Party and State Development: Sequencing and the Institutionalisation of Party Systems in South Asia

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PhD in Politics

University of Sussex

September 2021

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:……

Abstract

This research project introduces a new framework for understanding the role of political parties' relationship to the state on the institutionalisation of party systems. Conventional understandings of party system institutionalisation assume that institutionalised parties are necessary for interparty competition to stabilise. However, this approach fails to recognise the role of the state in shaping interparty competition and the development of political parties. This research project shows how parties' relationship to the state at critical junctures in the development of the political system have important effects on the trajectory of party system formation and institutionalisation. This is shown through a comparative study of the development of political parties and party systems in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, using process tracing and survey data collected through expert surveys.

The study finds that the sequencing of party and state development has a significant effect on the formation of party systems and their institutionalisation. This sequencing effect is defined by the comparative level of institutional development between political parties and the state. It is argued that at critical junctures, this relationship has a defining effect on the formation and development of party systems. Further, this relationship influences the development of political parties and the institutionalisation of party systems over time. This framework which incorporates the role of the state proposes a new way for understanding the institutionalisation of parties and party systems.

Acknowledgements

My first word of thanks goes to the many scholars cited in this thesis without whom this project would not have been possible. Many of them also contributed towards the expert survey which informs my theory and again, without their input this project would not have come to fruition.

My second debt of gratitude is towards my supervisors Rekha Diwakar and Paul Webb whose experience and advice clarified my thinking and helped articulate my ideas. Thank you for your words of encouragement and for putting up with my restlessness. A further thank you goes to Olli Hellmann who served as a supervisor in my first year. While Olli only supervised part of the project, he left a clear mark on the final product through his own research and important suggestions in the early stages of the project.

Thank you to the University of Sussex which funded my research through the Chancellor's International Research Scholarship and thank you to all my colleagues at the University in the department, school and beyond who commented on my work and made suggestions on early versions of my ideas. There are also many colleagues beyond Sussex and the United Kingdom that have shaped this project and my professional development through their suggestions, kindness, and words of encouragement. Thank you to them.

Vir my familie, dankie vir al die jare van steun en aanmoediging. Mamma en Pappa, dankie vir julle goeie voorbeeld van harde werk, deursettingsvermoë en liefde.

Finally, thank you to all the friends who I've lived, studied and grown with over the last three years. Merci, gracias, tack, σας ευχαριστώ, धन्यवाद, 谢谢.

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Abbreviations

ANC – African National Congress

BAL – Bangladesh Awami League

BDP – Botswana Democratic Party

BJP – Bharatiya Janata Party

BJS – Bharatiya Janata Sangh

BNP – Bangladesh Nationalist Party

BSP – Bahujan Samaj Party

CCM – Chama Cha Mapinduzi

CCP – Chinese Communist Party

DALP – Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project

DMK – Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam

ENP – Effective Number of Parties

EV – Electoral Volatility

FPTP – first-past-the-post

INC – Indian National Congress

INC (I) – Indian National Congress (Indira)

INC (O) – Indian National Congress (Organisation)

INC (R) – Indian National Congress (Requisition)

JD – Janata Dal

JI – Jamaat-e-Islami

JP – Jatiya Party

KMT – Kuomintang

LDP – Liberal Democratic Party

MMD – Movement for Multi-Party Democracy

MRD – Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

NDA – National Democratic Alliance

NDC – National Democratic Congress

NPCG – Non-Party Caretaker Government

NPP – New Patriotic Party

OBC – Other Backward Classes

PML – Pakistan Muslim League

PML (Q) – Pakistan Muslim League (Quaid e Azam Group)

PML (N) – Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz)

PNA – Pakistan National Alliance

PPDB – Political Parties Data Base

PPP – Pakistan Peoples Party

PPPP – Pakistan Peoples Party Parliamentarians

PR – proportional representation

PTI – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf

PSI – Party System Institutionalisation

RSS – Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh

SNTV – single non-transferable voting

SWAPO – South-West African People's Organisation

UNIP – United National Independence Party

UPA – United Progressive Alliance

Chapter 1
Introduction

The characteristics of party systems have immense consequences in determining the quality of democratic representation, the stability of governments and potentially, even the survival of the overall political system. Consequently, there is widespread agreement in the democratisation literature that political parties and party systems play a vital role in democratic transition and consolidation, with the strength or weakness of institutionalisation regarded as a significant determining factor in the success or failure of democratic consolidation. As a result, poorly institutionalised parties and underdeveloped party systems are often considered the weakest link in consolidating democracy.

This is true to the extent that party system institutionalisation (PSI) is considered necessary, although not sufficient, for the survival and consolidation of democratic processes, which is why scholars such as Mainwaring (2018: 2) see the level of institutionalisation as "one of the most important attributes along which party systems vary". The dominant scholarship assumes that party system institutionalisation is primarily dependent on the institutionalisation of parties that will stabilise voter preferences through the development of the party organisation and the formation of ideological links to society.

This thesis, however, argues that party institutionalisation is not necessarily the only way for party systems to become institutionalised. Party system and PSI theories mostly neglect the role of the state, leaving a gap in the literature on how parties and the state

interact in the formation and change of party systems. In the context of emerging democracies, this gap is particularly significant as state capacity and the professionalisation of the bureaucracy are often lacking, which makes it easier for parties to co-opt the state. This relationship and the sequencing of party and state development have important implications for political stability and governance and this thesis introduces a new framework for understanding the role of political parties' relationship to the state on the stability of party systems in emerging democracies.

In South Asia, various party systems during different periods have been characterised by relative continuity in the party systems despite the presence of weakly institutionalised parties. It is hypothesised that this was primarily due to the parties' relationship to the state with parties originating from the state or co-opting parts of the state for the parties' benefit, which allowed parties to maintain a competitive advantage over challenger parties despite relatively weak links to society and low organisational complexity. This thesis tests the hypothesis that through the interpenetration of the party and the state, parties can become persistent features of the system without having to institutionalise and can supplement their lack of organisational capacity and weak societal links with state resources to entrench their position in the party system. In this way, it introduces a new framework for understanding the role of the state in party system formation and institutionalisation.

In the first section of this chapter, an overview of party system formation and change in the literature is provided. Thereafter, the dominant framework for conceptualising PSI is reviewed, followed by a section conceptualising party institutionalisation. This is followed by a section discussing the relationship between party and PSI in the South Asian context to make the argument that South Asia is a theoretical anomaly incongruent

with existing PSI theories that can only be explained by acknowledging the role of the state. This is followed by a section discussing the hypothesis that party systems can become institutionalised without institutionalised parties if parties are capable of co-opting the state to support the party.

1.1. Party Systems in the Literature

Sartori (1976: 43) defines party systems as the system that "results from, and consists of, the patterned interactions of its component parts, thereby implying that such interactions provide the boundaries, or at least the boundedness, of the system". Consequently, these systems constitute something more than individual parties as "the system displays properties that do not belong to a separate consideration of its component elements" (Sartori 1976: 43). A common error some scholars make is to discuss party systems primarily in terms of the individual parties that compose the system. However, party systems are more than just the individual units and the system should be studied both in terms of the component political parties *and* how they relate to each other.

To understand variance in the party systems of Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, this thesis assesses both the formation of the respective party systems and the causes of change. The characteristics of party systems at their formation are significant as they determine the functioning of the political system for a significant period as a consequence of path dependency, and this affects later developments in the system. Significantly, this process of party system formation also usually occurs during a crucial period of state formation and institution building with profound consequences for the functioning of the entire political system as norms are formed, institutions built, and the political structures take shape. Further, it is important to understand party system change and whether processes

are decaying or institutionalising as the decay of existing processes creates unpredictability in a system, which often facilitates system collapse.

Party System Formation – Institutionalising a System

Following the framework set out by Chhibber and Kollman (2004: 9-16), there are three commonly used approaches for understanding the formation of party systems. The first, famously provided by Lipset and Rokkan (1990), is the sociological argument that party systems are rooted in stable social cleavages formed in the process of democratisation. These divisions are based around the mobilisation of social groups and the banding together of elites in the process of state-building and these societal cleavages are determined by the nature of the conflict between different social groups such as between classes, religious groups, and different elites such as the struggle between those favouring centralisation and those favouring the devolution of power. The early history of newly independent states and their path towards democratisation is thereby important in understanding the formation of cleavages in the social structure and the formation of the party system as the system is rooted in social conflict.

For instance, existing research on party system formation and PSI finds that the transition to democratic rule and the formation of the party system at the time of independence is a significant determining factor in explaining the degree of institutionalisation. In Africa, for instance, it has been found that existence of structures for mobilisation such as trade unions prior to independence provided the organisational power necessary for successful mobilisation and the formation of strong political parties that could contribute towards the development of a party system (LeBas 2011: 6). By contrast, where authoritarian rule suppressed mobilising structures such as these, parties were more likely to fragment along

ethnic lines or organise around personalised patronage networks which undermined later institutionalisation.

The second approach sees party systems as a result of attempts to resolve collective dilemmas. This approach regards voter, party and candidate behaviour to be determined by the logic of competition with parties seen as trying to maximise their ability to gain the electorate's votes who seek to maximise their own wellbeing (Ware 1996: 9). In this context, politicians have an incentive to join party organisations as a means of achieving their goals in gaining votes and setting policy. In emerging democracies, this can take the form of clientelism and patronage to form bonds between parties and voters to gain support.

The third approach works in conjunction with the first two and recognises the effect of institutions which mediate political conflict through rules and determine how politics is conducted within a country. This includes the work of Duverger (1963) which claims that the number of parties in a system will be influenced by electoral rules as the first-past-the-post voting system will favour two-party systems. This further includes Gallagher and Mitchell (2005) who argue that electoral rules will shape the choices available to voters, how governments are formed and if coalitions are necessary. The nature of the electoral system will also have psychological effects as elites respond to incentives created by electoral rules such as first-past-the-post systems which create disincentives for the formation of new parties as both voters and elites recognise that the system favours a strong two-party system (Blais & Massicotte 2002: 56).

One of the major gaps in understanding party system formation is the question of the role of the state and parties' relationship to the state. The majority of theories in the literature on party system formation assume that the party system is primarily structured by

competition between parties and the relationship between parties and the electorate. However, this disregards the state's role in structuring the environment in which party competition occurs and may favour some parties over others. Where parties have been able to co-opt parts of the state or receive some form of informal support from the state, they may be able to leverage this relationship to their advantage and exclude challenger parties from the core of the party system. A privileged relationship with the state may provide parties with resources that give them an advantage over rivals and so through their relationship with the state, rather than through the development of linkages with society, parties can maintain their position in a party system, allowing the system to stabilise.

In emerging democracies, factors like the colonial history of countries play an important role in party system formation with parties' roles in decolonisation and their relationship to the state post-independence providing some parties with opportunities to capture parts of the state for their advantage. Additionally, in younger democracies, the weakness of parties or the state may mean that one is dominated by the other, which will affect their ability to develop independently. In some cases, there may be challenges in the differentiation of parties and the state - particularly in post-authoritarian regimes, where parties may have emerged from the state, or in countries where one party dominated the independence movement.

In this context, the origins of the parties forming the party system and the strength of the state proves significant to understanding how the party system is structured and how future change in the system will occur. Based on this, it can be hypothesised that in countries where the state is weak or where parties can dominate the state, parties will be able to use state resources to further bolster their position in the party system. In such

systems, parties can use their position to informally institutionalise their relationship with the state, which will give the parties an advantage over their competitors and allow parties to entrench themselves in the party system. In turn, this institutionalised state-party relationship will stabilise competition and allow for the formation of a relatively institutionalised party system.

Party System Change and Institutionalisation

Once party systems have formed, a persistent concern in the literature is whether these systems remain stable and institutionalise or whether patterns of interaction change. The question of change lies at the core of stability and it is widely recognised that change can lead to instability and potentially democratic collapse. Consequently, there is a significant normative interest in understanding the factors which promote continuity in party systems as well as those which provoke change.

Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 575) argue that in the East and Southeast Asian context party systems have been institutionalised due to the presence of highly institutionalised authoritarian parties under semi-democratic rule. Similarly, Riedl (2014: 1) finds that the presence of a strong incumbent produces more stable party competition, fostering greater cohesion among the opposition and producing more accountability in Sub-Saharan Africa. In the emerging democracies of these regions, strongly institutionalised parties are seen as the primary route to the development of an institutionalised party system to the extent that Hicken and Kuhonta (2015: 3-4) claim that the stability of interparty competition necessarily depends on the existence of institutionalised parties.

In asking what explains variance in party systems across South Asia, it is generally assumed that variance in party systems stability following independence can be traced to the extent of party institutionalisation at the time of independence with the argument that

more institutionalised parties are more likely to form institutionalised party systems while poorly institutionalised parties are more likely to produce inchoate party systems. The significance of the relationship between party and party system institutionalisation is readily apparent in the fragmentation of India's party system, for example, with the causes of party splits often based in regional branches failing to resolve disputes with central leadership at times due to a lack of intra-party democracy.

Similarly, the party system instability in the early democratic history of Pakistan can be seen as a direct consequence of a failure to resolve intra-party disputes in the Muslim League, while the party's superficial links to Pakistani society after partition can be considered an additional debilitating factor undermining its legitimacy, which ultimately led to the collapse of the party system. In contemporary Pakistan, this problem continues to be the case to the extent that Amundsen (2016: 52) says "parties are like family businesses. Coalitions are based on political convenience rather than ideology or policy compatibility".

However, in the South Asian context, it can also be seen that party systems during some periods have remained stable despite a lack of institutionalised parties, which proves to be difficult to reconcile with existing theories of the relationship between party and party system institutionalisation. The puzzle then is to understand how party system change can occur without the parties themselves changing. It is hypothesised that this can occur due changes in parties' relationship with the state. In this way, parties can stay relatively under-institutionalised but through interpenetration with the state can entrench their position in the system, in turn leading to the formation of an institutionalised party system. If parties are able to institutionalise an informal relationship to the state in which they are

able to use state resources to support them, then they can become a more persistent feature of the party system, in turn leading to the institutionalisation of the system.

1.2. Conceptualising Party System Institutionalisation

After an initial wave of scholarship expanding on institutionalisation as a concept, including the work of Gurr (1968: 1114), Keohane (1969: 861-862) and Hopkins (1970: 768), interest in the concept diminished. However, the third-wave of democratisation inspired a renewal in interest as the focus shifted towards the institutionalisation of party systems (Sanches 2018: 20-21). Much of this was inspired by Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) contribution which provided a new framework for understanding and measuring PSI that has reminded the dominant framework for understanding PSI since.

As the scholarship has developed, understandings of the institutionalisation of party systems have changed significantly with various attempts at conceptual refinement and improvement on existing indicators. This is particularly the case for the quest to define the constituent components that characterise PSI. However, the dominant framework in use remains that of Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 4-5), who define an institutionalised party system using four dimensions:

1. Stability in inter-party competition, regarding the rules and nature of competition, and in the regularity of vote shares between elections. In contrast, a system that is not institutionalised is characterised as one in which parties appear and disappear. They choose to use Pedersen's index of electoral volatility to operationalise this component.
2. Stable roots in society, defined as the "linkages between parties, citizens, and organized interests" (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 9). They see this as the structuring of political preferences into regular voting patterns, which should

additionally mean that parties maintain a relatively consistent ideological position so that voters can locate parties on the political spectrum.

3. Legitimacy of the electoral process as the means of determining access to power. This is the belief that open elections should determine which parties govern and the main political actors must accept this as the legitimate route to power.
4. Party organisation, such that parties are not subordinated to the interests of individual leaders and have independence and value of their own. Additionally, "it is a sign of greater institutionalisation" (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 5) if parties have established party structures, are well organised, have resources of their own, have some form of cohesion, and generally have a tendency towards the routinisation of intraparty procedures particularly for determining who controls the party. In turn, intense factionalism is regarded as an erosion of party organisation.

While this conceptualisation has become the most commonly accepted framework for studying the institutionalisation of party systems, they do not provide precise indicators for criteria other than stability. Indeed, the last three dimensions of PSI identified by the pair are rough and incomplete approximations, leading to Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 14) admitting that they lack the data to adequately measure attitudinal components such as perceptions of elections as the legitimate route to power.

The theme of stability in party competition is found throughout the dominant literature (Meleshevich 2007: 18-21) and as argued by Mainwaring and Torcal (2006: 206), it is "perhaps the most important [dimension] because institutionalization is conceptually very closely linked to stability". Consequently, the stability of inter-party competition is often taken as the main dimension along which to understand PSI. Indeed, Casal Bértoa (2018:

66) in a review of the conceptual evolution of PSI, finds stability as the recurring theme across the literature. Based on this understanding, institutionalised party systems can be defined as those:

> "in which actors develop expectations and behavior based on the premise that the fundamental contours and rules of party competition and behavior will prevail into the foreseeable future. In an institutionalized party system, there is stability in who the main parties are and how they behave" (Mainwaring & Torcal 2006: 206).

Mainwaring and Scully's conceptualisation of PSI is based on a comparative study of Latin American party systems spanning 12 countries in central and southern America. The party systems are compared along the four dimensions included in their conceptualisation, but the main means of comparing party systems is the use of Pedersen's Index of Electoral Volatility (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 6-7). This approach is primarily focused on measuring stability in interparty competition by measuring continuity in the relative vote share of parties between successive elections (Pedersen 1979: 3). High levels of volatility in parties' respective vote share between successive elections are taken an indication of instability while continuity in parties' relative vote share is seen as an indicator of institutionalisation in the system.

Based on calculations of different party systems' electoral volatility, they cluster party systems into three categories encompassing institutionalised competitive party systems such as Chile and Costa Rica, underdeveloped party systems such as Peru and Brazil, and hegemonic party systems in transition such as Mexico. The extent of organisational complexity in the political parties as well as the strength of parties' linkages to society are then determined for each country using the age of parties as a proxy for social linkages

with the assumption that this is an indication that parties have secured the long-term loyalty of a segment of the population (Mainwaring & Scully 1995: 13).

Based on these metrics, party systems are ranked along the four dimensions with the authors finding a tendency for party systems with low electoral volatility to also have stable party organisations and linkages. Based on this, Mainwaring and Scully (1995) determine that there is an association between the institutionalisation of political parties, in terms of their organisational complexity and the strength of their linkages, and stability in interparty competition as measured by low electoral volatility. Their analysis emphasises the role of political parties in institutionalising a party system and see the development of institutionalised parties with strong linkages and a well-developed party organisation as the "underpinnings that facilitate PSI' (Mainwaring 2018: 4).

Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 575) reach a similar conclusion regarding the role of well-developed parties in the formation of institutionalised party systems in their study of East and Southeast Asian party systems. While Mainwaring and Scully emphasise the importance of PSI in consolidating democracy, Hicken and Kuhonta instead separate the concept from democracy. This is informed by their finding that many of the institutionalised party systems of East and Southeast Asia have their origins in some form of authoritarianism either through the success of previously authoritarian parties or semi-democratic regimes.

Using electoral volatility as a proxy for PSI, Hicken and Kuhonta compare 14 party systems in Asia and rank the systems according to the extent of volatility in interparty competition. Based on this data, they find that the passage of more elections does not inevitably lead to the institutionalisation of party systems and instead find that the institutionalisation of a party system is more likely "where the ruling party under the

previous authoritarian regime was highly institutionalized" (Hicken and Kuhonta 2011: 584). Consequently, they argue that the stability of interparty competition necessarily depends on the existence of strongly institutionalised parties which is seen as the primary route to the development of an institutionalised party system (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015: 3-4). They particularly emphasise a timing effect of the post-World War II development of the bureaucratic-authoritarian regimes in Asia which proved a critical juncture in moulding Asian political parties and led to the emerge of strongly institutionalised parties such as in Singapore, Malaysia and Taiwan.

Croissant & Völkel (2012) similarly seek to understand PSI in East and Southeast Asia by comparing seven Asian democracies including East Timor, Indonesia, Mongolia, the Philippines, South Korea, Taiwan and Thailand and exclude the semi-democratic regimes examined by Hicken and Kuhonta (2015). Their approach further differs in their use of Laakso and Taagepera's effective number of parties (ENP) method which uses electoral data to determine how many parties "effectively" share the party system. This is accomplished by considering the relative size of the parties represented in the legislature with the assumption that fluctuations in the effective number of parties will destabilise a party system (Laakso & Taagepera 1979: 3). This is useful for understanding trends in the fragmentation or consolidation of party competition between elections.

While Hicken and Kunota (2015) find that a longer history of democracy does not necessarily lead to the institutionalisation of party systems, Croissant and Völkel (2012: 250) add the qualification that the passing of at least one generation appears to be necessary for a party system to take root. Although confirming the importance of Asian parties' past authoritarian experience and relationship to the state, Croissant and Völkel

(2012) place greater emphasis on the role of structural factors such as political cleavages in determining the institutionalisation of interparty competition.

Riedl's (2014) study of party systems in 23 African countries makes similar findings on both the importance of structural factors and strong authoritarian parties in institutionalising party systems. The 23 African cases are compared using electoral volatility as a measure of stability in interparty competition to rank party systems according to the extent of PSI and separate weakly institutionalised systems from those exhibiting greater stability (Riedl 2014: 38). Through process tracing, the highly institutionalised cases are in turn analysed to understand the origin of their stable party systems. Riedl (2014: 5) finds that the balance of power between the incumbent authoritarian party and the opposition at the time of democratisation has a lasting impact on the nature of the party system as the strength or weakness of the incumbent in the transition influences the institutional rules, organisational development and the cleavages that define party competition. In cases with a strong incumbent party, this has fostered greater cohesion among the opposition and produces more stable party competition in Sub-Saharan Africa.

There are several similarities in the comparative literature on PSI in the emerging democracies of Latin America, Asia and Africa. First, most authors place a significant emphasis on the importance of institutionalisation of individual parties in terms of the strength of their linkages to society and the organisational development of the party organisation. The underlying assumption is that stable linkages to society are built through the development of party organisations, which in turn firmly roots political parties in society which allows for continuity in party system. In such cases, voters have

clear heuristics and ties to well-developed parties which will maintain continuity in the party system and allow for a party system to institutionalise.

Second, in both Asia and Africa, the presence of a strong previously authoritarian party is seen as facilitating the development of institutionalised party systems. In East and Southeast Asia, previously authoritarian parties have benefitted from strong party organisations developed under the previous regime which has given these parties a competitive advantage under democracy and in many cases, they have remained the ruling party around which the party system is structured and has stabilised. In Africa, the presence of strong incumbent authoritarian regimes has in turn led to the development of strong opposition parties united against the regime. This has allowed for the formation of pro- or anti-regime cleavages around which interparty competition can institutionalise.

While Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) framework has been widely used for studying the institutionalisation of party systems and has shaped the major literature on PSI, it has also been criticised for assuming a linear understanding of PSI on a spectrum of institutionalised or inchoate. Further, Mainwaring and Scully's conceptualisation of PSI has been challenged with the argument that their framework conflates concepts of party institutionalisation and the institutionalisation of a system by assuming that there is no possibility for the divergence of the two concepts. This linear understanding of PSI has been challenged with arguments in favour of unpacking the different dimensions of the concept.

Luna (2014: 404) critiques both Mainwaring and Scully's linear understanding of PSI as on a spectrum of institutionalised or inchoate as well as the widespread use of Pedersen's (1979) electoral volatility measure as a valid proxy for PSI which reinforces the linear understanding of PSI. Luna goes as far as arguing that this conceptualisation of PSI leaves

questions of cause and effect regarding the different dimensions ambiguous, making it difficult to determine if a high level of institutionalisation in one dimension is a symptom or cause of high institutionalisation in another dimension. Rather, Luna (2014: 413) argues that the different dimensions of PSI should not be conflated into a single measure or be considered as necessarily correlated as party systems can be made up of "contradictory configurations" in which systems exhibit vastly different levels of institutionalisation in the various dimensions.

Luna's work forms part of a critical strain of PSI scholarship which seeks to apply prevailing understandings to specific cases with the aim of furthering conceptual or theoretical understandings of PSI. One of the central themes found in this literature is challenging the assumption that political parties must necessarily be well-developed for a party system to institutionalise. This includes the work of Hellmann (2014: 54), who uses the example of the South Korean party system to show that interparty competition can be stable even where parties exhibit a lack of formal party organisation. Much of the South Korean party system's underlying stability is masked in the comparative literature's cursory overview of cases which largely only uses electoral volatility as a proxy for stability. Calculations of electoral volatility assume that party splits, mergers and the entrance of new parties are an indication of instability and thus code the South Korean party system as unstable. However, this disguises the reality that although the parties in the system are constantly changing, there is an underlying stability in South Korea's principal political actors who retain strong ideological linkages to society and business (Hellmann 2014: 60).

In such a case, party splits and mergers are taken by the comparative literature as an indicator of volatility, but behind the party name changes there is significant continuity

in the personalities and elite networks that define South Korean politics. In this way, the party system shows a measure of continuity in interparty competition despite the highly personalised nature of South Korean parties and the lack of well-developed party organisations - counter to the expectations of the comparative literature on PSI. This challenges the assumption that party organisation must necessarily be strong for institutionalised party systems to form and like Luna (2014), Hellmann (2014) challenges the practice of aggregating the various attributes of PSI into a single linear concept.

Similarly, Luna and Altman (2011) challenge conventional assumptions of PSI through an in-depth analysis of the Chilean party system. The comparative literature considers the Chilean party system to be well-institutionalised and in Mainwaring and Scully's 1995 study, it is considered one of the most institutionalised systems in Latin America with one of the lowest electoral volatility scores. However, as Luna and Altman show through survey data on voter's ideological preferences and ties to political parties, Chilean parties only have weak linkages to society. Again, contrary to theoretical expectations that institutionalised party systems are built on the strength of party organisations and parties' linkages to society, Chile shows that party systems can be stable without ideologically rooted parties or strong party organisations (Luna & Altman 2011: 22).

Both studies provide counter examples to the conventional theories in the comparative literature and much of the critical strain of PSI literature is concerned with unpacking the various dimensions contributing towards PSI. This is based on the acknowledgement that party systems can be "unevenly" institutionalised particularly in the level of institutionalisation in individual parties (Randall & Svåsand 2002: 8–9). Part of the problem stems from Mainwaring and Scully's failure to disentangle the relationship of party institutionalisation and PSI. Indeed, two of the four characteristics of

institutionalised party systems which they identify (party rootedness and party organisation) seem to relate more closely to the institutionalisation of individual parties as opposed to the system of interaction.

The conflation of the two concepts undermines attempts to understand the causes of PSI and this thesis challenges this dominant understanding of PSI which sees party institutionalisation and PSI as directly related. As discussed above, it is possible for the two concepts to diverge, which then raises the question as to how party systems can become institutionalised without institutionalised parties. This thesis proposes to fill this gap in the literature with the argument that party-state relations matter and that party systems can assume an institutionalised form through the development of informal relationships between parties and the state which stabilises parties' position in the system without parties institutionalising.

1.3. Conceptualising Party Institutionalisation

Huntington is credited with first developing the idea of the institutionalisation of organisations and political systems which he sees as "the process by which organisations and procedures acquire value and stability" (Huntington 1965: 394). His seminal work on the concept has proven foundational to later conceptualisations of PSI and research on party institutionalisation. He defines this process in terms of four dimensions:

1. Adaptability/rigidity, regarded as the ability to address and adapt to challenges arising from a changing environment. He chooses to measure this in terms of: age as a reflection of its ability to survive, generational age in terms of the ability of institutions to continue independently of founding figures, and the extent of functional change regarded as the ability to adapt to a changing environment.

2. Complexity/simplicity, determined by the number of subunits in an organisation and the differentiation in function between units. Organisations with a greater number of functions are also considered more complex and are more capable of adjusting to a changing environment, allowing for more flexibility. A more complex organisation or system also creates an effective training ground with offices lower in the hierarchy serving as a filter for merit and a system through which to gain experience as individuals progress to the core.

3. Autonomy/subordination, defined by the extent to which organisations and procedures are differentiated and exist independently of each other with their own interests and values which insulates them from outside influence. In particular reference to political parties, Huntington claims that a political party which expresses the interests of only one group in society is less autonomous than a party which articulates and aggregates the interests of several social groups as that party is bound to be captured by the interests of a single entity.

4. Coherence/disunity, understood as some measure of consensus among the units composing a system around the functional boundaries of the system and the procedures for resolving disputes. This aspect also serves to exclude outsiders from disrupting the system.

While his ideas of autonomy and coherence have largely been ignored in later conceptualisations, adaptability and the complexity of an organisation continue to be seen as important components of party institutionalisation. Other scholars focus on questions of stability and continuity in parties such as Panebianco (1988: 18) who defines party institutionalisation as “the consolidation of the organization, the passage from an initial, structurally fluid, phase when a new-born organization is still forming, to a phase in which

the organization stabilizes". Consequently, parties lacking institutionalisation are those which act on an *ad hoc* basis, based in personalism with a leader-centric organisational structure. In such parties, "activists often find their career advancement prospects blocked by arbitrary decision-making, nepotistic practices or the whims of a few leaders at the top" (Chhibber et al. 2014: 492).

Others define party institutionalisation in terms of stability and the routinisation of the party and define it along two dimensions: the stability of a party's roots in society, and the routinised nature of its organisational structure (Casal Bértoa 2017: 408). Still others further nuance this understanding by seeing societal rootedness in terms of the popular legitimacy of parties based on whether they are held in esteem by voters and the extent of organisational strength rather than just its routinisation (Webb & White 2007:12-14). A further way of conceptualising party institutionalisation is to distinguish between internal, the routinisation of the organisation, and external factors, the perception of outside actors that a party has "lasting power" (Harmel et al. 2019: 12-13).

While there are various approaches for conceptualising PI, a few persistent themes can be found around which to form a conceptual synthesis. The main themes centre around the routinisation and complexity of the party as an organisation and the strength of a party's relationship to society. Building on these understandings of party institutionalisation, this study measures party institutionalisation along the following dimensions:

1. Routinised organisational structures – this reflects the internal dimension of institutionalisation which is determined by the extent to which parties are valued in their own right beyond founding figures and exhibit routinised organisational processes and complexity beyond individual figures. This

would include identifying whether a party is based on personalism and the extent of intra-party democracy. Greater levels of organisational complexity and routinised mechanisms for choosing party leaders indicate greater institutionalisation.

2. Stable roots in society, determined by questions of voter identification, party membership, and links to other societal actors such as business or trade unions. Parties with stronger links, as well as a diversity of links, to society can be considered more institutionalised.

The party institutionalisation literature focuses on the development of the party primarily in terms of the party organisation and its relationship to society, disregarding the parties' relationships with other actors such as the state that shape the environment in which parties function. Huntington (1965: 399) assumes that institutionalisation depends on the differentiated development of organisations and Randall and Svåsand (2002: 7) considers a "degree of autonomy from the state" as a prerequisite for PSI. However, in democracies parties rarely exist fully autonomously of the state. To varying degrees, all parties rely on the state to provide the environment within which parties function – this includes legal provisions for parties, state subsidies, government jobs, and access to the media, etc. – which all contribute to the maintenance of parties.

Beyond a party's relationship with society and its internal organisation, it is also important to understand how parties relate to the state for explaining parties' "lasting power" in the party system. Parties are usually conceptualised as actors distinct from the state and are expected to function as the bridge between the state and voters. However, this fails to recognise that parties sometimes emerge from the state or find themselves closely intertwined with it. This is particularly relevant in emerging democracies where

low state capacity at independence can mean that parties come to dominate the state for their own benefit. Consequently, the relationship between party institutionalisation and PSI is not necessarily as linear as assumed in the conventional literature. The role of the state in mediating the relationship between the two is clearly illustrated in the South Asian region.

1.4. South Asia as a Theoretical Anomaly

Although PSI is generally considered to be one of the central elements influencing democratisation and democratic consolidation, relatively little research has been conducted on the topic in South Asia. While scholars, most prominently Croissant & Völkel (2012), Hicken & Kuhonta (2015) and Stockton (2001), have provided research on PSI in East and Southeast Asia, research on PSI and party institutionalisation in South Asia remains more limited. The existing research on party systems in South Asia focuses predominantly on India (Diwakar 2017) with some research on PSI in Bangladesh (Blair 2010), and Pakistan (Verma 2006). Considering that the world's largest democracy, India, is in South Asia and given the region's history of attempts and failure in democratisation, this is a significant gap in the democratisation literature.

This thesis proposes to fill this gap by studying the relationship between parties, the party system and the state in South Asia by comparing party system variance both across countries and across time. Variance in the region's party systems and democratic outcomes makes South Asia an ideal candidate for studying the institutionalisation of party systems as well as the effect of parties on forming a functioning party system. Unpacking the causes of party system variance in South Asia further builds on and complements the existing South Asian literature seeking to explain the divergent democratic outcomes across the subcontinent. This includes the work of Tudor (2013a)

and Oldenburg (2010) who examine the divergence of India and Pakistan in the immediate post-independence period through the lens of party institutionalisation as well as Chhibber et al. (2014: 492) who argue that greater party institutionalisation at the state-level in India reduces party system fragmentation.

Existing frameworks for understanding PSI assume that institutionalised systems will also consist of institutionalised parties, while inchoate systems will be made up of under-developed parties. Indeed, many scholars assume that an institutionalised party system will imply that parties are also institutionalised (Ufen 2008: 329). The experience of these three South Asian cases, however, challenges these assumptions. As can be seen from Table 1.1 below summarising the approximate extent of party and party system institutionalisation during different eras of democratic rule in South Asia, these systems have not always conformed to theoretical expectations. Of particular interest, are those quadrants in which PSI and party institutionalisation diverge, contrary to theoretical expectations and in conflict with the dominant framework for understanding PSI.

Table 1. 1 The approximate relationship between party and party system institutionalisation in South Asia (Source: Author's calculation)

	PSI High	PSI Low
PI High	India (1947-1969); India (1999-present)	India (1989-1999);
PI Low	India (1969-1975); Pakistan (1988-1999); Bangladesh (1991-2006); Bangladesh (2008-present);	India (1977-1989); Pakistan (1947-1958); Pakistan (1971-1977); Pakistan (2008-present); Bangladesh (1971-1975);

Following the evolution of India's party system and parties (Table 1.2 below), it can be seen how India has moved through all theoretical configurations, providing the only case in which relatively highly institutionalised parties can be found, but with low PSI. At independence, India experienced both high party and party system institutionalisation (1947-1969), but party decay in the late 1960s undermined the institutionalisation of its dominant party leading to a configuration in which the party system can still be considered predictable and stable, but without institutionalised parties (1969-1975). Ultimately, this resulted in a democratic intermission. When India returned to the democratic process after the national emergency imposed between 1975-1977, the country can be regarded as having low party and party system institutionalisation (1977-1989), but with time, its parties again institutionalised leading to the conflictual configuration of an inchoate system but with institutionalised parties (1989-1999). Finally, in the last two decades, India's system stabilised with both an institutionalised system and parties (1999-present).

Table 1.2 The approximate relationship between party and party system institutionalisation in India (Source: Author's calculation)

	PSI High	PSI Low
PI High	India (1947-1969); India (1999-present) ↓	←India (1989-1999)
PI Low	India (1969-1975) →	↑India (1977-1989)

In this way, the evolution of India's party system can be seen as a lifecycle that supports the argument that the institutionalisation of political parties will lead to the institutionalisation of the party system and that un-institutionalised parties will create

inchoate systems. This lifecycle understanding would provide a theoretical explanation for how a party system can lack institutionalisation in the context of institutionalised parties as this would likely indicate a period of transition as a system becomes institutionalised – such as India between 1989 and 1999. This provides an explanation for one of the conflictual theoretical configurations of the relationship between PSI and party institutionalisation.

The most peculiar cases, however, are those found in the quadrant in which systems are institutionalised, but parties are not. The cases of interest that require explanation are accordingly that of Pakistan's party system during the 1990s and Bangladesh's since 1991. In both cases, the party systems moved from the lower right quadrant to the lower left with party systems becoming relatively institutionalised without parties themselves first institutionalising – in contrast to the case of India's party system in which parties first became institutionalised before the party system institutionalised. This anomaly proves challenging to reconcile with existing frameworks for understanding PSI and it is argued that this can only be explained by understanding parties' relationship with the state.

1.5.Parties and the State

Party systems can become institutionalised without institutionalised parties if parties co-opt the state into supporting the party. Prevailing understandings of PSI and its relationship with party institutionalisation assume that institutionalised parties will lead to institutionalised systems and in turn, systems without institutionalised parties will similarly lack institutionalisation. This thesis, however, proposes to show and explain how systems can come to be institutionalised without well-developed parties. It is argued that the central mechanism through which this occurs is the co-optation of the state which

allows parties lacking institutionalisation to supplement their lack of party organisation and societal rootedness with state resources and thereby, entrench their position in the party system. In turn, this will lead to the stabilisation of the party system as inter-party competition crystallises. Ultimately, this thesis argues for a re-conceptualisation of party system formation and institutionalisation which accounts for the relationship of parties to the state.

Understanding the relationship between parties and the state proves to be a major gap in the literature on understanding the origins of PSI. Katz and Mair (1995: 17) first ventured into explaining this relationship with their cartelisation thesis in established Western European democracies and introduced the idea of the "interpenetration of party and state" as the latest stage in the development of European political parties. Their framework seeks to explain the historical development of parties and they identify four models of party organisation in this development process.

According to Katz and Mair (1995), the first parties were elite based with a loosely organised coalition of political elites coordinating their activity in a highly centralised manner, drawing on personal wealth and contacts for party resources. Later, these types of parties would be challenged by mass parties which drew their strength from their large membership which contributed resources to the party through membership fees and shaped decisions in a hierarchical decision-making process. In turn, mass parties would be overtaken by the catch-all party model in which parties maintained large memberships but sought to appeal to a broader segment of society based on policy issues which transferred power away from the party membership to party leaders. In the final stage of party evolution, Katz and Mair (1995: 17) see the emergence of cartel parties characterised by the professionalisation of politics and the decline in party membership

as parties become interpenetrated with the state. These cartel parties consequently act as "semi-state agencies" relying on state resources to maintain the parties and informally collude by distributing patronage among the main parties to fend off challengers (Katz & Mair 1995: 16).

However, unlike these established cartel parties, parties in emerging democracies lack the same institutional history of organisational development and rather than using the state to maintain the party, build the party out of offering access to the state. In the cases under analysis, it is this interpenetration of the state and party that is central to maintaining the predominant position of parties in these party systems in lieu of party institutionalisation, but these parties have followed a development path distinct from Katz and Mair's cartel parties. An important distinction to make is that Katz and Mair's cartelisation thesis is directed at well-organised, established parties in advanced democracies. In many emerging democracies, it is not that parties evolve and merge into the state, but rather that they emerge from the state, or build the party organisation out of their privileged access to state resources. This is particularly the case for new democracies where parties often originate within the state (van Biezen & Kopecký 2007: 237).

The transition to democracy and the strength of parties at the onset of democracy will determine the type of relationship that parties have with the state at the point of transition, particularly in terms of the balance of power between the two and the extent to which parties are organisationally differentiated or reliant on the state. In the cases of Bangladesh and Pakistan, it is argued that instead of developing party rootedness, these parties have co-opted the state, or in the case of Pakistan, have been co-opted by the state to maintain their position without having ever established a deep rootedness to society or developing the party organisation.

