaborated social identity model of collective conflict (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000) proposes that violence in diverse events involving crowds is a

function of the dynamic relationship among different groups of participants (e.g., police and protesters) rather than a consequence of the supposed inherent irrationality of crowds (Reicher et al., 2007). In line with this, researchers have demonstrated that participants in demonstrations who initially rejected violence may agree with the use of violence once the actions carried by police officers are considered illegitimate (e.g., try to hinder protests through coercion) and indiscriminate (i.e., police act against everyone in the crowd) (see Reicher, Stott, Cronin, & Adang, 2004, for a review; Stott & Drury, 2000). In this case, the collective legitimisation of protest violence within crowds can be explained through the emergence of new norms of conflict as a result of the interaction with police officers. Thus, what was previously unacceptable for most people (i.e., protest violence) may become acceptable as acts of self-defence against, or retaliation for, illegitimate aggression carried out against peaceful protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2018).

It worth noting that in parallel to ESIM, a large amount of social-psychological research mainly draws upon the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008) and has explored diverse antecedents that may predict people's participation in different forms of collective action including protest violence. In particular, some of those studies have suggested that social beliefs about how fair or dangerous the world is (see Gulevich, Sarieva, Nevruev, & Yagiyayev, 2017), and certain implicit theories about social change (see Shuman et al., 2016) may increase people's readiness and willingness to carry out violent actions during protests (e.g., throw stones or bottles, clashing with the police). In addition, researchers have also suggested that certain emotions (i.e., anger and contempt) are critical to predict people's intentions to carry out non-violent or violent actions respectively (see Becker, Tausch, & Wagner, 2011; Tausch et al., 2011).

Apart from their focus on the dynamic of protests rather than on predicting people's future participation in these activities, a crucial discrepancy among those works drawing upon ESIM and those based on SIMCA is the conceptualisation of norms regarding protest violence. While Reicher and collaborators have suggested that protest violence may dynamically emerge as a new norm of conflict according to protesters' interaction with the police, most of the subsequent research based on SIMCA has employed the 'static' binary categorisation normative and non-normative actions as a point of reference to judge people's action tendencies (see Wright et al., 1990). Thus, under the latter categorisation, protest violence has consistently been labelled as non-normative, or even as a radical action, due to its apparent incompatibility with societal norms regarding the use of violence (see Becker & Tausch, 2015, for a discussion).

4.2.2 The perceived political context

With respect to the political context, a large body of sociological literature has addressed the influence of political conditions on the actions that protesters might undertake. From different approaches based on *political opportunities*, sociologists have explored the potential effects of the political authorities' openness (see Eisinger, 1973; Meyer, 2004, for a review; Meyer & Minkoff, 2004; Tarrow, 1994), the presence of repression (see Davenport, 1995, 2004; Della Porta, 1995), and the regime type activists need to confront (see Hipsher, 1998; Regan & Henderson, 2002) on social movement dynamics. Although several sociologists have held that the impact of political opportunities on social movements is necessarily mediated by the perceptions that participants share about these opportunities (see Gamson & Meyer, 1996, for a discussion; Suh, 2001), while others

have argued for the need to explore individual perceptions about the political conditions people have to face (Earl, 2011; Honari 2017, 2018a), psychological research has not delved on how people perceive the political context in relation to protests.

To our knowledge, there are two main approaches aimed at exploring people's perceptions of their political context regarding protests from a psychological perspective. The first of them has used measures associated with people's trust in political institutions, politicians, and their representativeness (e.g., Lee & Chan, 2018; Li, Lee, & Li, 2016; van Stekelenburg & Klandermans, 2018), whereas the second has used a validated scale of measurement, subjective political openness repression (SPO-R), to evaluate non-participants' perceptions of the restrictions that both the government and the police impose on protests (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019b). Thus, employing SPO-R, Saavedra and collaborators (2019) have demonstrated that non-participants may support protesters' violence against the police according to the extent people perceive authorities impose harsh restrictions on protests.

4.2.3 Public opinion and non-participants' support for protest violence

Apart from incorporating the perceived political context into the analysis of protest, we suggest the work of Saavedra and collaborators is useful to understand non-participants' support for protesters' violence for two other reasons. First, it has included public opinion as a factor that people may consider when supporting protesters' violence. This suggests that to understand protest violence, what other people think about protests should be considered alongside other aspects described in psychological research on collective action such as the efficacy of alternative actions (e.g., Saab et al., 2016), perceived police

legitimacy (e.g., Gerber et al., 2018), corruption perceptions (e.g., Thomas & Louis, 2014), and the potential damage to the public image of high status groups (e.g., Teixeira et al., 2019).

A second reason to take into account Saavedra and collaborators' work is its conceptualization of protest violence as a variable and context-sensitive phenomenon. Thus, non-participants' support for protest violence follows a rationale centred in the specific perceived contextual conditions (i.e., government restrictions and police actions) where the protests take place, and does not necessarily imply a dis-identification with protesters (see Feinberg et al., 2017) or attributing irrationality to those who use violence (see Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 2019b; Simpson et al., 2018).

Given that support for violence against the police may vary according to the restrictions authorities impose on protests, we suggest that the use of specific tools associated with the concept of *ideological dilemmas* (Billig et al., 1988) could help us to get a deeper understanding of non-participants' accounts of protest violence. The main reason for this is that the ideological dilemmas concept seeks to challenge the notion that public opinion is necessarily coherent and unchangeable in relation to different aspect of the social world (e.g., 'protests need to be peaceful'), as has been traditionally proposed in social sciences (see Condor & Gibson, 2007). Thus, what Billig and collaborators (1988) have suggested is that social scientists need to analyse different features of people's discourse to explore the presence of contradictory ideas once people could face (or at least imagine) the same phenomenon in different scenarios. The latter is because both formal ideologies and everyday common sense embody incoherencies and dilemmas people need to solve in

their daily lives (e.g., Condor, 2011; Towns & Adams, 2009). In other words, the ideological dilemmas concept considers both the particular context where the individuals are situated and people as active agents able to interpret the inherent contradictions of their social world (e.g., using violence to defend the right to protest) instead of just following an explicit belief system (see Gibson, 2011).

4.3 The present research

This study seeks to explore non-participants' support for (and then legitimisation of) protesters' violence against the police, taking into account the political conditions under which protests take place. Thus, similar to what ESIM has described for protesters, our aim is to inquire whether *non-participants* might support protest violence against the police in response to a changing social context. In particular, we want to know whether non-participants might hold contradictory ideas (i.e., protests should be peaceful vs defend the right to protest) when authorities impose harsh restrictions on protests. Even though protest violence in the United Kingdom has been rather scarce (see Reiner, 1998), we think this dynamic process may be possible because non-participants are active interpreters rather than passive recipients of formal ideologies and societal norms concerning protests.

4.4 Method

Participants

British undergraduate students received course credits as a reward for taking part in the study. The recruitment was carried out using an online platform where the researchers published two separate calls for participants regarding a study about protests in the UK. While the first call was looking for students who had participated at least once in protests, the second was aimed at people without any experience. Initially, we considered a minimum of twenty participants (ten people with and ten people without experience in protests). However, after conducting seventeen interviews (nine women and eight men), we decided to stop the recruitment considering that regardless of participants' previous experience in protests, more or less the same themes and patterns of response appeared during the interviews without adding new elements that may have enriched our analysis.

Concerning the range of experience of those who had attended protests in the past, participants declared having participated at a minimum of one and a maximum of ten protests on different topics. However, none of them claimed to be an activist, part of a social movement, nor a member of a political party.

Procedure

We designed an interview schedule as well as two vignettes of a fictional student protest in the UK. The first of these vignettes described a scenario where the government and the

police try to restrict the protest announcing measures such as deploying riot police and police horses; authorising the use of batons; and conducting random stop and search. By contrast, in the second vignette, the government and police officers acted as facilitators of the same student protest. Thus, in this vignette, the Prime Minister publicly reinforces people's right to protest, while the police are engaged in helping protesters and kept the protest safe. To minimise the effect of the order in which vignettes were presented playing a role in participants' answers, we randomised vignettes' presentation order in each interview.

The materials for this study were designed to get interviews that lasted between 25 and 45 minutes (see the complete interview schedule in Appendix 9). In the first part of the interview, we asked participants about their own experience in protests (e.g., 'have you participated in some protest before? About what?'), and their thoughts about protests carried out in the UK (e.g., 'what is your opinion about protests in general?'). In the second part, the participants read the first vignette, and then answered some questions regarding hypothetical situations might happen under the described circumstances (e.g., 'would you participate in this protest?' or 'what would you think if some people threw objects at the police?'). In the third part of the interview, participants answered the same type of questions described above but concerning the scenario described in the second vignette (see all the vignettes in the Appendix 9).

Analytic approach

We used the guidelines described by Braun and Clarke (2006) as a reference to conduct our thematic analysis. Thus, the first author listened and re-listened to the interviews

during the data collection process to get a general idea of the information provided by the interviewees. In a subsequent step, the audio interviews were transcribed, and the scripts re-read several times seeking to identify relevant topics about the use of violence in protests. Then, we compared these topics across interviews and created broader categories of themes. Once we identified the most salient themes, we analysed different sections of each interview delimited by the question, 'what would you think if people hit or threw objects to the police during this protest?' Then, following the analytic strategy proposed in the ideological dilemmas approach, we focused our efforts in exploring the possible existence of contradictory ideas participants might hold regarding protest violence and how they talked about these.

4.5 Results

In the analysis of our interviews, we identified five main themes: protests should be peaceful; authorities should ensure the right to protest; protest violence is illegitimate when the right to protest is guaranteed; harsh restrictions to the right to protest make violence more likely; self-defence actions against the police.

4.5.1 Protests should be peaceful

Regardless of their experience in protests, interviewees assumed and explicitly recognised that taking part in protests is a right that people have to voice their opinions on diverse societal issues. In line with this, in Extract 1, Emily (who has not participated

in protests) argues that this right should not be restricted, while protests need to be conducted in a peaceful way:

> **1. Emily[1]:** […] I think it is kind of universal opinion that government should not stop people from saying what they want to say, and if it is a peaceful protest that is fair.

Indeed, for some participants, as Laura (who has participated in protests) in Extract 2, the absence of violence is an essential requirement that protests have to meet. To put it differently, Laura holds that those who want to protest in favour of a cause should do it peacefully, otherwise, protesters' actions may be de-politicised and considered as mere riots:

> **2. Laura:** I think as long they [protests] are peaceful, and it is like...I think when people use it is as an excuse to like, do rioting or just kind of riot shops, I think it is just kind of like quite mess and really useless […] I think if it is something you really truly believe, in a way you truly believe that needs to be changed, and if you're doing it in a peaceful way.

[1] All names have been changed to preserve anonymity

Despite the fact that our interviewees demonstrated being aligned with the pervasive idea that protest should be peaceful, only a few of them offered a clear definition of what can be understood as a peaceful protest. Interestingly, in Extract 3, Jenny (who has not participated in protests) offers a criterion that may define a peaceful protest: the absence of both criminal damage and wounded people:

> **3. Jenny:** [a protest where] there is no criminal damage, people don't usually get hurt [inaudible]. They [journalists] do some cover times where there is a lot of people and sometimes do get hurt in large con [concentrations] of people but it is usually no [inaudible], no damage or people come injured.

Indeed, Jenny's definition of a peaceful protest partially matched other interviewees' views that mostly associated peaceful protests with the lack of physical aggression among participants. An example of this can be found in Extract 4, where Emily mentions that a peaceful protest is an activity in which physical violence is absent. In other words, Emily's concerns about keeping protests peaceful are not just about potential outcomes (criminal damage or wounded people) but also for the occurrence of physical aggression (process):

> **4. Emily**: [in a peaceful protest] I would be comfortable just going because you think you will be surrounded by like...by people who believe what you believe but you don't have to be worried that is gonna turned into people fighting or any of that.

According to these interviews, it can be argued that our participants recognise the right to protest as a universal right that allows people to have their say within a democracy. However, the legitimate exercise of this right is restricted to the use of non-violent actions by protesters. This means that, at least initially, our interviewees were in agreement with the pervasive idea that protests should be peaceful.

4.5.2 Authorities should ensure the right to protest

Closely related to the norm that protest should be peaceful, we found that when our interviewees referred to either of the fictional scenarios, they repeatedly mentioned that in a democratic society the duty of both the police and government authorities is to guarantee that people can voice their opinion in the streets. Thus, in Extract 5, Alison (who has not participated in protests) positively evaluates that authorities allow people to have their say, even when these authorities may have the capability (e.g., equipment and officers) to hinder protesters' actions:

> **5. Alison:** I think is good the government is allowing [the student protest in the facilitated scenario] ...mmm...people's voice has to be heard. I think it is important if we say we're a democracy that we can...mmm...to voice our opinions. So, it is good that they [authorities] value that because they can easily just ignore the protest and have the police... mmm ... stopping them [students] from protesting. So, yeah, I think is good. It shows that we're allowed to have freedom of speech.

Apart from allowing protests, in Extract 6, Laura argues that the political authorities and the police also have the responsibility to monitor protests in case 'something violent' happens as well as to protect those who can be affected. In other words, alongside ensuring that people can protest peacefully in the streets, people expect that police officers implement measures to protect protesters. Conversely, Laura also suggests that any restriction imposed on peaceful protests might be considered as a sort of transgression to the freedom of speech:

> **6. Laura:** So, I think is good there would be police in there to make sure, like...I think is good get the policemen just to make sure that nothing look violent happens...but when they're shutting down anything even if it is a peaceful protest that is gonna...I don't understand why they would do that. It is just a bit pointless, like that is when your freedom of speech right is taking away slightly.

In line with the idea about the police's role in protesters' protection, Alison (in Extract 7) suggests that cooperation between authorities and protesters would help to keep protests safe for everyone. Indeed, Alison argues that violence is less likely to occur when the police are engaged in facilitating protesters' actions and establishing a cooperative relationship with protesters. The latter would prevent the emergence of a power imbalance and therefore, a conflict between protesters and police officers is less likely to occur:

> **7. Alison:** I think it is good, like personally, I think is good if the police aren't fighting the protesters but helping them. I think...mmm...it is important for people safety...mmm...and also in some ways it shows support for the protesters because

> it is kind of suggest they are in the same team instead of fighting each other […] I think in a situation where the police are aiding them, it kind of suggest that...there is not a such great power imbalance […] I mean, the police are not necessarily protesters but they're not trying to stop the protest. So, in some ways they are allowing it up.

4.5.3 Protest violence is illegitimate when the right to protest is guaranteed

In the context of facilitated protests and the norm of keep protests peaceful, in Extract 8, Sarah states that violence is out of place when police officers try to facilitate protests. In other words, for her, protest violence cannot be legitimated in a scenario where there is neither a manifest power imbalance between police and protesters or restrictions imposed on protests. Moreover, Sarah makes a negative judgement on those who violate the societal norm of peaceful protests, while she argues that the police should not be chosen as a target of violence because police officers are not responsible for political decisions:

> **8. Sarah:** Why you first gonna hurt the police? They are just standing there…make, ensure safe, they are not actually…the police didn't make decision on increased the budget. So, I think it would be silly, especially in a peaceful protest […] I would be…if the police were just literally standing by a barriers, I just think that is evil because hitting someone is not right and especially to a police officer who hasn't done anything personally to you…even if you don't like the police force, they haven't done anything directly to you, so, I would be shocked.

In line with Sarah's argument, in Extract 9, Laura argues that if protesters resorted into violence when protest activities were facilitated, public opinion would withdraw its support for both protesters' actions and their claims. Laura also suggests that, under favourable conditions for protests (i.e., absence of conflict between groups), violence is as an irrational behaviour carried out by people that cannot think properly about their actions. The latter means that for our interviewers, when authorities facilitate protesters' actions, violence is not acceptable by any means and its occurrence is attributable to individual psychology:

> **9. Interviewer:** Do you think this kind of actions [throwing objects or hit police officers] can change what other people think about protests?
>
> **Laura:** Yeah, I would be less like to support them [the protesters] I think. If they were violent...about the support from other people, if I was looking it from the other side, and then they being violent, it would be less likely they just support them. It would be...I think, it would cloud judgements of the characters as well. I just, they can't be a very rational people.

4.5.4 Harsh restrictions to the right to protest make violence more likely

In contrast to what might happen in a scenario where authorities actively facilitate protests, it seems that placing harsh restrictions on the right to protest makes it more likely that people resort to violence against the police. Our interviewees gave three reasons for this. First, authorities' restrictions on the right to protest might make evident the existence of a direct conflict in the streets, protesters versus police officers (as Alison points in

Extract 10). Undoubtedly, this emergent conflict might also involve an imbalance of power between both groups taking into account police officers are those who have the technical capabilities and the support from political authorities to disperse any protest:

> **10. Alison:** Mmm...well, the police in this scenario aren't supporting the protesters and they [the police] are going all the way to stop the protesters...like, kind of like...It is kind of becomes like two teams going against each other.

Second, the measures implemented by the police in the restricted scenario (e.g., the use of batons and the deployment of riot units) may be seen as real threats to protesters who might react to these measures using violence against police officers. The latter is stressed by Peter (who has not participated in protests) in Extract 11. Thus, Peter declares that the imposition of harsh restrictions against protesters might lead to a 'disaster' characterized by clashes against the police:

> **11. Peter:** If you put the police riot, you put the dog, you put the batons, so there are gonna be tough. So, of course the protest wants get many numbers as it could if the police and those forces [inaudible] whereas at the same time the people who are getting to protest are the hard guys. When I say hard, I mean they are brave, they are courageous but there are more hooligans in that sample space than in if it was open [like in the facilitated scenario]. So, there are more hooligans, so, if you have all these hooligans together and then you have... They [protesters] are fighting for the freedom of speech and at the same time you have police trying to suppress them. The result will be a disaster.

It worth noting that the ‘disaster’ mentioned by Peter is not limited to physical clashes with police officers, it also involves protesters needing to fight against authorities’ restrictions to defend freedom of speech. Thus, when authorities impose restrictions on the right to protest, our interviewee suggests a conflict between challengers to the status quo and the police might emerge because of two reasons. First, threats to the physical integrity of protesters, and second, threats to the exercise of freedom of speech.

According to our interviewees, a third reason that might explain the occurrence of violence is the type of people who may join protests in cases of authorities restricting the right to protest. Thus, Peter identified two broad categories of people who might hit the streets under the described circumstances. First, a depoliticised group, ‘hooligans’, who are those that in a facilitated scenario could be considered as a ‘conflictual minority’ looking for confrontations with the police. Second, ‘brave protesters’ that might be willing to hit the streets and confront the restrictions to people’s freedom of speech. In other words, in a scenario full of constraints and threats against protesters, these two categories of people might act together to challenge authorities’ measures and confront the police. However, it is necessary to highlight that for several interviewees, as Laura in Extract 12, the potential occurrence of protest violence, and the subsequent violation of the norm that protest should be peaceful, may backfire, causing a decrease in turnout:

> **12. Laura:** I feel no, I think what could end up happening is less people...who want a peaceful protest could not go there.

4.5.5 Self-defence actions against the police

In line with the idea that the restrictions imposed on the right to protest may act as a pre-condition or provocation to turn protests into violence, we found that our interviewers justified protest violence against the police to defend themselves from authorities' measures and protect the right to protest:

> **13. Sarah:** mmm…well, obviously…I don't know because I haven't never been in that situation but from watching stuff you can tell if someone is attacked by the police they fight back. You wanted to say in your head that you wouldn't fight back but in that situation you probably would because there is someone restricting you for no reason. I'm already angry about the cops, you can be really angry, so, you will fight back against the police but…I don't know, I might have to go to protest and see.

In Extract 13, Sarah suggests that she may support the use of protest violence as self-defence in response to police attacks (i.e., police officers as main aggressors), and the constraints imposed on people's right to protest. This means that under some circumstances (e.g., police repression), to protect their rights, people may have to decide between conformity to societal norms or choose alternative methods (e.g., use of violence) that are not necessarily aligned with those norms. However, rather than being a straightforward decision, supporting the use of violence against the police involves a conflict for Sarah. Thus, in a first moment, Sarah mentions that she cannot imagine herself breaking the societal norm of not using violence in protests. Indeed, her statement

suggests that keeping the protest peaceful is a norm most of the people are aware of even though someone is unfairly attacked.

Nevertheless, in a second moment, Sarah argues that despite fighting back might be a no desirable outcome, people might support protest violence against the police as a reaction to the harsh restrictions that authorities have arbitrarily imposed on protests. The equivocations mentioned above shed light on how Sarah grapples with contradictory ideas about protest violence. On the one hand, as the societal norm establishes, protest violence should not be allowed. On the other hand, this norm is challenged as a result of police transgressions against the right to protests and freedom of speech.

Apart from Sarah, other interviewees also expressed contradictory ideas (dilemmas) about protest violence against the police but used diverse strategies to deal with it. For instance, Paul (who has no experience in protests), in Extract 14, declares that he would never use physical violence against the police. Nevertheless, he says he would understand if other people (i.e., protesters) fought back against police if the authorities do not guarantee the right to protest and police officers are the main aggressors during a peaceful protest. In other words, Paul's formula to support protest violence without completely discarding the societal norm about keep protests peaceful consists in making other people responsible of carrying out self-defence actions, while he reaffirms that himself could not participate in any violent action against the police:

> **14. Paul:** Well, I think it would be me on a personal level. I think, you know, if someone is, you know, say hit by the police in a peaceful protest and then they act

> in self-defence, then it is justified but me personally I would not do it [fighting back the police] because of the person I am.

Another interesting strategy to deal with the dilemma can be found in Extract 15. There, Peter depoliticises his own (potential) reasons to fight back against the police. For him, fighting the police would be a matter of survival, a result of an instinct to stay alive in a dangerous context, instead of fight against either authorities' restrictions or police repression against the right to protest. However, he also argues that police aggression is due to him or someone else going against the criteria to define a peaceful protest (e.g., no criminal damage or fight against the police):

> **15. Peter:** Wow…no, if they attacked me physically, well. Yeah, I would fight back because, you know, it is a primal instinct to want be safe yourself but at the same they are police, and who knows, maybe I did something. Maybe, I look like someone who hit the police or like who broke in to a store [inaudible] So, you can say they [the police] justify in taking me for questioning but I would fight back and I would try to run away.

In terms of the actions our interviewees would consider as legitimate self-defence, some of them suggested that instead of fighting back, the most appropriate action to confront restrictions on the right to protests would be pushing back against the police. Thus, in Extract 16, Rebecca (who has not participated in protests) states that in case of facing police repression, she would try to run away from police officers or push them back:

> **16. Rebecca:** I think I would just like try to run away or get [inaudible] how to defend me, like push them away.

Even though most of our interviewees supported protesters' self-defence against the police when authorities impose harsh restrictions on protests, a few of them rejected the use of violence in all circumstances. Thus, similarly to what Drury and Reicher (2018) have described for actual protesters, in Extract 17, Paul expresses that even though he could shout at the police, he would refuse supporting violence against the police based on a moral argument, non-violent actions should prevail during protests and those who use violence are doing something wrong no matter the conditions under which protests are carried out:

> **17. Paul:** I probably get involved in shouting, but I wouldn't use physical force again it. If you're in a peaceful protest and then the police are using aggressions while everyone is being peaceful it shows that...paths you on the right side and they're on the wrong for showing aggression to people.

Like Paul, Claire (who has participated in protests) also rejects that protesters can use violence against the police even in a scenario where police impose harsh restrictions to protest. Indeed, she passes over the potential conflict between the police and protesters, suggesting that tensions during protests can be solved using 'rational' methods among 'capable' individuals that want to reach some social change. Thus, for Claire (in Extract

18), violence would be a 'wild' behaviour with a negative impact on protest's public image:

> **18. Claire:** I wouldn't like condone that [protest violence against the police], I wouldn't do it personally. I think, I can't do anything about it...mmm...I mean, I know people are angry but I think that can almost...I think when people use sort of violence and stuff, it almost makes that cause less kind of credible because they just see like sort of wild hooligans rather than people, you know, intelligent people who go to university and want to make a difference in the world.

Finally, we also found a couple of cases in which the rejection of protest violence responds to a practical rather than a moral argument. Thus, Brian, in Extract 19, argues that in the hypothetical case of being part of a protest, he would not fight back the police because of the negative consequence this may have for him. However, he also suggests that in case of being attacked by police officers, one particular form to defend themselves or other protesters is to record videos of police transgressions and then share them on social media. Thus, the use of videos and the internet may be considered as an alternative self-defence action in which people can employ a device used in their everyday lives (e.g., mobile phone) to gain support from public opinion without involving the use of violence:

> **19. Brian:** Probably, I would be quite scared. I guess, I would try to get people around to film it, and I would try to film myself […] I wouldn't like respond by attacking them because they're gonna have, well…I'll get beat up and probably

arrested. So, I would try to keep it…I wouldn't respond with violence but I would try to record it and share it.

4.6 Discussion

The analysis presented above helps us to show that the discussion about the use of violence in protests cannot be limited to judge protesters' actions as either 'good' (normative) or 'bad' (non-normative), or restricted to an over idealization of non-violent actions to reach social change (see Seidman, 1995, for a discussion). Instead, we suggest the analysis of these actions should respond to a more comprehensive approach where non-participants are active readers of collective action who can evaluate both the political circumstances protesters have to face (e.g., authorities' restrictions) and the dynamic of collective action (e.g., power imbalances). Consequently, judgments about specific actions (e.g., protest violence) should be considered as part of the everyday dilemmas people face. This argument suggests that people might hold contradictory ideas about the legitimacy of protest violence (as self-defence), making non-participants' support for protest violence as a context-sensitive variable rather than an unalterable belief. Hence, even though for some people protest violence should always be rejected, for others, self-defence actions against the police may become acceptable when authorities impose harsh restrictions on protests and police officers act as the main aggressors. To put it differently, people's support for protest violence is context-sensitive (i.e., based on the dynamic of protests and authorities' restrictions), and selective.

