



A University of Sussex PhD thesis

Available online via Sussex Research Online:

<http://sro.sussex.ac.uk/>

This thesis is protected by copyright which belongs to the author.

This thesis cannot be reproduced or quoted extensively from without first obtaining permission in writing from the Author

The content must not be changed in any way or sold commercially in any format or medium without the formal permission of the Author

When referring to this work, full bibliographic details including the author, title, awarding institution and date of the thesis must be given

Please visit Sussex Research Online for more information and further details

EASTERN CONNECTIONS

UNEVEN AND COMBINED ORIGINS OF IRANIAN AND TURKISH NATIONALISMS

D. Yavuz Tüyloğlu
Submitted January 2018

Thesis submitted for the fulfilment of the degree of
Doctor of Philosophy in International Relations, University of Sussex

Declaration

I hereby declare that this thesis has not been and will not be, submitted in whole or in part to another University for the award of any other degree.

Signature:

Summary

This thesis uncovers the reasons behind, and offers a solution to, the disconnection between theories of nationalism and histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms. These two fields of research remain isolated from each other and rarely interact. The field of nationalism studies has little to offer to the study of Middle Eastern nationalisms as the leading theories of the field base their explanation on European historical experience. Histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms, on the other hand, generally eschew any theoretical elaboration and remain largely wedded to narrative explanation.

Earlier chapters of the thesis trace the wellspring of this separation to an institutionally prevalent and rigid division of labour between disciplines and area studies. In Chapter 1, the thesis aims to clarify the causes of *theoretical poverty* in the histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms, with a specific focus on the cases of Iran and Turkey. The outcome of this poverty is a tendency to treat these nationalisms as unique, which ends up tacitly assuming the national unit of analysis and theoretically downplays the constitutive international dimension of their emergence. On the other side of the gulf, the dominant theories in the field of nationalism studies espouses a generalist thrust in their explanation, but only by abstracting from the historical conditions of Western Europe. This leads, argues Chapter 2, to *the poverty of theory*: as the historical conditions (and causal mechanisms) identified in the nationalism studies literature were absent in non-Western European cases, these nationalisms appear misshapen, or as theoretical externalities. This problem is termed variously as internalism, Eurocentrism or methodological nationalism.

The problem itself has been identified before; yet previous diagnoses remained without a viable prescription. Chapter 3 lays out the main claim of this thesis: that the internalisms exposed in the previous chapters can be overcome by theoretically accounting for the causal significance of international relations for the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. The chapter then cumulatively pieces together a methodological solution by engaging available ways to bridge the gulf between theory and history. It starts with exploring the promises and pitfalls of a solution previously suggested in the literature: historical comparison. Historical

comparison is found to be unsatisfactory on account of its obliviousness towards the fact that societies in contact do not only exist in a state of interrelationship but also reciprocally alter one another through their interaction. The chapter then reviews the recent debate in historiography between ‘comparativists and transnationalists,’ and takes a closer look at the calls for bringing transnational history and historical sociology into a fruitful exchange. This critical engagement culminates into the invoking of the theory of uneven and combined development (U&CD) as the most suitable candidate to bridge transnational history and historical sociology in order to overcome the problems of internalism in the study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Specifically, U&CD is well suited to theoretically integrate the mediating effects on Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire of other ‘backward’ societies, which experienced similar pressures and pursued modernisation with similar goals.

To substantiate these claims, Chapter 4 proposes an alternative periodisation to conventional Eurocentric historiography by demonstrating how the Ottoman Empire and the dynasties ruling over the Iranian plateau began to transform their external relations during the course of eighteenth century by way of bilateral international agreements, which marked a ‘conceptual turning point’ in sovereignty and citizenship. Then, rather than employing a sole focus on the state level strategies of backwardness, which draws a *relational* distinction between industrialised European powers and late developing states of the non-European world, the chapter identifies agents of ‘transmission and mediation’ located in another late developing society: the expatriate Qajar subjects resident in the Ottoman Empire. This community’s experience in the modernising empire and its convictions that the Ottomans could act as a model to reform the Qajar state and society adds a layer to our understanding of late development, which I call ‘mediated modernisation.’ This aspect of late development is largely overlooked in the accounts of Qajar modernisation and remained limited to specialised empirical studies.

The final chapter advances the ‘mediated modernisation’ argument into the turn-of-the-century emergence of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms – a period during which the first programmatic statements of these ideologies are formulated. The chapter starts by evaluating the impact of Japanese modernisation and the result of the Russo-Japanese War of 1904-05 on Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The second section focuses on

the wave of constitutional revolutions that swept across the late developing world during early twentieth century. As truly trans-imperial phenomena, the mobility and ‘cosmopolitan nationalism’ of these constitutionalist movements frontally challenges the internalist histories. With a similar challenge in mind, the third section of the chapter traces a diverse group of intellectuals and reformists who carried ideas, agitated reform and conspired revolution across the Eurasian continent.

Acknowledgements

A great portion of my appreciation and thanks should go to my supervisors Kamran Matin and Justin Rosenberg. With indefatigable enthusiasm and boundless generosity, they found time, *time and again*, to help me to get this project where it is now. Whenever I found myself at the bottom of the abyss of PhD (and this happened more than once), they always managed to send a rope down to pull me back up. I am immensely grateful to them.

Before Sussex, there were those who helped me to start this journey – to whom I am very much obliged. Çağrı Bağcıoğlu, Murat Borovalı, Cemil Boyraz, Can Cemgil, Demet Gürkan, İlay Örs Romain, Ege Özen and Harry Tzimitras have kept the occasional eye on me and welcomed me warmly when I was back in İstanbul from time to time. And even before, there were others. I owe great intellectual debt to the late Peter Gowan, Hannes Lacher and Umut Özkırımlı.

At Sussex, both the department and the larger PhD community provided me with a vibrant intellectual atmosphere and generous friendship. More specifically, I should make a note of my office folk from Arts C 351. The warm companionships of Georgina Christou, Titiksha Shukla and Steffan Wyn-Jones (and our space heater) militated against the cold and grey British weather. I would also like to thank İdil Akıncı, Darius A'zami, Chris Long and Kerem Nişancıoğlu for their friendship and intellectual stimulation. Last but not least at Sussex, I would like to thank Jayne Paulin who resolved my administrative problems with great patience and helped me navigate through hard times.

Outside the university, I shared homes with and very much enjoyed the friendships of Hector Parra, Huw Owen, Nick Warde, Jackson Lao, Mojdeh Mirfakhraee and Mojdeh's lovely daughters, Parisa and Mona. I am grateful to them for making a life beyond the PhD possible for me.

The great and glorious Beşiktaş football team gave me a good dose of joy during the course of this project. I would like to thank several names specifically: our manager

Şenol Güneş and players (current and former) Ricardo Quaresma, Jose Sosa, Cenk Tosun, Anderson Talisca and Dusko Tosic.

My family, very big and impossible to list individually, is full of love for me and never failed to support me.

Having that special person in my life made all the difference in the world. With Dora (better known as Dr. Sampaio) we travelled a good part of the PhD journey together. With her wisdom and sensitivity, she made me a better person. I would like to extend her the biggest *obrigado* ever and I look forward to the years ahead of us so I can keep on thanking her.

My father left this world after a long illness during the final year of my PhD and my mother many years earlier. To them this work is dedicated.

Contents

Summary	iii
Acknowledgments	v
Introduction	1
Chapter 1 Theoretical Poverty: Historiographies of Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms	13
1.1 Introduction	13
1.2 Generality of the Disciplines versus the Specificity of the Areas	14
1.3 The Question of Modernity and the Middle Eastern Nations and Nationalisms	25
1.4 Where in the World did Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms Come from – and When?	37
1.6 Conclusion	42
Chapter 2 Poverty of Theory: The Challenge of Late Nationalisms	44
2.1 Introduction	44
2.2 The Quest for General Theory and the Problem of Internalism	49
2.2.1 Ernest Gellner	49
2.2.2 Benedict Anderson	54
2.3 Capturing the Multiplicity of Nationalisms: Comparative History and Typologies	59
2.3.1 John Breuilly	60
2.3.2 Miroslav Hroch	65
2.4 Inverting Eurocentrism: Limits of Structuralism and Postcolonial Theory	70
2.4.1 Tom Nairn	71
2.4.2 Partha Chatterjee	77
2.5 Conclusion	82
Chapter 3 Theorising the International Origins of Late Nationalisms	85
3.1 Introduction	85
3.2 Is Comparison the Cure for the Theoretical Malaise?	88
3.3 Transnational History and Overcoming Internalism and Eurocentrism through Mobility	94
3.4 Uneven and Combined Development	100
3.5 Formation of Late Nationalism in the Middle East and U&CD	112
Chapter 4 Eastern Connections: Ottoman Influence on Early Iranian Nationalism	122
4.1 Introduction	122
4.2 From Kurdan to Erzurum: Modernising International Relations of the Middle East	126
4.3 Istanbul: Reformist Iranian's "Open Window Onto Europe"	133
4.4 Mirza Hoseyn Khan: The Reformist Ambassador in Istanbul	140
4.5 Conclusion	146

Chapter 5 Transimperial Origins of Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms	148
5.1 Introduction	148
5.2 The Rise of Japan	151
5.3 The Entangled Histories of Constitutional Revolutions	159
5.4 Transimperial Origins of Nationalism	165
5.5 Conclusion	169
Conclusion	171
Bibliography	175

Introduction

Theoretical deficiency has been a chronic trait of Middle East Studies. Almost from the day it became institutionally visible in the United States, not only its generalist critics in the disciplines but also its practitioners questioned its ‘scientific’ purpose and standing (Bilgin 2006). Many an eminent scholar lamented the field’s provincial empiricism and its failure to do more than ‘a kind of stamp collecting’ to contribute to debates in social sciences (Mitchell 2004:75). These criticisms are not peculiar to Middle East Studies. Area studies have been traditionally assigned to a subordinate epistemological role and tasked with gathering raw data for proper scientists (Cheah 2008).

While fresh fervour was added to the debate over theory (or its absence) with the onset of the so-called area studies controversy in the age of globalisation (Mirsepassi, Basu, and Weaver 2003; Tessler, Nachtwey, and Banda 1999), in many ways this was old wine in new bottles. Disciplinary generalists have over the years complained that the findings of the area studies are non-generalisable and, by their standards, of little scientific value. Area specialists, in response, have found these claims exaggerated and raised a charge of their own. In their view, the works of disciplinary generalists are too abstract to be of any use. And what they do is to masquerade what is essentially ‘American Area Studies’ as universal knowledge.

As it tends to happen in social sciences and humanities, both sides overstated the weaknesses of the other. Even then, some Middle East specialists have conceded that non-theoretical nature of their field is a problem to be reckoned with (Anderson 1990, 1999; Ciddi and Levin 2014; Khalidi 1995; Quataert and Sayarı 2003; Somer 2014). In the words of Syed Farid Atlas, for instance, ‘the Middle East in general and Iran and Turkey in particular have not been areas of analysis that generated significant theoretical issues having an impact on various fields and regions’ (1993:473).

This overall condition of the field is observable in the study of specific phenomena in the region. Nationalism in the Middle East is the case in point here. While there is little dispute over the historically constitutive role of this ideology in the region over the last hundred years or so (Gelvin 2011:182), negligible theoretical light has radiated from the

study of it. Accordingly, Mosher Behar notes that ‘the specialized scholarship on nationalism in the Middle East has rarely posed the defining question "What is nationalism?" in as theoretically structured a manner as the comparative social science scholarship does’ (2005:592). Nor have these specialised studies shown systematic interest in the theoretically oriented studies of nationalism (Marashi 2014).

It is this theoretical deficiency that gives this thesis its commencing impulse and its question with specific focus: *Why are Iranian and Turkish nationalisms un(der)theorised?* I derive this question from two initial and preliminary claims:

(i) Case or area studies accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms refrain from generalisation and broadly subscribe to empirical description. Thus, they suffer from *theoretical poverty*.

(ii) General theories cannot account for the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms and this generates *the poverty of theory* in nationalism studies.

The two literatures seldom communicate, and when they do, it is of little, if any, theoretical impact.¹ Presented in the most academically intuitive sense, there is a gulf between history and theory.

In this introductory chapter, I first attempt to justify the question. Why is the theoretical poverty of the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalism worth studying? And how can we identify this problem in the study of these nationalisms? This exercise presents brief signposts to my engagement with relevant literatures – both historical and theoretical – in the coming chapters by identifying their major problems that have created and sustained a gulf between history and theory.

¹ Nor many scholars traverse the boundary between nomothetic social science disciplines and ideographic area studies. Moshe Behar notes pointedly that ‘the only scholar with the Middle East as a principal regional focus who has made it into comparative anthologies on nationalism is Elie Kedourie’ (2005:596), whose notoriously conservative political views and idealist historiography, I must add, are now outmoded (cf. Breuilly 2000; O’Leary 2002). From the other way around, the only general work that engages with Iranian and/or Turkish nationalisms is by John Breuilly, who locates the Turkish case within the class of ‘reform nationalism outside Europe’ along with its Chinese and Japanese counterparts (1993:230–53).

The second step here is to connect nationalism as a historical phenomenon to the problems of these literatures – in the sense of a move from the deficiencies identified of these literatures to propose a solution. What alternative conceptualisation of nationalism can provide a panacea for the problems identified? An exercise in an alternative conceptualisation of nationalism shall signal the main premises for a theoretical solution to an historical phenomenon. What sort of theory is appropriate for the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms?

Once these foundations are set, I offer several points of clarification on issues that are not engaged directly or extensively in the coming chapters, but which need to be stated at the outset. This is followed by the chapter plan of the thesis.

Why the Worry about Theory?

My commencing curiosity is empirical. Nationalism has not been a subsidiary phenomenon in modern Iran and Turkey. Ali Ansari, for one, notes that nationalism ‘in all its manifestations has been the ideological reference point to which all competing ideologies [in modern Iran] have ultimately had to adhere, and within which most have been subsumed’ (2012:1). Although tension-ridden (Saleh and Worrall 2015), in Iran the Islamic Republic has made instrumental use of nationalism, hence defied the supposed incompatibility between Islam and nationalism (Grigoriadis and Ansari 2005:329). Others have made a note of its success in integrating non-Persian ethnicities (Ahmadi 2005; Halliday 2000:35; Yaghoubian 2014). Notwithstanding its differing instrumentality for different groups, there seems to be no mist around the fact that nationalism has manifested formidable magnetism in the modern history of Iran. ‘Every social movement in Iran since the 1891 Tobacco Rebellion to the 2009 post-election protests,’ observes one scholar, ‘was at least partially motivated by nationalism and harboured nationalist goals’ (Litvak 2017:2).

There is no shortage of similar assessments for Turkish nationalism. Hans-Lukas Kieser notes that ‘Turkey has been deeply marked by nationalism in the 20th century’ (2006:vii). Kadıoğlu and Keyman identify nationalist ideology as one of the key

parameters of modern Turkish politics. Even more curiously, they argue that Turkish nationalism has become powerful ‘especially since 1999, when Turkey became an official candidate for membership in the European Union (EU)’ – a process generally regarded as having a corrosive effect on nationalism had, so the authors argue, the opposite effect in Turkey (2011:xii; see also, Özkırımlı 2008). In both cases nationalism retains its powerful hold. So much so that the authors of a comparative analysis of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, a rare undertaking in the field, makes the historically far-reaching claim that ‘nationalism had operated as a dominant ideology in the process of the transition to modernity in both Turkey and Iran’ (Keyman and Yılmaz 2006:425). This much textual evidence should be enough to offer an initial assertion: Modern Iran and Turkey cannot be understood without making sense of the decisive and on-going role of nationalism.

And what amplifies this curiosity is the sheer size and the critical purposes of the specialised literature. Over the last several decades, the academic study of Turkish nationalism has powerfully challenged the Turkish nationalist narrative. It is academically superfluous to state that Turkish nation is now thoroughly deconstructed and historically exposed as a relatively recent political invention. In this sense, the study of Turkish nationalism has closely followed in the footsteps of the modernist wave of nationalism studies – though overwhelmingly slanted towards appropriating its deconstructive ethos rather than its penchant for theory building. In these broad outlines, there is now a voluminous and growing literature on the subject.

Compared to its Turkish counterpart, the academic study of Iranian nationalism took its critical turn towards its subject a decade or so later. The reason for its belatedness is related to the ‘institutional culture’ of Iranian Studies, where the dominant position upholds the narrative of the Iranian nation harking back to antiquity (cf. Matin-Asgari 2012). Apart from Mostafa Vaziri’s controversial and partially flawed modernist attack (1993) and Mehrzad Boroujerdi’s incisive ‘deconstruction’ (1998), it can be argued that generally scholars have either chosen to steer clear of the debate over modernity versus antiquity of the Iranian nation or have openly subscribed to the perennialist position (cf. Elling 2013:163–66). In this sense, nationalism was not a sociological or historical curiosity, as its source, the Iranian nation, was regarded as a perennial entity. Lately, a

younger generation of scholars has been challenging this position – though not always openly and not by naming names (see, for example, Aghaie and Marashi 2014).

I return to this burgeoning literature in the next chapter. It suffices here to note that despite the historical weight of the phenomena and the volume of scholarly effort, we are still short of satisfying the minimum requirements of social theorising for Iranian and Turkish nationalisms:

Social theory explains one social fact by another through a model whose elements are people in a social situation trying to solve the problem posed by the situation as available evidence indicates they see it. The fact to be explained is their aggregate social behavior, which consists of observable individual social behaviour (Aya 2006:117)

The failure to explain the emergence and development of nationalism as a social fact in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire is due to two related reasons. The first is what we may call the missing causal explanation. The cause or the source of Iranian or Turkish nationalism is not difficult to identify: (Western) Europe. Nationalism did not exist in Qajar Iran or in the Ottoman Empire. But it was ‘borrowed’ from Europe. While the facticity of the European influence is almost always *empirically* noted in the literature, the *theoretical* implications of this externality are either not addressed or limited to facile allusions to general theories/theoreticians or typologies that I demonstrate in the next chapter. In other words, their use of available theoretical work, if they are used at all, does not go beyond partial application always followed with heavy qualification due to *particularity* or the *sui generis* nature of the case in question. But the specialised literature does not theoretically integrate the historical conditions that underpin or enforce the act of borrowing.

The missing causal link has given the specialised literature a largely narrativist bent, which, in John Breuilly’s somewhat heavy-handed judgement, ‘explains nothing’ (1996a:157). Heavy-handed as it may be, Breuilly’s point can be supplemented with another. The increasing hegemony of social constructivist explanation in nationalism studies, which has made its way decisively into the study of Middle Eastern nationalisms, has served one valuable purpose. It demystified, at least academically, the

nationalist narratives by demonstrating the invented/imagined nature of modern nations. Yet this came at a significant cost. The social constructivist accounts by and large remain wedded to an internalist explanation.

These are the reasons behind the *theoretical poverty* of the specialised literature. How about the general literature? The works of such notable figures of modernist theories of nationalism such as Ernest Gellner, Benedict Anderson and Miroslav Hroch surely, on account of their popularity and stature at least, fulfil the demands of social theorising identified above by Rod Aya. As I try to demonstrate in Chapter 2, they do indeed explain the historical fact of nationalism by another social fact or social facts through sophisticated models. But the nationalism they theorise does not quite look like nationalism in the Middle East. This is because – and despite their sophistication – it is the *mode* of the theorising deployed by the modernist theories of nationalism where their failure to grapple with non-European cases of nationalism lies.

Theoretically oriented works on the historical emergence of nationalism are defined (and differentiated) on the basis of identifying the conditions of emergence of nationalism in modern Western Europe. These conditions vary from industrialism (Gellner 1983) to the dissolution of pre-modern ‘belief systems’ (Anderson 2006), from the emergence of the modern state and geopolitical competition (Breuilly 1993; Mann 1995; Tilly 1995) to the rise of capitalism and mass politics (Hobsbawm 1992; Kohn 1961). The choice of a particular socio-historical and/or political condition as the master variable (or some combination of variables) is determined by each theorist’s understanding of what (European) modernity is.

But when theory offers generalisations derived from the historical conditions of Western Europe, an immediate theoretical gap follows. Because the historical conditions identified in the literature were absent in non-Western European cases, their nationalisms appear misshapen, or as theoretical externalities. This is the outcome of what Friedrich Tenbruck insightfully calls the problem of ‘internalism.’ An internalist theory posits that ‘each society with its changes and growth can and should be explained in reference to its internal constitution’ (1994:75). What follows from this, he adds, is the conception that ‘differences between countries are considered as different stages of a process that is apparent everywhere and known in its directedness’ and as

such ‘European modernization [can be] dissolved into the parallel development of given societies; some may be ahead of others but all are driven by the same internal necessity’ (1994:77).

Yet these modernist theorists of nationalism, although cognizant of the international dimension of the emergence of (late) nationalisms and in possession of a considerable amount of historical learning, introduce, what I call, the ‘supplementary theories/procedures’ into their theories to account for the spread of the phenomenon. But because their theories are internalist in their core premises, their supplementary procedures are caught within static and homogenising conceptions of late nationalisms and can only attach the international as an *external and contingent* factor – an afterthought, that is (cf. Matin 2013a:1–23).

Modernist theories of nationalism have cornered themselves in this untenable position for the reason that providing a theoretical answer to what nationalism is and how it emerged in the conceptual/theoretical singular is not enough to digest cases of late nationalisms. Theory conceived in the ontological singular and supplemented with historical sociology, however rich, has to contend with the *later* emergence of the phenomenon *elsewhere*, but has also, in equal measure, to fail to do so.

We have, in other words, reached the point where we started. Like the separation between disciplines and areas, theories of nationalism and histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalism are by and large oblivious to the existence of one another. And this is a condition that goes well beyond the study of Middle Eastern nationalisms. Fred Halliday pointed out almost twenty years ago that the debate on nationalism ‘has in some ways reached an impasse: an array of general theories is offset against a mass of individual accounts with relatively little interaction between the two’ (1997:26–27). Reading both literatures, one may very well conclude that the nationalism of the general theoretical works is something entirely different from particular nationalisms that historically developed in Qajar Iran and in the Ottoman Empire.

International Relations, Late Nationalism and Backwardness

The solution to Halliday's impasse or, more pertinently, a much more satisfactory account of the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms requires us to theoretically integrate the causal influence of international relations. As pointed out above, failure to do so is the shared feature of the general and particular literatures. In that sense, to write a historical sociology of the emergence of nationalism is to offer an account of social change. It is to identify the conditions under which historically located agents aspired for a new structural setting. Historically the increasing geopolitical pressures imposed on Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire from the late eighteenth century onwards and attendant historical consciousness of the elites of these political formations in grappling with these pressures provides the historical setting of this thesis. The main impulse behind the emergence of nationalism, and especially the nationalism of late developing societies, has been, as Gregory Jusdanis notes, 'the discovery by intellectual and political elites of the tardiness of their societies. Nationalism therefore is in part a response to a condition of belatedness' (2001:7). The sense of belatedness or the anguish of backwardness, as Marshall Berman once put it (1988:175), was the driving impulse of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms.

Formulated in the language of the philosophy of (social) science: *if geopolitical pressures by advanced industrial social formations of Europe, then nationalism in the late developing non-European ones*. Nationalism follows from intersocietal interaction, which is suffused with uneven developmental levels among units. My 'constant conjunction' is this. Given external geopolitical pressures, the elites of the peripheral states borrowed nationalist ideology as a means to ward off geopolitical pressures and achieve or bolster sovereign independence.

And this is where a crucial argument of this thesis is located. Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire had experienced these pressures under distinctly different conditions than much of the late developing world. They were among a handful of peripheral societies that retained their formal independence, which allowed them some degree of

freedom to reconfigure their institutions, pursue defensive modernisation projects and shift between geopolitical alliances.

More importantly, these nationalisms, in their response to the geopolitical pressures from the advanced Western European powers, had made use of mediating effects of other ‘backward’ states, which experienced similar pressures and pursued modernisation with similar goals. What I mean is that the formative influences of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms were these societies borrowed not only from modern European powers in order to catch up, but also from non-European countries such as Japan, Russia and India (Aydın 2007b). Furthermore, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire borrowed from one another. That is, geopolitical pressures and responses towards them were refracted by one of these countries, before reaching to the other.

Such a theoretical recalibration of the empirical evidence can solve what appears to be the paradox of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, once it is seen that the international conditions within which (as well as against which) these nationalisms emerged and developed do not need to replicate the conditions of emergence of European nationalisms. Quite the opposite is historically valid. Because their conditions were uneven and their sources of influence multiple, Iranian and Turkish nationalisms combined these multiple influences in order to respond to the geopolitical pressures exerted by modern European powers. And this dynamism has to be captured theoretically. Otherwise it will resurface as anomalies in empirical-substantive analysis. If this can be done, an important gap in our understanding would be closed.

Thus the problem with the general and specialised literatures or their estrangement from each other is not one of history, but that of theory. Gareth Stedman Jones formulates it in captivating austerity.

The criteria by which the construction of a problem will be judged of historical significance will ultimately be dependent upon some explicit or implicit theory of social causation. In this sense, there is no distinction in principle between history and any of the other ‘social sciences.’ The distinction is not that between theory and non-theory, but between the adequacy or inadequacy of the theory brought to bear (1976:296).

The theory of Uneven and Combined Development (hereafter U&CD), developed from its broad outlines originally provided by Leon Trotsky (2007:3–12), I argue, fulfils Stedman Jones's criteria for adequacy and provides the tools to capture Iranian and Turkish nationalisms as distinct (i.e. semi-colonial) forms. By demonstrating that the existence of societal multiplicity is an emergent property of unevenness (Rosenberg 2010), Trotsky's idea gives a universal grounding to overall human history and its fragmentation into many societies.

From unevenness (spatio-temporal multi-linearity) follows combination, by which societies bring together different stages of development together in particular settings. Thus, what is treated as a standalone society from an internalist perspective can now be theorised as the developmental outcome of historically uneven interaction, which combines different levels of development in amalgamated forms. In this way, U&CD enables a theoretically and substantively original and productive engagement with the question of late nationalisms as opposed to forcing them into the historical conditions identified exclusively with European modernity.

U&CD allows a theorisation of the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms within a field of multiple determinations that does not necessitate the replication of the conditions of emergence, which were identified with Western European nationalisms. As a theoretical framework that is not constrained by linear causality, U&CD can accommodate a dynamic historical analysis wherein international and domestic factors can be grasped in their dialectical relation. By this formulation I mean that the historical emergence and the development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, are not, in this approach, grounded in a homogenous conception of development, whose content is derived from European experience.

Points of Clarification: What This Thesis Attempts to Do, and What It Does Not

In so far as the subject matter of the thesis (nationalism, and nations) is concerned, I start from a baseline: *nationalism is modern; so, for that matter, are nations*. With its

commitment to self-determination, autonomy and popular politics, nationalism displays unambiguously the qualities of modern politics. Its creation of (and attachment to) a mythologised past has been accomplished through modern institutions (state-run public education, universal conscription and market economy) and carried by means of modern political mobilisation. That this achievement of nationalism is highly consequential politically (and culturally) does not alter the fact that the past is an instrumentally deployed repertoire of cultural patterns. The material of the ‘ancient’ past is invented or adapted by nationalist elites and intellectuals to retrospectively validate the nation’s perennial existence (Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983). The recent power and emotional appeal of nations are no warrant for their antiquity.

The notion of modernity, despite sceptical voices towards its use (Chakrabarty 2011; Cooper 2005:113–49), remains useful. The editors of a recent collection of essays on historical sociology point out that the dichotomy of tradition and modernity, despite suffering immense pressure from various ‘turns’ in social theory and history over the last four decades or so, has proved to be resilient. For many it still serves as an expedient historiographical template that assumes ‘a directional development’ from tradition to modernity (Adams, Clemens, and Orloff 2005:2). While the problems of this binary code (Alexander 1994:172), especially its conception (or rather denigration) of tradition, are by now conclusively exposed and require no repetition here, I agree with Adams, Clemens and Orloff that we should be wary of calls to discard the concept of modernity, for it does ‘too much useful work – whether as an integrated ideal type or a separable cluster of signifiers – and it therefore systematically sneaks back into people’s utterances even if they disavow it’ (2005:14–15).

I am cognisant that such a choice locates this thesis within the tradition of state-focused (though not state-centric), elite level analysis. The shortcomings of this choice are now extensively argued. Yet, I agree with historian Pamela Kyle Crossley that while ‘the agency of every living human is important,’ such sensitivity ‘must be accompanied by some appreciation that because of proximity to immediate, material power (of which the living person may have known little or nothing), some individuals have a greater impact on change than others’ (in Akyeampong et al. 2015:1380).

The overall argument of this thesis is developed in five chapters. Chapter 1 provides a critical review of the literature on the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. This chapter aims to gauge the extent to which the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms are theoretically oriented. The following chapter is a review of a representative sample of modernist theorists from the field of nationalism studies. It demonstrates the various ways in which theorists of nationalism fail to account for the emergence and development of late nationalisms. Chapter 3 outlines the theory of uneven and combined development and shows how its ontological premises can theoretically capture a multi-linear historiography of late nationalisms. Chapter 4 offers a revisionist reading of the international relations of the Islamic world in the eighteenth century and demonstrates how changing conceptions of inter-dynastic relations paved the way for the later formation of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Chapter 5 focuses on the late nineteenth century and early twentieth century, during which Iranian and Turkish nationalisms crystallised under the impact of imperialist pressures, the rise of Japan and the wave of constitutional revolutions. The thesis closes with a conclusion that draws the implications of the arguments for future research.

Chapter 1

Theoretical Poverty: Historiographies of Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms

1.1 Introduction

This chapter opens up one of the preliminary claims of the Introduction: Case or area studies accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms refrain from generalisation and broadly subscribe to empirical description. Thus, they suffer from *theoretical poverty*. I do this by demonstrating the various ways in which the histories of the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms remain undertheorised. More specifically, this entails the exposition of the two shortcomings of the specialised literature identified above, namely the missing causal explanation and narrativism.

The argument is presented in three sections. The first one provides an overview of the so-called area studies controversy to locate the terms of the debate between (disciplinary) generalists and (area) specialists (Mirsepassi et al. 2003; Tessler et al. 1999). This overview aims to establish that the estranged relationship between theories of nationalism and histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms cannot be attributed to the diversity of nationalism as a historical phenomenon. Instead it rests upon a disagreement with a longer lineage in the social sciences and humanities. The theoretical poverty of the specialised literature on Iranian and Turkish nationalisms follows from, and arises in response to, the subordinate role to which area studies is allocated and, equally importantly, the way in which Iranian and Turkish nationalism have developed within this setting. Their trajectories have led to different internal disputes and challenges.

As a second step, this chapter poses one of the central questions of the general literature to the historical works on Iranian and Turkish nationalism, which pertains directly to the issues of causality and theorising. It is the ‘historiographical schism’ between modernism and its critics in the study of nationalism (Hastings 1997:2). The imperative to address the modernity of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms arises from the

historiographical baseline asserted in the introductory chapter: *nationalism belongs to modernity*. Because assertions have to be substantiated, firmly establishing this baseline (both historical and social theoretical) makes possible ‘an exploration of the transition from a social system that was not conducive to nationalism to a social system that was apposite to it’ (Gelvin 1999:74).

The third section then moves on to evaluate the social constructivist accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. It starts by documenting the various ways in which theory finds its way into historical accounts of Iranian and Turkish nationalism. Striking is how little theoretical self-reflection we find in these works, and even less engagement with general theories of nationalism. When the ideas of a general theorist are brought in, they arrive at a second remove: abstracted from the debates that sparked their formulation and criticisms they received, and from historical and theoretical difficulties inhibiting their straightforward application to late nationalisms. The section then moves on to evaluate their treatment of the ‘external’ sources of Iranian and Turkish nationalism. This evaluation concludes that external factors are treated as subsidiary circumstances and remain not only empirically but also theoretically external. This leaves social constructivist accounts with a broadly internalist explanation.