To understand how parties' relationship with the state has affected their development, it is necessary to examine the circumstances of party formation which can explain the failures of organisational differentiation of parties and the state. In the cases of parties like the Pakistan Muslim League (Nawaz) (PML (N)) and Bangladeshi parties such as the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and the Jatiya Party (JP), their origin lies in their artificial formation by authoritarian forces to create a basis of support after gaining power. In these cases, parties emerged from the state without an organic basis of societal support and thus relied on state backing to form support for their parties. These types of parties are what Shefter (1994: 5-6) refers to as "internally mobilized parties" in his work on party formation in the early democratic history of the United States. These are led by incumbent elites who form political parties as an attempt to mobilise support behind themselves to secure their hold over power in the face of challenge from regime outsiders.

In South Asia, these parties emerging from the state have been able to secure their position in the party system without developing a complex party organisation. Through parties' use of public office for rent-seeking and their use of state resources to support the party, particularly during electoral campaigns, it is argued that these parties have been able to institutionalise systems without first developing the party and their links to society. In these cases, parties use their informal relationship with the state as a source of organisational resources in campaigning, act as a gatekeeper in the distribution of state resources and at times, use state institutions to harass opponents.

This again raises an issue with Mainwaring and Scully's (1995) conflation of the dimensions of party organisation and party system stability as they assume that stability in inter-party competition is achieved through the development of programmatic linkages. However, this should not necessarily be considered the only source or cause of stability

in inter-party competition, which their approach considers as a by-product of stable voter-party linkages. Rather, clientelist relationships can equally tie voters and elites to a party and bring stability to inter-party competition without a need for parties to institutionalise.

1.6. Conclusions and the Structure of the Thesis

Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) claim that the stability of interparty competition, in this instance PSI, necessarily depends on the existence of institutionalised parties. However, the relationship between party and party system institutionalisation is more complex once the role of the state is considered. As this thesis proposes to show, institutionalised party systems can exist under conditions in which parties lack most of the characteristics that would define institutionalisation. This is possible through the interpenetration of parties with the state which allows parties to supplement their lack of institutionalisation with state resources. This thesis proposes to provide a new framework for understanding how party systems can become institutionalised through parties co-opting the state and addresses the theoretical gap in understanding the relationship between parties and the state in party system formation and institutionalisation.

In the remaining chapters, this argument is built using data gathered from expert surveys and uses process tracing to examine the effect of parties' relationship to the state on party system formation and change in South Asia. In the next chapter, a theoretical framework is provided for understanding the state's mediating role in the relationship between party and party system institutionalisation. This is accompanied by an elaboration of the research methods employed and operationalisations for the various concepts studied. In Chapter 3, political parties and their relationship to the state in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan are compared with an overview of the data's findings. The three chapters

thereafter examine the development of political parties, their relationship with the state and party system change in depth in each of the three cases.

Chapter 4 examines the evolution of the Indian party system with the argument that the party system at the national level has largely been defined by the institutionalisation of the main parties, conforming to the theoretical explanations of conventional PSI theories. Chapter 5 focuses on Pakistan in which the party system has shown more fluidity with weakly institutionalised parties and a strong a strong state which has undermined the development of the parties. Chapter 6 addresses the Bangladeshi party system and looks at how Bangladeshi political parties have intertwined with the state and used their access to state resources to maintain the weakly institutionalised parties. In the final chapter, the three cases are compared to explain how the sequencing of party and state development has affected the formation and institutionalisation of party systems in South Asia. The final chapter further applies the framework to Asia and Africa to illustrate the generalisability of the theory and concludes with a discussion of areas for further research.

This thesis provides three main contributions for advancing the PSI scholarship. First, parties do not necessarily have to institutionalise for the emergence of stable party systems. Through their relationship with the state, parties can remain electorally competitive in lieu of well-developed party organisations and strong linkages. Second, the role of the state and parties' relationship to the state cannot be disregarded in understanding interparty competition. Neither party systems nor parties should be understood as entirely conceptually distinct from the state as the state and parties' relationship to it shape the environment within which parties function. Finally, the role of the state and the origins of parties in the transition to democracy is important for understanding the formation of party systems. Parties' relationship to the state in the

process of democratisation has a significant influence on the nature of the party system formed as well as the trajectory of party development and the institutionalisation of party systems. Further, in contrast to some literature which links PSI to democratic consolidation, the thesis finds that the relationship between stable party systems and democratic deepening is not necessarily as correlated as previously assumed.

Chapter 2
Methodology and Theoretical Framework

The objective of this thesis is to explain the causes of variance in the levels of PSI in South Asia and asks three related research questions: what explains variance in the levels of PSI in South Asia? What is the relationship between party institutionalisation and PSI? And what role does the state play in the institutionalisation of party systems?

This chapter sets out the methodology of the thesis and explains the operationalisation of the various concepts studied. The first section elaborates on the hypotheses and thereafter, the choice of a small-N comparative study is justified by weighing the merits and weaknesses of alternative methodological approaches. This is followed by a section justifying the case selection and thereafter, the data collection process is set out. In the last three sections, the operationalisation of party institutionalisation, the party-state relationship, and PSI are discussed.

2.1. Hypotheses

It is argued that there are two ways in which party systems can become institutionalised. The first is through the institutionalisation of parties, which entails the development of the party organisation and its linkages to society. This is the assumption most commonly found in the literature which assumes that institutionalised parties form the basis of institutionalised party systems. The casual chain assumes that through the development of ideological or programmatic linkages built by a strong party organisation, political parties will have the resources necessary to remain electorally competitive and maintain

their position in the party system, thus allowing interparty competition to stabilise. In this scenario, challenger parties are unable to displace established parties due to the superior party organisation and societal linkages of institutionalised parties.

However, as previously stated, South Asian party systems have at various times been defined by relatively stable party systems without correspondingly institutionalised parties. It is argued that this is due to the development of parties' relationship with the state – either through parties becoming intertwined with the state or developing an informal relationship with parts of the state that can be used by established parties to retain their influence. In this way, the second route through which stable party systems can emerge is through parties co-opting the state. Under such conditions, parties become a persistent feature of the party system through their advantageous relationship with the state. In this scenario, challenger parties are unable to displace established parties due to established parties' superior relationship with the state.

There are four main ways in which parties can develop this advantageous relationship with the state:

1. Party system dominance – this can occur when one political party experiences a first-mover advantage in the early stages of democracy that allows the party to dominate politics. In this scenario, the party becomes synonymous with government and their extended period of rule allows for the development of a strong relationship with state institutions, extending the party's electoral advantage. This can be seen in several dominant party systems such as in the independence movements of southern Africa (Southall 2013) or the Liberal Democratic Party in Japan.

2. Supported by the state – in this scenario, political parties have developed a favourable relationship with parts of the state which support the party and provide them with advantages over opponents. This support can for instance come from the military or the bureaucracy which favours certain parties over others and tilts the playing field in their favour.
3. Emerging from the state – this primarily relates to authoritarian successor parties, parties that emerge from authoritarian regimes but operate after the transition to democracy. In these cases, parties draw their advantage from their "authoritarian inheritance" which can include a variety of resources built up under authoritarianism such as clientelist networks and a party brand which may give authoritarian successor parties a head start over new parties in multiparty competition.
4. Merging into the state – in this scenario, political parties and the state merge together through the parties' dominance over the state. This is often particularly the case for revolutionary movements which reshape the state and intertwine the party with the state.

These four avenues for how parties become intertwined with the state are not mutually exclusive and parties can gain advantages from a combination of these factors. Equally, drawing advantage from a beneficial relationship with the state does not exclude the role of party institutionalisation in structuring a party's ability to compete. Parties, for instance, may be both moderately institutionalised and gain advantage from their relationship to the state. For example, the INC in the first two decades of Indian independence can be seen as a relatively institutionalised party as well as drawing benefit from its dominance of the political space which saw the party as synonymous with government and state institutions. This relationship of the party with the state in turn, was

later important in maintaining the INC's position in the party system as a key party even after the de-institutionalisation of the party under Indira Gandhi.

Based on this, the following hypotheses are made:

> H1: The presence of major institutionalised parties with strong linkages and a well-developed party organisation is a sufficient condition for an institutionalised party system.
>
> H2: When major parties lack significant institutionalisation, but successfully co-opt the state to supplement party deficiencies, this is a sufficient condition for an institutionalised party system.
>
> H3: When major parties lack significant institutionalisation, and are incapable of co-opting the state, party system will remain under-institutionalised.

2.2. Methodology

Empirical methods for understanding the relationship between variables can broadly be categorised into four approaches: experimental, statistical, case study, and comparative methods. While the experimental method is usually considered the most scientifically rigorous, it is often difficult to apply in social sciences for ethical and practical reasons. Similarly, the case study method can be impractical as it has little value for theory building or making generalisations and is only useful for a deep understanding of a particular case. Consequently, the statistical and comparative methods are the two main approaches used in political science for hypothesis testing. The logic of the comparative and statistical methods is similar in that both are aimed at making generalisations based on inference and primarily differ in the number of cases under consideration (Lijphart 1971: 684).

While large-N studies and statistical methods most closely resemble the experimental method and are better for making strong inferences on the relationship between variables, this method requires a high level of abstraction and can be poor for understanding causal mechanisms (Landman 2003: 26). Consequently, the thesis relies on the comparative method which is superior for theory building and developing an in-depth understanding of causal mechanisms (Halperin & Heath 2020: 232-233). This is particularly true when the comparative method is combined with within-case analysis such as process-tracing to understand the cause-effect link connecting independent variables and the outcome (Van Evera 1997: 64). In this way, cross-case analysis is used to identify potential causes of an outcome while process tracing is then used to show how conditions are translated into outcomes.

2.3. Case Selection

The thesis uses a most similar systems design, which seeks to compare systems that share a host of common features but differ along a few key variables which account for the observed outcome (Meckstroth 1975: 133). In this way, it seeks to compares cases that are as similar as possible except for the variables under analysis. For this reason, Bangladesh, India, and Pakistan are an ideal natural experiment with the countries sharing a somewhat similar colonial and cultural history that helps control several extraneous variables. Further, the three countries all employ first-past-the-post voting systems for elections to the legislature, which is widely regarded in the literature as an important influence on the structure and stability of party systems.

Their shared political history also means that factors such as prior democratic experience and the length of democracy that contribute towards PSI are also controlled for (Tavits 2005). Further, public funding for political parties has been found to contribute towards

the institutionalisation of party systems (Birnir 2005) and in all three countries, there are no provisions for direct funding from the state of political parties. Finally, the three countries have had relatively similar levels of economic development since independence as seen in Figure 2.1 and were all classified as low-income countries until the late 2000s and 2010s. This helps control for economic factors which have been shown to contribute towards the institutionalisation of party systems (Casal Bértoa 2017a). Instead, the main defining feature explaining variation lies with political parties in the extent of their institutionalisation and their relationship to the state.



Figure 2.1 Gross National Income per capita in South Asia (Source: World Bank national accounts data).

Due to the vast number of parties in the region, many of which are relatively inconsequential, a sample of parties has been chosen on the basis of their prominent position in their respective party systems. In all three countries, there has been relative continuity in who the main parties are defining the core of their respective party systems. In Bangladesh, interparty competition has largely been defined by the Bangladesh Awami

League (BAL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP). The Indian party system has a diverse range of political parties with a long history of splits and mergers in many parties and has seen important changes at the regional level, but at the core, the two main national parties around which the party system is structured have remained the Indian National Congress (INC) and the Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP). Finally, in Pakistan party politics have largely revolved around competition between iterations of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML) and the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) with the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) breaking this mould with their breakout performance in the 2018 election.

2.4. Data Collection

Data was collected using expert surveys based on a framework of questions drawing from the Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) (Kitschelt 2013), the Political Parties Database (PPDB) (Poguntke et al. 2018), and the framework for studying party patronage set out by Kopecký and Spirova (2012: 21-22). These questions are aimed at understanding the functioning of political parties and their relationship to society and the state (see appendix 1). The questions are organised around four clusters of topics: the party organisation, the strength of parties' linkages, the extent and targets of clientelism, and the extent to which party patronage is prevalent in each country. These clusters of indicators either relate to party institutionalisation (party organisation and strength of linkages) or to party behaviour which uses access to state resources (clientelism and party patronage) to supplement deficiencies in party institutionalisation.

While there are limitations to using experts, such as the problem of respondents' biases, these limitations can be offset by using a multiple-rater design and aggregating responses to minimise error as employed in this study (Maestas 2018: 586). A further challenge is that even experts may have limited access to the internal workings of political parties and

so results should be interpreted with caution. However, the use of expert surveys was chosen over elite interviewing to avoid social desirability bias in politicians or bureaucrats. When discussing questions around how political parties misuse their access to state resources in sometimes ethically and legally problematic ways, there is a high likelihood that interview participants will not respond truthfully. Further, elite interviews can suffer from problems of credibility where politicians may distort facts in their own favour. Consequently, expert surveys are an opportunity to circumvent these challenges. Additionally, a standardised template which quantifies some traits of political parties, such as the extent to which they engage in clientelism, allows for comparison between parties and countries which is useful for situating parties comparatively.

Experts were selected based on their knowledge of political parties in one of the three countries included in the study and included a mix of scholars in the region as well as prominent scholars in the United States and Europe. The survey was sent out via Qualtrics to 68 experts and collected responses over a four-week period at the end of 2019. A total of 37 valid responses was anonymously collected from academics and civil society organisations researching parties. Nine responses were recorded for both Bangladesh and Pakistan while 19 responses were received on India. The results are summarised in Chapter 3. The data is further supported by survey data from the World Values Survey (Haerpfer et al. 2020), the Lokniti Centre for the Study of Developing Societies and election data from the various election commissions. The thesis further relies on party constitutions and legal texts to examine the structure and functioning of political parties. Secondary sources including academic journals, books and newspaper articles are used to corroborate the results from the expert survey. Due to the Covid-19 pandemic and international travel restrictions, fieldwork to further substantiate the findings was not possible.

In selected instances, election data is used to calculate electoral volatility (Pedersen 1979) and changes in the effective number of parties (Laakso & Taagepera 1979) to determine the extent of PSI as commonly used in the literature (Casal Bértoa 2015: 118). Although these methods are widely used by scholars, there are limitations or caveats that should be acknowledged in their use. This includes criticisms that Pedersen's electoral volatility fails to discriminate between different types of volatility such as volatility between established parties and volatility at the often inconsequential margins of a system (Mainwaring et al. 2017: 623) and criticisms that the effective number of parties does not take into account whether parties are old or new, nor how parties interact with each other (Mair 2006: 64-65). Recognising these limitations, secondary sources are used to supplement these methods in determining the extent to which the party systems under analysis conform to theoretical understandings of PSI. The operationalisations of party institutionalisation, parties' relationship to the state, and PSI are elaborated below.

2.5. Party Institutionalisation Operationalisation

Just as there are numerous approaches for conceptualising PI in the literature, there are many differing approaches to operationalising the concept. Some scholars, such as Gurr (1968), have employed crude indicators such as measuring the age of parties as a measure of institutionalisation or as suggested by Huntington (1965: 396), have used generational age as a measure of a party's ability to adapt and survive. Scholars such as Dix (1992) have applied Huntington's four-part framework – adaptability, complexity, autonomy, and coherence – to political parties.

Adaptability is measured in terms of parties' longevity, its generational age based on leadership succession, and changes in the party's role such as terms in government and the opposition. Complexity is understood in terms of the degree of personalism in a party

as well as the extent of organisational development with differentiated organisational subunits to coordinate party activity. Autonomy is measured by examining the extent to which parties are supported across class lines and the extent to which parties are "catch-all". Finally, coherence is determined by the extent of fractionalisation in party systems with more fractionalised systems regarded as more incoherent. This method is replicated by Stockton in application to East Asia (2001: 106-110).

Scholars have also used questions of voter turnout, party membership and party identification as indicators of the legitimacy of parties or the extent to which they are rooted in society (Webb & White 2007: 348). Other possible indicators of party instability identified by Marinova (2016: 33) include questions of party discipline, party personalism, the percentage of independent candidates, the extent of party switching and issues of party splits, mergers and the emergence of new parties. A further way of operationalising party organisation that focuses on candidate selection and the routinisation of the party, is to determine whether parties have a clear succession plan within the party, whether there is organisational continuity beyond elections, and whether career advancement for party activists is transparent and free of the whims of individuals (Chhibber et al. 2014: 493).

While there are various approaches for operationalising party institutionalisation, the most persistent themes in the literature on its conceptualisation centre around the complexity and routinisation of the party organisation, and the strength of a party's relationship to society. Consequently, questions drawn from the PPDB and the expert survey questions relating to political parties are clustered around these two dimensions.

2.5.1. Party Organisation

An institutionalised party organisation should have value and lasting power beyond individual leaders and should be governed by established rules and norms which guide decision-making and constrain individual leaders through the routinisation of processes. Parties lacking formal organisation are those which act on an ad hoc basis and are often based in personalism with a leader-centric organisational structure. In such parties, 'activists often find their career advancement prospects blocked by arbitrary decision-making, nepotistic practices or the whims of a few leaders at the top' (Chhibber et al. 2014: 492). An institutionalised party should have value in its own right beyond these elite figures.

A good way to determine this is to examine how power and decision-making is spread in an organisation. A highly centralised party will be more personalistic and based on the whims of individual leaders, while a party with shared decision-making structures and bargaining between the various levels of the party will be guided by processes and values beyond individuals. Similarly, complexity in the organisation beyond individual figures shows the extent to which a party functions as an institution guided by rules and norms rather than individual leaders.

Party Structure and Complexity

Respondents to the expert survey were asked two questions relating to party structure (Appendix 1). The first measures parties' geographical expansiveness by asking whether political parties maintain permanent offices and paid staff at the local level throughout the country. The second question assesses parties' informal organisational presence in the community by asking whether parties maintain a permanent social and community presence. Additionally, political parties' constitutions are studied to determine the structure and functioning of party organisations based on questions set out in the PPDB

to understand the balance of power in organisations. This is also evaluated against political parties' practice as the extent to which they adhere to their party regulations is a reflection of whether the party is guided by institutions or the whims of party leaders.

Intra-party Democracy and Personalism

The extent to which political parties are personalised is measured by asking respondents to the expert survey to assesses the approximate balance of power in the selection of candidates for national legislative elections. Respondents were asked to categorise the balance of power based on four options:

- National legislative candidates are chosen by national party leaders with little participation from local or state level organisations
- National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organisations
- National legislative candidates are chosen by local or municipal level actors
- Selection is the outcome of bargaining between different levels

Political parties in which this process is highly centralised in the leadership can be considered more personalised while parties which incorporate lower tiers of the party organisation in candidate selection will have greater intra-party democracy and complexity. The question of personalism is further determined by examining parties' processes for leadership selection and the extent to which this is based on competition.

2.5.2. Stable Roots in Society

The stability of a party's roots in society is generally determined by examining the extent to which a party has penetrated multiple sectors of society and built numerous linkages, ideally stable, with social organisations capable of mobilising voters for a party. Parties with strong linkages to voters and interest groups have greater lasting power and can be considered more institutionalised. To determine the strength of parties' linkages to society, respondents were asked to evaluate the strength of linkages on a scale of 0 (no linkages) to 4 (very strong linkages) for six categories of interest groups based on the DALP: trade unions, business, religious organisations, ethnic and linguistic organisations, urban/rural organisations, and women's organisations. Additionally, party membership is a good indicator of the extent to which parties have penetrated society and data from the World Values Survey and the Lokniti Centre for the Study of Developing Societies is used for this.

2.6. Party-State Relationship Operationalisation

Combined, the strength and complexity of the party organisation and its linkages provide evidence of the institutionalisation of individual parties. However, political parties often supplement institutional deficiencies by drawing on the state to support the party organisation and build societal linkages. Consequently, the nature of parties' relationship to the state is important for understanding how political parties function and compete in a party system. The nature of the party-state relationship can, for instance, determine whether a party can use its access to state resources and public goods to tie political elites and voters to the party, or whether the party can use funding from the state to maintain the party organisation. The extent to which parties find themselves intertwined with the state or able to capture parts of the state have clear implications for understanding how parties maintain the party organisation and their links to society.

Much of the literature on party-state relations is influenced by the work of Katz and Mair's (1995) cartelisation thesis which sees the emergence of cartel parties as the latest stage in party development with the interpenetration of the party and state. They challenge the notion of the neat separation of the party and state, making the argument that contemporary parties in advanced European democracies have used their privileged access to the state to maintain the survival of parties through the use of state funding and legal provisions to maintain the prominent position of parties in politics. Unlike the well-established and organisationally developed parties in the Western democracies studied by Katz and Mair, in newer democracies, parties often lack similar levels of institutionalisation before they find themselves interpenetrated with the state. Rather, in new democracies - where state institutions are often themselves relatively poorly developed – parties often use their privileged access to the state as a means of establishing the party organisation.

There are two primary ways in which parties can use their relationship with the state to supplement their lack of party institutionalisation: party patronage, and clientelism. These strategies are aimed at addressing the two dimensions of institutionalisation that parties lack: organisational development and societal rootedness. Parties can use their access to the state to develop the party organisation through party patronage to tie activists and elites to the party organisation while clientelism is used to supplement, build and maintain a party's linkages to society. Parties can thereby use their relationship with the state to gain two kinds of support that build the party: that of political elites, and the support of the electorate.

Party Patronage

While clientelistic practices are often recognised as a significant factor in tying voters to parties, less emphasis has been placed on the role of party patronage in tying elites to the party. Kopecký and Mair (2012: 7-8) identify party patronage as a form of party-state linkage whereby parties use their relationship with the state as an organisational resource to build and maintain the party organisation. Understood in this way, party patronage is not concerned with vote gathering but rather with building the party's organisational network. Through their power to appoint individuals to state institutions and distribute state jobs, parties can tie activists and elites to the party which in turn build the party organisation and its networks. While this often ties in or leads to clientelism, party patronage should be considered distinct from clientelism as it is not concerned with vote gathering but is rather a means of tying elites to the party. Further, party patronage is not necessarily illegal and often forms part of the regular functioning of politics such as the spoils system of politics in the United States (Müller 2006: 192).

To measure the degree to which political parties are intertwined with the state, respondents to the expert survey were asked to rate the extent to which appointments in the public sector are made on the basis of rewarding party activists rather than on the basis of merit. Based on the framework created by Kopecký and Spirova (2012: 21-22), respondents were asked to estimate the extent to which parties use patronage in nine areas of the public sector: economy, finance, judiciary, media, military and police, foreign service, culture and education, health care, and regional and local administration.

Clientelism

While parties do not use party patronage for the explicit purpose of vote gathering, they often use clientelism to tie voters to the party. Clientelism occurs when parties offer "material benefits only on the condition that the recipient returns the favour with a vote

or other forms of political support" (Stokes et al. 2013: 13). One of the primary ways in which parties use the state to support the party is the use, or misuse, of public office to distribute public goods to party supporters. In new emerging economies and new democracies, the state is often one of the largest employers in the country and controls a significant share of the overall economy which makes a favourable relationship with the state very appealing for voters. This is similarly true, in countries with large public sectors and significant state involvement in industry, which makes the opportunity for party-voter linkages through patronage appointments and clientelism higher (Kitschelt 2000: 862).

While parties may engage in other forms of clientelism such as using a candidate's personal resources to purchase clients, respondents to the expert survey were asked to assess the extent of parties' clientelist practices where state resources were redirected for this purpose. These practices are directed at building parties' linkages to society to supplement political parties' lack of institutionalisation. Based on the DALP's framework of questions, respondents were asked to assess the extent to which parties use their access to state resources to entice voters and build linkages to civil society organisations with four types of clientelism: preferential public benefits, preferential employment opportunities, preferential government contracts, and preferential regulation (see Appendix 1). Further, respondents to the expert survey were asked which types of voters parties target with these inducements. Finally, respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which parties engage in clientelism compared to ten years ago to understand the trend in parties' behaviour.

2.7. Party System Institutionalisation Operationalisation

The most commonly used methods for calculating PSI are Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) "Effective" number of parties (ENP) method and Pedersen's (1979) index of electoral

volatility. Following this logic, institutionalisation in party systems is primarily understood in terms of continuity in patterns of interparty competition and is determined by the extent of variance in party support between successive elections. Although these methods are widely used by scholars to calculate PSI, they are primarily focused on measuring *stability* in party systems as it is difficult to quantify the attitudinal dimensions of PSI, such as legitimacy, identified by Mainwaring and Scully. Further, the remaining two components of Mainwaring and Scully's conceptualisation relate more closely to party institutionalisation as discussed in the first chapter.

Both methods have limitations which are discussed below and when applying the methods, it is important to understand their theoretical assumptions. The limitations of these operationalisations are particularly apparent when applied to younger democracies. However, recognising these limitations, secondary sources are used to supplement these methods to counteract these limitations by providing the context in determining the extent to which party systems have remained stable. For instance, a high ENP in India should be understood in the context of the patterns of coalition formation persistent in the country's politics. Changes in the ENP may not necessarily matter if coalition partners remain durable, nor should electoral volatility be regarded as alarming if voters switch party support within coalition blocs.

Effective Number of Parties

Laasko and Taagepera's (1979: 3) ENP method is used to determine how many parties "effectively" share the party system. This is accomplished by considering the relative size of all the parties represented in the legislature with the assumption that a large number of parties will likely destabilise a party system. A high ENP will mean that party systems are more fragmented and that coalition formation is more complex. Similarly, changes in

the ENP will indicate changes in the relative strength of parties sharing the party system, which could indicate instability. ENP is therefore useful for determining the extent of party system fragmentation while changes in ENP can be used as an indicator of instability in the relative strength of parties. Laakso and Taagepera (1979: 4) use the following formula to calculate ENP:

Effective number of parties = $\frac{1}{\sum_{i=1}^{n} p_i^2}$

In this formula, p_i represents the fractional share of the *i*-th party, which is squared and once calculated, combined for all parties (*n*) which obtained seats or votes in an election. The calculation can be used for either vote share or the share of the legislative seats parties obtain. In first-past-the-post systems such as in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, this is likely to be different and sometimes significantly so. ENP is thereby useful for understanding changes between elections in the number of parties "effectively" sharing the system as well as showing the intensity of the change.

While there is evidence to suggest that excessive fragmentation of parliaments hinders the formation of stable government majorities, this does not necessarily have to be the case. In party systems shared by numerous political actors, what matters more is the stability of the relationships between parties and whether there is consistency in the alliances formed between parties. As Mair (2006: 64) points out, the number of parties sharing a space reveals very little about how the party system works if understood outside of the context of how parties interact.

The ENP calculation read in isolation also fails to distinguish between the nature of parties. Factors such as whether parties are new, established, splinters or mergers, all provide information reflecting the stability of the party system yet would not necessarily

be reflected by ENP. For instance, ENP would not record a change in cases where a party is wholly displaced by a new party, losing all of its votes to the new party. Under such circumstances the ENP would remain the same, yet it is clear that a significant change has occurred. This is a consequence of the method's narrow focus on the allocation of relative party strength in a system. However, if read within the broader context of understanding how parties interact in the system, ENP can be a useful measure for reflecting changes in the relative strength of parties in a system.

Pedersen's Index of Electoral Volatility

Of the two methods, Pedersen's Index has been the more widely used measure for determining stability in party systems following the trend set by Mainwaring and Scully (1995: 6). Pedersen's Index is aimed at measuring electoral volatility (EV), defined as "the net change within the electoral party system resulting from individual vote transfers" (Pedersen 1979: 3). EV has clear implications for stability in party systems as high volatility indicates significant changes in the relative strength of parties and is often an indication of upheaval in a system. In his definition of party system change, Pedersen (1979: 4) identifies three levels of potential change that should be addressed: the level of parliament and government, the party as an organisation, and the electorate. He, however, chooses to focus on the level of the electorate with the assumption that the results of an election will either cause change or register changes that have occurred in the other levels. EV is based on the following formula:

$$\text{EV} = \frac{\sum_{i=1}^{n} |p_{i,t} - p_{i,t-1}|}{2}$$

Here *p* represents the percentage of the vote obtained by a party (*i)* in a specific election (*t)*. Change is calculated as the difference between the vote obtained in an election ($p_{i,t}$),

and the previous election ($p_{i,t-1}$). Disregarding sign differences, this figure is calculated for each party and each election to calculate net change. Considering that this figure reflects both the net gains of winning parties and the net losses of losing parties, Pedersen simplifies this calculation to reflect just the net gains of winning parties by dividing the figure by two.

However, not all parties necessarily have an influence on the system. One of the greatest limitations of Pedersen's method is that it does not distinguish between vote transfers between established parties and new parties. Party system change at the margins can be quite unimportant if power is consistently alternated between the same small group of established parties. Pedersen's method would register such changes as equivalent to changes at the consequential core of the party system. The real question of party system change should focus on changes at the core or changes in the size of the vote share won by the core of established parties.

For instance, in post-communist Europe, Powell and Tucker (2014: 126) find that Pedersen's Index more closely aligns with the entry and exit of new parties than with the vote transfer between existing parties. While the extent of this type of volatility is relevant, it should be distinguished from vote transfers occurring within the core of established parties as the different types of volatility indicate different types of changes in the party system – changes in the party system caused by the entry of new parties versus changes in the relative strength of parties.

While the question of who controls the core of the party system can be considered the most consequential aspect of a party system, it is equally necessary to consider changes in the relative size of the vote share won by established parties at the core. As Powell and Tucker (2014: 124), point out, vote switching between existing parties is a healthy

component of democracy, but the entry and exit of parties can be considered a more destabilising variety of volatility. To distinguish between the two, they calculate EV for "stable parties" (Type B Volatility) separately from new parties and parties exiting the system (Type A Volatility). Mainwaring et al. (2017: 623) similarly distinguish between the vote share of new parties, referred to as extra-system volatility, and vote transfers to established parties, seen as within-system volatility.

Using Pedersen's method in this way provides a clear advantage to the original method for better understanding the source of EV in a party system. Applying Pedersen's method in this way combined with a qualitative understanding of the sources of change, particularly around party splits, mergers and coalition formation, allows for a fuller understanding of PSI. Disaggregating the data in this way is particularly relevant for new democracies, where party systems are often far more open to the entry and exit of new parties.

These quantitative methods for determining the extent of PSI have a clear set of limitations. The ENP of parties can only be fully understood by an accompanying analysis of the stability in the relationship of coalition allies. Similarly, electoral volatility can only be interpreted correctly by understanding the source of change in terms of understanding the nature of the vote-switching that has occurred. Vote-switching within coalition blocs will be less destabilising than other forms. Equally, vote-switching among established parties in the core of a party system will be less destabilising than vote-switching to new parties. However, recognising these limitations and controlling for their influence, we can confidently piece together a coherent understanding of PSI in the countries under analysis.

2.8. Conclusion

This chapter has set out the research methodology employed to collect the data and test the hypotheses stated at the start of the chapter. In the next chapter, the data from the expert surveys is summarised and compared between countries to test the hypotheses. Thereafter, the development of political parties, their relationship to the state and the party system is studied in-depth for each country to trace the process through which these relationships have formed.

Chapter 3
Parties and the State in South Asia

South Asian party systems in their subtle historic variation are an ideal natural experiment for understanding how parties engage with the state. Following independence in 1947 and the 1971 secession of Bangladesh, the three countries have had vastly different experiences in consolidating democracy. In part, this is due to variations in the institutionalisation of the main political parties in each country, but equally, parties' relationship to the state in critical junctures have played an important role in the formation and institutionalisation of party systems.

It is argued that the three countries each conform to one of the hypotheses set out in Chapter 2. India is argued to align with H1 based on the widespread assumption that the institutionalisation of political parties will lead to the formation of institutionalised party systems. Post-independence India in the early stages of democracy formed a dominant party system revolving around the highly institutionalised INC. Gradually, the party and the party system de-institutionalised, but with the steady development of the BJP, the party system has again institutionalised. It is argued that this has been possible due to the institutionalisation of the INC and BJP which structure contemporary Indian politics and the party system, conforming to the first hypothesis based on the common assumption that the institutionalisation of parties will lead to the institutionalisation of the party system. Based on this hypothesis, it is expected that the Indian political parties will exhibit a sufficient degree of institutionalisation that allows the parties to retain their position in the party system and through the strength of the two main parties, stabilise inter-party competition.

We would expect Bangladesh to conform to H2, which hypothesises that if parties lacking institutionalisation are able to co-opt the state, this will be a sufficient condition for the formation of an institutionalised party system. The Bangladeshi party system is an example of two parties that historically intertwined themselves with the state and in the case of the BNP, have emerged out of the state. Consequently, it is expected that party patronage will be high and that the parties will be considered very clientelist. Further, through their use of state resources to build the parties' linkages, it is expected that the parties will have relatively strong linkages to society.

Finally, it is argued that Pakistan conforms to H3, which stipulates that if parties lack institutionalisation and are incapable of co-opting the state, an institutionalised party system will be unable to form. In Pakistan, where it is argued that the state supports parties, the expectation is that party institutionalisation will be relatively low and will not be the main factor determining electoral competitiveness. If state institutions are stronger than the parties, it can also be expected that party patronage will be somewhat limited. In this context, there should be a greater distinction between the party and the state. Rather, parties and the state interact in a symbiotic relationship whereby the state plays kingmaker, while parties provide legitimacy to the overall political system.

An overview of the expert survey data is provided below to illustrate how the parties fit into the theoretical framework set out previously. In the first part, the chapter compares the institutionalisation of the party organisations by examining the geographical expansiveness of the party organisations and the balance of power between the various tiers of the party organisation. This is followed by a summary of the data on party patronage in the three countries as well as a preliminary examination of the relationship between party institutionalisation and the extent to which parties engage in party

patronage. Thereafter, the chapter examines the second dimension of party institutionalisation by examining the strength of parties' linkages to society. In turn, this is followed by an analysis of parties' clientelist practices to contextualise the strength of parties' linkages. The chapter ends with a summary assessing the extent to which the data supports the hypotheses introduced in Chapter 2. In the chapters hereafter, each country is analysed in depth to trace the process through which parties' relationship to the state have developed and the effect of this relationship on the formation and institutionalisation of their respective party systems.

3.2. Party Organisations in South Asia

To understand the extent to which a party organisation is institutionalised it is necessary to consider the organisational complexity and routinisation of the party. Routinisation is inherent in institutionalisation. For a party to be institutionalised, it needs to have value and exist in its own right beyond individual figures. A party should have lasting power beyond individuals, which means that established processes must be the defining factor dictating processes such as how party leaders and strategy is decided. In institutionalised parties, these established rules and norms need to be routinised to constrain individuals and govern decision-making. If parties are personalised and revolve around individual leaders making decisions on an *ad hoc* basis, then it is leaders and not institutions that guide the party. Personalised parties based on the whims of individual leaders lack this routinisation of decision-making.

To understand the extent to which parties are guided by rules and norms, we can look at the extent to which power is personalised or centralised in a party. Similarly, complexity in the organisation beyond individual figures shows the extent to which a party functions as an institution. Complexity shows that an organisation exists beyond individual figures

and has value outside of the leadership. A more complex organisation will have a greater number of organisational sub-units representing the party and will be more expansive rather than just concentrated in individuals.

3.2.1. Party Structure and Complexity

One way of measuring the organisational complexity of parties is to look at their geographical expansiveness (Janda 1980: 102). Institutionalised parties that compete at the national level should have structured local branches spanning a significant proportion of the country, connecting the party to its supporters and coordinating party workers. Institutionalised parties should also have value beyond merely competing in elections and play an important role in socialising voters and connecting them to their representatives. Consequently, if a party's local branches are only active during election campaigns, it should be seen as less institutionalised than those organisations that maintain permanent offices for coordinating local branches of the party.

Local branch offices can maintain a presence in the community serving as the local representatives of the party as well as providing a formal structure for party activists and supporters with which to coordinate. The more extensive a party's network of offices across the country, the more organisationally complex it can be considered. As shown in Figures 3.1 to 3.3, respondents to the expert survey were asked to evaluate whether parties maintained permanent offices and paid staff in districts across the country. Further, respondents were asked whether these offices representing local branches were maintained permanently or only for elections. This measure shows both the complexity and expansiveness of the party organisations.



Figure 3.1 Permanent Party Offices in Bangladesh (Expert Survey 2019)

In Bangladesh, the majority of respondents claim that the BAL and BNP maintain offices in most districts in Bangladesh (Figure 3.1). However, more respondents claimed that the ruling BAL maintained permanent offices in most districts. Similarly, both parties in India are seen to maintain offices in most districts, although the BJP receives more support for this claim and the gap between the parties is larger than in Bangladesh (Figure 3.2). In Pakistan, fewer respondents thought that the parties maintain permanent local offices in most districts, but the majority still considered the ruling PTI and the PML (N) to maintain offices in most districts (Figure 3.3). The sole party which respondents thought only maintains permanent offices in some district is the PPP, which in recent years has lost much of its national appeal and is primarily supported by its regional stronghold in Sind.



Figure 3.2 Permanent Party Offices in India (Expert Survey 2019)

Intriguingly, in every country, the ruling party is seen as the most geographically expansive and most respondents claimed that the parties maintained permanent local offices in most districts. This is likely a testament to the increased resources available to ruling parties through their access to state resources. These local party offices play an important role in connecting the local population to the party, and government, for accessing the state and its resources. Part of this role entails the distribution of clientelism, but equally, local party offices play an important role in helping voters to navigate the state through the party's formal or informal influence in the distribution of government services (Bussell 2019).



Figure 3.3 Permanent Party Offices in Pakistan (Expert Survey 2019)

A more nuanced approach is to ask whether parties maintain a permanent community presence beyond formal party offices. Political parties can also interact with the community in more informal ways, such as by providing a social function in the community, which often forms part of strategies to build party linkages beyond purely political activities. For instance, the BJP has developed strong grassroots linkages in rural India through welfare programs led by the party's affiliate organisations which include supporting education, training for local farmers and disaster relief (Thachil 2014: 108). While not wholly directed at party political activities, these types of programs and linkages help in transmitting a party's values and in this way, transfer party values to voters and embed the party in society (Nair 2009).



Figure 3.4 Permanent Community Presence in Bangladesh (Expert Survey 2019)

As seen in Figures 3.4. to 3.6, this adds nuance to the interpretation. Although the vast majority of respondents claimed that parties in Bangladesh were geographically expansive with a formal organisational presence in most districts, fewer respondents felt that the parties maintained a permanent community presence. In the case of the BNP, the majority of respondents claimed that the party did not maintain a permanent community presence despite the view that the organisation maintained formal party offices in most districts (Figure 3.4). This is also a reflection on how active political parties are in the local community and forms an important part of building linkages.



Figure 3.5 Permanent Community Presence in India (Expert Survey 2019)

For India, all respondents claimed that the BJP maintained a permanent community presence and the party is well-known for its grassroots activity through its various party affiliates (Figure 3.5). The majority of respondents similarly thought that the INC maintains a permanent community presence through informal party activities. Finally, the majority of respondents regard Pakistani parties as having a permanent presence in communities and interestingly, the PPP which was regarded as the least geographically expansive in terms of formal offices, scores very highly for their permanent community presence while the ruling PTI, in turn, scored the lowest (Figure 3.6). This highlights an important point that parties have both formal and informal organisational components and linkages.