Considering that non-participants' support for self-defence actions is selective and context-sensitive, future research on people's support for violence against the police must include the comparison between diverse (real or hypothetical) scenarios where non-participants can evaluate critical events such as authorities' measures and police actions regarding protests. Otherwise, it may be impossible to explore in detail the circumstances that explain people's support for protesters' self-defence actions, while collective action research will continue to be trapped in de-contextualised analyses of protesters' behaviour.

In terms of the type of actions that non-protesters' may be willing to support, it seems that our interviewees share a sort of 'self-defence' repertoire. Hence, there may be a set of actions (e.g., pushing back and yelling at the police) that most participants know and accept as self-defence against the police. We believe that even though some interviewers mentioned that they would support (or be willing to) fighting the police, most of them may prefer pushing back or yelling at the police because of the real or perceived negative consequences (e.g., getting criminal records) that people may face for hitting a police officer. Interestingly, for other interviewers recording videos of police transgressions and sharing them on social media appears as an alternative form of self-defence without involving physical contact, or resistance through technology (Cammaerts, 2012). The latter may indicate that (British) non-participants learnt about a set of actions that may become acceptable as people's self-defence against police transgressions, while other behaviours which don't involve physical violence (e.g., disobey police orders) but might be interpreted as punishable actions by some police officers (see Soares, Barbosa, & Matos, 2018, for a discussion), can help people to face authorities' transgressions exposing them to a broader audience.

Moreover, we suggest there are five reasons why research on this particular topic must go beyond the use of the mainstream labels (i.e., normative and non-normative) researchers have used to categorise protesters' actions. First, this categorisation ignores that public opinion's legitimisation of specific actions might change as a function of the interaction between authorities and protesters, throughout time, and across cultures. Thus, the use of violence defined in a neutral form as "the threat or exertion of physical force which could cause bodily injury" (Ball-Rokeach, 1972, p.101) may be considered a legitimate action within a society under some specific circumstances (e.g., high levels of repression implemented by an authoritarian regime) and in certain historical moments.

Second, communities differ in their judgements about the use of violence in collective action because they have different repertoires of protests (see Tilly, 1986, 2008). The latter implies that both the actions that protesters may carry out (e.g., clashing with the police) as well as people's legitimisation of these actions rely on a network of shared knowledge and values located in a specific time and place.

Third, protest violence does not necessarily affect a whole protest, and its legitimacy may change throughout a single protest event (see Day et al., 2018). In other words, what was unacceptable behaviour (e.g., throwing objects at the police) may become acceptable and then unacceptable again within the same mobilisation process. As normative and non-normative actions are static categories, it would be impossible to analyse correctly the dynamic described above, as well as non-participants' evaluations of these changes.

Fourth, there is the potential stigmatisation of those who use violence in protests (see Ball-Rokeach, 1972, 1980). In other words, those protesters who for whatever reason go beyond the pervasive norm that protests must be peaceful might be treated as outsiders (even as criminals) that are not capable of behaving in a civilised way (e.g., "Hong Kong leader Lam condemns 'rioters' after violent clashes", 2019). In line with this, unfortunately, and ignoring the inherent conflict behind the emergence of violence, many scholars have given a negative connotation per se to protest violence even relating it to processes associated with terrorism as extremism and radicalisation (e.g., Becker, Tausch, Spears, & Christ, 2011; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2015; Moskalenko & McCauley, 2009; Schumpe et al., 2018; Thomas et al., 2014). We firmly believe that treating protest violence as a deviant collective behaviour limits the understanding of both protesters' reasons to carry out protest violence as well as non-protesters' support for self-defence actions in a particular political context. Indeed, we think that using the terminology mentioned above may help to reproduce and maintain the status quo on behalf of economic and political elites.

Fifth, given the de-contextualised nature of normative and non-normative categories, there is a high risk that those interested in the study of collective action (and protests in particular) neglect the fact that sometimes people need to use and support violence as a primary or alternative strategy to achieve social change, fight against authoritarian regimes, or resist authorities' misconduct within democracies (see Seidman, 2015).

4.6.1 Limitations and future research

Considering that our interviewees and the protesters presented in the vignette shared the same identity category, students, future research should explore whether non-participants' support for self-defence actions is a universal phenomenon on behalf of those who suffered from authorities restrictions, or contrarily, it depends on who the protesters are (e.g., non-students adults).

Another essential aspect that researchers should address is whether non-participants may support self-defence actions carried out against counter-protesters. In other words, researchers should explore if, under a restricted political context, non-participants would support protest violence against those protesters who defend the status quo or the actions carried out by police force (e.g., pro-police demonstrators).

Moreover, taking into account that most non-participants cannot perceive protesters' actions first-hand, media communications becomes a critical factor that mediates what happens in the streets and non-participants' support for protesters' actions (see Koopmans, 2004a; Neville & Reicher, 2018 for a discussion). In line with this, future research needs to explore how bias in media coverage of protests main affect non-participants' support for self-defence actions against the police when authorities restrict the right to protest. Addressing the role of media is particularly important once we consider that previous literature on communication has stressed how social movements' prospects can be affected by media ownership and connection with political elites (see Chan & Lee, 1984; Chan, 2017; Tan, 2017); consumption patterns of media (see Lee, 2018); the negative coverage of those protests where violence occurs (see Boyle,

McLeod, & Armstrong, 2012; Lee, 2014; McLeod, 2007); and the impact of different media framing on the legitimacy of mobilization processes (see Valentim, 2019).

Finally, as this study was conducted in an advanced Western democracy where the right to protest is granted, researchers should explore non-participants' support for protesters actions in places where the exercise of these rights are restricted (e.g., Singapore), or in non-Western democracies without a long tradition of protests. For this, researchers must be aware that there are different cultural norms regarding protests. On the one hand, societies may grant a high value to protests in the development of societal life. On the other hand, people may consider protests as not so desirable activities in highly hierarchical societies where maintaining harmony within groups is a priority over individual dissent. Consequently, more than seeking mere replications, scholars must ensure their studies become meaningful for the particular contexts where these are carried out.

Chapter 5

Solidarity with those who hit the streets: Public opinion and support for protesters' self-defence actions when the right to protest is restricted

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5.1 Abstract

Previous social-psychological research has neglected the impact of public opinion's legitimisation of protests on non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions. In two experiments, involving English adults as participants, we combined vignettes describing various extents of public opinion legitimisation of protests with footage of police repression during a student protest in England (Study 1; $N = 151$), and against pro-independence demonstrators in Catalonia (Study 2; $N = 150$). Results demonstrated that solidarity with protesters mediates the relationship between public opinion's legitimisation of protests and non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police. However, we found distinctive patterns for each scenario. Whereas people showed solidarity with protesters when English public opinion delegitimised the student protest, the same happened regarding the protest in Catalonia only when English public opinion gave legitimacy to the pro-independence movement. Also, we found that own opinions about the right to protest play an essential role in feeling solidarity with victims of police repression and support for protesters' self-defence actions.

5.2 Introduction

Street protests are routinized activities in most of the Western democracies (Meyer & Tarrow, 1998). Thus, people frequently choose to join massive demonstrations worldwide to have their say, defend their rights, or protest about diverse issues. Recent examples of this are the 'Stop Brexit' protests in the UK (Otte, 2019); anti-Bolsonaro demonstrations in Brazil (Phillips, 2018); and women's marches in Chile ("Peaceful marches", 2019). Although mostly peaceful, from time to time protest violence occurs in Western countries, as was the case in the 2010 student protest in England (Coughlan, 2010), during the Catalonia referendum (Burgen, 2017), and for the yellow vest protests in Paris (Rubin, 2018).

Social-psychological research has tried to explain people's willingness to join non-normative actions (e.g., protest violence) through diverse factors such as injustice appraisals (van Zomeren et al., 2008), group-based emotions (Tausch & Becker, 2013; Tausch et al., 2011), and implicit theories about social change (Shuman et al., 2016). Moreover, the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury et al., in press, for a review; Drury & Reicher, 2000) explains that people's involvement in protest violence can be due to changes in identity boundaries and the emergence of new norms of conflict as consequence of group-level interactions with the police. To put it differently, according to ESIM, violence becomes acceptable when protesters perceive police actions to be illegitimate and indiscriminate.

Drawing upon ESIM, recent research has explored how certain processes operating among protesters (e.g., empowerment) can be extended to those who are not taking part in collective action (see Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019b). In line with this, Saavedra and collaborators have demonstrated that non-participants might support protesters' violence against police officers (as self-defence actions) due to the perceived legitimisation that public opinion gives to protests and the restrictions that authorities impose on the right to protest (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a; Saavedra et al., 2019). However, scholars have not yet examined how non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence may change, depending on both public opinion approvals of protests and the specific mechanism operating behind this support. To address this gap, we designed two experiments that tested whether different extents of public opinion's legitimisation of protests predicts non-participants' support for protesters self-defence actions; and whether solidarity with protesters mediates this effect. In addition, we explored whether own opinions on the right to protest and social dominance orientation, influences this process.

5.2.1 Public opinion's legitimation of protests

Research on collective action has suggested that legitimacy of protests based on own opinions (Chayinska et al., 2017) and de-politicized evaluative attributes (e.g., 'horrible', 'fabulous'; see Sweetman et al., 2019) are important antecedents of people's willingness to take part in collective action. However, Saavedra and Drury (2019b) have suggested these approaches only consider the legitimacy of protests at an individual level (i.e., personal preferences), and therefore, they should be complemented with a relational perspective that considers the perceived legitimacy that public opinion (i.e., collective level) may grant to these activities. As the same authors have claimed, this re-

conceptualisation of legitimacy of protests draws upon two different approaches. First, Neidhardt and Rucht's (1991) ideas about considering public opinion as one of the reference groups which social movements and protests need to interact with. Second, the historical and relational conceptualisation of context for collective action proposed in ESIM (see Drury et al., 2012; Reicher, 1996a).

A critical aspect of the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests is its relationship with the perceived restrictions authorities impose on protesters' actions. On the one hand, Saavedra and collaborators (2019) have suggested that people may perceive that public opinion is aligned with these restrictions (i.e., *alignment hypothesis*). On the other hand, it is also possible that people perceive public opinion gives more legitimacy to protests against the authorities' restrictions (i.e., *resistance hypothesis*). However, to this date, evidence has only supported the first of these hypotheses.

5.2.2 Non-participants and protesters' actions

For many years, social-psychological research has highlighted the importance of non-participants to the success of collective action. Non-participants are a source for movements to find more people to join in their actions through politicized identification (Simon & Klandermans, 2001), emotional social support (van Zomeren, Spears, Fischer, & Leach, 2004), and solidarity with disadvantaged groups (Saab et al., 2015; Subašić et al., 2008). Conversely, only a few studies have explained the relevance and the reasons for which non-participants support protesters' actions (e.g., Stuart et al., 2018; Teixeira et al., 2019) especially when these actions involve the use of violence (e.g., Bohler-Muller et al., 2017; Saab et al., 2016; Thomas & Louis, 2014). It is worth noting that recent

advances in social-psychological research have suggested that the perceived restrictions imposed by authorities and the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests may explain non-participants' support for protest violence in the UK and Chile (Saavedra et al., 2019). Indeed, after conducting an interview-based study, Saavedra and Drury (2019a) argued that non-participants might face an ideological dilemma: 'protests should be peaceful' versus 'defend the right to protest'. This dilemma implies that when non-participants perceive the government to impose arbitrary restrictions to the right to protest, and police actions are considered illegitimate, non-participants may change their norms regarding the use of violence and support protest violence against police officers as self-defence.

We suggest that Saavedra and Drury's study mentioned above is especially relevant for research on non-participants' role in collective action because of two reasons. First, it shows that like actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2018), non-participants may change their norms about the use of violence in protests depending on the political context for protests. Thus, it can be argued that non-participants' support for protest violence against the police is a dynamic process that depends on the perceived restrictions authorities impose on protests, and goes beyond the static categorisation (i.e., 'normative' and 'non-normative') scholars usually use to evaluate collective action (e.g., Sweetman et al., 2019; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al., 1990). Consequently, non-participants can disagree with protesters' violence when authorities guarantee people's right to protest, while violence against the police may be supported as self-defence actions when protesters need to confront authorities' restrictive measures concerning this right. Second, because its focus is on the perceived political context protesters' need to face, Saavedra and Drury's (2019a) work challenges some recent arguments about the backlash

effects that protest violence might have on protest public image, such as public opinion's lack of support (see Feinberg et al., 2017; Simpson et al., 2018).

5.2.3 Protests and mass media

Although some non-participants may get an impression of protesters' actions first-hand, most people form their opinions about protesters through the information displayed in mass media (e.g., newspapers, television, and the internet). Consequently, protesters' actions are mostly mediated by media and communications practices at different levels (Cammaerts, 2012). In particular, Chan and Lee (1984) suggest that media coverage of protests is biased according to media ownership and their closeness to political elites. Based on this, media communication scholars have developed the concept of 'protest paradigm' to account for a type of media coverage that systematically displays a negative and de-contextualized image of protest where protesters are demonised, their claims delegitimised, and public opinion is shown to be extremely critical to protests (Mcleod, 2007; see Tan 2017, for a review). Indeed, scholars have demonstrated that one of the main reasons for protest paradigm emergence is the occurrence of violence during protests (Lee, 2014; Mcleod & Hertog, 1992).

However, the fact that information about protests is mediated through mass media representations does not necessarily mean that people are passive receivers of this information. Instead, people continuously monitor what happens on the streets, and when they see images considered as a provocation or outrage (e.g., police use of tear gas against peaceful protesters), this situation can prompt people to take part in protests actively (e.g., Lee and Chan, 2018; Tang, 2015).

5.2.4 Solidarity with protesters

Psychological research on intragroup processes has demonstrated that solidarity is a component of identification with the in-group (Leach et al., 2008). Thus, those who identify themselves as a part of a group may tend to feel a bond of commitment towards fellow group members. Subsequent work in collective action has expanded the scope of intragroup solidarity to intergroup processes using two different approaches.

The first approach conceptualises solidarity to be the sympathy that members of the majority group may feel towards the disadvantages that minority groups suffer. Following this idea, several works have integrated solidarity into the social identity model of collective action (SIMCA; van Zomeren et al., 2008; van Zomeren et al., 2011) to explain how members of disadvantaged groups can find support or allies for their collective action in both the majority (Ochoa, Manalastas, Deguchi, & Louis, 2019; Saab et al., 2015) or third groups (Klavina & van Zomeren, 2018). Moreover, during recent years, some researchers have been trying to explain acting in solidarity with minority groups by integrating SIMCA with a construct based on a supposed ideological preference for keeping intergroup hierarchies and inequalities - social dominance orientation (SDO; Pratto, Sidanius, & Levin, 2006; Pratto, Sidanius, Stallworth, & Malle, 1994). In short, SDO researchers have argued that general audiences (e.g., Stewart et al., 2016), as well as those members of advantaged groups (e.g., Stewart & Tran, 2018) that show low levels of social dominance (and therefore a preference for intergroup equality), might be more inclined to demonstrate solidarity with the minority group and join collective action on their behalf.

The second approach has suggested that solidarity is based on something other than pure sympathy towards disadvantaged groups. Thus, solidarity would be a political act (political solidarity) from members of the public audience aimed at collaborating with members of the minority groups to challenge authorities that have lost their legitimacy (Subašić et al., 2008). In line with this, people from majority groups (i.e., public opinion) may feel a bond of commitment with members of a minority (disadvantaged group) in their struggles against authorities to reach the expected social change. As subsequent works have demonstrated, this political solidarity bond would be crucial to mobilising members of the majority group on behalf of others in need through a process of self-recategorization (see Subašić, Hardacre, Elton, Branscombe, Ryan, & Reynolds, 2018). To put it differently, members of the majority expand the boundaries of their group to create a higher-order identity that allows collaboration between members of the minority and majority groups to fight against authorities.

Despite the fact the key advantage of the political solidarity approach is that it stresses the importance of third parties (e.g., public opinion) in the analysis of collective action, there are two issues that social-psychological research has not yet addressed. First, existing research has not considered the support that members of general audience (i.e., non-participants) may grant to specific protesters' actions (e.g., the use of violence against police officers) in solidarity with the restrictions authorities impose on the right to protest. Second, there is the question of how non-participants' solidarity with protesters may be affected by the perceived legitimacy that public opinion grants to protests.

5.3 The present research

We designed two studies aimed at exploring the influence of public opinion's legitimation of protests on non-participants' support for protest violence against the police, and the role of solidarity as the main mechanism underlying this relationship. These studies were based on incidents that occurred in the 2010 student protest in London and the pro-independence movement in Catalonia, respectively. To better understand the design and results reported in the following sections, we provide a brief description of the London and Catalonia incidents.

The 2010 student protests took place in London from November to December that year to resist government plans for implementing a significant increment in university tuition fees and to cut the higher education budget (Vasagar, Lewis, Taylor, & Gabbat, 2010). In this context, the National Union of Students (NUS) and the National Campaign Against Fees and Cuts (NCAFC) organised massive demonstrations, while the government and the police announced controversial measures such as kittling protesters and ensuring a heavy police presence in the streets to 'keep public order' (Travis, 2010; Walker & Paige, 2010).

Regarding Catalonia, we need to stress that, along with being one of the wealthiest regions in Spain, historically, Catalonia has enjoyed a considerable amount of autonomy from the central government. However, in 2010, the Spanish conservative parliament decided to outlaw most of these privileges, allegedly to take advantage of the incomes coming from this region. As a consequence, the Catalonian pro-independence movement called for a

symbolic referendum in 2014 and for a full referendum on 1st October 2017 aimed at getting full autonomy ("Catalonia's bid for independence", 2018). Although both referendums were declared illegal by Spanish authorities, the world was furious after international media showed that, in an attempt to prevent the 2017 referendum from taking place, Spanish police beat peaceful pro-independence protesters and voters at poll stations (Henley & Mason, 2017).

Having described the scenarios in which the critical events happened, we can briefly state the main objectives and hypotheses that guide both experiments. Mainly, we want to test the effect of the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests on non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police. For this, we used vignettes to present three different scenarios in which public opinion legitimise protests (i.e., people have the right to protest), public opinion delegitimise protests (i.e., people should not protest), or was indifferent to them (i.e., it does not matter whether protests happen or not).

In line with previous research (see Saavedra et al., 2019), we expect that when people perceive that public opinion legitimises protests, they would be more willing to support protesters' self-defence actions in comparison to those who have to face an indifferent public opinion (H1). Thus, we expect that when public opinion legitimate protests, people feel a bond of solidarity with those protesters in the streets (H2), and this makes them more willing to support protest violence against the police as self-defence (H3). Conversely, we also suggest that people may be less willing to support protesters' self-defence actions when public opinion delegitimise protests in comparison with those who

confront an indifferent public opinion (H4), and therefore, it would be less likely for people to feel a bond with those protesters who face the authorities' restrictions (H5). Furthermore, we suggest that own opinions about the right to protest are likely to predict solidarity with, and support of, protestors' actions, and thus needs to be controlled for in our model. We made the same decision regarding SDO taking into account those arguments which suggest its direct relationship with solidarity, and more recently with the support for police officers' excessive use of force to managing non-violent demonstrations (see Gerber & Jackson, 2017).

We tested these hypotheses in two experiments. Study 1 uses a sample of English non-student participants. Study 2 was thus designed to explore potential differences between protester samples (English vs. Catalonian), and to additionally explore whether participants' familiarity with the motive of the protest affected the pattern of results found in Study 1. Also, it is worth noting that the recruitment processes for both studies were carried out in parallel, and therefore this impeded us from making any modification to the experimental design based on the results of any of them.

5.4 Study 1

5.4.1 Method

Participants. Ethical approval for Studies 1 and 2 was obtained from the Cross Schools Research Ethics Committee of the University of Sussex. Subsequently, for Study 1, we set Prolific to recruit our participants (N = 150; 50 participants per condition). We

activated the recruitment filters available on this online platform to distribute the advert of our experiment only to those users who self-categorised as English citizens, residing in England, and were non-students. We decided to use these filters for two reasons. One was to ensure consistency between participants' nationality and the place where they live with the characterisation of public opinion we manipulated (English public opinion). The second reason was to avoid participants of the study being in the same social category (i.e., students) as the fictional protesters presented in the manipulations, a shortcoming of previous works in this area (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019a; Saavedra et al., 2019). Consequently, only those users who met our selection criteria received an advert about a study on protests in England.

As a result of the data collection process described above, 151 English adults (80.13% Female; Age: $M = 36.73$, $SD = 9.84$) were recruited for Study 1. Regarding their previous experience as protesters, only seven participants declared they had participated in marches or protests in the 12 months before this study.

Design and procedure. Participants received a link to an online survey comprising three stages. In the first stage, participants answered items aimed at measuring demographics, their own opinions about the right to protest, previous participation in protests, and social dominance orientation (SDO). In the second stage, participants had to read one of the fictional news articles (randomly assigned manipulation) where English public opinion legitimises (i.e., people argued that students had the right to protest), delegitimise (i.e., people claimed students should not protest), or was indifferent (i.e., people did not care) to the 2010 student protest in London (see all the vignettes in

Appendix 10). For this, we invoked public opinion using statements about general public reaction to protests (i.e., a pie chart simulating a poll results), and bystanders' comments regarding protesters' actions (see McLeod & Hertog, 1992,). It is worth noting that for all the vignettes we described a political context where authorities (i.e., the government and police) imposed restrictions to protests.

Once participants read the story about the protest, they watched two minutes of footage in which the police beat peaceful protesters in a rally organised by NCAFC at Parliament Square (see the link to the footage in Appendix 10). In other words, along with the news article, we included images that might be considered as a public provocation (i.e., police repression) for non-participants. To ensure that participants read the entire story and watched the full footage before continuing to the next stage, we set the minimum time (two minutes) participants must stay in the sections dedicated to each, the vignette and the footage.

In the third stage of the experiment, after watching the footage, participants answered a set of items aimed at measuring their solidarity with protesters. Also, their support for various actions protesters could carry out against the police (e.g., fight the police back) were measured. After completing this stage, each participant received a £0.75 reward.

Measures. We included two questions as manipulations checks, 'to what extent do people think students have the right to protest?' and 'to what extent people think protests are important for a democratic system?' Both questions were evaluated on a scale ranging from 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a lot*).

To measure support for protesters' actions against the police, participants indicated their support for eight different actions student protesters might carry out in response to the actions showed in the footage (e.g., 'yell at the police', 'tackle mounted police officers'). Non-participants' support for each action was evaluated using a scale ranging from 1 (*strongly oppose*) to 5 (*strongly support*). It is worth mentioning that some of these items (see all the items in Appendix 10) draw upon the actions categorised as protesters' self-defence by Saavedra and Drury (2019a).

Solidarity with protesters (r = .89) was measured using two items (e.g., 'I feel a bond of solidarity with protesters') adapted from Leach et al. (2008) rated on a scale from 1 (*strongly disagree*) to 5 (*strongly agree*).

Using the same scale mentioned above, own opinions about the right to protest were measured with three items (α = .88) that were specially adapted to be used in this study (e.g., 'I think that participating in protests is a valid political action').

Finally, we included the SDO-short scale (Pratto et al., 2013) comprising four items (e.g., 'Group equality should be our ideal') to measure social dominance orientation (α = .72). Thus, participants evaluated each SDO statement on a scale from 1 (*extremely oppose*) to 10 (*extremely favour*).

Analytical procedure. We used Stata to get the descriptive statistics of all the variables included in this study; carry out exploratory factor analysis (EFA) on the items aimed to measure the support for protesters' actions; as well as to calculate the internal reliability of the scales involved in the model.

To test our mediation model using a categorical independent variable (i.e., manipulations), we employed MPLUS 7. Thus, we created dummy variables to calculate the indirect effects of public opinion's (de) legitimisation of protests on both solidarity with protesters and support for protesters' actions assuming the indifference condition as the reference group. Because our mediation model included a categorical independent variable, we followed Hayes and Preacher's (2014) guidelines to calculate and interpret the 'relative' indirect, direct, and total effects using bootstrap with 10,000 re-samples and 95% bias-corrected confidence intervals. Furthermore, this model was controlled for age, gender, previous participation in protests, own opinions about the right to protest, and SDO.

In a subsequent step, we explored the possibility of getting interaction effects between the experimental conditions (public opinion's legitimisation of protest) with own opinions about the right to protest in solidarity with protesters. In other words, we explored the interaction among different levels of legitimacy (i.e., individual and collective) on the bond non-participants might feel they have with those protesters suffering from police repression.

5.4.2 Results

Manipulation checks. We carried out ANOVAs to test the main effects of the manipulations. Thus, using a robust analysis of variance, we found that the experimental manipulations affected people's perceptions of whether a general audience acknowledge students' right to protest (first manipulation check), $F(2, 126.17) = 74.04$, $p < .001$. In particular, people in the 'legitimised' condition ($M = 4.26$) perceived that public opinion would tend to recognise more the students' right to protest in comparison with those participants exposed to either the 'delegitimised' ($M = 2.27$) or 'indifference' ($M = 3.19$) condition. Also, Tukey's post-hoc comparisons demonstrated that those participants in the 'delegitimised' condition perceived public opinion as more reluctant to recognise students' right to protest in contrast with those who had to face an indifferent general audience.

Regarding the second manipulation check, we found that participants' perceptions about the importance public opinion give to protests in a democratic system changed across experimental conditions, $F(2, 148) = 44.66$, $p < .001$. Thus, those in the 'legitimised' condition perceived that public opinion gave higher importance to protest ($M = 3.97$) in comparison with those participants who faced a public opinion that delegitimised ($M = 2.54$) or was indifferent to the student protest ($M = 2.54$). However, we did not find significant differences in the scores reported by those in the 'delegitimised' and indifference conditions. We suggest this taking into account that the indifference condition included a negative statement claiming that 'people have to work hard instead of wasting their time in protests'.