1.2 Generality of the Disciplines *versus* the Specificity of the Areas

What is known as ‘the area studies controversy,’ fought out on the enduring debate between nomothetic and ideographic modes of inquiry, took place largely within the confines of the discipline of Political Science (Bates 1996, 1997a, 1997b) in the United States (for European echoes of the controversy, see Jung 2014:249). Other disciplines, Timothy Mitchell points out, remained much less disturbed:

In anthropology (as in history and literature) everyone was an area expert, while in economics no one was. So neither discipline typically presented its practitioners with the choice between being an area expert or a theorist. In economics you were always the latter (in different degrees of purity), in anthropology you aspired to be both. Sociology continued to be so focused on

North America and Western Europe that it remained slightly removed from the debates over area studies (2004; see also Mirsepassi 1995).²

Area studies research and teaching became a part of American higher education in the postwar decades with antecedents in the interwar period (Lockman 2016:1–7). Its fundamental premise was that the world – that is the world beyond the United States and Western Europe – is made of distinct regions with internal coherence and these distinct regions or areas such as the Middle East, East Asia or Latin America can be studied on the basis of this coherence. Initially funded by such non-governmental bodies like the Rockefeller and Ford foundations, the study of world regions came under federal funding with the National Defense Education Act (NDEA) in 1958. The primary institutions that connected the funding to the academic community of researchers and students have been the Social Sciences Research Council (SSRC) and the American Council for Learned Societies (ACLS).

As a cover term, area studies research and training involves several key elements:

- (1) intensive language study;
- (2) in-depth field research in the local language(s);
- (3) close attention to local histories, viewpoints, materials, and interpretations;
- (4) testing, elaborating, critiquing, or developing grounded theory against detailed observation;
- (5) multi-disciplinary conversations often crossing the boundaries of the social sciences and humanities (Szanton 2004:4).

The immediate incentive behind establishing and funding such programs was the need for specialists in the US with in-depth knowledge of world regions. ‘Up to 1940,’ notes David Szanton, ‘US universities had produced no more than 60 PhDs on the

² When this particular disciplinary setting (Hauptmann 2005; Steinmetz 2005) is concerned, it is not difficult to understand why political scientists took the lead in raising the main ruckus against ‘mere description’ of area studies. For political scientists in the US have long claimed the mantle of scientific vocation along with Economics. But despite its ardent commitment to rigour, US Political Science has arguably failed to achieve the hallmarks of (self-proclaimed) scientific credibility of the discipline of Economics. The enthusiastic importation and application of rational choice theory (cf. Johnson 1997; cf. Shea 1997) exhibits clearly this reverence towards the discipline of Economics, if not the disgruntled acceptance of the role of the second fiddle in the pursuit of hard (social) science.

contemporary non-western world and most dealt with antiquity' (2004:6). But almost from its inception area studies' epistemological status, institutional location and its scientific and practical utility became points of contention. One view is that its main function has been 'to deparochialise US- and Euro-centric visions of the world in the core social science and humanities disciplines, among policy makers, and in the public at large' (Szanton 2004:2). Additionally, area studies research has been touted for its promise to overcome rigid disciplinary boundaries. In this sense, studying an area in its wholeness with an integrated multi-disciplinary focus is argued to be superior to slicing the social world up with bounded disciplinary frameworks of knowledge. But in so far as fulfilling these endeavours is concerned, area studies received mixed reviews (Bilgin 2006:581; Szanton 2004; Teti 2007). And despite its said promises, over the years, the number of standalone area studies departments has dwindled and they have been folded into social science disciplines, as they jostled with the latter for funding, institutional clout, tenured positions and academic prestige.

While these debates were under way, critics were quick to point out the unstated intentions of area studies programmes. One criticism highlighted the historical concomitance between the formation of area studies and the enhanced geopolitical position and aims of the United States in the postwar world. For Rey Chow, 'area studies as a mode of knowledge production, is, strictly speaking, military in origins' (Quoted in Sidaway 2013:986–87). Others draw our attention to the key involvement of the Office of Strategic Services and later, its successor, the Central Intelligence Agency (Cumings 1997). The precise nature of this relationship still a matter of debate (Johnson and Tucker 1975; Lustick 2000; Mitchell 2004; Rafael 1994).³ At a minimum, Pinar Bilgin's point sounds incontestable enough: 'were it not for the perceived threat of

³ At the very least, I think it would be mistaken to reduce the role of area studies to a handmaiden to the US security state during the Cold War (cf. Engerman 2010). While these linkages are now documented (Szanton 2004:9), it was also within the intellectual and political diversity of area studies that one notices many critical voices – especially from mid-1960s onwards when a strong counter-culture swept through the US campuses and triggered an 'epistemological revolution' (Novick 1988:469–572). Among these, of note were the Association of Arab-American University Graduates (AAUG) founded in 1968, which contested the professional silence and detachment of Middle Eastern Studies Association (MESA) towards especially the Arab-Israeli conflict (Mitchell 2004:91–92) and the Committee of Concerned Asian Scholars (CCAS), also founded in 1968, which was similarly critical of US foreign policy towards Asia and especially its Vietnam War debacle (Kagan 1968).

Soviet expansionism, area studies would not have developed in the way that it did' (2006:575–76).

It should also be added that this geopolitical assessment overlapped and partly articulated with the critique raised by the followers of Edward Said, whose *magnum opus*, *Orientalism* has taken the intellectual world by storm and generated discussions around its thesis that reverberates today (1979). One such follower claims that 'area studies needs to be understood in its relation to Orientalism in terms of it being the heir to this academic discipline' (Kolluoğlu-Kırlı 2003:94). There is indeed truth in this statement insofar as the formative period of area studies, especially that of Middle East Studies is concerned. In order to make the field of Middle East Studies to leave the ground, the human resources problem, identified above by Szanton, had to be solved. To that end 'senior Orientalists had to be brought from Europe to lead the new Middle East programs' (Mitchell 2004:82). The initial bargain was, as Bruce Cumming notes for the field of Asian Studies, that the classical Orientalists had to work with the political scientists and 'for their sufferance, the Orientalists would get vastly enhanced academic resources' (1997:8).

But the institutional and intellectual role and weight of the Orientalists had to be negotiated with the 'scientific' agenda of modernisation theory. The Orientalist *métier* was built, after all, on such 'humanistic' studies of history, classics and philology. More influential in the disciplines and in the new-fangled interdisciplinary field of development studies, modernisation theory could not but have its impact and 'scientific' demands on area studies. It may very well be that, as Edward Said observed, '[the fictions of] Orientalism and modernisation theory dovetail[ed] nicely' (Quoted in Pieterse 1991:10), but conflating them simplifies the divergent histories of different fields and their subfields. First, streamlining the influence of Orientalism and modernisation theory runs the risk of overlooking the divergent impact and timing of their critics. As Timothy Mitchell notes for the field of Middle East Studies, it may be convenient to subscribe to the widespread and overly neat periodisation that modernisation theory is challenged and overthrown by the dependency theory from 1970s onwards. But this would neglect the fact that the Middle East Studies had its 'own' critique of modernisation theory in the work of Samir Amin *before* the dependency school. Moreover, the dependency theory, which originated in Latin

American Studies, did not make enough impact in the Middle East Studies to justify the periodisation (2004:92–95). Secondly, conflating Orientalism with modernisation theory would lead to an undifferentiated view of the field of Middle East Studies. Their influence varied within subfields. Orientalism has had a far stronger, but lately fast diminishing, hold on Iranian Studies compared to Turkish Studies. Modernisation theory, on the other hand, made considerable inroads into the latter, as long as it was in vogue. These distinctions, of course, are not exclusive, but only relative. After all, modernisation theory did produce its output on Iran, as one of its landmark texts, Daniel Lerner's *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*, had chapters on both Iran and Turkey (1958).⁴ Nor did the endorsement of one approach necessarily lead to the exclusion of the other. Bernard Lewis, who received an Orientalist training from such influential figures as Louis Massignon, wrote one of the most influential books on the history of the late Ottoman Empire and Turkey with modernisation theory as its central historiographical device (Lewis 1968; cf. Zürcher 2010:41–53). But whatever overlaps there may have been, we need to be attentive to the 'mainstream' of subfields. For as I argue below, this shaped to some degree each fields 'tendencies' towards questions relating to nations and nationalisms, and set different priorities for their critics.

By the time the so-called area studies controversy (Tessler et al. 1999) exploded in the 1990s, the established disciplines had already gained the institutional upper hand against area studies. In the post-Cold War geopolitical reshuffling, the old criticism of particularism was laid again at the doorstep of area studies. The updated argument was that in the face of fast paced transformations wrought by globalisation and 'the apparent erosion of the conceptual and spatial boundaries with which area studies constructed its objects and defined its institutional identity' (Goss and Wesley-Smith 2010:ix),⁵ this type of research remained too limited in its analytical reach, even parochial, due to its focus on particular regions (Hall and Tarrow 1998). What is required, so it is argued, is

⁴ From his research, Lerner drew diametrically opposed and characteristically bombastic conclusions on Iran and Turkey. While 'modernizing process was barely visible' in the former, the latter was the 'bright model of successful transition' in the region (Lerner 1958:401 and 409).

⁵ Reflecting back on how area studies imparted stability onto regions of the world, Benedict Anderson memorably observed, with reference to the region he specialized in, that 'Southeast Asia was more real, in the 1950s and 1960s, to people in American universities than to anyone else' (1998:10).

a reformed version of area studies, relocated under the institutional tutelage of social science disciplines and aiming for theoretical generalisations and methodological sophistication to rise above the restricted knowledge of singular areas. A global world required, so the critiques claimed, a global scholarship (Teti 2007:118).

Between the overhaul of the erstwhile stability of concepts like the regional and the national, and diminishing federal funding, it seemed certain that the area studies' days were numbered. Over the course of the 1990s and in lockstep with the world-flattening vision of the so-called Washington Consensus neoliberalism (Friedman 2007), former fields of interest such as the Soviet Union and Eastern Europe were levelled down to geographies of market transformation as the state-centric vision of economic development lost much of its appeal (Makki 2004) – triggering a similar soul searching in the interdisciplinary 'twin' of area studies, development studies (Sylvester 1999:712). But we should be wary of swallowing the globalisation story in whole. Geopolitics has not gone away (Gowan 2003). If the field of Soviet Studies 'had to be reconfigured, without the generous levels of funding they had enjoyed during in the Cold War [,] the collapse of the Soviet Union had [also] rendered some areas, notably Central Asia, more visible' (Sidaway 2013:987).⁶

When the fashionable jargon of globalisation is suppressed, the area studies controversy, 'a prolonged and often acrimonious dispute' (Hanson 2009), essentially boils down to a debate among scholars fought on epistemological and methodological grounds. On one side are the theoretically oriented scholars of social science disciplines and on the other those from area studies with more concrete focus on world regions. 'Discipline-oriented scholars,' put sharply to highlight the contrast, 'have for many

⁶ On more specific and politically charged terms the utility of Middle East Studies has been questioned. It has been accused of failing to predict significant events that affected in the region. Of these the latest was a barrage of criticisms directed at the Middle East experts as they were found to be ill-equipped to foretell the momentous upheavals engulfing the region known as the Arab Spring (Gause III 2011a, 2011b). About a decade earlier, following the September 11 attacks, the area experts faced (Czwaro 2006) a far more vitriolic onslaught (cf. Lockman 2004; cf. Bein 2003; cf. Davidson 2008). In a particularly venomous diatribe, Martin Kramer claimed that the Middle East experts contributed to 'the public complacency about terrorism that ultimately left the United States vulnerable to "surprise" attack by Islamists.' Because, added Kramer, 'they underestimated [Islamism's] impact in the 1980s [,] misrepresented its role in the early 1990s [and] glossed over its growing potential for terrorism against America in the late 1990s' (2001a:56–57, see also 2001b; Gause III 2002).

years argued that the work of area specialists lacks rigor, and, above all, that it is not scientific in that it favours description over explanation, lacks analytical cumulativeness, and shows no interest in parsimony and generalization.’ From this perspective, area studies research is ‘overly preoccupied with detail and specificity’ and ‘offers little to those with broader interests, applied, as well as theoretical’ (Tessler et al. 1999:xiii–ix). From the standpoint of the other side, again strongly expressed, discipline-oriented scholars revel in ‘faddishness and oversimplification.’ They engage ‘in sterile debates about conceptual and theoretical frameworks, and with constructing highly abstract models that provide little real insight into the complex behaviour patterns or events’ (Tessler et al. 1999:xiii–ix). Their highhanded speculations have little utility for understanding the ‘real world.’

According to Pheng Cheah (2008), the discord between theoretical disciplines and area studies has three important implications. First, the separation is a division of labour. It assumes and imposes specialisation. Area studies collect raw data and generate descriptive work. Disciplines, on the other hand, are in the business of theory building. Their work is general and abstract. This division of labour leads to the second point. The different roles of theory and description, thus assigned, are not merely one of specialisation but also, more crucially, of hierarchy. The theoretical vocation of the disciplines is thought to be superior to the quotidian fact finding of area studies (Agathangelou and Ling 2004:30–31). For the disciplines are prior to area studies and provide the latter with the methodological and epistemological rules and principles.

Thirdly, the epistemological side of the controversy is essentially a re-articulation of the perennial philosophical opposition between universals and particulars (Cheah 2008:56). Disciplines, in their pursuit of the knowledge of the universal claim, to transcend the immediacy of the empirical evidence accumulated by area studies. ‘In part,’ notes Lucian Pye,

the division has been one between those who crave knowledge in the form of universal propositions and discount the merit of "mere description," and those who revere the unending uniqueness of human experiences and see mainly empty words in abstract formulations (1975:6).

What does this picture tell us about the Middle East Studies and more importantly about the historiographies of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms? It is within this setting that the Middle East Studies have come of age and internally diversified into broadly three kinds of stances (Teti 2007; see also Bilgin 2006). The first one maintains a hermeneutic understanding of the region, ‘grounded in the knowledge of languages, cultures and histories, reconstructing the story of regional politics as told and understood by the agents involved, emphasizing reliance on primary sources and fieldwork’ (Teti 2007:120). Unsurprisingly this stance is most strongly represented by historians, who, with characteristic suspicion towards theory, emphasise the irreducible nature of the region’s dynamics and their differences from the West. One may differentiate on normative grounds between an older generation, whose work was informed, in varying degrees, by Orientalism and those who do not openly subscribe to those views, but still stress the indispensability of contextual knowledge.⁷

There are two salient points that need to be stated regarding Orientalist scholarship. First, the representatives of this view assert a fundamental incompatibility between Islam and nationalism (Kedourie 1992:346; Vatikiotis 1987:42–22). These assertions are based on a double essentialism. Reductionism asserts that various forms of identity in the Middle East and in the wider Islamic world, such as class, ethnicity, gender, religion and political allegiances, can be derived from ‘one inclusive identity,’ that they can be reduced to an Islamic essence. With this move the essentialist argument ‘craft a fixed, unique, undivided, and a-historical identity bringing together all Muslims worldwide’ and to support this, they ‘first Islamicize the history of societies’ (Atabaki 2003:13–14). Once this internal homogeneity is imposed, it yields ontological exteriority. Islam as *the* defining quality of the region and as a belief system, so the argument goes, categorically opposes any form of community based on ethnicity and

⁷ The former Orientalist view has been on the back foot for the past two decades or so, but made somewhat of a comeback after September 11 attacks (most notably in Kramer 2001a). Today the latter, not-explicitly-Orientalist tendency is most clearly represented by the editorial policy of the *International Journal of Middle East Studies*, which ‘requires that articles be based on original research and the careful analysis of archival and other primary-source materials’ (<http://ijmes.chass.ncsu.edu/submissions.htm>). Closer to the latter group are the social scientists with a focus on the Middle East who subscribe to a ‘realist’ view of the region and claim to represent the world (or the part which they are specialised) as it is. According to Pinar Bilgin, the self-baptised Morgenthau of the Middle East do no more than ‘provide descriptions of current events through resorting to realist jargon in loose fashion’ (2006:581).

territoriality, hence nationalism and modernity (cf. Bromley 1993:90–94).⁸

In this vision of history, nationalism is purely an ideational phenomenon. It ‘is a doctrine invented in Europe at the beginning of the nineteenth century’ (Kedourie 1961:9). With its historical fountainhead clearly delineated, the Orientalist assumption of an epistemology of exteriority (cf. Nişancıoğlu 2013:17–19) bars nationalism from taking root in the Middle East, for modernity singularly belongs to and is attainable only in the West (cf. Matin 2013b:354). These are the assumptions that triggered the debate over whether late nationalisms were ‘of native origin or an outgrowth of national ideologies in Western Europe’ (Landau 1992:567) and led post-Orientalist scholarship to accentuate ‘local’ agency and endogenous modernisation. I return to this point below.

The second salient point is that Orientalism retains a strong, if lately challenged, institutional hold on Iranian Studies in the US (Matin-Asgari 2012; Dabashi 2007:21). But it comes with a deeply political twist. Orientalism of the Iranian Studies is distinctly nativist and nationalist. It works with an inversion of the negative qualities attributed to the purported historical continuity of the Iranian nation by Orientalism. In its inverted form the perennial Iranian nation appears as a mythical agent that has resiliently survived the centuries of tumult and turmoil. I engage with this mode of historiography in the following section.

Scholars in Political Science and related disciplines represent the second stance. They tend to ‘treat the region as a deviation from a model – usually a variant of modernisation or development paradigms – based on Western experience’ (Teti 2007:120). It is generally within this scholarship one finds self-criticisms of lack of theoretical rigour in area studies (Green 1994). Eminent scholars of the Middle East raised such concerns by stating that ‘most of us were content to describe rather than analyse’ and the field has produced ‘largely anecdotal, descriptive’ works that are

⁸ Yet, Kedourie curiously allowed the possibility of Turkish modernization without answering the obvious question: ‘if it can occur in one Muslim country, then why not in all, and what then of the alleged incompatibility of Islam and modernity?’ (Bromley 1993:92). Haim Gerber challenges the thesis of incompatibility from the other direction by arguing Islam’s inclusive treatment of ethnicities. As such, he leaves the assumption of the centrality of Islam largely untouched (2007). Gerber’s targets are not the Orientalists, but the scholars like John Armstrong (1982) and Adrian Hastings (1997), who subscribe to the so-called perennialist theory of nations and nationalism.

‘obsessed with current events’ (Anderson 1999:4, 1990). Decades earlier Manfred Halpern complained about thick empiricism prevalent in Middle East Studies, which he decried as ‘a kind of stamp-collecting, neglecting to identify essential structures and relationships’ (1962:118). Quite possibly influenced by institutional pressures and arguably internalising the charge that their research amounts to ‘mullah-watching’ (Anderson 1990:52), some Middle East specialists sounded the clarion call for scientific redemption under the roof of disciplines (Khalidi 1995:5).⁹

Turkish Studies has shown remarkable receptiveness towards these calls. ‘As a group,’ warned two *éminences grises* of the field, ‘we cannot afford to remain narrow specialists: more of us need to become members of our disciplines first and Turkish studies specialists second’ (Quataert and Sayarı 2003:x). The diagnosis they offered in the same page was not sanguine. ‘With very few exceptions,’ they observed, ‘scholars in Turkish Studies have been either content with applying the existing theories and conceptual frameworks to their studies or they have altogether ignored theoretical issues in their particular disciplines’ (2003:x). A decade later a journal of the field, *Turkish Studies*, re-opened the question of theory with a special issue (Ciddi and Levin 2014). Among the contributors to that issue, Murat Somer (2014) stressed the generally descriptive and case-specific nature of research on Turkey. And when a particular research is not bound by the descriptive specificities of Turkey, it either consumes a theory produced for *elsewhere* or forces Turkey into a most similar cases comparison.

To avoid these shortcomings, Somer appeals to Turkey’s many qualities, which for him presents a rare combination and makes it a source for theory development. In a vivid set of ‘contrasts,’ he highlights those rare qualities: ‘Turkey is Middle-Eastern and Western, a strong and a weak state, Muslim and secular, democratic with a long history of democratization and authoritarian with a long history of oppressing dissent, all at the same time’ (2014:573). Somer immediately opts for what we may call soft exceptionalism. It is not that ‘Turkey is the only country featuring an unusual collage of

⁹ Michael Hudson disagrees with these assessments: ‘I think it is fair to conclude that the field of Middle East comparative politics is actually in better shape than many of its own scholars believe. Despite bad (and probably worsening) field research conditions, inadequate funding for Ph.D. candidates and established scholars, and a certain regrettable disjunction from mainstream political science, a great deal of interesting work is being done not only by political scientists from the West but also, increasingly, from the region itself’ (2001:803).

seemingly contradictory characteristics’ but ‘one of the more difficult cases’ (2014:573). What starts as a call for theorisation, ends up with re-valorising particularity. Moreover, comparativism asserts itself. For it only follows from Somer’s reasoning that there are indeed countries out there, which are less difficult cases, hence more amenable to theorising. One could, of course, hazard a guess on which these theorisable countries might be.¹⁰

The third and the final stance are represented by the post-Orientalist scholarship emerged in the 1960s-1970s, ‘critiquing the intellectually and politically problematic assumptions of mainstream [Middle East Studies], responding to decolonization, the Arab–Israeli wars, and related global tensions.’ The central concerns of this scholarship are ‘problematizing cultural difference, writing history “from the margins” and exploring the nexus between academic analyses and political practices’ (Teti 2007:120). This is the most capacious category of the three and its application to the critical studies of Iranian and Turkish nationalism requires some further specifications. While the post-Orientalist label is certainly representative of the recent critical work on Iranian nationalism (cf. Ansari 2015:70), it does not work quite the same way for its Turkish counterpart. A better covering epithet may be social constructivism for these approaches. They are the subjects of the final section of this chapter.

¹⁰ In any case, Somer is off the mark at least in one instance. Since late 1970s, the historians and historical sociologists of the Ottoman Empire and Turkey have become part of the vibrant research community of the World Systems Theory headquartered in the Fernand Braudel Centre of the State University of New York in Binghamton. Although lost some of its appeal lately, working within this theoretical school with macro-structural ambitions, scholars have produced a prolific and influential corpus of research especially during the 1980s (İslamoğlu-İnan 1987; Kasaba 1988; Keyder 1987). It is important to note that this body of work was not merely derivative or theory-consuming, but actually contributed to the theory-building efforts of the school. I can think of no such ‘theoretical incorporation’ or disciplinary cross-fertilisation for Iranian Studies. It seems like the opposite is true.

For example, while the study of the Ottoman Empire has recently gone through a noticeable renewal and its students are eagerly participating in the so-called ‘imperial turn’ (Aymes 2013; Mikhail and Philliou 2012), same cannot be said of the histories of the dynasties ruled over the Iranian plateau and beyond. The companions and handbooks of imperial histories, covering sometimes literally all empires from the Roman Empire to the Soviet Union, does by and large ignore, most glaringly, the strongest of the Islamic dynasties ruled over the Iranian plateau, the Safavids (Doyle 1986) – let alone the Qajars. Or when it is brought in, the Safavid history is often ‘dissolved’ within a chapter on the Ottoman Empire – the implication being that the historical relevance of the Safavids is limited to their relationship with their neighbours (Burbank and Cooper 2010:133–41; Faroghi 2015). It is this lack of comparative interest that provoked Rudi Matthee to ask ‘Was Safavid Iran an Empire?’ (2010).

1.3 The Question of Modernity and the Middle Eastern Nations and Nationalisms

As I noted above, the need to address the question of modernity of Iranian and Turkish nations and nationalisms is dictated in the first instance by my earlier assertion that nations and nationalisms are modern. Secondly, at some level the different ways in which this question is handled in sub-fields gives us clues about their orientations. To start with, in so far the study of Turkish nationalism is concerned, the question of modernity is by and large, and *academically*, a non-problem. Among the scholars of the subject, there is an almost universal recognition of the belated modernity of Turkish nationalism. ‘Even by Southeast European standards,’ argues Halil Berktaş, ‘the Turks were tardy in developing a national consciousness’ (1990:101). Thus, ‘while Greek, Armenian and Bulgarian nationalisms existed in the Ottoman Empire at the end of the nineteenth century, one cannot speak of “Turkish nationalism” despite the fact that there were elements of identity (especially language) relating to “Turkishness”’ (Georgeon 2002:23). In so far as the timing of the emergence of Turkish nationalism in its programmatic form is concerned, the mainstream of Turkish historiography would generally locate this somewhere in the early twentieth century. But there is more to be said on this, to which I return shortly.

There are several supporting arguments towards the modernity of Turkish nation and nationalism. To begin with, language, for many nationalists the benchmark of any nation, cannot be the objective criterion to attribute a perennial existence to the Turkish nation. In the vast expanse of the Ottoman imperial domain,

[Turkish language] was associated with different social and occupational contexts and not necessarily with ethnicity. Ottoman Turkish – distinct from the Turkish spoken by the Turkish peasant in Macedonia, Thrace as well as Anatolia and looked down upon by speakers of the former – was the main language of Ottoman administration (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2010:77).

Such that, Kemal Karpat notes, it was only in the twentieth century Turkish language ‘acquired distinctly political dimensions’ and became an expression of the Turkish political identity (2004:435; see also Arai 1994:77).

Nor is ethnicity much of help. This is not surprising as ethnic Turks of the Ottoman Empire lived most of their lives in isolated villages, unless uprooted by environmental calamities or hurtled across the wide expanse of the empire by military conscription or settlement policies. They intermixed with numerous other ethnic and religious communities for centuries under an imperial regime, which by its very nature did not conceive cultural unity as a policy option. Ethnic identities, if we can use this designation at all, remained fluid and syncretic, and secondary to religious ones (Kasaba 2006:205–6). A similar tendency applied to the ruling classes of the Empire. More so than their ‘European’ counterparts, the Ottomans ‘projected an unabashedly pluralistic and multiethnic identity’ (Casale 2007:123).

As far as the Ottoman state is concerned, the subjects of the sultan were differentiated along religious lines. For the Ottoman imperial culture the word ‘Turk’ was a derogatory epithet. It represented ‘the ignorant and savage peasant of Anatolia’ (Kushner 1977:2; Lewis 1968:332–33). And for the Anatolian peasant, who well into the twentieth century identified himself/herself as Muslim, Turk meant a nomad, even worse, a Shi’a – that is a heretic (Georgeon 2002:35). Moreover, Turk was a European attribution, which the Ottoman elite deeply resented. As far as non-Turkish Muslims to the East are concerned, the Ottomans were, in reference to their geographical location, *Rumi* (Roman) Muslims (Kafadar 1996:1–2; Kunt 2005:191–92). Turkish ethnicity, then, is not at all conducive to establish the historical permanence of the nation. This is to a degree that even the so-called ethno-symbolist perspective in nationalism studies (Smith 1986, 2009), which insists on continuities between pre-modern ethnic communities and modern nations, treats the Turkish case, unlike the Iranian one (Gat 2017), as ‘a lost cause’ (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:8).

There was indeed a time when the modernity of Turkish nationalism or the Turkish nation was not a more or less universally accepted historiographical baseline. The early modern Republic in its zeal to give the newly formed nation its history went to extraordinary lengths to ‘nativise’ Turks into Anatolia. They turned the ancient Sumerians and Hittites into proto-Turks who putatively left their ancestral homeland in Asia escaping natural catastrophes. The climatic twist added a ‘scientific’ element to the historical narrative. Assuming the mantle of an ancient civilisation went some way to

insert the Turks into the progressive stream of Western civilisation. Not fully satisfied, Turkish History Thesis, as the overall project was called, made an even more universal claim. The Sun Language Theory asserted that all civilised languages were derived from an original proto-Turkic language (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:66–71).

As Erik Zürcher observes, ‘from 1932 onwards, the historical thesis formed the mainstay of history teaching in schools and universities. Its more extreme claims were quietly dropped from the late 1940s onwards, but traces remain even in the schoolbooks of today’ (2004:191). The motives for downplaying the spectacular elements of the Turkish nationalist history can partly be explained by the considerable influence of modernisation theory on Turkish Studies. Indeed, the Turkish case and the radicalism of its founding leader, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, was particularly attractive to the theorists who ‘inclined toward authoritarian modernism’ (Gilman 2003:31).¹¹ The difference modernisation theory introduced, or sharpened, was the logic of immanent historical discontinuity of modernity with its past. Historiographical implications of this shift are far from trivial. For it highlighted the unique achievements of the modern Turkish state and the elites that founded it at the expense of those elements that were based on, as they were, claims about a distant past with questionable ‘scientific’ credibility (cf. Ersanlı 2003:153–60). From the viewpoint of modernisation theory, Turkey, given its achievements, qualified at least for a prospective membership into the modern Western world. Ernest Gellner, who subscribed to an episodic understanding of world history and viewed transformations from one episode to the next as sharp discontinuities (cf. Martins 1974:280–84), perhaps gave one of the clearest statements on Kemalist ‘achievements’: ‘Turkey can claim that its commitment to modern political ideas owes nothing to alien imposition, and everything to an endogenous development. Turkey chose its destiny. It achieved political modernity: it was not thrust upon it’ (1994c:82).

As noted before, the case of Iranian nationalism is politically more complicated. ‘Nationalism,’ Ali Ansari observes, ‘often informed studies of Iran – consciously or

¹¹ Remarkably, Nils Gilman attributes the original use of the concept of the term to none other than Atatürk: ‘although the idea of an all-encompassing world-historical progressive process had roots in eighteenth- and nineteenth-century European thought, use of the word modernization to describe a political and economic program was first popularized by the Turkish dictator Kemal Ataturk (1880-1938), who made the “modernization of Turkey” one of his central political slogans’ (2003:30).

otherwise – and was regarded as the *sine qua non* of the pursuit of history’ (2015:70). Until the 1990s the dominant academic (and political) narrative of Iranian nationalism has been based on the so-called ‘Persian-National’ paradigm (Shahbazi 2005:100; Yarshater 1983, 1993; cf. Matin-Asgari 2012). While the basic premise of the paradigm attributes a continual national consciousness (or Iranianness) to people inhabiting the Iranian plateau, reaching as far back to the sixth century BCE, the actual ‘elements’ of Iranian identity over the *longue durée* has been subject to reformulation and redefinition. And these re-formulations and adaptations have been no less political than historiographical (Ram 2000).

Nationalist reading of Iranian history is embedded in an institutional culture which ‘regularly organize scholarly conferences and events, raise funds, dispense rank, recognition and awards, and generally play a decisive role in Iran-related academic hiring and publication’ (Matin-Asgari 2012:172). Heavyweights of this institutional setting are the International Society for Iranian Studies (ISIS), based in the United States and funding bodies such as the Foundation for Iranian Studies and the Kian Foundation. They publish the leading journals in the field, namely *Iranian Studies*, *Iran Nameh*, *Iranshenasi* along with the highly influential *Encyclopaedia Iranica*. Established scholars publishing in these journals hold the line of defence against those purportedly ‘negating Iranian identity and the existence of an Iranian nation in previous centuries, and at claiming that Iranian identity was conceived in Europe rather than in Iran’ (Quoted in Matin-Asgari 2012:172).

At least four defining features of a perennial Iranian nation can be traced, and sometimes combined (Ahmadi 2005), within the Persian-National paradigm: language (Meskoob 1992), religion (cf. Ashraf 1993), the idea of territorial continuity (Lambton 1957:12–13) and ‘race’ (cf. Zia-Ebrahimi 2011). For this paradigm, an Iranian nation as an identifiable cultural entity harks back to antiquity and has remained, or has been preserved, over the centuries, if not over the millennia. These attributions of nationness or national consciousness to pre-modern Iranians speak in different accents but share the root-language of modern nationalism and its characteristic of retrospective history writing. Yet this mode of historiography offers little factual evidence (Boroujerdi 1998:49) and operates with a highly romanticised conception of national consciousness reaching back millennia (Vaziri 1993).

Among the ‘national features’ identified above, Persian language seems to be the most popular among the nationalist and pseudo-nationalist scholars and has been treated as the main vessel of national consciousness over the centuries. Persian language, Matin-Asgari notes, is believed to have ‘preserved Iran’s nationhood or “the spiritual unity of Iranian history”’ (2012:175). As the hallmark of the Iranian nation, it is ‘an elixir that will guarantee the survival of Iranian identity’ (Boroujerdi 1998:43). Yet as late as the second half of the nineteenth century ‘probably no more than half of Qajar subjects spoke Persian (with vast regional variations in dialect—for example, Gilaki—so that even fewer peasants spoke a mutually comprehensible Persian)’ (Cole 1996:37). Given this, there is little need to trail the nationalist view of Iranian history back centuries to assess its claims on the nation-preserving powers of the Persian language. Here is a presentation of the linguistic landscape of Iran in the nineteenth century by one of its leading historians. Variety of languages and their dialects is plainly staggering.