Figure 3.6 Permanent Community Presence in Pakistan (Expert Survey 2019)

3.2.2. Intra-party Democracy and Personalism

As stated previously, parties based on personalism and the centralisation of power are more likely to act on an *ad hoc* basis without the constraints of norms and rules which govern the party (Chhibber et al. 2014: 492). Institutionalised organisation should have value in its own right beyond these leaders and should be guided by processes, usually as set out in the party constitution. As long as the party is the personal instrument of a leader or a small group of party elites, its institutionalisation is limited. A good way to determine this is to examine how power and decision-making is spread in an organisation.

One of the important functions of a party is to put forward candidates for elections and the processes for deciding candidates is one of the ways to understand how power is distributed. Survey respondents were asked to evaluate the balance of power within parties when it comes to selecting a candidate for national elections. As seen in Figures

3.7. to 3.9., most parties were regarded as highly centralised when it comes to candidate selection.



Figure 3.7 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in Bangladesh (Expert Survey 2019)

In Bangladesh (Figure 3.7), nearly all respondents claimed that candidates for national legislative elections were selected by national party leaders with little participation from lower tiers of the party organisation despite electoral reforms which require registered parties to finalise candidate nominations in "consideration" of members of the "concerned constituency" (The Representation of the People Order 1972). Similarly, for Pakistan there was near unanimous consensus that the balance of power for candidate selection resided in national party leaders for all parties (Figure 3.9).



Figure 3.8 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in India (Expert Survey 2019)

It is only in the case of the Indian parties that there is a near even split between respondents who see the balance of power in candidate selection primarily residing with national leadership and those which see candidate selection as an outcome of bargaining with lower tiers of the party organisation (Figure 3.8). This is a good indication of complexity beyond individual party leaders and is likely partly a consequence of large size of Indian parties which stretch over a vast territory. However, the ability to coordinate such large organisations, should itself be considered an indication of organisational complexity beyond a small clique of party leaders.



Figure 3.9 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in Pakistan (Expert Survey 2019)

The structure and functioning of the respective party organisations are analysed in-depth in the subsequent chapters examining each country. This includes understanding the organisational structures of the parties as well as their processes for electing party leaders. Broadly, nearly all of the major South Asian political parties are highly personalised and dynastic. In Bangladesh, both major parties are centralised around the heirs of the country's two main political icons and in India, the Nehru-Gandhi family have been a central feature of the INC since independence. Similarly, Pakistan's PML (N) and PPP are led by political families. It is only the BJP and the relatively newly formed PTI which are not controlled by political dynasties. However, in both cases, the party leaders are immensely powerful figures with a popular following which gives them significant influence over their party organisations.

In summary, Bangladesh's parties are regarded as very centralised and although geographically expansive, do not have an equivalent level of community presence. India's political parties appear to be the most institutionalised organisations of the three countries. Particularly in the case of the BJP, the party is seen as geographically expansive and are regarded by most respondents as having a strong permanent presence in the community. Similarly, the Indian parties show some extent of organisational complexity in their decentralisation of power, particularly when it comes to candidate selection. Pakistan's parties show mixed results. In terms of the parties' geographical expansiveness, they show some complexity although but appear more informally than formally organised. Similarly, candidate selection is considered highly centralised in Pakistan.

3.3. Party Patronage

Party patronage can be seen as both a measure of the extent to which parties use their discretionary power to make appointments on the basis of rewarding loyal party activists and the extent to which parties are intertwined with the state (Kopecký & Mair 2012: 7-8). In countries where party patronage is high, parties are more clearly intertwined with the state with party members taking up roles in state institutions, giving them greater discretionary power over the allocation of resources. Some state sectors also employ significant numbers of people and in countries where the state controls a large part of the economy, such employment may be lucrative.

This variety of employment opportunities can be used to reward both important party elites, such as through an ambassadorship, or minor party members, such as in regional administration. The ability to pack state institutions with party members thus both gives parties greater control over these institutions and is an opportunity to build networks of

dependents interested in maintaining the party's continued rule. Party patronage differs from clientelism as it is directed at building the party organisation rather than vote-gathering. However, party patronage is also important for supporting a party's clientelist practices as the deployment of party members in state institutions will support parties in redirecting state resources for party political purposes.

Respondents to the expert survey were given the following prompt:

> "Parties sometimes seek to ensure that appointments in the state sector are made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty, and/ or as a means of controlling the institution through the deployment of party representatives rather than on the basis of merit. In your view, are any of the below state institutions or related government bodies awarded to individuals such as party activists as a reward for party loyalty or work done to advance the party? In some cases, parties do not have discretion in making appointments in a particular sector – in such instances, these sectors should be marked 0 (not at all)."

Respondents were asked to evaluate the extent to which parties reward party activists with positions in the public sector on a scale ranging from 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). Responses have been averaged for each sector and each country with the assumption that the scale can be considered continuous.

As can be seen in Table 3.1, Bangladeshi state institutions are regarded as highly politicised with several sectors approaching the maximum score of 4. Several important sectors such as the judiciary, military and police, as well as regional and local administration receive very high scores. The politicisation of some sectors such as the judiciary is particularly concerning for the separation of powers and accountability as partisanship in the judiciary will further diminish checks on the power of the ruling party.

Further, the politicisation of regional and local administration will give the party significant control over the allocation of public services and plays an important role in the distribution of clientelism. From the data, it is clear that party patronage is prevalent across all sectors of the state and party membership has clear benefits for securing employment in the Bangladeshi state. The use of the state in this way provides the ruling BAL with a large number of positions that can be used to build the party organisation and maintain party membership.

Table 3.1 Averaged responses on extent to which appointments in the state sector are made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019).

	Bangladesh (n=8)	India (n=15)	Pakistan (n=7)
Economic	3.38	1.94	3
Finance	3.5	1.69	2.43
Judicial	3.86	1.19	2.14
Media	3.25	1.8	2.29
Military and Police	3.63	1.25	2.43
Foreign Service	2.75	0.93	1.83
Culture and Education	3.38	2.63	2.43
Healthcare	2.38	1.33	2.57
Regional and Local Administration	3.75	2.75	3.43
Average	3.32	1.72	2.51

By comparison, India shows far more professionalisation in the appointment of officials in state institutions. Most sectors receive low score in the prevalence of party patronage and some of the most important sectors such as the judiciary, military and police, and foreign service all receive low scores. The lack of party patronage is a good indication of the independence of India's state institutions and the separation of parties and the state. While parties may still try to use state resources and engage in clientelism, state institutions are seen as quite independent of party politics. One sector receiving a comparatively high score is regional and local administration. Particularly regarding

small regional parties, this is a sector where rank-and-file party members can be rewarded with employment. While the data shows that there is a greater separation between political parties and the state in India, parties still make some use of state employment to reward party members.

Pakistan shows a low to moderate amount of party patronage. The most important sectors such as the foreign service, judiciary and the media which wield greater political power receive relatively low scores. The highest scores are in regional and local administration, the economic sector and healthcare. These are the more relatively apolitical sectors, but also sectors which likely employ a large number of people. Particularly for regional and local administration, this may provide parties with opportunities for rewarding rank-and-file party activists with employment. In this way, Pakistan parties can make some use of the state for building party organisation, but do not dominate the state in the same way that the ruling BAL does in Bangladesh, nor is the Pakistani state regarded as professionalised as that of India.

Provisionally, there is some evidence in support of the theoretical expectations set out in chapter two. As anticipated, party patronage is very high in Bangladesh where authoritarian successor parties dominate the party system, and the parties are considered highly centralised around the party leadership. In this way, power is centralised in the Bangladeshi parties and activists are tied to the party through patronage rather than prospects of advancing through the party based on merit and their work for the party organisation.

India's results similarly provide support for the argument that the Indian party system at the national level is structured by institutionalised parties and that stability in the system comes from the strength of the parties. Although some party patronage is seen in regional

and local administration, most sectors are relatively apolitical. If the parties are not dependent on party patronage, then party activists must be tied to parties for reasons other than purely economic gain. This lends support to arguments that India's party system is increasingly structured by ideological appeals which binds voters and actors to political parties (Chhibber & Verma 2018).

Although it was expected that Pakistan should have a greater separation between the party and state, party patronage is still prevalent in some state sectors such as regional and local administration. However, looking at the data, it appears that the parties are kept out of the more important state sectors such as the judiciary, foreign service and to some extent, the military and police. This shows that Pakistani parties' relationship with the state is nuanced. Parties have more influence over appointments in regional and apolitical institutions while the core of the state, which operates at the national level experiences more independence.

3.4. Societal Linkages

Institutionalised parties are those strongly rooted in society and esteemed by voters. This rootedness is built through linkages with voters and interest groups, which support the party and establishes it within the community as an organisation with lasting power. Parties with stronger linkages as well as a diversity of linkages can be considered more institutionalised. To determine the strength of parties' linkages to society, respondents were asked to evaluate the strength of linkages on a scale of 0 (no linkages) to 4 (very strong linkages) for six types of civil society organisations. Respondents were asked: "do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the

party?" Assuming that respondents regard this scale as continuous, responses are averaged for each party and category of interest group.

Table 3.2 Bangladesh – Averaged responses on the strength of parties' linkages to different sectors of civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	BAL	BNP
Unions	3.11	2.11
Business	3.33	2.89
Religious organisations	2.89	3.22
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations	2.67	1.78
Urban/Rural organisations	2.5	1.88
Women's organisations	3.13	2.5
Average	2.94	2.40

In Bangladesh, the ruling BAL have stronger linkages than the BNP in every category expect for religious organisations where the BNP's linkages are seen as slightly stronger (Table 3.2). Interestingly, the BAL has relatively strong linkages in every category and intriguingly, has some of its strongest linkages with both unions and business – unlike in Pakistan where a clearer cleavage between pro-business and pro-worker parties can more be seen more distinctly with parties favoured by one or the other. This is likely a testament to the major role the ruling BAL plays in Bangladesh's economic activity due to its hold over the state.

Table 3.3 India – Averaged responses on the strength of parties' linkages to different sectors of civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	INC	BJP
Unions	1.79	2.56
Business	2.14	3.19
Religious organisations	1.15	3.69
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations	2.53	2.41
Urban/Rural organisations	1.85	2.5
Women's organisations	2	2.53
Average	1.91	2.81

In India, the ruling BJP predictably is seen as having the strongest linkages of the two parties and there is a large difference between the BJP and INC (Table 3.3). The BJP particularly received a very high score for its linkages to religious organisations, approaching the maximum score of 4, and further has strong linkages to business which is confirmed by the literature. Much like the BAL, the BJP also enjoys the support for a broad coalition including across classes with strong linkages to unions and business. The INC's linkages are comparatively weak, which reflects the decline of the party in recent years. However, the INC scores slighter higher than the BJP for its linkages with ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations which indicates that the party may have a niche in the party system which provides it with support, particularly as this is the area where the BJP has the weakest linkages.

Table 3.4 Pakistan – Averaged responses on the strength of parties' linkages to different sectors of civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	PML (N)	PPP	PTI
Unions	0.86	2.29	1
Business	3.43	1.71	2.43
Religious organisations	2.88	1.25	2.38
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations	2	2.88	1.63
Urban/Rural organisations	2.5	3.13	2.38
Women's organisations	1.71	2.38	2.13
Average	2.23	2.27	1.99

Unlike the ruling parties in Bangladesh and India, the ruling PTI has the weakest linkages of all three parties in Pakistan (Table 3.4). In nearly every category, the PTI's linkages are seen as significantly weaker than either of the opposition parties. With the weakest linkages of the three, it is curious that the PTI came to power. This lends support to the argument that in Pakistan, the support of the state is important for remaining electorally

competitive. The overall strength between the three parties is marginal, but even more so for the PML (N) and PPP. However, variations between the parties are apparent with the PML (N) clearly favoured by business while the left-wing PPP known for its land reform policies and support of worker's rights, enjoys the support of rural organisations and unions. The PTI, in turn, has scattered support and has the strongest linkages in none of the six categories.

The strength of parties' linkages cannot, however, be fully understood without considering the nature of the linkages. Voters associate with parties for various reasons including ideological affinity, traditional ties such as by being co-ethnics, or through clientelist inducements. Particularly in cases where parties are ideologically thin or lack deep roots in society, clientelism may be an appealing tactic for supplementing weak linkages to society. Based on the data, Bangladesh's two main parties, the BAL and BNP, appear by these measures to have quite strong linkages to society. However, these can't be fully understood without considering the nature of the parties' relationship with the state as this provides the context explaining the origins of their strong linkages.

The BJP again, shows moderately high levels of institutionalisation while the INC performs more poorly in the strength of their linkages. Although the INC as an organisation seems to be relatively well-institutionalised, this has not translated to strong linkages which may explain the party's poor electoral showing in recent elections particularly as linkages have deteriorated and the party has lost out to the stronger BJP organisation. Much like the data on party organisations, the Pakistani parties' linkages show a mixture of strength in some categories but are weak in others. Further, the ruling PTI peculiarly has the weakest linkages of the Pakistani parties, yet in the 2018 elections received more seats than the PML (N) and PPP combined. Consequently, the explanation

for the PTI's success may lie beyond the strength of the party organisation and its institutionalisation. Instead, as argued in Chapter 5, it is through the support of the military establishment that the PTI has risen to power.

3.5. Clientelism

Not all societal linkages can be considered the same. The nature of voter-party linkages may have their origins in an ideological affinity with the party, but equally parties may develop linkages based in clientelism. It is important to differentiate between these two as the nature of these linkages will likely affect their durability. We can assume that linkages based on ideological affinity and party identification are more stable than linkages based in clientelism, which will have a greater potential for vote-switching. This is particularly true if parties' linkages are dependent on clientelism and consequently, on their continued access to state resources. Research on parties in Africa, for instance, shows how seemingly dominant parties have atrophied once out of power due to their inability to maintain clientelistic linkages (Bleck & van de Walle: 2019).

The strength of parties' linkages should be considered in the context of their clientelist efforts. Parties in many young democracies around the world make efforts to build support for their party through clientelist networks which are usually aimed at supplementing weak linkages. While voters may support parties on the basis of economic inducements targeting the individual or their community, clientelism is usually only effective if parties have mechanisms in place for determining whether voters targeted by clientelism have indeed turned out to support the party (Kitschelt & Singer 2018: 56). This requires an organisational network of local brokers to monitor turnout and mobilise clients. While some parties may engage in clientelism, this will not necessarily mean that effective linkages have been formed nor that their efforts will result in electoral support.

The nature of these linkages is therefore important to acknowledge in interpreting the extent to which parties are rooted in societies. For instance, parties with authoritarian origins usually have existing clientelist networks built during the period of authoritarian rule. In the immediate period after a transition to multiparty elections, these clientelistic linkages will provide authoritarian successor parties with a significant advantage over newly formed parties but will not necessarily be a result of ideological affiliation with these parties. While it may be difficult to separate genuine ideological affinity for a party from support based in clientelism, we can get a good sense of the nature of these linkages by looking at the extent to which parties engage in clientelist practices. If a party has stronger linkages but only engages in some clientelist practices, it can be assumed that these linkages are more genuine. In turn, it can be assumed that if parties have strong linkages, but are very clientelistic, then these linkages are more likely a result of these clientelistic practices – particularly if the party organisation is considered more superficial and thinly ideological.

Survey respondents were asked questions about whether parties offer voters preferential access to various services provided by the state as an inducement to obtain their vote. Respondents were also asked to identify which types of voters parties target with such inducements. Respondents' evaluations of the types of voters targeted are summarised in Appendix 2. Several of these categories of voters overlap with the categories of interest groups with which parties build linkages. This includes women's organisations, religious groups, ethnic, linguistic or caste-based groups as well as urban and rural organisations. Chi-square tests show that engaging in clientelistic practices towards a specific group has a positive effect on the strength of linkages and is statistically significant for linkages with religious organisations ($X^2 = 19.167$, df. = 4, $p = .001$), ethnic, linguistic or caste-

based organisations (X^2 = 12.390, df. = 4, p = .014) and women's organisations (X^2 = 17.061, df. 4, p = .002).

The effect of special effort targeting voters according to income groups was also tested for by pairing poor and middle-income voters with trade unions, and middle-income and wealthy voters with business. However, it is not significant for the strength of parties' linkages to unions and business. This is likely more a limitation of the data available. There is for instance, no way of distinguishing whether poor or middle-income voters are tied to unions. Many probably work outside of unionised conditions and so appeals to these voters will not have an effect on the strength of linkages. Likewise, appealing to wealthy or middle-income voters will not necessarily translate to an increase in the strength of linkages with businesses as these voters are not all business owners. However, most importantly, the results show that engaging in clientelism is seen to have an effect on the strength of parties' linkages.

Respondents were also asked to evaluate the extent to which parties give or promise to give supporters preferential access in four types of state benefits as an inducement to obtain votes. The four areas where parties are known to provide inducements are elaborated in Table 3.5. below, along with the prompts given to respondents providing examples of the types of inducements that these categories include. Responses were recorded on a scale of 0 (no effort at all) to 4 (a major effort) for each of the four categories. Again, for a summarised overview, the responses have with averaged with the assumption that the scale can be seen as continuous.

Table 3.5 Four types of preferential benefits parties use to induce voters with clientelism	
Preferential public benefits	Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes (e.g., preferential access to subsidised prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?
Preferential employment opportunities	Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector (e.g., post office, janitorial services, maintenance work, jobs at various skill levels in state owned enterprises or in large private enterprises with government contracts and subsidies, etc.) as inducement to obtain their vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities?
Preferential government contracts	Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens and businesses preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities (e.g., public works/construction projects, military procurement projects without competitive bidding to companies whose employees support the awarding party) as inducement to gain their and their employees' votes. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities?
Preferential regulation	Consider whether candidates or parties influence or promise to influence the application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies (e.g., more lenient tax assessments and audits, more favourable interpretation of import and export regulation, less strict interpretation of fire and escape facilities in buildings, etc.) in order to favour individual citizens or specific businesses as inducement to gain their and their employees' vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favour?

Bangladesh's two main parties both receive high scores in the extent to which they engage in clientelism (Table 3.6). The extent to which the parties are seen to offer preferential employment opportunities is particularly high for both parties, which is to be expected considering the high levels of party patronage in the country. The difference between the extent to which the BAL and BNP engage in clientelist practices is marginal, yet as seen in the previous section, the BAL has stronger societal linkages than the BNP. Considering that the BAL is the ruling party, they likely have more access to clientelist opportunities and so may be more capable of fulfilling promises of preferential benefits through their control over the state.

Table 3.6 Bangladesh – Averaged responses on the extent to which parties try to entice voters with promises of providing preferential access to benefits. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	BAL	BNP
Preferential public benefits	3.14	2.67
Preferential employment opportunities	3.00	3.20
Preferential government contracts	2.86	3.00
Preferential regulation	2.80	2.75
Average	2.95	2.90

Interestingly, both parties in India are considered about equally clientelist and are also considered the least clientelist in the region (Table 3.7). Again, however, there are clear differences in the strength of the two parties' linkages with the BJP's linkages distinctly stronger than that of the INC. Looking at the strength of the two parties' linkages in the context of their clientelist practices, the difference in the strength of their linkages cannot be explained by clientelism. There must therefore be an explanation beyond clientelism for understanding the strength of these two parties' linkages. The most apparent alternative explanation is that voters and interest groups must have an ideological affiliation with the BJP and the party must be better at garnering support for itself than the INC.

Table 3.7 India – Averaged responses on the extent to which parties try to entice voters with promises of providing preferential access to benefits. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)		
	INC	BJP
Preferential public benefits	3.00	2.82
Preferential employment opportunities	2.18	2.00
Preferential government contracts	2.29	2.35
Preferential regulation	2.24	2.41
Average	2.43	2.40

Pakistan's PML (N) and PPP are considered the most clientelist of all parties surveyed, while the ruling PTI also receives a moderately high score (Table 3.8). Again, counter-intuitively, it is the ruling party with the weakest linkages that engages in the least clientelism and yet, is curiously capable of winning the most votes in the most recent 2018 election. Despite higher levels of clientelism, Pakistani parties' linkages are not as strong as the two Bangladeshi parties which also engage in high amounts of clientelism. This shows that the mere act of engaging in clientelism is insufficient for building a parties' linkages. Further, as discussed in Chapter 5, this also reveals Pakistani parties' complex relationship with clientelism as clientelist practices primarily occur on a personalised basis with local elites building personalised networks of loyalty rather loyalty to the party.

Table 3.8 Pakistan – Averaged responses on the extent to which parties try to entice voters with promises of providing preferential access to benefits. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)			
	PML (N)	PPP	PTI
Preferential public benefits	3.38	3.38	3.00
Preferential employment opportunities	3.25	3.25	2.75
Preferential government contracts	3.38	3.00	2.63
Preferential regulation	3.25	3.13	2.75
Average	3.31	3.19	2.78

3.6. Summary and Conclusion

From the expert survey data collected, there is evidence to support the argument that parties' relationship with the state has an important effect in determining their ability to remain electorally competitive. In the subsequent chapters, the effect of this relationship on PSI is examined in further depth to show how this relationship can determine stability in interparty competition. As this chapter has shown, the three cases can be matched to the hypotheses based on parties' varying degrees of institutionalisation and their relationship to the state.

The authoritarian successor parties of Bangladesh appear by some measures to represent institutionalised parties, but a deeper examination reveals that this is largely based on resources drawn from the state. Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 575) in their research on party system institutionalisation in the East and Southeast Asian context argue that the party systems which are institutionalised have their origins in highly institutionalised authoritarian parties formed under autocratic or semi-democratic rule. What this perhaps does not recognise, is that while these parties may exhibit many of the same features of institutionalised parties, much of this is ultimately drawn from these parties' access and control over the state. In Bangladesh's case, stability in the party system is a consequence of parties co-opting the state, which is consistent with the second hypothesis, H2, which states that: parties lacking significant institutionalisation, but which have co-opted the state to supplement party deficiencies are a sufficient condition for an institutionalised party system.

The data on India gives support to the argument that the Indian party system is increasingly structured by the institutionalisation of, at least, the BJP and aligns with the first hypothesis commonly found in the literature which states that: institutionalised

parties with strong linkages and a well-developed party organisation are a sufficient condition for an institutionalised party system. The data on party patronage shows that the parties exist somewhat separately of the state and are capable of attracting party activists beyond parties' ability to distribute patronage. Similarly, their linkages to society go beyond mere clientelism, at least when it comes to the two national parties. At the regional level, this is likely more complicated (Ziegfeld 2016a). Further, the two Indian parties also exhibit a level of complexity and decentralisation beyond individual figures although their party leader remain powerful figures.

Finally, with neither institutionalised parties nor the successful co-optation of the state, Pakistan's party system has remained more fluid. As stated in the third hypothesis, H3, parties lacking significant institutionalisation, and which are incapable of co-opting the state, will be unable to form an institutionalised party system. Considering Pakistan's history of military involvement in politics and its strong bureaucracy, it is understandable how the parties have been unable to co-opt the state as the military continues to wield significant economic and political power. While the PML (N) and PPP have been able to establish themselves as important parties in the Pakistani party system through their use of state resources, they have found themselves insufficiently intertwined. This would explain why the Pakistani party system shows greater fluidity and why it was possible for the PTI to disrupt the party system that previously centred around the PML (N) and PPP.

As discussed in the subsequent chapters, parties' relationship to the state at critical junctures have proven important in shaping the party system that has emerged in each country and the ways in which the systems have developed. It is clear that access to state resources have in many cases helped parties maintain the organisation through tying political elites and voters to the party. However, in some cases, political parties have

proven more adept at co-opting the state while in others, parties have instead found the state shaping the development of political parties. In the next three chapters, the formation and development of political parties and their relationship to the state is examined in greater depth for each country to understand the effect on this relationship on the institutionalisation of party systems.

Chapter 4
Political Parties, the State and Party System Institutionalisation in India

As the two largest national parties, the INC and BJP have significantly defined the functioning of the Indian party system and since the 1990s, competition at the national level has primarily revolved around the two parties. Their institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation have often had a direct impact on the stability of the party system, particularly as they represent the core around which much of the party system has been structured. In this way, changes in the structure and balance of power in the organisations have either helped bring stability to the party system and allowed its institutionalisation or have undermined continuity in the system.

Institutionalised parties should exhibit two features: the party should function as an organisation guided by rules and norms with lasting power beyond individual figures, and the party should be deeply rooted in society with lasting linkages. To understand the effect of party institutionalisation on PSI, this chapter examines the two parties' organisations and societal linkages using data collected from expert surveys as well as public election surveys collected by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies.

In the first part, the development of the Indian party system is discussed in depth to understand the institutionalisation of the system and the factors behind its volatility during different periods. Six major phases in the party system are identified: 1) an initial phase of Congress dominance (1947-1967), 2) a phase during which the INC is still dominant

but declining (1967-1977), 3) a phase defined by opposition to the INC (1977-1989), 4) a period of regionalisation in the party system (1989-1999), 5) a return to a more stable phase defined by competition between the two major electoral alliances (1999-2014) and finally, 6) the emergence of the BJP dominant phase (2014-present).

After reviewing the evolution of the Indian party system and the role of the INC and BJP in shaping change, the chapter examines the institutionalisation of the two parties. This assesses the routinisation and complexity of the party organisations and the strength of their linkages. This includes an analysis of the extent to which the parties make use of clientelism and party patronage to maintain the party organisations. Thereafter, the relationship between party institutionalisation and PSI during the different phases is discussed with the conclusion that the institutionalisation of India's two main parties has had a direct effect on the institutionalisation of the party system.

4.2. The Evolution of India's Party System

While India only became independent in 1947, the foundations for Indian democracy were laid well before independence. Since its inception and first meeting in 1885, the INC played a significant role in reforming British India and pushing for independent self-rule. Particularly since the 1920s, when reforms devolved power from the colonial government to local officials, the party grew into a mass movement that would lead the country to independence. This transformation into a mass movement with wide appeal was aided by reforms under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, who reorganised the party along linguistic lines to transform the elite-dominated party into a mass organisation (Adeney & Wyatt 2010: 127).

Reforms in the country's governance structures also gave party members experience in governing, particularly after the Government of India Act passed in 1935 allowed for the

election of provincial legislative assemblies in 1937 (Rubinoff 1998: 16). The INC was immensely successful in the 1937 elections and similarly following the 1946 election, the party formed the government in eight of the eleven provinces and governed in a coalition in one more (Chaudhry 1947: 113-114). The experience gained by governing and the development of the organisation transformed the INC into one of the most institutionalised independence parties in the world at the time of independence (Wilkinson 2015: 424).

The Congress "System" (1947-1967)

While the focus of this section is on the development of the Indian party system post-independence, it is difficult to separate the INC from the broader political system in the early democratic period. As Manor (1988: 65) states, the dominance of the INC over the party system and all of politics made it "arguably more important than all of the formal institutions of state put together". In the first two decades of independence, India's party system was dominated by the INC in what Sartori terms a predominant party system whereby one party continuously obtains an absolute majority of seats in successive elections (Sartori 1976: 196). During this time, politics and the party system revolved around the INC in what Kothari (1964) famously calls the Congress "System". Under this system, competition occurred within the party rather than between parties as the INC functioned as a "big tent" party garnering support across the political spectrum. The broad coalition of interests within the INC kept the party at the centre of politics and relegated opposition parties to the margins of the system. Additionally, these parties were often on the opposite ends of the political spectrum, which further meant that they were unable to work together to displace the INC from their dominant position especially given the first-past-the-post electoral system (Manor 1988: 64-65).

The INC's dominance over politics meant that opposition parties were not a significant alternative to the INC. Although multiparty competition occurred, the prospects of alternation were low with the INC winning sizeable majorities in successive state and national elections. Consequently, parties at the margins of the system instead acted as parties of "pressure" seeking to influence the centre by critiquing the ruling party and working with like-minded factions within the INC to shape policy and opinion. As Kothari (1961: 848) states, "they oppose by making Congressmen oppose". In this way, competition largely remained within the confines of the INC as factions and branches of the party competed for power and influence. This intraparty competition, however, kept the party internally democratic and sensitive to political pressure (Morris-Jones 1967a: 110).

Many other independence movements have not seen the same success as the INC, either in maintaining popular support or democratic rule. For instance, in neighbouring Pakistan, the struggle of the Muslim League to root the party in society post-independence and the consequent loss of East Pakistan shows the difficulty of transforming an independence movement into a successful political party. Indeed, in Huntington's (1965: 396) seminal article on institutionalisation, he sees the ability to transform an organisation from one function to another as an indication that an organisation is highly institutionalised.

The key to the INC's success came from its ability to successfully transform itself from an independence movement to a mass political party and again, to a ruling party. The party's role in leading the independence movement helped form the foundation of the organisation and established links to significant political actors such as trade unions and economic elites (Bates 2007: 135-165). This also firmly rooted the movement in society as it brought together a broad coalition of social, linguistic and class groups that gave the

movement popular appeal. Importantly, the INC was also adept at forming alliances with influential local figures such as landowners and the upper castes whose support additionally brought that of those economically dependent on these figures.

A significant factor that allowed the party to maintain its popularity in the transition from an independence movement to the ruling political party was its ability to devolve power from the centre to the state branches. Brass (1965: 2) describes the INC as "a coalition of semi-autonomous state parties" in the period following independence. While politics in the state-level branches of the party were immensely factionalised, this factionalism also invigorated the party by encouraging the recruitment of party members and incorporating new interest groups into the party. The party's dominance of the political space also provided it with the resources to maintain their dominant position. Control over much of the political space also meant the ability to distribute patronage to attract and keep elites within the party fold. Further, their proximity to the state attracted the financial support of business owners and industrialists, placing the party at the centre of Indian politics.

The Decline of Congress Dominance (1967-1977)

While organisationally complex and well-rooted in society, the INC's success under the Congress System also stemmed from the relative weakness of opposition parties. For the first two decades after independence, no parties could challenge the predominance of the INC. However, factional conflict took its toll on the party particularly following the death of the party leader and prime minister, Jawaharlal Nehru, in 1964. In many cases, these disputes were neither ideological nor based on policy, but were rather a struggle for control by various factions and personalities (Brass 1965: 53). The decline of the Congress "System" is most apparent in the results of the 1967 election with the party's seat share declining from 73.9% in 1962 to 54.8% in 1967 (Election Commission of India

1962; 1967). The drop in the INC's seat share cannot solely be attributed to the party organisation's decline. Indeed, their overall vote share did not decline significantly.

Much of this should rather be attributed to the increased organisation of opposition parties with growing regional strongholds as well as the rise of the Bharatiya Jana Sangh (BJS), a predecessor to the BJP. To contextualise the results, the INC received 44.7% of the overall vote in the 1962 election, compared to 40.7% in 1967 – yet its seat share declined by nearly 20%. Prior to this election, the first-past-the-post electoral system had disproportionally advantaged the INC particularly due to the fragmentation of opposition parties. With the increased organisation of opposition parties, the INC lost support to both the right and the left of the party and following the election, half the states were governed by coalitions or non-Congress parties – signalling a partial break from the INC's dominance (Morris-Jones 1967b: 284). From this point onward, party systems at the state level became increasingly bipolar as opposition parties organised and consolidated the vote against the INC. However, opposition to the INC usually differed from state to state which increased the fragmentation of the national party system as regional parties organised.

One of the winners in this election was the BJS, a predecessor to the BJP, which received the second most votes after the INC (9.3%) and increased its seat share by 21. The party was founded in 1951 by members of the Hindu nationalist Hindu Mahasabha and drew on the support of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) movement to contest elections. Originally a cultural-religious organisation, the RSS gained more prominence in the period following independence by supporting Hindu refugees displaced by partition as well as "defending" the Hindu community in communal riots during this time (Brass 1965: 24). Support for the party grew between elections as leaders invested in developing

the party organisation and building support through opposition to the INC in favour of Hindu majoritarian policies (Baxter 1969: 181). Particularly in the early 1960s, membership grew as the party intensified efforts to expand the party's base and organisational presence across India with the number of local committees nearly doubling from 2,551 in 1959 to 4,313 in 1960 (Graham 1990: 79-80). While the organisation remained nowhere near as powerful as the INC and relied heavily on the RSS, the foundations for an alternative to the INC started forming.

An increasingly politically aware electorate also meant the mobilisation of new voters with an estimated 24.4% of voters voting for the first time in the 1967 election with most new voters opting for opposition parties (Kothari 1971: 234). Factionalism in the INC and conflict over the allocation of party tickets additionally led to major defections with some members running as independents after failing to receive the party nomination (Brass 1969: 29-30). The decline in the party's position exacerbated conflict in the party's leadership which, after the death of Nehru in 1964 and his successor two years later, already faced schisms over the question of succession. Many blamed Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, Nehru's daughter, for the party's poor performance and for many senior members who lost their seats, the loss was personal (Brecher 1967: 425). This led to a major fissure developing between the party organisation led by state leaders, and the parliamentary party led by the PM Indira Gandhi.

Much of this conflict stemmed from a struggle over the decentralisation of power within the organisation as well as a divergence over future economic policy as Indira Gandhi pulled the party towards the economic left (Hardgrave 1970: 257-258). In 1969, the INC was torn apart in the party's first major split after it expelled Indira Gandhi who, in turn, took much of the parliamentary membership and organisation with her to form the INC

(Requisition) in contrast to the INC (Organisation) which joined the opposition in parliament. Following the split, Indira Gandhi's governing INC (R) was reduced to a parliamentary minority, but with the support of regional and leftist parties, Gandhi maintained control of government until an early election in 1971 returned her majority. In this election, Indira Gandhi's faction displaced the INC (O) almost entirely and established itself as the successor to the INC legacy (Singh 1981: 1).

In another important change, several opposition parties, including the INC (O) and BJS, formed a pre-election coalition which saw parties agreeing on a single candidate to run in opposition to the INC (R) to avoid splitting the vote (Noorani 1980: 238-239). Building on the 1967 election, opposition to the INC became more institutionalised as opposition parties learned to cooperate with each other and grew their organisations. Although the INC, now the INC (R), still dominated the party system, the Congress System was in clear decline. While the party system in this period largely saw continuity in the overall composition of parliament, subtle changes in the party system can be seen in the emergence of a more developed opposition as well as the de-institutionalisation of the INC under Indira Gandhi.

While still dominant, the party organisation was in decline. Under Indira Gandhi, the party organisation was increasingly centralised as she sought to prevent the recurrence of challenges to her leadership by directly intervening in state branches of the party and concentrating power in her position. In a federalised and highly complex country such as India, this centralised restructuring was a poor choice for maintaining unity in the party organisation and weakened the party as state leaders with significant followings were side-lined before ultimately leaving the party (Kochanek 1976: 109-110). Many new members sent to parliament and state assemblies consequently lacked their own local

support base and the party largely relied on Indira Gandhi's charisma and populist policies to maintain support (Malik 1988: 14-15). Gandhi similarly ruled India as an autocrat, expanding executive powers and ruling by decree. In 1975, a state of emergency was declared following a period of unrest sparked by the Allahabad high court decision that her election to parliament in 1971 was invalid due to the misuse of government resources in her election campaign. The general elections were postponed and many opposition leaders were jailed until the national emergency was lifted and a new election was called in 1977 when it was believed that conditions were favourable for an INC victory (Mitra & Enskat 1999: 132).

The Congress-Opposition System (1977-1989)

The 1977 election was meant to catch opposition parties by surprise and secure a victory for Indira Gandhi. Instead, it saw the first non-Congress national victory. Gandhi's authoritarian streak had led to further defections from her party and served to unite the opposition against her. In the build up to the election, several major opposition parties including members of the INC (O), BJS, the Socialist Party and the Bharatiya Lok Dal - itself an amalgamation of smaller parties formed a few years prior – joined to form the Janata Party (Manor 1988: 75). The party was a de facto coalition made up of interests spanning the political spectrum and won an almost "Congress-like victory" with 41.3% of the vote and 295 seats allowing the formation of a majority government (Sridharan 2002: 481).

Although the party leadership primarily consisted of former INC (O) members, former BJS members occupied 99 of the party's parliamentary seats and were a major component of the organisation's regional units, particularly in northern India where the BJS had spent years building the organisation and its base (Graham 1987: 4-5). The Janata Party,

however, remained a coalition of disparate interests and did not significantly integrate its diverse components following the election with many leaders preferring to use their own factions to bolster their influence within the organisation to the overall detriment of the party (Gupta 1979: 392). In 1979, conflict between the prime minister, Morarji Desai, and his deputy, Chaudhary Charan Singh, finally led to a major party split and ultimately the collapse of the government with no side enjoying a majority (Hardgrave & Kochanek 2000: 240).

Meanwhile, the INC (R) had again split under Indira Gandhi's uncompromising leadership following the 1977 election this time to form the INC (Indira), a highly centralised organisation largely dependent on the populist personality cult formed around Indira Gandhi (Joshi & Desai 1978: 1108-1109). Following the collapse of the Janata Party government, Gandhi again returned to power in an early election in 1980, this time winning a large majority after facing a fragmented opposition (Miwa 2006: 100). The Janata Party disintegrated into several new parties that would go on to play important roles in the coalition period thereafter including the Lok Dal and Janata Dal (JD) (Diwakar 2017: 15).

In 1984, following the assassination of Indira Gandhi, the INC led by her son Rajiv Gandhi won a landslide victory based on a wave of sympathy despite serious organisational weakness (Manor 1988: 87). Mitra and Enskat (1999:132) call it a "deviant election" obscuring the serious decline of the party. Although dominant at the national level, the INC was no longer the organisationally complex party that it was in the two decades following independence with little intra-party democracy and the party now only representing a narrow set of interests. The political landscape had similarly changed with the development of organised opposition parties. While no party could successfully

displace the INC at the national level, several strong parties had emerged at the state level including the Communist parties in Kerala and West Bengal, and the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam in Tamil Nadu. Yadav (1996: 99) refers to this period as the "Congress-Opposition system", characterised by the emergence of relatively stable competitive party systems at the state level while the INC remained the most important party at the national level around which the party system was structured.

Regionalisation and the Third Front (1989-1998)

For the next 30 years, no single party won a majority in a general election, ushering a new party system based on coalitions and at times, minority governments. The 1990s are seen as the "post-Congress phase" with the decline of the party and the deepening of social cleavages that the catch-all party could not bridge (Jaffrelot & Verniers 2011: 1092). Yadav and Palshikar (2003: 29-30) identify three important features defining Indian politics that emerged in the 1990s: Mandir, Mandal and Market.

Mandir (Hindi for temple) is in reference to the rising prominence of the BJP and their brand of Hindu majoritarian politics that gained traction during this time. Mandal refers to the Mandal Commission set up in 1979 by the Janata Party government to consider affirmative action reservations for Other Backward Classes (OBCs). The Mandal Commission classified OBCs as a group of socially disadvantaged castes forming a significant proportion of the Indian population and recommended reservations for OBCs in public sector employment and higher education. The Commission's findings were finally implemented when the Janata Party's successor party, the JD, came to power as the National Front in 1989. Several other successful parties such as the Bahujan Samaj Party (BSP) and several regional parties also emerged during this time specifically appealing to Dalits and OBCs. Finally, the 1990s saw significant market reforms, under

Narashimha Rao, the INC's first prime minister who was not a member of the Nehru-Gandhi family, and later under the coalition governments of the late 1990s.