Main results. To check whether all the activities protesters might perform against the police were part of a unique factor, we carried out an exploratory factor analysis (EFA) using Maximum Likelihood as extracting method. The results of this analysis demonstrated that participants of our study identified two broad categories of protesters' actions. Whereas the first category included three protesters' actions (e.g., 'pushing the police back'; α = .79) people might label as self-defence (see Saavedra & Drury, 2019a), the second category involved five actions (α = .94) aimed at inflicting direct harm on police officers (e.g., 'throwing stones and other objects at the police').

Table 5.1. Means and standard deviations of the main variables included in the analyses by experimental condition.

	Indifference condition		Legitimised condition		Delegitimised Condition	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Solidarity with protesters	3.15	1.24	3.16	1.14	3.50	1.25
Support for self-defence actions	2.51	1.06	2.24	0.92	2.37	1.03
Support for actions to inflict harm on police officers	1.41	0.69	1.16	0.4	1.28	0.68
Own opinions about the right to protest	3.92	0.89	3.63	0.97	3.77	0.82
SDO	3.10	1.88	2.65	1.18	3.00	1.48

Once we got the descriptive statistics for all the variables mentioned in the measures section (see Table 5.1), we checked their zero-order correlations. Thus, we realised that none of the variables included in this study correlates with support for protesters' actions aimed at inflicting harm on police officers (see Table 5.2). Therefore, we decided to focus

our analysis on testing the effect of public opinion legitimisation of protests (i.e., conditions) on the support for protesters' self-defence actions, including solidarity with protesters as the main mechanism. It is worth mentioning that this model was controlled for gender (coded 0 for male and 1 for female), and previous participation in protests (coded 0 for no previous participation and 1 for previous participation).

Table 5.2. Zero-order correlations among the variables included in the model.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Solidarity with protesters	1									
2. Support for self-defence actions	.52***	1								
3. Support for actions to inflict harm on police officers	.07	.41***	1							
4. Own opinions about the right to protest	.59***	.47***	.11	1						
5. SDO	-.27**	-.21**	-.06	-.35***	1					
6. Legitimised condition	-.06	-.09	-.12	-.11	-.12	1				
7. Delegitimised condition	.13	.00	.00	.00	.03	-.49***	1			
8 Age	-.07	-.06	-.14	-.01	.15	-.04	-.02	1		
9. Gender	.10	-.02	.07	.01	-.10	-.03	-.01	-.13	1	
10. Previous participation in protests	.18*	.18*	-.04	.18*	-.03	-.08	.04	-.05	.02	1

Note: Significance of coefficients is indicated *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Our mediation model (see Figure 5.1) accounted for 34.3% of the variance associated with people's support for protesters' self-defence actions. This model shows no direct effects of public opinion legitimisation of protests (manipulations) on people's support for self-defence actions. Also, public opinion's legitimisation of protests did not have any impact on solidarity with protesters. Nevertheless, contrary to what we expected, we found that only those who faced a public opinion that delegitimises protests (i.e., alignment hypothesis) tended to support protesters' self-defence actions through feeling a bond of solidarity with protesters (b = 0.15, 95% CI [0.05, 0.30], p = .04).

Another unexpected but important finding was the role of own opinions about the right to protest in the prediction of solidarity with protesters (b = 0.79, 95% CI [0.66, 0.92], p < .001). Taking into account this information, we decided to carry out an additional analysis to test the interaction between public opinion's legitimisation of protests and own opinions about the right to protest (see Figure 5.2.). In other words, we explored how, in a restricted political scenario, solidarity with protesters might depend on two different levels of legitimacy, collective (perceived public opinion) and individual (own opinions). Our results show that solidarity with protesters depends on the interaction between both levels (i.e., individual and collective) of the legitimacy of protests. Indeed, our analysis shows that the positive effect of own opinions on solidarity with protesters is slightly stronger for those who were allocated in the 'delegitimised' condition (b = 1.10, 95% CI [0.77, 1.07], p < .001) in comparison to those in the 'legitimised' (b = -0.36, 95% CI [-0.80, 0.60], p = .096) and indifference conditions (b = -0.43, 95% CI [-0.88, 0.00], p = .055). To put it differently, own positive views about the right to protest become especially important in feel solidarity with repressed protesters when public opinion is against protests.



Figure 5.1. Mediation model Study 1. The model is controlled for SDO, own opinions about the right to protest, gender, age, and previous participation in protests. Regression coefficients are the unstandardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated †$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

Considering the results reported above and that, in the model, SDO had no effect on either the mediator (b = -0.40, 95% CI [-0.12, 0.43], p = .427) or the dependent variable (b = -0.27, 95% CI [-0.11, 0.05], p = .593), we suggest that people may feel solidarity with protesters and support self-defence actions against the police 'in resistance' to a general audience that is aligned with the restrictions authorities has imposed on protests. Also, we propose that this 'resistance' may be triggered because of the contextual circumstances non-participants (and protesters) need to cope with, and own opinions people have regarding the right to protest.



Figure 5.2. Interaction effects in Study 1. Interaction between experimental conditions and own opinions about the right to protest to predict political solidarity with protesters.

5.4.3 Discussion

Although our results did not show a direct effect of the news articles manipulation on non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police, we found interesting results regarding the role of solidarity with protesters in this process. Thus, non-participants may feel a bond of solidarity with protesters in the streets when news articles invoke public opinion aligned with the restrictions that authorities imposed on protests. In other words, non-participants may report higher levels of solidarity with protesters when the protest paradigm (i.e., negative media portrayal of protests) is aligned with the restrictions imposed by authorities in comparison to a scenario where media coverage depicts a general audience that is indifferent to protests. Despite being unexpected, these results may be useful to begin a discussion about the possibility that non-participants feel solidarity with protesters as an act of resistance against the restriction to the right to protest as well as against negative biased media coverage of

protests. We suggest the evidence we reported about the role of own opinions about the right to protest in the prediction of solidarity with protesters may help to support this idea. Also, we suggest that it is the violation of shared norms and beliefs (i.e., the right to protest), and not ideological orientations (SDO), that can lead non-participants to feel a bond with those who are in the streets having their say.

With respect to solidarity with protesters as a mechanism, we suggest that similar to what has been described for actual protesters (see Drury and Reicher, 2018), non-participants might identify the police as enemies from whom protesters have the right to defend themselves when authorities act to avoid protesters' actions instead of guarantee people's right to protest. This means that even though the media coverage was aligned with authorities' measures against protesters, non-participants should not be considered as mere receivers of information concerning protests. Instead, people can interpret what is going on during a protest event and support protesters' actions against the police, as a function of the measures implemented by authorities, public opinion's legitimisation of protests, and their own opinions about the right to protest.

5.5 Study 2

5.5.1 Method

Participants. We used the same procedure as in Study 1 to recruit English adult (non-student) participants using Prolific. However, we incorporated two changes to this process. First, in the advertisement, we told the potential participants that this study was

about the pro-independence movement in Catalonia. Second, we activated an additional filter on the online platform to prevent those who took part in Study 1 from taking part in this new experiment. Thus, we recruited 150 English adults (59.33% Female; Age: *M* = 37.11, *SD* = 11.07), of which just a few (6%) had taken part in a protest.

Design and procedures. We used similar design and procedures to Study 1. However, two differences have to be mentioned. First, considering that in Study 1 neither experimental conditions nor solidarity with protesters predicted non-participants' support for actions aimed at inflicting harm on police officers, in Study 2 we tested our mediation model only to predict non-participants' support for self-defence actions. Second, both the vignettes and the footage referred to the pro-independence movement in Catalonia (see Appendix 11). Thus, the vignette described the legitimacy English public opinion gave to protests in Catalonia, whereas the footage showed Spanish police officers beating Catalonian demonstrators outside a polling station. As in Study 1, participants received a £0.75 reward once they completed the survey.

Measures. We adapted the manipulation checks of Study 1 to the Catalonian context. Thus, participants had to rate the following: 'what extent did people actively believe Catalans had the right to vote and protest against government decisions'; and 'to what extent people think protests are important for a democratic system' on a scale from 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a lot*).

We used the same items as in Study 1 to measure support for self-defence actions against the police (α = .88), solidarity with protesters (r = .84), own opinions about the right to protest (α = .82), and social dominance orientation (α = .81).

Moreover, considering that participants were going to be asked about protests that took place outside of their immediate context, we included an additional item to measure self-reported knowledge about the situation in Catalonia ('how much do you know about the situation in Catalonia?'). This item was rated on a scale from 1 (*none*) to 5 (*a lot*).

Analysis. To allow comparability with Study 1, we carried out the analyses using the same sets of items to measure support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police. In addition, we tested a mediation model for this dependent variable in the same way as in Study 1, including people's knowledge about the Catalonia pro-independence movement as an additional control variable.

5.5.2 Results

Manipulation checks. The results for our two manipulations checks were similar to each other, maybe because, as in Study 1, we included negative references to protests in both the delegitimised (i.e., Catalans should not be allowed to protest) and indifference conditions (i.e., protests are a waste of time).

Regarding our first manipulation check, we found differences in how participants perceived UK public opinion on Catalans' right to vote and protest, $F(2, 121.42) = 48.15$,

$p < .001$. Thus, those participants in the 'legitimised' condition perceived that English public opinion gave more legitimacy to protests in Catalonia ($M = 4.29$), in comparison to those in the 'delegitimised' ($M = 2.60$) and 'indifference' conditions ($M = 2.81$). However, and maybe because of the reasons mentioned above, we did not find significant differences between the other two conditions.

The results for the second manipulation check were similar to those described above. People perceived that UK public opinion gave different levels of importance to protests in a democratic system, $F(2, 121.64) = 24.15$, $p < .001$. However, as for the first manipulation check, only those in the 'legitimised' condition ($M = 4.15$) reported significant differences relative to the other two conditions (delegitimised condition: $M = 2.94$; indifference condition: $M = 2.91$).

Table 5.3. Means and standard deviations of the main variables included in the analyses by experimental condition.

	Indifference condition		Legitimised condition		Delegitimised condition	
	M	*SD*	*M*	*SD*	*M*	*SD*
Solidarity with protesters	3.68	1.06	4.04	0.95	3.97	1.18
Support for self-defence actions	3.15	1.21	3.35	1.16	3.07	1.22
Own opinions about the right to protest	4.01	0.85	4.00	0.90	3.90	0.84
SDO	3.04	1.52	2.91	1.63	3.14	1.93
Knowledge about Catalonia situation	2.06	0.87	2.19	1.05	2.58	1.10

Main results. The descriptive statistics for the key measures within all conditions are presented in Table 5.3. We noted the means for people's support for self-defence actions against the police were slightly higher than those obtained in Study 1. Even though the scores from both studies are not objectively comparable, we think this is a piece of interesting information to bear in mind considering it might be possible that people show higher support for protesters' self-defence actions when protesters are in a different political context.

Table 5.4. Zero-order correlations among the variables included in the model.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Solidarity with protesters	1									
2. Support for self-defence actions	.35***	1								
3. Own opinions about the right to protest	.36***	.36***	1							
4. SDO	-.28**	-.10	-.38***	1						
5. Legitimised condition	.09	.09	.02	-.05	1					
6. Delegitimised condition	.04	-.07	-.05	.04	-.50***	1				
7 Age	.14	.00	-.03	.08	-.08	.05	1			
8. Gender	.12	-.13	-.09	-.04	.03	.07	.04	1		
9. Previous participation in protests	.03	.04	.20*	-.13	-.06	.00	-.17*	.14	1	
10. Knowledge about Catalonia situation	.22**	.16*	.29***	-.14	-.05	.20*	.08	-.23**	.06	1

Note: Significance of coefficients is indicated *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

As in Study 1, we found that neither 'legitimised' nor 'delegitimised' conditions have direct effects on the dependent variable (see Table 5.4). However, as expected, when UK public opinion legitimises protests, it is more likely that non-participants feel a bond of solidarity with protesters, and this solidarity acts as a mechanism that predicts the support for protesters self-defence actions against the police in a different scenario (R^2 = .20). Moreover, unlike Study 1, there was no significant effect of 'delegitimised' condition on solidarity with protesters (see Figure 5.3).



Figure 5.3. Mediation model Study 2. The model is controlled for SDO, own opinions about the right to protest, gender, age, and previous participation in protests. Regression coefficients are the unstandardized estimates. Significance of coefficients is indicated †$p < .1$, *$p < .05$, **$p < .01$, ***$p < .001$.

These results suggest that for protesters' actions carried out in a different political context than one's own, non-participants may feel solidarity with those protesters who suffer from the restrictions imposed on the right to protest only when their own (local) public opinion legitimises protests relative to a (local) general audience that is indifferent to protesters' actions (b = 0.97, 95% CI [0.13, 0.24], p = .14).

Regarding the role of own opinions about the right to protest and SDO, the results were similar to those of Study 1. Thus, own opinions about the right to protest was a good predictor of both solidarity with protesters (b = 0.36, 95% CI [0.16, 0.55], p = .02) and support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police (b = 0.39, 95% CI [0.18, 0.58], p = .01). With respect to SDO, as in Study 1, it had no relationship with support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police (b = 0.07, 95% CI [-0.03, 0.17], p = .264). However, in this study, SDO had a small effect on solidarity with protesters (b = -0.10, 95% CI [-0.18, -0.21], p = .03). Considering these results, we tested again the interaction between the experimental conditions (public opinion's legitimisation of protests) and own opinions about the right to protest in solidarity with protesters (see Figure 5.4).



Figure 5.4. Interaction effects in Study 2**.** Interaction between experimental conditions and own opinions about the right to protest to predict political solidarity with protesters.

As in Study 1, we found that the effect of own opinions becomes stronger when people are faced with a general audience that delegitimates protests (b = 0.75, 95% CI [0.42, 1.08], p < .001) in comparison to those conditions where the public opinion is either indifferent (b = -0.40, 95% CI [-0.87, 0.56], p = .085) or legitimises protests (b = -0.45, 95% CI [-0.90, -0.00], p = .047). In other words, own positive views about the right to protest become especially predictive of felt solidarity with repressed protesters when public opinion is against protests.

5.5.3 Discussion

The results of Study 2 are very similar to those obtained in Study 1 regarding the role of the solidarity with protesters as a mechanism that may predict non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police (i.e., pushing the police back,

disobeying police officers' orders, or yelling at the police). As in Study 1, we found that non-participants might feel solidarity with protesters according to the extent that non-participants perceived that public opinion legitimates protests. However, there is one main difference between Study 1 and Study 2 that needs to be addressed. In this study, it was public opinion's legitimisation of protests (not delegitimisation) that led non-participants to feel solidarity with protesters. This may imply that when protests take place in a different political context (e.g., Catalonia), people might feel solidarity with protesters only when their local public opinion (i.e., English general audience) explicitly legitimises protests at the foreign location and expresses its disagreement with authorities' restrictions on the right to protest. The latter opens the door to think about the different mechanisms that could explain non-participants' support for protesters' actions carried out in an alien political context. Although this may be considered an exciting and challenging idea, researchers need to bear in mind the cultural, political, and historical differences that can bias the reported support for protesters' actions. To put it differently, it would not be fair nor scientifically rigorous to analyse the support that people living in developed Western democracies may give to protesters' actions in other regions (e.g., Africa or East Asia) without considering the existence of divergent social norms regarding protests and the type of actions that can be supported (e.g., only peaceful actions).

Also, we confirmed the critical role of own opinions about the right to protest in predicting solidarity with protesters, as well as the minimal influence that social dominance orientation (SDO) has on this construct.

5.6 General discussion

Through two studies, we have demonstrated that solidarity with protesters may act as a mechanism to predict non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions against the police depending on the legitimacy public opinion grant to protests. In particular, we found that non-participants may feel solidarity with protesters due to the interaction between two levels of the legitimacy of protests, individual and collective. The latter means that non-participants' take into account their own opinions about the right to protest and the extent to which public opinion legitimises protests that take place in either a local or foreign political context before feeling solidarity with those who hit the streets to fight for a specific cause.

In terms of the theoretical advances, our studies offer two main contributions to the social-psychological research on protests and collective action. First, our work extends the scope of the political solidarity model considering that third parties (i.e., non-participants) may support protesters' self-defence actions against the police without necessarily being involved or have the intention to take part in collective action. Although this means non-protesters may remain 'inactive', we do not consider this inactivity to be a negative outcome considering that protesters and social movements always need the general audience to legitimate both their claims and actions to increase the odds of reaching the desired goals (see van Zomeren et al., 2004, for a discussion). Indeed, we suggest that when non-participants realise that authorities try to hinder the right to protest and the media spread images that cause public indignation (e.g., the police beating protesters), solidarity with protesters might lead to support for protesters' self-defence actions and

also provoke non-participants to take action to complain against authorities' measures, or to question the legitimacy of authorities. An excellent example of this can be found in a protest that took place during 2019 in Hong Kong. In that event, a large group of mothers hit the streets to complain about police repression against young protesters, the use of the label 'rioters' on those who participated in demonstrations and to demand the local political leader's resignation (see Ng, 2019).

The second contribution of this work is to consider non-participants as active readers of both the political context where protests take place and the dynamic of collective action. Thus, we hold that non-participants can actively monitor and interpret the information about protests they can get from the media. Consequently, aside from their own opinions about the right to protest, non-participants may consider three main factors before feeling a bond of solidarity with protesters and support protesters' self-defence actions against the police: the restrictions authorities impose on the right to protest, perceived public opinion legitimisation of protests, and police actions against protesters. The latter implies that instead of attributing the occurrence of violence to protesters alleged 'irrationality', non-participants (like actual protesters) can understand that protesters' actions follow a specific rationale based on both the political circumstances that set the stage for protests and the interaction between protesters and the police.

There are some limitations to the two studies reported that are worth reflecting on. Both experiments included footage that may cause public indignation (i.e., police repression during protests) just after the experimental manipulations. Although we intentionally adopted this design to give more realism to the experiments (i.e., online news and social

media usually combines text, images, and footage), we suspect that confounding effects may be behind the reported results. However, instead of suggesting that the impact of text articles and footages should be tested separately, we believe that future research should try to replicate our results using a similar design or combining different pieces of information (e.g., Wouters, 2018) to simulate what people usually see about protests on media outlets.

Regarding people's support for protesters' actions in a different political context, we need to acknowledge that in Study 2 the protesters (i.e., Catalans) could be considered as similar to those who decided to support (or not) protesters' actions (i.e., English adults). Thus, protesters and non-participants belonged to European democracies suppose a limitation because it assumes people in any of these roles share some higher-order category (i.e., being European), as well as values and beliefs about democracy that partially may explain the results reported above. To address this issue, we propose that future studies should focus on exploring non-participants' support for protesters with whom there are no explicit connections or a prior higher-order category (e.g., Europeans and Africans) that can facilitate solidarity.

Another limitation future research needs to address is the role of own opinions about the right to protest on the prediction of both solidarity with protesters and the support for protesters' self-defence actions. Although we found consistent effects in both studies, it is still necessary to further explore how these effects can change according to the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, the political context in which protesters'

actions take place and the type of protest (i.e., peaceful or violent) has predominated in a country's recent past (see Murdie & Purser, 2017, for a discussion).

Undoubtedly, more research is needed to better understand non-participants' support for protesters' self-defence actions through solidarity. Thus, we suggest that future research can extend our model, testing the role of co-victimization (e.g., victims of police repression) and inclusive identity salience as measures of solidarity with protesters (see Subašić, Schmitt, & Reynolds, 2011); integrating the violation of moral beliefs in relation to protests (van Zomeren, Kutlaca, & Turner-Zwinkels, 2018). Also, future research should explore how support for protesters' self-defence actions may be an antecedent of people's willingness to join protests. By examining the factors mentioned above, it might be possible to understand better non-participants' role as active readers of collective action and people's reasons to support protesters' self-defence actions against the police in solidarity with protesters.

Chapter 6

Discussion

6. Discussion

In this thesis, I have offered new insights to understand non-participants' support for protesters' violence. For this, I designed a series of studies using different methods: survey-based questionnaires, experiments, and interviews. Furthermore, in Chapters 2 and 3, I tested part of these insights in two countries, the UK and Chile. In this section, I will summarise the main findings of my studies, discuss their theoretical and practical implications, and point to their limitations. Finally, I will provide some suggestions on how future research may address these limitations and extend the scope of this work.

6.1 Summary of the findings

In this section, I will present an overview of the main findings I reported in Chapters 2, 3, 4, and 5 organised by topic of interest. Moreover, the main contributions of these studies to the development of each topic will be discussed.

Perceived political context. As described in Chapter 1, the main objective of my research was to incorporate people's perceptions of the political context into the psychological analysis of collective action. For this, a fundamental starting point for my research was van Zomeren's (2016) idea of including advances from other fields (e.g., sociology) to understand the role of political structures in the psychological study of collection action. Along with van Zomeren's idea, noticing that except for those works that draw upon on the elaborated social identity model of crowd behaviour (ESIM; Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2005) in most of the psychological literature the

‘context of collective action’ almost exclusively referred to the socio-structural conditions mentioned by Tajfel and Turner (1979). This literature helped me to focus my efforts on the study of the perceived political context where protests take place. To put it differently, van Zomeren’s arguments, the historical conceptualization of context present in works draw upon ESIM (see Drury et al., 2012; Stott et al., 2018), and the limited idea of context as intergroup differences (i.e., the difference between groups in direct conflict) in the mainstream psychological literature on collective action, were essential ingredients to propose a new approach. This approach is built on people’s perceptions of those actors (i.e., the government, the police, and public opinion) that have enough influence to set and change the scenario where protests take place.

After carrying out a comprehensive literature review, which included sociological and political science studies (see Chapter 1), I realised that most of the research included analysis about the government, presence of repression, and public opinion as significant references for the political context where social movements and protests occur. Regarding the influence of the government, I considered that political opportunities (Tarrow, 1994) offered a dimension - political openness - that may be susceptible to people’s evaluation. As explained in Chapters 1 and 2, this dimension is referred to as the extent the political system, particularly the government, allows the presence and development of social movements.

Concerning the presence of repression, although the literature describes different forms and agents of repression (see Chapter 1), I chose to restrict the definition to the actions carried out by the police against protesters. I made this decision taking into account that

during protests, in their role of direct managers of crowd events and public order, the police are by far the primary and most visible agent of repression that protesters need to deal with (at least in Western democracies). It is worth noting that this effort to include repression in the psychological analysis of collective action is in line with Earl's (2011) and Honari's (2017, 2018b) suggestions about the importance of considering people's perceptions of repression and their consequences for the development of social mobilisation processes.

Regarding the role of public opinion, I followed Neidhardt and Rucht's (1991) ideas about considering public opinion as a reference group for social movements from which activists and protesters can obtain legitimacy for their claims and actions. For this, I decided to include public opinion in the analyses using meta-perceptions. The latter means that rather than getting an 'objective' measure of public opinion about protests, my main interest was to know people's perceptions about what other people think about protests.

Taking into account the antecedents listed above, in Chapter 2 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019b), I proposed a new construct- subjective political openness (SPO) - to include people's perceptions of the political context regarding protests into the social-psychological analysis of collective action. Theoretically, SPO should comprise psychological equivalents for political openness (government openness/restrictions), perceived repression (carried out by the police against protesters), and the legitimacy granted by public opinion to protests (perceived legitimacy of protests). Based on the concept of SPO, I developed a scale of measurement (SPO Repression scale, or SPO-R)

to evaluate people's perceived restrictions from the government and the police to the occurrence of protest, as well as the perceived legitimacy granted by public opinion to protests. This scale was validated as a bifactor model (one general factor comprising two dimensions), and its measurement invariance tested in two different studies, each of them using samples from the UK and Chile. In contrast to my original idea, the results demonstrated that only the first two components (government restrictions and perceived repression) belonged to SPO-R, while the perceived legitimacy of protests did not. Thus, while people consider government measures and police behaviour together to have a global picture of the scenario protesters need to face, public opinion seems to be part of a different analytic process.

Although the results were not precisely as expected, I argue that SPO-R scale is a worthy contribution which researchers can rely on to include perceived political context in their analysis of collective action without the need to create ad hoc items every time. Also, I suggest that the configuration of SPO-R as a bifactor model represents a contribution for purposes of research for two reasons. First, it can provide information about the global political scenario where protests take place (general factor), whereas the influence or weight of each component (i.e., government measures and police actions) can be analysed separately. Second, because bifactor models are similar to modular designs, SPO-R has the potential to extend its scope, adding or rejecting new dimensions (components) that other scholars may propose as relevant to the evaluation of the political context regarding protests.

Support for protesters' violence against the police. Using different research methods, in Chapters 3 (Saavedra et al., 2019) and 4 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a), I demonstrated that similarly to what ESIM describes concerning actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2018), non-participants may support violence against police officers as a response to the perceived restrictions implemented by the government and the police regarding protests. In other words, I suggest that non-participants' support for the use of violence by protesters follows a specific rationale that depends on the restrictions that authorities impose on protests in a particular place and time.

While Chapter 3 provides cross-sectional and experimental evidence for the situational nature of non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police, Chapter 4 delved deeper into this topic using vignettes-based interviews with non-participants. Interviews, along with ideological dilemmas used as an analytical tool, helped me to get a better understanding of the rationales behind the non-participants' support for protest violence. Thus, regardless of their previous experience as protesters, most of the interviewees were able to hold contradictory ideas about the support they and others (public opinion) may provide to protesters' violence against the police. Specifically, and in line with the pervasive idea that protests need to be 'peaceful' (see Jarman & Hamilton, 2009), the interviewees reported their initial disagreement with protest violence in situations where authorities actively tried to facilitate a hypothetical student protest. Nevertheless, the same interviewees expressed that they, as well as public opinion, would understand (and support) protesters' use of violence against police officers in case the right to protest is under threat due to the restrictions imposed by authorities. To explain the existence of these contradictory ideas, I think two elements should be considered.