Iran was, as *it still is*, a land of linguistic minorities. In the Persian, Bakhtiari, Luri, or Armenian; the nomadic tribes Bakhtiari, Qashqayi, Baluchi, Arabic, or Mamasani. In the Caspian provinces, the peasantry used Gilaki, Taleshi, or Mazandarani; the townsmen Persian and the Azeri dialect of Turkish; the tribes Kurdish or the Turkoman dialect of Turkish. The inhabitants of Azerbaijan were predominantly Azeri-speaking; but the region also had pockets of Tat and Armenian settlements, and of Kurdish, Shahsavani, Turkoman, Afshar, and Qareh Daghi tribesmen. The western provinces consisted predominantly of Kurdish, Luri, and Arab tribes; and partly of Afshar, Azeri, Persian, Bayat, Gurani, and Assyrian settlements. Moreover, many of the Kurdish valleys had developed their own Kurdish dialects. The southeastern provinces contained Baluchi, Arab, Afghan, Afshar, Kurdish, and Nowshirvani tribesmen. Finally, the northeastern region was populated with Persians, Azeris, Turkomans, Kurds, Arabs, Shahsavans, Afshars, Jamshids, Tajiks, Afghans, Qajars, Hazaras, Bayats, and Baluchis (Abrahamian 1982:14–15, emphasis added).

Rasmus Christian Elling puts the recent estimates for non-Persian languages spoken in Iran as Turkic and Turkic dialects 26%, Kurdish 9%, Luri 2%, Balochi 1%, Turkish 1%, other 2% (2013:20).

There is a counter-argument. It is contended that these languages and dialects are actually members of a wider linguistic family (Ahmadi 2005:133–34) or, in its milder version, they have over the centuries developed enough mutual affinities by way of exchange to deserve the epithet of a linguistic family, of which the linguistic wellspring is, unsurprisingly, Persian. Mostafa Vaziri exposes the nationalistic distortion of this line of argumentation.

What does a Kurd have in common with a Gilaki, given that their languages, traditions, and histories have been totally dissimilar? The philological answer provided was that they both belong to an Iranian language family. But this ignored the fact that neither Kurds nor the Gilakis ever used the term Iranian in their tradition. Furthermore, the classification of the Iranian language family was a recent academic undertaking; thus, the proposition that an Iranian consciousness had existed among the speakers of these language families in the past is improper and anachronistic (1993:5).

The case for Shi'ism as the main element of a continuous Iranian collective identity has a more directly political reference. It is traced back to the centralising efforts of the Safavid rule (1501-1736) and its imposition of Shi'ism as the official religion of the imperial domain (Dale 2010:77–105).¹² For example, historian Nikki Keddie claims that '*even though* Iran has numerous ethnic groups whose first language is not Persian and has seen several autonomist movements, the common Shi'i heritage has been significant social glue except in the few border areas where Sunnis predominate' (2006:318, emphasis added).¹³ But, as Abrahamian maintains, Shi'ism, although practiced by the majority of the population, has also been a source of fragmentation. Next to the main official Twelver branch existed many older sects such as Ismailis. Moreover, the

¹² The claim draws also on the geopolitics of collective identity, as the main regional rival of the changing dynasties of the Iranian plateau remained constant through the centuries: the Sunni Ottoman Empire. The eminent historian of the Qajar period, Fereydoun Adamiyat, on the other hand, identified the nature of the conflict as 'nationalist rather religious' (1949:237). Tellingly, he was quick to add that the quality of nationhood did not apply to the Kurds, as the designation of Kurdistan 'was merely a geographical expression' (1949:237).

¹³ Keddie does not subscribe to the view that the Safavid Empire was a (proto) national state: 'The Safavids are often seen as founders of the modern Iranian state. This is because (1) they unified a large territory comparable to modern Iran and (2) they established a common religious and cultural base centring on Shi'ism. It is, however anachronistic to present this as a national state, and the Shi'i religious identity, which the Safavids partly forced on Iranians to distinguish them from the Sunni Ottoman and Uzbek enemy states, was more important than any hints at a national identity' (1999:8).

nineteenth century Iran experienced major religious schisms in the form of Shaykhism and Babism. The religious picture was further complicated by the existence of Sunni Muslims, Armenian and Assyrian Christians, Jews and Zoroastrians. These cleavages found their expression in settlement patterns that sustained divisions (1982:15–18). In terms of the administrative reach of the state, policies imposing Shi'ism time and again acted as force for fragmentation and at their height, during the Safavid period, 'gradually eroded the tribal support for the empire on the Sunni periphery' (Amanat 2017:135).

Of the elements said to be the sources of pre-modern Iranian national consciousness, the purported territorial continuity appears to be least convincing – save for the now thoroughly discredited racial argument.¹⁴ Whenever it is raised, it is immediately qualified in some form. Acknowledging the modernity of the nations, Keddie nonetheless allows Iran an exception: 'however, in the case [of] Iran the concept of an entity called either Iran, *Iranshahr*, or a related term, is an ancient one, going back into pre-Islamic times and continuing during the early centuries of Islam' (1999:1–2; cf. MacKenzie n.d.). But immediately follows the qualification that 'there were long periods, especially after the Muslim conquest, when "Iran" was a geographical expression, and there was no real Iranian state, and Iran was either part of a larger Islamic state or saw numerous small and often ephemeral dynasties that sometimes included both Iranian and non-Iranian territories' (1999:3).

Sometimes even these qualifications are dropped and romanticism, if not mysticism, is substituted in their stead. Roy Mottahedeh provides one of the most stark examples: 'Iran, a land with over two millennia of consciousness of itself' (1985:10). But, as

¹⁴ The Aryan Myth was originally developed in the eighteenth century with the European intellectual discovery of India and the Sanskrit language. The search for common linguistic origins (the Indo-European language family) was transformed into a full blown racial argument in the course of the nineteenth century that in effect turned the Persians into members of an extended Indo-European kinship (Ansari 2012:13–14). Reza Zea-Ibrahimi's work exposes the farcical nature of these claims: 'since the discovery of Nazi Germany's death camps, the authority of the Aryan discourse in the West has at long last eroded, and the designation "Aryan race" has fallen into disuse except for a few publications of the most dubious scientific integrity, sometimes with evident racist and pro-Nazi leanings. Nevertheless, Iranians continue to nonchalantly refer to the *nezhād-e āriyāyi* [the Aryan race] and their alleged belonging to this family that would include Europeans' (2011:446–47). In any case, the doctrines of Aryanism, as Ali Ansari observes, had never found much support among the leading nationalists thinkers in Qajar Iran (2017:101).

Kashani-Sabet notes, it was only with the first Russo-Persian war of 1804 that ‘the story of Iran's journey toward nationhood’ commenced. The war marked ‘an episode that resulted in the loss of territory for Iran’ and ‘this defeat altered the geographic contours of the country and ignited the spirited discourse that advocated political reform and patriotism (*vatan parasti*). The contraction of frontiers forced a reconsideration of the country's political institutions’ (1999:4). It is only then that the question of territory became politicised and only later in the century became nationalised.

With regards to the empirically hazier claim that pre-modern Iran as a geographical entity was more ‘a concept of cultural identity than a national one’ (Keddie 1999:2), Hamid Dabashi recounts a colleague’s recollection from fieldwork that negates, albeit anecdotally, the supposed attachment of its inhabitants to a national-geographical entity called Iran.

Shahla Haeri, a distinguished Iranian anthropologist and a good friend of mine, told me once that when she was doing fieldwork in a remote village in Iran, she told one of the villagers, ‘Next time I come to Iran, I will bring you’ one thing or another. ‘Where is Iran?’ the villager asked. ‘I don’t know that village. Is it near here?’ (2007:20)

Abbas Amanat offers a more reasonable argument in his monograph that covers the vast expanse of Iran’s history since the age of Safavids. Amanat argues that the Safavid defeat at the hand of the Ottomans in Chaldiran (1514) commenced the geopolitical reality of a political entity with boundaries by curtailing Shi’i messianic revolution. But, he adds, in no uncertain terms, that this was not, not for centuries to come, modern nationhood (Amanat 2017:58 and 75).

The continuity thesis has shaped nationalist Iranian historiography in several ways. First, the attribution of a perennial existence to the Iranian nation shows an uncanny resemblance to the arguments deployed by Orientalist historians. These ‘discursive affinities’ (Tavakoli-Targhi 2001:4–8) between nationalism and Orientalism can be better observed if we compare the examples cited above with an oft-quoted passage from the work of an eminent nineteenth-century Orientalist, Sir John Malcolm:

Though no country has undergone, during the last twenty centuries, more revolutions than the Kingdom of Persia, there is, perhaps, none that less altered in its condition. The power of the sovereigns, and of the satraps of ancient times; the gorgeous magnificence of the court; the habits of the people; their division into citizens, martial tribes, and savage mountaineers; the internal administration; and the mode of warfare; have continued essentially the same: and the Persians, as far as we have means of judging, are at the present period, not a very different people from what they were in the time of Darius, and the Nousheervan (1815:621).

Nationalist historiography has in effect given a positive valence ('glorification of the past') to continuity, which for Orientalism symbolised the Asiatic stasis. This glorification basically inverted the premises of Orientalists historiography, but has done so on 'the common ground' of 'an uninterrupted link between present and pre-Islamic past' (Atabaki 2003:6).

As I noted before, the pervasiveness of the nationalist bias in the historiography of Iran has an unmistakable institutional and geopolitical ring to it. Iranian Studies, as developed in the United States during the Cold War generally upheld a positive view of the Pahlavi dynasty (Schaar 1979:74–78), which remained mostly in the slipstream of American foreign policy in the Middle East. Moreover, the Shah was generous in providing funding for the study of Iran in the United States as he wished to 'bolster [his regime's] connections with American academic institutions and enhance its reputation, especially after the sharp rise in oil prices in 1973 put much greater resources at [his] disposal' (Lockman 2016:212 and 320, note 14). Seen through this prism of the geopolitics of area studies, Hamid Dabashi's assessment seems on the mark. 'The field of Iranian Studies,' he argues, 'is a direct descendant of old-fashioned Orientalism, through the intermediary of Cold War-initiated area studies, albeit now mostly inhabited by native scholars, a nativist disposition, and cast in entirely domesticated and (ultra) nationalistic terms' (2007:21).

Secondly, it is not always clear, who actually preserved, or indeed *who was*, the pre-modern Iranian nation. For lack of historical evidence, some nebulous Iranian elite is given credit for being perennially nationalist (Moazami 2013:24–25). In so far the

historical agency is concerned, the problem is not so much the existence of pre-modern ethnic solidarity among elites or the study of it. The latter is a legitimate, if highly contested, research topic with an established school of its own (Özkırımlı 2010:143–68; Smith 2009). In that sense the argument sounds reasonable enough that a Persian collective of state officials, like the Chinese mandarins, has survived the vicissitudes of history, because they rendered an essential and much sought after service to the changing rulers of the Iranian plateau, who were in most cases of military background and of non-Persian ethnicity. But even then it does not follow that these people hedged their loyalty with their Iranian nation. As Craig Calhoun points out, ‘a web of interpersonal relationships locates a person locally, but membership in the category “nation” locates people in complex, globally integrated world’ (1997:7).

The question of agency takes its toll also on otherwise serious historians, when they, wittingly or unwittingly, reproduce the tropes of nationalist historiography. According to Abbas Amanat, ‘at least since the third century CE there was a well-defined political concept, an imperial entity with a centralized authority, called *Iranshahr* (Kingdom of Iran) and located it in *Iranzamin* (the land of Iran).’ He concedes that this concept ‘no doubt was modified, if not altogether lost.’ Yet its memories ‘did not entirely fade.’ But when it comes to identifying the agency, that is, who kept these memories fresh, historian’s instincts catches up with Amanat and forces him to qualify his position and to use passive voice:

It is possible to argue that the act of remembering a cultural past and identifying with its real or imagined accomplishments is particularly strong in critical junctures. During times of social upheaval when the state no longer is capable of and willing to safeguard and enforce a collective identity, memories are preserved through popular legends and poetic narrative (2012:4–5).

Here, the affinities of Amanat’s position with standard nationalist narratives are unmistakable. The nation perseveres, even without a potent state, in the face of historical misfortunes. But for Amanat, it is only ‘possible’ but not certain to argue that memories ‘are preserved.’ The use of passive voice is telling. The missing historical agency of a human collective is substituted by ‘popular’ literary form – vessels with no consciousness or historical agency. The substitution does not in effect make much of a

difference, for there is little, if any, consciousness or agency is attributed to the members of the Iranian nation. As Zia-Ebrahimi observes, the role of the Iranians in Iranian nationalist history ‘is limited to their maintenance – time and again – of a distinct culture, language, and way of life after a series of invasions by alien races’ (2016:6).

Thirdly, there is the problem of the habitual cursory use of concepts such as nation, nationalism, and national consciousness to cover centuries of history and the passing of imprecise and speculative historical assertions without analytical rigour and conceptual clarity. This kind of ‘scissors-and-paste’ history, wherein a ‘general assertion accompanied by brief examples’ (Breuilly 2005:15) requires considerable conceptual stretching to compensate for the dearth of empirical evidence. Yet, such elasticity is immediately followed by heavy empirical qualifications that reduce the concepts to floating and freely interchangeable designators. Richard Cottam, *inter alia*, provides a stark example of this. ‘Iran, in fact,’ he argues, ‘is an excellent example of a state in which national consciousness can be clearly identified for many centuries.’ Only to shift from national consciousness to nationalism in the next sentence: ‘but the importance of nationalism as a primary determinant of Iranian attitudes and political behaviour is largely confined to the twentieth century’ (1979:5). As Elling points out, after almost a century of state policies toward homogenisation, the ethnic composition of Iran retains its diversity. The population of almost 80 million is composed of Persian 51%, Azeri 24%, Gilaki and Mazandrani 8%, Kurd 7%, Arab 3%, Lur 2%, Baloch 2%, Turkmen 2%, other 1% (Elling 2013:18).

Finally, this perennialist understanding of the Iranian nation relieves historical explanation from any need of identifying causal mechanisms. Since national consciousness has always been there, in one form or another, the difficulties of empirical demonstration, not to mention sociological explication, are papered over. Yet the dubious claims of national consciousness cannot stand the available historical record. Juan Cole details a very different social and political landscape of Iran in the nineteenth century, which deserves to be quoted in full:

The Qajar empire in the second half of the nineteenth century simply was not a nation-state...Although a majority were formally Shi’ite Muslims, many

peasants practiced a magical folk religion far removed from the bookish world of the seminarian, and very large numbers of Qajar subjects had other religious identities, such as Christian, Jewish, Sunni, Zoroastrian, Isma'ili, Ahl-i Haqq, Babi and Baha'i. A third of the population was Turkic in language and heritage, and many other ethnicities, such as Lur, Arab, Kurdish and Baluchi, were encompassed by the Qajar state (even today, millions of women in particular among these linguistic minorities know little or no Persian). Literacy was almost certainly extremely low, something on the order of two or three percent, and a substantial portion of the population was pastoral nomads with no strong sense of territorial patriotism (nomads were perhaps fifty percent of Iranians in 1800, twenty-five percent in 1900). Iranian national identity was not an existent that needed to be symbolized, but an idea yet to be realized. This is not intended to deny that forms of ethnic identity existed on the premodern Iranian plateau, that Persian-speakers recited Firdawsi (and other poets) in village gatherings, or that these individuals conceived of Iran as a geographical notion or that some had a sentimental attachment to it. None of these phenomena, however, adds up to a nation in the modern sense. (1996:37).

Other concrete evidence can support Cole's overview of the composition of the Qajar society. Nineteenth century Iran, let alone previous centuries, was far from supporting the objective pre-conditions of nation building. The urban population did not constitute more than 10% of the total at the start of the twentieth century (Amanat 2017:14) and this effectively limited, in plain numerical terms, the size of the public sphere, public education and other 'homogenising' tools indispensable to any nation building effort by states. Moreover, the tribal pastoralists constituted 40% of the population at the same period. Given that 'the vast territories under tribal control were virtually off limits to the state's direct control' (Amanat 2017:14). The myth of the ancient Iranian nation is just that; something that has been formulated in the twentieth century, which no recognisable objective reality previously.

It makes little difference whether an author openly subscribes to the ideology of nationalism or not. For both in nationalist historiography and variety of approaches that posits the existence of nations long before modernity (cf. Smith 2000:34–51), we are offered 'a tunnel narrative in which the national, after a long subterranean existence, finally comes to the surface' (Breuilly 2011:66). Nationalism then becomes in effect a

non-problem, since its existence can be derived from an ontologically prior and historically durable national essence.

1.4 Where in the World did Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms Come from?

What about those who do not treat nationalism as a non-problem? There are, indeed, scholars who deploy critical approaches to the study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms – more numerous in the latter than the former due to reasons discussed above. They utilise a range of critical methods that are derived from schools of thought such as postcolonialism, poststructuralism, gender studies and discourse analysis (Özkırımlı 2005). Their critical spirit makes it possible for us to classify these approaches under the third stance of post-Orientalist approaches in Middle East Studies, but a more inclusive epithet seems to be social constructivism. Because if there is one common denominator that can bring these new approaches together, it is their epistemological commitment to the principle of social construction of reality, more specifically the social construction of the modern nation as apposed to its inherent naturalness or perennial history. In this, they agree with the macro-structurally oriented modernist theories of nationalism. But how does this commitment translate into research? In what ways do they overcome the particularism of the nationalist histories? A brief survey shall document that the critical spirit of these scholars does not quite lift them over the fence to land them on the theoretical side of the division.

One type of attempt toward generalisation points to the hybrid formation of nationalism and refrains from pigeonholing Iranian or Turkish into an existing type. Amy Mills, for example, sees Turkish nationalism that guided the secular and modernist reforms of the early Republican Turkey as ‘modelled after European nationalisms’ (2014:694), without naming any particular types or stipulating any analytical means to differentiate the ingredients of the mix. Çağlar Keyder is somewhat more specific when he argues that ‘Turkish nationalism was shaped in the general context of nineteenth-century “late-comer” nationalisms following the German example’ (2005:3). Essentially a comparative attempt, these designators are almost always presented in the introductory

passages as if their suggestive qualities are entirely transparent to the reader and they are rarely, if ever, elaborated.

A second type of generalisation comes in the form of classification. More often than not, researchers grab for the most readily available, but widely challenged, distinction between civic and ethnic nationalism. Günay Göksu Özdoğan, for one, claims that ‘the Kemalist vision and project of Turkish nation-building had both a territorial-political and an ethnocultural basis, attempting to forge a synthesis between French and German conceptions of nation’ (2010:49). Similarly, Feride Aslı Ergül stresses that

Turkish nationalism is the amalgam of several socio-political processes of different fractions and it includes both ethnic and civic approaches in it. It may be possible to claim that it evolved into a more civic form in time, but its ethnic expressions can not be totally ignored’ (2009:188).

Ali Ansari observes that the ‘ambitions [of early Iranian nationalists] were to emulate Anglo-American ideas of civic nationalism’ and this aspect of their thought is ‘often neglected in favor of a more Francophone approach, even though it might be argued that this somewhat more homogenous and elite-led reading of nationalism was more favored by Turkish rather than Iranian nationalists’ (2015:76).

This comparativist and classificatory theme is sometimes supplanted by direct references to the theoretical literature on nationalism. But this also yields more confusion than clarity. For example, Firoozeh Kashani-Sabet declares, in an endnote, that her analysis of nationalism is informed by the works of – in the order she presents them – Benedict Anderson, Partha Chatterjee, Homi Bhabha, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm (2002:179, note 1). This mixed bag approach to theory may very well be attributed to the sensible position that no one theory can explain Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Yet, she does not invoke such reasoning. Absent that, it escapes Kashani-Sabet that without identifying any means to adjudicate between notoriously incommensurable theoretical premises of these scholars, her assortment amounts merely to a list of eminent theorists of nationalism. At a minimum, I think, the reader is invited to understand that she subscribes to a broadly understood modernist view of

nationalism. But modernity of Iranian nationalism, so it appears, is not an obstacle to its particularity.

The historiography on Iranian nationalism is varied and multifaceted, much like the changing icons of the nationalists themselves...There are many different emphases in Iranian nationalism, including linguistic, territorial, ethnic, and religious. What is perhaps *unique* to the nationalist discourse in Iran is the way in which the varying emphasis on these complementary but often competing articulations of nationalism has transformed Iranian politics in radical ways (Kashani-Sabet 2002:162, emphasis added).

The assertion of uniqueness, or the denial of theory, is not substantiated. Understandably so, because the assertion congeals the dubious corollary that other nationalist discourses are monolithic in their claims on history and politics. In the end, we need just one other instance to refute any claim to uniqueness on this score of competing articulations (see Bora 2003; Özkırımlı 2011).

Occasionally, a particular theorist makes a cameo appearance. In one such instance, Soner Çağaptay strings together several disparate quotes from the works of Anthony D. Smith to make a case for the importance of ethnic myths, traditions, symbols and memories for the constitution of the Turkish nation. He then boldly asserts that ‘this model of nationalism sheds light on the ascent of Turkish nationalism before, during, and after the First World War, when the Ottoman Empire fell and the modern Turkish nation arose’ (2006:4). This sentence alone fundamentally contradicts his initial endorsement of ethno-symbolist theory. Because, instead of deep historical continuities central to his theoretical choice, we are now offered a discontinuous view of history (empire, then nation) – a view that is associated, more than any other, with modernisation theory. In any case, Çağaptay’s engagement takes no more than a paragraph and he later makes another passing reference to Smith. Nowhere does he reflect on the inherent complications the history of Turkish nationalism presents for the ethno-symbolist thesis (see Canefe 2002:134).

Such a miscellany of textual evidence could of course be challenged on the grounds of citing circumstantial evidence. But that is precisely the point I am trying to get across.

For not only the engagement with theories of nationalism is few and far between in the specialised literature, there remains only *one* systematic effort to ‘analytically assess... how Iran’s modern history adds to, or complicates’ the claims of the theories of nationalism’ (Marashi 2014:4). At the time of writing, there was no such effort for the case of Turkish nationalism. It seems reasonable, then, to argue that the literatures on Iranian and Turkish nationalisms suffer from theoretical confusion and poverty, albeit in various ways. And this disjuncture between theory and history is not peculiar to our cases, for they are only two instances of a much pervasive malaise.

At present, the field [of nationalism studies] is saturated with a vast number of abstract theoretical works and individual histories with relatively little interaction between the two. Theorists of nationalism generally refrain from applying their ideas to particular nationalisms, contenting themselves with passing references to a limited number of cases for illustrative purposes. Historians of nationalism, on the other hand, remain innocent of recent theoretical developments in the field, embracing, more often than not, descriptive narratives of particular nationalisms. (Özkırımlı 2010:219).

Prevalent as this malaise maybe, this cannot be our ultimate judgement. If it were, there would remain the problematic implication that the specialised literature must genuflect before the general theories and fit the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalism to their models. As I try to demonstrate in the next chapter, such an option would generate its own problems. For the theories of nationalism, as the quote from Umut Özkırımlı points out, are not exactly customised for case studies – certainly not, I would add, for late nationalisms. Then, we must press the argument forward. But towards which direction should we turn?

There is at least one more way – which I can think of – to evaluate the theoretical substance of the specialised literature on Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Our substantive conclusion from the previous section is, in Eric Hobsbawm’s phrasing, that ‘nations do not make states and nationalisms but the other way round’ (1992:10). But this *general* principle needs a diachronic elaboration across space – that is, the ‘diffusion’ and multiplication of nationalisms needs to be empirically accounted for their differential timings of emergence in multiple places by, in relation to or in search

of states. After all, nationalisms and states did not make their nations simultaneously. As such, if we cannot derive nationalism from the particular and internal histories of the Iranian or the Turkish nation, then the available analytical move points towards, to retain the terminological parity, ‘external’ sources.

In the specialised literature, the notion of externality, as it determines the conditions of the early formation of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, has three valences, all of which are vital to the argument developed in this thesis and they will receive their due attention in the following chapters. For the time being, let us see how they are understood in the specialised literature. Of these valences of externality, the first one is historically straightforward. Nationalism is of Western European origin. It matters little for our purposes whether this was the revolutionary France (Kedourie 1961:12–13), the Spanish colonies in South America (Anderson 2006:47–65), the cross-Atlantic world of republican revolutions (Sewell Jr. 2004) or the first modern capitalist society, England (Greenfeld 1992:29–87). We cannot write this historical fact off. No amount of ahistorical mystification of *Iranzamin* (the land of Iran) (see, for example, Sharifi 2013:2–3) or reinvention of the Ottomans as Turks (Deringil 1998), along with the ample number of references above, can convincingly ‘naturalise’ nationalism (and nations for that matter) into the ‘pre-modern’ times in order to circumvent nationalism’s non-native origins. Indeed, Ali Ansari, in his monograph on Iranian nationalism, makes this as its entry point to resolve the problem of hermeneutical circle: ‘one difficulty in analysing any ideological process is to know where to enter the debate.’ His answer is a chronological one: ‘given the dominance of Western thought on the development of Iranian nationalism, it seems relevant to start with the impact of the West in the latter half of the nineteenth century’ (2012:3). Jacob Landau, posing the problem from what seems to be at the international relations angle, argues that ‘Turkish nationalism developed largely as a response to competing forms of patriotism among non-Turkish entities both within the Ottoman Empire and outside it’ (1992:567).¹⁵

The second externality is that of the nationalisms of the ethnic and/or religious minorities. This dimension of externality is particularly visible in the case of Turkish

¹⁵ A sub-species of this first externalist source are the linguistic and historical works of Orientalists and Turcologists in the nineteenth century, which provided nationalists with templates of nationalist history (Özkırımlı and Sofos 2008:32; Tavakoli-Targhi 2001:4–8).

nationalism, because earlier nationalists of Greeks, Serbs and Bulgarians had, in varying degrees, the blessings and the support of external powers like Britain and the Russian Empire, and also because these nationalism ‘eventually’ led to the disintegration of the Empire (Davison 1986).

The third externality relates the geographical origins of the early nationalist thinkers like Yusuf Akçura, Ahmet Ağaoğlu and İsmail Gaspiralı. These émigré intellectuals were mostly the subjects of the Russian Empire who arrived with the waves of immigrations following the Tsarist drive of conquest reaching to areas with large Muslim populations such as the Crimea, the Caucasus and Central Asia over the course of the nineteenth century.

The way in which history of nationalism integrates these factors has been overwhelmingly done by retaining an ontological distinction between internal and external dimension of a society that is transformed into a nation. Surely, the exogenous factors are relevant, but they are relevant at the point of impact. The recent social constructivist and revisionist approaches work with a linear causal mechanism when it comes to explaining the emergence of nationalism. Because they wish to expose nationalism’s modernity, they have to accept that it came from Western Europe. So the impact of the West is empirically registered. But once it does its job and acts as a trigger or a source, then the analysis turns inwards. What is introduced empirically is excluded theoretically, because the narrative structure retains the separation of external and internal that is connected with linear, not ontologically constitutive, causality. Rather paradoxically, what starts as an epistemological challenge to nationalism ends up tacitly accepting the national unit of analysis. In other words, critical studies of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms fall prey to methodological nationalism (Martins 1974:276–78).

1.5 Conclusion

This chapter tried to identify the parallels between two disconnections. The first is the one between social science disciplines and area studies, and the second between the theories of nationalism and the histories of nationalism. This is not an exercise in perfect congruity, because nationalism studies remain an interdisciplinary endeavour

where paradigmatic coherence has proved to be not only an elusive quest, but also deemed unfavourable. In this sense, the antagonistic nature of the area studies controversy is not directly replicated in nationalism studies between general theories and particular. This is for the simple reason that theorists of nationalism have not cohered around rigidified disciplinary structures and therefore they have not claimed 'scientific' primacy or exercised institutional boundary maintenance. But the empirical referent of theory both for the disciplines and the theories of nationalism remains the modern Euro-American historical development, which masquerades as the universal, thus fails to digest cases of late nationalisms.

More importantly, the 'non-theoretical' sides of the both disconnections suffer from internalism. This can partially be explained by the intellectual socialisation the scholars within the general logic of area studies, whether or not they study the histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms. This general outlook is well captured by Pinar Bilgin.

[A] concern shared by many Middle Eastern scholars that existing theories lack explanatory value in the Middle Eastern context. This incongruity between social science theories and Middle Eastern 'realities', in turn, is a symptom of a broader problem—that is, the limited utility of 'standard' concepts and theories within 'non-Western' contexts. This is one reason why many students of the Middle East, who were frustrated in their efforts to 'fit' existing theories to Middle Eastern experiences, have increasingly turned away from doing theory-informed work and sought solace in assumptions of 'Middle Eastern exceptionalism' (meaning that the Middle East requires narratives specific to itself), thereby further reinforcing a restricted notion of 'theory' as something that the 'theorists' do (Bilgin 2006:579).

Following Bilgin's lead, this thesis turns to theories of nationalisms to see in they are indeed of 'limited utility.'

Chapter 2

Poverty of Theory: The Challenge of Late Nationalisms

2.1 Introduction

The previous chapter maintained that the gulf between theory and history runs deep in an institutional culture that has founded and sustained a division of labour between social science disciplines and area studies. This division of labour has imposed on area studies in general and Middle East Studies in particular an inferior role within an epistemological hierarchy that privileges the theoretical vocation of social science disciplines over the empirical toiling of area studies. In response to this imposition many of the Middle East specialists have distanced themselves from theories, which they consider as irrelevant to the region's dynamics, and have retreated into narrative description. Seen in this light, the detachment of area studies from the disciplines is more a question of sociology of knowledge than one inherent in their subject matters.

Drawing a parallel with this separation, I also made references to scholars who express their disapproval of a similar situation in the field of nationalism studies wherein general theories and empirical studies exist side by side with little interaction. To some degree, the particularism prevalent among the students of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, which I documented in the previous chapter, can be attributed to their 'academic socialisation' in area studies, but it is not fully reducible to it. The separation between theories and histories of nationalism (or between the general and the particular) has its own characteristics attributable to the ways in which nationalism studies as a field has developed.

One critical conclusion from the preceding analysis is that in so far as the historiography of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms is concerned, the separation is more often habitually observed than critically questioned. The existing engagements with the theories of nationalism, frequently no more than brief allusions to particular theorists, remain fragmented in their aims and fall short of mobilising their critiques as resources

for an alternative theorisation of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Generally non-cumulative reviews of different theorists identify the shortcomings of the theories vis-à-vis the specific empirical case and often make, wittingly or unwittingly, a tacit case for exceptionalism (Bayar 2014:6–12; Yaghoubian 2014:5–24). Without critical edge, they do not go beyond the minimum conventional requirements of literature review.

This is the point where this chapter picks up its thread. Histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, I argue, need to systematically and critically engage with theories of nationalism to expose their shortcomings and to recover their explanatory potential where possible. Only then can alternative theoretical resources be proposed. Mere assertions that theories of nationalism cannot capture the ‘reality’ of Middle Eastern nationalisms will not do. Therefore, this chapter is not seeking to recycle the misgivings of the area specialists and be done with it. Instead, it investigates the theoretical side of the theory/history disjuncture with a focus on the so-called modernist theories of nationalism – the dominant ‘paradigm’ of the field (Smith 1998) – in order to *avoid* the barren conclusion that history is history and theory is theory, and never the twain shall meet. In that sense, the guiding question of this chapter can be formulated as follows: *What is it about theories of nationalism that renders them inapplicable for the histories of late developing nationalisms in general and Iranian and Turkish nationalisms in particular?*

The need for such an engagement with theories of nationalism is not a figment of my imagination. It is necessitated by the phenomenon itself. The global history of modernity presents us the challenge that it has been an age wherein ‘differences were increasingly expressed in similar ways’ (Bayly 2004:2). Since nationalism has been the most prevalent form of expressing collective identity and difference in the modern world, this requires generalising inquiry. As Maria Todorova points out in the same vein, ‘in assessing the nationalist phenomenon in a global framework, the great puzzle is, of course, the remarkable similarity of both the institutional forms of nationalism and of the national imaginary’ (2005:149; see also Thiesse 2005:122). Nationalism, for all its claims for particularity, is *also* general. As such, nationalisms intriguingly resemble one another. And that likeness warrants theorisation.