These significant political issues coupled with the declining institutionalisation of the INC led to significant fragmentation in the national party system. State politics also became far more important during this time with regional identity emerging as an important social cleavage for parties such as the Telugu Desam Party and Asom Gana Parishad that despite their regional appeal would play an important role in forming coalition governments at the national level (Diwakar 2017: 18). The emergence of new political cleavages posed a challenge to the INC's catch-all identity as new parties such as the BJP, BSP and regional parties sapped votes away from the INC based on these cleavages (Heath & Yadav 1999: 2518). In this way, national elections became nothing more than the compilation of verdicts at the state level.

The fragmentation caused by the regionalisation of the party system can be seen by calculating Laakso and Taagepera's (1979) Effective Number of Parties (ENP) – a measure used to determine how many parties effectively share the party system based on their relative size. Although a fragmented system will not necessarily mean instability, the rapid fragmentation of a party system is a good indication of major change in the system. Graph 4.1 below shows the ENP for the number of seats and votes respectively won by parties. The rapid fragmentation is particularly apparent in the difference between the seat share of the ENP from a low 1.69 in 1984 to 4.11 in 1989 with the ENP continuing to rise in the 1990s.



Figure 4.1 Effective number of parties in India (1952-2019) (Source: Author's own calculation using data from the Election Commission of India).

Although the party system at the national level was becoming more fragmented, competition stabilised at the state level with an increasing number of states settling into bipolar party system configurations (Sridharan 2002: 475). In West Bengal and Kerala, competition revolved around a Left Front coalition of parties led by the communists in opposition to the INC and in the northern states of Rajasthan and Madhya Pradesh, the BJP consolidated its base in opposition to the INC. Facing a variety of cleavages largely defined by party systems at the state level, the INC was forced to adapt to each state while gradually losing its hold over the national party system. Many successful regional parties such as the Tamil Maanila Congress were also splinter parties of the INC that rebelled against the party over state leadership disputes (Ahuja 1998: 11). Importantly, no single challenger was large enough to claim the position lost by the INC at the national level

and instead, power became fragmented with various smaller parties forming coalition governments.

In 1989, a coalition of seven parties led by the Janata Party's successor JD formed a minority government with the outside support of the BJP and the communist parties. Several coalition partners including the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam, Telugu Desam Party and Asom Gana Parishad were regional parties from non-Hindi speaking state and pushed for the further devolution of power, further deepening the regional identity cleavage. However, much like the collapse of the Janata Party's de facto coalition, the JD coalition suffered from deep internal divisions – this time both between coalition partners and the JD leadership. This culminated in the JD splintering, the deputy PM forming his own short-lived government and once again, the collapse of a non-Congress government (Nikolenyi 1998: 367-368). Thereafter, the INC again returned to power after a 1991 election although this time as a minority government only capable of surviving due to the opposition's inability to cooperate with each other. Tellingly, this government was also the only government out of seven that served its full term between 1989 and 1999 (Singh 2001: 330).

This era also saw the rise of the BJP. Founded in 1980 by former BJS members following the disintegration of the Janata Party, the BJP initially won only two seats in the 1984 election. However, in the following election in 1989, its support grew to 85 seats. Initially, the party primarily relied on the support of upper caste Hindus, but through the 1990s grew its base among all groups, particularly drawing in the OBCs (Heath 1999: 2513). The party's anti-system politics challenging India's secular identity and their use of populist tactics such as their role in the destruction of the Babri Mosque in 1992 supported the party's rise to prominence (Sridharan 2014: 26). Additionally, the BJP inherited the

BJS's deep societal roots in the party's northern heartland and following the 1996 election, emerged as the largest party albeit without a majority. The result was a hung parliament with neither the BJP nor the INC capable of putting together a majority coalition (Nikolenyi 2014: 102).

In 1996, the President of India instead invited the JD as the third largest party - with only 46 of the 543 seats - to form a government, as the BJP was unable to garner support to form a majority after 13 days in power. This period of party system reconfiguration saw a significant proportion of the vote shifting to regional parties from 26% in 1991 to 46% in 1999 (Ziegfeld 2012: 69). The fragmentation of the party system and the importance of smaller parties in coalition formation in turn further encouraged fragmentation by creating incentives for politicians with a personal following to create small regional parties that could be used to leverage the party, region and individual into a national coalition.

Consequently, the United Front alliance led by the JD was compelled to form a coalition with ten partners, many of which were regional parties, and rely on the outside support of the INC to form a government. Much like India's previous coalitions, there was little uniting the group other than the prospect of power. The JD faced pressure both from the left – who opposed economic reforms despite the government's survival being dependent on the support of the INC who favoured reforms – and from regional parties who formed their own faction within the coalition (Singh 2001: 345). Again, the government collapsed after the INC withdrew support for then PM, Deve Gowda, leading to the formation of a new JD government led by Inder Kumar Gujral who in turn, lost the support of the INC after a year and triggered an early election in 1998.

Coalitions and the Rise of the BJP (1998 – 2014)

The Indian party system from the mid-1980s to early 1990s was extremely volatile in terms of the main actors composing the system, the vote share of parties, and the formation of coalitions. The end of the 1990s and the 2000s changed this as competition assumed a binodal structure of competition between the two major alliances led by the INC and BJP. In 1998, the BJP came to power at the head of the National Democratic Alliance (NDA), a pre-election coalition that saw the BJP and its regional partners running on a joint manifesto with a seat-sharing arrangement whereby parties negotiated among themselves to determine candidates for constituencies. By this point, the BJP had adopted a more moderate stance to appeal to a wider audience as the party grew its base and expanded beyond its regional stronghold (Ogden 2012: 25).

After the withdrawal of a coalition partner, an early election was called with the BJP again winning at the head of 20 party NDA coalition in 1999 (Schakel & Swenden 2018: 17). Unlike previous coalition governments led by the JD, the NDA had a clear senior partner in the BJP and as smaller parties were restricted to distinct state strongholds, the potential for conflict between coalitions partners was minimised. Similarly, in most cases, these regional parties were a direct competitor with the INC, which favoured the BJP in bringing together an anti-INC alliance (Sridharan 2005: 195).

The NDA coalition was momentous as the first coalition- and first non-Congress government to complete its 5-year term (Adeney & Sáez 2005: 3). This signalled the start of a new phase in India's party system with coalitions as well as parties holding together as patterns of cooperation between parties institutionalised with norms for coordination taking shape and structuring party behaviour (Kailash 2014: 194-195). In response to the NDA, the INC formed the United Progressive Alliance (UPA) for the 2004 election which

returned the INC to power albeit for the first time with coalition partners. Building on the trend started by the NDA, joining the UPA offered smaller regional parties access to federal resources and positions in exchange for their support, which in turn, helped regional parties maintain their base. Consequently, in some cases, coalitions have been opportunistic rather than ideological. For instance, between 1996 and 2009 the Dravida Munnetra Kazhagam entered coalitions to form governments led by the JD, BJP and INC. In this way, state parties learned that through seat-sharing arrangements or coalition deals with national parties they could leverage their regional influence to gain influence at the centre as national parties became dependent on the support of regional parties to secure a majority (Schakel & Swenden 2018: 13).

In 2009, the UPA again won the general election, marking the first time since 1984 that the incumbent party did not lose power. Following the volatility of the 1990s, this marked a return to a period of greater stability where governments served out full terms and no major party splits upset the party system. However, the UPA's success did not last and following the 2014 election, the NDA returned to power with the BJP winning a majority of seats - the first party to win a majority since 1984. Much of their success stemmed from their mobilisation of new voters with the largest voter turnout in history (until the 2019 election), up from 58.19% in 2009 to 66.44% in 2014 (Sridharan 2014: 24).

Further, the BJP benefitted from the popularity of Narendra Modi and the declining popularity of the INC following major corruption scandals and a slowing economy which fuelled the anti-incumbency vote. The BJP also benefited from a significant seat distortion in this election with the first-past-the-post system returning 20.6% more seats than votes to the BJP – an advantage usually enjoyed by the INC. Finally, their success

was largely at the expense of the INC rather than regional parties which maintained a significant vote share (Tillin 2015: 182).

BJP Dominant System (2014- present)

In the most recent 2019 election, the BJP expanded their majority to 55.9% of seats, leading to some declaring the rise of the second dominant party system (Chhibber & Verma 2019). Although it does not meet Sartori's definition of a dominant party system, which he characterises as winning an absolute majority in four consecutive elections (Sartori 1976: 196), there is little doubt that the rise of the BJP has significantly structured the party system in recent years. Much of the ideological space is dominated by the BJP which has expanded across India to become a major party in almost every constituency (Diwakar 2019: 14). While the "Modi Factor" is important to acknowledge in understanding their success the party also enjoys a large organisational advantage (Thachil 2019). This includes the support of grassroots organisations that assist in mobilising voters, a cohesive organisation with a clear ideological brand and significant financial backing. Further, it is widely acknowledged that the INC faces significant organisational challenges as its leaders attempt to revitalise the party.

As seen in the history of the Indian party system, the institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of the INC and BJP have played a leading role in the stability of the Indian party system. Generally, trends in the institutionalisation of the party system have followed the trajectory of the rise and decline of the INC and BJP party organisations. In the next section, the institutionalisation of the two political parties is examined to understand how they organise, connect to society and interact with the state.

4.3. Institutionalisation in the Party Organisations

Both parties have deep roots in Indian political history. Tracing its founding back to its first session in 1885, the INC has been an inseparable part of Indian politics. Similarly, the BJP and its ideological predecessors have long played an influential role in politics. Shyama Prasad Mookerjee, the founder of the BJS, the BJP's organisational predecessor, was included in Nehru's first cabinet in an independent India in 1947. Prior to this he was president of the Hindu Mahasabha, a Hindu nationalist movement founded in 1915 and active in the independence movement, which laid the ideological foundation from which the BJS was formed in 1951 with the support of the RSS, a prominent Hindu nationalist organisation founded in 1925 (Diwakar 2017: 8).

Since their founding, both parties have evolved significantly as organisations. The INC started as a small elite-based organisation aimed at representing Indian interests under colonial rule in 1885. Later, with the introduction of provincial elections in 1919 and under the guidance of Mahatma Gandhi, the organisation was transformed into a mass movement with the aim of achieving independence. Following independence in 1947, the INC became India's dominant party with a mass following bringing together a broad coalition of political interests under the leadership of Jawaharlal Nehru. Following his death, the party saw a major restructuring of the organisation under his daughter, Indira Gandhi, as power centralised around the party's leadership and substantially weakened the organisation which suffered from various party splits. Since then, the organisation has been again been reconstructed and has assumed a greater measure of institutionalisation although without the scale following independence.

For the BJP, the organisation and its predecessors have a similarly long history preceding independence with the organisation tracing its ideological foundation to the Hindu

Mahasabha movement founded in 1915 and its close ally, the RSS established in 1925. Although the BJP was only formed in 1980, the party's linkages and structure were shaped under its organisational predecessor the BJS formed in 1951 with the support of the RSS. The BJS faction also formed a major organisational component of the Janata Party founded following the state of emergency in 1977 and has grown significantly as an organisation since the faction's formation of the BJP in 1980. The development of the two parties is discussed in greater depth in the section on the evolution of the party system. In next part, the structure and functioning of the two party organisations is discussed.

4.3.1. Party Structure and Complexity

Both parties are formed of complex tiered structures in a similar hierarchy with power primarily vested in Committees (Indian National Congress 2010) or Councils (Bharatiya Janata Party 2012) at the national and state/territories level. Due to India's federal nature, there is a greater devolution of power to state branches of the parties and leaders of state branches are often themselves powerful figures within the party. The structure of the party organisations are illustrated in Figures 4.2 and 4.3 based on the parties' constitutions.

Below the state level, both parties have provisions for district committees although these committees do not have representation at party plenary sessions and cannot vote for the party president. For the INC, district committees are primarily responsible for the enrolment of members while the BJP has an additional tier below district committees, Mandal committees, responsible for enrolling party members. Below this, both parties organise block/constituency (INC) or village/town (BJP) units above local committees: the parties' smallest units. The main difference between the parties' organisations lies with their processes for electing their national and state level executives. This is discussed in the section on intra-party democracy and personalism.



Figure 4.2. The Organisational Structure of the INC



Figure 4.3. The Organisational Structure of the BJP

Both parties are organised as national parties and in contrast to India's numerous regional parties, have representation across India in most districts. As can be seen below, most respondents in both the 2008-2009 Democratic Accountability and Linkages Project (DALP) survey (Figure 4.4.) as well as the 2019 expert survey conducted for this project (Figure 4.5.) claim that the parties maintain permanent offices in most districts. A small shift is, however, noticeable with more respondents in the 2019 survey claiming that the BJP is represented locally in most districts while the INC has seen a decline. This corresponds with the frequent claims of the INC's organisational decay and the decline of its grassroots support.



Figure 4.4 Permanent Party Offices in India (Source: DALP Survey 2008-2009)



Figure 4.5 Permanent Party Offices in India (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

The subtle decline of the INC's organisation is also prevalent in party membership data. Post-election survey data from the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies between 1996 and 2014 show two important features of party membership in India as seen in Figure 4.6. First, 10.6% of respondents reported being a member of one of India's many political parties in the 2014 survey. This is more than twice the average number (5%) of self-reported active party members in the latest World Values Survey and shows a politically active Indian public (Haerpfer et al. 2020). This is also shown in the 2019 National Election Study survey data where 22% of respondents reported attending election meetings or rallies in the run up to the election (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 2020).

Secondly, as seen in Figure 4.6., there is a noticeable decline in the percentage of respondents who report membership of the INC between 2009 and 2014, while the BJP's membership remained steady and surpassed the INC in 2014. Of the 10.6% of respondents

who reported party membership in 2014, 17.8% affiliated with the BJP while 15.7% were members of the INC. Most likely, the gap between the two parties' membership figures has grown further with a recent recruitment drive by the BJP enlarging the party from 110 million members in 2015 to an estimated 180 million – the largest party in the world (Press Trust of India 2019).



Figure 4.6 Party affiliation of respondents who report party membership. (Source: Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies)

Although the INC has experienced a decline, it remains a significant player with a presence across India and a large organisation albeit with significant challenges to revitalise the party. The reach of the party organisations and their local affiliates can be seen below in Figures 4.7. and 4.8. in response to the question of whether parties maintain a permanent community presence. In both surveys, most respondents claim that both parties maintain a permanent presence in the community although there is a noticeable change with less respondents affirming the INC's community presence in the more recent

2019 survey (Figure 4.8.). Again, this likely reflects the party's declining organisational capacity and weaker grassroots activity when compared to the BJP.



Figure 4.7 Permanent Community Presence in India (Source: DALP Survey 2008-2009)



Figure 4.8 Permanent Community Presence in India (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

However, despite the decline of the INC's grassroots support, the party remains organisationally complex with a strong brand. Similarly, both parties have ties to grassroots volunteer organisations predating independence aimed at building and organising the community. In the case of the INC, its volunteer organisation, the Seva Dal, is formally incorporated in the party organisation. In turn, the BJP informally associates with the RSS, and the collection of Hindu nationalist groups emerging from the organisation, benefits significantly from the group's large membership. While both parties associate with similar grassroots organisations, the depth of the respective affiliates differ substantially with the INC attempting to revive the Seva Dal and its 170,000 volunteers to counter the influence of the RSS's estimated 5-6 million members (Pandey 2019).

Both parties also show organisational complexity in their various suborganisations called frontal organisations by the INC or Morcha by the BJP. Both have formally recognised party wings for youth and women. The INC additionally formally recognises the National Students' Union of India as a frontal organisation and has a very active youth wing strengthened under the leadership of Rahul Gandhi. Again, the BJP benefits from its relationship with the RSS and informally associates with the Akhil Bharatiya Vidyarthi Parishad, a student wing of the RSS affiliated with the BJP. These suborganisations often serve as the training ground for the development of party members and several party presidents of the BJP rose to prominence through the ranks of the party's youth wing.

Additionally, these suborganisations often play an important role in building linkages with the public and supporting the parties' activities. Both parties are also associated with large trade unions and the INC formally includes the Indian National Trade Union Congress, one of India's largest unions if not the largest with 33 million members, as one

of the party's frontal organisations (Dhoot 2013). In turn, the BJP informally affiliates with the RSS's trade union wing, Bhartiya Mazdoor Sabha, which also claims to be India's largest union.

When comparing the party organisations, subtle differences are apparent. Most of the INC's structures are formally organised and the various organs are expected to function with significant autonomy and have formal rules in place for electing their own presidents. Although there are indications of the INC's declining organisational capacity particularly among its grassroots support, the party still has a significant community presence and remains organisationally complex. The BJP by comparison, although significantly formalised as a party organisation, relies on many informal affiliations for its grassroots support, which is stronger than that of the INC (Thachil 2014: 108).

4.3.2. Intra-party Democracy and Personalism

Based on its statutes, the INC provides more opportunities for internal party elections than the BJP with more opportunities for lower party members to elect their own leaders. INC Pradesh (state/territory) presidents are elected by members of the lower district committees while BJP state presidents are elected by the state council (see Figures 4.2 and 4.3 on the structure of the organisations). Half of the INC's national executive (the Working Committee) is elected, while the BJP's national executive is nominated by the party president in its entirety. This is somewhat reflected in participants' views on the balance of power in the selection of candidates for elections. In both the 2008-2009 DALP survey and the 2019 expert survey, more respondents claim that candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining for INC candidates than for the BJP.



Figure 4.9 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in India (Source: DALP Survey 2008-2009)



Figure 4.10 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in India (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

Interestingly, in the second survey taken ten years after the first, more respondents regard candidate selection as centralised in parties' national leadership. This reflects two

important changes in the parties' leadership that define contemporary party politics and the parties' power dynamics. Data for the second survey was collected shortly after the resignation of Rahul Gandhi as the party president with his mother Sonia Gandhi returning to the role following his resignation. In this way, responses to the second survey likely reflect the continued dynastic control of the Nehru-Gandhi family over the INC and the centralisation of power in the Working Committee. Similarly, between the two surveys a close ally of Prime Minister Narendra Modi, Amit Shah, became president of the BJP with many seeing his election as a demonstration of Modi's hold over the party. While both parties show a greater balance of power and internal bargaining than their South Asian counterparts as discussed in chapter three, individual leaders clearly still play a significant role in defining the parties.

According to the party's constitution, the INC's Working Committee (the national executive) should be composed of 25 members including the party president and parliamentary leader (currently there are three vacancies). Twelve members are elected by the All India Congress Committee (the party's national conference) while the rest are appointed by the party president. In this way, the composition of the Working Committee is tilted towards supporting the party president who is elected by members of the national and state committees. In practice, however, the party president has been nominated unopposed, except for the 2000 election, and has remained in the hands of the Nehru-Gandhi family since 1998 and for the majority of the party's history since independence. The position has been held by Sonia Gandhi since 1998 who briefly stepped aside for her son, Rahul Gandhi, to take over in 2017 before he resigned in 2019 following the party's election defeat and returned the role to his mother in an interim capacity.

Without elections for the party president, the INC's top leadership has largely remained dynastic with much of the party's functions centralised under the control of the Working Committee and the Gandhi family (Chhibber 2011: 283-284). Indeed, many of the party's MPs also come from political families with nearly 37% of INC MPs elected in 2004, 2009 and 2014 having a family member precede them in politics – far more than the BJP (16%) (Ziegfeld 2016b: 126). While evidence suggests that dynasticism is more prevalent in more weakly organised parties, it should also be recognised that many dynastic MPs are locally rooted and represent the party in the same parliamentary seat as family members preceding them (Chandra 2016: 38). In this way, while dynasticism can be an indication of a weaker organisation, it can also be a consequence of strong local linkages. Indeed, there is significant support for the Gandhi family to lead the party despite the lack of formal elections and many believe that the family is important for holding the party together.

Both parties have centralising tendencies with the party presidents wielding significant power over the organisations. However, the size and complexity of both parties stretches beyond these leaders and shows a measure of differentiation distinct from individual figures. The state branches of the parties play an important role in local politics and opportunities for progression within the party ranks are available to party members. Further, according to respondents from the 2019 National Election Study, 42.8% claimed that the party was the most important consideration that determined their vote compared to 31.2% for the local candidate and 17.1% for the Prime Ministerial candidate (Centre for the Study of Developing Societies 2020). Although individual figures are important, parties are valued as institutions with lasting power beyond individual actors.

4.4. Party Patronage

With strong party organisations, opportunities for career progression through the ranks of the parties and internal democratic practices, the parties are less dependent on party patronage to hold the organisations together. This is evident in the results of the 2019 expert survey in which respondents saw appointments in the Indian public sector as the least politicised of the three countries in the study. The relative lack of party patronage is a good indication of the independence of India's state institutions and the separation of parties and the state. This also shows that the parties have value distinct from the state and the opportunities that access to the state provides through party membership. While party patronage is still prevalent in some sectors, the relative lack of politicisation of the state is a good indication of the institutionalisation of the party organisations.

Table 4.1 Averaged responses on extent to which appointments in the state sector are made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent).

	Bangladesh (n=8)	India (n=15)	Pakistan (n=7)
Economic	3.38	1.94	3
Finance	3.5	1.69	2.43
Judicial	3.86	1.19	2.14
Media	3.25	1.8	2.29
Military and Police	3.63	1.25	2.43
Foreign Service	2.75	0.93	1.83
Culture and Education	3.38	2.63	2.43
Healthcare	2.38	1.33	2.57
Regional and Local Administration	3.75	2.75	3.43
Average	3.32	1.72	2.51

4.5. Institutionalisation of Societal Linkages

The INC was historically structured as a mass-based party first developed under the leadership of Mahatma Gandhi but following the party's transformation under Indira

Gandhi has turned into a catch-all party with power emanating from the top down. Much of this restructuring often came at the expense of the party's base and the consequences are apparent in many of the contemporary challenges faced by the party organisation and its diminished grassroots support. By comparison, the BJP is a mass-based organisation with a disciplined grassroots following and active membership. With a large, dedicated party membership, the BJP has developed the organisation into a deeply rooted machine. At elections, this machine plays an important role in mobilising voters with local party operatives ensuring that supporters turn out for the election (Sircar 2020: 187). Indeed, the last two elections which returned BJP majorities also saw the highest turnouts in election history.

Survey data collected by the Centre for the Study of Developing Societies on the Indian public's political preferences and experiences show the success of the BJP's political machine which has overtaken the INC in canvassing voters. Of the respondents who were canvassed by party workers in the last election, 36.1% were visited by BJP party workers while only 19.5% received a visit from the INC.



Figure 4.11 Percentage of respondents canvased by party workers. (Source: Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies)

The effects of the parties' respective organisations are apparent on the strength of their linkages to society and in the last ten years, identification with the BJP has grown significantly with the growth of the organisation. The conventional understanding of party institutionalisation assumes that programmatic linkages with society are formed through the development of the party organisation which infuses party values into the public through the party's activism. Accordingly, a party with a weaker organisation will find it more difficult to build and maintain societal linkages. Trends in party identification also reflect shifts in the strength of parties' linkages to the public. Of the 28.7% of respondents who answered yes to the question "is there any political party you particularly feel close to?" in 2019, 41.2% identified with the BJP while only 19.2% identified with the INC.



Figure 4.12 Party identification of respondents. (Source: Lokniti-Centre for the Study of Developing Societies)

The rise of the BJP and its Hindu nationalist ideology has also deepened ideological cleavages between the two major parties. Chhibber and Verma (2018) argue that contemporary Indian politics is defined by two major cleavages – the politics of statism, which centres around questions of the extent to which the state should regulate society and redistribute private property, and the politics of recognition, which revolves around accommodating minority rights and protecting marginalised groups. This has translated into supporters of the BJP favouring less state intervention, particularly in regulating business and providing subsidies, while the INC has historically emphasised a large role for the state in shaping society and regulating the economy (Chhibber & Verma 2018: 41).

On the politics of recognition, the BJP's ideology favours a Hindu nationalist idea of Indian nationhood based in Hindu cultural practices as opposed to the INC's secular

nationalism emphasising cultural and political pluralism (Diwakar 2017: 67). These ideological differences have increasingly influenced Indian politics, especially with the rise of the BJP and its strong ideological agenda. This has shaped voters' identification with parties and the difference between the depth of two parties' societal roots is reflected in the expert survey data collected in 2019, which shows that the BJP's linkages are stronger than the INC in every category of civil society other than ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations.

Table 4.2 Averaged responses on the strength of parties' linkages to different sectors of civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent).

	INC	BJP
Unions	1.79	2.56
Business	2.14	3.19
Religious organisations	1.15	3.69
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations	2.53	2.41
Urban/Rural organisations	1.85	2.5
Women's organisations	2	2.53
Average	1.91	2.81

Although the INC's linkages are considerably weaker than the BJP's, the party still receives strong support from ethnic, linguistic and caste-based organisations. Considering the ideological cleavage between the two parties, the INC's brand of secular nationalism and pluralism has evidently maintained the party's relevance in the overall party system as the INC still retains the support of voters in favour of reservations and a greater role for the state in redistributive politics.

4.6. Clientelism

The difference between the strength of their linkages cannot be explained by clientelism as there is little difference between the extent to which the two parties engage in clientelist efforts. As can be seen in Table 4.3 below, both parties are regarded by respondents to the 2019 survey to be roughly equally clientelistic. As previously mentioned, there is

evidence indicating that parties' ideological appeals influence voters' choices and parties matter to voters beyond the material benefit that support may provide (Chhibber & Verma 2018: 52). Similarly, party organisations matter and in the case of the BJP, the party organisation plays a clear role in mobilising support for the party. The extent to which party organisations show complexity and value beyond individuals affects their ability to build and maintain societal linkages. Consequently, the institutionalisation of parties has a clear effect on their ability to maintain their vote share – a key requirement for continuity in party systems and the formation of an institutionalised party system.

Table 4.3 Averaged responses on the extent to which parties try to entice voters with promises of providing preferential access to benefits. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent).

	INC	BJP
Preferential public benefits	3.00	2.82
Preferential employment opportunities	2.18	2.00
Preferential government contracts	2.29	2.35
Preferential regulation	2.24	2.41
Average	2.43	2.40

As illustrated, the contemporary Indian party system is largely defined by these two major parties showing signs of institutionalisation and value beyond individual leaders. Although the INC faces challenges with rejuvenating the party organisation and its grassroots support, the party remains organisationally complex and has a long history and brand that helps it retain relevance. The BJP by comparison shows significant institutionalisation with strong linkages and a vast organisation deeply rooted in Indian society. The next section further elaborates on the relationship between party institutionalisation and PSI to show that party institutionalisation has shaped the institutionalisation and de-institutionalisation of the Indian party system.

4.7. Party and Party System Institutionalisation

When trying to understand changes in the Indian party system, whether it is towards a more institutionalised system or its de-institutionalisation, the importance of parties and their respective institutionalisation is clear. The development of the Indian party system and the relationship between party and party system institutionalisation can be summarised as below.

Table 4.4 The approximate relationship between party and party system institutionalisation in India (Author's calculation)		
	PSI High	PSI Low
PI High	India I (1947-1969); India V (1999-present)	India IV (1989-1999);
PI Low	India II (1969-1975);	India III (1977-1989);

I. In the initial phase under the Congress "System" the party system was well institutionalised in a predominant party system format under the leadership of the INC. Without an institutionally complex organisation such as the INC, India could likely have followed a trajectory similar to Pakistan following independence and seen the rapid collapse of democracy. This early stable phase of the party system can directly be attributed to the institutionalisation of the INC with deep linkages to a broad coalition of interests and an organisationally complex structure capable of resolving internal disputes and maintaining unity. Although dominating the multiparty system, the period of Congress dominance also allowed for democratic norms to take hold and socialised the public and elite into democratic practices (Tudor 2013a: 32).

II. The decline of the party organisation is, however, readily apparent in the years following Nehru's death as Indira Gandhi took over. Under her leadership the party

experienced significant deinstitutionalisation as the organisation's norms of compromise and consensus were dismantled to centralise power around Indira Gandhi. This included bypassing internal party structures such as the state leadership to manipulate the party to her will. This period of increasing personalisation in the party and the ad hoc interference with party processes also had an effect on the strength of the party's linkages with influential local leaders leaving the party over disagreements with the national leadership and taking their support base with them. At this point, prior to the emergency the party system as a whole retained stability with the continued dominance of the INC despite the de-institutionalisation of the party. However, without an institutionalised INC, the Congress "System" was no longer possible, and the fortunes of the party slowly declined.

III. Coming out of the emergency in 1977, the INC had further de-institutionalised with several major splits in the party and little intra-party democracy left. At this point the INC also lost power to the Janata Party, itself a weakly institutionalised organisation with little cohesion beyond their shared opposition to the INC. During this period between the emergency and the 1990s, the party system was largely in a state of significant volatility with frequent changes in the party system composition and successive coalition governments collapsing. Much of this instability was driven by the lack of party institutionalisation with the weakly institutionalised INC unable to serve as the pillar around which to structure interparty competition. Similarly, no single party had the organisational depth or strength of linkages to significantly fill the void left by the INC and all the coalition governments of this time collapsed as a consequence of intra-party conflict. In this way, the lack of party institutionalisation continuously undermined the institutionalisation of the system with successive party splits further fragmenting the system.

IV. However, by the 1990s, many parties including regional organisations and the BJP became more institutionalised, particularly as they adopted more programmatic appeals based on regional identification, caste or Hindu majoritarianism. The effects of greater party institutionalisation can be seen by looking at changes in the electoral volatility (EV) of the time as seen in Figure 4.14. In the period between 1977 and 1989, electoral volatility was largely a consequence of the frequent splits and mergers of parties. By the 1990s, the EV returned to a level roughly similar or lower than that seen during the Congress "System" phase. This is largely a consequence of the institutionalisation of parties which were no longer splitting as frequently as the period prior. In this way, greater continuity in voters' electoral choices lowered EV. However, despite the lower EV, the party system at this time cannot be considered institutionalised. A major critique of EV as an indicator of PSI lies with its failure to address how parties interact with one another in the party system (Mair 2006: 65). The collapse of several coalition governments during the 1990s illustrates this point well – despite lower volatility, the irregular interaction of parties with one another undermined the formation of an institutionalised party system with predictable patterns of interaction between parties.



Figure 4.13 Electoral Volatility in India (author's calculation using Election Commission of India data).

V. By the turn of the century, a coalitional party system institutionalised as parties learned to cooperate and a more stable pattern of interaction emerged between parties. Part of this should be attributed to the greater institutionalisation of parties with parties holding together and maintaining their influence in their respective bases. In this way, continuity in party alternatives allowed parties to develop stable and predictable patterns of interaction with one another, leading to the institutionalisation of the party system. With the leadership of the BJP and INC in their respective election alliances, successive governments served out their full terms in stark contrast to the frequent turnover of the 1990s. The institutionalisation of the BJP has been an important factor supporting the emergence of an institutionalised party system with the party increasingly serving as a stable pillar around which the rest of the party system can be structured. Similarly, although the INC has struggled with significant decay of the organisation, it maintains a strong party brand that gives it lasting power. With two major relatively institutionalised parties at the head of alliances, the Indian party system has assumed a more stable binodal configuration.

4.8. Conclusion

The evolution of India's party system since independence follows the conventional framework for understanding the relationship between party institutionalisation and PSI. This paradigm claims that institutionalised parties are necessary for an institutionalised party system to form and India's experience supports this argument. The institutionalisation of the INC at independence significantly supported the country's young democracy and laid the foundation around which a stable party system could be formed. Beyond the stability provided by the party's dominance of the party system, this dominance also contributed to the building and emergence of opposition parties. Several

significant parties indeed emerged from the INC and opposition to the INC gradually fostered cohesion among the opposition.

As seen in Sub-Saharan Africa, the presence of a strong incumbent party can encourage cooperation among the opposition and lead to a more stable party system as competition revolves around support or opposition for the dominant party (Riedl 2014: 1). This can be seen for instance in the Congress-opposition phase of the party system where competition assumed a more stable structure at the state level with competition between regional parties organised in opposition to the INC. The decline of the INC and the lack of strong party alternative following the Emergency can also be seen as a major impediment to the formation of an institutionalised party system. Much of the volatility experienced during this time was also a consequence of the lack of continuity in party alternatives which additionally hampered the formation of stable coalitions.

The rise of the BJP as an institutionalised alternative to the INC similarly shows the importance of a well-organised party with deep societal roots. With two moderately institutionalised parties at the head of established alliances, the Indian party system has assumed greater stability and institutionalised into a binodal configuration of competition between the two alliances. This case study of the Indian party system's evolution shows the important role that institutionalised parties can play in forming an institutionalised party system. However, although institutionalised parties can serve as a sufficient condition for the institutionalisation of party systems, they are not a necessary condition. As the subsequent chapters argue, parties' relationship to the state can also play an important role in shaping the formation and institutionalisation of party systems particularly if parties are able to co-opt the state to supplement their organisational deficiencies.

Chapter 5
Political Parties, the State and Party System Institutionalisation in Pakistan

Until the 2018 breakout election performance of the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), in which the PTI emerged as the largest party after nearly doubling its vote share, the Pakistani party system primarily revolved around competition between electoral alliances led by the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and iterations of the Pakistan Muslim League (PML). Despite the PPP and PML's image as Pakistan's political establishment, their rapid displacement by the PTI proves intriguing as the organisation is weakly institutionalised and has very limited linkages to society. The PTI's success is partly a consequence of the popularity of its leader Imran Khan, but more significantly the party has benefited from a unique environment of political entrepreneurs and a sympathetic military establishment.

This chapter traces the development of Pakistan's party system and its relationship to the state to understand how this relationship has impeded the institutionalisation of political parties and the party system. In the first section, the evolution of Pakistan's party system is examined from the formation of the PML and its role in the creation of an independent Pakistan to the most recent election in 2018 won by the PTI. Several distinct phases alternating between civilian government and military rule are analysed to understand how this history of struggle between political parties and the military-bureaucracy has shaped the political environment of contemporary Pakistan.

Thereafter, party institutionalisation is discussed in two parts. The first examines the institutionalisation of party organisations and how political parties have used patronage to tie political elites to parties. The second discusses political parties' linkages to society and how clientelism is used to tie voters to candidates. Finally, the military's continued role in the Pakistani political system is discussed to explain how the country's history of military rule has shaped the political environment and how the military and the state continue to exert influence over political parties. It is argued that as a result of this continued interference by state institutions, Pakistan's political parties have remained weakly institutionalised and have been unable to form an institutionalised system of interparty competition.

5.2. Evolution of Pakistan's Party System

Since its independence in 1947, Pakistan has struggled with numerous challenges undermining the establishment of a stable democratic regime. It has seen four military coups, three wars with India, and lost a significant portion of its territory and population following the secession of Bangladesh in 1971. Many of these challenges stem from a difficult transition to independence with major underlying structural impediments which the weakly institutionalised parties were poorly equipped to address. This led to the country's first military coup in 1958 under General Ayub Khan and later the secession of Bangladesh. Following the secession of Bangladesh, there was a brief period of civilian rule under the PPP before a second extended period of military rule under General Zia-ul-Haq (1977-1988). After General Zia-ul-Haq's death, a two-party system formed alternating between PPP and Nawaz Sharif's PML (N) governments until General Pervez Musharraf's military coup in 1999. Since the 2008 election, there have been three

successful transfers of power between civilian governments led by the PPP, PML (N) and PTI.

Building up to Independence

The All-India Muslim League, commonly known as the Muslim League and later renamed as the Pakistan Muslim League (PML), was founded in 1906 as a counterweight to the Indian National Congress (INC) to represent Muslim interests under British colonial rule in the Indian subcontinent (Bahadur 1954: 40-42). In the decades prior to independence, the INC had grown as a popular mass organisation and played an important role in negotiating reforms with the colonial government leading to the passing of the Government of India Act in 1935 which introduced provincial legislative assemblies in British India with the first elections held in 1937. This first round of provincial elections was a major test of the strength of the respective subcontinental parties and one in which the INC was immensely successful and formed the government in eight of the eleven provinces (Chaudhry 1947: 113-114).

The Muslim political community was, however, highly fragmented by comparison and the Muslim League was unable to consolidate the group's interests under a cohesive platform (Noman 1942: 325). Further unlike the INC which had transformed into a mass-based organisation, the Muslim League was still largely a party of elites much like the INC had been prior to the organisation's reforms under Mahatma Gandhi. Consequently, the Muslim League won only 109 of the 492 seats reserved for Muslim candidates in the 1937 election (Oberst et al. 2016: 254). Part of this was due to the party's failure to unite the Muslim vote as significant factional conflict between smaller parties and independents primarily interested in provincial politics split support for Muslim interests. At this stage the Muslim League was still weakly organised and had almost no presence in the

important Muslim majority provinces of Sindh and the North Western Frontier Province that would later form part of Pakistan and drew most of its support from Muslim minority provinces found in modern India (Sayeed 1968: 83-84). The party performed best in Bengal, but even there was unable to secure a majority in a highly fractured legislative assembly.

In many ways, the Muslim League's poor performance caused by provincial factionalism in the Muslim vote strengthened the argument for a strong unified voice to represent Muslim interests at the centre in negotiating further transfers of power from the colonial government. The dominance of the INC over the political system also fuelled fears that Muslim interests would be side-lined, leading to increased support for unifying the Muslim vote under the leadership of the Muslim League's Muhammad Ali Jinnah who had led the party since 1913. In the years after the 1937 provincial election, Jinnah built up the party through a series of concessions to regional Muslim parties which agreed to support Jinnah as the representative of Muslim interests to the central government. The structure of the party organisation was modelled after the INC, but lacked the mass following of the INC and instead was highly personalised around Jinnah who in turn, was dependent on the support of regional elites with separate provincial power bases (Jalal 1985: 41).

In the period prior to the 1945-1946 provincial elections, the Muslim League worked extensively to build the party organisation by mobilising the rural Muslim elite in opposition to the INC and using religious networks to build support for the party particularly following the 1940 Lahore Resolution in which the party formally committed to the creation of a separate Muslim state which would include Sindh, Punjab, Baluchistan, the North West Frontier Province, and Bengal following independence

(Talbot 1982: 15-16). The strategy proved successful with the Muslim League displacing several established parties, most importantly in Punjab where the party faced strong opposition for leadership of the Muslim vote. In the end, the Muslim League won 445 of the 490 seats reserved for Muslims, solidifying its position as the indisputable representative of the Muslim population in British India (Oberst et al. 2016: 254). Despite the Muslim League running on a somewhat ambiguous platform regarding what form Muslim political representation would take after independence, the results were interpreted as a verdict for an independent Muslim state (Jalal 1985: 174). In August 1947, Pakistan separated from India and gained its independence from British rule.

Party Rule in Pakistan Before the First Coup (1947-1958)

Despite the Muslim League's dominant role in representing Muslims interests in the negotiations leading to independence, it was poorly rooted in most of the Muslim population. Its strongest linkages were in the Muslim minority states that now form part of modern India and with independence, the Muslim League had to rebuild new linkages in the new territory that it was to govern (Bates 2007: 182-183). Most leaders in the party's Working Committee and nearly half of Council members (the two highest tiers of the party organisation) were from Muslim minority provinces and had moved to Pakistan from India (Sayeed 1968: 206). In many ways, these *Muhajir* (the Urdu word used for the migrants) were outsiders with a weak power base in the newly formed territories. Yet, the newcomers who primarily moved to the then capital Karachi formed a significant political force occupying important government positions (Haq 1995: 991).