The first element is intrinsically linked to the restrictive measures mentioned in Chapter 3 (Saavedra et al., 2019), the restriction of the right to protest. Consequently, when people refer to the unfavourable conditions that some authorities' measures can create for protest, it seems that these restrictions cannot be considered without their immediate negative effect on one of the foundational ideas of Western democracies, the rights to protest and freedom of assembly. In other words, those who firstly disagree with the idea of protesters' violence against the police may support these actions when they perceive the restrictions put in place by the authorities affect and even violate this right.

The second element that may explain the contradictory ideas about the use of violence against the police is the concept of self-defence. In this case, protest violence against the police could be supported by non-participants and public opinion when it is conceptualised as something that protesters need to do to confront authorities' restrictions and stop police transgressions against protesters. In line with this, some interviewees argued that before agreeing with protesters' violence, it would be necessary to know who the aggressor was (i.e., the police or protesters). Conversely, protest violence could not be reconceptualised as 'self-defence' when people perceive the authorities try to facilitate protests, and the police made efforts to guarantee the right to protest.

My work makes an essential contribution to the study of the consequences that protesters' actions may have on those who do not take part in protests. Albeit protesters and social movements indeed need that public opinion (i.e., bystanders, sympathisers, non-sympathisers) support their causes to reach the expected social changes, it is no less true

that protesters' actions are under public scrutiny. Thus, Chapters 3 and 4 extend the scope of previous research on the support for protesters' actions (e.g., Teixeira et al., 2019) focusing attention on physical violence against the police. To explore this topic, we assumed the same starting point as some psychological research (Drury & Reicher, 2000; Reicher et al, 2007; Stott and Drury, 2000) on collective action (and on actual protesters' behaviour) which argues that rather than mindless, protest (crowd) violence follows a context-situated rationale. In line with the studies mentioned above, our findings show that, similarly to actual protesters, non-participants may back violence against the police when they perceive that the authorities try to prevent legitimate protests, these measures threaten the right to protest normative in Western democracies, and the police carry out actions arbitrarily against protesters. Therefore, I argue that non-participants' support for protesters' violence against the police is contextually situated and follows a rationale based on the perceived characteristics of the political context where protests take place and how the authorities shape this context. Considering this, I think it is possible to make a final claim. Protest violence against the police (as 'self-defence') and non-participants' support for these actions should be considered as a subset of collective action explained in terms of their rationale instead of being marginalised and criminalised by authorities, researchers, or public opinion.

Legitimacy of protests and public opinion. After reviewing the social-psychological literature in collective action, it became clear that in relation to collective action, the concept of legitimacy has been addressed in the literature under two diverse forms: legitimacy of the context (e.g., inequality between groups, see Tajfel & Turner, 1979; system-justification, see Jost et al., 2017), and own opinions (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017; Jiménez-Moya et al., 2019). However, public opinion (i.e., the views of bystanders

and other non-participants) on the legitimacy of protests as acts of value (independently of the social group behind the actions) is a neglected topic in the literature. Consequently, considering public opinion as one of the reference groups for social movements (Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991), as well as the importance non-participants might have for the support and success of social mobilization processes (see Simon & Klandermans, 2001; Subašić et al., 2008), in Chapter 2 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019b), I suggested that the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests might be an essential part of the perceived political context.

As described in Chapter 2, I used meta-perceptions, or how people perceive that others like them can legitimate the presence of protest in the streets, to measure the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests. However, whereas the measures for this construct worked properly, it did not belong to SPO-R scale as was expected. Thus, people's evaluation of the political context concerning protests were based on government and police actions aimed at facilitating or restricting protests but not on the perceived opinion of others non-participants.

Considering the results reported in Chapter 2, in Chapter 3 I performed a cross-sectional survey and an experiment to test the relationship between the perceived political context (based on the government and the police actions to manage protests) and the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests. Also, I tested if the second construct mediated the relationship between the perceived political context and non-participants' support for protesters violence.

For the first relationship mentioned above and considering the novelty of my work, I proposed two ad hoc hypotheses. First, the resistance hypothesis. Based on the idea of the right to protest, this hypothesis suggests that people might give more legitimacy to protests, the more they perceive the authorities are trying to restrict the presence of protests in the streets. Second, the alignment hypothesis. The latter suggests that non-participants' perceptions about the legitimacy given by public opinion to protests may be in line with non-participants' perceptions of authorities' restrictions on protesters' actions. Thus, the more restrictive is a political context perceived, non-participants would think that public opinion gives less legitimacy to protests. Both the cross-sectional study and the experiment provided evidence that supports the alignment hypothesis more than the resistance hypothesis in the British and Chilean samples.

Regarding the role of the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion as a mediator of the relationship between perceived political context and people's support for protesters' violence against the police, I found a context-sensitive mediation. The latter means that considering other people's opinion about protests is an important mechanism to understand non-participants' support for the use of violence against the police for British people but not for Chilean people. Although this result was consistent in both the cross-sectional and experimental studies, I am still seeking an explanation for this difference embedded in the recent political history of the UK and Chile, the tradition of protests in both countries, and in the divergent protest policing approaches.

In Chapter 4 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019a), I again explored how the mechanism mentioned above could work in the context of interviews carried out using vignettes. While non-

participants may hold contradictory opinions regarding the use of violence against the police, people also declared that public opinion might legitimate protest violence when authorities' measures threaten the right to protest and police officers were the aggressors. Although these results extended what was reported in previous chapters bringing out arguments impossible to address through quantitative methods, I realised that there was no research where public opinion legitimation of protests was manipulated. Bearing this in mind, I designed the experiments reported in Chapter 5 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019c).

Chapter 5 contains the report of two experiments designed to explore how British non-participants may support protesters' self-defence actions (i.e., pushing back the police, yelling at police officers, and disobeying police orders) according to the extent public opinion (de)legitimize protests. For this, I manipulated the legitimacy given by (British) public opinion to two famous protests (the 2010 student protests in London and the Catalonia Independence Movement in 2017) that took place in contexts where the government imposed restrictive measures, and the police carried out indiscriminate actions against protesters. I suggested that solidarity with protesters would be a mechanism that leads non-participants to support protesters' self-defence actions when people perceive that public opinion expressed resistance (i.e., consider protests were legitimate) to the unfavourable conditions the authorities' set for protests. Conversely, it was expected that when public opinion was aligned (i.e., considered protests illegitimate) with the restrictions set by authorities, non-participants would not feel any bond of solidarity with protesters, and therefore, non-participants would not back self-defence actions against the police. The results demonstrated that solidarity with protesters acts as a mechanism that explains the influence of perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protest on non-participants' support for protesters' self-defensive violence. However,

there were differences in how this mechanism worked depending on who the protesters were and the own opinions non-participants had about protests.

With respect to who the protesters were, whereas non-participants felt solidarity with protesters in Catalonia only when public opinion gave legitimacy to protest to confront a restrictive political context (i.e., resistance), solidarity with British student protesters was activated only when public opinion was aligned (i.e., delegitimizing protests) with the restrictions set by authorities. Moreover, both experiments (i.e., about the Catalonia Independence Movement and 2010 student protest) showed that non-participants' previous opinions regarding the legitimacy of protests increased the bond of solidarity with protesters when in a restrictive context people perceive that public opinion delegitimises protests.

Considering the results described above, my work makes three significant contributions regarding the legitimacy of protests. First, it includes a new conceptualisation of the legitimacy of protests focused on the perceived value other people give to protesting instead of own opinions about these activities, or the legitimacy that a specific group gives to protests. This perspective will help that new psychological research in collective action considers protests within a broader political system instead of activities exclusively focus on solving problems between two main groups in conflict (e.g., protesters and authorities).

My second contribution is the consideration of public opinion as a source of legitimacy of protests. Even though the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests is

not part of the subjective political openness scale (SPO-R), perceptions about other people's views about protests (meta-perceptions) may help to set the political scenario where protesters' actions take place. Thus, representations about other people's thoughts allow people to interpret those norms that rule their immediate context, have an idea of the type of actions considered (il)legitimate, actively create their interpretation of this context, and promote social change (see Elcheroth, Doise, & Reicher, 2011). The inclusion of meta-perceptions on public opinion's legitimisation of protests also advances the study of collective action because it means going beyond the analysis of own opinions regarding protests. Whereas own opinions do not necessarily represent social facts (see Elcheroth et al., 2011), our perceptions of what other people think about the political acts in which we may take part (or not) give us a more accurate idea of what is going on in our context (social facts). However, as I reported in Chapter 5, this does not mean that researchers need to discard own opinions from the analysis of collective action. What I propose is that perceived legitimacy given by others to protests should be considered along with own opinions (or own legitimacy of protests) in the analysis of what non-participants may think about protests and the actions carried out by protesters.

Last but not least, my third contribution is related to the mechanism through which the perceived legitimacy given by others to protests (meta-perceptions) may lead non-participants to support protesters' self-defensive actions. Thus, my findings demonstrate that non-participants may back self-defence because of a bond of solidarity with those protesters that need to face both restrictions to their right to protest and the indiscriminate actions of police officers. However, I also found that instead of being a universal feeling deployed on behalf of those in need, solidarity with protesters depends on who the protesters are (British or Catalonians) and people's opinions about protests.

6.2 Theoretical implications

In this section, I will discuss the most important implications of my work in terms of theoretical advances for the study of collective action from a social psychological point of view.

A bridge between psychological and sociological research on collective action. For the conceptualisation of the subjective political openness (SPO), I imported advances from the sociological literature on social movements to the psychological analysis of protests. In particular, I used political opportunities (Tarrow 1994), reference groups (Neidhardt & Rucht, 1991), and research on repression (see Della Porta, 1995; Honari, 2018b) as starting points to create a construct aimed at understanding people's perceptions of their broad political context regarding protests. Thus, SPO has the advantage of allowing researchers to analyse people's perceptions of authorities' behaviours concerning protests, and the possible consequences of these perceptions on both people's willingness to join protests and their support for protesters' actions. In other words, SPO enables researchers to consider the political context for protests as a variable rather than a fixed attribute that sets the conditions where protesters actions take place.

Moreover, it is noteworthy that SPO's development represents an advance in responding to two different academic arguments. First, to van Zomeren's claim (2016) about the necessity of including political structural variables into the psychological analysis of collective action. Second, to Earl's (2001) and Honari's (2017, 2018a) ideas on moving the sociological analysis of repression against social movements from its focus on the macro and mesosystems (i.e., presence of repression in society) to a perspective that

considers people's perceptions about the repressive measures implemented by different authorities.

A validated scale of measurement for perceived political context. Apart from introducing SPO as a new construct for the analysis of protests from a psychological perspective, my work has the practical benefit of also providing a scale of measurement (SPO-R) to evaluate people's perceptions of both government restrictions and police repression against protesters. This scale was validated in two different countries (the UK and Chile) and languages (English and Spanish), enabling researchers to evaluate the mentioned dimensions without the need to create ad hoc items every time. It is also important to note that the SPO-R scale is configured as a bifactor model where the political context can be measured both as a whole as well as considering their components separately (e.g., the government and police). As a consequence of this, SPO-R could be used to measure people's perceptions in different political contexts, weighing the influence of different actors in it.

Highlighting the role of non-participants on supporting protesters' actions. In line with recent advances in the study of collective action (e.g., Selvanathan & Lickel, 2019a, 2019b; Stuart et al., 2018) and the idea of exploring the impact of crowds on those who are not part of them (see Neville & Reicher, 2018, for a discussion), my work stresses the importance of non-participants for protests. Building on previous research into non-participants' support for violent actions (i.e., Thomas & Louis, 2014), my approach is the first in exploring the effect of the perceived political context on this support, as well as focusing the attention on protesters' violence against the police. I have also argued that

in several political contexts (e.g., the UK), non-participants may back violence against the police based on the perceived legitimacy public opinion gives to protests. Consequently, non-participants may use diverse sources of information (e.g., social media, newspapers, television) regarding protests before supporting (or opposing) protesters' actions.

Non-participants' support for protest violence as a dynamic phenomenon. As ESIM describes what happens to actual protesters (see Drury & Reicher, 2000; Drury & Reicher, 2005; Drury & Reicher, 2018, for a review), my work shows that non-participants' support for violence depends on the interaction between protesters and the police, as well as on the conditions set by authorities regarding protests. The latter represents an extension of the ESIM's scope if we consider that non-participants may agree with protest violence when they perceive authorities are restricting or violating what people consider the legitimate right to protest.

Moreover, my work also contributes to knowing that non-participants may conceptualise protest violence as a relational phenomenon which legitimacy may change according to the perceived context where protests take place (i.e., imposed restrictions) and who is considered the main aggressor (protesters or police officers). This idea challenges the arguments included in a plethora of psychological research which assumes that non-violent and violent actions in protests are mutually exclusive (e.g., Becker & Tausch, 2015; Sweetman et al., 2019; Tausch et al., 2011; Wright et al., 1990), and that protest must be peaceful to ensure non-participants' support (e.g., Orazani & Leidner, 2019a, 2019b; Thomas & Louis, 2014). Thus, what I have offered here is an explanation based

on the idea that facing a situation where the right to protest is restricted and the police attack protesters, non-participants may agree with protest violence even though they initially disagree with this type of action. It worth noting that to reconcile these contradictory ideas about protesters' violence, people use the term 'self-defence' when they consider necessary that protesters take actions against the restrictions imposed by authorities.

Perceived legitimacy given by others and own opinions. This work also expands the understanding of perceived legitimacy given to protests in three different ways. First, it considers public opinion as a source of legitimacy of protest through the use of meta-perceptions (people's perceptions of other people thoughts about protests). The inclusion of public opinion represents an advance in the analyses of protests because it enables to measure the value that people think the society gives to protests beyond own opinions as has mostly described until now (e.g., Chayinska et al., 2017). Second, my work considers people's evaluation of protests as political acts of worth, independently of the cognitive reactions people may have to protesters' actions (e.g., Sweetman et al., 2019), and the perceived efficacy of certain groups in reaching their expected goals (e.g., Jiménez-Moya et. al., 2019). Third, the evidence suggests the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protest maintains different types of relationship within the perceived political context. On the one hand, people may perceive that public opinion's legitimisation of protests directly correlates with the authorities' measures concerning protests (i.e., alignment hypothesis). On the other hand, people perceive that public opinion may grant legitimacy to protests when authorities try to restrict protesters' actions (i.e., resistance hypothesis).

Solidarity with protesters as a mechanism of support for protesters' self-defence. My work provides evidence that may help to expand the scope of the political solidarity model of social change (Subašić et al., 2008). Thus, I suggest that apart from encouraging people to join collective action on behalf of minority groups (Saab et al., 2015; Subašić et al., 2018), solidarity may act as a mechanism people can draw upon for upholding protesters' self-defence actions in a political context hostile to protests. In other words, non-participants may use high-order categories (e.g., 'protesters are human beings like me') to create a bond with those people whose right to protest is threatened and suffer from authorities' arbitrary actions.

Moreover, the results reported in Chapter 5 (Saavedra & Drury, 2019c) includes two new elements non-participants might consider before showing solidarity with those who protest in the streets. First, solidarity with protesters is directly related to non-participants' own opinions regarding protests. Indeed, this relation may be stronger when people perceive that public opinion delegitimises protests. Second, non-participants would show solidarity with protesters in their political context (British students) when public opinion is aligned with the restrictions authorities impose on protests. Thus, people may feel solidarity with protesters in 'resistance' to authorities and public opinion delegitimization of protests. Conversely, when protests take place in a different political context (Catalonia), non-participants may show solidarity with protesters in 'resistance' to authorities' measures but aligned with their public opinion which legitimates protests.

6.3 Practical implications

In line with previous research on collective action (see Drury & Reicher 2018; Drury et al., 2012) my work extends the idea that protest violence is not mindless, it follows specific patterns, and in particular, that non-participants are aware of these features as active readers of collective action. To be precise, I demonstrated that similarly to what happens with actual protesters, non-participants may back protesters' violence against police officers (as self-defence) in situations where authorities threaten the right to protest and police actions are perceived as illegitimate. Also, I provided evidence on how non-participants may support protesters' self-defence actions in solidarity with those protesters who face a hostile political context. Consequently, in this section, I will describe some of the implications my research may have practically.

The role of the government and the police. As was described in previous chapters, people's perception of their political context as open or restricted to protests is a crucial factor for non-participants' support for protesters' violence. Therefore, rather than restricting protesters' activities, authorities must focus their efforts on actively facilitating the presence of protests in the streets and keep strict control over the actions of police officers during demonstrations (e.g., Geneva Academy, 2014; Reicher et al., 2007; Stott, 2009). Otherwise, non-participants may think the authorities are potential enemies that need to or deserve to be attacked by protesters.

From a different point of view, in the event that protesters need to confront a hostile context, both authorities and the police may lose legitimacy in front of non-participants.

Thus, both the government and the police have to consider their legitimacy is not automatically granted and the actions they take against or in favour of protesters may change the extent that non-participants agree with protest violence. The latter is essential considering that in democratic regimes authorities have the duty of ensuring that people can exercise the right to protest and any measure aimed at restricting this right may be considered an attack on democratic rights as well as an attempt to maintain the status quo on behalf of the political and economic establishment.

Moreover, I suggest there are three potential outcomes for which both political authorities and the police must not restrict the right to protest based on the premises that crowds are inherently violent and agents of public disorder. First, it has the potential to create a political environment where non-participants may perceive that people like them are not allowed to have their say, and therefore, the actions protesters can use may be reduced to violent acts against the police. Second, similarly to what recent research has reported regarding the spread of riots (Drury et al., in press), the situation described above could help to propagate an escalation of protest violence where people may back protest violence through a psychological mechanism of solidarity with those in the streets and disapproval of authorities' actions. Third, protest violence is rare, and its occurrence does not necessarily involve the entire crowd or protest event. Thus, if authorities implement measures aimed to avoid the actions of specific groups (i.e., conflictual minority) to all protesters without distinction, it may encourage non-participants to support violence against the police considering the vast majority of protesters are suffering from arbitrary measures which restrict people's right to protest. Hence, policing protest needs to be selective (Reicher et al., 2007), not only to maintain police legitimacy in the eyes of protesters but also considering non-participants and public opinion.

Role of public opinion. Public opinion is one of the sources from which non-participants may get an idea about the norms regarding protests, their legitimacy, and the type of actions other people support or not. In practical terms, I think that scholars, authorities, and journalists need to stop considering public opinion as an entity with immutable ideas. Although I am aware the latter conception probably derives from the extensive use of quantitative surveys by media communications, governments, and other organizations with the objective of knowing people's opinion about some specific topics (e.g., political preferences, voting intention). I argue, however, that this paradigm should be challenged to account for the political context people (and protesters) have to face. In other words, I suggest that to know other people's opinions about protests and protest violence, people need to be asked about the specific (or at least an imaginary) context where these political actions take place. Consequently, we must understand that people's opinions on these topics may change according to the political conditions that protesters have to face.

Moreover, in the analysis of public opinion regarding protests, academics and practitioners must take into account that non-participants may not always perceive that other people grant legitimacy to protesters' actions when authorities impose restrictions on the right to protest (resistance hypothesis). Indeed, as it was demonstrated in other chapters, people may also perceive that public opinion is aligned with the government and police restrictions on protests (alignment hypothesis). The latter could mean that public opinion is framed in concordance with the political establishment, and therefore, protesters and their actions run the risk of being vilified by non-participants.

Consequently, along with considering the political conditions where protests take place, we need to consider the reasons that make people think public opinion can go against (or not) authorities' restrictions.

Media coverage of protests and protest violence. Nowadays, media coverage and new technologies (e.g., internet) are vital sources from which people can get an idea about protests and those who participate in them (see McGarty, Thomas, Lala, Smith, & Bliu, 2014, for a discussion). Thus, through media outlets, people can get an idea of public opinion regarding protests and the actions protesters carry out in the streets. However, this involves two main issues. One of these concerns the invocation of public opinion in media coverage and the other concerns the approach used to frame protests. Regarding the first of these problems, public opinion can be depicted in different forms - through survey polls, statements by reporters and officials, or the generalisation of some bystanders' views (McLeod & Hertog, 1992). The problem with many of these characterisations of public opinion is they can be inaccurate, or mere manipulations aimed at demonising protests and protesters.

The second problem, framing of protests, is related to the paradigm of protest (Chan & Lee, 1984; McLeod 2007). In short, this means that media coverage may negatively affect people's ideas (e.g., non-participants) by making them see protesters as outsiders (i.e., setting a division line between protesters and the whole society), and putting excessive emphasis on 'radical' actions (e.g., protest violence against the police) carried out by protesters (Lee, 2014).

Taking into account the significant influence media outlets have over public opinion, I think there are some things scholars and practitioners interested in protests can do to help non-participants have less biased representations of protesters' actions. First, it is necessary to publicly criticise the idea of 'mob mentality' as a concept used to delegitimate crowds (e.g., protests) and the actions carried out by a collective. Thus, scholars should claim through different media outlets that people in crowds are guided by a specific logic which responds to the contextual political conditions people need to confront. In line with this, it will be necessary to state that violence is not inherently attached to crowds. Instead, violence should be conceptualised as a situational behaviour people may use to cope with both police transgressions and government restrictions to the right to protest.

Another critical aspect that scholars interested in collective action may reinforce to resist misrepresentations about protests is that protest violence can appear and disappear during a single event. Thus, protesters could alternate between different actions to confront restrictions imposed by authorities or other groups (e.g., counter-protesters). Therefore, scholars should point that many reports on protesters' actions released through media outlets (e.g., use of violence against the police) may be only partial snapshots that not necessarily represent neither the whole protest nor show the reasons protesters considered to carry out those behaviours. In other words, those who research collective action must help to demystify media coverage of crowd events, as protests, and the use of violence during them.

Finally, considering that the description bias in media coverage of protests varies depending on both the editorial positions and closeness of media owners with the elites, I think that scholars should promote the use of alternative and independent press coverage of protests in their analyses. Thus, getting diverse sources of information regarding the same event would help to get a less biased story of the actions carried out by protesters, the rationale behind them, and the interaction amongst protesters, police officers, and counter-protesters.

6.4 Limitations and future research

In this section, I will discuss some limitations that need to be taken into account to assess the impact of the contributions reported throughout the chapters. In addition, I will include some suggestions that future research may consider to either address these limitations or expanding the scope of this work.

Regarding the SPO-R scale, it is necessary to mention three main limitations; two theoretical and one methodological. In terms of theory, the items for this scale were worded in negative terms. In other words, they directly measure the perceived level of restrictions instead of the perceived level of openness a political context may show about protests. Considering that the sociological basis which inspired the scale is referred to the acceptance of social movements and that few restrictions to protests do not necessarily mean an open political context, I suggest that in the future a new scale aimed to evaluate authorities' capability to facilitate protesters' actions (see Chapter 2). Thus, a version of the scale focus on the facilitation of protests (SPO-F) should be compared with SPO-R in the same context to evaluate their similarities/discrepancies.

Another theoretical issue related to SPO-R scale is the number of actors that might shape the perceived contextual conditions regarding protests. Even though in Chapter 2 we clarified that the dimensions proposed to be part of subjective political openness (SPO) were chosen following advances in sociology and political science, we are aware that considering only the government and the police is a very limited approach that cannot explain the whole variability of an actual political context. To address this issue, I propose that based on existing theoretical and empirical works, researchers should take advantage of SPO-R's multidimensional nature and modular design to focus their efforts on testing new dimensions that might help to get a more elaborate description of how restricted/open a political context is regarding protests. As a first step, I suggest that researchers should include evaluations of the reference groups mentioned by Neidhardt and Rucht (1991). Thus, for example, it would be interesting to know if along with the government and the police, people may consider other elements (e.g., the legal system and media coverage of protest) to get a more accurate picture of their political context.

Despite how trying to include new dimensions may appear an appealing and challenging task, follow-up research should take into account Gamson and Meyer's (1996) criticism of political opportunities (the approach which inspired SPO) when they point out that almost everything might be considered as part of the political milieu. Consequently, I suggest that the process to add new dimensions for SPO must be based on both strong theoretical arguments and empirical evidence to avoid the paradox of accounting for everything without addressing anything at all.

With respect to the methodological limitation of the SPO-R scale, despite all the advantages of its configuration as bifactor model, it is still true that this type of model involves a real challenge for new projects aimed at including the perceived political context in the analysis of collective action. Thus, even though psychological research has reconsidered the utility of bifactor models and researchers can rely on powerful statistical packages (e.g., Mplus, Stata, R) to model multidimensional constructs, I think four main difficulties need to be considered for the future development of SPO-R scale (and its derivatives) as a bifactor model. First, because of the predominance of unidimensional models in psychology, a considerable amount of time is required to understand, interpret, and explain adequately multidimensional constructs (see Bonifay, Lane, & Reise, 2017, for a discussion). In line with this, researchers may need to make an extra effort to demonstrate that a bifactor model configuration is more suitable than a second-order factor model (more well-known in psychology) to represent a construct as SPO (see Chen et al., 2006, for a discussion). However, researchers also need to keep in mind that bifactor models sometimes may 'artificially' appear as the best choice due to their tendency to overfit to diverse patterns of data (Bonifay & Cai, 2017).

A second difficulty related to the use of bifactor models is they are not easy to set up, which could result in anomalous estimates due to misspecifications (Markon, 2019). Although some scholars have published handy guidelines to help other researchers in the processes of coding and testing this type of model (e.g., Biderman, 2013), the expertise required to set and evaluate specific parameters associated with a bifactor model sometimes may go far beyond the statistical skills most psychologists have. In addition to the necessary technical expertise, the special procedures required to calculate the statistical power and required sample size (e.g., Montecarlo simulations), as well as the

internal reliability of a multidimensional construct (i.e., Omega coefficients) are reasons that may discourage the use of bifactors models in general, and the development of SPO-R in particular.