If this is so, then the first place one needs to look at is the theoretical literature on the subject. How do theories address this puzzle and why have the ways in which they do this not been illuminating for Iranian and Turkish nationalisms? In analytical terms, I try to address these questions by tracing them in two different theoretical registers. The first is the causal core of theories. Almost all modernist theories, attempting at some form of generalisation, try to determine the historical preconditions that made nationalism possible or necessary. They try to explain ‘one social fact by another’ (Aya 2006:117). The causal core of the theories is often, I argue, where the problem of internalism can be found in its starkest form.

And this was my second preliminary claim in the Introduction: the modernist theories cannot account for the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms and this generates *the poverty of theory* in nationalism studies. Because, I also claimed, that this poverty is a by-product of internalism, which is a legacy of classical social theory (Poggi 1965; Tenbruck 1994). Internalist theories treat societies as closed systems. Social change is ‘thus viewed as a process that is internal to societies, and cultural differences among various peoples explain their different rates of development’ (Magubane 2005:95). There is one more layer to internalism. The model for this ontologically singularly conceived internal social change is derived from the historical experience of Western Europe (Matin 2013b:354). In more specific terms, the causal mechanism (if x, then nationalism) is abstracted from this particular historical experience yet treated as a universally iterative sequence.

The second theoretical register concerns the fact that nationalism exists in the multiple. One way or another every theorist is confronted with the historical and geographical variety of nationalism and seeks to address this theoretically. This generally takes two forms. A theorist either introduces a temporal and/or developmental distinction between early (almost always European) and late (almost always non-European) nationalisms or takes the multiplicity of nationalism as the baseline and offers typologies to handle the variety of the phenomenon. These are not mutually exclusive forms of explanation and one can find examples where they are combined. One commentator points out the significance of this issue for any theory of nationalism:

It may not be necessary for a theory of nationalism to explain the emergence of the

original national states but it must surely explain why, once in existence, this form of political organization has proved so attractive, why it is so appropriate for a society attempting to develop, otherwise we have no more than a theory of international imitation in which the nation state is, for unexplained reasons, worthy of imitation (Orridge 1981:184).

It is at the intersection of these two theoretical registers I seek the answer to the question identified above. Because it is in the relationship between these registers one can trace the relationship of theory to history. Often, theory is built from the substantive history of early nationalisms, through which that history is effectively de-historicised and is elevated to the status of the universal and, *then*, applied to the history of late nationalisms, if at all. In a sense, the logic of comparativism is inscribed in all modernist theories of nationalism, where the history of early nationalisms serves as the constant, the ideal-typical, the theoretical and the history of late nationalisms as the divergent, the particular and the empirical – much like the distinction between the disciplines and the areas. Indeed, the distinction between the early and the late corresponds to the distinction between the theoretical and the empirical (Mongia 2007:388).

This comparativist undercurrent of nationalism studies, more generally known as Eurocentrism, is intimately tied to the problem of internalism (cf. Anievas and Martin 2016a). And the mishandling of the relationship between theory and the history of nationalism is not the making of nationalism studies. To reiterate, it is a legacy inherited from classical social theory, which, Anthony Smith pointed out 40 years ago, did not recognise the diffusion of nationalism as a specific problem that needed attention (1978:236). The very fact that nationalism does not simply have *a* history and *a* geography, but histories and geographies, escaped the founders of social theory, and their later followers.

This chapter is organised around three important problems in the theoretical literature: internalism of the general theories, static historiography of comparativism and under-specificity of theories of ‘late nationalism.’ Each problem is treated under a separate section and in each section I review the works of two notable theorists. Admittedly, all of the pairings make somewhat strange bedfellows, but I try to justify my choices by

establishing common elements and concerns. I do not claim that the problems identified for a specific pair of theorists afflicts them in the same manner.

To that end the first section reviews the works of Ernest Gellner and Benedict Anderson. As social scientists Gellner and Anderson develop general theories of nationalism as part of a broader concern. They offer nothing less than macro historical sociologies of modernity within which nationalism plays a crucial role and their theories represent the most potent forms of internalism.

Historians Miroslav Hroch and John Breuilly represent the second pairing here. As seasoned historians they hold an occupation-induced suspicion towards general theory. Yet they do not retreat into particularism. They deploy concepts and methods of social science. They start from the fact that nationalism is not a singular phenomenon and it shows great variety. This leads them to argue that it cannot be captured by a single theory. They propose instead that a viable solution can only be found in the realm of methodology. Consequently, they employ a comparative method and build typologies (cf. Arnason 2006). Their attempt to escape the internalism of the general theory however falls short mainly due to the static historiography of the comparative method itself.

The final section reviews scholars of a more ‘radical’ persuasion whose work concentrates on the ‘external’ sources of nationalism. Here the works of Tom Nairn and Partha Chatterjee are under review. They are my hard cases, so to speak. I agree with Nairn in his identification of the uneven development as the structural cause of nationalism and with Chatterjee on his compelling critique of Eurocentrism – especially of Benedict Anderson. In many ways, they go further than others to shed light on the dynamics of late nationalisms. But their attempts at building general theories of peripheral nationalism are paradoxically trapped in the Eurocentrism they seek to challenge. Their epistemologies are far more indebted to the Eurocentric dichotomy between the West and the East than they realise. This leaves much to be said about the variations among peripheral nationalisms and especially about the nationalisms of the semi-colonial societies like Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. As such, my disagreement with them is at a more specific level.

2.2 The Quest for General Theory and the Problem of Internalism

Benedict Anderson observes that despite its mighty political power, nationalism ‘has never produced its own grand thinkers: no Hobbeses, Tocquevilles, Marxes, or Webers’ (2006:5). Nationalism may not have its *grands philosophes*, but, according to Siniša Malešević, the field of nationalism studies does actually have two ‘founding fathers’: Ernest Gellner and Anderson himself (2015:3). The veracity of Malešević’s designation is beyond doubt. Much of what passes as theoretical reflection on nationalism engages one way or another with the work of Gellner or Anderson. As such, to start the review with their works offers the conventional safe choice: one should begin at the beginning. Incidentally, in their works one can detect internalism at its most profound form – much more so in Gellner’s than Anderson’s, it must also be said.

In both, I seek answers to two questions:

- What is nationalism?
- How did nationalism spread?

More so than the answers given to each question, the tension between the answers, if any, would reveal their successes and failures to provide satisfactory theorisation of late nationalisms.

2.2.1 Ernest Gellner

One of the most influential social theorists of the twentieth century, Ernest Gellner’s academic career showcases a distinguished diversity of subjects including ethnographic fieldwork in the Atlas mountains, a highly controversial critique of Oxford linguistic philosophy, monographs on the sociology of Islamic world, indefatigable defence of the Enlightenment ideals and countless and sometimes heated exchanges with other scholars. A ‘polymath and provocateur’ in the words of one reviewer (Langlois 1994:87), when Gellner died in 1995, the flags at Cambridge University were set at half mast (Hall 2011:vii). Seen as part of such an illustrious and prolific intellectual life, his venture into the study of nations and nationalism could not but spark much inspiration

and debate (Hall 1998b; Hall and Jarvie 1996; Lessnoff 2002; Malešević and Haugaard 2007). Lately, and perhaps lamentably, he is remembered primarily as a scholar of nationalism at the expense of his other substantial contributions (Malešević 2015:3).

The distinguishing mark of Gellner's contribution to nationalism studies is that he is, by common consent (Breuilly 2006:liii), *the* scholar who offered the most systematic theory of nationalism. Gellner aims at theorisation at the grandest scale. It is on account of this that his failure is on a par with his ambition, in so far as theorising late nationalisms is concerned. And any review of Gellner's theory of nationalism should be grounded on his 'philosophic history' (1989:11–20; cf. Meadwell 2015:273–79), which is based on three sharply disconnected stages of universal human existence moving from hunter-gatherer bands to agrarian societies to reach finally the industrial society. Gellner concentrates on the transition from the agrarian world to the industrial one.

The key dimension of this transformation is the changing relationship between power and culture. The agrarian societies were based on a hierarchical division between high and low cultures. The ruling groups legitimised and sustained their position on the basis of a sharp cultural divide, which blocked upward mobility. Culture in agrarian societies acted as a means of vertical differentiation. Industrial division of labour, in contrast, requires an upwardly mobile and functionally interchangeable population with a basic skills set (1989:205–23). This society is an aggregate of individuals not restricted to positions acquired by birth and sustained by tradition based on estates. This mobility and egalitarianism necessitates a context-free language, and basic literary and numerical skills, which allow one to shift between occupations. The 'modular man' that Gellner marks as the basic unit of this society is 'capable of performing highly diverse tasks in the same general cultural idiom, if necessary reading up manuals of specific jobs in the general standard style of the culture in question' (1994b:102). This is what Gellner calls the high culture of industrial society. It can only be achieved by a standardised public education administered by a state and is presented in the cultural idiom of nationalism to hold together an anonymous, impersonal society. This is the *function* of nationalism for industrial society.

There is another key element of this philosophic history. Transitions from one stage to the next are not gradual but revolutionary (Gellner 1989; cf. Hearn 2006:105–6).

Moreover, the last of these stages, industrial society, is universal and a historical necessity, not a contingency that may allow political choice. As a 'step-like transition' (Smith 1998:30), it is fated to be the general condition of humanity. 'Mankind,' asserts Gellner, 'is irreversibly committed to industrial society' (1983:39). It is this structural change, which *necessitates*, as in the orthodox Marxist base/superstructure model, nationalism as the ideology of an abstract and homogenous community of equals. It could not have been different. He notes to that effect that 'nationalism as such is fated to prevail, but not any one particular nationalism' (1983:47).

Gellner's theory demonstrates unmistakably the influence of the abstract universalism of classical social theory (as it was reincarnated in post-war modernisation theories). History unfolds as the progressive succession of stages, the final one defined by industrialism. This final stage in history, or the form of society it generates, is both nowhere (as Gellner provides no empirical demonstration for his theory) and fated to be everywhere. Thus, culture becomes a means of horizontal differentiation *among* societies. Unsurprisingly, this view of history and the place of nationalism within it have become the Achilles' heel of Gellner's theory. There are two key criticisms here.

The link between industrial society and nationalism, many argued over the years,¹⁶ is far from convincing beyond Western Europe. The modern world is replete with robust nationalisms that were neither functionally nor temporally subsequent to industrialisation, for there was, and still is in certain parts of the world, little of that outside Western Europe.¹⁷ Furthermore, not only was industrialisation not the condition behind the emergence of nationalism, but it was actually one of its goals. This of course inverts (and negates) the functional relationship/necessity and gives nationalism of the late developing societies a distinctly political bent. And the study of politics has never been the strong suit of functionalist social theory.

¹⁶ Accusations of functionalism, laid at Gellner's doorstep more than once over the years (O'Leary 1998:51–52), have produced different responses from him. In one instance he recognised the empirical limitations of his theory for certain cases (1994a:189). In another he was habitually unimpressed by the criticism. He could not see why functionalism 'should be a badge of shame' (1996:627). These responses, however, do not even parry the major empirical problem that shakes Gellner's theory at its foundations.

¹⁷ Nor does industrialisation necessarily require high culture sustained by mass literacy as the case of Britain demonstrates. The first industrial society was 'notoriously laggard in introducing compulsory mass education, long after initial industrialization had been achieved' (Breuilly 2006:xxxv).

In this sense, Gellner's theory and the 'philosophic history' that underpins it are unrepentantly internalist/Eurocentric. It works by modelling from an abstract case of industrial society that is fated to be replicated *internally* in other societies. Thus, the functional relationship between industrialism and nationalism is coupled with a teleological view of history (Stagardt 1996:186; see also Chatterjee 1993a:4–5).¹⁸ But, as Miroslav Hroch observes, 'the development of commodity production and productive relations proceeds in principle without regard to the development of linguistic, cultural or political entities' (1985:5). As such, Gellner fails to offer a theoretical, not to mention a logical, answer to the question why a universal stage in history should and did fragment into *many* national high cultures. His commitment to the abstract universalism of classical social theory displays a striking and nonchalant disregard for any notion of lateness as a developmental, as opposed to merely chronological, category.

However, this is not all there is to Gellner's argument. In *Nations and Nationalism* the argument takes a turn. And the new direction is actually old. It originates in an earlier chapter (1964:147–78), far more focused on the dynamics of modernity than contrasting it with its past. Here the leitmotif of modernity is not the universal multiplication of national high cultures, but political fragmentation due to the uneven spread of industrialisation:

This ghastly tidal wave [of modernisation] does not hit various parts of the world simultaneously: on the contrary, it hits them successively (though of course not in any neat and orderly succession). *Essentially, nationalism is a phenomenon connected not so much with industrialisation or modernisation as such, but with its uneven diffusion* (1964:166, emphases added).

The uneven arrival of industrialism 'divided humanity into rival groups very effectively' (1983:52) as it disrupted previous political arrangements (1964:171). These disruptions have their winners or losers, and hence lead to nationalism in two ways. The first is when some members of the urban population find their access to the labour

¹⁸ In this teleology nationalism becomes, in the words of Perry Anderson, 'a wholesomely constructive and forward-looking principle' (1992:207).

market and to the bureaucracy limited because they do not belong to the high culture of that society. The barriers to communication incite the disadvantaged group towards appreciating their own culture and seek a political roof for it. Or, secondly, when this unequal access to the fruits of industrialisation overlaps with what Gellner calls ‘entropy-resistant’ traits like religion, skin colour and rigid cultural practices of a disadvantaged group, this can lead to a rival nationalism (1983:63–87; O’Leary 1997:210).

But the moment when a better understanding of late nationalism seems imminent also marks the closure of that possibility. For all its dynamism, this secondary theory turns out to be an internalism of a specific kind. Gellner appears to have drawn exclusively on the dynamics of uneven industrialisation and its politicisation of cultural differences in the Habsburg domains during the nineteenth century (Marashi 2014:4–9; Smith 1998:231, note 3). This empirical limitation causes a mismatch with other experiences of nationalism. As Afshin Marashi notes for the Iranian case,

the social dislocations were felt to be caused not by local bourgeois-aristocratic proto-industrial elites of the city who spoke a different regional language or dialect than the town dwellers or peasantry – as was the case in the paradigm of east-central Europe –but rather, by global-imperial economic penetration into Iran (2014:9).

And the empirical problem is indicative of Gellner’s tendency to fold the premises of this secondary theory back into a theorisation of society in the singular

The industrial age inherited both the political *units* and the cultures, high and low, of the preceding age. There was no reason why they should all suddenly fuse into a single one, and there were good reasons why they should not: industrialism, in other words the type of production or of the division of labour which makes these homogeneous breathing tanks imperative, did not arrive simultaneously in all parts of the world, nor in the same manner. The differential timing of its arrival divided humanity into rival *groups* very effectively (1983:52, emphases added).

Notice how the fact of political multiplicity of the pre-industrial age only ends up being divided into rival groups. A legacy of political and cultural differentiation among societies is identified, but addressed in the conventional sociological category of groups.

Ultimately, this leaves us with two key defects in Gellner's theory in so far as the history of late nationalisms is concerned. First, it overlooks the impact of industrialisation at the intersocietal level, i.e. the incorporation of late developing societies into the world economy (Marashi 2014:8). As we shall see below, this is precisely the level at which Tom Nairn puts Gellner's secondary theory in use. Second, the cumulative outcome of this double internalism is, as Jonathan Hearn argues with reference to Gellner's work, that the theory 'hides the fact that societies simultaneously at various "stages" interact, and that their "stage" is often an outcome of those interactions, not of some internal development' (2006:106–7). This intersocietal dimension that acts as *one* of the determinants of social change is completely effaced by Gellner and has no bearing on the emergence and trajectory of late nationalisms.

2.2.2 Benedict Anderson

Benedict Anderson, the prominent South East Asia specialist, died in late 2015. A path-breaking book on nationalism, his magnum opus, *Imagined Communities* survives him. It is almost impossible to gauge the influence of this book without attaching a laudatory adjective. Anderson's publisher lends a helping hand in this instance. Tariq Ali, in a short obituary he wrote on behalf of Verso Books, notes that 'since it was first published in 1983, [*Imagined Communities*] helped to sustain our publishing house intellectually and financially' (2015). It is hard to tell which part of Ali's, doubtlessly sincere, praise is more remarkable. Is it the part that *Imagined Communities* has kept afloat (and will probably continue to do so) a publishing house¹⁹ that is politically on the 'wrong side' of an age to survive its ethos of cutthroat market competition? Or is it the part that a quick browse through Verso's catalogues reveals names with anything but little intellectual influence? It is certainly not an exaggeration to say that no other

¹⁹ John Breuilly recently reported that *Imagined Communities* has so far sold about half-a-million copies. This extraordinary figure for an academic book excludes the number of sales for its many translations (in Breuilly et al. 2016:626).

book on nationalism can claim to match *Imagined Communities* in its reach to readerships beyond nationalism studies.

Anderson presents his narrative of modernity and nationalism in two steps: the disintegration of the old world and the formations of modernity (historical transformation), and the spread of nationalism to the colonial world (the distinction between early and late nationalism). Roughly the first step takes place in the Euro-American world in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. This period marks the disintegration of the medieval world and the emergence of the original models of nationalism, or the nation-form as Anderson prefers to put it. The second step is the adaptation of these models by the post-colonial states in the twentieth century. The disintegration of the European medieval world and the formations of modernity constitute the first half of the book, whereas the second half is reserved for late nationalisms.

Although a familiar theme for any modernist account of nationalism, in Anderson's narrative the great modern transformation and the attendant emergence of nationalism are more than material and institutional processes. 'Nationality...nation-ness, as well as nationalism, are cultural artefacts of a particular kind'; therefore nationalism should be understood both in relation to the erosion of large cultural systems that preceded it and as the combined effect of novel historical forces within which it was formed (2006:4). In so far as the preceding cultural systems are concerned, two institutions held the medieval world together. The Catholic Church and the dynastic state exercised spiritual and secular authority over peasant masses. Although Medieval Christendom had never corresponded to a unified political entity, it maintained a tight grip on its privileged access to divine truth by its exclusive custodianship over the sacral language of Latin. The message of God was transmitted to the mass peasantry through local intermediaries, who shared this custodianship with each other.

The Protestant Reformation unmade this 'transnational' link. And the development of capitalism by way of print media in the vernacular (print-capitalism) created new reading publics by giving new fixity to the 'national' language below Latin and above local vernaculars. These developments also ushered in a new conception of time. Homogenous empty time, a concept Anderson borrows from Walter Benjamin, broke

the link between the sea of Christian believers and otherworldly salvation conceived in messianic time. Society, in other words, was secularised and the modern individuals, who could now read the message without intermediaries, imagined their collective existence as a nation. Homogenous empty time allowed an imagination of the national community moving up in the calendar. Novels and the newspaper became the primary means of representation for this new conception of time. The former acted as an analogue for the nation with its characters sharing the same temporal existence despite being unaware of each other. And the newspaper, consumed daily and in mass, generated 'a shared sense of simultaneity' among its readers (Parker 1999:40). This secularised sense of national existence removed the source of political legitimacy from the dynastic state and relocated it to the limited and sovereign national community (Anderson 2006:9–37).

The second big claim of Anderson fits in here. The disintegration of the medieval order based on Latin as the language of ontological truth, divinely ordained rule of dynastic authority, and the fusion of cosmology and history by the messianic conception of time had its costs. Ancient religions, whatever their other merits or shortcomings, neutralised the arbitrariness of human mortality by 'transforming fatality into continuity.' Given this disintegration and the need for a new answer to the fatalities of human existence, Anderson continues, 'few things were (are) better suited to this end than an idea of nation.' For nationalism, unlike the evolutionary/progressive styles of thought such as Marxism and liberalism, offered existential comfort (2006:10–11).

It is at this point Anderson's account takes a more chronological turn and looks at how early modern state centralisation and standardisation of rule in Europe was differently experienced across the Atlantic. In Spanish America, recruitment on the basis of talent was not eagerly practiced. The imperial centre, for various reasons that should not detain us here, thwarted the upward mobility of its creole functionaries. They were also limited in their geographical mobility within their respective imperial administrative units. Having found that the accident of birth severely hindered his fortunes, the creole functionary's bureaucratic pilgrimage became the cauldron of a different sentiment. On his 'cramped pilgrimage [the creole functionary] found travelling-companions, who came to sense that their fellowship was based not only on that pilgrimage's particular stretch, but on the shared fatality of trans-Atlantic birth' (2006:57). When this shared

resentment towards the centre crisscrossed with the clearly defined territoriality of the imperial administrative units, the arrival of Enlightenment ideals, the independence movements and print-capitalism, Creole nationalism was born; the first of its kind.²⁰

The second step in the narrative, that of nationalism's spread comes after this period of transformation in Anderson's account and it has been a matter of extensive debate. In terms of composition, Anderson reserves the second half of the book to not so much the making, but the diffusion of nationalism to the extra-European world. To that end, he offers a classification of different nationalisms travelling geographically and chronologically from Latin American Creole nationalism to Western Europe linguistic nationalisms. From Western Europe it reaches to Russia and the British Empire in the form of state-sponsored official nationalism. The latter is imported by the twentieth century anti-colonial nationalisms. The thread that binds these different forms is what Anderson calls 'modularity.' According to Anderson, 'once created, [the nation] became "modular", capable of being transplanted, with varying degrees of self-consciousness, to a great variety of social terrains, to merge and be merged with a correspondingly wide variety of political and ideological constellations' (2006:4). Thus, nationalism becomes the universal mode of political experience. It travels, so Anderson argues, across homogenous empty space and time.

A model became available for pirating from the second decade of the nineteenth century. As the experiences of the independence movements in the Americas and the French Revolution became printed, they turned into concepts. 'Out of the American welter,' argues Anderson,

²⁰ I provide this brief summary on Creole nationalism to retain the unity of Anderson's argument. The historical veracity of his claim that nationalism originated in Spanish Latin America is now widely disputed by Latin Americanists. The specialists of the region 'reject Anderson's big claim about Latin America, namely that the wars of independence were nationalist undertakings that resulted in models for the development of nationalism in Europe and elsewhere. There are probably no historians of the independence wars who would accept Anderson's version of them, which was, as has often been pointed out, based on a limited range of secondary sources. His suggestion that the career pathways of creole bureaucrats played an important role in generating elite consciousness of difference both from Spain and within the Americas has been met with scepticism, partly because he provided no specific evidence in support' (Miller 2006:205; cf. Castro-Klarén and Chasteen 2003; cf. Doyle and Van Young 2013). Furthermore, Anderson is criticised on the grounds that he could only locate original nationalism in Spanish America by minimising the influence of the French Revolution (Sewell Jr. 2004:92–94).

came these imagined realities: nation-states, republican institutions, common citizenships, popular sovereignty, national flags and anthems, etc., and the liquidation of their conceptual opposites: dynastic empires, monarchical institutions, absolutisms, subjecthoods, inherited nobilities, serfdoms, ghettos, and so forth (2006:81).

What underpins Anderson's concept of modularity is his vision that politics in the modern world has taken an increasingly standardised form (1998:29).

The debate on modularity is not surprising (Goswami 2002; Gupta 2004). After all, Anderson is arguably the first theorist to tackle the question of the spread of nationalism beyond its Euro-American core, hence the question of late nationalism, in a way other than simplistic diffusionism of ideas. Yet, this framing of modernity is found flawed on account of its restriction of the content of nationalist politics to its original, modular forms (Mongia 2007). The nation-form in this sense is modular at its origin (Parker 1999). In the words of one critic, 'by insisting upon the "ineradicable" nature of past "modular" forms, Anderson unwittingly takes *all* of the *imagination* out of *all* imagined communities!' (Ullock 1996:427).

This leaves his model open to criticism on empirical grounds. Claudio Lomnitz, for one, compellingly challenges Anderson's identification of secularisation as a pre-condition for the emergence of nationalism in Spain and by extension in Spanish America – especially in Mexico – by demonstrating the constitutive role of religious motivation and religious organisations behind the emergence of nationalism (2000). Jim MacLaughlin raises a similar criticism for Anderson's native Ireland: 'nationalism in Ireland did not grow out of the dusk of religious modes of thought. If anything it contributed to the growing power of the churches and boosted their political power while heightening the appeal of simple religious beliefs among ordinary people' (2001:239). Troublingly for Anderson, none of these instances are late nationalisms. And in cases of late nationalisms, religion did not vacate public sphere to allow secular nationalism (Marashi 2014:15).

Surely, an argument can be made that Anderson does not restrict the emergence of an existential need for answers to the disappearance of a specific religion (i.e. Christianity) from the daily lives of people or the erosion of (European) dynastic legitimacy. His claim of ‘a profoundly standardized conception of politics’ allows a more inclusive conception of a historical and geographical transformation. As such, it can be related to wider changes wrought by modernisation in the periphery. For that, however, we would still need an international theory that grasps the unevenly constituted societal multiplicity not as an afterthought but the very basis within which ‘nationalism’, or any such answer to the existential urge, spreads and combines with ‘local’ forms. In other words, Anderson’s concept of modularity needs to specify ‘causal processes at work’ (Cooper 2015:484).

2.3 Capturing the Multiplicity of Nationalisms: Comparative History and Typologies

Comparison is perhaps the most customary tool in social sciences and humanities to approach any phenomenon that shows temporal and spatial variety. Nationalism is one such phenomenon. But it comes with one crucial characteristic. As noted above, it aspires to achieve similar things, uses similar techniques and utters similar discourses in order to establish difference. This allows historians with social scientific leanings to pursue comparative historical analysis on the basis of a singular phenomenon with historical and geographical variations.

What requires attention here is that both Breuilly and Hroch operate with limited comparison. They introduce qualifications as to which cases can be compared and which cannot be. Breuilly asserts a fundamental difference between European and non-European nationalisms (1993:10). This difference, at the least a subject of curiosity for any comparativist, does not merit further discussion for Breuilly. For Hroch, two initial exclusions prepare the ground for comparison. First, he distinguishes old nations of Western Europe from ‘small nations’ of Eastern Europe – on which more below. And secondly, he declares the non-European world²¹ as outside the remit of his theory by

²¹ Still, his work, especially the periodisation of nation-formation he offered, has found reception among students of non-European nationalisms (Gelvin 1998; Hoyo 2010; Koohi-

arguing that ‘I regard the nation-forming process as a specifically European phenomenon’ (Hroch 2015:xi), with an apparent but unexplained move that turns European nation-formation into a uniform category.²²

2.3.1 John Breuilly

John Breuilly’s *Nationalism and the State* is an empirically comprehensive effort by a historian to provide ‘a general framework for analysis’ for the study of nationalism. Although his uncompromising commitment to conceptual precision and his recourse to typology make a dry and overly argumentative reading at times, Breuilly methodically puts together a survey of nationalism with remarkable historical reach and geographical variety. A rarity within the field, Breuilly’s work covers more than 30 cases. As Charles Tilly once called it, *Nationalism and the State* is truly a ‘sourcebook’ of the history of nationalism (1996).

For Breuilly the trouble with the study of nationalism is that the word refers to several things and not all of these meanings are commensurable. He identifies three different such meanings in circulation: (i) Nationalism is a set of ideas; (ii) nationalism is a sentiment; (iii) nationalism is a form of politics. His proposed way out of this semantic imbroglio is to restrict nationalism to a political explanation. To that end he argues that nationalism is ‘above and beyond all else, about politics and politics is about power. Power, in the modern world, is principally about the control of the state’ (1993:1).²³

Seen in this way, nationalism makes three political assertions:

1. There exists a nation with an explicit and peculiar character.

Kamali 2003; Siddiqi 2010; Shissler 2003; cf. Harris 2009:62–63), albeit with ‘theoretical tinkering’ (Maxwell 2010:870).

²² In any case, Hroch’s understanding of ‘non-European’ histories appears heavily influenced by Orientalist categories. His analysis of the late Ottoman Empire deploys many of the highly disputed and now largely discarded tropes of declinism, oriental despotism and economic stagnation (2013). Maria Todorova raised a similar critique on Hroch’s ‘rather scanty knowledge of southeast European developments’ which ‘makes for embarrassing reading from an otherwise great historian’ (2005:158 note 43).

²³ Weber’s influence is unmistakable: ‘today, in the age of language conflicts, a shared common language is pre-eminently considered the normal basis of nationality. Whatever the “nation” means beyond a mere “language group” can be found in the specific objective of its social action, and this can only be the *autonomous polity*’ (Weber 1978:395, emphasis in original).

2. The interests and values of this nation take priority over all other interests and values.
3. The nation must be as independent as possible. This usually requires at least the attainment of political sovereignty (1993:2).

Treating nationalism as a form of politics, argues Breuilly, is superior to two other major approaches. The first one is the idealist approach. Nationalism in this view is a political doctrine elaborated by intellectuals. The second one is the socio-economic approach that treats nationalism as 'an expression of something deeper such as class interest or an economic or social structure or a cultural formation' (1993:1). The problem with these approaches is that they cannot pin down nationalism conceptually. Nationalist doctrine mixes with other doctrines so freely as to render its identification highly difficult. For the socio-economic explanations Breuilly raises a similar objection. So many different social classes and interests carry the banner of nationalism at one time or another that pursuing this line of research could only end up in confusion. Breuilly does not deny the importance of these factors. He accepts that they can illuminate the analysis of particular nationalisms, but they cannot be the basis of a general framework. Therefore typologies of nationalism cannot be founded on them.

In the next step, Breuilly introduces another crucial distinction. He excludes from his work what he calls state-led nationalism, because he finds it very difficult to draw precise conceptual boundaries around this type of nationalism: 'to regard all policies of self-interest undertaken by national governments as nationalist would be to empty the term of any specific meaning' (1993:8). It is more feasible to treat nationalism as oppositional politics seeking to obtain or use state power. By this point we have a reasonably precise concept of nationalism. It refers to successful political movements that seek state power in the name of their nation. The other meanings of nationalism are left out of the picture. Nationalism, often likened to a chameleon for its ability to adapt to different circumstances, finds its colour spectrum rendered almost monochromatic in Breuilly's hands.

Breuilly is not yet done on his mission to make his way through the fog of conceptual imprecision. His second claim is on method. Casting doubt on the possibility of a general theory of nationalism, he opts for a general framework of analysis, which should fulfil two criteria. Given that 'the internal variations within nationalism are too

great to allow a single method of investigation,' a necessity for a typology arises. Following from that, comparative history is the best available method to utilise such a typology and to populate identified types (1993:2).

His typology has two modes of differentiation. The first is the nature of nationalist opposition. This generates three types of nationalism: 'a nationalist opposition can seek to break away from the present state (separation), to reform it in a nationalist direction (reform) and or to unite it with other states (unification)' (1993:9). He then checks these against the type of the state a particular nationalism opposes. On this score nationalisms are differentiated on the basis of opposing either a non-nation state or a nation-state. This procedure gives six classes of nationalist movements with the relevant examples below:

	Opposed to Non-Nation States	Opposed to Nation-States
Separation	Magyar, Greek, Nigerian	Basque, Ibo
Reform	Turkish, Japanese	Fascism, Nazism
Unification	German, Italian	Arab, Pan-African

* Reproduced from Breuilly (1993:9)

Breuilly offers, in a later work (1996a), a concise historicisation of this straightforward formulation of nationalism and politics. To that end he asks the crucial questions. Where and when did nationalism emerge and why? And it is here that the rigorously built edifice of his methodology starts to appear skeletal and to buckle under the pressure of the multiplicity of nationalism.