The Muslim League's success in the 1945-1946 election had largely been dependent on the support of local elites rather than a well-developed party organisation (Talbot 1991: 102). As a largely *Muhajir* organisation it was only weakly rooted in Pakistani society

post-1947. This weakness was apparent at both the grassroots and elite levels as the party had only started cultivating support in these regions shortly before independence. This meant that the party lacked significant local organisation and instead had to compete with local elites, particularly powerful landlords with an entrenched political base that had previously enjoyed significant influence through their connections to the provincial governments.

Similarly, many latecomers brought into the party fold and rooted in the local society with personalised followings were kept outside of the ruling elite and had little loyalty to the Muslim League. This was particularly the case for Bengali politicians, many of whom later broke from the Muslim League to form their own parties (Oldenburg 2010: 43). This left the party with virtually no support in East Bengal, later renamed East Pakistan, and little care for their interests as most of the Muslim League elite had moved to West Pakistan which undermined their ability to connect with the East Pakistani population concerned with preserving Bengali culture and language (Rose 1989: 112-113). Separated in two territories with a hostile India in between, the newly formed country suffered from a weak state structure and lost many trained bureaucrats to India in partition. Further, East and West Pakistan had little in common beyond religion from which a coherent idea of the nation could be formed.

This disparate collection of interests and visions for Pakistani society made governing even more challenging. In many ways, Pakistan was “a place insufficiently imagined” with no commonly agreed vision for the Pakistani state (Oldenburg 1985: 711). This is seen for instance in Pakistan’s struggle to adopt a post-independence constitution which was only agreed in 1956, nine years after independence. The challenge stemmed not only

from the Muslim League's alienation of the Bengali population, but also from the weakness of the organisation in the West.

One of the main problems plaguing the institutionalisation of the Muslim League was the personalisation of its politics with a cult of personality built around Jinnah who was revered as *Quaid-i-Azam* or "great leader" of the new nation. Similarly, the support for many of the notables in the provinces were primarily personalised followings with weak ties to the party. The effect of this weak institutionalisation of the Muslim League had disastrous consequences for the party following the death of Jinnah in September 1948 after only a year of Pakistani independence. Institutionalised parties should have value beyond that of individual leaders and should have an established mechanism for determining leadership succession (Stockton 2001: 97). In the case of the Muslim League, the party was thrown into disarray following the death of Jinnah in 1948 and later with the assassination of Liaquat Ali Khan, Pakistan's first prime minister in 1951. Between independence and the first coup in 1958, Pakistan had seven prime ministers compared to India's one (Sayeed 1980: 32).

The leadership vacuum left by Jinnah let a rift between the Punjabi and Bengali factions of the party fester as the factions struggled for control of the party and the future political configuration of the newly formed state (Shebab 1990: 91). Much of this struggle centred around the distribution of power between East and West Pakistan with the Bengalis largely excluded from the bureaucracy and military, and consequently economic development, despite forming a majority of the population in East Bengal. A significant source of conflict in forming the country's first post-independence constitution was over issues such as the establishment of Bengali as an official language and the appropriate allocation of parliamentary seats between the two territories. The weak

institutionalisation of the Muslim League impeded the peaceful management of this conflict and these disagreements led to disillusioned Bengali party members forming the Awami League in 1949 which severely crippled the Muslim League in East Pakistan.

The party split was a defining moment for politics between the two regions and deepened the schism between East and West to the extent that the Muslim League won only 9 out of 309 seats in the first provincial election in 1954 in East Pakistan (Nair 1990: 167). The Bengali nationalist movement's victory was short-lived. Within a few weeks, the newly formed government was dismissed by the Governor-General, an ex-civil servant, using the colonial era Government of India Act of 1935 which still functioned as Pakistan's constitution and brought the region under the control of a West Pakistani bureaucrat (Ayoob 1971: 199). A few months later, the Governor-General declared a state of emergency and dismissed the national assembly leading the whole of Pakistan down a path in which politicians were increasingly side-lined as the civil service and military expanded their power.

Between August 1955 and October 1958, Pakistan had four separate governments as the weak parties were incapable of forming a stable government with politics defined by the political manoeuvring of individuals rather than coherent parties (Oberst et al. 2016: 163). In 1958, President Iskander Mirza declared martial law in Pakistan and appointed army chief General Ayub Khan as Chief Martial Law Administrator. However, the military seized power under the leadership of General Ayub Khan a few weeks later in a bloodless coup following disagreements between President Mirza and General Ayub Khan. Thereafter, General Ayub Khan banned all major political parties.

Military Rule and the Secession of Bangladesh (1958-1970)

In many ways, the coup of 1958 was the formalisation of an existing system of power relations merely discarding the façade of parliamentary democracy (Ayoob 1971: 199). The weakness and conflict among the political parties meant that the policymaking process largely came to bypass the parties to fill an institutional vacuum left by the weak party leadership shortly after independence. This process took shape after the 1951 death of Liaqat Ali Khan which deepened the leadership crisis and allowed for an alliance between the civil service and military to progressively gain further power. Most significantly, this also meant a transfer of power from the *Muhajir* Muslim League elites to the local particularly Punjabi elites (Kanpur 1991: 25).

Much of the failure in forming a stable democratic system can be attributed to colonial legacies which left behind a well-developed Pakistani civil service and military, but little democratic tradition (Daechsel 1997: 152). Instead, the civil service historically sought to prevent the emergence of mass movements, manipulating the system by leveraging local power rivalries and thus maintaining the paternalistic, autocratic system of governance formed under the colonial administration. This created a culture of patronage and clientelism built into local politics with the rural population economically dependent on landowners and their clientelist networks (Talbot 1982: 9). These were the same elites that lent their support to the Muslim League in the struggle for independence, but only extended their support for the Muslim League's agenda as the best means for preserving their interests rather than a genuine affinity for the party.

The landed elite which now also formed the new political elite stood to lose the most from a genuinely representative government and had little incentive for democratic reform and instead sought to protect their privilege and political control (Tudor 2013: 4). This speaks

to the weak rootedness of the Muslim League in the Muslim majority provinces prior to independence where the party had only started cultivating ties shortly before independence. It further illustrates the failure of the Muslim League to develop into a mass organisation with a broad coalition of interests as the INC had done in India. Instead, the party was largely a coalition of loosely affiliated elites with disparate interests with little shared vision for the future of Pakistan.

The development of Pakistan's political parties was further undermined by the system of governance put in place under military rule. Based on a paternalistic belief that the Pakistani population was not ready for parliamentary democracy, General Ayub Khan instead implemented a system of "Basic Democracy" whereby local representatives were elected by the population, but the most important functions were retained by bureaucrats (Shebab 1990:135-136). Under this system, 80,000 local representatives or Basic Democrats were directly elected and placed in charge of local administration and in turn, served as an electoral college for electing the president and members of the national and provincial legislatures (Baxter 1971: 2000). This significantly stunted the development of Pakistan's political parties and would have long term consequences for the development of a stable democratic regime and party system.

In many ways, this was a managed democracy with political parties banned from the process and the military rule maintaining the power to disqualify candidates from running for office. However, the system worked to legitimise military control by creating the illusion of public participation (Paul 2014: 75). In effect, the system perpetuated the influence of the landed elite by keeping politics at the local level and creating a system of administration that allow local elites to maintain their clientelist networks largely to the detriment of political parties. Consequently, the system came to be associated with

corruption and contributed towards the growing discontent with General Ayub Khan's regime (Mukherjee 2016: 273).

In the second half of the 1960s, opposition to the regime grew following the 1965 presidential election and the war with India in the same year. The presidential election, albeit under the managed Basic Democracy system, was one of the first instances in which a major organised movement challenged the legitimacy of the regime. Although unable to campaign on party labels, opposition parties and former Muslim League leaders combined forces and convinced Fatima Jinnah, the sister of the late Mohammad Ali Jinnah, to run for the presidency (al Mujahid 1965: 283). Despite Ayub Khan's clear victory with 62.7% of the Basic Democrats' vote, the opposition campaign was successful in sowing doubt in the legitimacy of the regime. Several months later, support for the regime further declined after Ayub Khan signed a ceasefire agreement with India following the 1965 conflict, seen by some Pakistanis as selling out Kashmir, damaging Ayub Khan's reputation (Talbot 2005: 179). The situation was worsened for Ayub Khan after his popular foreign minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto resigned shortly thereafter and formed the People's Party of Pakistan (PPP) to campaign for democracy. Following months of riots and protests in 1968, Ayub Khan stepped down as president in March 1969.

In the election held in the following year, the Awami League won 160 of 300 seats in the national legislature compared to the 81 won by the PPP as the second largest party (Siddiqui 1972: 145-146). Meanwhile, the Muslim League was in disarray following a split in the party after Ayub Khan joined the organisation and assumed the role of party president in 1963, a move opposed by a faction of the party which preferred a parliamentary system of government (al Mujahid 1965: 281).

The AL won 75% of the votes and all but two of East Pakistan's seats giving the party a national majority despite winning no seats in West Pakistan (Blair 2010: 99). Much like the AL, the PPP's support was primarily regional and it did not run any candidates in East Pakistan. After years of political control, the military and bureaucracy primarily composed of West Pakistanis were opposed to a government led by East Pakistan while Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto and the PPP similarly rejected the notion, precipitating a standoff between East and West (Jahan 1972: 193). The military soon interfered to arrest the AL's leader Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib), sparking the war which led to Bangladesh's secession discussed further in the next chapter.

Pakistan Following Bangladesh's Secession (1971-1977)

After the fall of General Ayub Khan and the Pakistani military's humiliating defeat in Bangladesh, the military-bureaucracy alliance that previously dominated the state was in retreat (Jones 2020: 48). As the PPP won a majority of votes in West Pakistan in the 1970 election, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto assumed power of the remaining Pakistani territory unhindered by the military-bureaucratic alliance, allowing the party to undertake significant reforms. Bhutto re-established a parliamentary system and undertook major economic reforms, particularly around land redistribution and the nationalisation of several industries.

The PPP came to power based on the popularity of its charismatic leader Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and drew most its support from urban intellectuals, trade unions and student groups opposing the military regime and campaigned on an anti-poverty socialist platform (Baxter 1971: 209). However, much like the Muslim League in 1945-1946, the party organisation was still weakly institutionalised and relied extensively on the charisma of Bhutto and much like the Muslim League compromised with opportunist

local elites to leverage existing rural power bases to supplement the party's lack of societal linkages (Talbot 2005: 198). Once in power, the PPP faced the same challenge as the Muslim League of transforming a weak party organisation and a loose coalition of interests into a ruling party.

In many ways, the coalition was inherently unstable as it brought together the urban intellectual middle-class and poorer rural voters whose interests would inevitably clash (Syed 1992: 87). Once in power, Zulfikar Ali Bhutto largely ignored the development of the party organisation, preferring a more autocratic approach to governing, much like Indira Gandhi in India, and pushed out many of the original party leaders that had first built the organisation, including the party secretary-general who had written the party constitution (Jones 2020: 48). These party leadership positions were filled by opportunistic large landowners primarily interested in preserving their own interests. Rather than being based on formal party structures, the PPP was now instead cobbled together with patronage which fostered factionalism and alienated the leftist organisation-minded groups which brought Zulfikar Ali Bhutto to power.

The shifting policy position of the PPP which had now largely purged the party of its more leftist elements increasingly came to represent the establishment as important bureaucrats returned to power in alliance with Bhutto (Mohmand 2014: 12-13). Increasingly, Bhutto relied on the state apparatus to maintain control, neglecting his popular following and the party organisation and at times using coercive means to supress the opposition (Sayeed 1980: 110). Consequently, many of the PPP's supporters shifted their support to an alliance of opposition parties including successors of the Muslim League contesting the 1977 election under the banner of the Pakistan National Alliance

(PNA) which coordinated to run a single candidate against the PPP in districts to avoid splitting the vote (Ziring 1977: 589).

The 1977 election was marked by significant antagonism between Bhutto and the opposition PNA. Results indicated that the PPP won 155 of the 200 seats in the National Assembly with 58.1% of the vote in the first-past-the-post system to the PNA's 36 seats (Weinbaum 1977: 613). While the PPP's overall victory was expected, it was also expected that the PNA would put up a strong fight (Burki 1999: 48). The unexpected scale of the PPP's results immediately raised suspicion and led to large opposition protests alleging vote rigging and after months of protests, the military once again stepped in under General Zia-ul-Haq to seize power in 1977, detaining Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and promising fresh elections (Jones 2020: 51).

The Return to Military Dictatorship (1977-1988)

Although General Zia-ul-Haq promised elections in 90 days, the 1977 coup ushered in the longest period of military rule in Pakistani history. Initially, General Zia-ul-Haq promised a rerun of the election, but once Bhutto was released from detention it was clear that he was still immensely popular and posed a threat to the military-bureaucratic alliance that had again seized power. Instead, the military regime used political party polarisation as a scapegoat for repeatedly postponing new elections and launched a propaganda campaign to discredit the PPP and Bhutto, recognising his continued popularity (Qureshi 1979: 913). This campaign to discredit Bhutto included the release of a white paper by the military claiming a coordinated effort by Bhutto to rig the election based on questionable evidence - widely seen as an exaggeration of voting irregularities (Syed 1992: 230-232). More significantly, a case of conspiracy to murder a political opponent

was opened against Bhutto and in 1979 he was executed after being found guilty in a process some regard as highly political (Burki 1988a: 202).

After Bhutto's execution, the military regime abandoned the pretence of safeguarding democracy and instead cancelled an impending election and banned political parties (Noman 1989: 32). Like previous regimes, General Zia-ul-Haq imposed control by first banning political parties and later after unbanning them, managing their development through threats of bans and limiting their activities (Choudhury 1988: 35). However, in contrast to General Ayub Khan whose regime relied extensively on the bureaucracy and functioned as an alliance between the two, General Zia-ul-Haq instead filled civilian bureaucratic posts with military officers whom he could control (Talbot 2005: 247-248). This gave him greater control over the political system than his authoritarian predecessors and even after lifting martial law in 1985, he retained significant authority in his role as president and head of the army.

General Zia-ul-Haq's regime diverged significantly from the political and economic reforms made under Bhutto, preferring the privatisation of industry and reintroducing the prominence of Islam in the political system. This bought him the support of the middle class and helped carry the regime through several challenges by opposition party movements to restore democratic rule (Burki 1988b: 1091). Further, rapid economic growth under the regime made him popular among some sections of the population. The Soviet invasion of Afghanistan towards the end of 1979 also strengthened Pakistan's relationship with the United States which helped prop up the regime with military equipment and development aid.

In the early 1980s several reforms were made to bring civilians back into the political process after continued agitation by the Movement for the Restoration of Democracy

(MRD) which brought together political parties including the PPP opposing the military regime. In 1981, an advisory body nominated by the president was formed to replace the dissolved National Assembly as part of General Zia-ul-Haq's plans to form an "Islamic democracy", but largely only served as a sounding board for the regime and had limited legislative capabilities (Korson & Maskiel 1985: 589-590). Two years later in 1985, the regime held party-less elections for national and provincial legislatures, but as political parties were banned, it instead became an opportunity for large landowners and industrialists to gain greater access to government and had little representative basis (Noman 1989: 37). In addition to the 1979 introduction of a system equivalent to General Ayub Khan's "Basic Democracy", this only served to entrench the power of local notables empowered by clientelism while political parties were circumvented (Wilkinson 2000: 208).

Notwithstanding the party-less basis of the election, the unexpectedly high voter turnout (52.9%) despite a boycott by the MRD illustrated the demand for a return to civilian rule and set in motion a process of democratisation with martial law lifted, parties legalised and the introduction of a civilian prime minister (Richter 1986: 207-208). Although General Zia-ul-Haq nominated the prime minister and still held significant power in his role as president, the prime minister charted a course independent of General Zia-ul-Haq as a former Muslim League member and revived the party under the banner of the PML which occupied much of the supposedly party-less legislature. The opening of the political space reinvigorated political parties' mobilisation of the population in their demands for reforming the system and in 1986, Benazir Bhutto, the daughter of the late former prime minister Zulfkar Ali Bhutto, returned to Pakistan from exile to lead the PPP (Rizvi 1986: 1077).

General Zia-ul-Haq sought to retain control over the system through his position as president which was bolstered by a constitutional amendment giving him greater powers shortly after the 1985 election. Further, with the military's capture of state institutions and the constant threat of military intervention, the civilian government's power was severely restricted. However, the prime minister and his PML followers showed a level of independence contrary to General Zia-ul-Haq's expectations and in early 1988, he dismissed the legislative assemblies recognising the threat to his power (Rais 1989: 199-200). New elections were announced on a party-less basis for November 1988. However, three months before the scheduled elections, General Zia-ul-Haq died in a plane crash, upsetting the regime's plans for the upcoming election.

The Return of Political Parties (1988-1999)

The death of General Zia-ul-Haq provided an opportunity to break with military rule and shortly after his death, the Supreme Court ruled that the election could be held on a party basis. The party system was, however, extensively fragmented and the MRD coalition which opposed the military regime quickly parted ways. Nevertheless, the PPP remained popular particularly following the return of Benazir Bhutto as the head of the party. Recognising the mass support of the PPP, political parties on the right including various PML factions and Islamic parties formed an alliance to avoid splitting the vote with Nawaz Sharif at its head, a PML member cultivated by General Zia-ul-Haq as an alternative to the previous prime minister, Muhammad Khan Junejo (Rais 1989: 202).

The PPP won 93 of the 204 general seats (38.52% vote share) in the National Assembly to the 54 won by the Sharif-led alliance (30.16% vote share) (Election Commission of Pakistan 1988: 200). The PPP formed a government with Benazir Bhutto as prime minister after allying with a Karachi-based *Muhajir* party. However, once in power,

Bhutto's control over the government was subverted by the conservative military-bureaucratic oligarchy left behind by General Zia-ul-Haq who plotted to undermine her government, including bribing PPP parliamentarians in a failed vote of no confidence against Benazir Bhutto (Jones 2020: 53). Further, the upper house of Parliament was elected during General Zia-ul-Haq's tenure in an election boycotted by the PPP which further restricted the PPP's room for manoeuvre, while 40 PPP members re-elected to the National Assembly in 1988 had broken with the party's boycott in 1985, raising serious questions around party loyalty (Weiss 1990: 436). Consequently, Bhutto's ability to make meaningful change was severely limited.

In 1990, her government was dismissed by the president, a former bureaucrat who served as finance minister under General Zia-ul-Haq, citing corruption and incompetence. An election held a few months later brought Nawaz Sharif to power with the backing of his PML-led alliance which won 106 of the 207 seats with 37.37% of the popular vote while the PPP secured only 46 seats despite only a minor drop in its overall vote share to 36.83% as seen in Table 5.1. (Election Commission of Pakistan 1990: 191). Much of this was caused by the consolidation of the vote in Punjab behind the Sharif-led alliance with independent and third-party candidates persuaded by the PML to drop out. The effect of this is illustrated in Table 5.1. As the most populous province with 115 of the 207 contested National Assembly seats, Punjab was key to winning elections in Pakistan.

Table 5.1 Vote share and seats won from Punjab in the 1990 election to the National Assembly (Source: Syed 1991).

	1988		1990	
	Vote share	Seats	Vote share	Seats
PPP-led alliance	38.7%	52	38.4%	14
Sharif-led alliance	37.2%	49	49.5%	92
Independents	14.6%	9	8.0%	6
Other parties	8.5%	5	4.1%	3

In many ways, Nawaz Sharif was seen as carrying the legacy of General Zia-ul-Haq who had groomed Sharif for power and had first given him the role of chief minister in Punjab – a role that Sharif would use to his advantage in the election (Shafqat 2020: 29). The PML benefitted significantly from incumbency as the caretaker provincial government in the run-up to the 1990 election and its control over the provincial bureaucracy allowed the party to leverage its position to build support through clientelism (Syed 1991: 583-584). The Sharif-led alliance also benefitted from the support of the military and intelligence service who raised funds for Sharif and his allies after internal intelligence assessments determined that the PPP would win (Jaffrelot 2015: 247-248). In 2012, the Supreme Court ruled that the election had been rigged with evidence that the head of the army and the head of the Pakistani intelligence service had conspired with the president to finance candidates in opposition to the PPP (Dawn 2012).

Despite the military-bureaucratic oligarchy's role in bringing Nawaz Sharif to power, his government was similarly dismissed in 1993 following major disagreements with President Ghulam Ishaq Khan, an experienced bureaucrat who had served in senior positions under both Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq (Ziring 1993: 1178-1179). This in turn, led to a political crisis after the Supreme Court ruled that the dismissal was unconstitutional and after several months of stalemate, the head of the army brokered an agreement in which both the president and Sharif agreed to step down for new elections (Talbot 2005: 328-329). The struggle led to a split in the ruling alliance with Sharif's party thereafter known as the PML (N) while his PML opponents allied with the PPP in the 1993 election (Amin 1994: 193). This time, the PPP emerged as the largest party with 86 seats and formed a government with the support of smaller parties while the PML (N) won only 73 seats despite their larger vote share (Wilder 1995: 377).

Three years later, the PPP government was, however, once again dismissed – this time, by the new President Farooq Leghari citing corruption and incompetence after Bhutto's husband, Asif Ali Zardari, and other cabinet ministers were implicated in corruption (Syed 1998: 117). This led to the fourth general election in less than ten years and a historically low voter turnout at 35.2% with the PPP's electorate significantly disillusioned. Consequently, the PML (N) won a large majority (137 seats) and controlled all four provincial legislatures while the PPP won only 18 seats (Jaffrelot 2015: 253). The results of the four elections are shown in Table 5.2.

Table 5.2 Vote and seat share in the Pakistani elections between 1988 and 1997 for the two main parties (Source: Election Commission of Pakistan and Zingel 2001)

	1988		1990		1993		1997	
	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats	Vote	Seats
PML (N)/ predecessor	30.1%	54	37.3%	106	39.9%	73	44.8%	137
PPP	38.5%	93	36.8%	46	37.9%	86	21.3%	18

This period of alternation between parties led by Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif was remarkably stable as seen in Figure 5.1 illustrating electoral volatility (EV) between 1988-1997. Overall EV during this period is generally lower than EV in the Indian party system between 1952-1971 where the INC dominated the party system – which was a highly stable party system. Further, when EV is disaggregated using Powell and Tucker's (2014: 124) method, which distinguishes between "stable parties" (Type B Volatility) and new parties and parties exiting the system (Type A Volatility), then the extent of continuity between the established parties is even higher.



Figure 5.1 Electoral Volatility in Pakistani General Elections (1988-1997)

Emboldened by the party's mandate, Nawaz Sharif introduced a constitutional amendment to strip the president of the power to dissolve parliament and thereafter sought to subordinate the judiciary and the military to his control as he consolidated power in an increasingly authoritarian manner (Shafqat 2020: 33-34). However, after Sharif tried to dismiss the head of the military, General Perez Musharraf, the army turned against him and initiated a bloodless coup, returning Pakistan to military rule yet again (Rizvi 2000: 210-211).

Musharraf and Later Democratisation (1999-present)

Like Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq before him, General Musharraf initially claimed no interest in politics until ultimately assuming the role of president in 2001 (Shah 2002: 70). Further, much like previous regimes, General Musharraf tried to build grassroots support for his regime by further decentralising power and introducing party-

less elections at the local level – which largely only maintained local clientelist networks while political party activities were severely curtailed (Talbot 2002: 318-320). In 2002, Musharraf held a fraudulent referendum asserting support for his presidency and with the support of the intelligence service created a new PML faction to serve as the civilian face of his military government (Shah 2014: 1013). This faction, the PML (Quaid e Azam Group) was primarily formed by opportunistic former PML (N) members who joined the "king's party" while the opposition PPP and PML (N) were targeted with new registration requirements with both Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif in exile outside of Pakistan (Talbot 2003: 204).

Under General Musharraf, the president's power to dissolve parliament was restored and the size of the national assembly was significantly increased with 65 new general seats and 60 additional seats reserved for women. Many of these reforms were designed to favour Musharraf and his PML (Q) allies who emerged as the largest party after the 2002 election with 79 seats (25.66% vote share) to the PPP's 63 (26.05%) and the PML (N)'s 15 (11.66%) and formed a government with the support of a right-wing alliance of Islamist parties (Mufti et al 2020: 282). Despite the return of elections, the political system was still largely under military tutelage with the state bureaucracy used to maintain the military regime and keeping the political space closed by placing hurdles in the way of political parties (Samad 2017: 512).

Musharraf's control over the system did not, however, last as long as that of his authoritarian predecessors. In 2007, when Musharraf's presidential term was set to expire, the military regime made an ill-fated attempt to dismiss the chief justice of the Supreme Court hoping to prevent the Supreme Court from challenging continued military rule, which instead sparked countrywide protests from civil society, political parties and the

legal sector (Shah 2014: 1013-1014). Ultimately, Musharraf was forced to hold new elections in 2008 under immense opposition to the regime, heightened by the assassination of Benazir Bhutto in the run-up to the election (Nelson 2009: 16). The PPP emerged as the largest party with 94 of the 272 general seats (30.6% vote share) with Bhutto's husband Asif Ali Zardari leading the party and formed a large coalition with the PML (N) which won 71 seats (19.6% vote share) and a smaller regional party (Goodson 2008: 11).

In 2006, while still opposing Musharraf, Benazir Bhutto and Nawaz Sharif signed a "Charter of Democracy" agreement between their respective parties asserting that neither party would in future join nor solicit the support of the military against the other, establishing an understanding for future norms under a civilian parliamentary government (Jaffrelot 2015: 260). The shared understanding came into effect once in power and after the 2008 election, the two main parties cooperated to reform the system to prevent the military from once again undermining democracy. This included passing the 18th constitutional amendment which shifted the balance of power away from the president and towards a parliamentary system and removed the president's ability to dismiss parliament as well as important electoral reforms to reduce the scope for military manipulation (Shah 2014: 1016-1017).

Although marred by incidents of violence, the 2013 general election marked a significant milestone in Pakistani democracy with the first civilian government completing a full term in office and successfully transferring power to another civilian government (Adeney 2017: 120). The election also marked an alternation of power with the PML (N) winning the election with 129 of the 272 general seats (32.7% vote share) and forming a majority after 19 independent candidates joined the party to elect Nawaz Sharif as prime

minister (Election Commission of Pakistan 2013). The PPP performed poorly, winning only 36 seats (15.2% vote share), with support for the party severely damaged by recurrent corruption allegations against Zardari who had been elected as president after Musharraf was forced to resign in 2008 (Malik 2014: 180).

The election also marked the entrance of Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI), the party of former cricket star Imran Khan, as the second largest party by vote share (16.9%) and third largest with 26 seats. Prior to the 2013 election, the party had only won a single seat in 2002 (held by Imran Khan) and boycotted the 2008 election. Much of the party's success relied on the popularity of Imran Khan who benefitted from being a political outsider who pushed for a "new" Pakistan (Malik 2013: 41). The PTI was founded in 1996 and grew into a mass movement of urban middle-class activists intent on transforming Pakistan's dynastic and often corrupt political system, gaining momentum in the run-up to the 2013 election. However, as the movement gained prominence, opportunistic political elites joined the party ranks with the encouragement of its leaders who saw it as necessary for the party's electability (Khan 2020: 60-61).

The party particularly gained prominence after leading mass protests against the PML (N) regime in 2014 claiming that the elections were rigged and called for Sharif to resign despite investigations finding little evidence of widespread vote rigging. More significantly, following the protests the military came to see the PTI as a means to reducing the power of the PML (N) and in some ways, tacitly supported the PTI in its agitations against the PML (N) government (Jaffrelot 2015: 291-293). The PML (N)'s position was further weakened in 2016 after several Sharif family members were implicated in the Panama Papers leak, in which documents emerged linking them to offshore holding companies concealing some of the family's assets and leading to

accusations of money laundering and tax evasion. Ultimately, the Supreme Court disqualified Nawaz Sharif from political office in 2017 and in 2018, he was sentenced to ten years in jail on corruption charges (Shafqat 2020: 37).

In 2018, the PTI came to power after a contentious election, winning 116 seats (31.6% vote share) compared to the 64 seats (24.4% vote share) won by the PML (N) and 43 seats (13% vote share) to the PPP (Mufti et al. 2020: 283). In many ways the election was a paradox. Despite the successful transfer of power after a civilian government served out a full term in office for the second time in Pakistani history, the election was marred by serious charges of fraud with accusations that the intelligence service interfered to support the PTI and undermine the PML (N) (Behera 2018: 239). To gain the majority needed to govern, the PTI entered a coalition with a smaller regional party and for many, the PTI's rise to power marked the end of a two-party system of competition between the PML (N) and PPP that had long defined Pakistani politics (Shah 2019: 129).

With the emergence of the PTI as a major political contender, Pakistan's party system has again assumed a more fluid form with the institutionalised system of competition between the PPP and PML (N) disrupted. Both established parties have been severely damaged by the corruption charges against their leaders and serious questions remain around whether the PPP and PML (N) will revive to their former heights or even just remain relevant. The rapid rise of the PTI also reveals much about the nature of Pakistani politicians' ties to political parties which are often transactional and opportunistic rather than based in party loyalty. This is discussed further in the next section on the institutionalisation of the three major parties.

5.3. Institutionalisation in the Party Organisations

Under Pakistan's various military regimes, political parties were severally weakened with their development stunted by party-less elections under Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq. Further, even during periods of democratic rule, the military and intelligence service have often played a background role in manipulating politics against the ruling party and fuelling antagonism between political parties. While military rulers' legacies have significantly undermined the stability of the democratic regime by hamstringing political parties and leaving the military with significant political power, much of the challenge to form a stable party system has been antagonised by parties' consistent refusal to cooperate with one another, leaving politics a zero-sum game (Talbot 2005: 289). This has inhibited the consolidation of democracy which in turn, has undermined the development of political parties.

A major problem for Pakistan's main parties has consistently been the lack of party discipline with party factionalisation and splits occurring often, along with the tendency for politicians to switch parties prior to elections. Both the PPP and the PML have suffered splits which have fragmented the party system and weakened the hold of the established parties. A major reason why politicians have little loyalty to political parties is that candidates are largely dependent on personal resources to run campaigns and consequently, politics has become highly personalised to the detriment of party organisations. As a result, all three major parties have weak organisational structures and rely significantly on local notable or elites rather than party reliable party activists (Siddiqui et al. 2020: 7).

5.3.1. Party Structure and Complexity

Pakistani party leaders, especially those in the PML (N) and PPP have historically paid little attention to the development of their party organisations. Instead, parties have relied on the charismatic authority of party leaders who portray themselves as the embodiment of the party in lieu of organisational capacity and party resources (Javid & Mufti 2020: 152). Consequently, Pakistan's major established party organisations, including the PPP, PML (N) and PTI, are largely under-developed and often rely on local notables to mobilise voters, which has left party organisations and membership fluid. Data from the World Values Survey also shows the relative smaller organisational base of the Pakistani parties with 86.2% of respondents claiming no party membership in Pakistan in 2018 compared to Bangladesh's 77.2% and India's 71.8% in 2012 (Haerpfer et al. 2020).

Mufti (2016) compares Pakistani parties to franchise organisations whereby local politicians act mostly autonomously in their constituency, are expected to fund their own election campaigns and easily switch between party labels. Consequently, these party recruitment and selection processes which favour candidates' "electability" leave parties vulnerable to defections and party factionism with little party unity or discipline as opportunistic local elites have little loyalty to parties. This fluidity has kept party organisations weak and as shown in Chapter 3, Pakistani parties are considered the least geographically expansive of the three countries surveyed in the 2019 expert survey. Only 67% of respondents thought the ruling PTI have local party offices in most districts – by comparison, 89% stated the same for the BAL and 94% for the BJP. The data for Pakistani parties is shown in Figure 5.2.



Figure 5.2 Permanent Party Offices in Pakistan (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

5.3.2. Intra-party Democracy and Personalism

Pakistan's main parties are inseparable from their respective leaders who serve as icons for party identification in the absence of elaborate party organisations and clear ideologies (Waseem 2016: 85). One of the main roles of these leaders is keeping the various factions of their respective parties within the party fold and the leaders are seen as the core for maintaining continuity in the parties in lieu of institutionalised organisations. Many of Pakistan's parties are based around dynastic founding families that control the party leadership with succession often passing on to relatives such as seen in the Bhutto and Sharif families. Within these parties there are also many subsets of dynastic local leaders whose families maintain control over local level constituencies (Shafqat 2020: 23).

Pakistan's history of party-less elections has consistently interrupted the development of party organisations and entrenched the personalisation of politics. In turn, the

personalisation of parties has meant that dynastic families have maintained a stranglehold over the leadership of parties and undermined attempts to build internal democratic mechanisms in the parties (Chiriyankandath 2014: 3-4). As a result, parties are "like family businesses" where coalitions are based on political convenience rather than ideology or policy compatibility and often the political fortunes of a party are strongly related to the popularity or unpopularity of its leader (Amundsen 2016: 52). Further, this personalisation of parties has also impeded the development of parliamentary democratic norms with the leaders of the main parties often centralising power around themselves and disregarding the opposition to the detriment of political institutions.

In all three parties, the highest executive body is nominated by the party president and consequently, there is very little room for intra-party democracy despite electoral reforms in 2002 requiring registered parties to hold regular intra-party elections. The updated Elections Act (2017) requires registered parties to hold intra-party elections for office bearers at the federal, provincial and local levels at least every five years, but the Election Commission has been lenient with the interpretation of the legislation. Consequently, intra-party elections are largely a formality with little real competition as party leadership remains in the hands of founding figures and dynasties. As can be seen in Figure 5.2, all respondents to the 2019 expert survey regard candidate selection as highly centralised in the PTI and PML (N) while nearly all saw the PPP as highly centralised.



Figure 5.3 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in Pakistan (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

The PPP was first built on the charisma of Zulfikar Ali Bhutto whose populist style brought the party to power. Bhutto projected himself as *Quaid-i-Awam*, the leader of the people, styled after Jinnah's *Quaid-i-Azam* (great leader) (Jones 2020: 45). Since then, the party has similarly relied on Benazir Bhutto's charisma and Zulfikar's legacy to maintain the party's support. Following Benazir Bhutto's death in 2007, the PPP has been led by her son, Bilawal Bhutto-Zardari, who was 19 years old at the time of his appointment as party chairman and remains the party's co-leader along with his corruption-implicated father Asif Ali Zardari (Jones 2020: 56). Zardari remains the president of the parliamentary branch of the party, the PPP Parliamentarians (PPPP) which was formed in 2002 to bypass party leadership requirements set by Musharraf and remains registered with the electoral commission as a separate entity to the PPP despite contesting on behalf of the party (Mugheri 2017). Since the introduction of legislation in

2017 requiring registered parties to hold intra-party elections, the PPP's leadership has been elected unopposed in both the 2017 and 2021 party elections (Wasim 2021).

Similarly, control over the PML (N) has remained in the Sharif family. In 2017, the Supreme Court expelled Nawaz Sharif from parliament and consequently, having no public office he also lost his position as the party president as per the party's constitution (Geo News 2017). In response, the party specifically amended the party constitution to allow Nawaz Sharif to reassume the party presidency in an unopposed election and introduced a controversial 2017 electoral law in parliament to allow politicians disqualified from holding public office to lead political parties. However, Nawaz Sharif was again disqualified from holding office as party president after a 2018 court ruling, following which his brother, Shahbaz Sharif, assumed the interim presidency and was later elected unopposed as the party president (Hussain 2018). Despite his disqualification, Nawaz Sharif was declared "leader for life" and the party continues to rely on his image as the party brand.

Finally, despite its promise of challenging the dynastic grip of political families over Pakistani politics, the PTI has similarly become personalised around the appeal of Imran Khan. While initially showing a greater degree of intra-party democracy than the other established parties, intra-party democracy declined after the party gained popularity in 2014 and attracted opportunist career politicians, shifting the balance of power away from a mass-based organisation to a catch-all party led by career politicians - some of whom have close ties to the military or served under General Musharraf's regime (Khan 2020: 61; 71). Much like the personalisation of the PML (N) and PPP, the PTI has similarly become centralised around the leadership of Imran Khan who wields significant influence over the selection of candidates and party leaders. This has especially become the case

after the party matured into a catch-all format led by career politicians, which has led to many older party workers leaving the PTI. While the PTI is unique compared to the PPP and PML (N) in that the party president has not run unopposed, its intra-party elections are still largely symbolic. In the 2017 election, only 10.4% of eligible party members voted in the PTI's election which required party members to vote for one of two 14-member party "panels" composing the entire leadership as selected by the candidate for party chairman (Express Tribune 2017). Imran Khan's panel was elected with over 73% of the vote.

5.4. Party Patronage

With little opportunity for career advancement through the closed leadership ranks of the parties and little ideological differentiation between the main parties, parties are primarily held together through patronage opportunities. Consequently, party-switching is a frequent occurrence prior to Pakistani elections as candidates seek to align themselves to the party perceived as likely to win or join the ruling party after the election in the case of independent candidates. For instance, 42% of the candidates who ran in both the 2008 and 2013 elections switched parties prior to the 2013 election (Zhirnov & Mufti 2019: 521).

The weak ideological identification of some voters and politicians means that there is little disincentive for party-switching which occurs primarily prior to elections as the constitution's anti-defection clause prevents floor-crossing in parliament and national assembly members can lose their seat on the recommendation of the party leader if they fail to vote along party lines. The extent of party switching can be immensely consequential as seen in the 2018 election where 70% of the PTI's seats won in the

populous Punjab came from defectors (Siddiqui 2020: 15). Party-switching on such a scale means the difference between PTI or PML (N)-led governments.

Mufti (2011: 16) distinguishes between two types of Pakistani legislators: party loyalists and constituency politicians. Party loyalists associate with a single party and work their way up the party ranks and earn a party ticket through demonstrating their loyalty and work to the party, while constituency politicians are largely autonomous "electables" that join a party to strategically bolster their position and have very little loyalty to the party. This is possible as weak party-voter linkages have meant that many candidates have instead developed personalised linkages. In this way, there is little disincentive for politicians to avoid party-switching and aligning with the future government, which gives politicians access to resources which can be distributed to political activists aligned to the candidate (Wilder 1999: 193).

Unlike party patronage in Bangladesh where party workers are rewarded with positions in state institutions, patronage networks in Pakistan are personalised by individual politicians' political machines rather than party organisations. These machines are usually headed by a boss, family or small group competing for national or provincial assembly seats and bring together locally elected politicians and personal followers to mobilise voters (Liaqat et al. 2020: 126-127). As national and provincial assembly members typically nominate party candidates for local elections, the vast majority of local politicians campaign on behalf of candidates for higher office and use their own personal following to support national or provincial candidates. In turn, local politicians gain from the strength of their connections to higher-tier politicians as voters tend to reward more connected candidates (Liaqat et al. 2020: 131).

Consequently, Pakistani political parties are internally weak and fluid organisations which recruit members based on their vote bank with a range of mediators between the party and voters including landlords, political brokers, kin groups and local party leaders (Mohmand 2014: 9-10). Unlike the party-based patronage seen in Bangladesh, Pakistani patronage occurs on a more personalised basis than on a party basis. This is partly related to the military's historic influence over state institutions and the collusion between the military and bureaucracy which kept parties out of state institutions. As seen in the table below, the most important state sectors in Pakistan including the judiciary and foreign service remain relatively apolitical. The main sectors in which appointments are seen as made on the basis of rewarding party loyalty are in regional and local administration, and the economic sector - important sectors for the distribution of clientelism.