A third difficulty researchers might find in expanding the scope of SPO-R is related to testing measurement invariance for bifactor models. Thus, complexities associated with bifactor models impede that scale comparison across countries becoming an automatized process using statistical tools, or that can be carried out following guidelines thought for unidimensional constructs.

A fourth difficulty researchers need to cope with in the future development of SPO-R is the large sample size required to calculate bifactors models. Considering the complexity of a proposed model (i.e., number of dimensions and indicators per dimension), the required sample size to test inferences using a bifactor model is larger than those models involving only unidimensional constructs. The latter appears especially important when bifactor constructs are considered as mediators (see Gonzalez & MacKinnon, 2016).

Although the difficulties mentioned above are serious, by any means, they should not be considered fatal or impossible to address by future research. Indeed, the main objective to list them is to provide as much information as I can to allow other researchers to make informed decisions on what they must bear in mind to expand the scope of SPO-R scale. To solve most of the limitations mentioned above there are resources already available on conducting Montecarlo simulations using bifactor models with different types of data (e.g., Muthén & Muthén, 2009), calculating all versions of Omega coefficients (e.g.,

Rodriguez, Reise, & Haviland, 2016), and testing measurement invariance in bifactor models (Yap et al., 2014).

As it was mentioned in previous chapters, one of the main shortcomings of this research is that all the empirical studies were conducted in Western democratic countries, the UK and Chile. Despite the fact these countries have a different tradition of protest as well as divergent policing approaches to deal with protesters (see Chapters 2 and 3, for a discussion), their societies and political regimes were, and currently are, aligned with both Western cultural values and Western ideals of democracy. Hence, it is possible to argue that in the UK and Chile, people may consider the right to protest as something inherently attached to their political systems, as well as something authorities must guarantee for everyone. To tackle this limitation, I suggest that SPO-R scale need to be validated, and the other reported studies replicated, in Eastern countries/cities with a long tradition of protests and diverse political regimes throughout their history as Japan, South Korea (e.g., Kim, 2017), and Hong Kong (e.g., Lee & Chan, 2018).

Indeed, I think Hong Kong represents a unique challenge to the study of the perceived political conditions where protests take place considering the struggles its inhabitants have to go through under the 'one country, two systems' policy implemented after the British hand-over in 1997.

Even though Hongkongers never got full democratic rights while the city was a British colony, they enjoyed more political freedom than those who lived in Mainland China, especially after the establishment of People's Republic of China (Tsang, 2007). This

situation allowed Hongkongers to maintain their long traditions of protests and demonstrations, being the annual rally to commemorate Tiananmen Square massacre (1989) one of the most iconic collective actions of the city. However, since their reunification with the mainland, local activists have denounced an increasing interference of the Chinese central government in their local political affairs. These interferences represent a masked violation of the Sino-British agreement which guarantees that Hong Kong would maintain its own governmental, legal, and economic system at least until 2047.

According to activists and local politicians (see Bland, 2018) the main consequences of the growing influence of Chinese government in Hong Kong political affairs are the arbitrary restrictions imposed on the press, as well as to the rights to protest and freedom of assembly. The latter becomes especially important after the world learned about two main issues of Hong Kong's current political context regarding protests. First, some of those who took part as activists and opinion leaders in the most well-known collective action after the reunification, the Umbrella Movement (2014), were prosecuted and recently convicted to jail (see Lau & Lok-kei, 2019). Second, at the time of writing, Hongkongers have been carrying out street protests against their local government for months. Initially, people demanded the Legislative Council of Hong Kong to withdraw a bill allowing the extradition of Hong Kong citizens prosecuted for allegedly political offences to Mainland China. However, authorities' unresponsiveness to this demand, protests ban, and police brutality made protesters increase their demands to five: the complete withdrawal of the extradition bill; that authorities don't use the word 'riots' to refer to the protests; the unconditional release of arrested protesters; an independent inquiry into police brutality during protests; and the implementation of the universal

suffrage (Rourke, 2019). It worth noting that in their almost daily protests, Hongkongers have carried out both non-violent and violent actions to complain against authorities and defend themselves from indiscriminate arrests and police brutality against protesters. In fact, onsite research has shown that a large portion of protesters backs protest violence to confront police brutality and pressure the government (Lee, Tang, Yuen, & Cheng, 2019).

Taking into account the antecedents mentioned above, I propose research should put more attention to the changing (and more restricted) political context that Hongkongers are facing. In particular, I suggest that researching non-participants' views on protests may help us to understand better Hongkongers' reactions to the increasing restrictions on the right to protest and their support for protesters' actions.

Another scenario that further research on perceived political context may focus on is Singapore. In contrast to the situation in Hong Kong, Singapore is already a restricted scenario to protests (see Tan, 2017). Despite being declared a parliamentary democracy, protests and other public demonstrations were legally banned for a long time. Nevertheless, since a couple of decades ago, the Singaporean authorities started a rather slow process of political reforms which main outcome was the authorisation of rallies and demonstrations within the city-state. Although the current legislation allows people to have their say, there are still many restrictions that may make it difficult for Singaporeans' real participation in politics as well in collective action (see Sin, 2017). These restrictions are related to who can organize (i.e., only Singaporean citizens) and participate (i.e., only Singaporean citizens and permanent residents) in demonstrations; the venue where people can meet (i.e., only at the Speakers' Corners); and the topics can be addressed during the

events (e.g., discussion about religious topics are not allowed). Although Singaporeans do not have a tradition of protests (protests in this city-state are scarce), I encourage other researchers to put attention on the evolution of these liberalisation measures concerning protests and evaluate people's reactions to these new policies longitudinally.

Although the suggestions mentioned above may sound very attractive, it seems essential to point out three issues scholars have to consider before studying the perceived political context regarding protests in any of these places. First, none of these places represents an Eastern culture free from the pervasive influence of Western culture (and its ideals of democracy) making difficult to talk about 'pure' political systems that respond to the needs of a specific society (e.g., East Asian cultures). Therefore, I encourage other researchers to be aware that they may often find overlapped and even contradictory ideas within political systems that for various reasons (and in different proportions) have merged Western political ideals with Eastern cultural values and traditions.

Closely related to the idea described above is the second issue, Western bias. Even though studies carried out in WEIRD (Western Educated Industrialized and Democratic) countries are over-represented in the current literature on collective action, researchers should keep in mind that seeking samples worldwide just for the sake of confirming results obtained in America or Europe is counterproductive. Indeed, the main reason to avoid mere replications is that, unlike other phenomena, protests are historically situated, respond to particular political dynamics as well as to specific cultural values. Hence, to avoid simplistic judgments on political systems organized in a different fashion than in Western countries, researchers need to delve into the political history of the countries

where the projects are carried out, knowing the predominant societal values, and avoid excessive criticism of those features do not fit with the Western ideals of democracy (see van Zomeren, 2018, for a discussion). To put it differently, instead of trying to 'force' generalizations of certain political traits or orientations inspired by Western politics, future research on perceived political scenarios should adapt its aims, instruments, and procedures to the specific contexts where research projects are carried out.

A third issue is on the establishment of cross-cultural research on collective action considering the perceived political context where protests take place. In general terms, I agree with van Zomeren's idea (2019) on the core motivations for collective action (i.e., group identification, group-based anger, group efficacy beliefs, and moral convictions) are context-sensitive, and therefore, the importance of each of them would be a function of the features offered by the cultural and political systems. In line with this, I suggest the same rationale should be applied to the study of the perceived political context about protests through subjective political openness (SPO). Thus, it worth noting that each of the current and potential dimensions that may account for people's perceptions of the scenario protesters need to face can be more or less salient depending on the political regime; the sort of relationship between different authorities involved in policing protest; and the cultural value given to protests.

Moreover, I also think the same rationale mentioned above should be considered to the study of non-participants' support for protest violence. As it was mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4, support for protesters' violence depends on both the perceptions of the immediate political context and the repertoire of protests available in a specific time and place.

Therefore, if researchers are interested in carrying out cross-cultural psychology on collective action, they must bear in mind that protesters' (actual and potential) actions may (or not) be aligned with the Western norm that protests must be peaceful.

Another significant limitation of my studies is the use of vignettes to depict the political context where protests take place. Besides those limitations mentioned in Chapters 3 and 4 regarding the difficulties our study participants may have had to engage with a fictional scenario, it is necessary to specify an additional issue related to the use of vignettes. Although vignettes provide a useful method to depict a general overview of the political context about protests, vignettes cannot realistically simulate either modification in the measures that authorities (i.e., the government and the police) implement to facilitate/restrict protesters' actions or the occurrence of protest violence. In other words, vignettes cannot capture the dynamic of protests concerning the actions carrying out by neither protesters nor authorities. Although in Chapter 5 I tried to solve this problem combining the use of vignettes and videos to characterise the political context, I suggest that future research should include other resources that make possible displaying changes in the dynamic of protests. Thus, for example, researchers will need to select and develop footage where participants can see changes in the interaction between the police and protesters, or photo sequences in which protest violence occurs and then stops or disappears. The latter becomes crucial for the analysis of protests and collective action in general, once researchers consider that violence does not necessarily occur over a whole protest and protesters may alternate the type of actions they perform in a single event. In other words, I suggest that in the short-term, the study about the influence of perceived political context on non-participants' support for protest violence should follow the ideas proposed in the multimodal reading of public protests (Day et al., 2018). Thus, researchers

should focus their efforts on accounting for the shifts regarding the use of violence that may occur in a single protest event, how these shifts are represented in both public opinion and authorities' narratives about the (il)legitimacy of protests and on the abandonment of the (pervasive) binary non-violent-violent categorization of protests.

Finally, I suggest that assuming the perspective described above may also help to address a topic the interviewees pointed in Chapter 4, backing protesters' violence against the police would depend on who is the main aggressor. Thus, I may argue that the use of footage or other resources showing the dynamic of a protest might allow comparison of people's reactions to violence initiated by protesters prior to any police action with those reactions to protesters' violence when police officers act as the main aggressors (i.e., self-defence). Although by any means this implies that protesters' violence in the absence of a direct provocation is mindless, this type of study can be useful to delimit better our understanding on what people consider as (il)legitimate self-defence actions.

6.5 Conclusions

All the studies included in this thesis stress the importance of non-participants as well as the integration of the (perceived) political context into the psychological analysis of collective action. Indeed, the introduction of a new construct, subjective political openness (SPO), is a contribution that allows researchers to include features of the political structure (government restrictions and perceived repression) in their analysis of protesters' actions. It is also noteworthy that SPO implies a step in creating a bridge between sociological research on social movements and psychological research in

collective action that may help to merge different levels of analysis (e.g., macro, meso, and microsystems) avoiding unnecessary parallelisms.

Moreover, my analyses reveal that non-participants' support for the use of violence against the police is based on a similar rationale to that of actual protesters when they support or carry out protest violence. In other words, both the perceived political context (created by authorities' restrictions) and the dynamic of protests (the interactions among protesters and the police) would be the reference points for people's evaluations on their support for protesters' violence against the police. Thus, non-participants may conceptualise pushing back or even fighting police officers as self-defence actions when people perceive the government trying to restrict the right to protest and police arbitrarily beating or arresting protesters. Consequently, my research shows that non-participants may conceive protest violence as situational and relational phenomena which should not be reduced to explanations based on either personal traits, ideological orientations, or to the irrationality and dangerousness classically attributed to crowds.

Another significant aspect addressed in this thesis is the role of public opinion as a source of legitimacy of protests. In other words, my research contributes to knowing how non-participants might perceive the relevance that protests have for other people beyond their own opinions. This contribution is a valuable insight taking into account that through the use of meta-perceptions researchers may get an idea of the importance protest may have for a specific society. Also, I provide evidence on the existence of a link between non-participants' perceived restrictions by authorities and the perceived legitimacy given by others to protests. Therefore, it would be plausible that people may use both sources of

information to get an idea about the situation protesters have to face and make a decision on granting (or not) support for protesters' self-defence actions.

Having mentioned the contribution related to the perceived legitimacy given by public opinion to protests, its influence on people's solidarity with protesters in restricted scenarios needs to be highlighted as well. Thus, I suggest that solidarity with protesters may be differentially activated according to both own opinions on protests and the extent to which non-participants perceive public opinion legitimates the protests organised by some specific groups. Likewise, I provide evidence that solidarity with protesters acts as a mechanism that allows non-participants to back protesters' self-defence actions in scenarios where the authorities restrict protests and public opinion may either follow or resist these measures.

Undoubtedly, and for the sake of democracy, protests will continue to take place worldwide. Accordingly, researchers need to be aware of the political conditions under which these protests take place, the occurrence of protest violence, as well as of the dynamics of protests that make non-participants back protesters' violence against the police. Indeed, I think that scholars must focus their efforts on understanding the political trajectories and historical repertoire of protests of a specific society before analysing and make a judgement over the occurrence of protest violence and the support it can gain from non-participants. I firmly believe that the two main effects of these efforts would be that those who use (and support) violence against the police during protests were not immediately vilified because of their actions and thoughts, and second, that future

research in non-Western countries would be less affected by Western ideals of democracy.

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Non-participants' support for protest violence: the role of the perceived political context

Volume 2 of 2

by

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BSc Psychology (Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile)

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Contents (Volume 2)

Appendix 1: Online questionnaire (English) for Chapter 2 Study 1

Validation of Subjective Political Openness Scale (SPO)

Information and Consent

Dear participant,

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.

This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to compare the opinion of young people from different cultures (UK and Chile) about social movements and some activities associated to them as marches and protests. The main purpose of this study is to validate a scale of measurement that analyses people's opinions about these topics considering those individual and contextual factors that could affect the development of these thoughts.

We hope you will take part in this study, and to do so, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, till the point that the report of this project is drawn up.

Please take into account that if you decide to participate or not in our study, it will have no impact on your marks, assessments, or future studies.

Your participation will consist of completing an online questionnaire specially designed for this study; it keeps measures of comparability with the instrument used in Chile by people of your same age. Your data will be kept confidential, and your answers will not be able to link with your contact details at any level. Completing the questionnaire **should not take you more than 25 minutes**. After that, you are welcome to ask questions about the project by contacting the researchers.

Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will be able to choose between receiving 2 credits, or entering in a prize draw (£45) as a reward for the time dedicated to this project. You should bear in mind that your odds of winning the draw are shared with those of the other participants (250 more or less).

Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people about the social movements, and contrast it with the thoughts of people of your same age from another country. The latter will be able to extend the knowledge and understanding

of this topic considering the cultural differences that may exist about it. The results of this study will be used to write academic papers and will be part of a PhD thesis. No identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/2. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in this study please proceed to give your consent.

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an online questionnaire.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

☐ By ticking this box I give my consent to participate in this study.

To start, please enter a valid Sussex email address (just to allocate the reward):

Please, indicate what is your current status at University of Sussex

- ❍ Undergraduate student
- ❍ Master student
- ❍ PhD student
- ❍ None

Thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree.*

	1	2	3	4	5
The government allows people to protest in the street freely.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government values the fact that people express their opinion by participating in marches or protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government believes that the protests are a legitimate act of political expression.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government hinders participation in marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Protests are constantly delegitimised by the current government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The protests are respected and their concerns listened by the government authorities	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government is concerned to guarantee that people can participate in marches and protests without problems	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens' participation in protests is considered as a problem by this government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government considers protests as a threat to its political stability	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The people always should be able to protest itself in the street freely	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I positively value the fact that people express their opinion by participating in marches or protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I think that the protests are a legitimate act of political expression.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Political expressions involving participation in protests should be restricted	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government should hinder participation in marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I am against that people express their discontent by participating in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
From my perspective the protests are not legitimate in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I respect that social movements conduct public activities to express their concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In this country, people participation in marches and protests should be guaranteed	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Protests are a threat for the political stability of own country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the street, please indicate how often are the following situations. For this please use the next scale where 1 is *never*, 2 *rarely*, 3 *sometimes,* 4 *often*, 5 *always*.

	1	2	3	4	5
In this country, the protests are dispersed using violent methods	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police use an indiscriminate violence against the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these are immediately attacked by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in demonstrations usually are persecuted by the police and government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In my country, those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Usually in this country, some people are arrested without any more justification than having participated in a protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When a protest takes place, it is immediately stopped by the police actions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
One of the primary objectives of the police is to prevent the development of any political demonstrations	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the street please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The police can use the violence to break up any kind of protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police have to use force against all participants in a protest when some protestors become violent	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police have to prevent anyone carrying out protests in this country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
All those who participate in protests should be persecuted by the police and government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
If some people are injured by the police during protests it is their own fault	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
It is legitimate that the police arrest people during a march without explanations	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Some people should be arrested without any more justification than having participated in a protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When a protest is carried out, its development should be immediately stopped by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
One of the primary objectives of the police should be preventing the development of any political demonstrations	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Taking into account what people of your country think about the presence of social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of public opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical*.

	1	2	3	4	5
People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The people of my country agree that those whose rights are violated can protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens of my country believe that those who participate in protests are simply criminals whose objective is to destabilise the country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
For the people of my country, those who participate in protests just try to alter the public order	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens of my country conceive that participating in marches and protests is a right that all of us have	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People of my country positively value that citizens express their concerns organizing marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The people of my country think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and protests in your country, please indicate how typical the following statements are of your own opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical*.

	1	2	3	4	5
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
It is fine that people carry out protests even though I do not share the protesters' concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I agree that those whose rights are violated can protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests are simple criminals whose objective is to destabilise the country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests just try to alter the public order	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Participating in marches and protests is a right that all of us have	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I positively value that citizens express their concerns organizing marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the police of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements. For this please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons behind their actions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Generally, the police make decisions based in facts, non in personal opinions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please, indicate your agreement with each of the following statements. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
People like me don't have any say about what the government does	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I don't think public officials care much what people like me think	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People like me can generate social changes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
If I put my mind to it, I would carry out actions to influence the way in what the government make decisions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please, assess each of the following statements about the government actions using the following scale where 1 is *none attention* and 5 *a lot of attention*.

	1	2	3	4	5
How much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social movements claims, when it decides what to do?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social movements claims, when these use the violence?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social movements claims, when these act peacefully?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate your extent of your confidence in each of the political institutions using the following scale where 1 is *none confidence* and 5 a *lot of confidence*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The politicians	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The parliament	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Courts of Justice	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months?

❍ Yes
❍ No

Please indicate how much you value the following groups or social movements, using the next scale where 1 is *nothing* and 5 *a lot*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Student social movements	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those Social movements that support labour claims	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Environmental movements	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those Social movements that support indigenous claims	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those Social movements that support sexual diversity	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Pro-Immigrant movements	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking in the list of social movements that you read before, please indicate which is the most valuable for you:

❍ Student social movements
❍ Those social movements that support labour claims
❍ Environmental movements
❍ Those social movements that support indigenous claims
❍ Those social movements that support sexual diversity
❍ Pro-Immigrant movements

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below referred to the social movement that you selected as the most valuable. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
I feel committed to this movement	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I identify with this movement	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

How old are you?

Sex

- ❍ Female
- ❍ Male
- ❍ Other

What is your nationality?

In which country do you live?

What kind of reward would you prefer for your participation in this study?

- ❍ 2 Credits
- ❍ Enter in a prize draw (£45)

Appendix 2: Online questionnaire (Spanish) for Chapter 2 Study 1

Validación Escala Subjective Political Openness

Carta de consentimiento informado

Usted ha sido invitado a participar en el estudio *"Subjective Political Openness"* a cargo de los investigadores Patricio Saavedra y John Drury de la University of Sussex, Reino Unido, y Roberto González Gutiérrez de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. El objeto de esta carta es ayudarlo a tomar la decisión de participar en la presente investigación.

¿Cuál es el propósito de esta investigación?

Esta investigación forma parte de un proyecto internacional que busca comparar las opiniones que tienen los jóvenes de dos culturas distintas (Reino Unido y Chile) sobre los movimientos sociales y actividades asociadas a estos como son las marchas y protestas. Uno de los objetivos fundamentales de esta investigación es validar que analiza las opiniones que las personas tienen sobre estas temáticas, de tal forma de considerar tanto factores individuales como contextuales que pueden estar influyendo en el desarrollo de estas opiniones.

¿En qué consiste tu participación?

Tu participación consistirá en contestar un cuestionario online especialmente diseñado para este estudio, que mantiene medidas de comparabilidad con las de los otros países participantes del proyecto de investigación. En el cuestionario se te pedirá que indiques tu opinión de la sociedad chilena y la vida en Chile.

¿Cuánto durará tu participación? Tu participación total en el proyecto será de 25 minutos, que es el tiempo que demora contestar el cuestionario online.

¿Qué riesgos corres al participar?

Al participar de este estudio no corres ningún riesgo físico ni psicológico, tanto directa como indirectamente.

¿Qué beneficios puede tener tu participación?

Al contar con una muestra de chilenos como tú, será posible mostrar las opiniones de los jóvenes chilenos sobre los movimientos sociales y compararlas con la de otro país y cultura, lo que permitirá enriquecer el conocimiento, análisis y comprensión de este tema considerando las diferencias de cada uno de los países participantes en este estudio transcultural. Asimismo, entre todos los participantes de este estudio se sorteará un Kindle PaperWhite una vez finalizada la recolección de datos durante abril de 2016.

¿Qué pasa con la información y datos que entregue? Los investigadores mantendrán CONFIDENCIALIDAD con respecto a cualquier información obtenida en este estudio. Así los datos de contacto que el encuestador te solicitará al momento de aceptar participar en este proyecto serán solo con el fin de enviarte el correo con el link que te dirigirá al cuestionario online. El equipo de investigación a cargo resguardará tus datos recopilados en la hoja de reclutamiento sellados en una bodega por un espacio de 5 años, luego de los cuales serán destruidos de tal forma de impedir su divulgación o mal uso. De todas maneras te aseguramos que tu información de contacto no será incluida al momento de consignar los archivos de datos para su análisis, siendo tu encuesta identificable solamente por un número único que se encuentra asociado a tus respuestas mas no a quién lo respondió. Así también se asegura a los participantes que los datos recopilados en este estudio solo serán utilizados para los fines de esta investigación específica.

¿Es obligación participar? ¿Puedo arrepentirme después de participar?

Tú NO estás obligado de ninguna manera a participar en este estudio. Si accedes a participar, puedes dejar de hacerlo en cualquier momento sin repercusión alguna y sin necesidad de justificar tal acción frente al encuestador o al equipo de investigación a cargo del proyecto.

¿A quién puedo contactar para saber más de este estudio o si me surgen dudas?

Teniendo en Si tienes cualquier pregunta acerca de esta investigación, puedes contactar a Patricio Saavedra Morales de la University of Sussex. Su email es P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk Si usted tiene alguna consulta o preocupación respecto a sus derechos como participante de este estudio, puede contactar al Comité Ético Científico

de Ciencias Sociales, Artes y Humanidades. Presidenta: María Elena Gronemeyer. Contacto: eticadeinvestigacion@uc.cl.

Al hacer click en ‘Aceptar’ estarás indicando que has tenido la oportunidad de leer esta declaración de consentimiento informado y ACEPTAS participar en este proyecto. Si, por el contrario, no deseas participar, haz click en ‘Rechazar’.

- ☐ Aceptar
- ☐ Rechazar

Pensando en el gobierno de tu país, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
El gobierno permite que la gente se manifieste libremente en las calles	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno valora que la gente exprese su opinión participando en marchas o protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Para el gobierno las protestas son un acto legítimo de expresión política	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno restringe expresiones políticas que implican la participación en protestas.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno obstaculiza la participación de la gente en marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Este gobierno se opone a que la gente exprese su descontento participando en protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las movilizaciones sociales son constantemente deslegitimadas por parte de este gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las movilizaciones sociales son respetadas por parte de las autoridades de gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno está preocupado de garantizar que la gente pueda participar en marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La participación de los ciudadanos en protestas es vista como un problema por este gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Quiénes participan en protestas son etiquetados como criminales por este gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Este gobierno considera las protestas como una amenaza para su estabilidad	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La gente siempre debería poder manifestarse libremente en las calles	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Valoro positivamente que la gente exprese su opinión participando en marchas o protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Para mí las protestas son acto legítimo de expresión política	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Deberían restringirse expresiones políticas que impliquen la participación en protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno debería obstaculizar la participación de la gente en marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Estoy en contra de que la gente exprese su descontento participando en protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Desde mi punto de vista las protestas carecen de legitimidad en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Respeto que los movimientos sociales lleven a cabo actividades públicas para expresar sus preocupaciones.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En este país se debe garantizar que la gente pueda participar en marchas y protestas.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las protestas son una amenaza para la estabilidad de nuestro país	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Respecto a las protestas y manifestaciones que se llevan a cabo en la vía pública, por favor indica cuan frecuentes son cada una de las siguientes situaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *nunca,* 2 *rara vez,* 3 *a veces*, 4 *frecuentemente, y* 5 *siempre*.

	1	2	3	4	5
En este país las protestas son disueltas utilizando métodos violentos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía utiliza la violencia en forma indiscriminada contra los manifestantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Es difícil llevar a cabo protestas en este país ya que éstas son inmediatamente atacadas por la policía	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Quiénes participan en protestas usualmente son perseguidos por la policía y el gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En mi país aquellos que participan en protestas pueden terminar heridos debido a la violencia desproporcionada utilizada por la policía	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Es usual que en este país algunas personas sean arrestadas sin mayor justificación que haber participado en una protesta	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando una protesta se lleva a cabo su avance es inmediatamente impedido por la policía	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Uno de los objetivos primordiales de la policía es impedir que se desarrollen manifestaciones políticas de cualquier tipo	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Respecto a las movilizaciones sociales y protestas que se llevan a cabo en la vía pública, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones utilizando la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La policía puede utilizar la violencia para disolver cualquier tipo de protesta	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía debe usar la violencia contra todos los participantes en una protesta cuando algunos de ellos se vuelve violentos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía debe dificultar que cualquier persona lleve a cabo protestas en este país	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Quiénes participan en protestas deberían ser perseguidos por la policía y el gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Si algunas personas son heridas por la policía durante las protestas es porque ellas se lo buscan	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Es legítimo que la policía detenga a personas durante una marcha sin darle explicaciones	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las personas deberían ser arrestadas sin mayor justificación por haber participado en una protesta	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando una protesta se lleve a cabo su avance debe ser inmediatamente impedido por la policía	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Uno de los objetivos primordiales de la policía debe ser obstaculizar las manifestaciones políticas de cualquier tipo	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Teniendo en consideración lo que la gente de tu país piensa respecto a la presencia de movilizaciones sociales y protestas, por favor indica cuan típicas de la opinión de tus conciudadanos son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones.

Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy atípica* y 5 *muy típica*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La gente de mi país cree que participar en protestas es una acción política válida	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos creen que está bien que se realicen protestas a pesar de que no compartan las demandas o exigencias de los manifestantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente piensa que es legítimo que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan su vida cotidiana	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las personas de mi país apoyan las protestas de aquellas personas cuyos derechos han sido violados	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos de mi país creen que quienes participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan desestabilizar al país	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos de mi país piensan que quienes participan de las protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad importante en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos de mi país creen que el participar en protestas y marchas es un derecho que todos tenemos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente de mi país valora positivamente que los ciudadanos expresen sus inquietudes organizando marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Teniendo en consideración lo que tú piensas acerca de la presencia de movilizaciones sociales y protestas en tu país, por favor indica cuan típicas de tu opinión personal son las siguientes afirmaciones (1 *muy atípica* y 5 *muy típica*) .

	1	2	3	4	5
Creo que participar en protestas es una acción política válida	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Pienso que está bien que se realicen protestas a pesar de no compartir las demandas o exigencias de los manifestantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Valoro que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan mi vida cotidiana	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Apoyo las protestas de aquellas personas cuyos derechos han sido violados	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Creo que aquellos que participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan desestabilizar al país	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Pienso que aquellos que participan en protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las protestas son una actividad relevante en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Participar en marchas y protestas es un derecho que todos tenemos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Valoro positivamente que los ciudadanos expresen sus inquietudes organizando marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Creo que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Pensando en la policía de tu país, por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
En el transcurso de una protesta la policía siempre utiliza procedimientos que son justos para todos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Durante una protesta la policía siempre explica claramente las razones que se encuentran a la base de sus acciones	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Mientras se desarrolla una protesta la policía tiene la oportunidad de corregir sus decisiones cuando éstas son injustas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En general la policía actúa en una protesta basando sus decisiones en hechos, no en opiniones personales	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La gente como yo no tiene nada que decir acerca lo que el gobierno hace	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
No creo que las autoridades de gobierno se preocupen mucho acerca de lo que piensa la gente como yo	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente como yo puede generar cambios sociales	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Si me lo propongo puedo realizar acciones que influyan en el modo en que el gobierno toma decisiones	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Por favor evalúa cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones con respecto a las acciones del gobierno utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *ninguna atención* y 5 *mucha atención*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a lo que la gente piensa cuando decide lo que tiene hacer?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando decide lo que tiene que hacer?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando estos utilizan la violencia?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o exigencias de los movimientos sociales que se expresan de forma pacífica?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Por favor indica tu grado de confianza hacia las siguientes instituciones políticas utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *ninguna confianza* y 5 *mucha confianza*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Los políticos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El parlamento	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El sistema judicial	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Has participado en marchas, movimientos sociales o protestas durante los últimos 12 meses?:

- ❍ Si
- ❍ No

Por favor indica cuanto valoras los siguientes grupos o movimientos sociales utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *nada* y 5 *mucho*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Movimientos sociales de estudiantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a demandas laborales	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Movimientos sociales ambientalistas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a los pueblos originarios	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a la diversidad sexual	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Movimientos sociales de apoyo a inmigrantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Pensando en la lista de movimientos o grupos que acaba de leer, por favor indique según su opinión personal cual es el que usted más valora:

- ❍ Movimientos sociales de estudiantes
- ❍ Movimientos sociales de apoyo a demandas laborales
- ❍ Movimientos sociales ambientalistas
- ❍ Movimientos sociales de apoyo a los pueblos originarios
- ❍ Movimientos sociales de apoyo a la diversidad sexual
- ❍ Movimientos sociales de apoyo a inmigrantes

Por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones referidas al movimiento que tú seleccionaste como el que más valoras utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Siento un compromiso con el movimiento	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Me identifico con el movimiento	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

¿Cuántos años tienes?

Sexo:

- ❍ Mujer
- ❍ Hombre
- ❍ Otro

¿Cuál es tu nacionalidad?:

¿En qué país vives actualmente?:

Si tienes algún comentario sobre alguna pregunta específica del cuestionario o los temas presentes en éste puedes hacerlo en el espacio que se muestra a continuación. Tu opinión es importante para nosotros.

Por favor, señala si una vez finalizada la investigación quieres recibir un resumen con los resultados generales de la misma en tu correo electrónico:

- ❍ Si
- ❍ No

Appendix 3: Overview of cross-cultural invariance tests for Chapter 2 Study 1

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for government openness.

Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA		Model Comparison
									LL	UL	
M0	4.28	4			.99	.99	.01	.01	.00	.10	
M1	5.03	7	0.74	3	1.00	1.00	.02	.00	.00	.06	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	77.92	10	72.89	3	.82	.79	.10	.17	.13	.20	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M2P	5.10	8	0.07	1	1.00	1.01	.02	.00	.00	.05	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2P-M1
M3P	7.19	10	2.09	2	1.00	1.00	.03	.00	.00	.05	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3P-M2P
M4P	14.77	11	7.57	1	.99	.99	.12	.03	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M4P-M3P

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing partial strong invariance; M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance; and M4P to the model testing the invariance of latent factor (variance).

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for perceived repression.

Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA		Model Comparison
									LL	UL	
M0	5.97	4			.99	.98	.01	.04	.00	.11	
M1	7.78	7	1.81	3	.99	.99	.02	.02	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	87.54	10	79.75	3	.85	.82	.15	.18	.14	.21	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M2P	9.81	8	2.02	1	.99	.99	.03	.03	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2P-M1
M3P	16.45	10	6.64	2	.98	.98	.04	.05	.01	.09	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3P-M2P

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing partial strong invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance.

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for legitimacy of protests (original scale).

Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA		Model Comparison
									LL	UL	
M0	4.26	4			.99	.99	.01	.01	.00	.10	
M1	9.87	7	5.61	3	.99	.98	.05	.04	.00	.09	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	66.73	10	56.85	3	.82	.78	.10	.15	.12	.19	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M2P	10.02	8	0.14	1	.99	.99	.05	.03	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2P-M1
M3P	12.32	10	2.29	2	.99	.99	.03	.03	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3P-M2P
M4P	12.60	11	0.27	1	.99	.99	.03	.02	.00	.07	$\Delta\chi^2$ M4P-M3P
M5P	14.06	12	1.46	1	.99	.99	.05	.02	.00	.07	$\Delta\chi^2$ M5P-M4P

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing partial strong invariance; M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance; M4P to the model testing the invariance of latent factor (variance); and M5P to the model testing the invariance of latent factor (mean).

Appendix 4: Online questionnaire (English) for Chapter 2 Study 2

Validation of Subjective Political Openness Scale 2 (SPO)

Information and Consent

Dear participant,

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully. This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to compare the opinion of young people from different cultures (UK and Chile) about social movements and some activities associated to them as marches and protests. The main purpose of this study is to validate a scale of measurement that analyses people's opinions about these topics considering those individual and contextual factors that could affect the development of these thoughts. We hope you will take part in this study, and to do so, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, till the point that the report of this project is drawn up.

Your participation will consist of completing an online questionnaire specially designed for this study; it keeps measures of comparability with the instrument used in Chile by people of your same age. Your data will be kept confidential, and your answers will not be able to link with your contact details at any level. **Completing the questionnaire should not take you more than 35 minutes.** After that, you are welcome to ask questions about the project by contacting the researchers. **Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will receive (£0.75) as a reward for the time dedicated to this project.**

Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people about the social movements, and contrast it with the thoughts of people of your same age from another country. The latter will be able to extend the knowledge and understanding of this topic considering the cultural differences that may exist about it. The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD thesis. No identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is **ER/PS356/5.** The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study. If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk). Thank

you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in this study please proceed to give your consent.

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an online questionnaire. I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

Consent:

- ❍ By ticking this box I give my consent to participate in this study.

Thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree.*

	1	2	3	4	5
The government allows people to protest in the street freely	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government uses the law to stop protests taking place	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government openly threatens all those who takes part in protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government hinders participation in marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government considers those who participate in protests as enemies of the state	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens' participation in protests is considered as a problem by this government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government considers protests as a threat to its political stability	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The people always should be able to protest itself in the street freely	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I positively value the fact that people express their opinion by participating in marches or protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I think that the protests are a legitimate act of political expression.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To maintain order on the streets, the government should forbid protest and demonstrations	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government should hinder participation in marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I am against that people express their discontent by participating in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
From my perspective the protests are not legitimate in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I respect that social movements conduct public activities to express their concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the streets of the UK, please indicate how often are the following situations. For this please use the next scale where 1 is *never*, 2 *rarely*, 3 *sometimes*, 4 *often*, 5 *always*.

	1	2	3	4	5
In this country, the protests are dispersed using violent methods	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police uses an indiscriminate violence against the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these are immediately attacked by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To disperse a protest, police officers commonly hit demonstrators	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In my country, those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Usually in this country, some people are arrested without any more justification than having participated in a protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In my country, people are afraid to participate in protests because of police behaviour	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Considering your PERSONAL OPINION about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the street please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The police should use the violence to break up any kind of protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police have to use force against all participants in a protest when some protestors become violent	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police should hit demonstrators to maintain public order	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police should disperse any protest to protect private property	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
If some people are injured by the police during protests it is their own fault	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
It is legitimate that the police arrest people during a march without explanations	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police force should stop and search any person on a protest because 'If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear'	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Taking into account WHAT PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY think about the presence of social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of public opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical*.

	1	2	3	4	5
People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Citizens of my country believe that those who participate in protests are simply criminals whose objective is to destabilise the country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
For the people of my country, those who participate in protests just try to alter the public order	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The people of my country think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The people of my country think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Continuing with WHAT PEOPLE OF YOUR COUNTRY think about the presence of social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of public opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Protests are a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Demonstrations are fine even if they are inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Protesters are simply criminals who threaten the stability of this country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Demonstrators are threat to public order	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Protests are an important part of our democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Protests are a necessary feature of our democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and protests in your country, please indicate how typical the following statements are of your own opinion. For this, use the next scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical*.

	1	2	3	4	5
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests are simple criminals whose objective is to destabilise the country	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests just try to alter the public order	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Participating in marches and protests is a right that all of us have	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I positively value that citizens express their concerns organizing marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I think that demonstrations are a necessary activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests are outsiders who know nothing about democracy	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People who take part in demonstrations just want more rights but they need to learn about responsibilities	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Protests are just an excuse to commit crimes against the private property	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you expressed above are mainly based on....?

- ❍ Your personal experience
- ❍ What you have heard from members of your family
- ❍ What you have heard from your friends
- ❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Thinking about the police of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements. For this please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons behind their actions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Generally, the police make decisions based in facts, non in personal opinions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please, assess each of the following statements about the government actions using the following scale where 1 is *none attention* and 5 *a lot of attention*.

	1	2	3	4	5
How much attention do you feel the government pays to what the people think when it decides what to do?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social movements claims, when it decides what to do?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social movements claims, when these use the violence?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
How much attention do you feel the government pays to social movements claims, when these act peacefully?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate your extent of confidence in these institutions using the following scale where 1 is *none confidence* and 5 *a lot of confidence*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The politicians	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The parliament	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Courts of Justice	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The press	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Now thinking about the British government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job?

- ❍ 1 Extremely dissatisfied
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Extremely satisfied

How represented do you feel by the British government?

- ❍ 1 Totally unrepresented
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Totally represented

Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months?

- ❍ Yes
- ❍ No

In a context of a protest (AS A PROTESTER OR JUST AS A BYSTANDER), have you experienced some of the followings situations during the last 12 months? Mark all those corresponding.

	Yes
Been hit by police water cannons	❍
Been hit by police officers	❍
Witnessed police officers hitting demonstrators	❍
Been arrested without a clear explanation by police officers	❍
Witnessed arbitrary arrests	❍
Been exposed to the police tear gas	❍

In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by protesters justified?

	1	2	3	4	5
When the police hit protesters without provocation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police uses water cannons and tear gas against the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When the police acts to stop a peaceful protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police treat protesters as common criminals	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police hurt people not directly involved in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police officers stop some protesters to check their identities and search them	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by the police justified?

	1	2	3	4	5
When protesters attack the police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When some demonstrators participate in looting	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police officers think that someone is suspected of participating in riots	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police officers think that someone is suspected of being part of an anarchist group	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When the protesters disrespect police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When the protesters disobey orders given by police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When protesters throw stones or other objects at police force	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When protesters hurt people not directly involved in the protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

How old are you?

Sex:

- ❍ Female
- ❍ Male
- ❍ Other

What is your nationality?

In which country do you live?

Which of these activities best describes what you are doing at the present?

- ❍ Full time work
- ❍ Part time work
- ❍ Not working
- ❍ House person
- ❍ Retired
- ❍ Unemployed
- ❍ Student/full time education
- ❍ Other

Please could you select the option which best represents your total income in the last 12 months, before any deductions for tax, etc.

- ❍ No income
- ❍ Under £2,500
- ❍ £2,500-£4,999
- ❍ £5,000-£9,999
- ❍ £10,000-£14,999
- ❍ £15,000-£19,999
- ❍ £20,000-£24,999
- ❍ £25,000-£29,999
- ❍ £30,000-£34,999
- ❍ £35,000-£39,999
- ❍ £40,000-£44,999
- ❍ £45,000-£49,999
- ❍ £50,000-£74,999
- ❍ £75,000-£99,999
- ❍ £100,000 or more

Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the police service?

- ❍ Yes, me
- ❍ Yes, a family member
- ❍ Yes, a close friend
- ❍ No

How interested would you say you are in politics?

- ❍ Not, at all interested
- ❍ Hardly, interested
- ❍ Quite interested
- ❍ Very interested

How often do you follow politics in the news on television, on the radio, or in the daily papers?

- ❍ Never
- ❍ Once or twice a week
- ❍ Several times a week
- ❍ Every day

How often do you talk about politics with.....

	Never	Once or twice a week	Several times	Every day
your family?	❍	❍	❍	❍
friends?	❍	❍	❍	❍
co-workers or classmates?	❍	❍	❍	❍

In the UK, there are different ways of trying to improve things or help prevent things from getting worse. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Please, mark your answer in the appropriate column for each activity.

	Yes	No
I contacted a politician, government or local government official	❍	❍
I was active in a political party or action group	❍	❍
I was active in another organisation or association (different to political party or action groups	❍	❍
I wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	❍	❍
I signed a petition	❍	❍
I took part in demonstrations	❍	❍
I boycotted certain products	❍	❍
I attended a political meeting or rally?	❍	❍
I expressed political views on social media	❍	❍
I donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity	❍	❍

In politics people sometimes talk of ‘left’ and ‘right’. Please, indicate where would you place yourself on this scale, where 1 means *extreme left* and 7 means *extreme right*?

- ❍ 1 Extreme left
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5
- ❍ 6
- ❍ 7 Extreme right

Appendix 5: Online questionnaire (Spanish) for Chapter 2 Study 2

Segunda Validación Escala Subjective Political Openness

Carta de consentimiento de informado

Usted ha sido invitado a participar en el estudio 'Subjective Political Openness, Protests and Political Attitudes' a cargo de los investigadores Patricio Saavedra y John Drury de la University of Sussex, Reino Unido, y Roberto González Gutiérrez de la Pontificia Universidad Católica de Chile. El objeto de esta carta es ayudarlo a tomar la decisión de participar en la presente investigación.

¿Cuál es el propósito de esta investigación?

Esta investigación forma parte de un proyecto internacional que busca comparar las opiniones que tienen los ciudadanos de dos culturas distintas (Reino Unido y Chile) sobre los movimientos sociales y actividades asociadas a estos como son las marchas y protestas. Uno de los objetivos fundamentales de esta investigación es validar una escala de medición que analiza las opiniones que las personas tienen sobre estas temáticas, de tal forma de considerar tanto factores individuales como contextuales que pueden estar influyendo en el desarrollo de estas opiniones. Además de lo anterior se busca explorar cuales son las posibles relaciones de las opiniones personales sobre el contexto y las movilizaciones sociales con variables asociadas a la validación de ciertas estrategias de

acción en las mismas marchas, la evaluación del gobierno de turno y el interés por la política.

¿En qué consiste tu participación?

Tu participación consistirá en contestar un cuestionario (online o en papel y lápiz) especialmente diseñado para este estudio, que mantiene medidas de comparabilidad con las de los otros países participantes del proyecto de investigación. En el cuestionario se te pedirá que indiques tu opinión de la sociedad chilena y la vida en Chile. El tiempo que toma contestar el cuestionario completo es aproximadamente 35 minutos.

¿Cuánto durará tu participación?

Tu participación total en el proyecto será de 35 minutos, que es el tiempo que demora contestar el cuestionario en cualquiera de sus formatos.

¿Qué riesgos corres al participar?

Al participar de este estudio no corres ningún riesgo físico ni psicológico, tanto directa como indirectamente.

¿Qué beneficios puede tener tu participación?

Al contar con una muestra de chilenos como tú, será posible mostrar las opiniones de los chilenos sobre los movimientos sociales y compararlas con la de otro país y cultura, lo que permitirá enriquecer el conocimiento, análisis y comprensión de este tema considerando las diferencias de cada uno de los países participantes en este estudio transcultural. Asimismo, entre todos los participantes de este estudio se sortearán dos Gift

Cards de $30.000 cada una luego de finalizar la recolección de datos durante Septiembre de 2016.

¿Qué pasa con la información y datos que entregue?

Los investigadores mantendrán CONFIDENCIALIDAD con respecto a cualquier información obtenida en este estudio. Así los datos de contacto que el encuestador te solicitará al momento de aceptar participar en este proyecto serán solo con el fin de enviarte el correo con el link que te dirigirá al cuestionario online. De la misma forma el correo electrónico que se solicita en el cuestionario se utilizará solo con el fin de asignar las Gift Cards sorteadas como compensación al tiempo invertido en el estudio.

El equipo de investigación a cargo resguardará tus datos recopilados en el cuestionario y en la hoja de reclutamiento sellados en una bodega por un espacio de 5 años, luego de los cuales serán destruidos de tal forma de impedir su divulgación o mal uso. De todas maneras te aseguramos que tu información de contacto no será incluida al momento de consignar los archivos de datos para su análisis, siendo tu encuesta identificable solamente por un número único que se encuentra asociado a tus respuestas mas no a quién lo respondió. Así también se asegura a los participantes que los datos recopilados en este estudio solo serán utilizados para los fines de esta investigación específica.

¿Es obligación participar? ¿Puedo arrepentirme después de participar?

Tú NO estás obligado de ninguna manera a participar en este estudio. Si accedes a participar, puedes dejar de hacerlo en cualquier momento sin repercusión alguna y sin necesidad de justificar tal acción frente al encuestador o al equipo de investigación a cargo del proyecto.

¿A quién puedo contactar para saber más de este estudio o si me surgen dudas?

Si tienes cualquier pregunta acerca de esta investigación, puedes contactar a Patricio Saavedra Morales de la University of Sussex. Su email es P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk Si usted tiene alguna consulta o preocupación respecto a sus derechos como participante de este estudio, puede contactar al Comité Ético Científico de Ciencias Sociales, Artes y Humanidades. Presidenta: María Elena Gronemeyer. Contacto: eticadeinvestigacion@uc.cl

Al hacer click en 'Aceptar' estarás indicando que has tenido la oportunidad de leer esta declaración de consentimiento informado y ACEPTAS participar en este proyecto. Si, por el contrario, no deseas participar, haz click en 'Rechazar'.

- ❍ Aceptar
- ❍ Rechazar

Pensando en el gobierno de tu país, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
El gobierno permite que la gente se manifieste libremente en las calles.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Este gobierno se ampara en la ley para evitar que las protestas tengan lugar.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Este gobierno amenaza abiertamente a quienes participan en protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno restringe expresiones políticas que implican la participación en protestas.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno obstaculiza la participación de la gente en marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Éste gobierno se opone a que la gente exprese su descontento participando en protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Este gobierno considera a aquellos que participan en protestas son enemigos del Estado	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La participación de los ciudadanos en protestas es vista como un problema por este gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Quiénes participan en protestas son etiquetados como criminales por este gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Este gobierno considera las protestas como una amenaza para su estabilidad	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La gente siempre debería poder manifestarse libremente en las calles.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Valoro positivamente que la gente exprese su opinión participando en marchas o protestas.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Para mí las protestas son acto legítimo de expresión política.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Para mantener el orden en las calles el gobierno debería prohibir las protestas y manifestaciones	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno debería obstaculizar la participación de la gente en marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Estoy en contra de que la gente exprese su descontento participando en protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Desde mi punto de vista las protestas carecen de legitimidad en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Respeto que los movimientos sociales lleven a cabo actividades públicas para expresar sus preocupaciones.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Respecto a las protestas y manifestaciones que se llevan a cabo en las calles de Chile, por favor indica cuan frecuentes son cada una de las siguientes situaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *nunca*, 2 *rara vez,* 3 *a veces*, 4 *frecuentemente*, y 5 *siempre*.

	1	2	3	4	5
En este país las protestas son disueltas utilizando métodos violentos.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía utiliza la violencia en forma indiscriminada contra los manifestantes.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Es difícil llevar a cabo protestas en este país ya que éstas son inmediatamente atacadas por la policía.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Para dispersar las protestas la policía usualmente agrede a los manifestantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En mi país aquellos que participan en protestas pueden terminar heridos debido a la violencia desproporcionada utilizada por la policía.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Es usual que en este país algunas personas sean arrestadas sin mayor justificación que haber participado en una protesta.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En mi país la gente tiene temor de participar en protestas debido a la conducta de la policía en ellas.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Considerando tu OPINIÓN PERSONAL respecto a las movilizaciones sociales y protestas que se llevan a cabo en la vía pública, por favor indica tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones utilizando la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La policía debería utilizar la violencia para disolver cualquier tipo de protesta.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía debe usar la violencia contra todos los participantes en una protesta cuando algunos de ellos se vuelve violento.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía debería agredir a los manifestantes para mantener el orden público	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía debería dispersar cualquier protesta con tal de proteger la propiedad privada	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Si algunas personas son heridas por la policía durante las protestas es porque ellas se lo buscan.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Es legítimo que la policía detenga a personas durante una marcha sin darle explicaciones.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía debería detener y registrar a cualquier persona en una protesta ya que 'quién nada hace,nada teme'	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Teniendo en consideración LO QUE LA GENTE DE TU PAÍS piensa respecto a la presencia de movilizaciones sociales y protestas, por favor indica cuan típicas de la opinión de tus conciudadanos son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy atípica* y 5 *muy típica*.

	1	2	3	4	5
La gente de mi país cree que participar en protestas es una acción política válida.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos creen que está bien que se realicen protestas a pesar de que no compartan las demandas o exigencias de los manifestantes.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente piensa que es legítimo que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan su vida cotidiana.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos de mi país creen que quienes participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan desestabilizar al país.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Los ciudadanos de mi país piensan que quienes participan de las protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad importante en un sistema democrático.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La gente de mi país piensa que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema democrático.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Continuando con LO QUE LA GENTE DE TU PAÍS piensa respecto a la presencia de movilizaciones sociales y protestas, por favor indica cuan típicas de la opinión de tus conciudadanos son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy atípica* y 5 *muy típica*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Las protestas son una acción política válida	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Está bien que se lleven a cabo manifestaciones aún cuando interrumpan la vida cotidiana	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Quiénes participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan desestabilizar al país	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Quiénes participan en protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las protestas son una parte importante de nuestro sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las protestas son una característica necesaria de nuestro sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Teniendo en consideración lo que tú piensas acerca de la presencia de movilizaciones sociales y protestas en tu país, por favor indica cuan típicas de tu opinión personal son cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones (1 es *muy atípica* y 5 *muy típica*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Creo que participar en protestas es una acción política válida	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Valoro que se lleven a cabo protestas aun cuando éstas interrumpan mi vida cotidiana	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Creo que aquellos que participan en protestas son solo delincuentes que buscan desestabilizar al país	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Pienso que aquellos que participan en protestas solo buscan alterar el orden público	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las protestas son una actividad relevante en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Participar en marchas y protestas es un derecho que todos tenemos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Valoro positivamente que los ciudadanos expresen sus inquietudes organizando marchas y protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Creo que las protestas son una actividad necesaria en un sistema democrático	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Aquellos que participan en protestas son personas poco comprometidas que no saben nada acerca de la democracia	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Aquellos que participan en manifestaciones solo quieren más derechos pero necesitan aprender sobre responsabilidades	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Las protestas son solo una excusa para cometer delitos contra la propiedad privada	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Las opiniones que acabas de expresar más arriba se encuentran basadas principalmente en.....?

- ❍ Tu experiencia personal
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado en tu familia
- ❍ Lo que has escuchado de tus amigos
- ❍ Lo que has visto o escuchado en los medios de comunicación

Pensando en la policía de tu país, por favor demuestra tu grado de acuerdo con cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones. Para ello utiliza la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *muy en desacuerdo* y 5 *muy de acuerdo*.