On this score he tries to uncover the historical relationship between nationalism and modernisation. Acknowledging his agreement with Gellner on modernity, Breuilly argues that it involved a fundamental change in the generic division of labour. By generic he means a broader set of human activities (coercion, cognition and production) than the specific economic division of labour. In Europe the old corporate division of labour, wherein specific institutions such as the guilds carried a bundle of different functions, gave way to a functional division of labour. In this latter form, each major

function increasingly unbundled from older multi-functional organisation and was concentrated into its specific institution.

What links this transformation to nationalism is the development of the modern state. Originally developed in a liberal form, the modern state's rise involved a 'concentration of "public" powers into specialised state institutions (parliaments and bureaucracies), while leaving many "private powers under the control of non-political institutions' such as free markets, private firms, families and so on (1996a:164). The separation of the public and private realms, and the breakdown of corporate ties generated the new-fangled idea of the individual. The key problem that followed from this was 'how to make the state-society connection; how to maintain some harmony between the public interests of the citizens and the private interests of selfish individuals (or families)' (1996a:165).

Two answers provided to this pressing question give us the key to the history of nationalism. The first, political answer hinged on the notion of citizenship. From the eighteenth century onwards, the aggregate of individuals was defined as a body of citizens, a community of rights-bearing individuals who voluntarily entered into contractual commitment to live together as a nation under a shared set of rules, institutions and values. Only this way, it was thought, could the individuals' commitment to the state be secured. The second, cultural answer put a premium on the collective character of the society in response to two key issues that confronted political élites: an intellectual problem (how did one legitimize state action?) and a political problem (how could one secure the support of the masses?). 'In practice,' argues Breuilly, 'nationalism has been a sleight-of-hand ideology which tries to connect the two ideas together' (1996a:166). And 'given this sleight of hand, as well as the political neutrality of the cultural identities to which nationalism appeals (which means they are available for many political uses), nationalism has taken a bewildering variety of forms,' concludes Breuilly (1996a:166). This, in turn, justifies his starting point and the need for a typology of nationalisms.

The strength of Breuilly's work is concentrated in one of his key assertions. When he argues that nationalism is first and foremost about politics and modern politics is about

the state, this goes some way to overcome the conceptual confusion.²⁴ But this element of his approach is also its weakness. When subjected to a closer look, his notion of modern politics is far too generic to fulfil the promises of his method, which is to provide the readers with a general framework to understand nationalism in its variety. As Geoff Eley argues in a review of the first edition of the book, ‘what Breuilly exactly means by “nationalism as politics” remains extraordinarily elusive’ and is wedded to a very formalistic conception of the separation of the public and the private (1984:398). Thus, the prospect of grasping the various forms of nationalism by means of a classification is predicated on a universal mode of nationalist politics pegged to the attainment of state power. But Breuilly’s method does not tell us how this mode of politics, or quite simply nationalism, became universal or why it was pursued in many different ‘contexts.’ What makes comparison possible or the grounds for comparison is asserted rather than explained (Mongia 2007:385).

Comparative method and classification works in this case with a posterior logic. It runs something like this: because nationalisms show great variety, they cannot be grasped by a single definition, but they can be captured by and distributed under different taxonomical headings if we can find one core principle common to all. In his later work Breuilly acknowledges that much of nationalism studies, including his *Nationalism and the State*, suffers from two defects. The first is what he call the ‘internalist bias’ which ‘works back from the “successful” cases of nationalism; those which resulted in a state given the name of the nation for which those nationalists laboured’ (2011:66). This posterior reasoning, which is just noted, suggests a deeper problem. It does not start by asking why nationalism has been endorsed as a political device in different political contexts. For these contexts, in the plural, are conceived as disconnected instances of the same, nationalism-producing political dynamic.

²⁴ His other key argument is unexceptionable. In so far as the ‘overall mood’ in nationalism studies is concerned, there is nothing unfamiliar about his claim that nationalism has many manifestations and that it cannot be captured by a single theory. Indeed, nationalism studies, the broad multi-disciplinary field of research, which otherwise brims with conceptual, theoretical and historiographical controversies, seems to have reached some sort of a tacit consensus on the impossibility of a general theory of nationalism. And this is because there *are* many and different nationalisms. Nationalism exists in the multiple – in the sense of both number and form/type (see, among others, Anderson 1986; Bhabha 1990; Calhoun 1997:21–22; Hall 1993; Kosofsky Sedgwick 1992:241; McCrone 1998:169–87; Seth 1993:91–92). On this score, Breuilly is preaching to the choir.

This limitation of Breuilly's work is a by-product of his underdeveloped conception of politics, which he assumes to explain separate cases of nationalism. But the logic of nationalist politics did not emerge *separately* in individual cases. As Breuilly rightly points out, as the second defect of the literature, 'even where connections across cases are considered important, these are presented in a bilateral form, as in accounts of how an imperial power transfers nationalist ideas, sentiments and politics to a periphery' (2011:67). A better rephrasing could possibly be 'unidirectional' rather than 'bilateral' in this sentence, but the gist of the argument is clear enough. Without a conceptual device such as Anderson's modularity, Breuilly's comparative method cannot grasp the political dynamics of late nationalism and its content formed with reference to this dynamic other than treating lateness as a chronological, but not a developmental and intersocietal feature of nationalist politics across the modern world. Even then, I must add, this does not mean, as Moshe Behar erroneously claims, that Breuilly presupposes the existence of nations (2005:595).

2.3.2 Miroslav Hroch

Although the first systematic quantitative and comparative study of the emergence and development of nationalist movements, Miroslav Hroch's study had to wait seventeen years to make its full impact. Originally published in German in 1968, the work of the Czech historian largely escaped the attention of the Anglo-American academy (Özkırmılı 2010:114) until the English translation of his seminal text arrived under the title *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe* (1985). Since then it has influenced several generations of scholars (cf. Maxwell 2010). The measure of this influence is not lost on the leading figures of the field. According to Eric Hobsbawm, Hroch's work 'opened the new era in the analysis of the composition of national liberation movements' (1992:4). Ernest Gellner acknowledged with witty honesty that the publication of Hroch's book 'made it difficult for him to open his mouth for fear of making some mistake' (in Hall 1998a:6).

As an opening manoeuvre Hroch identifies two problems that afflict the literature on nations and nationalism. The first of these is by now familiar to us. He observes that there has accumulated on one side 'an immense mass of information' on individual histories of national movements which entices 'the historians of all the European

nations...to consider their own national history as a unique, specific and incommensurable component of the world's development.' On the other side is 'the traditionally one-sided conception [that treats] general (or European) history as the history of certain great states, a history in which the small states and nations occupy only a marginal place, or no place at all' (1985:xi). It is this second group of states and nations that Hroch concentrates on.

The second flaw in the literature compounds this separation. According to Hroch, the literature erroneously represents the history of nation-formation in Europe as the unfolding or the spread of the idea of nationalism. But ideas, he argues, do not travel and find reception merely on account of their intrinsic inspirational value. Nor can intellectuals in the business of inventing nations valorise them outside certain objective preconditions. Even if this was the case, we are still left with the challenge that 'individual discoveries of national sentiment do not explain why such discoveries recurred in so many countries, independently of each other, under different conditions and in different epochs' (1998:79).

In light of these problems, Hroch proposes an elaborate solution backed by original and punctilious empirical research on national movements in Central and Eastern Europe. His solution entails several key elements: Theoretical/methodological, conceptual and historiographical. For the first, Hroch declares that he is not advancing a theory, but offering 'effective methods for the classification and assessment of experiences of nation-building as a process set within a wider social and cultural history' that aims for controlled generalisations rather than consigning specific nation-building experiences to their unrepeatable singularity (1996:78, 1998:91). He then offers a sociological conception of the nation as 'a large social group integrated not by one but by a combination of several kinds of objective relationships (economic, political, linguistic, cultural, religious, geographical, historical), and their subjective reflection in collective consciousness' (1996:79).

In his view, this overcomes the limitations of the objective definitions of the nation by acknowledging that individuals cannot be defined by some essential characteristics, but only by the recognition of their locations within a set of social relationships. The nation is, then, a social group like others, but a particular type. Its particularity comes from its

size and relative permanence. It is a large social group that is not defined by immediate personal contact. And unlike other large social groups, relations among co-nationals are relatively constant and well defined. Nationalism is the surface manifestation of this relative permanence manifested in individual and social consciousness, but 'its essence derives from the stable connection of the individual with a series of objective social relations' (1985:4).

Historically, Hroch locates the formation of the nation within the transition from feudalism to capitalism in Europe with earlier, feudal antecedents. In early modern Europe, these antecedents led to two different outcomes. Most of the Western European states evolved under the rule of a single ethnicity and experienced the classical pattern of bourgeois revolutions: 'a new class, the "third estate", [who] set itself up against the old feudal ruling class and sooner or later proclaimed itself the representative of the whole nation' (1985:8). Hroch finds this model of nation-formation inapplicable to the histories of what he calls 'small nations.' This in effect introduces one parameter of comparison into his history.

The terminology is not quantitative, but qualitative. By small or oppressed nations Hroch refers to those populations that occupy a compact territory without 'their own' nobility, political unit or a literary tradition. These small nations generally existed within multi-ethnic empires and for such a long period of time that the relationship between the oppressor and the oppressed became structural. Since they had an exogenous ruling class, their experience of the transition from feudalism to capitalism generated a different outcome. The bourgeoisie of these small or oppressed nations, mostly concentrated in Central and Eastern Europe (with notable exceptions like the Irish and the Catalans in the West), were ethnically different from the majority of the population.

To be able to make meaningful comparisons, Hroch develops a periodisation of national movements. This involves three phases. Phase A 'is marked by a passionate concern on the part of a group of individuals, usually intellectuals, for the study of the language, the culture, the history of the oppressed nationality' (1985:22). This was not as yet an organised movement with clear political goals. They were not, in the political sense of the term, nationalist. In Phase B a new group of agitators threw in their lot with the

national movement, formulated concrete political goals and strove to broaden the social basis and reach of their message. The final Phase C was when the national agitation gains a mass following. Hroch's comparison concentrates on Phase B. And his criterion for comparison is 'the social and territorial composition or origin of the national leaders, the "pioneers" of the agitation in Phase B of the national movement' (1998:92).

Hroch then plots this periodisation against the broader transition from feudalism to capitalism by identifying three key developments of the latter transition: the industrial revolution, the bourgeois revolution and the formation of an organised and class-conscious proletariat (1985:27). This yields four different types of national movements.²⁵ Type 1, the integrated type nationalist movements experienced Phase B before the revolution and the movements gained mass character during or shortly after the revolution. The second type is the belated nationalist movement. Nationalist agitation started before the revolution and masses only became part of nationalist agitation after a class-conscious working-class was organized. Type 3, the insurrectional type of national movement reached Phase C (the mass movement) before the revolution, under feudal conditions. The nation is formed *before* the bourgeois revolution. The disintegrated type is the final one. Nationalist agitation began after the capitalist transformation and under a liberal constitutional system. Hroch does not have much to say about this type, but, as Gellner notes, the implication seems to be that early industrialisation can be fatal for certain nationalist movements (1994a:189). The most relevant examples for this category appear to be post-industrial nationalist movements of the Quebecois and the Catalans.

The problems with Hroch's approach are of two kinds. One is with the way in which he charts his theoretical position in relation to other approaches and the way he formulates his concept. Significant in this context is his challenge to idealism – that is, to approaching nationalism as a matter of history of ideas. Hroch is right to challenge the shortcomings of the concept of nationalism, when it is presented in an idiom of idealist philosophy of history. Ideas could not simply flow around, and 'intellectuals can

²⁵ Gellner shrewdly points out that by differentiating large and small nations on the basis of 'state-endowment', Hroch implicates a third dimension to the classification. This dimension does not enter into the argument as Hroch concentrates on small nations. It is this wider typology, Gellner adds, which implies a more general theory of nation-formation (1994a:187–88).

“invent” national communities only if certain objective preconditions for the formation of a nation already exist’ (1998:79). But he overstates his case in one count and fails on another. First, history of ideas was indeed a very popular approach to the study of nationalism around the time Hroch’s work was published in Czechoslovakia, but much less so at the time of its English translation and it was certainly dated and unpopular by the end of twentieth century (Breuilly 2000; Eley and Suny 1996). Second, ideas in the form of political principles, institutional configurations and concrete programmes of social and political transformations are transported, transplanted and adapted by human beings, at times with great urgency, in concrete historical circumstances confronted by questions of political expedience, and even political and cultural survival. The cure for idealist diffusionism is not an exclusive ‘social determination’ (cf. Eley 1996), for posing the problem in this way reproduces the idealist/materialist dichotomy (cf. James 1996:7).

But more crucially Hroch’s challenge falls back to internalism. He argues that ‘the diffusion of national ideas could only occur in specific social settings’ (1996:79). This move not only enables him to distance himself from a diffusionist view, but also reinforces his ontological claim that a nation is a set of social relations. But in his attempt to play down the diffusion of ideas, Hroch sacrifices a crucial dimension of social change and he seals the national as a bounded set of social relations. Nation formation, it seems, operates separately in each national context, which he conceptually and historically delimits *a priori*.

In a sense, Hroch’s logic of comparativism works in the opposite direction of Breuilly. Where the latter, by his own admission, retraces his steps from successful instances of nationalism, Hroch fixes nationalisms ontological basis *a priori*. It is the pre-existing nation as a set of social relations that produces nationalism (Gellner 1994a). This absolves him of the need to historicise the spread of nationalism. The most clear textual expression of this comes when Hroch’s analysis is confronted with the need to offer a causal explanation for the emergence of late nationalisms:

The nondominant ethnic group was distinguished from the state-nation (like the French, Dutch, or Portuguese) by three deficiencies: it lacked “its own” nobility or ruling classes, it possessed no state, and its literary tradition in its

own language was incomplete or interrupted. *Sooner or later* a group of educated members of such an ethnic community reached the conclusion that their group also belonged to the category of the “nation” (1985:xiii, emphasis added).

Two types of nationalism, early and late, are juxtaposed with reference to their state endowment, but no connection between them is conceptualised. At best there is an implication that the early nations acted as models for the later ones, but this does not receive any theoretical attention in Hroch’s history. But the relationship between them is not one of interaction or influence but of chronological succession, wherein the late nationalism is typified by the unfortunate term, revival.

The theoretical downside of Hroch’s ‘internalism’ is its inattention to international relations. National agitation arises primarily in response to the crisis of the old regime. International relations can exert an occasional influence but not at a magnitude to merit theoretical attention: ‘Sometimes, important events in international politics, for example the Napoleonic wars, could strengthen or accelerate the crisis’ (1985:xiv). Indeed, Hroch’s empirical case studies makes, if at all, only passing references to ‘external factors.’ Norwegian independence is won partly, argues Hroch in one instance, as a result of ‘a favourable constellation in international politics’ (1985:41).

2.4 Inverting Eurocentrism: Limits of Structuralism and Postcolonial Theory

The authors that are subjected to perusal in this section represent a direct contrast with the ones in the previous one. Whereas Breuilly and Hroch established a dichotomy between the West and the East by asserting that there is some fundamental difference between their nationalisms, in many ways Nairn and Chatterjee see this dichotomy as the source of nationalism, or at least in Chatterjee’s case, its particular form in the colonial world.

In both Nairn’s and Chatterjee’s works there is a degree of ambiguity in so far their normative view of nationalism is concerned. I argue that they are both nationalist in their own way and this shapes their argument. Chatterjee’s verdict on nationalism is

decidedly negative yet also ambiguous (Ballantyne 2003:111). This effectively puts a distance between him and the Marxist optimism towards the liberating potential of Third World nationalism. Nairn provides an interesting contrast. Written almost a decade before, his work does not display the pessimism of Chatterjee's. An argument can be made that the low-spirited mood of the 1980s set by the failure of post-colonial development and the devastations of the Third World Debt Crisis weigh down on Chatterjee's *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (1993a). More proximately, the turbulent history of post-colonial India where the state became increasingly authoritarian and droves of intellectuals became disillusioned with the developmental project of bourgeois nationalism and its promises have doubtlessly left their marks on Chatterjee and the other members of the Subaltern Studies collective (Ludden 2002:6).

The contrasting fortunes of these critiques of imperialism also suggest that by the time their work on nationalism 'hit the market,' the Anglo-American academia, with its proverbial quota for 'radicals,' was receptive to the type of critique of the Empire offered by postcolonial theory (Kaiwar 2014:1–30) at the expense of the one offered by a Marxist who openly embraced Scottish nationalism (Cocks 2002:114–16).

2.4.1 Tom Nairn

It was the resurgence of nationalism in advanced industrial countries, and Tom Nairn's native Scotland in particular, in the 1960s and 1970s that provided the immediate context for a series of articles published in *New Left Review* during 1970s, which were later compiled under the title of *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism* (1981). Nationalist mobilization in Wales, Scotland, Quebec and more violently in Northern Ireland provoked interest after almost thirty years of post-war affluence and the established belief – notably held by modernisation theory – that nationalism, not to mention nationalist conflict, was a characteristic of societies experiencing the shift from underdevelopment to development. Nationalism, much like geopolitics, was attributed to the horrors of Nazism, which advanced, civic and patriotic societies of the West scorned as atavistic and irrational. For them the problem of nationalism simply did not exist any more.

According to Nairn, in order to avoid the past failures of Marxism and much of other

approaches, a theory of nationalism needs to beware of two things. First, it must not get caught up in the normative dispute whether nationalism is good or bad. 'A detached historical view,' argues Nairn, can 'see the phenomenon as a whole, in a way that rises above [its] "positive" and "negative" sides' (1981:332). Second, 'the only framework of reference which is of any utility is world history as a whole' (1981:332). Locating the source of nationalism at this level allows Nairn to reject internal explanations or, as he calls them, 'internal motions as such' as the driving forces behind its genesis. To pursue country-by-country analysis is to swallow 'the usual mangled half-truth of commonsense' served by the ideology of nationalism that 'human society consists essentially of several hundred different and discrete "nations", each of which has (or ought to have) its own postage-stamps and national soul. The secret of the forest is the trees, so to speak' (1981:332). Thus, and stated categorically, the real origins of nationalism are 'in the machinery of world political economy' and its uneven expansion outwards from Western Europe since the eighteenth century (1981:335). Nationalism, argues Nairn, is 'as a whole quite incomprehensible' outside this historical context of the uneven development of capitalism (1981:96).

Having made this general claim, Nairn moves on to specify the historical dynamics of nationalism's emergence. To that end, he elaborates on the general claim by exposing the discrepancy between the self-image of capitalism and its actual operation. The avatars of capitalist development presented it to the world outside its core areas as a progressive force. They argued that capitalism, although initially uneven, has an internal natural dynamic to re-balance the developmental disparity between the early developers (England and France) and the latecomers (Germany, Japan, Italy and the rest of the world). The historical agency to achieve this would be an enlightened cosmopolitan élite in the periphery in collaboration with their counterparts in the core countries. Once this universal class realised the benefits of the pacific commerce and overcame the irrationality of 'war', the benefits would start trickling down to the masses (1981:336–37).

The actual history of capitalist development, however, did not unfold as the progressive elimination of unevenness between the core and the periphery, but rather the latter experiencing its impact as domination and invasion. It was not the growing harmony of interest among first the upper classes worldwide and later the masses, but the sordid

material interest of the English and French bourgeois classes at the heart of world capitalism. The peripheral élites, ‘trampled over rather than taught the rules of the game; exploited rather than made partners’, soon realised that the concepts of the Enlightenment and classical political economy were a smokescreen for something entirely different (1981:339).

From the structural determination of uneven capitalism, Nairn derives three key aspects of peripheral nationalism. First, the distinction he draws between the ideology and actual practice of world capitalism allows him to specify a causal mechanism for the emergence of a nationalist response among the peripheral élites. This causality is not based on a Eurocentric diffusionist model wherein nationalism as an idea flows from Europe to the less fortunate parts of the world. It is one of geo-economic compulsion generating political consciousness. The emergence of peripheral nationalism is not one of choice, but one of necessity (1981:339).

Nairn then adds another causal chain, so to speak, to explain *why* peripheral nationalism needed the mobilisation of the masses – although only later and not in all cases (1981:339). On the face of it this appears as an internal mechanism related to the specifics of the relationship between the élites and the masses. However, for Nairn it is connected to the fact of unevenness of world capitalism. The compulsion of underdevelopment generates the necessity to resort to populism given limited resources at the disposal of the peripheral élites. All that they had was the people, *their* people, who were anything but a nation yet: ‘the new middle-class intelligentsia of nationalism had to invite the masses into history; and the invitation card had to be written in a language they understood’ (1981:340).

Third, for Nairn the content of peripheral nationalism cannot be understood without reference to the condition of unevenness. It gave peripheral nationalism its profound ambiguity. The nationalists of the late developing world aspired for catch-up. They desired for themselves and for their nations all of the bounties of modernity. But to be able to do this, late developing nationalism needed to appeal to the non-modern. It had to formulate its call to arms in the idiom of ‘a sentimental culture sufficiently accessible to the lower strata’ (1981:340). In its inescapable ambivalence, the peripheral nationalism is caught up in the agonising web of combining Western ‘technology’ with

national 'culture.' To that end, they were 'compelled to attempt radical, competitive short-cuts in order to avoid being trampled over or left behind' (1981:341).

More than the first (the structural factor), the second and the third arguments explain the emergence of nationalism: 'The dilemma of underdevelopment becomes "nationalism" *only when* it is (so to speak) refracted into a given society, perceived in a certain way; and then acted upon' (1981:100 *emphases added*). The second chain identifies two reasons for the peripheral élites' response to imperial injustice: the imperial drive for cultural assimilation (Anglicization or Frenchification) and exclusion of the part of peripheral élite from the transnational class (1981:338–39). The disaffected lot then turned to the masses and invited them to the fight. But these arguments do not add up to a proper methodology to answer the question *why* did the peripheral response take the *form* of nationalism? That is, nationalism that seeks a political roof for an abstract community of equals with attachment to an ancient homeland, sharing common culture and speaking a national language (cf. Orridge 1981:183). For all their problems, 'Eurocentric' theorists like Gellner and Anderson offer social theoretical explanations for this specific form of community. They explain nationalism as a social fact by making reference to other, *prior* social facts. What Nairn offers (in his third argument) is, at best, a reworked version of the psychologism of the traditional diffusionist historiography of Hans Kohn, Elie Kedourie and others (Smith 1978:238–40). We can trace this in his history of nationalism.

Unlike the conventional view that locates nationalism's emergence in revolutionary France (Löwy 1998:52), Nairn argues that nationalism first emerged in countries experiencing late development, though not in the 'overseas periphery' as erroneously claimed by Breuilly (1993:412). Germany and Italy were the birthplaces of nationalism as we know it when they were 'march-lands endeavouring to re-order themselves to face the threat from the West' (1981:343). It was in these two countries and later in Japan that one encounters the most potent form of the phenomenon. Because it was in these ablest of late developers that 'a painful experience of "under-development" combined with modern socio-economic institutions enabling them to mobilise and indoctrinate their masses effectively' (1981:345–46). And from there it spread to the rest of the world in concentric circles carried on by 'the tidal wave of modernisation' (1981:96–98), a term Nairn borrows from Gellner (1964:166–71).

Nationalism emerged in the early developing countries only after it was fully formed in the periphery – that is only after Germany, Italy and Japan *caught up* in the late nineteenth century. ‘England, France and the United States did not invent nationalism,’ argues Nairn, because ‘they did not need to, originally’ (1981:344). For they already had what nationalism is really about. At this point the argument takes a complicated turn for the reader. Here is what Nairn says about the pioneers of development:

From the very outset, part of the “superiority” of the development leaders lay in their political and state systems. It lay in the fact that they had invented the national state, the real proto-type of the nationalist ideal, by quite empirical processes extending over many centuries. They discovered and proved its power long before nationalism had been formulated as the general, systemic response to that power's incursions throughout the world (1981:343).

The implicit distinction between the national states of England and France, and the nationalism of late developers suggests that there existed English and French nations (but not nationalisms), before peripheral nationalisms. And it is the national political and state systems that partly made the early developers superior. Moreover, this early experience of national state building was an outcome of ‘quite empirical processes’ (Nairn’s euphemism for normal). Peripheral nationalism emerged as a compensatory mechanism to achieve these *national* things.

Nairn’s dogged commitment to structuralism offers little methodological finesse to make a convincing case for that. As Anderson argues, ‘it will be hard to see [from Nairn’s argument] why the invitation came to seem so attractive, and why such different alliances were able to issue it’ (2006:80). What is less hard to see, however, is why Nairn has been charged with being a nationalist (Cocks 2002:111–32; Hobsbawm 1977). Given that neither the structural pressures of world capitalism nor its uneven development can explain the *form* of peripheral response, Nairn adds a ‘reverse’ causal line that reasons from the cultural difference of late developing societies to anchor the structural determination internally. The mildly formulated instrumentalist element in the argument (exclusion of the part of peripheral élite from the transnational class) does not change this contradictoriness of his attempt to secure the argument from both ends.

Seen in this way, Nairn's method seems similar to the hybrid of primordialism and constructionism which

treats ethnic consciousness as a universal *potentiality* which is realized – objectified, that is, as an active political identity – when a population recognizes common interests, usually when it finds its existence, interests, or integrity under threat. From this neoprimalist perspective, collective identities are not “things” in or for themselves, but an imminent capacity that takes on manifest form in response to external forces (1995:5, emphasis in the original).

The limitations of structuralism can be further exposed by a closer look at Nairn's method to explain the spread of nationalism in the wider peripheral world. What he offers on this score is an imagery of nationalism spreading in concentric waves from the early late developers outwards. This draws a very accessible world map of nationalism's history, but ultimately simplifies the central dynamic of his theory. In effect, this vision of diffusion is based on a mentally convenient, but historically one-dimensional, imagery. Let me try to illustrate the problem by putting Nairn's cases to a different use. Germany's 'early late development' altered the unevenness of world economy in at least two crucial ways. First, the early developers responded to the German catch-up by adjusting their worldview. Nairn captures this by arguing that by the end of nineteenth century early developers also became nationalist. But he fails to see the other significance of this for the general condition of unevenness. Germany's early late development also altered the vision of other late developers. So did the Japanese modernisation, but in a significantly different way than the German one especially for the late developers in Asia. A similar dynamic was at work when Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire became models for the Qajar reformers in Iran. The challenges that unevenness poses for late developers and the overall objectives of their strategies cannot be captured within a neatly imagined model of tidal waves. Ignoring these developments, Nairn's uneven development acts as the structural condition that explains peripheral nationalisms *separately* by alloying them with individual ethno-national cultures.

2.4.2 Partha Chatterjee

One of the founding members of the influential Subaltern Studies group established in late 1970s, Partha Chatterjee is the leading theorist of nationalism within the wider school of postcolonial theory. For the purposes of this review, I focus on Chatterjee's two key contributions. The first is his book, *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* (1993a), where he develops a Foucaultian discourse analysis of nationalist thought in colonial and postcolonial India. The other is his engagement with the work of Benedict Anderson and especially his notion of modularity. In a consistent and sharp argumentation and tone over the years, Chatterjee has argued that Anderson's notion of modularity is Eurocentric and espouses a hierarchical difference between the original nationalism of the West and its lower quality Eastern copy (1991, 1999, 2003; see also Guha 1985).

Chatterjee's earlier engagement attempts to make a case that because the wellspring of nationalist thought is the West, nationalist thought in the colonies carries a paradox. He builds his argument in two steps. First, he offers a hotchpotch and at times not remarkably sophisticated criticism against what he calls *sociologism* of the existing theories, which fits 'nationalism to certain universal and inescapable sociological constraints of the modern age.' If this method does not quite work for anti-colonial nationalism, then a typology of Western and Eastern nationalisms is offered to sociologically account for the deviance of the latter (1993a:22). Such sociologically determinist or functionalist understandings of nationalism empties it of all content, Chatterjee argues; 'it is the content of nationalist ideology, its claims about what is possible and what is legitimate, which gives specific shape to its politics' (1993a:40).

We need, in other words, to take the content of nationalist doctrine seriously, for it is in the structure of a body of knowledge that we can trace the dynamics of power – hence the Foucaultian substance of his argument. This is because, Chatterjee argues, the injustices of colonialism are not restricted to the political, economic and military domains. Colonial oppression extends into the epistemological domain through the ideology of nationalism. In this sense, Chatterjee is not offering a causal account in the conventional sense. He is less interested in what makes nationalism than in the inherent

contradictoriness of nationalist thought and the implications of this for colonial and post-colonial politics. The paradox of nationalist thought is

the particular manifestation of a much more general problem, namely, the problem of the bourgeois-rationalist conception of knowledge, established in the post-Enlightenment period of European intellectual history, as the moral and epistemic foundation for a supposedly universal framework of thought which perpetuates, in a real and not merely a metaphorical sense, a colonial domination (1993a:11).

At this second step Chatterjee develops a critical study of ideology. He adapts from Anour Abdel-Malek (1963) the analytical distinction between the problematic and the thematic of a social ideology. The problematic is the level of an ideology that ‘*asserts* the existence, and often the practical realizability, of certain historical possibilities.’ Nationalist thought at this level ‘retains the essentialist character [of the Oriental] depicted in Orientalist discourse. Only he is not passive, non-participating. He is seen to possess a “subjectivity” which he can himself “make.”’ The thematic of ideology, on the other hand, *justifies* the claims asserted at the level of the problematic ‘by an appeal to both epistemic and moral principles.’ The thematic of nationalist thought, in this sense, ‘accepts and adopts the same essentialist conception based on the distinction between “the East” and “the West”...hence the same ‘objectifying’ procedures of knowledge constructed in the post-Enlightenment age of Western science.’ Nationalist thought is inherently contradictory ‘because it reasons within a framework of knowledge whose representational structure of power [it] seeks to repudiate’ (1993a:38). This contradiction finds its formative expression in what Chatterjee calls *the moment of departure* of colonial nationalism, when the aspiring nationalists encounter post-Enlightenment thought and accept its essentialist distinctions between the West and the East, but also advocate strategies to overcome it.

The epistemological entrapment into which colonial peoples were led by nationalism also *determined* the path post-colonial development. Chatterjee makes a case for this by arguing that the Gramscian notion of passive revolution was ‘the *general* form of the transition from colonial to post-colonial national states in the 20th century’ (1993a:49-50, emphasis in original). The twin pressures of independent capitalist development, he

argues, dictate the form of the post-colonial state: the underdeveloped domestic means of production and the overwhelming dominance of metropolitan capitalism (backed by its political and military power). In the face of these pressures the nascent bourgeoisie was confronted with the necessity to enlist the peasantry in the fight against the empire. But because it lacked the social power to assume the leadership role, the bourgeoisie did not pursue a full-scale attack on the traditional power structures and instead opted for a molecular transformation of society. This is *the moment of manoeuvre* when the colonial nationalists seek to 'bring [the pre-capitalist dominant groups] round to a position of subsidiary allies within a reformed state structure,' even if in this phase many political possibilities with emancipatory potential are attainable (1993a:49).

Colonial nationalism finds its most systematic expression when it embarks on its passive revolution in earnest following national independence. This is *the moment of arrival*, which Chatterjee associates with the thought of Jawaharlal Nehru (1993a:131–66). At this point the discourse of nationalism 'is not only conducted in a single, consistent, unambiguous voice, it also succeeds in glossing over all earlier contradictions, divergences and differences' (1993a:51). The moment of arrival effectively blocks the genuine participation of subaltern classes in national political life, for the state-building nationalist believes that the project of national emancipation 'necessarily implies an elitist programme, for the cultural synthesis in question can only be realized by the refined intellect' (Özkırımlı 2010:185).

Chatterjee's objection to modularity, developed in his later work, is based on his claim that Anderson privileges the original nationalism of Europe and the Americas over late and derivative nationalisms of Asia and Africa:

If nationalists in the rest of the world have to choose their imagined community from certain 'modular' forms already made available to them by Europe and the Americas, what do they have left to imagine? History, it would seem, has decreed that we, in the post-colonial world, shall only be perpetual consumers of modernity. Europe and the Americas, the only true subjects of history, have thought out on our behalf not only the script of colonial enlightenment and exploitation, but also that of our anti-colonial resistance and post-colonial misery. Even our imaginations must remain forever colonised (1993b:5).