Table 5.3 Averaged responses on extent to which appointments in the state sector are made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019).

	Bangladesh (n=8)	India (n=15)	Pakistan (n=7)
Economic	3.38	1.94	3
Finance	3.5	1.69	2.43
Judicial	3.86	1.19	2.14
Media	3.25	1.8	2.29
Military and Police	3.63	1.25	2.43
Foreign Service	2.75	0.93	1.83
Culture and Education	3.38	2.63	2.43
Healthcare	2.38	1.33	2.57
Regional and Local Administration	3.75	2.75	3.43
Average	3.32	1.72	2.51

5.5. Institutionalisation of Societal Linkages

Despite subtle ideological distinctions between the three parties, with the PPP on the left and the PML (N) and PTI on the right, the ideological differentiation between the three parties is at times blurred and voting is only weakly programmatic (Siddiqui et al. 2020:

7). Further, while the PML (N) and PTI are right-leaning and the PPP ideologically left, this has not prevented party members from switching between the three parties. The PPP has shifted from a populist, mass left-socialist ideology under Zulfikar Bhutto to pragmaticism under Benazir Bhutto and finally, patronage politics under Zardari but retains an image of being pro-poor (Jones 2020: 58-59). The PML (N) is seen as more business-friendly and enjoys the support of the religious middle-class, particularly in the populous Punjab (Shafqat 2020: 35).

The ideological differentiation between the PML (N) and PPP can be seen Table 5.4. below on the strength of parties' linkages to various segments of civil society. The PPP enjoys a clear advantage with unions and historically has strong ties to rural organisations which sets it apart from both the PML (N) and PTI. The PML (N) in turn, has very strong linkages to business as well as religious organisations. Intriguingly, the ruling PTI is seen as having the weakest linkages overall and its links are seen as weaker than either the PML (N) or PPP in each sector. The weakness of the PTI's linkages is not surprising considering that until the 2013 election, the party only ever held a single seat in the National Assembly.

Table 5.4 Averaged responses on the strength of parties' linkages to different sectors of civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019).

	PML (N)	PPP	PTI
Unions	0.86	2.29	1
Business	3.43	1.71	2.43
Religious organisations	2.88	1.25	2.38
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations	2	2.88	1.63
Urban/Rural organisations	2.5	3.13	2.38
Women's organisations	1.71	2.38	2.13
Average	2.23	2.27	1.99

The PTI and Imran Khan espouse a platform of change and renewal, but to its critics, the party lacks clear policy proposals and largely relies on popular discontent with the establishment for its support. It has, however, remained close to Islamic parties and at times, Imran Khan has been accused of being a Taliban apologist following controversial comments which have created a contradictory image of the PTI's leader as a staunch conservative despite his reformist rhetoric (Waseem 2016: 76). The party places itself on the right as pro-business and religiously conservative, however, this is largely the same political space occupied by the PML (N) and in both sectors, the PML (N) has stronger linkages than the PTI.

5.6. Clientelism

With the weakest linkages of the three and a relatively new party organisation, it is remarkable that the PTI could so readily displace the established PPP and PML (N) so long synonymous with Pakistani politics. With neither strong linkages nor a well-developed party organisation, how is it that the PTI has grown to become Pakistan's largest party in the National Assembly – raising its vote share from 16.9% and 26 seats in the 2013 election to 31.6% and 116 seats in 2018? It is well-known that Pakistan's established parties have long engaged in clientelist practices to tie voters to parties and candidates through networks of brokers, kin groups and local elites (Mohmand 2014: 9-10).

Patterns of clientelism vary between groups of voters and the different political parties. Research suggests that clientelist networks play a more important role in rural areas while party identification is more relevant for defining the voting behaviour of urban voters (Siddiqui et al. 2020: 7). In the constituencies where party identification is low, parties often rely on local notables to mobilise voters usually through material incentives (Mufti

2016). This is a long-established tactic used by civilian politicians and the military alike to use the state machinery to mobilise voters through the misuse of public money to maintain clientelist networks (Talbot 2005: 399). Often these networks have been built up over years with parties and political families developing regional strongholds tying voters to their candidacy through material incentives and serve as a conduit for accessing benefits from the state (Javid & Mufti 2020: 148). The PML (N), for instance, has benefitted from its well-developed clientelist networks and the political machine that the party has built up in the Punjab over the years through the Sharif brothers' control of the state apparatus (Rollier 2020: 122).

Clientelism is, however, usually only effective if parties have mechanisms in place such as a brokers or party workers for determining whether voters targeted by clientelism have indeed turned out to support the party (Kitschelt & Singer 2018: 56). This requires a degree of organisational complexity or a network of local brokers to monitor turnout and mobilise clients. Consequently, the PTI's breakout performance in the 2018 is even more curious as it is a relatively new party with an underdeveloped organisation and comparatively weak societal linkages. As can be seen in the table below, the PTI is also regarded as the least clientelist of the three major parties.

Table 3.8 Averaged responses on the extent to which parties try to entice voters with promises of providing preferential access to benefits. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	PML (N)	PPP	PTI
Preferential public benefits	3.38	3.38	3.00
Preferential employment opportunities	3.25	3.25	2.75
Preferential government contracts	3.38	3.00	2.63
Preferential regulation	3.25	3.13	2.75
Average	3.31	3.19	2.78

With weaker linkages than its main competitors, a comparatively underdeveloped party organisation and no established party clientelist network, the PTI's displacement of the two established parties seems unusual. Understanding the PTI's success is complex and there are several reasons for this. First, the PTI's main competitors, the PML (N) and PPP, themselves remain relatively weakly institutionalised despite a longer established role in Pakistani politics. Second, the PTI's appeal largely lies in Imran Khan's anti-establishment rhetoric and the promise to break with the past, which appeals to many voters disillusioned with the corruption of both Nawaz Sharif and Zardari. In a system where party leaders are portrayed as a heuristic for the party brand, the overreliance on party personalities is a serious impediment when the party leader has been implicated in corruption. By comparison, Imran Khan's clean image and popularity as a Pakistani cricket hero is a major advantage for the PIT.

Third, and mostly importantly, clientelism in Pakistan primarily manifests in personalised political machines of families or local bosses that control constituencies. Returning to Mufti's (2016) analogy of party franchises, when support is personalised in this way, party-switching incurs little cost to candidates who are instead incentivised to align with the party deemed most likely to win the election. In the case of the 2018 election, this was the PTI and over 70% of the party's seats were won by defectors to the party, many of whom brought their personal banks to the party in exchange for a party ticket (Siddiqui 2020: 15). In this way, the PTI did not have to develop its own party-based clientelist networks of voters and could instead rely on the networks of "electables".

Finally, the PTI benefitted from a military and state establishment sympathetic to the party which created an uneven playing field, by opposing the PML (N) and supporting the PTI. This includes engineering defections from the PML (N), the selective conviction

of political candidates, and the intimidation of the media (Behera 2018: 240-241). This is an account repeated by the European Union Election Observation Mission (2018: 10) which found “a systematic effort to undermine the former ruling party through cases of corruption, contempt of court and terrorist charges against its leaders and candidates”.

5.7. The Role of the Military and the state

Much of Pakistan’s political history since independence has been marked by constant shifts in the balance of power between political parties and the military. Often, however, the balance of power has tended towards the military which has played parties off against one another and at times, parties have served as the conduit through which the military has ruled (Siddiqui et al. 2020: 2). The military has employed three tactics for retaining influence in Pakistani politics: nurturing and selecting political leaders, shaping the political environment by supporting favoured candidates, and infiltrating political parties with favoured candidates (Siddiqa 2020: 216). Consequently, the military has emerged as a kingmaker in Pakistani politics through its role as arbiter and guardian of the state.

All of Pakistan’s military regimes have resorted to tactics including repression, political party bans, party-less elections, election rigging, interference in candidate selection and the co-optation of political parties to ensure the election of malleable legislative assemblies and often politicians in short-sighted self-preservation have cooperated with the military to the party system’s overall detriment (Zhirnov & Mufti 2019: 521). This has stunted the development of Pakistan’s political parties and has meant that party organisations have been kept consistently weak and have instead relied on party personalities to attract voters and “electables” to fluid party labels. Further, a history of party-less elections and weak party identification has led to the emergence of local political machines based on the personalised following of bosses or local notables with

little loyalty to party labels, or democracy, often cooperating with military regimes for personal benefit.

In some cases, the military has co-opted parties such as when General Ayub Khan assumed the presidency of the PML in 1963 or more recently when General Musharraf facilitated the formation of the PML (Q) faction in the early 2000s to cooperate with his regime. However, unlike Bangladesh where past military rulers have successfully turned authoritarian successor parties into competitive parties under democracy, the Pakistani military has instead usually switched its support between parties and acted as an arbiter seeking to preserve the military's interests. Rather than political parties colonising the state through cadre deployment, in Pakistan it is the military that has historically leveraged its deployment of officials to capture the state. Under Generals Ayub Khan and Zia-ul-Haq, this assumed a more direct approach with overtly military regimes. In the case of Musharraf, control over state institutions was achieved by the secondment of military officers to lower levels of government in which these officers served as military "watchdogs" rather than assuming a direct role in governing (Shah 2014: 1016).

In this way, the military has assumed tutelage over the political system and framed itself as the guardian of Pakistani society, intervening against instability caused by political parties and stepping in against allegedly corrupt governments. The high levels of political party instability and corruption – partly a consequence of past military regimes' policies - have consequently created a legacy of distrust in political parties. As seen in data from the World Values Survey (Figure 5.3), there is a significant gap between Pakistanis' trust in the military (93.2% in 2018) and democratic institutions such as parliament (50%) and political parties (43.6%). In Bangladesh, by comparison, which has had a similarly

difficult recent history with military regimes, 74.7% of respondents reported a great deal or quite a lot of confidence in Parliament (Haerpfer et al. 2020).



Figure 5.3. Pakistani public's confidence in institutions. (Source: Haerpfer et al. 2020).

5.8. Conclusion

While party systems are conventionally understood in terms of competition between political parties as shaped by cleavages and the electoral systems, the Pakistani experience reveals the importance of the state's relationship to parties in shaping the political environment in which parties compete. As Pakistan's political history shows, the ways in which parties interact, cooperate and compete have been shaped by parties' relationship to the state. In the case of Bangladesh, this party-state relationship takes the form of parties capturing the state for their own interest. In Pakistan, it is instead state institutions including the military and the bureaucracy which have manipulated the parties for their own interests. Through manipulating elections and distorting the development of party

organisations, the Pakistani state has undermined the emergence of institutionalised political parties and consequently, prevented the formation of an institutionalised party system.

Instead, policies of party-less elections and the state's manipulation of politics have created a system of political silos led by local notables with largely personalised followings based on patronage and clientelism. This personalisation of politics has kept political parties weakly institutionalised as candidates are incentivised to engage in party-switching to align with the future ruling party – often determined by the support given to favoured candidates by the military and state establishment. Along with the selective undermining of opposition parties, the Pakistani military and state establishment have been able to prevent the emergence of strong parties and have manipulated the party system to maintain legislative assemblies amenable to the establishment's interests. In this way, the state's interference in political parties has undermined their development and left political parties weakly institutionalised. In turn, this has undermined the emergence of an institutionalised party system as weak party labels and the military's disincentives for party loyalty has meant that both politicians and voters only have weak ties to political parties.

Chapter 6
Political Parties, the State and Party System Institutionalisation in Bangladesh

Competition between the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) and Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) has long defined the Bangladeshi party system and since the 1990s, the two have alternated power several times and captured a significant vote share in successive elections. This is despite their relative lack of party institutionalisation with both organisations heavily personalised and lacking significant complexity beyond a small party elite. The success of both parties has come from their use of the state to build and maintain the parties through patronage and clientelism. Under each government, the ruling party has found itself significantly intertwined with the state which has been captured by political elites for personal benefit and for the benefit of the party in power.

This chapter examines the development of the Bangladeshi party system since the country's independence from Pakistan in 1971 and looks at how the two main parties have used the state to supplement their lack of party institutionalisation. In the first section, five distinct periods are analysed to explain the evolution of Bangladesh's political system. The first period looks at the historical context to the formation of Bangladesh. The second period examines the formation of Bangladesh under the BAL (1971-1975). Thereafter, there was a period of semi-authoritarian military rule (1975-1990) followed by the return of democracy and caretaker governments between elections (1991-2008). The last period looks at Bangladeshi politics since 2008 under the BAL.

In the second section, the respective party organisations and their institutionalisation is discussed by looking at the parties' histories and the structure of the organisations. This is followed by a discussion of intra-party democracy and how the parties have used party patronage to draw political elites into the party fold. Thereafter, the parties' societal linkages are examined. As both parties are only thinly ideological, they rely extensively on clientelism to maintain these linkages and have structured local development in such a way as to use state resources to maintain support for the party in power. The chapter concludes with a brief discussion of how the relationship between parties and the state has shaped the party system throughout Bangladeshi history with the argument that the parties' unique relationship with the state has been the main source of continuity in the party system.

6.2. Evolution of Bangladesh's Party System

In 1947 when Pakistan achieved independence, the country was divided into two territories, East (contemporary Bangladesh) and West (contemporary Pakistan), with the bulk of India separating the two parts. Apart from a shared religion, the two regions were culturally dissimilar and had little else holding the two parts together (Bates 2007: 182). Further, colonial rule had unevenly developed political institutions with East Pakistan's state apparatus mostly underdeveloped. To make matters worse, the Muslim League, which had brought about the creation of Pakistan and was the country's only organised party, favoured West Pakistan with the new political elite largely relocating from India to West Pakistan. With time, many in East Pakistan came to see the new status quo favouring West Pakistan as a new form of colonialism.

Much of contemporary Bangladeshi politics is defined by the country's struggle for independence from Pakistan and its aftermath. The two main historical figures whose

dynasties still define Bangladeshi politics first made a name for themselves in the Bangladeshi liberation movement and competing narratives over their respective roles is the defining feature distinguishing Bangladesh's two major political parties. The section below outlines the main political events that have shaped Bangladeshi politics since 1947 starting with the region's experience under the Muslim League and the dominance of West Pakistan. Thereafter, the short-lived rule of Sheikh Mujibur Rahman and the BAL is discussed before examining more than two decades of military rule under Generals Ziaur Rahman and Hussain Muhammad Ershad. This is followed by a section focusing on the period of democratic rule between 1991 and 2006 defined by competition between the BAL and BNP with a brief democratic interlude under a caretaker government between 2006-2008. Finally, the state of Bangladeshi politics and the decline of democracy since 2008 is examined.

Historical Context to the Formation of Bangladesh (1947-1971)

As mentioned previously, when Pakistan became independent in 1947, the newly formed state was spread across two territories separated by hundreds of kilometres of Indian territory with very little in common between the two regions other than religion. From the start, governing two territories split in such a way was bound to be difficult, but the relative weakness of the political parties in the newly formed state made the process significantly more difficult. Further, most of the state institutions formed under British rule were primarily found in India with Pakistan, particularly East Pakistan, relatively underdeveloped by comparison. To further complicate the matter, the ethnic composition of the two territories impaired the development of a shared sense of identity despite a common religion.

One of the first issues facing the emerging state was the question of a national language. Despite being spoken by only a small minority of the population (around 3%), the political elite in the ruling Muslim League declared Urdu as the national language and ignored the protests of East Pakistan who made up 55% of the population of the new state and formed the largest linguistic group (Khan 2017: 189). As a result, several major Bengali politicians broke from the Muslim League in 1949 and formed the Awami Muslim League, later changed to the Awami League, to better represent East Pakistani interests. In 1952, a banned student protest at the University of Dhaka over the language issue turned violent and clashes with the police left four dead, marking a turning point which galvanised the Bengali nationalist movement (Uddin 2006: 114-115). The event turned East Pakistan against the Muslim League and in the first provincial election in 1954, East Pakistan overwhelming rejected the party which won only seven of the 309 seats in the election (van Schendel 2009: 116). The majority of seats went to the Awami League (143 seats), which formed a government with their main coalition partner, the Krishak Sramik Party (48 seats), which was organisationally weak, but whose leader was immensely popular and became the province's chief minister (Nair 1990: 141, 165).

The deep underlying differences between the two units and the West Pakistani establishment's fears of being dominated by the Eastern half hampered the development of the necessary political institutions with the struggle between elites preventing the adoption of a post-independence constitution until 1956. The constitution acknowledged Bengali alongside Urdu as a national language and formed the disparate West Pakistani region into one regional unit in an attempt to counterbalance the Bengali nationalist movement. Two years later, however, a military coup suspended the constitution with the justification that the factionalism of politicians was creating instability (Talbot 2005: 126-127). However, an alternate reading on the causes of the coup is that the imminent

elections threatened the interests of the Punjabi elite and the military in West Pakistan - the most developed component of the state formed under colonial rule.

During this first period of military rule, the military government increasingly neglected East Pakistan and instead focused on developing West Pakistan, fuelling discontent and leading to the further rise of Bengali nationalism in the East. In late 1959, the military regime introduced a system of "Basic Democracies" for local elections whereby political parties were banned, but local representatives numbering 80,000 were elected, who in turn elected the military leader General Ayub Khan and legitimised military control (Mukherjee 2016: 262). This system undermined the emergence of organised parties and instead deepened the power of local elites who used their access to state resources to build personalised clientelist networks. Despite the ban on political parties, Bengali nationalism was on the rise and in 1966, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman (Mujib) the leader of the Awami League issued a six-point list of demands for a future state including increased autonomy for East Pakistan which further incited support against the existing political structure (Choudhury 1972: 248).

In 1969, protests across East and West Pakistan led to the resignation of General Ayub Khan and the introduction of a transition government which agreed to hold national elections in 1970 for a new parliamentary body based on the population of territories rather than parity between the two wings (Baxter 1971: 200-201). The Awami League won all but two seats in the more populous East Pakistan and as a result held an absolute majority at the national level despite winning no seats in West Pakistan (al Mujahid 1971: 169). This would have allowed the Awami League to form the new constitution by themselves – an unappealing prospect to the military and bureaucracy dominated by West Pakistanis.

Further, the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) led by Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, the former foreign minister under General Ayub Khan, won a majority of seats in the West and announced a boycott of the new National Assembly (Blair 1971: 2557). The military government chose to suspend the National Assembly two days before its first sitting, sparking protests and the complete collapse of central authority in East Pakistan (Sisson & Rose 1990: 91). After failing to come to a compromise between the military, Mujib and Bhutto, the military launched a surprise attack on East Pakistan, arresting Mujib with the claim that the Awami League planned to secede. From March 1971, the West Pakistani army fought Bangladeshi guerrillas until finally surrendering in December shortly after India joined the war to support the secessionist movement in East Pakistan.

The Formation of Bangladesh (1971-1975)

After the war, the newly formed state of Bangladesh was in disarray as many of the positions in the bureaucracy and military had been occupied by West Pakistanis. The Awami League, branded as the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) thereafter, stepped into the vacuum as the transitional government based on the charisma of Mujib who was hailed as a hero after his release from Pakistani custody (Jahan 1973: 202). In the newly formed country's first election in 1973, support for the party was affirmed with the BAL securing 73% of votes and 97% of seats in parliament albeit with the help of coercive tactics to undermine its rivals (van Schendel 2009: 179). Despite the popularity of Mujib - the "father of the nation" - corruption within the party and their lack of political experience severely undermined the party's ability to govern and the lack of economic progress started fostering resentment in some sections of the population.

Mujib also struggled to keep the party together which was rife with factionalism and undermined by competition between party members who used the party's nationalisation

of industries to build personal networks of support through clientelism. The huge range of issues facing the new state, made more difficult by the lack of governing experience, meant that the party had little time for developing the party organisation and instead focused on managing factional conflict and issues of governance (Jahan 1974: 125). Consequently, the BAL remained underdeveloped as an organisation while no opposition parties including the banned right-wing parties, which were seen as Pakistani collaborators, were adequately developed to pose an effective challenge.

Faced with severe challenges of underdevelopment and the necessity of rebuilding the economy after the war, Bangladesh's economic outlook was poor. These problems were compounded by the party's lack of governing experience and a series of poor policy choices which nationalised large parts of the economy despite widespread corruption and mismanagement. Further, international and state aid was administered following the war by decentralised relief committees controlled by BAL members who held discretion over the allocation of aid in local communities and often engaged in corruption (Blair 1978: 70;73). With rapidly rising inflation and food shortages, discontent increased over rampant poverty and unemployment, Bangladesh's main opposition parties formed a United Front protesting the corruption and mismanagement of the BAL while armed revolutionary parties on the left organised to complete the "unfinished revolution" (Maniruzzaman 1975: 120-122).

In response, Mujib declared a state of emergency and amended the constitution to make him president and implemented one-party rule in January 1975 (Blair 2010: 99-100). Opposition parties that did not join his party were banned and Mujib was declared President for the next five years (Maniruzzaman 1976: 120). However, by August 1975, a group of disgruntled army officers staged a coup and murdered Mujib and most of his

family. Two more coups followed in November with General Ziaur Rahman ultimately emerging as the victor (Sheikh & Ahmed: 2020: 340).

Military Rule (1975-1990)

For the next 15 years, Bangladesh was ruled by military dictatorships partially modelled after General Ayub Khan whereby executive power was concentrated in a self-appointed general turned president promising economic development and a clean administration free of corruption. Although claiming that he had no interest in politics and only aimed to aid the transition to democracy, General Ziaur Rahman quickly placed himself in the centre of politics. In a 1977 referendum, he claimed 99% of the vote affirming support for his rule (Rashiduzzaman 1978: 127-127). In the year thereafter, he was elected with 76% of the vote in a surprise presidential election, beating a retired general supported by the BAL and consolidating his role as the head of the new regime (Rashiduzzaman 1979: 191-193). After his election to the presidency, General Ziaur Rahman formed the Bangladesh National Party (BNP) to legitimise and civilianise his rule, absorbing several right-wing parties supporting his rule into the newly formed BNP.

In a further step towards a return to civilian government, a parliamentary election was announced for 1979 – the second general election since the formation of Bangladesh. At first, opposition parties threatened to boycott the elections with demands that martial law be lifted prior to the election rather than after as planned (Khan & Zafarullah 1979: 1025-1027). Following partial concessions by General Ziaur Rahman, the election was held in early 1979 and won by the BNP which was better prepared for the election than its rivals and benefitted from the party's close relationship with the state. The BNP won 207 of the 300 seats, but with only 41.16% of the overall vote in a fragmented first-past-the-post system where 29 parties contested alongside numerous independents (Baxter &

Rashiduzzaman 1981: 496). The second largest party, a faction of the BAL secured only 39 seats.

Although some semblance of a cleavage was emerging between the more right-wing BNP and left-wing opposition parties including the BAL, the parties' policy platforms remained vague and parties lacked significant societal linkages. The party organisations were also generally weak due to prior bans on political parties and open politicking. In the case of the BNP, the party was only six months old at the time of the election and largely relied on General Ziaur Rahman and the support of the military and newly rebuilt bureaucracy to cobble together a party to support the regime (Islam 1984: 569). In turn, the BAL was weakened by factions splintering off as a result of internal rivalries previously suppressed under Mujib's leadership.

The stability provided by General Ziaur Rahman in the move towards civilian rule and parliamentary democracy was, however, interrupted by his assassination in 1981 by a group of disgruntled military officers in a failed coup. Within six months, a new presidential election was held with the respective campaigns advocating to continue the legacy of General Ziaur Rahman (BNP) or Mujib (AL) (Khan 1982: 166). As Baxter (1982: 76) states, it was "a contest between two dead men" as the political parties had not significantly developed as organisations and continued to rely on the charisma of individual leaders. Although the BNP candidate won the election with 65% of the vote, the military still demanded a role in the political system as agreed under General Ziaur Rahman and fearing their exclusion, the military staged a bloodless coup in 1982 with the Chief of the Army General Hussain Muhammad Ershad taking power (Rahman 1983: 149-150).

Once in control, General Ershad followed the modus operandi of the country's previous military rulers for building legitimacy. After "reluctantly" taking power with the justification that "corrupt" politicians were creating instability, General Ershad promised to restore democracy - first with local elections that could be used to secure support for the government at the grassroots level through clientelism (Bertocci 1985: 156-157). Shortly thereafter, General Ershad held a referendum on continued support for his rule and after winning the contentious referendum announced an economic plan similar to that of General Ziaur Rahman and formed his own party by offering patronage to senior defectors from the BNP and BAL (Ahmed 1995: 313-315). Beyond the senior defectors enticed with patronage, the newly formed Jatiya Party (JP) was largely made up of bureaucrats and officers in the martial law administration.

The party system now consisted of three main actors: the JP, the BNP and the AL. Smaller parties either allied with the BNP, which was now led by the former president's widow Khaleda Zia, or the BAL led by Sheikh Hasina – the daughter of Mujib recently returned from exile and one of his only surviving family members. In 1986, after significant agitation by the BNP and AL, the Ershad regime announced parliamentary elections. Initially, both parties refused to participate in elections organised by the regime under martial law, however, the day before a planned countrywide strike, the BAL broke ranks and announced that it would participate. Despite their shared opposition to General Ershad, the BNP and BAL similarly despised each other, and the BAL's capitulation was aimed at positioning itself as the main opposition party over the BNP (Islam 1987: 164-165).

The BNP boycotted the election in which the JP won a narrow majority (153 of 300 seats) with the BAL as the main opposition party (76 seats) (Huque & Hakim 1993: 255).

Shortly after, General Ershad announced a presidential election for a few months later, but with claims of voting irregularities in the parliamentary election, both main parties boycotted the presidential election and with no real opposition, it was seen as illegitimate (Ahmed 1995: 321). Following continued protests by the BNP and BAL and a declaration of emergency, General Ershad agreed to another parliamentary election in 1988 only for both parties to boycott it and for the legitimacy crisis to deepen (Rahman 1989: 218). After two more years of protests and the collapse of support from the military and senior JP members, General Ershad resigned in 1990 (Bates 2007: 209).

A Return to Democracy and Caretaker Governments (1991-2008)

The emergence of the BNP as a successful national party was one of the major legacies of the military era and after the fall of General Ershad, the BNP won the 1991 parliamentary elections with 31% of the popular vote (140 of 300 seats) to the BAL's 28% (88 seats) (Baxter & Rahman 1991: 687). Following the election, the BNP entered a coalition with the Islamist Jamaat-e-Islami (JI) to form a majority, marking the return of civilian rule and democracy. Unlike the JP, the BNP developed as an organisation once out of power and its role in the pro-democracy movement allowed the party to develop its grassroots support and build on the popular legacy left by General Ziaur Rahman. By comparison, the JP withered away once out of power and although the JP has continued to contest elections, its support has steadily declined since the 1991 election where it secured only 12% of the vote and 35 seats – the party's best performance under fair elections.

Since then, the party system has primarily revolved around competition between the BNP and BAL with the much smaller JP and JI occasionally acting as minor coalition partners. In the 1996 election, the BAL won with 37.4% of the vote (146 of 300 seats) to the BNP's

33.6% (116 seats) and entered a coalition with the JP as a minor partner (Bangladesh Election Commission 1996). In the 2001 election thereafter, the BNP won with 40.9% (193 seats) to the BAL's 40.1% (62 seats) (Bangladesh Election Commission 2001). As seen in Figure 6.1 which shows the ENP for the three elections, interparty competition during this time solidified around competition between the BNP and BAL with the ENP (seats) declining from a relatively low 3.1 to 2.2.



Figure 6.1 The Effective Number of Parties in Bangladesh (1991-2001)

Despite regular elections and two government turnovers between 1991 and 2001, the democratic process remained marred by election violence, parliamentary boycotts by the opposition and frequent strikes (Moniruzzaman 2009: 91-94). The problem of combative elections reached its height in 2006 after the scheduled elections had to be postponed due to widespread pre-election violence, leading to the military once again stepping in to back a caretaker government until new elections could be held (van Schendel 2009: 199).

In 1990, following the fall of General Ershad's regime, the major parties agreed to implement a system whereby a non-party caretaker government (NPCG) headed by a former chief justice and independent advisers would assume government functions and organise the election in the period between the dissolution of parliament and convening the next (Ahmed 2003: 59). The system was introduced due to the history of incumbents, particularly the previous military rulers, using the state machinery to support their re-election campaigns and was meant to ensure free and fair elections. In 1996, the NPCG system was incorporated as a constitutional amendment to ensure the fairness of future elections after a contentious and widely boycotted February 1996 election organised under the BNP led to a major impasse and had to be rerun under a NPCG after immense pressure by opposition groups (Zafarullah & Akhter 2000: 358-359). Thereafter, the NPCG system led to relatively smooth transitions for the June 1996 and 2001 elections.

However, the system encountered a major problem in the next election cycle after the ruling BNP raised the retirement age of Supreme Court justices in a move seen as an attempt to manipulate the impartiality of the next NPCG by ensuring that a justice considered favourable to the BNP could be made the next head of the NPCG (Khan 2015: 3). As a result of public backlash, the justice in question declined the position and without a mutually agreed candidate to lead the NPCG, the BNP-elected President, Iajuddin Ahmed, assumed the role – sparking violent protests (Ghoshal 2009: 69). Shortly thereafter, President Iajuddin Ahmed resigned from the role after pressure from the military and a new NPCG was formed under a state of emergency with the former governor of the central bank, Fakhruddin Ahmed, as the head (Ahmed 2011: 139). Unlike previous NPCGs, the military-backed NPCG attempted to reform the political system beyond its constitutional mandate and lasted two years – longer than any previous NPCG (Jahan 2015: 253).

Many of the reforms were aimed at restricting cadre-deployment and depoliticising state institutions such as the bureaucracy and the election commission. The NPCG additionally targeted the two main political parties for reform, seeing their confrontational politics as the source of Bangladesh's problems and a threat to stability. Working with mid-level members of both parties, the NPCG encouraged intra-democratic reforms within the organisations to reduce the autocratic hold of the party leaders and tried to get the leaders to retire from politics (Amundsen 2016: 52). Further, the NPCG also encouraged the formation of new parties, but without patronage to distribute, many previously reform-minded politicians returned to their former parties and the new parties failed to gain traction. Despite recognising many of the deficiencies of the political system, the NPCG's ability to reform it faced significant resistance from the parties and was ultimately forced to compromise on its reforms as public support for the NPCG diminished (Ahmed 2010: 39). In 2008, the NPCG finally held a general election, conceding to many of the parties' demands and compromising on some of the NPCG's reforms.

The End of Caretaker Governments and the Decline of Democracy (2008-present)

The election saw the highest election turnout in Bangladeshi history (86.3%) and secured a supermajority for the BAL despite a relatively modest gain in the popular vote – up from 40.2% in 2001 to 48.1% in 2008 (Ahmed 2011: 145-146). By comparison, the BNP secured 32.4% of the vote in 2008 and 30 seats, down from 40.9% and 193 seats in 2001. After winning the election, the BAL added a constitutional amendment removing NPCGs between elections in 2011 even though they had first introduced the idea and protested for months in 1996 demanding its introduction (Shanta 2017: 533). A Supreme Court judgement which had ruled that the NPCG amendment was unconstitutional, however, also stated in the same verdict that the system should be kept for another two

parliamentary terms for the sake of stability (Sarkar 2011). This suggestion was ignored by parliament.

Without the provision for an NPCG between elections, the BNP and its smaller allies boycotted the 2014 election (Jahan 2015: 253). This left 153 of 300 parliamentary seats uncontested in an election marred by violence, low turnout and the harassment of opposition leaders (Riaz 2014a: 152). The only other significant party to contest the election was the JP now led by Rowshan Ershad, the wife of the former dictator, despite her husband's initial insistence on boycotting the election. General Ershad in the end contested and won a seat from a hospital bed where he had been taken a few months prior for "treatment" by a military escort after announcing that he would boycott the election (Riaz 2014b: 127-128). General Ershad later claimed that he had been detained for refusing to take part. Curiously, the JP became both government and opposition following the election with several JP members included in the cabinet while Rowshan Ershad was made leader of the opposition (Habib 2014).

With another large parliamentary majority, the BAL continued their programme of bending state institutions to the will of the party and with it, the democratic process. Since 2014, there has been a sharp decline in the quality of democracy and the associated conditions necessary for a functioning democracy with restrictions on the media, the undermining of civil society organisations and the harassment of the opposition (Blair 2020). The decline of Bangladeshi democracy can be seen in Figure 6.1 below with a significant decline in their combined Polity score in 2014 and again in 2018, falling well below a combined score of 6 commonly regarded as democratic. Similarly, Freedom House (2020) rates Bangladesh as "partly free", while the Economist Intelligence Unit (2020) scores Bangladesh as a hybrid regime with a score of 5.88 – falling below the 6

required for flawed democracies and 8 for full democracies. Much of this is attributed to the decline of civil liberties and the associated rights necessary for a well-functioning democracy.



Figure 6.2 Combined Polity 5 scores for Bangladesh since the 1991 election. Source: Marshall & Gurr 2020.

With the decline of democracy, the impartiality of state institutions has similarly faded away and the BAL has increasingly used the state to harass opponents such as through the selective pursuit of corruption charges targeting the BNP. For instance, of the corruption charges filed against the two leaders by the 2006-2008 NPCG, those against PM Sheikh Hasina have been dropped under the BAL while cases against BNP leader Khaleda Zia were pursued and led to her imprisonment in February 2018 (Riaz 2020: 10). Despite the imprisonment of their leader and a clearly uneven playing field, the BNP decided to contest the 2018 election but managed to win only 6 seats to the BAL's 288 in an election widely regarded as unfair with numerous accusations of vote-rigging (Blair 2020: 140).

The BAL's control over the state allowed the party to pack the Election Commission with supportive Commissioners that have skewed the playing field. This is seen for instance in the uneven application of rules with opposition parties and candidates penalised while the BAL has largely avoided punishment for the same violations (Riaz 2019: 59). While still an electoral democracy, the future of Bangladeshi democracy and the party system remains questionable as the BAL completes its takeover of the state while the BNP withers away with Khaleda Zia effectively banished from running for office and her son in exile.

As the history of the Bangladeshi party system shows, the BAL and BNP have remained persistent features around which the Bangladeshi party system has been shaped despite both main parties' lack of institutionalisation. This is both due to the historical legacies that they carry as well as the way that the parties have intertwined themselves with the state to maintain their organisations and linkages. In the next section, the institutionalisation of the two parties is examined along with a discussion on how the parties have used their proximity to the state to build and maintain the party organisations and their linkages to society.

6.3. Institutionalisation of the Party Organisations

The Awami League was founded in 1949 by dissident members of the Muslim League in East Pakistan who felt that they had been denied influence in the party organisation and the new Pakistani central government. In contrast to the largely elitist Muslim League, the Awami League brought together a broad coalition of interests from different classes and backgrounds around Bengali nationalism. Prior to Bangladeshi independence this broad coalition of elites and populists was held together by their mutual opposition to the Muslim League (Nair 1990: 94). However, once Bangladesh gained independence and

the BAL came to power, the party's cohesion quickly declined as conflict grew between left- and right-wing factions of the party. Once in power, the BAL recognised the need to further strengthen the organisation and resolved to separate the parliamentary party from the party organisation (Jahan 1973: 204).

However, failing to find a consensus candidate to lead the party organisation, the party leader, Mujib, was asked to stay on as both head of the organisation and prime minister. Thus, power was centralised in the popular leader who held the party together through the distribution of patronage to appease the various factions (Jahan 1974: 129). In turn, factions used their access to state resources to form personalised support bases through clientelism in a bid to strengthen their relative position within the party. In this way, the organisation was held together by the charisma of Mujib and the distribution of patronage and clientelism granted by the party's control over the state. After the assassination of Mujib and the 1975 coup, the party split into several rival factions, revealing the importance of Mujib and access to patronage for holding the party together. The party was only reunified once Mujib's daughter, Sheikh Hasina, returned from exile and assumed leadership of the party. Much like under her father, power was centralised around Sheikh Hasina who formed an indispensable pillar of the party.

Although the origin of the BNP differs significantly from the BAL, its functioning and dependence on the state and its charismatic leader is similar. Founded after the 1978 presidential election, the BNP emerged out of the state as part of General Ziaur Rahman's civilianisation of the military regime. Controlling the state machinery and its resources gave General Ziaur Rahman the opportunity to build a party out of patronage and much of the newly constructed BNP had extensive ties to the state. Many party members were drawn from the military bureaucracy and retired senior officials occupied many of the

important positions within the party. Further, factionalism in opposition parties and their thin ideological cohesion made it easy to encourage politicians to join the ruling party through patronage (Jahan 2014: 5).

This ideological pragmatism meant that the party brought together numerous factions and creeds held together largely by continued access to state resources. After General Ziaur Rahman was assassinated, his successor struggled to maintain cohesion and many members joined the JP formed by the new military regime led by General Ershad. However, under the leadership of General Ziaur Rahman's widow the BNP was revitalised and transformed into an opposition party and pro-democracy movement. The party's role in returning democracy to Bangladesh helped distance the BNP from their authoritarian origins and build grassroots support. Since the full return of democracy in 1991, the party has been democratically elected twice with Khaleda Zia at the head of the party carrying the legacy of General Ziaur Rahman.

6.3.1. Party Structure and Complexity

Both parties rely extensively on the popularity of their respective leaders. As a result, power is primarily concentrated at the highest level of the parties. The main organisational structures of the parties are found at the national level while there are provisions for district, Upazila (sub-district) and metropolitan city committees as the main sub-units of both parties. However, many of the lower tier units are inactive with reports indicating that a significant proportion of district and Upazila councils have vacant leadership positions and irregular or no meetings in many party sub-units (Risingbd 2012). Although the parties have some partisan support and a grassroots following, most of the party organisation below the national level is poorly organised and lacks institutionalisation.

Although the BAL's party constitution sets out the functions and schedules for convening the various bodies, in practice many of these rules are not adhered to (see Figure 6.3 for the BAL's organisational structure). For instance, the BAL's National Committee which is meant to convene biannually to coordinate between the Central Working Committee (the executive body) and elected members of the district committees did not sit for ten years between 2002 and 2012 (Liton & Tusher 2012). Similarly, district committees are expected to convene district councils prior to the BAL National Council (equivalent to the party conference) to elect district representatives. However, in the past 30-40% of these sub-units have failed to convene a council in time (Jahan 2014: 17) and in preparation for the 2019 National Conference, the majority of district councils were hurriedly convened in the three weeks prior to the National Council (Shawon 2019a). However, whether or not district councils are convened in time, the outcome is likely to have very little effect on the National Council which largely serves as a rubber stamp for the party leadership.

Although the party constitution prescribes specific tenure for leaders, this is rarely adhered to and the role of ordinary party members in the selection of leaders is extremely limited (Ahmed 2010: 43). The BAL's National Council held every three years to elect the party's leaders has similarly interpreted the party constitution very loosely. The national conference is made up of party office bearers, elected officials from district committees and co-opted members whose role it is to elect the Central Working Committee, amend the party constitution and set the party manifesto. In practice, however, recent Councils since 2009 have only elected the party president and general secretary, often uncontested, who in turn have appointed the Central Working Committee (Liton 2016a).