	1	2	3	4	5
En el transcurso de una protesta la policía siempre utiliza procedimientos que son justos para todos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Durante una protesta la policía siempre explica claramente las razones que se encuentran a la base de sus acciones	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Mientras se desarrolla una protesta la policía tiene la oportunidad de corregir sus decisiones cuando éstas son injustas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En general la policía actúa en una protesta basando sus decisiones en hechos, no en opiniones personales	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
En el transcurso de una protesta la policía siempre utiliza procedimientos que son justos para todos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Por favor evalúa cada una de las siguientes afirmaciones con respecto a las acciones del gobierno utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *ninguna atención* y 5 *mucha atención*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a lo que la gente piensa cuando decide lo que tiene hacer?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando decide lo que tiene que hacer?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o exigencias de los movimientos sociales cuando estos utilizan la violencia?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuanta atención crees que el gobierno pone a las demandas o exigencias de los movimientos sociales que se expresan de forma pacífica?	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Por favor indica tu grado de confianza hacia las siguientes instituciones utilizando para ello la siguiente escala de evaluación donde 1 es *ninguna confianza* y 5 *mucha confianza*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Los políticos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El parlamento	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El gobierno	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
El sistema judicial	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La policía	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
La prensa	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Ahora pensando en el gobierno de Chile, ¿Cuán satisfecho estás tú con la forma en que está realizando su trabajo?

- ❍ 1 Extremadamente insatisfecho
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Extremadamente satisfecho

¿Cuán representado te sientes por el gobierno chileno?

- ❍ 1 Para nada representado
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Totalmente representado

Has participado en marchas, movimientos sociales o protestas durante los últimos 12 meses?:

- ❍ Si
- ❍ No

En el transcurso de una protesta (YA SEA COMO PARTICIPANTE O MERO ESPECTADOR), ¿has experimentado alguna de las siguientes situaciones que se describen a continuación durante los últimos 12 meses? Marca TODAS las que correspondan.

	Si
Ser alcanzado/a por el carro lanza aguas de la policía	❍
Ser golpeado por la policía	❍
Presenciar agresiones de la policía a los manifestantes	❍
Haber sido arrestado sin que los policías hayan dado una explicación clara para ello	❍
Haber presenciado arrestos arbitrarios	❍
Haber sido expuesto a los gases lacrimógenos de la policía	❍
Ser amenazado por los caballos de la policía	❍

En tu opinión, ¿Cuándo se justifica el uso de la violencia por parte de los manifestantes?

	1	2	3	4	5
Cuando la policía golpea a los manifestantes sin mediar provocación	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando la policía arresta manifestantes sin otorgar ninguna explicación para ello	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando la policía utiliza carros lanza aguas y gases lacrimógenos contra los manifestantes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando la policía actúa para detener una protesta pacífica	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando la policía trata a los manifestantes como criminales comunes	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando la policía daña a la gente que no está directamente involucrada en las protestas	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando los policías detienen a algunos manifestantes para comprobar sus identidades y registrarlos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

En tu opinión, ¿Cuándo se justifica el uso de la violencia por parte de la policía?

	1	2	3	4	5
Cuando los manifestantes atacan a los policías	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando algunos manifestantes participan en saqueos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando los policías sospechan que alguien ha participado en desórdenes públicos	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando los policías sospechan que alguien es parte un grupo anarquista	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando los manifestantes le faltan el respeto a los policías	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando los manifestantes desobedecen las órdenes dadas por los policías	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Cuando los manifestantes lanzan piedras u otros objetos a la policía	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

¿Cuántos años tienes?

Sexo:

- ❍ Mujer
- ❍ Hombre
- ❍ Otro

¿Cuál es tu nacionalidad?

¿En qué país vives actualmente?

¿Cuál de las siguientes actividades describe de mejor manera tu situación actual?

- ❍ Trabajo a tiempo completo
- ❍ Trabajo Part time
- ❍ Dueña/o de casa
- ❍ Jubilado
- ❍ Cesante
- ❍ Estudiante a tiempo completo
- ❍ Otro

Por favor, indica la opción que mejor representa el ingreso total mensual de tu hogar. Esto es, considerando la suma de los ingresos de todas las personas que viven en tu hogar después de descuento legales como salud, previsión e impuestos:

- ❍ De 0 a $650.628
- ❍ De $650.629 a $962.926
- ❍ Más de $962.926

¿Cuántas personas viven en tu hogar?

Por favor, indica la opción que mejor representa tu ingreso mensual líquidos, es decir, tu ingreso después de descontar salud, previsión u otros impuestos:

- ❍ Sin ingresos
- ❍ Menos de $95.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $95.001 a $175.000 líquidos
- ❍ $175.001 a $200.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $200.001 a $219.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $219.001 a $270.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $270.001 a $330.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $330.001 a $410.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $410.001 a $547.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $547.001 a $875.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $875.001 a $1.000.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $1.000.001 a $2.000.000 líquidos
- ❍ De $2.000.001 a $3.000.000 líquidos
- ❍ Más de $3.000.000 líquidos

Tú, alguien de tu familia directa o algún amigo cercano trabajan actualmente en la policía (Carabineros)?

- ❍ Si, yo
- ❍ Si, un familiar
- ❍ Si, un amigo cercano
- ❍ No

¿Cuán interesado/a tú dirías estás en la política de tu país?

- ❍ Para nada interesado/a
- ❍ Escasamente interesado/a
- ❍ Muy interesado/a
- ❍ Demasiado interesado/a

¿Con cuanta frecuencia sigues tú las noticias sobre política en la televisión, la radio o en los diarios?

- ❍ Nunca
- ❍ Una o dos veces por semana
- ❍ Algunas veces en la semana (más de dos)
- ❍ Todos los días

¿Con cuanta frecuencia hablas de política con.....

	Nunca	Una o dos veces por semana	Algunas veces por semana	Todos los días
tu familia?	❍	❍	❍	❍
amigos?	❍	❍	❍	❍
compañeros de trabajo o universidad	❍	❍	❍	❍

En Chile existen diferentes maneras para tratar de mejorar las cosas o de ayudar a prevenir que éstas empeoren. ¿Has realizado alguna de las siguientes actividades durante los últimos 12 meses? Por favor, marca tu respuesta en la columna apropiada para cada actividad.

	Si	No
He contactado a un político o algún funcionario de gobierno central o local	❍	❍
He participado activamente en un partido o grupo político	❍	❍
He participado activamente en otra organización o asociación (diferente a un partido o grupo político)	❍	❍
He usado una insignia o sticker de campaña	❍	❍
He firmado una petición	❍	❍
He participado en marchas o manifestaciones	❍	❍
He boicoteado ciertos productos	❍	❍
He participado en reuniones políticas	❍	❍
He expresado opiniones políticas en las redes sociales (Facebook, Twitter por ejemplo)	❍	❍
He donado dinero o recaudado fondos para una actividad social o política	❍	❍

En política la gente a veces habla de 'izquierdas' y 'derechas'. Por favor, indica cual sería tu posición en la siguiente escala donde 1 significa *extrema izquierda* y 7 *extrema derecha*.

- ❍ 1 Extrema izquierda
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5
- ❍ 6
- ❍ 7 Extrema derecha

Appendix 6: Overview of cross-cultural invariance tests for Chapter 2 Study 2

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for government openness.

Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA LL	90% CI for RMSEA UL	Model Comparison
M0	8.32	4			.99	.98	.01	.05	.00	.11	
M1	10.91	7	2.59	3	.99	.99	.01	.04	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	67.59	10	56.67	3	.92	.91	.07	.12	.10	.16	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M2P	12.87	8	1.95	1	.99	.99	.02	.04	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2P-M1
M3P	35.07	10	22.20	2	.96	.96	.06	.08	.05	.11	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3P-M2P

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing partial strong invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance.

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for perceived repression.

Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	90% CI for RMSEA LL	90% CI for RMSEA UL	Model Comparison
M0	8.08	4			.99	.98	.01	.05	.00	.10	
M1	10.71	7	2.63	3	.99	.99	.02	.03	.00	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	20.16	10	9.44	3	.99	.98	.04	.05	.17	.89	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M3	26.69	14	15.98	7	.98	.99	.05	.05	.02	.08	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3-M2
M4	55.92	15	29.22	1	.96	.97	.24	.08	.08	.11	$\Delta\chi^2$ M4-M3

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M3 to the model testing partial strict invariance; and M4 to the model testing the invariance of latent factor (variance).

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for legitimacy of protests (original scale).

									90% CI for RMSEA		
Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL	Model Comparison
M0	14.15	4			.98	.94	.02	.08	.04	.13	
M1	19.67	7	5.52	3	.97	.96	.04	.07	.03	.11	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	61.34	10	41.66	3	.90	.88	.08	.12	.09	.15	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M2P	34.48	8	14.81	1	.95	.92	.05	.09	.06	.13	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2P-M1
M3P	38.02	9	3.53	1	.94	.92	.04	.09	.06	.13	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3P-M2P

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M2P to the model testing partial strong invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance.

Table. Goodness-of-fit indices and comparison of models testing measurement invariance for legitimacy of protests (simplified scale).

									90% CI for RMSEA		
Model	χ^2	*df*	$\Delta\chi^2$	Δdf	CFI	TLI	SRMR	RMSEA	LL	UL	Model Comparison
M0	7.88	4			.99	.97	.01	.05	.00	.10	
M1	15.04	7	7.16	3	.98	.97	.04	.05	.01	.09	$\Delta\chi^2$ M1-M0
M2	24.51	10	9.46	3	.97	.96	.05	.06	.03	.09	$\Delta\chi^2$ M2-M1
M3	75.12	14	60.08	7	.88	.90	.09	.11	.08	.13	$\Delta\chi^2$ M3-M2
M3P	38.77	13	14.26	-1	.95	.95	.07	.07	.04	.10	$\Delta\chi^2$M3P-M2

Note: M0 corresponds to the baseline model without any restricted parameter; M1 to the model testing weak invariance; M2 to the model testing strong invariance, M3 to the model testing strict invariance; and M3P to the model testing partial strict invariance.

Appendix 7: Selected items for Chapter 3 Study 1

Table. Items used to measure government openness.

Thinking about the current government of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below.

Government openness
1. The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests
2. This government hinders participation in marches and protests
3. The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests
4. Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government

Table. Items used to measure perceived repression.

Thinking about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the streets of the UK (Chile), please indicate how common are the following situations.

Perceived repression
1. The police use indiscriminate violence against protesters
2. Carrying out protests in this country is difficult because these are immediately attacked by the police
3. In my country, those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police
4. To disperse a protest, police officers commonly hit demonstrators

Table. Items used to measure perceived legitimacy of protests.

Taking into account what people of your country think about the presence of social movements and protests, please indicate how typical the following statements are of public opinion.

Perceived legitimacy of protest
1. People of my country think that participating in protests is a valid political action
2. Citizens are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns
3. People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient

Table. Items used to measure support for protesters' violence against the police.

In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by protesters justified?

Support for protesters' violence
1. When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation
2. When the police act to stop a peaceful protest
3. When police treat protesters as common criminals
4. When police hurt people not directly involved in protests

Appendix 8: Online questionnaire for Chapter 3 Study 2

Protests and political contexts

Information and Consent

Dear participant,

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.

This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to compare the opinion of young people from different cultures (UK and Chile) about social movements and some activities associated to them as marches and protests.

We hope you will take part in this study, and to do so, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. If you decide to take part, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason, till the point that the report of this project is drawn up.

Please take into account that if you decide to participate or not in our study, it will have no impact on your marks, assessments, or future studies.

Your participation will consist of completing a questionnaire specially designed for this study; a similar instrument will be used in Chile by people of your same age. Your data will be kept confidential, and your answers will not be able to link with your contact details at any level. **Completing the questionnaire should not take you more than 25 minutes.** After that, you are welcome to ask questions about the project by contacting the researchers.

Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will be able to choose between receiving 2 credits, or entering in a prize draw (£50) as a reward for the time dedicated to this project. You should bear in mind that your odds of winning the draw are shared with those of the other participants (150 more or less).

Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people about the social movements, and contrast it with the thoughts of people of your same age from another country. The latter will be able to extend the knowledge and understanding of this topic considering the cultural differences that may exist about it.

The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD thesis. No identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/7. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk).

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in this study please proceed to give your consent.

Project approval reference: **ER/PS356/7**

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an online questionnaire.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

☐ By ticking this box I give my consent to participate in this study.

To start, please write a valid Sussex email address (just to allocate the reward):

Please, indicate your current status at University of Sussex:

- ❍ Undergraduate student
- ❍ Master student
- ❍ PhD student
- ❍ None

How old are you?

Sex:

- ❍ Male
- ❍ Female
- ❍ Other

What is your nationality?

Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the police service?

- ❍ Yes, me
- ❍ Yes, a family member
- ❍ Yes, a close friend
- ❍ No

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
People always should be able to protest in the street freely	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I positively value the fact that people express their opinion by participating in marches or protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I think that protests are a legitimate act of political expression.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I respect that protest campaigns carry out public activities to express their concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you just expressed above are mainly based on…?

❍ Your personal experience
❍ What you have heard from members of your family
❍ What you have heard from your friends
❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Considering your PERSONAL OPINION about the protests and demonstrations that are carried out in the street, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
The police should use violence to break up any kind of protest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police have to use force against all participants in a protest when some protestors become violent	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
If some people are injured by the police during protests, it is their own fault	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
It is legitimate that the police arrest people during a march without explanation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police force should stop and search any person on a protest because 'If you've got nothing to hide, you've got nothing to fear'	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you just expressed above are mainly based on…?

❍ Your personal experience
❍ What you have heard from members of your family
❍ What you have heard from your friends
❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

Taking into account what you think about the presence of campaigns and protests in your country, please indicate how typical the following statements are of your own opinion. For this, use the following scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical*.

	1	2	3	4	5
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I value the appearance of protests in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I positively value that people express their concerns by organizing marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

The opinions that you just expressed above are mainly based on…?

❍ Your personal experience
❍ What you have heard from members of your family
❍ What you have heard from your friends
❍ What you have seen or heard in the mass media

How interested would you say you are in politics?

❍ Not at all interested
❍ A little interested
❍ Quite interested
❍ Very interested

How often do you follow politics in the news on television or on the radio or in the daily papers?

- ❍ Never
- ❍ Once or twice a week
- ❍ Several times a week
- ❍ Every day

In the UK, there are different ways of trying to improve things or help prevent things from getting worse. During the last 12 months, have you done any of the following? Please, mark your answer with an 'X' (*Yes* or *No*) in the appropriate column for each activity.

	Yes	No
I contacted a politician, government or local government official	❍	❍
I was active in a political party or campaign group	❍	❍
I wore or displayed a campaign badge/sticker	❍	❍
I signed a petition	❍	❍
I took part in demonstrations	❍	❍
I boycotted certain products	❍	❍
I attended a political meeting or rally	❍	❍
I expressed political views on social media	❍	❍
I donated money or raised funds for a social or political activity	❍	❍

Please indicate your confidence in the following institutions using the following scale where 1 is *no confidence* and 5 *a lot of confidence*.

	1	2	3	4	5
Politicians	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Parliament	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The press	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the police of your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the following statements. For this please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree*.

	1	2	3	4	5
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons behind their actions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Generally, the police make decisions based on facts, not on personal opinions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

In your opinion, when during a protest is the use of physical violence by protesters justified? Please, use the following scale to answer where 1 is *never* and 5 *always*.

	1	2	3	4	5
When the police hit protesters without provocation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police hurt people not directly involved in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police treat protesters as common criminals	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by the police justified? Please, use the following scale to answer where 1 is *never* and 5 *always*.

	1	2	3	4	5
When protesters attack the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When some demonstrators attack shops	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When protesters throw stones or other objects at police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When protesters hurt people not directly involved in the protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Now thinking about the British government, how satisfied are you with the way it is doing its job? Please, mark your answer using the following scale:

- ❍ 1 Extremely dissatisfied
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Extremely satisfied

How represented do you feel by the British government? Please, mark with an “X” your answer using the following scale:

- ❍ 1 Totally unrepresented
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Totally represented

Condition 1: Facilitated condition.

Please, read the article presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following pages.

New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police force announce special measures

Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education announced by the government.

London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to Higher Education by 5%, many organizations have argued that students and their families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government's decision,

originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they currently invest in their education.

Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the PM stated: “The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain's finances, and no further discussion is necessary. However, as a government we understand that some people feel concern about decisions like these, and so we have prepared a communication campaign to inform the public about the practical implications of this new policy. Furthermore, we consider the calls to protest against these agreements as part of a democratic system, it is valid that some people want to participate in demonstrations to express their opinions. Accordingly, our duty as responsible authorities is to enable protests to place in the best way possible, allowing people can move freely throughout the streets. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to set up a collaborative plan that will facilitate people’s participation in the protests.”

At the same time, the Home Secretary said that a series of protests were authorized to go ahead, and the police force should assist the protesters’ plans, “The Metropolitan Police Commissioner has confirmed that officers received the order to keep constant communication with protesters, allowing the protests to take place in the best way possible”.

During the evening, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner talked with the press about the concrete measures that the police will implement during the journey of protests, “essentially our measures are related to close the roads around the streets where the protests will take place, allowing for protesters to move without problems. Further, the police will inform motorists about the diversions and alternatives routes through social media”.

The Met Commissioner said that the only police officers around the demonstrations will be those in charge of traffic management wearing their traditional uniforms.

Regarding the measures announced by the government, Mark Johnson (one of the main Students Union leaders) said that he values the fact that the government had authorized protests around the country. Nevertheless, he stressed that demonstrations will take place allowing people to express their disagreement with the Higher Education budget cuts and how the authorities are doing things “We hope that people's discontent will be heard by the government”.

Condition 2: Restricted condition.

Please, read the article presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following pages.

New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police force announce special measures

Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education announced by the government.

London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to Higher Education by 5%, many organizations have argued that students and their families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government's decision, originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university

tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they currently invest in their education.

Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the PM stated: “The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain’s finances, and no further discussion is necessary. Therefore, the calls to protest against these agreements just contribute to damaging the public order, security, and stability of our country. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to set a collaborative plan with the objective to prevent any type of protest during the week. In consequence, the police will arrest all those who try to threaten public order.”

At the same time, the Home Secretary said that protests will not be authorized. The police force will then be able to use all the legal means available to keep the order and maintain public safety. “We will not allow people to carry out neither riots nor demonstrations to disturb the social peace in Britain”.

During the evening, the Metropolitan Police Commissioner talked with the press about the preventive measures that the police will implement throughout the protests, “essentially our measures are related to a significant increase of riot police in the main cities, allowing for a greater number of patrols around boroughs, and implementing more stop and search measures for all those who are involved in a non-authorized protests. If

riots take place in the streets, the police force could use baton rounds and horses to take control of the situation avoiding damage to public and private property".

Far removed from the authorities' view is Mark Johnson's opinion. As one of the main Students Union leaders, he argues that demonstrations will take place regardless of the measures announced by the PM. "The Government's decision to forbid the protests instead of hearing what people have to say about the budget cuts is a clear sign of its habitual intransigence, the cabinet prefers repression rather than paying attention to the citizens' views".

Condition 3: Control condition.

Please, read the article presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following pages.

New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police force announce special measures

Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education announced by the government.

London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to Higher Education by 5%, many organizations have argued that students and their families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government's decision, originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university

tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they currently invest in their education.

Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the PM stated: “The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain's finances, and no further discussion is necessary”.

Regarding the announced protests, Mark Johnson (one of the main Students Union leaders) stressed that demonstrations will take place allowing people to express their disagreement with the Higher Education budget cuts and how the authorities are doing things “We hope that people's discontent will be heard by the government”.

According to the article, to what extent did the authorities try to prevent the protests from taking place?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

According to the article, what extent do police cooperate with the develop of the protests?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

Thinking about the scenario described in the article, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree.*

	1	2	3	4	5
The government restricts political expressions involving participation in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
This government hinders participation in marches and protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The government is against people expressing their discontent by participating in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People's participation in protests is considered as a problem by this government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests are labelled as criminals by this government	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the scenario described in the article about the protests, please indicate how common could be the following situations in it. For this, please use the next scale where 1 is *never, 2 rarely, 3 sometimes, 4 often,* and 5 *always.*

	1	2	3	4	5
Protests dispersed using violent methods	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police using indiscriminate violence against the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Difficulties in carrying out protests because these are immediately attacked by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police officers hitting demonstrators to disperse a protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Those who participate in protests may end up injured by the disproportionate violence used by the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People are afraid to participate in protests because of police behaviour	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the scenario described in the article, how typical of the citizens' opinion could be the following statements. For this, use the next scale where 1 is *very untypical* and 5 *very typical.*

	1	2	3	4	5
People think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People are of the opinion that carrying out protests is fine even when not sharing the protesters' concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People think that taking part in protests is legitimate in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People think that demonstrations are an important activity in a democratic system	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the scenario described in the article, please evaluate the likelihood of suffering each of these situations during a protest. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *impossible* and 5 *guaranteed.*

	1	2	3	4	5
Being injured	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Being killed	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Being arrested	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Being tortured	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Sexually harassed	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the scenario described in the article, please indicate how important these risks would be for you during a protest. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *unimportant* and 5 *very important.*

	1	2	3	4	5
Being injured	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Being killed	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Being arrested	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Being tortured	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Sexually harassed	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please, tell us in a couple of lines about what did you read in the article presented before.

Please indicate your agreement with the follow statement, 'I identify with the student protesters':

- ❍ 1 Fully disagree
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Fully agree

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree.*

	1	2	3	4	5
I think that student protesters can stop the government policies	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I think that the student protesters can successfully defend their rights	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The student protesters actions can cause social change	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

How willing would you be to carry out the following actions to support the students' campaign? For this, please use the next scale where 1 is *very unwilling* and 5 *very willing.*

	1	2	3	4	5
To participate in discussion meetings or forums.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To sign letters supporting the students claims	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To attend demonstrations or rallies	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To throw stones or bottles to the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To confront the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To participate in barricades	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To blockade roads	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

How effective do you think are each of the following actions would be to meet the students' objectives? For this, please use the next scale where 1 is *very ineffective* and 5 *very effective.*

	1	2	3	4	5
To participate in discussion meetings or forums.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To sign letters supporting the students claims	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To attend demonstrations or rallies	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To throw stones or bottles to the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To confront the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To participate in barricades	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
To blockade roads	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

In your opinion, when during a protest is the use of physical violence by protesters justified? Please, use the following scale where 1 is *never* and 5 *always.*

	1	2	3	4	5
When the police hit protesters without provocation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police officers arrest demonstrators without giving any explanation	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police hurt people not directly involved in protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When police treat protesters as common criminals	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

In your opinion, when is the use of physical violence by the police justified? Please, use the following where 1 is *never* and 5 *always.*

	1	2	3	4	5
When protesters attack the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When some demonstrators attack shops	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When protesters throw stones or other objects at police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
When protesters hurt people not directly involved in the protests	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the possible behaviour of the police force described in the article, indicate your agreement with each of the following statements. For this, please use the following scale where 1 is *strongly disagree* and 5 *strongly agree.*

	1	2	3	4	5
In a protest the police always use procedures that are fair for everyone	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police always clearly explain the reasons behind their actions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
During a protest the police provide opportunity for unfair decisions to be corrected	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Generally, the police make decisions based on facts, not on personal opinions	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

What kind of reward would you prefer for your participation in this study?

❍ 2 credits
❍ Enter in a prize draw (£50)

Appendix 9: Interview schedule for Chapter 4

Exploring people's responses to protests

Information and Consent

Dear participant,

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.

This research is an interview-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to explore the opinion of young British people about protests and the different tactics employed by either protesters and authorities during these activities.

If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. Nonetheless, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason till the point that the report of this project is drawn up (30th May 2018). For the latter, you can contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk).

Please take into account that if you decide to participate or not in our study, it will have no impact on your marks, assessments, or future studies.

Your participation will consist of reading two fictional scenarios about protests in the UK and giving an answer to some questions included in a schedule especially elaborated for this study. **The interview should not take more than 45 minutes of your time and it will be recorded to allow the analysis of your answers**. Nevertheless, your answers will be kept confidential and it will not be able to link them with your contact details at any level.

Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will receive 3 credits as a reward for the time dedicated to this project.

Your involvement will be very valuable in showing the opinions of young British people about protests and their thoughts about the actions carried out by those who are involved in them. The latter will allow to extend our understanding of these topics considering the different perspectives people in the UK might have.

The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD thesis. No identifiable information will be used for any of these purposes. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/8. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way

in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk).

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in this study please proceed to give your consent.

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to be interviewed by the researchers in charge of the study and I am aware the interview will be recorded to analyse my answers by the research team.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential, and that no information I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the reports on the project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that the report is drawn up without being penalised or disadvantaged in any way.

Name: _____

Signature:_____

Date: _____

[The aim of the following questions is to know your opinion about protests and how people participate in them under different political conditions. During the interview you will read a couple of articles describing the circumstances under which a protest was planned to take place].

[Now I would like to know your opinion about protests in the UK].

Introduction to the general topic (protests in the UK):

- What is your opinion about protests in general?

- Have you participated in some protest before? About what?

- What motivated you to participate in protest?

- How relevant were other people to motivate you for taking part in the protest?

[Now, I will present you an article about a protest that could take place in the following days].

Vignette 1: Right to protest is restricted by authorities.

New student demonstrations: Authorities and police announce special measures

Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education announced by the government.

London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to Higher Education by 15%, many organizations have argued that students and their families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The

government's decision, originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they currently invest in their education.

Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the Prime Minister stated: "The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain's finances, and no further discussion is necessary. Therefore, the calls to protest against these agreements just contribute to damaging public order, and the security and stability of our country. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to set a collaborative plan with the objective to prevent any type of protest during the week. In consequence, the police will arrest all those who try to threaten public order by attending the protest".