To correct this Eurocentric bias, Chatterjee argues that colonial nationalisms operated in two distinct domains. The first is the material domain of the economy, statecraft and politics, where Western models were consciously imported due to their technological and organizational superiority. In this domain anti-colonial nationalism is modular. This is not, however, all there is to colonial nationalism. There is also the spiritual domain: the domain of culture, the family, language and education. If the material domain is formed on an identity with the colonizer's superior achievements, the spiritual domain is protected by anti-colonial nationalism. The latter is where anti-colonial nationalism is 'most powerful, creative and historically significant'; this is where it 'fashions a "modern" national culture which is, nevertheless, not Western' (1993b:6). This is where the anti-colonial nation happens. Therefore, it cannot be seen simply a copy of Western nationalism.

This criticism, however, is misplaced. Anderson clearly acknowledges, albeit only in the second edition of *Imagined Communities*, that nationalism built its formative and critical force outside the reaches of the colonial state – that is outside the public spheres of economics and politics, which were closely supervised by the metropole (Ullock 1996:427). 'It was precisely because temples, mosques, schools and courts were topographically anomalous,' notes Anderson with the help of spatial metaphors, 'they were understood as zones of freedom and – in time – fortresses from which religious, later nationalist, anticolonials could go forth to battle' (2006:168–69). Tellingly, Chatterjee concedes that Anderson may be right to the extent that nationalism in the colonial world has indeed copied from the European model. But this is only the case because 'we have all taken the claims of nationalism to be a *political* movement much too literally and much too seriously' (1993b:5, emphasis in original) – exactly the kind of approach he advocated in *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World* against 'sociological determinism and functionalism' (1993a:38).

This is indeed a critical juncture in Chatterjee's work and marks his desire 'to come out of the cage of intellectual history' (Goswami 2013:181). It seemingly follows from his earlier claim that all colonial peoples made their way into the nation-state system through passive revolution. Although this claim sounds conceptually intriguing, it nevertheless rings historically vacuous (cf. Marashi 2014:15–19). For without the

specification of minimum necessary premises for any historiography of nationalist decolonisation, no such sweeping assertion could allow us to answer why passive revolution acted as the common midwife for these post-colonial states in different times and places, not to mention in opposition to different colonialisms (see, for instance Riley and Desai 2007).

Absent such answers, Chatterjee has to operate, like most post-colonial theorists, with an understanding of European colonialism that is monolithic and powerful and all the more inescapable (cf. Lazarus 2002). This is to the point that all post-colonial development is caught in the epistemological categories of post-Enlightenment thought. In his quest against the avatars of Eurocentrism, Chatterjee ends up inversely reproducing the dichotomy of Eurocentric historiography. Even his later encounter with Anderson, certainly more animated politically, replicates to a degree the 'spatial' differentiation between the British coloniser and the colonised for the post-colonial India (Haj 1997:146).

Chatterjee is not clear whether these dualities are the *actual* forms of post-colonial politics or the overbearing *categories* of post-Enlightenment thought. The reader is never truly informed of the difference. For that reason there is some truth in the charge that Chatterjee's analysis is trapped in Eurocentric categories (Ramaswamy 1994:961). This may sound a tad unfair for a postcolonial theorist, but the confusion is remarkable. In his early work, Chatterjee berates nationalism for being European and in his later work, he berates a theorist of nationalism for saying nationalism is European.

But there are further problems with such binaries as outside/inside, politics/culture, West/East, material/spiritual. First, and at a more general level, Chatterjee's argument that nationalists laboured in the spiritual domain to build their nation is hardly a differentiating factor among nationalisms (Desai 2008:427). In other words, nationalisms are surely different, but they are not different in creating difference. The argument that nationalisms are different 'rhetorically overstate[s] the particularity of nationalist imaginings' (Goswami 2002:779). By overlooking the global uniformities of the modern world (Bayly 2004), it inversely reproduces the normatively suspect dichotomy of Western and Eastern nationalisms by foregrounding the cultural content of the latter.

Secondly, these ‘defensive and compensatory contrasts’ (Parker 1999:43, note 2) are deployed by Chatterjee as antidotes to the Eurocentrism of Anderson, which, in the former’s reading, treats Western nationalism as a superior and also a singular category over and above non-Western nationalism. This is not the case. Imitation of earlier forms of nationalism is not exclusive to colonial nationalists. For Anderson, official nationalisms were secondary and in reaction to the popular linguistic nationalisms of the early nineteenth century. It is one thing to argue that the processes through which such imitations have taken place remain frustratingly underspecified in Anderson’s account, especially in their geopolitical dimensions (Goswami 2002), yet quite another, and flawed, to claim that for Anderson the original and the copy distinctly belong to the West and the rest respectively. To argue the latter, as Chatterjee does, amounts to a flagrant disregard of the *empirical* support Anderson brings in to sustain his case for the modularity of the nation-form in *Imagined Communities* (cf. 2006:86–111).

Thirdly, and more specifically, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire add a further element of complication to Chatterjee’s dichotomies. The ‘spatial’ dualities forecloses an analysis of nationalism in semi-colonial societies, which did not operate with such a separation – not, at least, in the immediate and objective sense proposed by Chatterjee. They did politically imagine and challenge the master frame set by Western geopolitical pressures. This was not a static exercise caught within simple toggling between ‘the West and the East.’ Nor was it based on strictly ‘spiritual’ alternatives, but involved differing degrees of embracing Western civilisation and culture. As Fatma Müge Göçek notes, a clear-cut divide between the European coloniser and the non-European colonised does not hold in the case of the Ottoman Empire ‘where the lines were much more nuanced and identities much more fluid’ (2013:74; see also Gelvin 1999:77).

2.5 Conclusion

This chapter offers three conclusions. First, whatever its other shortcomings, Anderson’s notion of modularity strikes an important chord. The alternative on offer to such an abstraction is the argument that there can be no conceptual and theoretical unity to the study of nationalisms or one has to fall back onto an essentialist position like

Nairn. But such a position neglects ‘the historical regularities or “family resemblance” between diverse modern nationalist movements, despite their highly variegated regional and cultural contexts of production’ (Goswami 2002:776). In more concrete terms, we need to take Siniša Malešević’s caution seriously:

While there is no dispute with the view that cultural differences are real, the fact is that the organisational skeletons of modernity remain very similar if not identical: the nearly uniform bureaucratic institutions of the nation-state all over the globe, the ever-present state’s monopoly of organised violence, taxation, education and legislation; the dominance of the very similar financial institutions and capitalist corporations, the rise of context-free science and technology, the interdependent industrial expansion, etc.’ (2014:377).

Thus, what is needed is not the abandonment of modularity but its reformulation (cf. Goswami 2002; cf. Cooper 2015).

Second, the static ontology and the ‘experimental time’ of comparative analysis (Adams et al. 2005:66), even when it subscribes to modernist historiography, cannot but assume the existence of multiplicity of political or cultural groups that transform into nations. The question for this approach is how to get beyond the static ontology and find theoretical premises that can capture the very fact and consequences of multiplicity. One promising way is to see comparison not a tool imposed on history but one ‘used in the past by historical actors themselves, when they engineered similarities and differences in order to create particular historical trajectories for their polities and communities’ (Saunier 2013:5). Comparison in this sense has indeed been built into the global diffusion of nationalism:

Because the first nation-states (i.e., Great Britain, the United States, and France) happened to be the most powerful states in the world from the eighteenth century to today, [a variety of political movements across the world] “pirated” nationalism...hoping they would one day preside over states that matched the military glory, political might, and cultural prestige of these powerful nation-states (Wimmer and Feinstein 2010:769).

Third, a reformulated concept of modularity should be able to historicise the diffusion of nationalism without getting caught in the fruitless back-and-forth of the West and the East dichotomy which afflicts both Nairn's and Chatterjee's work. There are indeed passing moments in Nairn's writing where he makes approving, but fleeting, use of Leon Trotsky's notion of uneven and combined development (1981:339), which intimates a methodology to bridge the articulation of nationalism as a *universally* acceptable form of politics and its *particular* manifestations in the late developing world. But in Nairn's use uneven and combined development is 'merely a rhetorical device rather than a theoretical category' (Matin 2013a:82). His uncritical application of Gellner's tidal waves argument costs Nairn the ontological depth of the dynamics of unevenness and the promise of combined development to shed light on the heterogeneity of nationalist politics, as he ultimately opts for a simplified notion of bi-temporality (developed/underdeveloped) seemingly inspired by the core-periphery differentiation of the world systems theory (Balibar 1991:89–90; Wallerstein 1991).

Chapter 3

Theorising the International Origins of Late Nationalisms

3.1. Introduction

Our analysis so far endeavoured to make a case that a gulf exists between histories of nationalisms and theories of nationalism. This involved reviewing two sides of the gulf in their respective literatures to identify their shortcomings. The problem with the specialised literature engaged with in Chapter 1 is its particularism. For lack of theoretical resources on which to base their historical research, they tend to treat their cases as exceptional. In other words, specific late nationalisms are historicised with reference to their particular and internal developmental dynamics, even if the original impetus came from ‘outside.’ This has led to an intellectual dead-end wherein all nationalisms have their specific dynamics that cannot be subjected to theoretical control. The paradox is that, especially for the critically oriented studies of the subject, nationalism manages almost surreptitiously to fix the analytical boundaries of its own deconstruction.

The internalism of the histories of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms has its theoretical counterpart in the general literature. Before moving forward, let me restate the content and consequences of internalism, for this is the cardinal problem this thesis seeks to tackle. A particularly incisive criticism of internalist social theory is made available to us in a lesser known article by a German sociologist named Friedrich Tenbruck (1994; see also Martins 1974; Poggi 1965).²⁶ The fundamental assumption of internalist sociology, according to Tenbruck, is that ‘each society with its changes and growth can

²⁶ Tenbruck’s article was originally published in German in 1989 and it had a specific target in mind: the postwar History of Society school (*Gesellschaftsgeschichte*) in Germany. Appeared well before the high tide of globalisation theory with its fashionable but flawed critique of methodological nationalism, the article contained ‘prophetic proposals.’ Yet Tenbruck’s challenge went largely unanswered (Osterhammel 2009:43) – a fate similarly fell upon the text’s English translation in 1994. This goes to show how difficult it could be to penetrate through the skin of sclerotic principles in social sciences and humanities. Despite being published in English more than 20 years ago and in a journal which has been very much at the centre of the globalisation debates, according to the Google Scholar metrics Tenbruck’s piece have received only 31 citations as of December 2017.

and should be explained in reference to its internal constitution.’ This basic premise inevitably leads to the treatment of interactions among societies as insignificant details. ‘Inter-societal conditions,’ added Tenbruck, ‘represented only facilitating or inhibiting modifications and complications of their own internal dynamic’ (1994:75). Internalism banishes the intersocietal from the theoretical domain. In the actual execution of sociological theorisation, internalism ominously guards against asking certain types of questions concerned with, for example,

the reciprocal conditioning of societies, their relationship to each other, that is their ‘external situatedness,’ and in addition those factors that, as religious, political, economic or cultural processes of societalization, occur across and beyond a range of societies; or those which take place below this level, e.g. as migrations, asylum-seeking or other forms of population movement; and, finally, all forms of military, cultural and economic expansion (1994:76).

But this is not all there is to internalism. One of the reasons why internalism is so rampant in modern social theory, to the extent that it has become invisible to most, is because many of the European and North American practitioners of sociology never realised that there can be any other type of society than theirs; nor did they think that their society requires any external input for its development. Like a duck takes to water, for the Western sociologist its fundamental conceptual category, society, appeared quite natural and self-reproducing within its boundaries. Those who dared to venture beyond those boundaries methodologically armed themselves almost exclusively with comparative method. This has interlaced sociological internalism with another widespread intellectual and political problem: Eurocentrism.

To see how this is different from the internalism of historical works on nationalism, we can contrast the role of causal explanation in both. Unlike the specialised literature where causal explanation is sacrificed for narrativism, in the general literature the problem is with the nature of the causal explanation itself. This is because in the latter case, the causal analysis is derived from a certain historical geography; and for that reason, it cannot be extended to the late developing cases. The empirical problem, most clearly expressed, is that late developing nationalisms fully expose the limitations of an internalist theory. In either case the analytical boundaries unconsciously impose

themselves. In the specialised literature the analytical boundaries of the specific national unit paradoxically set limits on the analysis of nationalism. The deconstruction of the nation is caught in ‘the territorial trap’ (Agnew 1994). In the general literature the historical experience of a specific historical geography (Europe) presents itself as the supplier of the universal causal key to explain other nationalisms.

Needless to say, I am not the first person to notice the troubling rift between theory and history in the study of nationalism. Therefore, the chapter reviews previous attempts in a cumulative fashion in order to propose its own solution to the problem. This will allow me to evaluate various attempts at bridging the rift between theory and history, and, more importantly, to avoid the potential risk of self-referentiality of my proposed theoretical solution. To that end, the first section starts with an almost routinely proposed solution: comparison. Although in most cases its ‘nature and methods...are assumed as givens’ (Friedman 2013:34), comparison ‘seems fundamental to human understanding...that depends upon principles of relation and differentiation’ (Felski and Friedman 2013:1–2). As a first port of call, comparison is touted as the most immediately available and viable tool to bridge the gap between theory and history. But despite all its cognitive authority, comparison has recently come under fire for its inability to account for connective and interactive dimension of social reality.

That critique of comparison leads to, or rather largely emanates from, the recent global or transnational turn in historiography. The proponents of this burgeoning perspective on history claim to overcome the limitations of traditional history writing – namely Eurocentrism, internalism and static temporality of comparison – by shifting the focus on to transactions, transfers and crossings between and across societies (Conrad 2016; Haupt and Kocka 2009; Iriye 2013). These histories, named collectively by its two practitioners as ‘the family of relational approaches’ (Werner and Zimmermann 2006:31), come with many adjectives (world, transnational, global, connected, entangled etc.), work in different scales and ask sometimes dramatically different questions. Notwithstanding their internal variety, they seem to agree on the premise that the world cannot be fully understood if discreetly bounded units (most notably nations or nation-states) determine where historical analysis starts and ends. In their challenge towards nation-centric histories, they focus on ‘the interdependencies that are not captured by “the nation” as a category, such as the transfer of ideas, technologies and

cultural practices' (Rüger 2010:659). Given its pronouncements, transnational history appears to be a perfect cure for the problems identified in the previous chapters.

This is only a targeted look because I do not pursue an extensive survey of transnational history. What is more useful here is to assess, in two steps, the contributions of this new turn in historiography to (i) the study of nationalism, which would yield (ii) theoretical insights. Notwithstanding its crucial criticisms of methodological nationalism and Eurocentrism, transnational history is hampered by a mobility bias which neglects the transhistorical quality of 'geopolitics' and often repeats the excesses of globalisation theory (cf. de Vries 2013).

Following this discussion with its still tentative findings, I present in detailed fashion the premises of Uneven and Combined Development, as the most well suited theory to establish the above mentioned cooperation and to overcome the theory and history rift in the study of nationalism. This presentation has several steps. The first is an introduction of Leon Trotsky's original contribution in response to the apparent peculiarity of the Bolshevik Revolution in Russia. This is followed by an analysis of the recent renaissance of Trotsky's original idea, especially, though not exclusively, in the discipline of International Relations. It is here we find increasingly in systematic form the key premises of U&CD, as I demonstrate by successively explaining the meaning of each component: unevenness, combination and development. And following from these premises are the methodological principles of U&CD.

The final section of the chapter demonstrates the application of U&CD's methodology to the formative period of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms from the mid-eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries. To that end it introduces the intermediary concepts of 'politics of comparison' and 'mediated modernisation,' which connect main premises of the theory to the historical analysis.

3.2 Is Comparison the Cure for Internalism?

The review of the specialised literature in Chapter 1 cited numerous complaints of theoretical deficiency. As part and parcel of the so-called crisis of area studies, the

contribution of Middle East Studies, by admission of its practitioners, seems to halt at the region's borders. Consequently, the studies of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms are stricken by national-myopia. For 'particular histories of particular nationalisms,' notes John Breuilly, 'tend to become absorbed into their subject' (1996b:138). Moreover, although these studies are not marred by essentialism and make use of recent critical and deconstructivist epistemologies, the single case study approach is the most popular choice. Narrative accounts of different nationalisms' invention or imagination are ultimately caught up in the hermeneutic circle of nationalist thought (or discourse, to use the more fashionable term) and inadvertently end up registering the power of the nation (Breuilly 1996a:157). Paradoxically, the critical stamina of social constructivism falls short of overcoming national epistemological boundaries.

But there may still be room for improvement. And one avenue towards that end is pointed out with noticeable frequency: comparison (Hroch 1998:78). Fred Halliday, who diagnosed a rift between general theories and individual case studies of nationalism, called for a halt to general theorising: 'what we need instead are comparative, individual, histories that are both written in the light of these general theories and that, critically, test them against the historical record' (1997:27). Another commentator suggests an almost identical treatment. Given the current saturation of the field of nationalism studies with abstract general theories at one end and concrete individual histories at the other, 'the value of "theoretically informed" comparative case studies needs to be emphasized more than ever' (Özkırımlı 2010:219). With an area studies focus, Moshe Behar reiterates the prescription: 'the incorporation of the core comparative questions into the study of nationalism in the Middle East is a prerequisite for overcoming the relative idiosyncrasy typifying this domain' (2005:587).

In the instances just cited, authors provide little methodological guidance on how to compare and, as such, comparison seems to be 'more widely admired than consciously practiced' (Grew 1980:768).²⁷ And when it is employed, as, for example, in the study of Turkish nationalism, it is at best 'implicit and indirect' (Zürcher 2014:592). Even then, extending the benefit of the doubt to comparative historical analysis may be of more

²⁷ Tellingly, two prolific historians of modern Iran and Turkey choose to downplay their methodological ambitions by attaching the qualifier, 'Some Comparative Remarks,' to the titles of their works (Atabaki 2007; Atabaki and Zürcher 2004:44–64).

value at this point than outright scepticism. What does, then, comparative historical analysis offer? How does it close the gap between history and theory? And how can it help overcome the limitations in the study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms?

‘Truth on this side of the Pyrénées,’ said Blaise Pascal some centuries ago, is ‘error on the other side’ (Quoted in Dogan 2009:13).²⁸ For its practitioners, the major virtue of comparative historical analysis is its ability to *manage* the diversity of social reality. Given that the social sciences have no theories with universal validity, the comparativists argue, the best way to comprehend such a diversity and idiosyncrasy of human societies, according to one sociologist, is the comparative method (Dogan 2009:13). It is by way of comparison we can hope to reach new historical generalisations (Moore 1973:x). In this sense, comparative historical analysis is most beneficial, notes one historian, when it formulates ‘arguments at a middle range about differences and similarities among a range of cases that allow us to understand the general issue at hand better than had we limited our scope to one country only’ (Baldwin 2004:11). Usually, this goal is attained by pausing ‘along the path leading from one national history to abstract sociological generalizations’ and generating typologies (Baldwin 2004:8).

The appeal of comparison is potently felt in the (sub-) discipline of historical sociology. If anything, historical sociology was born comparative, thanks more than anyone else to Max Weber and his work on world religions (Kalberg 1994; Onaka 2015).²⁹ The German sociologist, who principally endowed historical sociology with its comparative birthmarks,³⁰ rebuked a sceptic historian in 1914: ‘we are absolutely in accord that history should establish what is specific to, say, the medieval city; but this is possible only if we first find what is missing in other cities (ancient, Chinese, Islamic)’ (Quoted

²⁸ Mattei Dogan mistakenly attributes these words to Michel de Montaigne, instead of Blaise Pascal. The translator of Pascal’s work, Roger Ariew, notes that Pascal paraphrased Montaigne’s earlier point: ‘what truth is it that is bounded by these mountains, and that is falsehood in the world beyond them?’ (Pascal 2005:19)

²⁹ Emile Durkheim was equally adamant on the centrality of comparative method to sociology: ‘comparative sociology is not a special branch of sociology; it is sociology itself, in so far as it ceases to be purely descriptive and aspires to account for facts’ (2013:109).

³⁰ As Peter Burke notes, ‘Weber spent much of his working life in the attempt to define the distinctive characteristics of Western civilization (notably what he called its institutionalized “rationality”), by means of systematic comparisons between Europe and Asia in the economic, political and religious spheres and even in that of music’ (1993:23).

in Roth 1976:307). Even when the hegemonic postwar American sociology ‘retreated into the present’ (Elias 1987) at the expense of historical inquiry, a meagre number of ‘renegade’ historical sociologists like Barrington Moore and Reinhard Bendix struggled to keep the comparative fire going. It was the second-wave historical sociologists of 1970s and 1980s (cf. Adams et al. 2005:15–30), including the sub-discipline’s household names like Immanuel Wallerstein, Theda Skocpol, Charles Tilly and S. N. Eisenstadt, who reintroduced historical analysis back into the mainstream of sociology. And it was ‘by stressing comparative method, they participate eagerly in the discipline’s obsessive concern to justify itself as a science,’ because comparative method is ‘the standard alternative to mainstream statistical methods when the number of cases is insufficiently large’ (Sewell Jr. 1996:246).

There are certain key features that define the methodological and epistemological aspirations of the comparativist agenda. At its core, contemporary comparative historical analysis is driven by a legacy of asking big questions. Having emerged at a time of epochal transformations of industrial capitalism, imperialist expansion and confrontation, state centralisation, nation formation and urbanisation, the classical social theories confronted questions of comprehensive structures and large-scale processes. This central occupation with ‘how...societies come to be recognisably modern’ (Adams et al. 2005:3) fostered ‘an affinity between asking big questions and using comparative historical research methods’ that ‘has helped to sustain a single tradition from the beginning of modern social science analysis to this day’ (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:7). This tradition, having lapsed into an institutional coma in the immediate decades of the postwar period, was revived in the last quarter of the twentieth century to pursue a research agenda with three distinctive features. First, the fundamental concern of comparative historical analysis is to identify and explain causal configurations that produce major outcomes of interest. Second, comparative historical analysis deploys an explicit focus on historical sequences and processes unfolding over time. Third, the analysis is carried out by systematic and contextualised comparisons of cases on the axes of similarity and difference (Mahoney and Rueschemeyer 2003:10–15).

With such a venerable tradition to cite and so many accolades under its belt, comparative historical analysis, then, appears to be the best available cure for overcoming provincial empiricism and internalism that hinders the study of the

formative period of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. And this is not the end of it. If one chooses to deploy it, comparative analysis could potentially offer further benefits to the historiography of Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire in light of a highly authoritative counsel. Almost a century ago, the eminent historian Marc Bloch (1967)³¹ made a distinction between universal comparison and historical comparison (cf. Hill and Hill 1980; cf. Sewell Jr. 1967; cf. Steinmetz 2014:416–17). In the former case, comparison involves societies ‘so widely separated in time and space that any analogies observed between them with respect to such and such phenomena can obviously not be explained either by mutual influence or by a common origin’ (1967:46). For Bloch this was not the right direction to take. The second option, historical comparison, involves neighbouring and contemporary societies that influence each other, are shaped by same broad causes and have common origins. For these reasons, historical comparison ‘may hope to reach conclusions of fact that are less hypothetical and much more precise [because] it is more capable of rigorous classification, and more critical about the objects it compares’ (1967:48; see also Dogan 2009:22).³²

For Bloch’s principles Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire are most suitable. The geographical contiguity of these countries has been a source of continual interaction (peaceful or otherwise), exchange and influence over the centuries (Ateş 2013; Baghoolizadeh 2012; Elik 2011; Issawi 1970; Kunt 2011; Masters 1991; Shaw 1991; Yıldırım 2009). From a comparative perspective, Iran and Turkey show noteworthy similarities in ‘structural’ conditions they were exposed to and in their ‘domestic’ characteristics. Inheritors of long imperial heritages, they experienced geopolitical pressures from the industrial European empires and Russia at about the same time and devised similar reform efforts to cope with these pressures. Bending history ‘a little,’ the political high point of their reforms, the promulgation of a constitution, was nearly simultaneous, or at least part of a global revolutionary wave (Sohrabi 2011). With the majority of their populations Muslim, both countries were radically transformed by authoritarian modernisers in the twentieth century (Atabaki and Zürcher 2004), who wished to shake off their societies’ Islamic legacy (Hazır 2015:6). And these

³¹ Originally published in French in 1928.

³² In a similar vein, Aram Yengoyan observes that ‘traditionally, comparisons have invoked the idea that if what is being compared shares some common time and space, the findings will be more powerful’ (2006:9).

characteristics, among others, justify the reasonable volume of comparative analysis (Ahmad 2014; Akkoyunlu 2014; Arjmand 2008; Pfaff 1963; Shambayati 1994, 2004; Sohrabi 2011; Tezcür 2011; Vardağlı 2014). Yet, curious is the neglect of the comparative study of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms (Keyman and Yılmaz 2006).

Bloch's call for paying attention to mutual influences between neighbouring societies poses a problem for the logic of comparative analysis since it privileges synchronic over the diachronic. The comparative method fixes its objects of inquiry and freezes them in experimental time (see, Adams et al. 2005:66).³³ Fixing objects of inquiry does not, however, mean freezing them in the photographic moment. It entails identifying and isolating causal sequences within comparable scales in order to trace their presence or absence in cases subject to comparison (Hewitson 2014:164–68). But in its freezing of time, comparison neglects the interactive dimension of social reality and overlooks the fact that once a particular causal sequence unfolds it generates dynamics that impact on what appears to the comparativist scholar as comparable later sequences.³⁴ What is lost in comparative method, notes Michael Werner and Bénédicte Zimmermann, is the interactive dynamics that 'when societies in contact are studied, the objects and practices are not only in a state of interrelationship but also modify one another reciprocally as a result of their relationship' (2006:35; see also Delanty 2016:20). The net result of this is that comparative historical analysis fails 'to transcend the boundaries of nationalist historiography' (Tyrrell 1991:1033; see also Gould 2007:766).

Comparative historical analysis is also prone to Eurocentrism, our second major problem. There is a tendency in comparative work to treat 'the West as norm from which other cultures diverge' (Burke 1993:26; for an alternative, see Holdrege 2010). The findings of such treatment then tend to be a list of presences and absences. An ominous legacy, first and foremost of Max Weber's work, 'we are able to see what is not there, in other words to understand the significance of a particular absence' (Burke 1993:23, see also 2016:87). Comparative historical sociology's lore of absences in the

³³ As Kocka and Haupt (2009:14) put it, 'comparison usually does not deal with the passage of time, but, rather, with similarities and differences.'

³⁴ Some time ago Michael Burawoy (1989:781), drawing inspiration from Leon Trotsky (1969), spotted this problem of freezing history in Theda Skocpol's highly influential, but equally challenged, comparative analysis of social revolutions (1979). This criticism is repeated by William Sewell (1996:257–58).

non-European world includes, among others, rationality, private property, individualism and, more recently, civil society (see, for example, Yapp 1992). In this way comparison establishes difference and ‘with every spectre of difference comes the possibility of hierarchy, of relations of domination and subordination’ (Mongia 2007:385). Conducted in this way, the tenor of historical inquiry becomes comparison *to* (rather than comparison *of*), which ‘sets up a hierarchy with the lead comparison as the normative entity against which something else will be compared’ (Levine 2014:340).

3.3 Transnational History and Overcoming Internalism and Eurocentrism through Mobility

The criticisms towards comparative historical inquiry have been primarily raised by a new group of historians who have been inspired by Akire Iriye’s call ‘to search for historical themes and conceptions that are meaningful across national boundaries’ (1989:2). The call itself and the responses it gathered corresponded to a particular historical conjuncture, ‘our’ recent age of globalisation, which threw the stability of the units of historical and sociological analysis into doubt. Much like the onslaught visited upon area studies (discussed in Chapter 1), comparative historical analysis came under increasing scrutiny. It appears that comparison is no longer the main methodological identity of historical sociology, leading some to nostalgically lament the passing of earlier, comparativist days (Arjomand 2011; see also the response by Mahoney 2011). Let us now look at first the new breed of historians who promises us greener pastures beyond the old and static world of internalism and comparison.

In 2006, *the American Historical Review*, the flagship journal of the discipline, inaugurated a new feature. Since then the Annual AHR Conversation, as the feature is called, has been bringing several eminent historians into an online exchange of ideas on a significant issue in historiography. That the editorial board chose transnational history as ‘the important theme’ for the first conversation (Bayly et al. 2006) is a testament to the meteoric rise of this branch of history writing. Before the 1990s only a handful of historians plied their trade in transnational waters. But after the tsunami of globalisation purportedly flattened the boundaries of the modern nation-state and in parallel drastically undermined nation-centrism in social sciences and humanities, adjectives

such as transnational, global, connected or entangled have become academic household items (Iriye 2013:1–17). So much so that the editor of the first AHR Conversation felt the need to issue the warning that transnational history was ‘in danger of becoming merely a buzzword among historians’ with little agreement on its aims and method (Bayly et al. 2006:1441).

My concern here is not to provide an extended review of this recent turn in historiography with its myriad perspectives, even less to arbitrate among them to announce whether world, global, transnational or any similar perspective in history has a better grasp of our brave and newly globalized past, than others. Internal differences are often tenuous (Iriye 2013:11) and they sometimes appear to be little more than practices of academic markings of territory. The question of method, or more pointedly the question of theory remains crucial however as it connects to the mainstream of this thesis: the relationship between history and theory in the study of (late) nationalism. As one of its more renowned practitioners notes, this kind of history ‘cannot be satisfied with mere description. Whether more explanatory or more interpretive in its general inclination, it always requires theoretical input – usually input it has not generated itself’ (Osterhammel 2016:25).

While it may be cumbersome to catalogue all the internal differences among the variety of transnational histories, it is much easier to pin down the things they agree on. Two agendas seem to drive the coterie of transnational historians. First, transnational history seeks to challenge methodological nationalism. It wishes to overcome the dominance of the nation-state as the sole unit of analysis. It argues that histories of societies do not start and stop at the boundaries of states and are shaped by processes that cut across them. In this sense, it explores interconnections, movements and transfers across borders. Second, it challenges Eurocentrism of conventional historiography. It argues that Europe has no privileged status in world history nor are its achievement completely of its own making. These two are recurrent themes in almost all of the transnational history literature (Conrad 2016; Iriye 2013; Saunier 2013).

To my knowledge, the most programmatic statement of the potential contribution of transnational history to the study of nationalism is an article by Dean Konstantaras. Taking his inspiration from one member of that historiographical family, *histoire*

croisée, Konstantaras identifies his empirical puzzle as ‘the spectacle of near contemporaneous [rise and spread of nationalist movements] in several parts of the world³⁵ that were nevertheless widely divergent in their political and economic configuration’ (2013:387). Compared to other forms of collective identification in human history, nationalism’s track record has been extraordinary. If we measure the temporal distance between the conventional French Revolutionary starting point and the end of the decolonisation period around the 1970s, this gives us less than 200 years, at the end of which the earth’s surface was exclusively populated by separate and sovereign nations. Given nationalism’s epidemic multiplication, the argument that all nationalisms are different and as such they should be analysed ‘in their own context,’ appealing as it sounds, is bound to reproduce not one, but many ‘internalisms.’ Thus, the argument that a nationalism can only be understood with reference to its *own* conditions of emergence rings rather hollow.

Given this contemporaneity and interconnectedness, a relational historiography can add to the wealth of nationalism studies ‘by mining ideological appropriations and other forms of interaction for new layers of meaning or investigating the mutually constituted elements in various contemporary imaginings of identity and nationhood’ (Konstantaras 2013:384). Thus the study of the rise and spread of nationalism from a relational history approach, notes Konstantaras, is ‘largely about culture.’ And he adds, in unexceptionable fashion, that culture ‘in principle and in any given context’ is ‘fundamentally relational and contingent upon a variety...of crossings’ (2013:385; see also Leerssen 2011).