Figure 6.3 Organisational Structure of the Bangladesh Awami League

The Central Working Committee which forms the party executive in encompasses the smaller and more powerful Presidium made up of the party president, general secretary and 17 members. Even though the party constitution and the rules of the Electoral Commission stipulate that party leaders should be elected, the Presidium has de facto been appointed by the party president and its membership has not changed significantly since the 2009 National Council (Appendix 3). The only real change has been the gradual expansion of the Presidium – each time with almost all senior party members reappointed with the only new members usually taking up new seats (Shawon 2019b).

The BNP similarly lacks significant institutionalisation and loosely adheres to the party constitution. The most blatant example of the party's lack of institutionalisation is the irregularity with which National Councils have been organised. Although the party constitution states that the party chairman and national executive should be elected by the National Council every three years, only six National Councils have convened since the party's founding in 1978 and there was a 16-year delay between the party's 4th (1993) and 5th (2009) National Councils (Jahan 2014: 20).

Further, much like the AL, the election process of the BNP's national executive defies both the party constitution and the rules introduced by the Election Commission under the 2006-2008 caretaker government to improve intraparty democracy. Rather than directly electing the national executive as required, the authority to "elect" the party executive was granted to party leader Khaleda Zia in the last two Councils in 2009 and 2016 (Liton 2016b). In turn, Khaleda was "elected" unopposed by the National Council while her son was elected senior vice-chairman, a role specifically introduced in 2009 to smoothen succession (Liton & Suman 2009). After Khaleda Zia's imprisonment in 2018

on corruption charges, her son, Tarique Rahman, assumed the role of acting Chairman although he remains in exile.

Above the National Council sits the National Executive Committee which brings together all the presidents and general secretaries of the party's various sub-units as well as the senior office holders of the party (see Figure 6.4). The Committee coordinates and oversees the implementation of the party programme by the lower committees and associations. In practice, however, the National Executive Committee has sat infrequently despite the party constitution's stipulation that the committee should be convened every three months (Jahan 2014: 21). For example, prior to a 2018 meeting to discuss the party's response to Khaleda's impending conviction, the National Executive Committee had not convened for over a year and a half (Prothom Alo 2018).

Power is primarily vested in the National Standing Committee similar to BAL's Presidium. Again, much like the Presidium, the most senior positions in the party are nominated by the party leader and have been occupied by the same senior members for over a decade. Only one new member was added to the National Standing Committee between the 2009 and 2016 National Councils (see Appendix 4). The main changes in the Committee's composition have been a result of the death or exclusion of members due to poor health (The Independent 2016). This powerful body oversees the activities of the lower committees, formulates party policy and approves all party publications. Further, the Standing Committee also serves as the parliamentary board which determines candidates for elections albeit in partnership with the respective district branch for which the candidate is decided.

BNP organisational structure and functions as set out in party constitution and in practice

National Council – includes the National Executive Committee, National Standing Committee, Parliamentary Party and the president and general secretary of every party sub-unit as well as two women from each district and metropolitan committee. Party chairperson can nominate 10% of councillors. Although the party constitution stipulates that the National Council should be convened every three years, only 6 have been held since the party's founding in 1978. The National Council elects the party executive, adopts party policy and amends the party constitution.

National Executive Committee – 502 members including presidents of all district and metropolitan committees, co-opted members nominated by party chairperson and office holders elected by National Council (de facto nominated by party chairperson). Duties include co-ordinating lower committees, implementing the party program and taking direction from the National Standing Committee.

National Standing Committee –Party chairperson, senior vice-chairman, general secretary and 16 members nominated by party chair (two seats are vacant). The highest decision-making body sets policy, directs the National Executive Committee and monitors activities of lower committees.

District, Metropolitan City and Upazila sub-units

Advisory Council – party chairperson and 63 nominated members.

Parliamentary board – National Standing Committee also serves as the parliamentary board. For determining candidate nominations, the president and general secretary of the respective district committee are included as members.

Parliamentary party – all BNP MPs. Selects leader, deputy leader and whip in consultation with party chairperson.

Figure 6.4 Organisational Structure of the Bangladesh Nationalist Party

The lower levels of both parties are weakly institutionalised. As previously mentioned, many of the district level units reportedly have vacant leadership positions and meet infrequently. At the same time, the coordinating bodies linking the national leadership with the party sub-units (the BAL's National Committee and the BNP's National Executive Committee) in both parties meet irregularly despite the party rules. The weakness of the lower units of the parties is further illustrated in responses to the 2019 expert survey shown in the graphs below. Although the majority of respondents agree that both parties maintain permanent local offices in most districts (Figure 6.4), the permanent community presence of both parties (Figure 6.5) is generally lower than that of the parties in India and Pakistan.



Figure 6.5 Permanent Party Offices in Bangladesh (Expert Survey 2019)



Figure 6.6 Permanent Community Presence in Bangladesh (Expert Survey 2019)

6.3.2. Intra-party Democracy and Personalism

The autocratic, dynastic nature of both parties has long been recognised as a major obstacle to intra-party democracy. The 2006-2008 caretaker government attempted to democratise the parties by reforming the Election Commission and trying to encourage the two leaders to retire from politics – ultimately, going as far as arresting both on corruption charges (Amundsen 2016: 52). However, the popularity of both leaders meant that reform efforts were unsuccessful and the caretaker government was forced to capitulate with both leaders returning to the head of their parties. Changes in the electoral laws and registration requirements for parties in 2009, have similarly tried to democratise the parties with little success. Article 90B of the Representation of the People Order (Amendment) Act, 2009 stipulates that all central committee officeholders should be elected as a condition of party registration (The Representation of the People Order 1972).

However, the party leaders have thus far been elected unopposed and have in turn "elected" their central committees as discussed above.

The main feature distinguishing the two parties is the respective dynasty which they support. Both leaders are immensely popular among their supporters and have inherited the legacies of the two most popular political figures in contemporary Bangladeshi history – Sheikh Mujib and General Ziaur Rahman. For supporters of the BAL, Sheikh Hasina carries the legacy of her father Mujib, the founding father of Bangladesh who won Bangladeshi independence and introduced democracy to the country. In turn, supporters of the BNP see Khaleda Zia as continuing the legacy of her husband General Ziaur Rahman who declared the war of independence on behalf of Mujib and brought down the one-party state introduced by Mujib following independence (Ahmed 2010: 37). In this way, the party system is structured by competing narratives over the roles of the respective parties with each framing themselves as the champion of democracy while the other is portrayed as anti-democratic.

Much like the personalistic authoritarian successor parties of Latin America, both the BAL and BNP lean heavily on the popular appeal of their past leaders as a brand identifying the parties. The success of such parties lies in their ability to transform support for a popular leader into a collective identity and brand (Loxton & Levitsky 2018: 131). In this way, Peronism and Fujimorismo have lasted as political identities in Argentina and Peru beyond the individual leaders. Similarly, the BAL and BNP have transformed Mujib and General Ziaur Rahman into party brands with their legacies carried on by Mujib's daughter and General Ziaur Rahman's widow. Consequently, the dynasties have become inseparable from the parties, giving Khaleda Zia and Sheikh Hasina a powerful hold over their parties with little dissent from even senior party members as their roles as

party leaders are unquestionable (Rahaman 2007: 108). Both party leaders have also carved a space for their sons in national politics (Hassan & Nazneen 2017: 208). In 2009, the BNP introduced the role of senior vice-chairman specifically for Khaleda Zia's son, Tarique Rahman, who became the party's acting chairman after Khaleda Zia's imprisonment in 2018. However, Tarique Rahman was also sentenced in the same case that led to his mother's imprisonment and remains in exile in London from where he leads the party. In turn, Sheikh Hasina's son, Sajeeb Wazed serves as an advisor to the Prime Minister under the current government.

However, personalism is not solely confined to the two dynastic heads of the party. The parties' highest decision-making bodies (the BAL's Presidium and the BNP's Standing Committee) rarely see significant change. In the BAL, there has been very little change in the composition of their Presidium between the Councils held in 2012, 2016 and 2019 (See Appendix 3). The main changes in the BAL, have come from the gradual expansion of the Presidium with new leaders generally added to the Presidium rather than replacing previous members. For the BNP, the only changes in their Standing Committee's membership between the 2009 and 2016 Councils was to replace two deceased members while two members suffering from ill health were excluded but their seats left vacant (see Appendix 4).

As the executive committees have been appointed by the party leaders, there is effectively no intra-party democracy at the highest level. This concentration of power in the executive is also reflected in the selection of candidates for national elections with nearly all respondents to the 2019 expert survey claiming that candidates are decided by national leaders with little participation from lower party units (see Figure 6.6). This despite the 2009 electoral reforms requiring registered parties to finalise candidate nominations in

"consideration" of members of the "concerned constituency" (The Representation of the People Order 1972). Both parties show very little institutionalisation of the organisations beyond the party elite. Both are guided by the whims of their leaders rather than a set of rules and there is little intra-party democracy to speak of. With no prospects of career advancement in the party ranks of the highly autocratic party organisations, what draws political activists to the parties?



Figure 6.7 Balance of Power in Candidate Selection in Bangladesh (Expert Survey 2019)

6.4. Party Patronage

In both cases, patronage rather than ideology has primarily kept political elites within the fold of the party and party patronage has played an indispensable part in Bangladeshi politics since independence. When the BAL first came to power following Bangladesh's secession from Pakistan, the party organisation was relatively weak with little holding the organisation together other than their mutual opposition to Pakistani rule. To prevent a

split in the party, Mujib used patronage to appease the various factions of the party who competed for power (Jahan 1974: 129). Further, the newly formed state was very weak with the political development of East Pakistan (contemporary Bangladesh) largely neglected under West Pakistani rule and made worse by the exodus of Pakistani bureaucrats following Bangladeshi independence.

The BAL was also distrustful of the remaining civil servants and purged large parts of the bureaucracy who were seen as collaborators, replacing many with inexperienced supporters of the liberation movement (Kochanek 1993: 55-56). Consequently, many of the vacancies in the newly formed state were filled by BAL members, politicising the public sector and introducing a system whereby the ruling party became closely intertwined with the state. The nationalisation of many industries further expanded the role of the state and opportunities for patronage. Ultimately, this attack on the former establishment and popular displeasure over poor economic growth and governance led to the assassination of Mujib and a military takeover in 1975.

Under the new military ruler, General Ziaur Rahman, the politicisation of the public sector continued as the military regime civilianised by forming a party out of former civil servants and military officers. In this way, the BNP emerged as a party out of the state and used their control over state resources to build a party out of patronage. With the backing of the state, the BNP cobbled together a coalition of supporters excluded from the BAL regime – bureaucrats, the military, the business community and former BAL members side-lined under Mujib (Kochanek 1993: 59). The second military dictatorship under General Ershad tried to replicate this model, but lacking the popularity of General Ziaur Rahman, General Ershad was unable to building a lasting party, only attracting

opportunists enticed by patronage and perpetuating the culture of using state resources for personal gain.

While the natural tendency is to define Bangladeshi political history in terms of distinguishing between military and democratic regimes, Suykens (2017: 187-188) argues that the dominant form of rule has been variations of the party-state. Under this system, the party in power not only becomes the principal means to connect to the state, but also exerts significant power over the entire public order and the accumulation of wealth. Consequently, connections with the party in power are important in industry and business as the party's domination of state institutions gives it control over all aspects of labour, industrial and economic policy. Further, through the use of party patronage, the party also exercises control over affiliated workers unions and business associations (Suykens 2017: 194). This significant overlap between the party, the state and the accumulation of wealth means that there are numerous incentives for supporting the ruling party. In turn, opposition parties excluded from power primarily engage in street politics of disruption and protest as is common in Bangladesh.

The extent of this party-state overlap is illustrated in Table 6.1 below. In Bangladesh, appointments in the state sector are largely made on the basis of party patronage and significantly more so than in India and Pakistan. Several sectors in Bangladesh such as the judiciary, military and police, and regional and local administration achieve almost the maximum score and the extent of party patronage is comparatively high in every sector. In such a system where there is significant overlap between the party and the state, there are clear advantages to having a close relationship to the ruling party. It is through this close relationship with the state and the opportunities that parties can offer to their

supporters that the two parties have been capable of attracting support without a strong ideological or programmatic appeal.

Table 6.1 Averaged responses on extent to which appointments in the state sector are made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019).

	Bangladesh (n=8)	India (n=15)	Pakistan (n=7)
Economic	3.38	1.94	3
Finance	3.5	1.69	2.43
Judicial	3.86	1.19	2.14
Media	3.25	1.8	2.29
Military and Police	3.63	1.25	2.43
Foreign Service	2.75	0.93	1.83
Culture and Education	3.38	2.63	2.43
Healthcare	2.38	1.33	2.57
Regional and Local Administration	3.75	2.75	3.43
Average	3.32	1.72	2.51

6.5. Institutionalisation of Societal Linkages

There is only a thin ideological differentiation between the two parties that helps to structure party competition and bind supporters to the parties. The BAL began as a social-democratic, secular party and has since moved to the centre, while the BNP is nationalist, “mildly” Islamic and conservative, but remains economically centrist (Blair 2020: 139-140). As discussed previously, the major differentiation distinguishing them is the competing legacies of Mujib and General Ziaur Rahman. Rahman (2019: 175) sees their ideological differentiation as competing narratives of the “foundational myth” of the nation. The BAL has historically emphasised Bengali ethnicity as the defining national feature by drawing on the language movement of the 1950s which unified East Pakistan in its agitation for independence from West Pakistan (van Schendel 2009: 203). In turn, the BNP has emphasised the Islamic nature of the nation and under General Ziaur Rahman

allied with Islamic parties in contrast to the BAL's committed secularism (Ahamed & Nazneen 1990: 807).

However, despite these competing visions of the nation as Bengali/secular or Bangladeshi/Islamic, the parties' programmatic appeals are largely indistinguishable and there has been no major difference in the parties' economic policies in recent times (Ahmed 2011: 143). Consequently, both behave to a large extent as catch-all parties appealing to support from all communities, classes and occupations (Tasnim 2017: 103). As can be seen in the table below summarising responses to the 2019 expert survey, there is no clear left-right distinction in the strength of parties' linkages. Thus, the BAL has stronger linkages with both workers unions and business. The BNP has stronger linkages to businesses than unions, but the BAL performs better in both. The sole category in which the BNP is seen to have stronger linkages than the BAL is religious organisations. This is to be expected considering that the BNP has historically allied with Jamaat-e-Islami, the main Islamist party of Bangladesh while the BAL claims to be secular. Despite this, the difference in the extent of their linkages to religious organisations is narrower than the difference between all other sectors of civil society.

Table 6.2 Averaged responses on the strength of parties' linkages to different sectors of civil society. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019).

	BAL	BNP
Unions	3.11	2.11
Business	3.33	2.89
Religious organisations	2.89	3.22
Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations	2.67	1.78
Urban/Rural organisations	2.5	1.88
Women's organisations	3.13	2.5
Average	2.94	2.40

The BAL outperforms the BNP in all other categories and on average, has stronger societal linkages. However, with relatively little ideological differentiation between the two parties and similarly poor levels of organisational complexity, something other than ideology or the strength of the party organisations must explain variance in the strength of parties' linkages. The answer lies with clientelism.

6.6. Clientelism

Although there are subtle variations in the parties' approaches to clientelism, both parties are on average considered about equally clientelist by respondents to the 2019 survey as shown in the table below. While both parties make similar efforts to entice voters with promises of preferential benefits, their ability to fulfil their pledge is dependent on the parties' access to state resources, which would explain the BNP's weaker linkages. As the party has been excluded from government for an extended period, the BNP's linkages have eroded (Bertelsmann Stiftung 2020: 12).

Table 6.3 Averaged responses on the extent to which parties try to entice voters with promises of providing preferential access to benefits. Responses range from a scale of 0 (not at all) to 4 (to a great extent). (Source: Expert Survey 2019).

	BAL	BNP
Preferential public benefits	3.14	2.67
Preferential employment opportunities	3.00	3.20
Preferential government contracts	2.86	3.00
Preferential regulation	2.80	2.75
Average	2.95	2.90

Clientelism is often used by weakly institutionalised parties as a strategy for building societal linkages in young democracies and in Bangladesh, clientelism has played an important role in the political system from its inception. As previously mentioned, when Bangladesh separated from Pakistan, many of the state institutions were very weak and coupled with the BAL's purge of the civil service, most public sector positions were filled

with party members (van Schendel 2009: 176). With the party in control of the state, party loyalists including small-scale farmers and trade unions expected to be rewarded for their support that brought the party to power. Factionalism within the BAL also meant that party members competed for the personalised support of these groups to advance their own position in the party, further incentivising patronage and clientelist activity. Almost all relief efforts were similarly placed under the discretion of local BAL members in the aftermath of the war and the party members used state and international aid channelled through the party to build their local influence through clientelism (Suykens 2017: 200-201).

When the military came to power in 1975, they used a similar strategy of using local development to build grassroots support for the regime and the newly formed BNP. By giving local committees responsibility for development, the new regime empowered local elites with discretion over state resources which was used to build clientelist networks that would maintain the local elite's hold over the development committees (Blair 1985: 1240). In turn, these local elites were made dependent on their continued access to state resources and significant efforts were made to establish a closer relationship between the bureaucracy and the local leaders (Rashiduzzaman 1978: 128). In this way, the BNP used its control over the state and the promise of development to build a grassroot following and perpetuate a culture of clientelism coupled with local development. When the military regime later introduced presidential and parliamentary elections, these connections turned out support for the party.

Particularly in rural Bangladesh, patron-client relations have long structured the relationship between the rich and poor as landowners and those with access to resources have the power to include or exclude the poor from development opportunities (Lewis &

Hossain 2008: 71). Contemporary local development committees have continued this pattern and much like under previous regimes, local development committees are used to build a link between support for the party and access to state resources. MPs play an influential role in local development as advisors on local development committees and have access to constituency development funds as well as influence over the allocation of public expenditure which provides for building personal support (Ahmed 2018: 171). This primarily benefits MPs from the ruling party and opposition strongholds are closed off from receiving the same funds (Jahan 2015: 260-261). This would also explain the BNP's weaker linkages as the party has been out of power for since 2001.

While clientelist practices can in some cases be seen as a means of building societal linkages and rooting the party, it can also undermine the institutionalisation of parties. Firstly, clientelist ties reduce the incentives for parties to build an ideological identity to tie voters to the party through shared policy ideals. Further, clientelism often serves to tie clients to individual politicians or political brokers rather than the party. In this way, support is dependent on continued access to state resources, meaning that both politicians or supporters can easily switch party loyalty for better opportunities as has often been the case when a new regime comes to power.

Finally, clientelist linkages tying supporters to an individual rather than the party may directly undermine party cohesion as individual politicians compete for individual power within the party or in a position with access to state resources at times to the detriment of the organisation. In Bangladesh, there is a long history of local factionalism within parties as factions compete for resources in the ruling party (Lewis & Hossain 2017: 17). The problem of factional conflict over resources is so acute in Bangladesh that nearly 40% of political violence stems from intraparty conflict (Aziz & Razzaque 2018: 44). Similarly,

Jahan (2014: 48-49) finds that intra-party violence within the BAL and BNP leads to more injuries and deaths than violence between the two parties. In this way, while clientelism may to some extent root parties in society, the continued reliance on clientelism for support undermines the long-term institutionalisation of parties.

6.7. Parties and the State

The weakness of the state at the formation of Bangladesh proved crucial both to the development of political parties and state institutions. With the BAL merging into the state and the BNP later emerging out the state, both party organisations have relied extensively on their relationship to the state and as a result, the development of both the parties and the state has been stunted by this relationship. In the case of Bangladesh's two main parties, this has reduced incentives for institutionalising the party organisations with the parties instead opting to maintain clientelist ties to voters rather than developing programmatic or ideological appeals to build societal linkages. Further, the way in which parties have captured the state has led to the rise of patronage and as party leaders primarily control patronage appointments, this has centralised power and prevented the emergence of greater intra-party democracy and the routinisation of the party organisations. In brief, this relationship has undermined the long-term institutionalisation of both political parties.

Despite this lack of institutionalisation, the parties have, however, remained persist features of the Bangladeshi party system and this relationship between political parties and the state allowed for the formation of a relatively stable pattern of interparty competition between the BAL and BNP – at least until the 2014 election. Their hold over Bangladeshi politics is most evident in the 2006-2008 NPCG's failed attempts to reform the political system where efforts to foster intra-party democracy and introduce new party

alternatives ultimately fell short. Paradoxically, the way in which the parties have co-opted the state has consequently both undermined their institutionalisation, but also allowed them to maintain their positions in the party system. In this way, despite the parties' lack of institutionalisation, their ability to co-opt the state stabilised their support and led to the formation of an institutionalised party system in terms of continuity in the main political parties and the relative vote share.

This is contrary to the expectations of the main PSI theories put forward by Mainwaring and Scully (1995), and Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) which assume that the institutionalisation of political parties is necessary for the institutionalisation of the party system. However, as the Bangladeshi experience shows, relatively underdeveloped political parties can form a stable party system by co-opting the state to supplement deficiencies in the party organisations and their societal linkages.

6.8. Conclusion

During their time in power, both parties have sought to take advantage of a weak state to supplement the deficiencies of their organisations. This can be seen first in the BAL's purge and capture of bureaucracy in the early 1970s, followed by General Ziaur Rahman's use of the state to form the BNP. Both have relied on party patronage to build and maintain their organisations while party activists have used their access to state resources to build clientelist networks to support the party. In this way, two weakly institutionalised parties dominated by autocratic leaders and little defining ideology were able to remain competitive in the Bangladeshi party system in a relatively stable, de facto two-party system.

Conventional understandings of party system institutionalisation assume that institutionalised parties form the basis of a stable party system. The assumption states that

party systems stabilise through parties' development of ideological and programmatic linkages to society formed through the political activism of well-developed party organisations. In this way, organisationally complex parties become strongly rooted in society based on their ideological appeal which gives the parties lasting power as institutions guided by rules and norms distinct from individual politicians. However, as the case of Bangladesh shows, it is possible for weakly institutionalised parties to form a relatively stable party system if they can capture the state to support the party organisation. This showcases the important role that parties' relationship to the state plays in defining party competition and structuring the party system. Further, the Bangladesh case illustrates how the institutionalisation of a party system will not necessary feed into a democratic deepening and arguably, in Bangladesh this closure around the two main parties may have stifled democratic accountability and inhibited a deepening of democracy.

Chapter 7
Conclusion and Theoretical Implications

In tracing the formation and development of party systems in Bangladesh, India and Pakistan, the importance of the state in shaping these systems is clear. The way in which political parties related to the state at critical junctures in the political history of each country had a significant effect on the party system that emerged from these periods. This chapter elaborates on the implications of these findings to make generalisations for the broader study of party systems and PSI. In the first section, the three cases are drawn together to provide a unified understanding of the effect of parties' relationship to the state on the formation and institutionalisation of party systems. It is argued that this relationship is defined by the sequencing of the respective development of parties and the state at critical junctures which has a lasting effect on the development of political parties and party systems. Thereafter, a new framework for understanding party system formation and institutionalisation is proposed to complement the existing scholarship on PSI. This is followed by a section applying the theory to Asia and Africa to illustrate its generalisability and finally, areas for future research are proposed.

7.1. Sequencing: Political Development and Party Institutionalisation

The ways in which political parties relate to the state is determined by both the extent of their own development and that of the state. Ideally, both should exhibit a level of institutional development with established processes and norms that define their functioning and should exhibit value and autonomy distinct from individual actors. In cases where either political parties or the state are weak, it is however possible that one

can come to dominate or manipulate the other. This can occur where state institutions lack an existence autonomous from the control of political parties or where a strong well-developed state apparatus interferes with political parties and undermines their functioning. This relationship between political parties and the state is thus defined by a question of sequencing and whether one exhibits a greater level of development over the other or if both have similar levels of institutional development. This question of sequencing determines how political parties and the state relate to each other and further influences how political parties, as well as their relationship to the state, develop over time.

In turn, this relationship between political parties and the state mediates how political parties interact with one another in a party system. The conventional literature on party system formation and institutionalisation largely focuses only on the competition and interaction between parties. However, the way in which parties relate to the state defines the environment in which political parties compete for power and further defines how political parties develop. Parties dominated or undermined by the state will remain weak and consequently, it will be difficult for an institutionalised party system to form and the system will remain more fluid. In turn, in cases where parties dominate a weak state, parties that benefit from this advantageous relationship may lack incentives to develop the party organisation and instead can rely on this beneficial relationship to supplement their organisational deficiencies – in this way, keeping parties weakly institutionalised, but the party system stable.

Alternatively, parties can use this beneficial relationship as an organisational resource to build a lasting, strong party organisation and linkages as seen in some cases discussed later. In such cases, a preferential relationship to the state excludes opposition parties

from effectively challenging established parties on an uneven playing field. This relationship between political parties and the state, as defined by the sequencing of their respective development, can thus mediate between party and party system institutionalisation and can have a significant influence on the development of the party system and the extent to which it becomes institutionalised or remains volatile.

The origins of South Asian party systems and the extent to which these systems have institutionalised have largely been defined by the strength of political parties and the extent of political development at two critical junctures. The first critical juncture occurred following independence, and partition, in 1947 when power was transferred from British colonial rule to the Indian National Congress (INC) in India and Pakistan Muslim League (PML) in Pakistan respectively. The second critical juncture occurred following the 1971 formation of Bangladesh (the former East Pakistan), which charted alternate paths for the political and party development of the two parts of Pakistan. In both instances, the interplay between party institutionalisation and state development at these critical junctures defined the future development of their respective party systems. Moreover, the outcomes of these critical junctures had a significant influence on the future trajectory of political party development and further defined the way in which parties' relationship to the state has evolved.

Post-1947: Party Institutionalisation and the Legacies of Political Development in India and Pakistan

In the post-independence and partition period after 1947, there was a significant difference in the respective strength of the INC in India and PML in Pakistan. Despite the PML's success in the 1945-1946 provincial elections in British India and the portrayal of the party as the voice of the subcontinental Muslim electorate prior to independence, the

party was weakly institutionalised. This can be seen in both dimensions of party institutionalisation with a weakly routinised party organisation and superficial linkages to the population.

The PML was highly personalised around the leadership of Jinnah and the party organisation lacked significant complexity with much of the organisation's haphazard expansion occurring shortly prior to the 1945-1946 election. Much of this expansion was also dependent on the transactional support of established regional elites which had little loyalty to the party and whose interests only temporarily aligned with that of the PML. Further, the PML was only weakly rooted in the local population in the newly formed Pakistan and drew most of its support and leadership from the Muslim minority provinces of British India – later composing modern India. The only Muslim majority province in which the PML had relatively strong roots was East Bengal (later East Pakistan and Bangladesh) and after the Bengali faction of the party left to form the Awami League in 1949, the PML had almost no support in the province.

By comparison in post-independence India, the INC was firmly rooted in society and had a well-developed party organisation built during the independence movement. With a long organisational history, experience of governance and strong linkages to Indian society, the INC had clear organisational advantages compared to the PML. This made the INC one of the most institutionalised independence parties in the world with a broad coalition of support transcending class, caste, and linguistic differences (Wilkinson 2015: 424). While the INC still relied on the leadership of the party leader, Jawaharlal Nehru, it also exhibited a level of organisational complexity beyond that seen in the PML with the various provincial branches of the INC strongly rooted in Indian politics.

These organisational differences played a significant role in how the parties managed the tumultuous transition to independence as well as their own organisational transformation from independence movements/parties to governing parties. These differential levels of organisational development and cohesion also affected how the two parties interacted with the state. In the case of the INC, the strength of the organisation meant that the party dominated politics as the natural party of governance post-independence and consequently, had a powerful hold over the state which compounded the party's organisational advantage over rivals. In turn, the INC's unique role in Indian politics further entrenched its hold over politics and dominance over the party system by drawing elites and political interests into the party fold such as seen in the "Congress System" discussed in Chapter 4.

In Pakistan, by contrast, the weakness of the PML and the factional conflict following the death of Muhammad Ali Jinnah in 1948 left a governance vacuum filled by the bureaucracy and military. In lieu of an effective and cohesive party organisation, the role of governing was performed by the bureaucracy and military establishment developed under colonial rule. As part of the region's colonial legacy, the civil service and military were well-developed state institutions, but had little experience working with democratically elected representatives. Following the political instability caused by the poorly institutionalised PML, the bureaucracy-military alliance reverted to colonial era mechanisms of autocratic rule through the Governor-General and the civil service. The weakness of the PML in this formative phase, particularly in the context of forming a new constitution, and the turn to autocratic rule left a lasting legacy on the development of Pakistan's political parties and their relationship to the state.

The legacy of how India and Pakistan's parties related to the state in this formative phase had a significant influence on the nature of the party systems formed following independence. In India, the INC's dominance over politics as a result of its vast organisational resources in the formative period after independence gave the party system a significant measure of stability. This was due to a combination of the strength of the party and the party's unique relationship to the state which compounded its dominance over the political system. In this way, India benefitted from both a strongly institutionalised governing party and well-developed state institutions (Tudor 2013b: 3). The INC's dominance over the political system served as an anchor around which the party system formed and provided the stability necessary for democracy to take root, for opposition parties to evolve and for a relatively institutionalised party system to form.

In Pakistan, the weakness of the PML and a lack of viable party alternatives meant that state institutions held political power which bypassed democratic politics and developed a political culture of autocratic politics undermining the development of political parties due to extra-legal bureaucratic and military coups. The autocratic nature of politics and recurrent party bans reduced incentives for party membership and for developing institutionalised party organisations. Consequently, political parties have remained weak while the military and its bureaucratic allies have continued to interfere in interparty competition by tilting the playing field towards favourable parties and undermining opponents. This has resulted in a party system defined by weakly institutionalised parties where many political elites are prone to party switching with the intention of joining the future ruling party as defined by the military establishment which plays the role of kingmaker.

Post-1971: Party Institutionalisation and the Legacies of Political Development in Pakistan and Bangladesh

The secession of Bangladesh from Pakistan in 1971 served as a second critical juncture defining the future development of political parties and their relationship to the state in Pakistan and Bangladesh. Unlike the first critical juncture, both major parties were poorly institutionalised in the period following Bangladesh's secession and the reconfiguration of the two countries. Both the Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) and the Bangladesh Awami League (BAL) relied on the charismatic appeal of their respective leaders with only superficially developed party organisations supporting them. Further, both parties mostly drew support from their opposition to the General Ayub Khan regime, in the case of the PPP, and to West Pakistani domination as a whole, in the case of the BAL. In this way, the elections that brought the parties to power can instead be seen as referendums on issues of democratisation and Bengali nationalism respectively.

The PPP was formed only a few years before the 1970 Pakistani election and was made up of a contradictory coalition of grassroots leftist and rural support contrasted by its support from the urban middle-class and opportunist elites. Consequently, the party had little cohesion and gradually, the PPP's leadership positions were filled by the landholding elite which alienated the party's grassroot linkages to parts of the population. Further, the autocratic leadership style of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto meant that he had little interest in developing the party organisation and the PPP instead relied on his popular appeal as a basis of support and used patronage to keep economic elites within the party fold.

In Bangladesh, the BAL was similarly brought to power based on the popular appeal of its charismatic leader Mujib and further benefitted from a broad coalition of support in

favour of Bangladeshi independence. However, the organisation suffered from factionalism once in power and lacked significant cohesion. Without a common ideological vision for the party, the organisation was held together through patronage to appease the various factions of the party while party workers who assumed roles in the new state engaged in clientelism to build personal power bases to advance their position within the party.

Despite similarities in their common lack of party institutionalisation, the way in which the parties interacted with the state varied based on the extent of political development in the two countries. Bangladesh inherited underdeveloped state institutions and many positions in the bureaucracy were left vacant following the withdrawal of West Pakistan which dominated the state apparatus. Further, the BAL purged sectors of the bureaucracy which were seen as sympathetic or collaborating with West Pakistan and filled these positions with BAL party members. In this way, the party became intertwined with the state from the outset and used its control over the state to reward party elites and grassroots supporters of the party. By comparison, in Pakistan, the powerful bureaucratic-military establishment was only temporarily in retreat following the loss of East Pakistan, initially giving Zulfikar Ali Bhutto and the PPP significant leeway in pursuing their policies, but eventually returned to power through the coup led by General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977.

Both countries experienced a turn towards authoritarianism through military coups by General Zia Rahman in 1975 in Bangladesh and General Zia-ul-Haq in 1977 in Pakistan. However, there are subtle variations in how these authoritarian regimes related to parties in the two countries. In Bangladesh, General Zia Rahman attempted to legitimate his rule through establishing the Bangladesh Nationalist Party (BNP) and thus formed a party

emerging out of the state while facing little opposition from a disorganised BAL. Consequently, with the Bangladesh's second major party emerging from the state and extensively intertwined with the state at this critical juncture, the country has had little opportunity for the development of state institutions independent of political parties.

In Pakistan, General Zia-ul-Haq faced a legitimate threat from the PPP and instead sought to discredit party politics and keep parties out of the governance process through party-less elections and bans. In this way, the military-bureaucratic alliance undermined the development of Pakistani parties to keep them weak and thus stunting their development. Further, the military and administrative establishment played parties off against one another by shifting their support between the PPP and iterations of the PML to prevent an effective challenge against the power of the military establishment.

This varied experience of weakly institutionalised political parties' relationship to the state at this critical juncture also defined the development of their respective party systems. In Bangladesh, this intertwining of parties with the state has meant that political parties have remained weakly institutionalised and instead rely on their ability to distribute access to state resources to maintain party organisations. Consequently, the party system has largely been defined by a zero-sum game of competition between the BNP and the BAL with a measure of stability in terms of the important players in the party system, but an underlying weakness in the strength of the party organisations. This has also had problematic consequences for the consolidation of democracy with both parties engaging in undemocratic practices to undermine their opponents.

In Pakistan, the military's interference in inter-party competition has kept political parties weak and led to a party system defined by fluidity. Much of this fluidity is related to the weak institutionalisation of Pakistan's parties and the problem of party switching which

has often been encouraged by the military's interference in politics. Further, the history of party-less elections and politicians' use of clientelism and the promise of access to state resources has meant that many linkages between voters and politicians are defined by personalised silos of support for individuals or local machines rather than for a political party. This has created a system defined by little party loyalty since linkages are personalised and the military's role as kingmaker creates incentives for party switching to the future governing party.

The way in which party institutionalisation has interacted with the extent of political development and affected the institutionalisation of party systems in these two critical junctures is summarised in Table 7.1. In each case, the institutionalisation of political parties relative to the state has had a significant effect on the consequent formation of party systems and the extent to which these systems have institutionalised. These three cases present three distinct pathways for how the sequencing of party and state development can shape party systems and their institutionalisation. This sequencing effect illustrates the importance of understanding parties' relationship to the state in determining the formation and institutionalisation of party systems.

Table 7.1 The approximate relationship between the institutionalisation of political parties and the extent of political development and the consequent effect on the institutionalisation of the party system.			
Country	Institutionalisation of parties	Political development and state capacity	Effect on the party system
India	Strong independence party	Well-developed civil service	Institutionalised party system through institutionalised parties
Pakistan	Parties kept weak	Strong alliance between bureaucracy and military	Party organisations are weak, incapable of controlling state, more fluid party system
Bangladesh	Parties stronger than state	State institutions underdeveloped	Parties intertwined with state, stable party system, weak parties

7.2. A New Framework for Understanding Party Systems and Party System Institutionalisation

The two most widely used approaches for understanding the formation of party systems focus on social cleavages and institutional rules – although there is generally an interaction between the two. The sociological argument put forward by Lipset and Rokkan (1990) claims that party systems are rooted in the social cleavages formed in or accentuated in the process of democratisation. This is based on the idea that political elites band together to mobilise social groups in the process of democratisation to represent specific group interests and in the process form the social cleavages around which these various interests compete for power. The institutional argument, in turn, focuses on the effect of electoral rules on the structure of party systems. This line of scholarship includes the work of Duverger (1963) on how electoral systems influence the number of parties in a party system and how these institutional rules will affect the ways in which parties interact such as whether the system encourages the formation of coalitions or favours a single party majority. Generally, the literature commonly assumes that party system

formation and change is determined by these two approaches as well as by the interaction between the two.

The dominant literature on party system institutionalisation (PSI) follows in the sociological tradition and chooses to focus on the stability of the social cleavages which define electoral competition. This is captured by the literature's focus on electoral volatility which is treated as a proxy for the stability of cleavages. Following the social cleavages argument, the assumption is that through the development of a strong party organisation, political elites can mobilise support along a social cleavage and attract voters to the party brand through ideological appeals to voters. In this way, parties build linkages with society through the development of the party organisation and a distinct party brand with which supporters affiliate. Strong linkages and a well-developed party organisation are by this logic considered necessary for a party to maintain support in a party system and it is assumed that it is through these strong linkages and party organisations that interparty competition stabilises around set social cleavages.

In turn, parties which lack these characteristics and have weak linkages to society or lack a strong party organisation are vulnerable to being displaced by challenger parties. In such a system of weak political affiliations, party systems are prone to instability as new parties emerge and displace older parties making it more difficult for voters to use the heuristics commonly available to identify their preferred candidate. These heuristics include a track record of governance and a clear ideological brand with which voters can identify a party's policy priorities. Without these heuristics, voters may struggle to identify the party most suitable for representing their interests and can be prone to switching support between parties. Party systems marked by significant fluidity, frequent changes in the options available to voters and fluctuations in the relative strength of support for parties

are considered prone to political instability and unpredictability. Consequently, some measure of party system institutionalisation is commonly assumed to be necessary for the consolidation of democracy (Casal Bértoa 2012: 452).

The dominant theories on the causes of PSI assume that the institutionalisation of individual political parties is the primary way in which party systems become institutionalised. This is the most commonly accepted argument put forward by Mainwaring and Scully (1995) which emphasises the role of political parties in institutionalising a party system and sees the development of institutionalised parties with strong linkages and a well-developed party organisation as the "underpinnings that facilitate PSI' (Mainwaring 2018: 4). Hicken and Kuhonta (2011: 575) similarly emphasise the role of strongly institutionalised parties in their study of Asian party systems and go as far as claiming that party system stability necessarily depends on the presence of institutionalised parties (Hicken and Kuhonta 2015: 3-4).

This assumption that institutionalised parties will lead to institutionalised party systems or at least that the two concepts converge has been challenged by several scholars. This includes the work of Luna and Altman (2011) who show that party systems can be institutionalised, or stable, without the parties forming the system themselves being institutionalised. Consequently, Luna (2014) argues for disentangling the various attributes of PSI as the extent of party and party system institutionalisation can diverge. Similarly, Hellmann (2014) uses the example of the South Korean party system to argue that interparty competition can be stable even where parties lack strong formal party organisations if politicians retain strong linkages. Finally, as Randall and Svåsand (2002: 8–9) argue, party systems are often "unevenly" institutionalised particularly in new

democracies where individual parties are unevenly developed and function at differing levels of complexity and organisation.