At the same time, the Home Secretary said that protests would not be authorized. The police would then be able to use every legal means available to keep order and maintain public safety. "We will not allow people to carry out either riots or demonstrations to disturb the social peace in Britain". He also announced a significant presence of riot police in the main cities, allowing for a greater number of patrols around boroughs, and implementing more 'stop and search' measures for all those who are involved in a non-authorized protest. Furthermore, in case riots take place, the Home Secretary said that the police could use baton rounds and horses to manage the situation and prevent damage to public and private property.

The opinion of Mark Johnson is very different to the authorities' view. As one of the main Students Union leaders, he argues that demonstrations will take place regardless of the measures announced by the Prime Minister. "The Government's decision to forbid the protests is a clear sign the cabinet prefers repression rather than paying attention to citizens' views. Unfortunately, these measures are supported by ad-hoc laws made to hinder participation in protests and therefore to prevent British people expressing their opinion freely". Johnson also complained about the role of the press in relation to the protests: "Journalists and the mass media act in behalf of the government and the rich to maintain the current system; the students are treated as criminals in the newspapers and the television only because we want to demonstrate our disagreement with the new policy. We are not rioters, we are not criminals, we are just students fighting for our education".

- Can you describe briefly the situation you read about in the article?

-What are your feelings about the situation described in the article? Why?

- What would be your reasons to participate (or not) in the announced protest?

- Would you protest because you felt the power to do it?

- What do you think would be the main obstacles to you participating in the protest?

- Which factors would encourage your participation in the protest?

[Now, I will ask you some questions about the role of the authorities in relation to the announced protest].

The role of the government and the police (authorities):

- In your opinion, what were the reasons that the authorities carried out the announced measures in relation to the protest?

- Do you think these kinds of measures would affect the protest? How?

- What would be your reaction to the police measures? Why?

[The followings are questions about some situations could happen during the protest].

Justification of the use of violence (by protesters):

- What would you think if during the protest people hit or throw objects to the police?

- What would be your reaction if the police attack you? Would do you defend yourself? How?

- What would be your reaction if the police attack other protesters? Would do you defend them? Why? How?

Legitimacy of protest given by others:

- Thinking again in the scenario presented in the vignette, do you think people outside of the protest would support it? Why (or why not)?

- Do you believe that the measures announced by the authorities would cause more people to support the protest? Why? Why not?

- Do you believe that people outside protests would support self-defence if the police attack protesters? Why?

[Now, I will present you an article about the same protest as before but under different conditions].

Vignette 2: Right to protest is guaranteed by authorities.

New student demonstrations: Authorities and Police announce special measures

Many organizations have called for participation in the demonstrations that will take place throughout the country to protest against the budget cuts in Higher Education announced by the government.

London. As a response to the government announcement to cut the budget allocated to Higher Education by 15%, many organizations have argued that students and their families should express their disagreement with this new policy by participating in marches and demonstrations around the country at the end of this week. The government's decision, originally announced a month ago, means a dramatic increase in the cap on university tuition fees. Because of this, students could pay up to twice the amount of money they currently invest in their education.

Early this week, the Prime Minister met with the Home Secretary to assess the possible political situation that the authorities may face because of the demonstrations. After the meeting both ministers spoke with the press about the issue. There the Prime Minister stated: “The cuts were agreed by me, the cabinet and approved by Parliament to save Britain's finances, and no further discussion is necessary. However, as a government we understand that some people feel concern about decisions like these, and so we have prepared an information campaign to inform the public about the practical implications of this new policy. Furthermore, we consider the calls to protest against these agreements to be part of a democratic system, and a right guaranteed by law allowing citizens express their opinions. Accordingly, our duty as responsible authorities is to enable protests to place in the best way possible, allowing people to move freely throughout the streets. Today, I met with the Home Secretary and the Metropolitan Police Commissioner to set up a collaborative plan that will facilitate people’s participation in the protests.

At the same time, the Home Secretary said that a series of protests were authorized to go ahead, and the police force should assist the protesters' plans, “The Metropolitan Police Commissioner has confirmed that the only police officers around the demonstrations will be those in charge of traffic management wearing their traditional uniforms. Furthermore, these officers received the order to keep constant communication with protesters, and to close the roads around the streets where the protests will take place, allowing for protesters to move without problems”.

Regarding the measures announced by the government, Mark Johnson (one of the main Students Union leaders) said that he values the fact that the government had authorized protests around the country. “We hope that people's discontent will be heard by the

government", Johnson said. Moreover, he remarked people can attend the protests without concerns, because the laws of this country protect people's right to protest, and prevent any police misconduct during demonstrations. Finally, Johnson declared that journalists and the press have been very helpful in informing people about the announced protest demonstration and how to attend it.

[The following are questions related to the last article that you read].

-Can you describe briefly the situation you read about in the article?

-What are your feelings about the situation described in the latest article? Why?

- What would be your reasons to participate (or not) in the announced protest?

- Would you protest because you felt the power to do it?

- What do you think would be the main obstacles to you participating in the protest?

- Which factors would encourage your participation in the protest?

[Now, I will ask you some questions about the role of the authorities in relation to the announced protest].

<u>The role of the government and the police (authorities):</u>

- In your opinion, what were the reasons that the authorities carried out the announced measures in relation to the protest?

- Do you think these kinds of measures can affect the protest? How?

- What would be your reaction to the police measures related to the protest? Why?

[The followings are questions about some situations could happen during the protest]

Justification of the use of violence (by protesters):

- What would you think if during the protest people hit or throw objects to the police?

- What would be your reaction if people hit the police during the protest? Why?

Legitimacy of protest given by others:

- Thinking again in the scenario presented in the vignette, do you think people outside of the protest would support it? Why (or why not)?

- Do you believe that the measures announced by the authorities would cause more people support the protest? Why? Why not?

- What would be the reaction of the people outside the protests if protesters hit or throw objects to the police?

Debriefing

Thank you for taking part in this study. During the interview, you read two articles about a student protest that would take place during the following days. Both of the articles were specially created for this study with the purpose of describing the occurrence of a protest under different political conditions. As you read, one of the articles described a scenario where the protest was facilitated by the authorities (the police and government), while in the other the same authorities tried to prevent protests.

We are expecting to find differences in people's attitudes towards protests and towards the tactics undertaken by the authorities in relation to the political scenario protesters have to cope with.

The political context has been suggested as a possible predictor of participation in collective action according to sociological, economic and anthropological accounts. However, psychological approaches addressing the influence of political scenario have barely developed during recent years. In a previous study, we created and validated a measurement scale to assess people's perceptions of the government and the police (facilitating vs preventing protests in the streets). This study is a continuation of such research into the influence of political conditions on the attitudes towards collective action from a psychological perspective.

Appendix 10: Online questionnaire for Chapter 5 Study 1

Attitudes towards protesters' tactics (student protest in UK)

Information and Consent

Dear participant,

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.

This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to explore the opinion of English people about protests and the different tactics employed by protesters.

If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. Nonetheless, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason till the point that the report of this project is drawn up (31st December 2018). For the latter, you can contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk).

Your participation will consist on answering a set of questions about protests and the tactics employed by protesters in them. **Filling in the questionnaire prepared for this project should take about 9 minutes of your time**.

Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will receive £0.75 as a reward for the time dedicated to this project.

Your involvement will be very valuable in knowing English people's reasons to support (or not) the actions carried out by protesters. The latter will allow to extend our understanding of this topic considering the different opinions people in England might have.

The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD thesis. In addition, de-identified data collected from this study will be stored in the University of Sussex Data Repository, therefore, the data may be inspected and analysed by other researchers. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/9. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk).

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in this study please proceed to give your consent.

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an online questionnaire.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the database of this project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that the report is drawn up. I understand that de-identified data collected for this project will be stored in the University of Sussex Data Repository and may be accessed and analysed by other researchers.

☐ I give my consent to participate in this study

☐ I do not give my consent to participate in this study

How old are you?

What is your gender?

- ❍ Male
- ❍ Female
- ❍ Other

Which of these activities best describes what you are doing at present?

- ❍ Full time (30+ hrs per/wk)
- ❍ Part-time (8 – 29 hrs per/wk)
- ❍ Part-time (less than 8hrs per/wk)
- ❍ House person
- ❍ Retired
- ❍ Registered unemployed
- ❍ Unemployed but not registered
- ❍ Student/full time education
- ❍ Other

There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the ideas about groups in general? Next to each statement, select a number from 1 (*extremely oppose*) to 10 (*extremely favour*) to show your opinion.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
In setting priorities, we must consider all groups	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
We should not push for equality between groups	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Group equality should be our ideal	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the police of your local area, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below (1 *strongly disagree*, 2 *disagree*, 3 *neither agree nor disagree*, 4 *agree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Police protect people's basic rights	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police are generally honest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Most police officers do their jobs well	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police can be trusted to do what's right	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the Police force?

- ❍ Yes, me
- ❍ Yes, a family member
- ❍ Yes, a close friend
- ❍ No

Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and protests in your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
It is fine that people carry out protests even though I do not share the protesters' concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People have the right to protest anyway they choose	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months?

- ❍ Yes
- ❍ No

How often do you follow politics in the news on television, the radio or in the daily papers?

- ❍ Never
- ❍ Once or twice a week
- ❍ Several times a week
- ❍ Everyday

How representative do you think your political thoughts are of the English people's opinion?

- ❍ 1 Non representative
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Very representative

How similar are you to the average English person?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Very similar

How represented do you feel by the British government?

- ❍ 1 Totally unrepresented
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Totally represented

Condition 1: Public opinion legitimises protests

Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following sections.

In November and December 2010, the National Union of Students (NUS) organised a series of protests in opposition to the government plans to cut the further education budget and increase university fees. During those days, thousands of students participated in marches and demonstrations across the country, while others took part in campus occupations. Even though the Prime Minister at the time declared that the government was committed to supporting peaceful protest, the Metropolitan Police deployed a massive number of officers, horses, and riot police units to manage those protests carried out through Central London.

News records from that year demonstrate that most English people thought the students, as any other group within the society, had the right to protest and show their discontent with the decisions or situations they think are not fair. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like ‘we are in a democratic country, students can go and protest if they want to’ or ‘protests are useful for people to make their voices heard’. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people attitudes towards student protests.


English attitudes towards student protests
15%
20%
65%
People who legitimated student protests
People who thought protests were not a legitimate way to complain against the government
People who were indifferent to protests

Condition 2: Public opinion does not legitimise protests

Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following sections.

In November and December 2010, the National Union of Students (NUS) organised a series of protests in opposition to the government plans to cut the further education budget and increase university fees. During those days, thousands of students participated in marches and demonstrations across the country, while others took part in campus occupations. Even though the Prime Minister at the time declared that the government was committed to supporting peaceful protest, the Metropolitan Police deployed a massive number of officers, horses, and riot police units to manage those protests carried out through Central London.

News records from that year demonstrate that most English people thought students had no right to disturb people's daily routine with their protests and they should have accepted government decisions. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like ‘the government should restrict protests because they pose a threat to public order’ or ‘protests usually go nowhere and are just an excuse for rioting and looting’. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people attitudes towards student protests.


English attitudes towards student protests
15%
20%
65%
People who legitimated student protests
People who thought protests were not a legitimate way to complain against the government
People who were indifferent to protests

Condition 3: Public opinion indifferent to protests

Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following sections.

In November and December 2010, the National Union of Students (NUS) organised a series of protests in opposition to the government plans to cut the further education budget and increase university fees. During those days, thousands of students participated in marches and demonstrations across the country, while others took part in campus occupations. Even though the Prime Minister at the time declared that the government was committed to supporting peaceful protest, the Metropolitan Police deployed a massive number of officers, horses, and riot police units to manage those protests carried out through Central London.

News records from that year demonstrate mostly English people didn't mind student protests and showed no interest in either these or other demonstrations. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like 'who cares about protests. The only important things here are hard work and paying the bills' or 'people should focus their attention on solving real problems instead of wasting their time going to protests'. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people attitudes towards student protests.



According to the information you read about, to what extent did people actively believe the students had the right to protest against government decisions?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

According to the information you read about, to what extent did people think protests are important in a democratic system?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

The footage you are about to watch is of the events that took place during a demonstration organised by the NUS in Central London to protest against the issues previously described.

Link to the video: https://youtu.be/jz0Z5_h_CtY

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the protesters in the video (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Given the way the protesters are treated by the police, I can easily identify with them (the protesters)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I share the same beliefs and values with protesters when it comes to the way the police should act in protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I feel solidarity with the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I feel a bond with the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I identified with the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the police officers in the video (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
I identified with the police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police officers in the video have the same sense of right and wrong as me	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police officers in the video stand up for values that are important for people like me	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I support the way the police officers acted in the video	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Considering the police behaviour in the video, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below (1 *strongly disagree*, 2 *disagree*, 3 *neither agree nor disagree*, 4 *agree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Police treated protesters with respect	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police treated protesters fairly	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police took time to listen to protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police explained their decisions to protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate the extent you would support the following actions protesters in the video might carry out as a reaction to the police behaviour (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Pushing the police back	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Yelling at the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Disobeying police orders	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Throwing stones or other objects at the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Hitting police officers with bare hands	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Tackling mounted police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Throwing petrol bombs at the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Hitting police officers using weapons (e.g., sticks, baseball bats).	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

This is the end of the survey. Please, press the bottom below to submit your responses.

Submit

Debriefing

Thank you for taking part in this study. The questionnaire you completed actually is part of an experiment which main objective is to know more about the influence of public opinion on people's support for different tactics employed by protesters. The article you read was specially created for this study with the purpose of describing one of the three possible scenarios the student protests had to face in relation to public audience (people given legitimacy, people denying legitimacy, and people indifferent to the protests). Moreover, the footage you watched after reading the article is an extract from a longer video recorded by an independent news agency during the 2010 student protests in London (you can find the complete video at https://youtu.be/jz0Z5_h_CtY).

We are expecting to find differences in the levels of support people might give to protesters tactics regarding what other people think about the protests (the article you read) and the exposure to police misbehaviour against protesters (the footage you watched).

Previous research has suggested that people who don't participate in protests might consider authorities (i.e., the police and the government) behaviour regarding protests to support the use of specific tactics by protesters. In addition, perceptions of public opinion legitimization of protests have also been suggested as a factor people might take into account to support protesters tactics, violent tactics in particular. This experiment is a continuation of such research into the influence of different levels of legitimacy given by

others to protests on the support for violent tactics in a scenario where authorities act against protesters.

The slight deception in the introductory information to the study given at the start was used to get you to respond to the study in an authentic and engaged way, without revealing the exact nature of the experiment. This is a standard technique in social psychology studies and I hope the deception did not negatively impact you in any way.

We hope you enjoyed participating in this project. Thank you once again for your support and cooperation with this research! If you have any questions regarding the study, please contact: Patricio Saavedra Morales: P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk or Professor John Drury: j.drury@sussex.ac.uk

Appendix 11: Online questionnaire for Chapter 5 Study 2

Attitudes towards protesters' tactics (protest in Catalonia)

Information and Consent

Dear participant,

You are being invited to take part in a research study. Before you decide whether or not to take part, it is important for you to understand why the research is being done and what it will involve. Please take the time to read the following information carefully.

This research is a questionnaire-based study led by researchers at the School of Psychology, University of Sussex. It seeks to explore the opinion of English people about protests and the different tactics employed by protesters.

If you decide to take part in this study, you will be asked to give your consent to proceed. Nonetheless, you are still free to withdraw at any time and without giving a reason till the point that the report of this project is drawn up (31st December 2018). For the latter, you can contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk).

Your participation will consist on answering a set of questions about protests and the tactics employed by protesters in them. **Filling in the questionnaire prepared for this project should take about 9 minutes of your time**.

Participation in this study does not involve any direct or indirect physical or psychological risk, and you will receive £0.75 as a reward for the time dedicated to this project.

Your involvement will be very valuable in knowing English people's reasons to support (or not) the actions carried out by protesters. The latter will allow to extend our understanding of this topic considering the different opinions people in England might have.

The results of this study will be used to write academic papers, and will be part of a PhD thesis. In addition, de-identified data collected from this study will be stored in the University of Sussex Data Repository, therefore, the data may be inspected and analysed by other researchers. This study has been approved by the Sciences & Technology Cross-Schools Research Ethics Committee (crecscitec@sussex.ac.uk). The project reference number is ER/PS356/9. The University of Sussex has insurance in place to cover its legal liabilities in respect of this study.

If you have any questions or comments regarding the study, please contact Patricio Saavedra (P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk), or if you have any concerns about the way in which the study has been conducted, please contact John Drury (j.drury@sussex.ac.uk).

Thank you for taking the time to read this information sheet. If you are willing to take part in this study please proceed to give your consent.

I agree to take part in the above University of Sussex research project. I have had the project explained to me and I have read and understood the Information Sheet for participants. I understand that agreeing to take part means that I am willing to fill out an online questionnaire.

I understand that any information I provide is confidential and that no information that I disclose will lead to the identification of any individual in the database of this project, either by the researcher or by any other party.

I understand that my participation is voluntary, that I can choose not to participate in part or all of the project, and that I can withdraw at any stage of the project till the point that the report is drawn up. I understand that de-identified data collected for this project will be stored in the University of Sussex Data Repository and may be accessed and analysed by other researchers.

☐ I give my consent to participate in this study

☐ I do not give my consent to participate in this study

How old are you?

What is your gender?

- ❍ Male
- ❍ Female
- ❍ Other

Which of these activities best describes what you are doing at present?

- ❍ Full time (30+ hrs per/wk)
- ❍ Part-time (8 – 29 hrs per/wk)
- ❍ Part-time (less than 8hrs per/wk)
- ❍ House person
- ❍ Retired
- ❍ Registered unemployed
- ❍ Unemployed but not registered
- ❍ Student/full time education
- ❍ Other

There are many kinds of groups in the world: men and women, ethnic and religious groups, nationalities, political factions. How much do you support or oppose the ideas about groups in general? Next to each statement, select a number from 1 (*extremely oppose*) to 10 (*extremely favour*) to show your opinion.

	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
In setting priorities, we must consider all groups	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
We should not push for equality between groups	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Group equality should be our ideal	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Superior groups should dominate inferior groups	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Thinking about the police of your local area, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below (1 *strongly disagree*, 2 *disagree*, 3 *neither agree nor disagree*, 4 *agree, 5 strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Police protect people's basic rights	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police are generally honest	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Most police officers do their jobs well	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police can be trusted to do what's right	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Do you or any of your immediate family or close friends work for the Police force?

- ❍ Yes, me
- ❍ Yes, a family member
- ❍ Yes, a close friend
- ❍ No

Taking into account what you think about the presence of social movements and protests in your country, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
I think that participating in protests is a valid political action	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
It is fine that people carry out protests even though I do not share the protesters' concerns	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I value the development of protests in spite of the fact these can be inconvenient	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
People have the right to protest anyway they choose	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Have you participated in marches or protests during the last 12 months?

- ❍ Yes
- ❍ No

How often do you follow politics in the news on television, the radio or in the daily papers?

- ❍ Never
- ❍ Once or twice a week
- ❍ Several times a week
- ❍ Everyday

How representative do you think your political thoughts are of the English people's opinion?

- ❍ 1 Non representative
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Very representative

How similar are you to the average English person?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Very similar

How similar are you to the average European person?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 Very similar

How much do you know about the situation in Catalonia?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

Condition 1: Public opinion legitimises protests

Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following sections.

On the first of October 2017, Catalonia's pro-independence movement organised a referendum to decide the continuity of the region as part of Spain. Even though the referendum was declared illegal by Spanish central government and the constitutional court, that day thousands of Catalans went to polling stations to cast their ballots. To stop the referendum Spanish government confiscated ballot papers; arrested key officials; and shut down the connections between polling stations. In addition, riot police units were deployed in Catalonia to seize ballot boxes, remove voters from polling stations, and maintain public order.

News records on this issue demonstrate that although the international community was divided on the issue, most English people thought Catalans had the right to cast their ballots and protest against the government measures. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like 'Catalans have the right to vote on their own future and protest to defend their democratic rights' or 'protests are useful for people to make their voices heard'. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people's opinion on the Catalan situation.


English attitudes towards the Catalan situation
15%
20%
65%
People who legitimated Catalan referendum and protests
People who thought neither Catalan referedum nor protests were legitimate
People who were indifferent to Catalan situation

Condition 2: Public opinion doesn't legitimise protests

Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following sections.

On the first of October 2017, Catalonia's pro-independence movement organised a referendum to decide the continuity of the region as part of Spain. Even though the referendum was declared illegal by Spanish central government and the constitutional court, that day thousands of Catalans went to polling stations to cast their ballots. To stop the referendum Spanish government confiscated ballot papers; arrested key officials; and shut down the connections between polling stations. In addition, riot police units were deployed in Catalonia to seize ballot boxes, remove voters from polling stations, and maintain public order.

News records on this issue demonstrate that although the international community was divided on the issue, most English people thought Catalans had neither right to cast their ballots nor protest against the government. Indeed, in England prevailed the idea that Catalans should have accepted Spanish government decisions on behalf of the interests of the entire country. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like 'Catalans should be restricted from voting and protesting, they posed a threat to public order' or 'protests usually go nowhere and are just an excuse for rioting and looting'. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people's opinion on the Catalan situation.


English attitudes towards the Catalan situation
15%
20%
65%
People who legitimated Catalan referendum and protests
People who thought neither Catalan referedum nor protests were legitimate
People who were indifferent to Catalan situation

Condition 3: Public opinion indifferent to protest

Please, read the information presented below, then, answer the questions relate to it in the following sections.

On the first of October 2017, Catalonia's pro-independence movement organised a referendum to decide the continuity of the region as part of Spain. Even though the referendum was declared illegal by Spanish central government and the constitutional court, that day thousands of Catalans went to polling stations to cast their ballots. To stop the referendum Spanish government confiscated ballot papers; arrested key officials; and shut down the connections between polling stations. In addition, riot police units were deployed in Catalonia to seize ballot boxes, remove voters from polling stations, and maintain public order.

News records on this issue demonstrate that although the international community was divided on the issue, most English people showed no interest in the Catalan situation. In line with this, a study recently published by the BBC shows that in most of the testimonies collected during those days people said things like 'who cares about what is going on in Spain. The only important thing here is hard work and paying the bills' or 'people should focus their attention on solving English people's problems instead of wasting their time

in foreign issues'. Further, the following pie chart was included in the article to illustrate English people's opinion on the Catalan situation.



According to the information you read about, to what extent did people actively believe Catalans had the right to vote and protest against government decisions?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

According to the information you read about, to what extent did people think protests are important in a democratic system?

- ❍ 1 None
- ❍ 2
- ❍ 3
- ❍ 4
- ❍ 5 A lot

The footage you are about to watch is of the events that took place at some polling stations during the referendum in Catalonia.

Link to the video: https://youtu.be/APsHNIrS7-s**.**

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the protesters in the video (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Given the way the protesters are treated by the police, I can easily identify with them (the protesters)	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I share the same beliefs and values with protesters when it comes to the way the police should act in protests.	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I feel solidarity with the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I feel a bond with the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I identified with the protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below in relation to the police officers in the video (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
I identified with the police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police officers in the video have the same sense of right and wrong as me	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
The police officers in the video stand up for values that are important for people like me	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
I support the way the police officers acted in the video	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Considering the police behaviour in the video, please indicate your agreement with each of the statements below (1 *strongly disagree*, 2 *disagree*, 3 *neither agree nor disagree*, 4 *agree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Police treated protesters with respect	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police treated protesters fairly	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police took time to listen to protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Police explained their decisions to protesters	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

Please indicate the extent you would support the following actions protesters in the video might carry out as a reaction to the police behaviour (1 *strongly disagree*, 5 *strongly agree*).

	1	2	3	4	5
Pushing the police back	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Yelling at the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Disobeying police orders	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Throwing stones or other objects at the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Hitting police officers with bare hands	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Tackling mounted police officers	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Throwing petrol bombs at the police	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍
Hitting police officers using weapons (e.g., sticks, baseball bats).	❍	❍	❍	❍	❍

This is the end of the survey. Please, press the bottom below to submit your responses.

Submit

Debriefing

Thank you for taking part in this study. The questionnaire you completed actually is part of an experiment which main objective is to know more about the influence of public opinion on people's support for different tactics employed by protesters. The article you read was specially created for this study with the purpose of describing one of the three possible scenarios the pro-independence movement in Catalonia had to face in relation to public audience (people given legitimacy, people denying legitimacy, and people indifferent to the referendum and protests). Moreover, the footage you watched after reading the article is an extract from a longer compilation of footages about the events took place over the Catalonian independence referendum on the first of October 2017 (you can find the complete video at https://youtu.be/APsHNIrS7-s).

We are expecting to find differences in the levels of support people might give to protesters tactics regarding what other people think about the referendum and protests (the article you read) and the exposure to police misbehaviour against protesters (the footage you watched).

Previous research has suggested that people who don't participate in protests might consider authorities (i.e., the police and the government) behaviour regarding protests to support the use of specific tactics by protesters. In addition, perceptions of public opinion legitimization of protests have also been suggested as a factor people might take into account to support protesters tactics, violent tactics in particular. This experiment is a continuation of such research into the influence of different levels of legitimacy given by

others to protests on the support for violent tactics in a scenario where authorities act against protesters.

The slight deception in the introductory information to the study given at the start was used to get you to respond to the study in an authentic and engaged way, without revealing the exact nature of the experiment. This is a standard technique in social psychology studies and I hope the deception did not negatively impact you in any way.

We hope you enjoyed participating in this project. Thank you once again for your support and cooperation with this research! If you have any questions regarding the study, please contact: Patricio Saavedra Morales: P.Saavedra-Morales@sussex.ac.uk or Professor John Drury: j.drury@sussex.ac.uk