But how exactly does a transnational or a relational approach advance our understanding of the history of nationalisms? What sort of gap does it propose to close? Here the usual suspects are of two kinds: historians with a focus on single nations and social scientists who offer ‘structural’ explanations. The contemporaneity and interconnectedness of nationalisms is lost on historians who tend to focus on the particular, or, as Charles Tilly once put it, if they are insistent ‘on time and place as fundamental principles of variation’ (1991:87). And therein lies the problem. To the eye of the historian ‘each movement appears as the product of unique conditions and

³⁵ Konstantaras’s focus is on Europe and the Atlantic World in the Age of Revolutions, but the premises of transnational history, which he subscribes to, should allow me to stretch his point to other regions and periods. What good is ‘the transnational’ otherwise!

contradictions.’ But if ‘the looking-glass is raised to a higher elevation, similar developments are found to be occurring in many other parts of [the world] under very different circumstances, at roughly the same time’ (Kostantaras 2013:387–88). The question is obvious as it is damning for internalist historians. Can we really assume that all nationalisms somehow emerged in different contexts in response to the same problems and deployed the same discourses? What connects the dots? How can we even start to answer these questions if our histories of specific nationalisms remain *overdetermined* by ‘local’ factors? Historians or at least some of them can, of course, only be found wanting in their negligence of these questions, not in their attempts to answer them. The latter charge goes to the historically minded social scientists that study nationalism, also known as the modernist theorists of nationalism (Özkırımlı 2010:81–141).

Unlike historians, social scientists like their generalisations. And given the spatial and temporal multiplicity of the phenomenon of nationalism, they infer, so argues Kostantaras, ‘the existence of a necessary connection between certain general developments of the age and the formation of national sentiment’ (2013:388). In so many words, Kostantaras points out the problem of non-iteration of ‘original’ causal sequences in later instances of the same phenomena elsewhere – hence the problem of internalism. But this is only partly an accurate and a seriously incomplete assessment of theories of nationalism. All these theorists³⁶ in question are perfectly aware of the diversity of nationalisms and they do try to account for it. The mistake is not with structuralism or functionalism as such. Nor is it right to find solace in the empirical diversity of nationalisms in order to argue that such is the reason for the failure of theorising, as Konstantaras implies. It is the way in which theory is constructed that is problematic. And this leads us one step closer to a discussion our cases and their relation to nationalism studies (cf. Marashi 2014).

By exposing theoretical needs of transnational history, we can proceed onto their resolution by establishing links with historical sociology. Transnational history comes with a conceptual baggage. While its corrective aspirations towards overcoming the methodological nationalism should be acknowledged, it is not always theoretically

³⁶ Kostantaras qualifies his simplification in an endnote: ‘These arguments are largely directed toward the arguments of [Ernest] Gellner’ (2013:398 note 38).

equipped to overcome the much larger and persistent problem of internalism. This can be demonstrated on several counts.

Firstly, transnational history suffers from what Jürgen Osterhammel calls ‘mobility bias.’ The price of upsetting the stability of units of analysis is an excessive emphasis on mobilities and flows, which costs transnational history ‘a sense of proportion by underestimating social structure and hierarchy’ (2016:38; see also Rockefeller 2011). The processual ontology that undergirds much of transnational history is troubled by ‘the plain fact that much of the social world stays the same much of the time’ (Abbott 1995:859). Those who took the joyride of globalisation in the 1990s, we should remind ourselves, later had difficulties to accept the resilience of the nation-state. In a powerful critique, Jan Rüter raises precisely this immensely important question: ‘Does not the focus on “in between” on “trans” and “cross” imply the existence of states as the powerful pillars between which all the exchange and transfer takes place?’ (2010:659). Indeed, Kostantaras acknowledges the weight of this problem and ponders on how to theoretically account for the fact of *multiple* political entities, but ultimately opts for the classical move of the historian and ‘set[s] these theoretical difficulties aside’ (2013:385). This escapism essentially confirms the theory deficit in transnational history identified by Jürgen Osterhammel above.

Secondly, failure to answer Rüter’s *ontological* question smuggles in the indefensible assumption that the fact of humanity’s fragmentation into multiple political entities with uneven resources (to use the plainest ontological language possible) does not have any theoretical relevance. The net result of this is that transnational history does not acknowledge the historical and the theoretical import of ‘asymmetrical transfers’ (Werner and Zimmermann 2006:39) and risks slipping into a laudatory narrative of reciprocity among individuals and societies, essentially repeating the excesses of the globalisation rhetoric (de Vries 2013:39–42). Yet reciprocity is *not* symmetry. And the asymmetry is not solely about the transfers but more crucially about the historically located actors in uneven power relationships. One of the profoundest expressions of this unevenness has always been among multiple societies.

Seen in this light, we cannot but point out that the emergence of late nationalisms was not simply an outcome of transnational interactions, but of ‘the structural similarity of

the task that fell upon one nationalist leadership after another in the long story of the emergence of the nation-states system' (Desai 2009) under pressure from more developed and imperialist states. Not to mention that this 'structural' condition was not exclusive to the non-European world. And this is actually the opening gambit of Kostantaras. But he does not follow it through. Ultimately, without addressing the ontological fact of unevenness among *multiple* societies, which was *not* inaugurated by nationalism, recurrent emphases on the nation's relational construction remain anodyne. Surely, the modern nations, as with all social *and* societal forms, are relational constructions. The question is what are those 'things' that relate to one another, if they are not nations? And what kind of causal determinations, if any, follow from their co-existence that can help us to understand nationalisms?

After all, while we can certainly dispute the existence of nations and nationalism before modernity, the same disputation does not extend to the fact of humanity's existence in multiple societies with their states – the latter being the cluster of institutional and legal mechanisms through which the specialisation of internal roles, varying degrees of social coherence and conflict, and external differentiation and 'diplomacy' have been instituted, managed and enforced. The available historical record makes it plain that human social existence has always taken the form of multiple and *politically differentiated* societies since the Neolithic Revolution (cf. Rosenberg 2010). And it is this fact that has given licence to the institutionalisation of a tradition of thought and systematic research under the title of the discipline of International Relations (cf. Rosenberg 2016).

Thirdly, this ontological problem helps us make sense of what might otherwise seem as a semantic quibble. The application of the transnational epithet to historical eras before modernity is found to be anachronistic. The fact that 'before 1850, large parts of the globe were not dominated by nations so much as by empires, city-states, diasporas, etc.' (Bayly in Bayly et al. 2006:1442; see also Waldinger and Fitzgerald 2004) restricts the utility of the term transnational. More importantly still, the unreflective extension of the term actually runs counter to its stated intention of challenging methodological nationalism. The indiscriminate use of the term paradoxically naturalises and dehistoricises the 'national' by leaving assumptions of space, state and subjectivity conceived in national terms intact (Mongia 2014:203).

3.4 The Theory of Uneven and Combined Development

From the preceding review, we can now proceed on to the substantive elements of a solution. First, our solution shall be such that ‘rather than starting from the internal structure of society, the foundations for its concept formation should incorporate inter-societal conditions and cross-cutting processes of societalization’ (Tenbruck 1994:92). Translated into the terminology of historical sociology, we need a theoretical approach that does not treat the conditions that made the emergence of late nationalisms possible (i.e. social change) as internal to societies. But it also needs to overcome two other problems transpired from comparative historical analysis and transnational history. Thus, secondly, it should be able to integrate the interactive dimension of the constitution and transformation of societies which comparative historical analysis is unable to do. This shall make it possible to theoretically account for the multi-linear causalities which the traditions of historical sociology has failed to capture (cf. Magubane 2005). And finally, our solutions shall be such that it should not abstract these multilinear causalities from the transhistorical fact of humanity’s existence in multiple societies. And in light of the problems just discussed, recent commentaries broach the need to address the theoretical deficit in transnational history. And the way to do this, they propose, is to bring transnational history and historical sociology in a fruitful exchange (Anievas and Matin 2016c; Delanty 2016; Osterhammel 2016).

The germ of such a solution, I argue, can be found in the work of the Russian revolutionary Leon Trotsky. He presented the most programmatic and condensed statement of his approach to history in his *History of the Russian Revolution*; a book he finished writing in 1930 when he was in exile on the island of Prinkipo, near Istanbul (2007:3–12). The immediate historical puzzle that provoked Trotsky’s mind was the October revolution. This was a proletarian revolution. But the historical wisdom of Marxism at the time, which was hardened into a dogma under the institutional roof of the Second International (1889–1916), held that societies must first have a bourgeois-democratic revolution to achieve capitalist development. Only then, and on the

foundations of capitalist mode of production, could a militant industrial working class form and later overthrow the rule of the bourgeoisie through a proletarian revolution. None of these prerequisites, not by any stretch of imagination, had matured in Russia – neither in 1905 nor in 1917. Yet a socialist revolution did take place. And Trotsky reasoned that something went seriously wrong. Not in history *per se*, certainly not in Russia, but in the ways in which the Second International Marxists (mis)understood Russian history or, even more fundamentally, history in general.

The root of this misunderstanding was obvious to Trotsky. The dogmatists followed Marx to the letter: ‘The country that is more developed industrially only shows, to the less developed, the image of its own future’ (1976:91). The implication of Marx’s statement is clear enough. There is one historical path towards capitalist development and the pioneer nation of industrialisation, England, laid it out for everyone else to follow³⁷ – except for those that have no history (Benner 1995:159–86). Trotsky, however, offered a contrasting picture: ‘England in her day revealed the future of France, considerably less of Germany, but not in the least of Russia and not of India’ (2007:890). Clearly, he resisted an understanding of capitalism’s history (that is both its past and future) that envisioned internally unfolding multiplication of the same developmental trajectory within diverse and multiple societies differentiated by certain time lags. Nor, it must be noted, did he think that England, France, Germany, Russia, India or any other society for that matter followed separate path of its own. In Trotsky’s view, what we are accustomed to see as *sui generis*, the particularities of the national, were actually the products of the international interaction: ‘it is false that the specific features are “merely supplementary to the general features,” like warts on a face. In reality, the national peculiarities represent an original combination of the basic features of the world process’ (1969:147).

³⁷ This is not all there is to Marx’s writing, however. Theodor Shanin made a compelling case that late in his life Marx ‘had come...to accept the multiplicity of roads also within a world in which capitalism existed and became a dominant force’ after extensive contacts with Russian thinkers and revolutionaries (1983:29). The question of late Marx and the possibility of an alternative, Russian road to socialism through primitive commune (*obschina*) generated some heat (Desai 1986; Sayer 1987; Anderson 2010; Araujo 2017; Brown 2010). As things stand, the jury is still out on the question whether a strictly stageist and unilinear view of history can be attributable to Marx’s work *in toto*. I cannot venture into this issue here. Suffice it to say that I agree with Derek Sayer. While Marx’s doubts and reformulations were serious and characteristically far-sighted, the fact remains that he ‘never explicitly reworked his overall vision of history on the basis of these late insights’ and as such we shall refrain from making major claims on his behalf (Sayer 1990:22).

Seen in this light, the outbreak of the October revolution was not some kind of a deviation from the universal patterns but intrinsically connected to the developments of other societies:

‘But do you really believe,’ the Stalins, Rykovs and all the other Molotovs objected dozens of times between 1905 and 1917, ‘that Russia is ripe for the socialist revolution?’ To that I always answered: No, I do not. But world economy as a whole, and European economy in the first place, is fully ripe for the socialist revolution. Whether the dictatorship of the proletariat in Russia leads to socialism or not, and at what tempo and through what stages, will depend upon the fate of European and world capitalism (1969:129).

This is all good and convincing. But is this all there is to it? It cannot be. Because I introduced Trotsky with a promise to present his approach to history in general, not just to the history of the dynamics of modern capitalist world, the October revolution or the significance of *international* interactions and combination. And I rounded off the argument by adding that the way Trotsky reasoned, the flaw in the historical vision of the Second International Marxists was not confined to their misunderstanding of the October revolution, but to history in general. Surely, then, I cannot get away with stretching historical arguments made in relation to a specific period – and a comparatively very short one in that – across the whole skin of human history – especially, not after criticising transnational history for committing a similar sin of conceptual stretching. Fortunately, Trotsky did indeed elaborate a conceptual system germane to the full expanse of the history of social world with which he resolves the puzzle of the October revolution. This conceptual system has four key components, all of which are alluded to above in relation to the historical dynamics of the revolution: unevenness, societal interactivity, combination and development. To those components our focus shall now turn.

Unevenness refers to the fact that human beings have *always* lived in *multiple* societies with varying levels of development. This variety has been an outcome of dissimilar social and material conditions, which were, and remains to be in differing degrees, ecological, demographic, institutional, cultural and so forth. This fundamental condition

of human existence engenders temporally multi-linear patterns of development among multiple and diverse societies – that is both quantitatively (many) and qualitatively (different). This is, as Leon Trotsky put it, ‘the most general law of the historic process’ (2007:5).³⁸ In other words, this is a transhistorical condition. And this transhistorical condition gives rise to a particular dimension of social reality ‘which arises specifically from the coexistence within it of more than one society’ (Rosenberg 2006:308). Let us refer this dimension of human existence, for want of a better term, the intersocietal.

The second element, interactions among societies, contained in the kernel of the intersocietal, is absolutely essential to the conceptual system of the theory of uneven and combined development. Without conceptually integrating interactivity in the core of the theory, U&CD would only be describing ‘temporal coincidences’ of individual societies separated in space (Rosenberg 2006:317). If we do not posit interactivity as a causally consequential fact on the intersocietal, we would end up doing two things. First, we would have to derive the multiple instances of unevenness as the outcome of internal dynamics of particular societies. We already encountered examples of this in Chapter 1 with the nationalist historiography, which explain the *modern* form and existence of their nations by a mechanism of reverse teleology. This internalist historiography, which is not restricted to our cases, is based on establishing a linear narrative of the nation’s perennial past reaching providentially to its present form and its future. This type of internalism is also referred to as particularism or exceptionalism. Unevenness without interactivity could easily be subsumed within this type of historiography – quite conceivably, for example, by making references to one of the most imprecise and infinitely flexible concepts in our lexicon, culture (Yengoyan 2006:5). Second, we can try to capture the diversity of human societal existence by means of comparison. But this only gets us, as I argued above, as far as ‘the abstracted space’ (Rosenberg 2006:319) and ‘the experimental time’ (Adams et al. 2005:66) of comparative method. In one of its historically specific forms, comparison serves as a means to exclude the later cases of a phenomenon (here, nationalism) from the remit of the theory, because the histories of later cases do not correspond to causal sequences derived from the internal dynamics of ‘original’ instances. As we have seen in Chapter

³⁸ It should be immediately noted that by ‘law’ Trotsky is ‘designating only a general proposition or observation about historical development,’ not a universal causal determination (Knei-Paz 1978:89).

2, the theories of nationalism, in different ways, commit this fallacy of masquerading theories based on internal, historical experience of Western European countries as universal theory. This form of internalism, otherwise known as Eurocentrism, is distinct from the internalism (particularism or exceptionalism) of the area studies. But they have been shaped by an institutionalised division of labour broadly shaped by the epistemological hierarchy of disciplines and area studies.

But unevenness is not merely a descriptive feature of human history. It is not about cataloguing temporal coincidences of societal differences. Its political form, the intersocietal, has a causal significance. That is because societies do not exist in isolation. The opposite is historically valid.

The internal structure of society is everywhere conditioned, determined or even brought into existence by external factors, so that each society is linked to others, interdependent with them or even shaped by processes of societalization that cut across them (Tenbruck 1994:80).

‘Even the spatial isolation of less complex societies,’ Tenbruck reinforces his argument with a hard case, so to speak, ‘is not a geographical accident but the result of the avoidance of other peoples or the retreat into desired remoteness’ (1994:78). The intensity, frequency and content of these intersocietal determinations, of course, vary historically and *can* obviously hold a stronger dose of significance between societies in geographical proximity, as Marc Bloch reminded us. But the key point is that that variation is about the historical *form* of the intersocietal, not about the *fact* of it (Rosenberg in Callinicos and Rosenberg 2008:87).³⁹

We have now established that unevenness is a transhistorical condition and it gives rise to the intersocietal. Multiple societies have interacted with and influenced one another.

³⁹ Relatedly, with the decidedly modern concept of society I refer to all of the historically different forms of what Kamran Matin calls the ‘mutually recognized [socio-political] integrities’ (2013a:3). My usage is for practical purposes only. The alternative, referring to the variety of those socio-political integrities across history by their historically specific designators, would not only make a confusing reading, but would also defeat the theoretical purpose of the presentation. I also chose not to use scare quotes, because whatever its other drawbacks, the concept of society has a readily accessible cognitive familiarity to our modern minds – a quality, I think, is not available to any other concept.

No one of them, in whatever form and size, has existed outside this dimension. Following from this, our next step is a connecting one. It moves us from unevenness and interactivity to combined development. How did Trotsky 'operationalise' the transhistorical facts of unevenness and interactivity? What is their concrete causal purchase? Unevenness, for one, yielded him the differentiation between 'advanced' and 'backward' societies – that is between Western Europe and Russia in *History of the Russian Revolution*. These are strictly relational categories. They do *not* refer to any inherent properties of societies. Echoing Marx's famous discussion on commodity fetishism in the Volume I of *Capital* (1976:163–77), Colin Barker weighed in on the issue.

Only from the angle of world economy, of the combined development of the different countries within it, do words like "advanced" and "archaic" have any meaning, as measures of coercive comparison within a larger system of competitive interactions. Nothing intrinsic makes a thing "backward". We can turn a horse-drawn gun carriage every way up, subject it to all manner of chemical and other tests, and nothing "backward" will appear in its make-up. But set it against a motorised tank, and its backwardness soon appears (2006:78).

From this developmental distinction between the advanced and backward societies, follows the competitive geopolitical pressures felt by the backward countries. Trotsky termed this causal mechanism as 'the whip of external necessity,' which forces backward states to borrow from advanced societies (2007:5). 'Every developing nation, like every young craftsman, writer, or artist,' he argued elsewhere, 'begins by imitating: it is a form of schooling' (1972:292). But, crucially, late developing countries do not and cannot *temporally* repeat the same trajectory of development. The fact that they can export the existing achievements of advanced societies grants them 'the privilege of historical backwardness.' This privilege

permits, or rather compels, the adoption of whatever is ready in advance of any specified date, skipping a whole series of intermediate stages. Savages throw away their bows and arrows for rifles all at once, without traveling the road which lay between those two weapons in the past (Trotsky 2007:4).

Forced into this path, observed Trotsky, ‘Russia was compelled to build railroads [despite having almost no highways]. Without having gone through the European artisan and manufacturing stages, Russia passed directly to mechanised production’ (Quoted in Thatcher 1991:240).

Left in this form, however, the general law of unevenness and its causal consequences can appear only semantically different from the unilinear understanding of history. After all borrowing from advanced societies, provided that it operates without hindrance, is bound to generate, logically at least, a tendency towards convergence among societies; and a super-charged one in that since backward societies can skip over stages.⁴⁰ But this possibility of developmental repetition is excluded, because ‘the backward nation,’ Trotsky pointed out, ‘not infrequently debases the achievements borrowed from outside’ during the process of adaptation. He illustrates this by noting that Under Peter I, the introduction of European techniques and training in Russia had led to the strengthening of serfdom, rather than dissolving it to pave the way a more advanced form of labour. Furthermore, ‘European armament and European loans – both indubitable products of a higher culture – led to a strengthening of tsarism, which delayed in its turn the development of the country (Trotsky 2007:4–5). Both this scenario and the one in which countries like the United States and Germany had overtaken Britain industrially are just two contrasting instances on a spectrum of open-ended possibilities resulting from backward societies trying to assimilate the achievements of the advanced ones with varying success. This is because ‘the possibility of skipping over intermediate steps is...by no means absolute. Its degree is determined in the long run by the economic and cultural capacities of the country’ (Trotsky 2007:4).

The net result of these points is quite substantial indeed. Let me briefly restate, so we

⁴⁰ In *Third International After Lenin*, which he wrote in 1928, Trotsky indeed makes some such argument that capitalism, in contrast to preceding economic systems, ‘equalizes the economic and cultural levels of the most progressive and the most backward countries’ by virtue of its unprecedented expansionist dynamics (1957:19). But he immediately raises the dialectical qualification that capitalism itself actually rules this possibility out by its anarchistic methods of capitalism. Both of these tendencies (equalisation and unevenness), he rounds off the argument, were bolstered by imperialism (1957:20). In this instance, his discussion remained within the conceptual boundaries of the classical Marxist understanding of ‘uneven development,’ which is ‘a generic property of capitalism and delinked from the intrinsic unevenness of historical development’ (Matin 2013a:13).

can take our next step. As a transhistorical fact, uneven development gives rise to the intersocietal. This dimension of human social existence contains the *historically given* property of interactivity. No society has truly existed outside interaction or outside the dimension of intersocietal. But this still retains a distinction between what is external to societies and what is inside them. Societies, after all, are not only constituted by their interaction with other societies, but also by their internal, reproductive⁴¹ dynamics ('economic and cultural capacities of the country'). Even the causal dynamic of the whip of external necessity, *on its own*, may very well be prone to be construed as operative on the abstracted space of developmental comparison between the advanced and the backward society – however relationally we may conceive the distinction. But this is exactly where things get interesting. Because what Trotsky provides us with the causal consequences of the whip of external necessity *and* the privilege of backwardness is a conceptual bridge that integrates external and internal dimensions of societies.

And the bridgehead we arrive is the third element of the theory: combined development. Trotsky defines combined development as the 'drawing together of the different stages of the journey, a combining of the separate steps, an amalgam of archaic with more contemporary forms' (2007:5). Although almost all of what is available in Trotsky's writings on the subject refers 'specifically [to] the sociological [amalgam] of capitalist and non-capitalist forms which resulted from' international capitalist pressures on late developing countries (Rosenberg 2006:319), he clearly intended the term to be applicable across human history: 'the law of uneven development is supplemented throughout the whole course of history by the law of combined development' (Trotsky 1983:300; cf. Matin 2007).

It was left to Justin Rosenberg, who intellectually spearheaded the recent neo-Trotskyist revival of interest in U&CD (Hobson 2011; Anievas and Matin 2016c), to extract, what he calls the three dimensions of combined development (see also Cooper 2015:486). For that task Rosenberg mined the *longue durée* of the Russian history – beginning with the early Russian state formation in the ninth century. The first dimension of the

⁴¹ Reproduction, as I use it here, does not carry the negative connotations of stasis and decay that was dear to Orientalist historiography. As Sanjay Subrahmanyam points out, continuity and change are not necessarily antonyms (1997:759).

combined development is the most straightforward one. ‘The course of Russian history,’ Rosenberg points out, ‘was “combined” in the sense that at every point it was causally integrated with a wider social field of interacting patterns of development’ (2006:321). The general implication of the argument is that every society’s external conditions of existence constantly impacts upon its internal development. This makes any society a dynamic component of the development of other societies. To clarify this seemingly sociologically elusive dimension of the social world, Rosenberg employs a quilt metaphor. The visual aspect of a quilt is a patchwork wherein each individual patch has a different colour. Moving from the source domain of the metaphor (the quilt) to the target domain (the intersocietal),⁴² Rosenberg likens patches to what he calls regional constellations of uneven development, within which a particular society exists. And ‘from each of these patches of the quilt (such as that of Russia and its neighbours) the outer members appear to interact directly on the margins of the other, adjacent constellations, stitching the patches together’ (2006:322).

This act of stitching, so to speak, allows us to empirically register the impact of certain ‘events’ arising in one constellation on another – events that ‘spill over’ from its original constellation. We can think of the emergence of a novel ideology (for example nationalism) in one regional constellation or the outbreak of a deadly epidemic. The consolidation of a new power centre that leads to forced migration, a technological breakthrough, social revolutions or a novel institutional configuration are examples of events that criss-crossed regional constellations. But this stitching is not an act of unadulterated and passive transmission. For unevenness does not only overdetermine what a society is, but also filters, refracts and reconfigures the substance and the consequences of interaction. Thus, ‘knock-on effects reverberate serially across two or more constellations, gathering force or dispersing, often changing their form as they go, and impacting indirectly on remote social settings whose members played no role in the genesis of the causal process’ (Rosenberg 2006:322).

⁴² According to Neil Smith and Cindi Katz, ‘metaphor works by invoking one meaning system to explain or clarify another. The first meaning system is apparently concrete, well understood, unproblematic, and evokes the familiar; in linguistic theory it is known as the “source domain.” The second “target domain” is elusive, opaque, seemingly unfathomable, without meaning donated from the source domain.’ Metaphors, they add, ‘assist in reducing the unfamiliar to the familiar’ (1993:67–68).

The second dimension of combined development was by way of interdependence, ‘not just of events but also of the structures of social, material and cultural life.’ The interdependence of these structures has reproduced Russian society ‘through institutionalized relationships which extended beyond Russia itself, integrating it into regional political orders, cultural systems and material divisions of labour’ (Rosenberg 2006:324). And finally, as a cumulative and causative result of the previous two dimensions of combined development, at a ‘yet deeper dimension’ we can observe that ‘Russian social formation was a hybrid, a changing amalgam of pre-existent “internal” structures of social life with “external” socio-political and cultural influences’ (Rosenberg 2006:325). The ultimate conclusion Rosenberg draws from this exposition is that combined development, as with unevenness, is not historically limited to the era of capitalist modernity: ‘there had...never existed a pre-combination Russia’ (2006:325).

Now we must also bring our exposition of the theory of uneven and combined development to a conclusion. The final element, development, however, requires some attention, for it is overburdened with a highly questionable heritage. Its traditional association with unilinear stageism and progressive directionality impairs its utility as a historical and sociological notion. This progressive vision of history, conventionally imbedded in the notion of development, Robert Nisbet argued almost half a century ago, is underpinned by the biomorphic metaphor of ‘growth’ from the teachings of Ancient Greek philosophers onwards (1970). Moreover, the metaphor of growth ‘generates or underlines a vision of change as primarily immanent or endogenously determined’ (Martins 1974:274), which, in the nineteenth century, was elevated to a central role in historiography and social theory to make sense of recent European superiority over rest of the world. The ‘growth’ of European civilisation, or what we are today more accustomed to call modernity, is argued to be an endogenous dynamic and a culmination of the continent’s internal history, going through stages and accumulating force and sophistication since the time of the Athenian democracy. The shorthand for this vision of development is Eurocentrism (Matin 2013b:354). The dominant *scale* of this endogenous understanding of development, however, gradually shifted from the European civilisation to the Euro-American nation-state in the course of the twentieth century, as the latter increasingly came to be seen as ‘the terminal unit and boundary condition for the demarcation of problems and phenomena for social science’ and

history. This second form internalism, resourced from Eurocentrism, is what we today as methodological nationalism (Martins 1974:276).

How do we, then, deal with such a loaded notion? To start with, in a very general sense, we can indeed attribute directional development to the entirety of human *social* history. Drawn on the broadest canvas, the contours of human history in its entirety reveal three kinds of societies: hunter-gatherer, agrarian and industrialising. And transformations from one mode of societal existence to the *next* were revolutionary in their implications for the relationship of humans to their natural environments, the organisation of social power and surplus extraction and the production and institutionalisation of knowledge. On this broadest scale, as Justin Rosenberg points out, there is no dispute among historians and as such there is ‘a real historical referent to the term “development”’ (2006:329–30).

But this generality has always been suffused with unevenness and, its attendant consequence, combination that militate against any unilinear understanding of history. We have seen that by theoretically integrating combined development ‘as the concrete expression of unevenness’ that is operative as ‘a differentiated multiplicity’ (Matin 2013a:15), U&CD radically refashions development, that big bad wolf of social theory, as ‘decidedly multilinear’ (Matin 2013a:16). For any generality or directionality we attribute to the ‘development’ of human history in its entirety, cannot be reflected on to, or derived from, ‘lower’ scales like civilisations or societies.

As an integrated theory of external and internal dimensions of the society, U&CD shows us that what is traditionally theorised as a uniform and standalone society (or regional constellations or civilisations, for that matter) is actually the developmental outcome of historically uneven interactions, which combine with the internal, reproductive dynamics and structures of a society to generate a societal interface that is simultaneously more and less than the society itself. What seems as a particular society is a part and parcel of an intersocietal existence that cannot be captured simply by the historical experience of that society alone. Nor can it be checked against a prior notion of development abstracted from a particular historical geography and adorned with a self-fashioned claim to universality. Intersocietal co-existence is not a dimension that confronts societies externally. It is *constitutive* of societies. Thus development has, and

always had, an uneven, interactive and combined character. The consequence is that we have to ‘abandon at the deepest theoretical level any notion of the *constitution* of society as analytically prior to its *interaction* with other societies’ (Rosenberg 2006:325 emphasis in original).

This principle applies, as the recent research aptly demonstrates, to the so-called European miracle (Anievas and Nişancıoğlu 2015; Hobson 2004) no less than to the parts of the world with ‘non-miraculous histories’! From these ontological premises, then, we can reach to a conception of the universal formulated by Kamran Matin: an ‘operational causal context whose ontic fabric is heterogeneous and radically open to, in fact constantly shaped and reshaped by, difference, which generates emergent forms that overdetermine their own context of emergence’ (2013a:16).

The core premises of U&CD allow us to solve three problems. First, they mark a break away from an internalist conception of the conditions of the emergence of late nationalisms. The internalist conception explains this phenomenon by reference to the ‘local’ conditions of its emergence and reproduction or explains it away as a paradox for lack of congruence with European nationalisms’ conditions of emergence. In other words, it is ultimately a question of non-European modernity formed and constrained in an interactively uneven world and politically manifold responses generated by historically located agents responding to that unevenness. The neglect of this dimension led internalist theories to relegate the international to an external and contingent factor. Thus, U&CD introduces an alternative theoretical solution to the study of the formative periods of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms.

Secondly, they identify causal mechanisms which are not simply iterative, but temporally multi-linear and interactive. As such, the emergence of late nationalisms can be located within an interactive historical geography that recalibrates the unidirectional explanation that is grounded in the ‘from the West to the East’ diffusion. This recalibration engenders a re-thinking of nationalist agency in the Qajar and the Ottoman empires, by allowing the integration of multi-linear influences, or borrowings, in what we can call ‘the politics of combination’ by nationalists which is sensitive to the sources of political modernisation. Thus, rather than comparing the emergence and development of Iranian and Turkish nationalism with a European blueprint, thus expelling them

beyond the theoretical pale, combined development illustrates the amalgamated forms of social development that gave rise to them.

Thirdly, a dynamic historiography becomes possible, which punctures the homogenous conception of Western pressure and Eastern response by the identification of multiple sources of influence and borrowing which historically transformed over the course of the nineteenth century from the initial acceptance of the universality of Western civilisation to a more balanced assessment. But also, this allows for the 'causes' of nationalism themselves to change over time.

3.5 The Formations of Late Nationalisms in the Middle East and U&CD

From the general law and the three components of the solutions just identified follows the specific methodology of U&CD. In order to present the components of methodology, this section works its way through the noteworthy works that made use of Trotsky's original idea. To that end, two names stand out: George Novack and Ernest Mandel. Their works reviewed here with an eye on two important questions raised with regards to the recent revival of interest in the field of international relations and historical sociology. These questions are

1. Temporal scope of the theory of uneven and combined development: Can the theory of uneven and combined development be applied across the history of human societies or is its explanatory reach confined to the capitalist era? In other words, is U&CD a transhistorical theory or not?
2. The explanatory status of U&CD: Is it a general law that applies to inter-societal existence as a whole or a theory with more defined analytical value or a methodology with a specific purpose?

A broad overview of the twentieth century literature (until its final decade) on Trotsky does not immediately yield much to work with in terms of U&CD. For, as Neil Davidson notes, the scholarly attention on the Russian revolutionary's remained almost

exclusively focused on his notion of permanent revolution (2018:14). Michael Löwy's *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development* is possibly the best example of this focus. Demonstrating a commanding grasp of the revolutionary milieu within which Trotsky formulated his idea of permanent revolution, Löwy then extends his analysis to later cases of successful and failed revolutionary attempts across the world. The book provides highly informative and empirically rich studies of cases including, among others, revolutionary politics in China, Cuba, Mexico and Algeria. But not once Löwy actually attempts to discuss the *theory* of U&CD as laid out in *The History of the Russian Revolution*. His sole concentration remains, as the main title of his book makes amply clear, the *politics* of U&CD (1981).