As this revisionist scholarship shows, there is a clear possibility for the divergence of party and party system institutionalisation. Institutionalised parties will not necessarily lead to an institutionalised party system and similarly, party systems can be stable without the presence of institutionalised parties. However, the process through which party systems can become institutionalised without the formation of strong party linkages and well-developed party organisations is poorly understood. Part of this is due to the literature's treatment of political parties as actors distinct and wholly separate of the state. The PSI literature focuses primarily on the competition between parties and fails to recognise that much of this is mediated by parties' interaction with the state.

As the South Asian cases show, the boundaries between parties and the state can at times become blurry. Similarly, the state and the institutional rules which it imposes in many ways shape the development of political parties. Understanding the ways in which political parties interact with the state, particularly at critical junctures, is vital for understanding the formation of party systems and the effect on PSI. Much like the sociological argument on the formation of social cleavages in the democratisation process, the question of sequencing and parties' relationship to the state in the process of democratisation similarly influences the nature of the party system formed. This is particularly important to recognise in newly democratising countries which often also undergo a period of significant state reforms in the process.

Usually, parties are conceptualised as actors distinct from the state and are seen as functioning as the bridge between the state and voters. However, this fails to recognise that parties sometimes emerge from the state, such as in cases of authoritarian successor

parties, or merge into the state by building a party organisation out of a weak party's proximity to the state. For authoritarian successor parties, there are many authoritarian inheritances which can be drawn upon including a party brand, an incumbent advantage or well-developed organisation built under autocratic rule. Further, patronage and clientelist networks built under autocratic rule can be leveraged following democratisation to hold onto power such as seen in tactics of successive Bangladeshi dictators who attempted civilian reforms.

Similarly, parties can merge into the state when state institutions are weak and poorly developed. In such cases, merging with the state is an opportunity for building support for the party and drawing elites into the party fold through providing access to the resources available to the state. Katz and Mair's (1995: 17) cartelisation thesis proposes the idea of the "interpenetration of party and state" as the latest stage in the development of European political parties. These cartel parties are defined by the professionalisation of politics with cartel parties acting as "semi-state agencies" through their use of state resources to maintain party organisations and informally colluding to distribute patronage among established parties (Katz & Mair 1995: 16). However, unlike these established cartel parties, parties in emerging democracies lack the same institutional history of organisational development and rather than using the state to maintain the party, build the party out of offering access to the state.

In advanced democracies, social cleavages often play an important role in defining interparty competition as well as determining voters' ideological identification and linkages with parties. However, in many emerging democracies, political parties are often only thinly ideological and make very similar developmental appeals to voters interested in good governance and economic progress. In such cases, political parties often instead

use clientelist tactics to tie voters to their party in lieu of strong ideological or programmatic appeals which distinguish party brands. In this way, parties act as intermediaries to the state and through their ability to effectively co-opt a weak state can remain electorally competitive without necessarily developing the party organisation. In such cases, parties' relationship to the state structures the formation and development of the party system rather than social cleavages which may be superficial or inadequately emphasised by political elites.

This interplay between parties and the state is important for understanding both the development of political parties and the formation of party systems. This thesis introduces three main points for advancing the PSI scholarship drawn from the South Asian cases studied. First, parties do not necessarily have to institutionalise for the emergence of stable party systems. Through their relationship with the state, parties can remain electorally competitive in lieu of well-developed party organisations and strong linkages. Second, the role of the state and parties' relationship to the state cannot be disregarded in understanding interparty competition. Neither party systems nor parties should be understood as entirely conceptually distinct from the state as the state and parties' relationship to it shape the environment within which parties function. Finally, the role of the state and the origins of parties in the transition to democracy is important for understanding the formation of party systems. Parties' relationship to the state in the process of democratisation has a significant influence on the nature of the party system formed as well as the trajectory of party development and the institutionalisation of party systems. Further, this relationship between political parties and the state can be an inhibiting factor to democratic accountability and consolidation. In this way, the institutionalisation of party systems through this route may be detrimental for democratic

development in contrast to conventional assumptions of the relationship between PSI and democracy.

7.3. Applying the Theory to Other Regions

The importance of understanding parties' relationship to the state at critical junctures is similarly apparent when applying the concept to regions outside of South Asia. Below, the theory is applied to Africa and East and Southeast Asia to illustrate its generalisability. The role of parties' relationship to the state is particularly relevant for Asian and African party systems. In East and Southeast Asia, several successful democracies have adopted the developmental state model which emphasises a state-led model of active involvement of a large state apparatus in shaping society and economic development. This model was uniquely introduced in East and Southeast Asia and has had important effects on the development of political parties in the region. In Africa, parties' relationship to the state is similarly important considering the region's history of one-party states. Despite most African countries sharing a common experience of one-party rule in the 1970s and 1980s, very different party systems have developed across the continent following the reintroduction of multiparty elections in the 1990s. This section shows how parties' relationship to the state can be used to explain the development and institutionalisation of these party systems in the third wave of democratisation in Africa.

East and Southeast Asia

East and Southeast Asian democracies particularly show the importance of considering the role of the state in the formation and institutionalisation of party systems. When it comes to East Asian developmental states, parties have often found themselves extensively intertwined with the state and have benefitted significantly from this relationship. Japan and Taiwan provide two excellent examples of parties benefitting

from a close relationship to the state. In Japan, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) continuously held power singly or as a dominant coalition partner since its formation in 1955 until 2009. Through its continued dominance over the Japanese party system, the LDP found itself extensively intertwined with the state through the "iron triangle" which brought together the interests of the LDP, bureaucrats and business interests in a collaborative relationship capturing the policy process for mutual benefit (Krauss & Pekkanen 2011: 189). Through clientelist practices and pork barrel spending, the LPD secured the continued support of voters while benefitting from the financial support of large industries which bankrolled the party's election campaigns and in turn benefitted from preferential government policies and subsidies supporting business interests' economic development (Rosenbluth & Thies 2010: 66-67).

As a result of this relationship, the Japanese party system saw little volatility with the LDP dominant over the system despite the relatively informal nature of the party organisation. The LDP's experience is also significant in that the party has historically lacked many of the characteristics generally considered representative of institutionalised parties and has instead relied on candidates' personalised linkages and informal networks of cooperation between factions of the party that compose the party leadership. Much of the party's success has drawn on *Koenkai*, personalised candidate-support organisations, built up through clientelist practices by drawing on state resources, such as pork barrel spending, to maintain these networks. While some have argued that the LDP's success was due to the country's unique Single Non-transferable Vote electoral system, the party remained successful well past electoral reforms in 1994 due to the continued importance of these *Koenkai* linkages formed through clientelist spending (Krauss & Pekkanen 2011: 2). Japan's experience illustrates how parties that manage to merge into and intertwine themselves with the state can benefit from this relationship and stabilise a party system.

The Taiwanese experience provides an example of a strong party organisation emerging out of the state. After fleeing mainland China in 1949, Taiwan's Kuomintang (KMT) ruled Taiwan as the sole legal political party until democratic reforms in the late 1980s and 1990s. Following its defeat by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP), the KMT underwent significant reforms to strengthen the party organisation in the 1950s by emulating the organisational structure of the CCP to develop a mass-based organisation and filled the emerging developmental state with party members in bureaucratic positions (Hellmann 2017: 159). In the 1970s, after Taiwan (technically the Republic of China) lost recognition at the United Nations to the People's Republic of China, the KMT again underwent reforms to indigenise the party and started building linkages to the Taiwanese population through clientelist tactics.

During its tenure as the autocratic rulers of a one-party state, the KMT built up the Taiwanese developmental state with an impressive track record of economic growth and built a powerful party organisation out of the party's control of the political space (Cheng & Huang 2018: 93). With an impressive record of economic development, a strong party organisation and local linkages built up through clientelism, the KMT was in a strong position when Taiwan started democratic reforms in the 1980s and 1990s. The benefit that the party derived from decades of autocratic rule and the strong organisation built up during that time, meant that Taiwan's democratic reforms were undertaken with the KMT confident of the party's continued success post-democratisation (Slater & Wong 2018: 297). Indeed, the party won successive elections in the 1990s and returned to power in 2008 after two terms as the largest opposition party and remains an important political player in the Taiwanese party system post-democratisation.

In both cases, these parties' strong relationship to the state helped stabilise the Japanese and Taiwanese party systems and likely contributed significantly to the successful consolidation of democracy in the countries. The two examples have similar outcomes, in terms of the stable party systems formed out of the presence of a single powerful party, but show different approaches to co-opting the state either by developing a mutually dependent relationship with the state or by deploying party members into the bureaucratic apparatus.

In a similar fashion, South Korea's various iterations of successor parties to the military regime have relied on clientelist networks and relationships to big business built under authoritarianism to remain electorally competitive post-democratisation (Cheng & Huang 2018: 97). This has created an underlying stability in South Korea's principal political actors who retain strong clientelist networks and linkages to big business despite weakly institutionalised formal party organisations (Hellmann 2014: 60). These weak, but rooted party organisations succeeding the military regime can be contrasted to the well-developed KMT party organisation left behind by Taiwan's one-party rule, but the underlying principle of parties' relationship to the state remains crucial for understanding the formation and institutionalisation of the respective party systems.

While these East Asian cases illustrate how parties can use the state and the consequent effect that this has on party system formation, the Filipino experience more clearly shows the importance of sequencing and the comparative institutional development of political parties and the state. Under American colonial rule in early 20th century, Governor-General William Taft emphasised the development of democratic institutions which took precedence over the development of state capacity – a unique colonial experiment as most colonial powers usually focused on developing bureaucratic capacity (Hutchcroft &

Rocamora 2003: 262-266). This sequencing of democratic institutions over state capacity, provided the opportunity for political power but left behind a weakly institutionalised state and allowed a weak state to be captured by economic elites which used their access to state resources for personal enrichment and to retain power through patronage and clientelism. In turn, this political tradition has had lasting consequences for the Filipino party system which remains highly volatile, fragmented and composed of competing political families or clans with weak party organisations dependent on populism and clientelism to maintain power (Tomsa 2013: 22).

Africa

In Africa, parties' relationship to the state have similarly proven important for understanding party system formation and institutionalisation. Following independence starting in the 1960s, most independence movements and emerging leaders in Africa consolidated power around a single party based on the idea of the necessity of national unity as emphasised by African nationalist political thought which drew on Leninist ideals of the vanguard party. In countries led by civilian governments, the winners of the first elections usually consolidated their hold on power following independence by undermining opposition parties, weakening the legislature and consolidating power around a single party. Post-independence, this led to the emergence of many one-party regimes either by coercion or the merger of parties and consequently, African electoral politics in the 1970s and 1980s are defined by a period of one-party rule. These one-party regimes were not always successful and attempts at forming a one-party state out of coercive means usually led to military coups while fragmented multiparty systems were similarly prone to coups. Stable civilian governments, albeit under one-party rule, primarily emerged in those cases where a single popular party came to power through

election or through the merger of parties (Collier 1978: 73). This has meant that most African democracies are relatively young with little electoral experience and few well-established parties – although there are select cases in which democracy has successfully taken root.

Since the 1990s, multi-party elections have become commonplace throughout most of Africa - although not necessarily always under fair conditions. In some cases, previously autocratic parties survived the return of multiparty democracy, but in most cases, these parties faded away after a few elections (LeBas 2018: 212). Most regimes and ruling parties from the 1970s and 1980s remained weak and many of the once dominant parties, such as the Kenya African National Union and the Malawi Congress Party, atrophied once out of power (Simutanyi 2013: 119). In such cases, these parties failed to capitalise on their beneficial relationship to the state to build lasting party organisations. Unlike the East Asian experience, the accumulation of state resources in Africa was often personalised rather than organisational, leading to the emergence of a new political and economic elite, but to isolated cases of strong parties (Riedl 2018: 176). Without serious investments in the party organisations, many parties remained weak and party leaders failed to form cohesive organisations under one-party rule that lasted beyond multiparty democracy.

In countries like Zambia, for example, the ruling United National Independence Party (UNIP) under Kenneth Kaunda faded into obscurity after the return of multiparty elections in 1991. Unlike successful one-party regimes, the UNIP did not significantly intertwine the party with the state due to the personalised nature of the regime and consequently, the party was easily displaced in the first multiparty election by the opposition Movement for Multi-Party Democracy (MMD). However, like in many other

African cases, the opposition was similarly poorly organised and despite winning a large majority in 1991 election, the party's success was only temporary. Lacking significant linkages to important interest groups such as the Zambian trade unions and rife with internal factionalism, the MMD lost support in successive elections to new opposition parties and itself faded into relative insignificance (Paget 2014: 153-154). Consequently, Zambia's party system has become one of the most volatile on the continent with significant vote switching between new weakly organised parties (Sanches 2018).

By contrast, when Ghana reintroduced multiparty elections in 1992, the head of the authoritarian regime Jerry Rawlings returned to power through the newly formed National Democratic Congress (NDC) party which ruled for a further eight years under democratic rule. Much of the NDC's success came from the linkages that the party forged under authoritarian rule to local brokers such as traditional power structures which allowed the party to retain clientelist networks and incorporated local elites into the party organisation (Owusu 1996). This long process of linkage building also included the adoption and transfer of a party ideological brand partly based on the populist, socialist ideals of the Ghanaian independence leader Kwame Nkrumah (Morrison 2004: 423). The strength of the NDC and its ideological stance, in turn, fostered a united opposition of intellectual and business elite forming the New Patriotic Party (NPP) which drew on opposition to the regime to promote a pro-business, centre-right ideology (Daddieh & Bob-Milliar 2014: 116-117). In this way, the strength of the NDC which emerged out of Rawlings' autocratic regime united the opposition around the NPP and led to the formation of a stable two-party system of competition which has endured since 1992. Other than Cabo Verde, which has a party system based on similar historical roots, Ghana is the only institutionalised two-party party system in Africa and both parties are deeply

rooted in Ghanaian society with strong party organisations structuring competition between the two (Riedl 2014: 1).

Aside from Cabo Verde and Ghana, the most stable party systems in Africa with the lowest electoral volatility are the dominant party systems found in Southern Africa where Botswana's Botswana Democratic Party (BDP), Namibia's South-West African People's Organisation (SWAPO), South Africa's African National Congress (ANC) and Tanzania's Chama Cha Mapinduzi (CCM) have each enjoyed uninterrupted rule with sizeable majorities under multiparty democratic rule (Sanches 2018). In all four cases, these dominant parties have in some form or another used their dominance over the party system to embed the party in the state apparatus for the continued benefit of the party organisations (Southall 2013).

Upon taking power after the 1994 election ending Apartheid in South Africa, the ANC has gradually also assumed control over the state through the deployment of party members to the state apparatus by replacing former civil servants and filling leadership positions with top ANC members (Reddy 2013: 89). In Namibia, SWAPO have similarly elaborately intertwined the party with the state and brazenly use state resources for party purposes such as in election campaigns and over the years have worked to establish the party as a permanent feature within the state machinery (Melber 2013: 66-67). While Botswana has a longer democratic tradition and was founded with a professionalised civil service, since the death of the country's first president Seretse Khama in 1980, there has been an increasing politicisation of the public service and the BDP have come to fuse state and party interests through its dominance over the political system (Makgala & Giollabhuí 2014: 73-74).

Tanzania differs from Africa's other dominant party systems as the CCM ruled prior to the reintroduction of multiparty elections and is one of the most durable cases of one-party dominance in Africa, ruling the country since independence in 1961 under the leadership of Julius Nyerere. It has accomplished this feat by acting as the gatekeeper between society and the state and uses its control over state resources to maintain its support among the economic and political elite (Bakari & Whitehead 2013: 93). Further, the CCM has used its role to build a strong party organisation with deep linkages across Tanzania and has cultivated the party's historical role in bringing about independence to portray itself as the party of national unity. Consequently, the party has comfortably won every multiparty election since 1995 with large majorities and much like Ghana, the strength of CCM has unified the opposition around a single party which is growing in support as it emulates the organisational strategies of the CCM (Paget 2019).

Particularly in the case of enduring dominant party systems, there are clear benefits that incumbent parties can draw from the state. However, once dominant parties have not always been able to maintain their dominance or to intertwine themselves with the state. The extent to which parties are able to co-opt the state depends significantly on the parties' relationship to the state at critical junctures and their relative development. In South Africa and Namibia, their political transitions provided an opportunity for reforming the public sector and through their electoral dominance the ruling parties have made efforts to embed the party within the state through the deployment of party members. In Ghana and Tanzania, previously authoritarian parties have remained electorally competitive by developing strong party organisations and enduring clientelist linkages that have allowed the parties to survive under multiparty elections and in the case of the NDC in Ghana, endure as an opposition party.

This dynamic of party-state relations is particularly important in Africa considering the continent's history of one-party states and military rule. Africa also has a significant number of presidential and semi-presidential systems, especially in Francophone Africa, and this centralisation of power has significantly disadvantaged opposition parties. In Africa, presidents rarely lose elections as they draw on the advantages of incumbency to build support for their continued rule (Bleck & van de Walle 2019: 55-57). This centralisation of power usually coincides with large legislative majorities for the president's party and often independents or smaller parties officially or informally join the presidential majority to benefit from access to the state. Aligning with the ruling party is important for legislators as candidates are expected to fund their own election campaigns due to the weakness of parties and often draw on state resources for campaigning. Further, aligning with the president or party in power is important for meeting voters' demands for economic development. In this way, discretionary control over the allocation of state resources allows the president to build networks of dependency, giving the president significant control over the party and undermining its institutionalisation.

7.4. Areas for Future Research

The Asian and African experiences of party system formation and institutionalisation reaffirms the importance of understanding the role of the state in shaping political parties and interparty competition. Their experience also raises several areas for further exploring the implications of this approach to understanding PSI. This includes understanding the effect of the origins of political parties particularly in post-authoritarian regimes where successful parties often emerge from the previous regime. Similarly, the role of colonialism in shaping the sequencing of party and state development should be further

studied to understand the effects of historical legacies on shaping this relationship. Additionally, the effects of institutional rules on how parties relate to the state should be further examined to understand the effect of different electoral systems, presidentialism and federalism. Finally, it is important to understand under what circumstances parties' close relationship to the state will be beneficial for the survival and consolidation of democracy.

Origins of Parties

An important common feature found in many of the cases discussed above is the authoritarian origins of many of the successful parties that have structured party systems and brought stability to emerging democracies through their enduring relationship to the state or the benefits that the party has gained from a period of autocratic rule. Authoritarian successor parties in some cases, such as in Taiwan and South Korea, have stabilised democracy and through embracing democratic ideals have contributed to the consolidation of democracy despite their authoritarian origins (Slater & Wong 2018: 285-286). Hicken and Kuhonta (2015) similarly recognise the role of well-developed parties with origins in some form of authoritarianism as contributing to PSI, but they choose to separate the concept from democracy. However, there are many normative reasons for unpacking questions around when authoritarian successor parties can contribute to democratic consolidation.

An opportunity for further research is to understand under what circumstances previously authoritarian parties that find themselves intertwined with the state will adopt democracy and contribute towards its consolidation. The biggest danger to these emerging democracies is usually when these parties are first voted out of power such as when the NDC first lost in Ghana or the KMT's first loss in Taiwan. In these cases, it is argued that

the NDC and KMT conceded their loss with the knowledge that they would be able to return to power again through the strong organisations that the parties had built in power. In Africa, however, many of these previously authoritarian parties have disappeared once out of power, lacking the state resources that held these parties together and failing to use the opportunity to invest in the party organisation and its linkages. For those interested in preserving democracy in younger unconsolidated democracies, it would be useful to understand how parties that rely on the state can be built up to last beyond their loss of power and under what circumstances these parties will fully adopt democratic ideals.

As previously stated, the accumulation of state resources has been personalised in Africa rather than organisational which sets it apart from parties in the Asian developmental states. Further, a second major difference between the East Asian cases and Africa is that many African countries have yet to experience the same expansion of the middle class upon which democracy is assumed to depend (Bleck & van de Walle 2019: 32). In such cases, this also heightens the risk of autocratisation if these dominant parties lose elections. This further illustrates the need to understand the economic aspect of the success of parties such as the KMT in Taiwan and the LDP in Japan and their willingness to concede defeat.

Further, much of the framework can equally be applied to post-communist Central and Eastern Europe where some political parties and political elites such as in Poland, Lithuania and Slovenia emerged out of the communist regime to invent themselves as democratic parties under the new system. However, in many of these cases, these post-communist parties that emerged out of the state were not as successful in maintaining their power as in other regions (Grzymala-Busse 2018: 145-146). Understanding the

dynamics of the party-state relationship in post-communist Europe can add additional value to the framework.

Colonialism

The South Asian cases illustrate the important effect of colonial legacies on the development of state institutions and lasting effects that these have on the political system. The uneven levels of development in the state institutions of Pakistan and Bangladesh, for instance, were important in determining how parties related to the state and in turn, shaped the development of the parties and the party system. Similarly, the Philippines shows the consequences of the sequencing of party and state development on shaping the party system. While it is clear that colonial legacies have lasting consequences on the formation of political systems, there is an opportunity to better understand the specific effect of different types of colonial rule on shaping parties' relationship the state. This includes understanding how the choices of colonial powers in adopting direct or indirect means of governing have shaped the post-colonial state and the effect that this has had on the development of the state administration and how parties relate to the post-colonial state.

Electoral Systems

All three South Asian cases studied are first-past-the-post (FPTP) voting systems which both affects the shape of the party and how voters connect with candidates. However, the importance of understanding the role of the state is also clear in Japan's unique single non-transferable voting (SNTV) system as well as the proportional representation (PR) systems found in Namibia and South Africa's party-list PR system. While the role of the state in shaping party systems remains important in any electoral system, further research is necessary for understanding how different voting systems affect parties' relationship to

the state and in turn, how this relationship affects party system institutionalisation. This includes questions of how parties use their access to the state differently based on the electoral system to build linkages to voters. There is likely a variation in the clientelist strategies employed by parties based on the electoral system as can be seen in the personalised linkages found in FPTP systems such as in Pakistan, which in turn differs from the personalised linkages found in Japan's SNTV system. Similarly, parties' use of the state to build linkages also differs in PR systems where linkages are more party based.

Presidentialism

Although all three South Asian cases are parliamentary systems, there is a great deal of personalisation and the centralisation of power in the heads of the respective parties. Often this level of personalisation is a consequence of the weak institutionalisation of party organisations which rely extensively on party leaders to both hold political elites together and function as a representation of the party brand. This effect is likely stronger in presidential systems and as the African experience shows, incumbent presidents wield significant power over the party organisation and state. A further research opportunity is to better understand the mechanics of how party leaders use their power over the state to distribute party patronage and the variance between presidential, semi-presidential and parliamentary systems.

Federalism and Substate Party Systems

The theory can similarly be applied to federal systems to understand substate politics. Although the Indian party system has only been examined at the national level, there is significant evidence for the importance of parties' relationship to the state for understanding party systems at the regional level (Tillin 2013). Applying this understanding to regional parties entails complex questions of how regional parties

leverage their influence at the centre to redirect resources to their regional strongholds to bolster support for their party (Ziegfeld 2016a). For example, this framework is useful for understanding the survival of the once dominant *Partido Revolucionario Institucional* in Mexico which has used its control over subnational governmental resources to maintain clientelist linkages (Flores-Macías 2018: 263). More research is required to understand how parties' relationship to the state at the various levels of government shapes party systems, their institutionalisation, and the development of political parties.

Democratic Consolidation

The origins the PSI literature are primarily an attempt to understand the consolidation of democracy and many scholars emphasise the assumption that stable party systems are necessary for the consolidation and survival of democracy. The new approach proposed in this thesis contributes towards this literature in three ways. First, it shows how institutionalised party systems do not necessarily have to rely on institutionalised parties for party systems to stabilise. Secondly, it provides a new explanation for understanding how party systems can become institutionalised through parties' use of the state. Finally, it shows how stable party systems do not necessarily lead to democratic deepening and may even in some cases be detrimental to democratic accountability as seen in Bangladesh. While it is shown that party systems can institutionalise through parties co-opting the state, the question remains whether and under what circumstances this pathway to an institutionalised party system will be beneficial for democracy.

While in cases like Ghana, Japan and Taiwan this has led to the emergence of well-functioning democracies, the institutionalisation of party systems through this pathway has not always led to a democratic deepening. In dominant party systems such as Tanzania, this has coincided with semi-authoritarian rule which is maintained through

CCM's control of the state. Similarly, in Botswana, Namibia and South Africa, the dominance of these ruling parties has decreased democratic accountability and equally, has undermined effective governance. As seen in Bangladesh's zero-sum game of competition between the BNP and BAL, competition for access to the state can lead to parties undermining democratic principles to maintain their hold on power. In such a system, established parties' dominance over the party system can have negative consequences for democracy. To better understand these dynamics, more research is necessary to understand under what circumstances this pathway will lead to an eventual democratic deepening or help stabilise democracy.

7.5. Conclusion

The role of the state is shaping party system formation and institutionalisation has long been disregarded in the literature on PSI. Instead, scholars have primarily focused on the institutionalisation of individual political parties with the assumption that this will lead to the institutionalisation of party systems or have conflated the institutionalisation of parties and the party system into a single concept. As this thesis shows, political parties do not necessarily have to institutionalise for institutionalised party systems to form if they are capable of co-opting the state to supplement their organisational deficiencies. In this way, the role of the state and parties' relationship to it cannot be disregarded in understanding party system formation and institutionalisation.

Conceptual understandings which attempt to make neat distinctions between political parties and the state make the error of dismissing the complex symbiotic relationship between the two. Neither party systems nor political parties can be understood without considering the role of the state in shaping the environment within which parties evolve and function. As the South Asian cases show, as well as the other examples discussed in

this chapter, the sequencing of development of political parties and the state in critical junctures has important implications for the formation and institutionalisation of party systems.

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Appendices

Appendix 1

Expert Survey

Please answer the questions in this survey by selecting the response(s) that best capture, in your judgement, the practices and organisation of national parties in [COUNTRY]. In answering the questions, please reflect on the current situation in [COUNTRY]. Except for a very small number of questions asking you to evaluate the trend over the last decade, questions refer to the present.

What is the functional level of the party's smallest units that are represented at higher levels?

	Branch party	Electoral constituency party	Municipal party	District party	Other	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Political parties often have special non-territorial sub-sections or organisations for particular types of members, such as women or youth. Please select all the following that apply for each party:

	Women	Youth	Seniors	Ethnic/linguistic group	Religious	Other	Don't know
Party 1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

If applicable, which of these sub-organisations are represented at party congresses? Please select all the relevant groups:

	Women	Youth	Seniors	Ethnic/linguistic group	Religious	Other	Don't know
Party 1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Do the following parties or their individual candidates maintain offices and paid staff at the local or municipal level? If yes, are these offices and staff permanent or only during national elections?

	Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices in MOST districts	Yes, the party maintains permanent local offices, in SOME districts	Yes, the party maintains local offices, but only during national elections	No, the party does not maintain local offices	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○

Do the following parties' local organisations maintain a permanent social and community presence by holding social events for local party members or sustaining ancillary social groups such as party youth movements, party cooperatives, or athletic clubs?

	Yes	No	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○

In Parliamentary or Congressional elections, do the following parties enable rank-and-file party members to select the nominees of the party for electoral legislative office, for example through primary elections, caucuses, or mail ballots?

	Yes, party members select nominees in MOST districts	Yes, party members select nominees in SOME districts	No, party members do not select the nominees	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○

The power to select candidates in national legislative elections is generally divided between local/municipal party actors, regional/state-level party organisations, and national party leaders. Sometimes one particular level of party organisation dominates the selection process, while in other cases candidate selection is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organisation.

Which of the following four options best describes the following parties' balance of power in selecting candidates for national legislative elections?

	National legislative candidates are chosen by national party leaders with little participation from local or state level organisations	National legislative candidates are chosen by regional or state-level organisations	National legislative candidates are chosen by local or municipal level actors	Selection is the outcome of bargaining between different levels	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○

Similarly, which of the following options best characterises the process by which the following parties decide on electoral strategy, for example campaign platforms and slogans, coalition strategies, and campaign resource allocations?

	Electoral strategy is decided by national party leaders with little participation from local or state level organisations	Electoral strategy is decided by regional or state-level organisations	Electoral strategy is decided by local or municipal level actors	The choice of electoral strategy is the outcome of bargaining between the different levels of party organisation	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○

Political parties often have more or less routine and explicit linkages to civil society organisations such as unions, business or professional organisations, and cultural organisations based on religion, language, or ethnicity. The linkages might include leadership and membership overlap, mutual financial support, reserved positions for representatives of these organisations at National Conventions, etc.

Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the party? Please indicate the strength of these linkages on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating no links, 1 indicating weak links and 4 indicating very strong links:

Strength of Linkages: Unions

	0 (No linkages)	1 (Some linkages, but weak)	2	3	4 (Very strong linkages)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the party? Please indicate the strength of these linkages on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating no links, 1 indicating weak links and 4 indicating very strong links:

Strength of Linkages: Business

	0 (No linkages)	1 (Some linkages, but weak)	2	3	4 (Very strong linkages)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the party? Please indicate the strength of these linkages on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating no links, 1 indicating weak links and 4 indicating very strong links:

Strength of Linkages: Religious organisations

	0 (No linkages)	1 (Some linkages, but weak)	2	3	4 (Very strong linkages)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the party? Please indicate the strength of these linkages on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating no links, 1 indicating weak links and 4 indicating very strong links:

Strength of Linkages: Ethnic, linguistic or caste-based organisations

	0 (No linkages)	1 (Some linkages, but weak)	2	3	4 (Very strong linkages)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the party? Please indicate the strength of these linkages on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating no links, 1 indicating weak links and 4 indicating very strong links:

Strength of Linkages: Urban/Rural organisations

	0 (No linkages)	1 (Some linkages, but weak)	2	3	4 (Very strong linkages)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Do the following parties have strong linkages to one or more of the following civil society organisations, and how strong are the linkages between these organisations and the party? Please indicate the strength of these linkages on a scale of 0-4 with 0 indicating no links, 1 indicating weak links and 4 indicating very strong links:

Strength of Linkages: Women's organisations

	0 (No linkages)	1 (Some linkages, but weak)	2	3	4 (Very strong linkages)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

In some democracies, political parties may give or promise to give benefits to specific individual citizens or identifiable small groups of citizens. In exchange, politicians anticipate receiving the electoral votes cast by those individuals and small groups of voters. In the questions that follow, you are asked to assess the efforts parties make to organise such transfers of benefits to individual voters and small groups in exchange for their electoral support.

Consider whether candidates and parties give or promise to give citizens preferential access to material advantages in public social policy schemes (e.g., preferential access to subsidised prescription drugs, public scholarships, public housing, better police protection etc.) as inducement to obtain their votes. How much effort do candidates and parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential public benefits?

	0 (No effort at all)	1 (Only a minor effort)	2	3	4 (A major effort)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens preferential access to employment in the public sector or in the publicly regulated private sector (e.g., post office, janitorial services, maintenance work, jobs at various skill levels in state owned enterprises or in large private enterprises with government contracts and subsidies, etc.) as inducement to obtain their vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by providing preferential access to employment opportunities?

	0 (No effort at all)	1 (Only a minor effort)	2	3	4 (A major effort)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Consider whether candidates or parties give or promise to give citizens and businesses preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities (e.g., public works/construction projects, military procurement projects without competitive bidding to companies whose employees support the awarding party) as inducement to gain their and their employees' votes. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters by offering them preferential access to government contracts or procurement opportunities?

	0 (No effort at all)	1 (Only a minor effort)	2	3	4 (A major effort)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Consider whether candidates or parties influence or promise to influence the application of regulatory rules issued by government agencies (e.g., more lenient tax assessments and audits, more favourable interpretation of import and export regulation, less strict interpretation of fire and escape facilities in buildings, etc.) in order to favour individual citizens or specific businesses as inducement to gain their and their employees' vote. How much effort do candidates or parties expend to attract voters and the businesses for which they work by influencing regulatory proceedings in their favour?

	0 (No effort at all)	1 (Only a minor effort)	2	3	4 (A major effort)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Compared to ten (10) years ago, would you say that politicians nowadays make the same, greater or lesser efforts to provide preferential benefits (such as preferential access to public resources, public sector jobs, government contracts, and favourable regulatory rules) to individuals and small groups of voters?

	Much less effort now	Somewhat less effort now	About the same effort now	A somewhat greater effort now	A much greater effort now	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Do political parties make special efforts to attract members of one or several of the following groups with such inducements? Please check ALL that apply for each party.

	Rural voters	Urban voters	Specific ethnic, linguistic or caste group	Women	Youth	Seniors	Religious groups	Don't know
Party 1	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 2	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 3	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐	☐

Do political parties make special efforts to attract members of one or several of the following groups with such inducements? Please check ALL that apply for each party.

	Poor voters	Middle income voters	Wealthy voters	Don't know
Party 1	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 2	☐	☐	☐	☐
Party 3	☐	☐	☐	☐

If parties provide preferential benefits in order to receive votes, which of the following groups of voters do they primarily target?

A. Partisan loyalists, for whom there is no competition among parties: that is, those who consider voting only for one party and abstain from voting, if that party is not a good prospect.

B. Strategic voters, for whom there is competition among parties: those who consider switching their preferences from one party to another party depending on the past record and the prospective benefits they expect from supporting different competitors.

	Primarily to its partisan loyalists	Primarily to strategic voters	Both loyal and strategic voters	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○

Please assess how effective political parties are in their efforts to mobilise voters by targeted benefits:

	0 (Not at all)	1 (To a small extent)	2	3	4 (To a great extent)	Don't know
Party 1	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 2	○	○	○	○	○	○
Party 3	○	○	○	○	○	○

Parties sometimes seek to ensure that appointments in the state sector are made primarily as a means of rewarding party loyalty, and/ or as a means of controlling the institution through the deployment of party representatives rather than on the basis of merit. In your view, are any of the below state institutions or related government bodies awarded to individuals such as party activists as a reward for party loyalty or work done to advance the party? In some cases, parties do not have discretion in making appointments in a particular sector – in such instances, these sectors should be marked 0 (not at all).

	0 (Not at all)	1 (To a small extent)	2	3	4 (To a great extent)	Don't know
Economic	○	○	○	○	○	○
Finance	○	○	○	○	○	○
Judicial	○	○	○	○	○	○
Media	○	○	○	○	○	○
Military and Police	○	○	○	○	○	○
Foreign Service	○	○	○	○	○	○
Culture and Education	○	○	○	○	○	○
Healthcare	○	○	○	○	○	○
Regional and Local Administration	○	○	○	○	○	○

Appendix 2

Table 3.5 Do political parties make special efforts to attract members of one or several of the following groups with such inducements? (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	Rural voters		Urban voters		Ethnic, linguistic or caste group		Women		Youth		Seniors		Religious groups	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
BAL	12.5%	87.5%	12.5%	87.5%	25.0%	75.0%	25.0%	75.0%	12.5%	87.5%	75.0%	25.0%	0.0%	100.0%
BNP	12.5%	87.5%	0.0%	100.0%	62.5%	37.5%	37.5%	62.5%	12.5%	87.5%	75.0%	25.0%	12.5%	87.5%
INC	0.0%	100.0%	43.8%	56.3%	6.3%	93.8%	37.5%	62.5%	56.3%	43.8%	81.3%	18.8%	62.5%	37.5%
BJP	18.8%	81.3%	18.8%	81.3%	25.0%	75.0%	43.8%	56.3%	18.8%	81.3%	81.3%	18.8%	6.3%	93.8%
PML (N)	62.5%	37.5%	37.5%	62.5%	50.0%	50.0%	87.5%	12.5%	75.0%	25.0%	87.5%	12.5%	50.0%	50.0%
PPP	37.5%	62.5%	50.0%	50.0%	0.0%	100.0%	75.0%	25.0%	87.5%	12.5%	87.5%	12.5%	100.0%	0.0%
PTI	50.0%	50.0%	37.5%	62.5%	87.5%	12.5%	62.5%	37.5%	37.5%	62.5%	87.5%	12.5%	62.5%	37.5%

Table 3.6 Do political parties make special efforts to attract members of one or several of the following groups with such inducements? (Source: Expert Survey 2019)

	Poor voters		Middle income voters		Wealthy voters	
	No	Yes	No	Yes	No	Yes
BAL	28.6%	71.4%	42.9%	57.1%	28.6%	71.4%
BNP	42.9%	57.1%	14.3%	85.7%	28.6%	71.4%
INC	5.9%	94.1%	47.1%	52.9%	76.5%	23.5%
BJP	25.0%	75.0%	18.8%	81.3%	31.3%	68.8%
PML (N)	57.1%	42.9%	14.3%	85.7%	14.3%	85.7%
PPP	12.5%	87.5%	50.0%	50.0%	75.0%	25.0%
PTI	62.5%	37.5%	12.5%	87.5%	37.5%	62.5%

Appendix 3

BAL Presidium Membership[1]		
2012	2016[2]	2019[3]
Sheikh Hasina		
Obaidul Quader		
Syeda Sajeda Chowdhury		
Begum Matia Chowdhury		
Sheikh Fazlul Karim Selim		
Mohammad Nasim		
Kazi Zafarullah		
Sahara Khatun		
Mosharraf Hossain		
Syed Ashraful Islam		Deceased
Syeda Zohra Tajuddin	Deceased	
Abdul Latif Siddique[4]	Disgraced and removed	
Satish Chandra Roy	Excluded	
Nuh-Ul-Alam Lenin	Excluded	
	Shri Piyush Kanti Bhattacharya	
	Nurul Islam Nahid	
	Dr. Abdur Razzak	
	Lt. Col. Muhammad Faruk Khan	
	Shri Ramesh Chandra Sen	
	Abdul Mannan Khan	
		Abdul Matin Khasru
		Shajahan Khan
		Jahangir Kabir Nanak
		Abdur Rahman

[1] References: https://www.albd.org/pages/organization ; https://web.archive.org/web/20161126234601/http://www.albd.org/index.php/en/party/organisation ; https://www.dhakatribune.com/bangladesh/2016/10/23/hasina-16-presidium-members-4-joint-gen-secys

[2] Two new seats added in 2016.

[3] Four new seats added in 2019.

[4] This is the only instance in which a Presidium member was expelled. Siddique was fired as a minister and expelled from his party for a comment made against Hajj, the Islamic pilgrimage to Mecca, which caused public outcry. He was later charged and convicted for corruption. https://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-asia-30195714

Appendix 4

BNP National Standing Committee Membership[5]	
2009	2018
Begum Khaleda Zia	
Tareq Rahman	
Dr. Khandaker Mosharraf Hossain	
Moudud Ahmed	
Jamir Uddin Sarkar	
Tariqul Islam	
Lt. G. (Retd.) Mahbubur Rahman	
Brigadier G. (Retd.) ASM Hannan Shah	
MK Anwar	
Rafiqul Islam Mia	
Mirza Abbas	
Babu Gayeshwar Chandra Roy	
Dr. Abdul Moin Khan	
Nazrul Islam Khan	
Mirza Fakhrul Islam Alamgir	
Dr. R. A. Gani	Deceased
Salah Uddin Quader Chowdhury	Executed
Begum Sarwari Rahman	Excluded for health reasons
M Shamsul Islam	Excluded for health reasons
	Amir Khosru Mahmud Chowdhury
	Salah Uddin Ahmed
	Vacant
	Vacant

[5] References: https://www.londonmohanagarbnp.org ; https://bdnews24.com/politics/2016/08/06/bnp-announces-new-national-standing-committee