A similar approach is noticeable in Ernest Mandel's work. Unlike Löwy, however, Mandel's work is suffused with U&CD and as such it 'occupied a special place' in his thought (Linden 2007:145). This came in a textually subterranean form and Mandel never explicitly discussed the law U&CD at any length. As a perceptive reader put it, one can at best reveal the 'traces' of it in Mandel's work (Stutje 2007:171). In that regard, in his most explicit engagement with Trotsky and his idea of uneven of combined development, the first chapter of his book *Trotsky as Alternative*, Mandel's reading put accent on his notion of permanent revolution. Trotsky's 'contribution to the history of [the twentieth] century,' he contended, 'was a predominantly political one' rather than sociological. But he added in the same breath that this political and 'eminently practical' contribution to understanding of 'class struggle on a global scale' was 'rooted in a magnificent theoretical achievement, the discovery of the law of uneven and combined development' (1995:1).

The theoretical roots of permanent revolution in uneven and combined development are left textually unearthed, but a closer reading immediately reveals Mandel's commanding grasp of the relationship between the sociological theory of uneven and combined development and the politics of permanent revolution. For example, in a passage where he discusses the unevenness of capitalist development, Mandel draws a distinction between the working classes of advanced societies and that of backward ones. Unlike advanced capitalist societies where the conservatism of the labour movement leadership impedes radicalism, 'the working class [of some less developed or transitional countries] can achieve a much higher level of class-consciousness, of unity

and militancy in the more developed countries.’ By gaining mastery over their political fate, the working classes can potentially conquer state power and ‘will begin the address the tasks of the socialist revolution.’ In other words, politics of permanent revolution, in objective terms, could involve skipping of stages, which is made possible by the ‘law of uneven and combined development’ (1995:3, see also Mandel 1975:22–23).⁴³

Mandel’s deployment of uneven and combined development with reference to working class politics in what he refers to as transitional countries contains a cue for our first question that has been raised in the context of the recent revival of U&CD in the discipline of international relations. As part of the debate around the ‘use and misuse’ of uneven and combined development in the recent literature, as two recent commentators put it (Allinson and Anievas 2009), the first main point of contention concerns U&CD’s temporal scope. There are two opposing views on this matter. IR scholars Justin Rosenberg and Kamran Matin has made the argument that inter-societal co-existence has been a constant feature of human life since at least the appearance of settled human communities following the Neolithic Revolution (Matin 2007; Rosenberg 2010) and this entailed unevenness and gave rise to its attendant consequence: combined development. George Novack, earlier, made an even more encompassing claim that the law of uneven and combined development is pertinent to not only inter-societal relations, but to the more fundamentally determinant levels of social and biological evolution (1980:116–20).

In the opposing camp two connected arguments have been raised against the transhistorical reach of U&CD. In the first, Neil Davidson argues that ‘the detonation of the process of U&CD requires sudden, intensive industrialization and urbanization, regardless of whether the pre-existing agrarian economy was based on feudal or capitalist relations (2009:15). This view is seemingly shared by Ernest Mandel as well,

⁴³ Elsewhere, Mandel makes what could be read as a tacit reference to the combined development in terms of class politics. According to this, inter-societal difference (i.e. unevenness) generates different modalities of working class politics of skipping stages – in effect arguing against any linear conception of working class politics leading to a singular revolutionary resolution. ‘To conclude from the universal character of *class contradictions* to the necessary universal form of *class struggle*,’ he argues, ‘is to presume immediate and total correspondence between objective socio-economic developments and *human action*, i.e. to eliminate from the picture the whole problem of national peculiarities, political forms, social relationship of forces, varieties of consciousness and role of organizations, in other words, Lenin, Trotsky, Luxemburg and a lot of Marx and Engels too!’ (1970:22–23).

although he does not provide any extended discussion of it (1975:23). Echoing Davidson's call to U&CD's confinement to the capitalist era, Sam Ashman cautions that extending its historical reach would devoid Trotsky's theory from explanatory power and turn it into a mere descriptive category (2009) – a view also shared by Benno Teschke (2014).

The relationship between U&CD's temporal scope and how this choice can determine its explanatory status relate to the second point of contention. Is U&CD a law, a theory or more restrictedly a methodology? Some saw the whole project of writing history on the intellectual foundations of this grandiose notion, for all its surface charm, methodologically imprecise. John Elster, for one, argued that U&CD 'belongs to a class of Marxist notions whose suggestiveness is equaled only by their elusiveness' (1986:56). Another critique addressing Novack's work suggested that U&CD amounts to a 'rather fragmentary and undeveloped conception' (Romagnolo 1975:8). Given that Novack made arguably the most lavish claim with regards to the explanatory range of U&CD, it is no wonder that his work invited scrutiny. In one such instance, Cliff Slaughter raised a clearly defined problem. He argued if U&CD is to accord with the status of a law then it must answer for the *direction* of combined development in specific settings: 'Will the processes at work give rise to a dialectical leap forward in history, as in the October Revolution in Russia, or will they give rise to degenerative processes, as in the bureaucratic distortions of Stalin's regime, or the destruction of the Tasmanian aborigines?' (Quoted in Novack 1980:120). Novack's answer was that U&CD cannot answer this question at the level of general premises, but only through the analysis of 'the specific weight of all the factors in the given situation' (1980:123).

The recent neo-Trotskyist literature largely subscribes to a similar view and avoids referring to U&CD as a law. In a recent monograph Alexander Anievas and Kerem Nişancıoğlu also takes this cautious approach and suggests that uneven and combined development

refers to and theorises concrete historical processes, be they epochal or conjunctural. In other words, we may speak of a theory (or theories) of uneven and combined development in this more historically delimited sense: that is, in terms corresponding to specific epochs or conjunctures characterised by

different modes of production that animate the broader dynamics of such historical temporalities (2015:58).

This historically ‘adjusted’ understanding of U&CD, which this thesis also follows, guards against two problems that would follow from its restriction to capitalist era alone. Reducing U&CD to the capitalist era alone leads to a circular reasoning, a tautology, as the fact of U&CD as observed during the high-tide of capitalist industrialization explains the U&CD (Brophy 2018). Secondly, a ‘ultra-historicist’ reading of U&CD which retains ‘capitalism as its ‘core generator’ can only end like many theories before it – Marxist or otherwise: the trap of Eurocentrism. For once again we are back to a historical theory which at its core starts with the European origins of capitalism that spreads and transforms rest of the world (Hobson 2011).

In so far as the methodology is concerned, the application of U&CD as a *historically adjusted theory*, then, requires several steps. The first is to identify the historically manifest effects of unevenness (the general law) between geopolitically superior and aggressive European powers on the one hand, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire on the other from late eighteenth century onwards. This date by no means indicates the *genesis* of their relationships. It marks the changing nature of that relationship, hence that of uneven development and its attendant consequences (Findley 1989:20; Lambton 1957:12). For example, Ann Lambton argues (1957:12), if in a somewhat simplifying way, that the nature of the relationship changed from one of contact (with the West) to one of impact (of the West). Indeed, from the eighteenth century onwards the centralised monarchies of Europe started to exert immense pressures on the Ottoman Empire and later on Qajar Iran. This is by now an integral part of the histories of nationalism in the non-European world. But the methodological implications of this fact need to be spelt out.

The nature of the imperatives felt by the backward entities of the Middle East can also help us to clarify the conditions that made formative conditions of nationalism possible. It does in other words can help us navigate through the misty seas of unsettled conceptual debates on nationalism. The form of the whip of external necessity shall act as our proverbial compass in this conceptual effort. The European pressures initially felt as militarily threatening the territorial existence of these land-based empires. This had

two implications. First, given that the reproduction of these imperial formations depended largely on agricultural surplus, hence the existence of taxable arable land, the geopolitical fortunes of these polities were inextricably tied to their ability to expand their domains by way of territorial aggrandizement. Second, this territorial dynamic of reproduction, an articulation of internal and external dimensions, is supported by an imperial self-understanding that upheld claims of civilisational superiority to the world around it. When the military balance tilted towards European powers, this dynamic of imperial reproduction and its vision felt threatened. It is no wonder then that early reformers of both polities, such as Selim III and the crown prince Abbas Mirza to cite two important examples, prioritised military reorganisation as the most pressing necessity.

This imputed a central role to the imperial state to cope with the consequences of uneven development and, following from this, gave a markedly political bent to the early articulations of nationalism in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. The imperatives of unevenness, in Mao Zedong's efficient phrasing, put 'politics in command' (Quoted in Dore 1972:3). Now, identifying the driver of reform effort as *primarily* political compels me to clarify my understanding of nationalism. This requires a quick reference to Chapter 2 where I discussed theories of nationalism.

There, I argued that John Breuilly is right to insist that nationalism is first and foremost about politics and modern politics is about the state. This way of approaching the subject, I added, clarifies the conceptual confusion – though certainly not overcomes it. Where Breuilly erred, by his own later admission, was his internalist understanding of politics overstretched beyond its conceptual means by a static comparative method. But what if we change the epistemological status of comparison and treat it as the frame of politics. In other words, what if make comparison 'the substance of the inquiry rather than its framework' (McMichael 1990:386).

With this shift in focus, comparison can be seen as the grammar of the politics of late nationalism. We no longer treat comparison 'as a methodological problem, but as a historical object' (Stoler 2001:862). For late nationalism, before anything else, is about overcoming the backward conditions of one's purported nation and relatedly about saving the state. It is an ideology of late development (Dore 1973:12; Matossian 1958)

that seeks to reimagine the political community and mobilise its resources in order to close the developmental gap with the industrialised and militarily superior European powers.⁴⁴ Harry Harootunian presents this superimposing reality of geopolitics in superlative phrasing, ‘the peoples of the world outside of Euro-America have been forced to live lives *comparatively* by virtue of experiencing some form of colonization or subjection enforced by the spectre of imperialism’ (2005:26, emphasis in original). Crystallised within this geopolitical context, late nationalisms developed a fundamentally comparative vision of the world wherein the elites of the backward societies felt the independence of their nations and states under imminent threat, or, to be more historically accurate, they acknowledged the political necessity of the nation by comparison with the superior European world. This was the primary dimension of *the politics of comparison*. And nationalism as *politics of comparison* is our first intermediary concept that ‘bridges’ the theoretical principles of U&CD with empirical analysis.

But can unevenness single-handedly provide us the key to the theorisation of late nationalism? It certainly cannot. Because we only *partially* left the abstracted space of comparison, we still need to move *fully* into ‘the real space of historical time [where] the spatio-temporal coexistence of societies...is the matrix of their concrete interrelation’ (Rosenberg 2006:319). Deriving the emergence of nationalism from uneven development between Europe and the Middle East is a necessary but also a partial move, because it remains operative on a singular axis of West-East differentiation. Primary as this may be, it is not the whole story. Because a historiography based on this geopolitical determination alone risks getting caught in the Eurocentric underpinnings of the ‘challenge and response’ argument (see, for example, Zürcher 2004:5–6), which reduces the political possibilities of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms exclusively to their relation to the European impact. This problem rears its head even in accounts that are critical of Eurocentrism. Because they retain in inverted form the restrictive and homogenising duality of the West and the East (cf. Lazarus 2002). As I argued before, this problem limited the explanatory fortunes of Tom Nairn and Partha Chatterjee’s works.

⁴⁴ Ronald Dore captures this dynamic very well: ‘the political will to catch up, to raise the nation’s status in the international pecking order of nations, contributes a good deal of the driving force of [late] development’ (1972:3).

The matrix of concrete interrelations of late developing societies under the full weight of European geopolitical pressures in the nineteenth century operated through layers of unevenness, which were not limited to the West-East axis alone. But also whatever interrelation and influence materialised among late developing societies could not ignore that overpowering fact of European pressures. They were indeed orientated towards addressing those pressures. Equally importantly, that overpowering axis did not remain unidirectional. I earlier raised an argument along these lines against Tom Nairn. It went something like this. Nairn is essentially right in criticising internalist explanations of nationalism and he is also right in associating the origins of late nationalism with the uneven development of capitalism across the world. But he was equally wrong to reduce the fact of unevenness to the singularity of the West-East axis, as late developing societies like Germany, Russia and Japan, to give influential examples, *modified* the structural coordinates of unevenness. What Nairn's account failed to capture, due to his impressionistic use of U&CD, was a crucial argument of Trotsky. In *The Third International After Lenin*, Trotsky argued that there are different scales of unevenness for different parts of the world, which shapes and informs the strategic content and orientation of late development. 'The *unevenness* of historical development,' he memorably argued, '*is in itself uneven*' (1957:15, emphases in original).

From this important principle, we can derive our second intermediary concept: *mediated modernisation*. The 'original' European achievements in their variety of material, institutional or ideational forms did not always arrive or were imported into late developing world by way of unidirectional diffusion. Often they were mediated, refracted and transformed during their 'journey,' which modified the terms of their adoption in the late developing society that was at the end of the chain of mediation. Whether a late developing society was at the beginning, in the middle or at the end of these chains depended on its developmental distance from the advanced societies and its 'cultural and economic capacities.' France, although a late developer vis-à-vis Britain, greatly benefited from its geographical and cultural proximity to the first industrial society. The Meiji Japan, although geographically distant, inherited considerable 'cultural and economic capacities' from the Tokugawa period (Francks 1999:20–24).

And the scales through which this mediation performed can be elucidated further by the dimensions of combined development identified by Rosenberg above. The first one (events) is utilised especially in Chapter 5 to trace the multilinear impact of the Russo-Japanese War and the constitutional revolutions of the early twentieth century. The second one (structures) includes regional constellations referred above. Regions can be understood as a number of societies that cohere around a set of characteristics, which differentiates them from other constellations. But this understanding is radically different from the seemingly similar ‘units’ that framed the vocation of area studies. For regions in this sense cannot be reduced to its core attributes. Nor can the other structures Rosenberg refers to be spatially limited within the regional constellations. Among others, we can add, trans-imperial networks of trade, shifting geopolitical alliances and ‘transnational’ movements (for example, pan-Islamism in the nineteenth century) were the kind of things that cut across both Russia and the regional constellations it was part of – challenging, reasserting or modifying the meanings of these latter two. These structures, as they are understood here, are akin to what Nile Green calls ‘arenas’ that are ‘dynamic and mutable spaces of interaction that enable patterns of dissemination, circulation, or competition among ideas no less than commodities’ (2014:558). At any moment in time, a regional constellation can be *analytically* broken down to a number of such structures or arenas, which reveals various layers of entanglements and interactions that are not limited within the boundaries of the region in question or within its *constituent* societies.

This dimension of combination is presented in Chapter 4 with reference to the history and activities of the community of Qajar subjects in Istanbul, who acted as transmitters of European developments and Ottoman reform efforts. In Chapter 5 these structures, in the form of ‘transnational movements’ extend beyond and cut across Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire.

Our final point relates to a geopolitically determined ‘particularity’ of Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. As a host of scholars reminds us (Balaghi 2008:3; Boroujerdi 1996:24; Gelvin 1999:77; Göçek 2013:74; Vejdani 2015:5), the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran were semi-colonial entities (Osterhammel 1986; Pizzo 2016) which made possible distinct modes of engagement with the geopolitical pressures of the European

powers and led to multi-directional and lateral appropriations among late developing societies and influences that operated in response to the European pressures.

Chapter 4

Eastern Connections: Ottoman Influence on Early Iranian Nationalism

4.1 Introduction

This chapter offers a first take on the history of Ottoman and Iranian modernisations and proto-nationalism that is not framed within the problematic strictures of internalism or causally underdeveloped notions of diffusion or modularity criticised in Chapter 2. To that end, it is useful to restate the relevant argument formulated in the Introduction of this thesis: the gulf between theories of nationalism and the histories of late nationalisms arises from the lack of theoretical attention given to the international conditions of emergence of nationalism. I argued therefore that nationalism as a response to ‘backwardness’ follows from intersocietal interaction, which is suffused with uneven developmental levels among socio-political units.

In addition, I made a claim that semi-colonial conditions (Osterhammel 1986; Pizzo 2016) of the Ottoman Empire and Iran allowed them some degree of freedom to reconfigure their institutions, pursue defensive modernisation projects and shift between geopolitical alliances. The historical condition of semicoloniality and the theoretical tools of uneven and combined development – particularly its emphasis on multilinearity of historical development – that were laid out in the previous chapter allow me to challenge three conventional premises of historiography of late modernisations and nationalisms.

The first premise is that modernity was a fully formed European development that subsequently diffused outwards to the non-European world by following a unilinear trajectory. This diffusion was unilinear in the sense that modern Europe and the rest of the world were two ontologically separate entities. Much like a one-way circuitry, the former was the source and the latter was the recipient. Framed in this dyadic manner, no interaction or influence was conceived among non-European societies. Nationalism, a

product of modernity, was also something – once it was fully formed – that could only have flowed from Europe to the late developing world. This Eurocentric idea of a unilinear pattern of diffusion, to take the succinct point of one critique who documents the Moroccan efforts to modernise their military under Ottoman guidance, is ‘at least a very simplistic one’ (El Moudden 1994:243).

The second premise complements the first. The change in the non-European world, to the extent it could take place, could only be triggered from outside – that is by way of European impact. Non-European societies lacked endogenous sources or catalysers of transformation and progress. Ergo, they had nothing to offer one another in that regard. Recent historiography on Iran and the Ottoman Empire has done much to challenge this view and provided ample evidence to challenge the Orientalist historiographies that associated the non-European world with innate stasis and an inexorable drift to decline in the face of growing European power (Emrence 2007; Martin 2005; Moazami 2013; Tezcan 2012). But occasionally this otherwise legitimate historiographical challenge has put undue emphasis on a kind of internalist explanation in the name of refuting the external (i.e. European) impact thesis. The pendulum swing of historiography has tended to the reproduce, rather than overcome, the problematic external-internal dichotomy (cf. Nişancıoğlu 2013:9–10).

The third premise is already implicated within the two previous points but needs a clearer statement. The dichotomy of dynamism versus inertia has been presented with a certain periodisation. The most ubiquitous form of this periodisation is based on a both temporally and spatially clear-cut and simplistic distinction between modernity and pre-modernity. Modernity emerges and matures in Europe, where time is progressive and linear. The non-European world, on the other hand, is mired in a state of stillness and non-development. Its time is cyclical and regressive. Non-European modernity could only start with European intervention and this has been generally taken quite literally in most traditional histories. It was the occupation of Egypt by Napoleon that chaperoned the Middle East into the modern age (cf. Ze’evi 2004).

The historical account presented here aims to challenge these premises of conventional historiography in three steps. The first section focuses on the general law of unevenness of historical development and outlines the geopolitical environment within which

eighteenth century non-European states had to exercise their sovereignty. In terms of unevenness, the significance of this historical entry point is relatively straightforward and, as I try to document below, it marks a major shift of attitude among the ruling elite in the Ottoman Empire. From the eighteenth century onwards, the empire had to confront the challenges posed by European powers. Iran, partly owing to its relative geographical isolation and partly due to internal instability, was not yet fully implicated in or influenced by geopolitical changes in the eighteenth century. Save for the Russian Empire's increasing interest in the Caucasus, Iran's position as a buffer state between its neighbour to the north and the British Empire had to come about in the nineteenth century proper (Matthee 2012:115–16).

This much is part of our conventional historical learning. What would be unconventional, and that is what I attempt below is that the response to the European challenge was not restricted to emulation of the European ways. Well before the so-called dawn of modernity in the Middle East following Napoleon's invasion of Egypt in 1798 and contemporaneous with similar transformations in Europe, the Ottoman Empire and Iran began to transform their external relations by way of bilateral inter-dynastic agreements, which marked a 'conceptual turning point' in sovereignty and citizenship (Tucker 1996).

With that in mind, I start with a mid-eighteenth century treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Afsharid dynasty of Iran that set in motion developments that established notions of modern territoriality and imperial citizenship in the Islamic world that would end with codification of extraterritorial rights for Iranians in the Ottoman Empire towards the end of nineteenth century. This move enables a periodisation that departs from the conventional threshold of the nineteenth century as the inauguration of modernity in the Middle East by way of European intervention. The inter-dynastic conditions of emergence of modern peoplehood in the Middle East are not, I argue, subsequent to but coeval with changes in Europe. Secondly, looking at the relationship between two non-European states helps us to think within a 'scale' of transformation that adjusts, though not discards, the uneven power relationship between Europe and the Middle East.

I do not aim here only to recover some prior empirical facts about the concomitant Middle Eastern modernity. The point is more fundamental. It is to demonstrate that the intersocietal co-existence and interaction with transformative qualities were not subsequent to the extension of international society into the Islamic world. The Ottoman Empire and post-Safavid Persia, despite much turbulence the latter went through, were sovereign states. They were not *only* made into one following European impact. In that sense, this chapter follows from and contributes to the revival of interest in the history of eighteenth century Iran (Axworthy 2018a). Traditionally bracketed between the Safavid decline and the rise of Qajars, the ‘short’ eighteenth century has long been understood along the lines proposed by Roger Stevens, namely a ‘horrible’ period, that should be treated ‘with the greatest possible brevity’ (Stevens 1971:30). But recent work suggests far more dynamic history with attempts towards *independent* modernisation (cf. Axworthy 2018b).

The second section looks at the consequences of this unevenness, especially the whip of external necessity and the privilege of backwardness. But it does this from a particular socio-spatial scale that is relatively underutilised in the so-called neo-Trotskyist literature. Rather than employing a sole focus on the state level strategies of backwardness that draws a *relational* distinction between industrialised European powers and late developing states of the non-European world, it identifies agents of transmission located in another late developing state. The Qajar subjects resident in the Ottoman Empire, in official and unofficial capacity, are the case in point here. Their experience in the modernising empire and convictions that the Ottomans could act as a model to reform the Qajar state and society adds a layer to our understanding of modernity which is largely overlooked in the accounts of ‘Iranian’ modernisation and remained limited to specific empirical studies (see, for example, Zarcone and Zarinebaf 1993b). This investigation into this community of expatriate Qajar subjects serves as an instance of ‘mediated modernisation’ where a late developing society acts as model for another not only for how to modernise, but also how to modernise to cope with geopolitical pressures.

The third section focuses on the actions of a single individual from that community who was well placed in assessing the promises and pitfalls of Ottoman reform efforts, and to draw lessons from this to inform his compatriots at home. The individual in questions is

Mirza Hoseyn Khan. As the Qajar ambassador in Istanbul between 1859 and 1870, his career was probably the most concrete instance of mediated modernisation vested with official capacity. The section demonstrates his close relationship with the key Tanzimat reformers and his later adoption of Ottoman development in Qajar Iran when he was given ministerial portfolios.

Before moving on, one crucial qualification should be inserted here. My aim in raising these arguments, significant as they are, is not to downplay the power of European geopolitical pressures weighing down on the Qajar and Ottoman empires. There can be no denying of this momentous fact of history. As Albert Hourani cautioned, ‘a new sort of relationship’ was indeed ‘established in the nineteenth century between Europe and the Near East’ and ‘its effect was to initiate certain new movements.’ But he asked, characteristically inspiring much future research, ‘was this all that happened?’ (1961:36). This chapter argues that not only this was not the case, but also that understanding *everything else that happened* requires a mode of analysis that is not restricted to marshalling empirical evidence and historiographical interpretation based on internal (or native) resources of modernity in the imperial domains of the Qajars and the Ottomans. It is by way of inter-imperial relations of these late developing states, I argue, we can actually tap into very crucial developments and may begin to challenge the internal-external dichotomy perpetuated in historiography.

4.2 From Kurdan to Erzurum: Modernising International Relations of the Middle East

In this section I try to make a case that origins of modern peoplehood in Iran and the Ottoman Empire should be sought in eighteenth century international relations. It is here that one finds the proto-nationalist legal developments that differentiated Muslims on territorial lines within a wider religious community. The argument aligns with important points raised by Ayşe Zarakol in recent discussion with respect to the history of the concept of sovereignty. She makes the argument the ingrained notion that ‘the concept of sovereignty emerged (first and exclusively) in Europe’ is based on history written with reference to European materials only. Then she raises the provocative prospect of a different historiography: What if the concept of sovereignty developed in the East and

the West independently of each other? Should not this then ‘point to larger systemic causes our current theories are not well-equipped to deal with?’ (In Costa Lopez et al. 2018:596).

This section historically traces the development of ideas sovereignty in the international relations of the Islamic world in the eighteenth century and beyond to demonstrate, not the internal and native sources of modern nationhood, but its gestation through novel understanding of sovereignty in the Islamic world. In empirical terms our focus is on the Ottoman Empire’s relations with dynasties that have ruled over the Iranian plateau since the accession of the Safavids and with particular reference to the legal status of ‘Iranians’ in the Ottoman realm.

Despite constituting the largest number of ‘foreigners’ in the Ottoman domains throughout the imperial history, Iranians were not recognised as constituting a ‘nation’ like the resident European communities of the Empire. Before the nineteenth century, the Ottoman Empire treated Iranians in its domains as part of the wider Muslim world (*dar-ul Islam*). Iranian pilgrims visiting holy places or Iranian merchants trading in the Empire were not accorded with the legal and political rights of a foreign community, as it was the case with the Europeans living and trading in the imperial lands. The latter were subjects of the abode of war (*dar-ul harb*) (Masters 1991:3).

Following the establishment of a centralised Safavid state on its eastern borders in 1501, the Ottomans had to confront a regional rival that presented a direct challenge to the Sunni orthodoxy, which constituted one of the pillars of their state. Especially during times of war, sectarian hatred became the main substance of Ottoman efforts to justify armed conflict. The Ottoman *ulema* were instrumental in this regard. They issued religious orders (*fetva*) that scorned the Shi’i Muslims as heretics. ‘The eternal reward for killing one Shi’i,’ Abbas Amanat quotes from a *fetva* by the mufti of Istanbul, ‘was equal to killing seventy Christian infidels’ (2017:55).

The first peace treaty between the Ottoman Empire and the Safavids signed in 1555 went to some lengths to urge Iranians to pay sufficient respects to the three caliphs that succeeded the prophet. This proved to be a repeating element in the future diplomatic texts as the Ottomans continued to see Shi’i Iranians as heretics. Yet this was not

recognition of difference in the legal sense, as it did not amount to granting official status to them. Despite the sectarian hatred directed against the Shi'is, the Ottomans remained ambiguous on this matter as the wording of the treaty 'confirmed in a general sense the sultan's status as protector of all Muslims' (Tucker 1996:19). In times of peace, the Ottomans refrained from making policies based on the Shi'a/Sunni split in Islam; they consciously chose not to recognise that such a split existed. In that sense, the Ottomans did not differentiate between Muslims residing in, passing thorough or trading within their realm, even if their loyalty were to another dynasty.

But this was only one side of the relationship. As Ernest Tucker points out, 'interdynastic relations between the Ottomans and the Safavids were [also] characterised by numerous congratulatory letters, embassies and gift exchanges, particularly upon the enthronement of the new monarchs' (1996:19). But this *modus vivendi* between the Ottomans and the Safavids was thrown into turmoil when the latter's rule collapsed in 1722 under the pressure of Afghan invasions. The Ottomans lost little time in seizing the power vacuum and turning it into an opportunity for territorial aggrandizement towards east, justified again on religious grounds. By now however there was a new player in the territorial game. As Maryam Ekhtiar notes, after at least three centuries of economic and diplomatic contact, the Russian state centralised and geopolitically confident under Peter the Great (r. 1682-1725) started to take interest in Iran, most immediately in Caucasia (1996:58; Matthee 2012).

Curiously enough, the Ottomans backed the claim of the Safavids over the Afghans and carried out some indecisive fighting which only extended the period of uncertainty in Iran. Not long before a Turkic tribal leader, Nader Qoli Beg, supporting the Safavid claimant Tahmasb II prevailed and was honoured as Tahmasb Qoli Khan. When a renewed Afghan threat distracted him into Khorasan, Tahmasb II, now emboldened, attacked the Ottomans and was soundly defeated. The punitive peace the victors imposed infuriated Nader and on that pretext he deposed Tahmasb and his son, Abbas III, became the new ruler. Nader lost no time to pursue the lost territory, during which his armies defeated the Ottomans twice. On the back of his recent military success, he was enthroned as Nader Shah (r. 1736-1747) of the Afsharid dynasty. The Safavid rule in Iran was over for good (Shaw 1991:303).

The ensuing negotiations and the peace treaty that followed it between the Ottomans and Nader Shah contained some unprecedented proposals from the latter. Nader Shah asked the Ottomans to accept him as the leader of a fifth Sunni school, Ja'fari – named after the sixth Shi'i Imam, Ja'far al-Sadiq. The Ottoman delegation categorically refused this, as they did with the Afsharid request for a fifth pillar for this newfound sect at the Ka'ba, Islam's most sacred mosque. These proposals were far too radical for the representatives of a state that fashioned itself as the upholder of Sunni orthodoxy. The Ottoman refusal did not sit well with Nader Shah, who resumed hostilities. For the last time, the Ottomans resorted to religious justification for fighting against Shi'i Iranians. After some indecisive fighting, he dropped his proposal for a fifth school and the Treaty of Kurdan was signed in 1746.

The Treaty turned out to be 'a landmark piece of diplomacy' (Salzmann 2004:73) as it laid down the groundwork for a territorial system of states. Of the clauses it contained, several need to be expounded here to make sense of their novelty. The Ottoman accession to ban the taking of Shi'i captives as slaves marks a reversal of attitude. In Islamic law for one to be lawfully taken as a slave, one has to be an infidel. With this agreement, the Ottomans accepted Shi'is into the *dar al-Islam* as fellow Muslims. This recognition was further compounded by accepting Shi'i pilgrims to have their own caravan leader (*emirü'l-hacc*) which allowed 'a representative of the shah to exercise political authority in Ottoman territory' (Tucker 1996:32) – a significant move towards extraterritoriality. On a similar note, the Treaty acknowledged the special needs of Iranians by granting them permission to visit Shi'i shrines in Ottoman Iraq. In overall, the Treaty of Kurdan, having employed the terminology of 'two countries' to signify their sovereign equality and instituting for the first time in Islamic world the exchange of permanent ambassadors, marked

a conceptual turning point at which the Ottomans, by formally recognizing the legitimate status of Iranian Shi'is, began to move towards a definition of *dar al-islam* that embraced both the unity of the Islamic past and the pluralism of an emerging system of independent Muslim nations (Tucker 1996:17).

Even the death of Nader Shah soon after the signing of the treaty did not reverse these steps, as his successors did not renege on its terms. For its part the Ottomans stuck with

the treaty as well. When the next dynasty, the Zands, attained control of the Iranian plateau and occupied Basra in 1775, the Ottomans did not justify the war on religious grounds. ‘As an indication of the further secularization of Ottoman-Iranian relations’, notes Sabri Ateş, the *fetva* issued this time ‘differed from its predecessors by defining the enemy not as a Shi’i apostate, but rather as a rebel (*baghi*) against the sultan’ (2013:25).

The path-dependent quality of the changes of the eighteenth century helps us see the Erzurum Treaties (1823 and 1847) as a culmination of earlier developments. Following a fresh round of hostilities between the Ottomans and the latest dynasty of Iran, the Qajars, these treaties mark, according to one commentator, the high point in the slow relegation of the ideal of *umma* to the realm of theology and its extraction from the international relations of these two states (Masters 1991:9). All sectarian diatribes, a common element of earlier treaties, were completely expunged from the language of diplomacy.

Having removed sectarian divisions, the Ottomans followed the legal thread to its secular logical conclusion. They added Iran ‘to the list of countries for which the bureaucrats at the Porte maintained separate registers [*Ecnebi Defterleri*] of cases involving its citizens who needed state intervention’ (Masters 1991:11; Kern 2011:56–57). This was an unequivocal statement on the part of the Ottoman state to recognise Iranians as a separate ‘nation’ or, less anachronistically, the subjects of a different sovereign. ‘For the first time in Middle Eastern politics, religious identity was a secondary means of classification’ (Baghoolizadeh 2012:2). Furthermore, I can agree with Baghoolizadeh that these developments ‘imposed vaguely-conceived imperial identities on Qajar and Ottoman subjects’ who are now ‘aligned with a crown and land, as opposed to a simple religious affiliation’ (2012:3). In addition to the vagueness of these identities, I would note the fact that this new-fangled identity was ‘imposed’ more on the Qajar subjects living in or travelling through the Ottoman realm, whose number would warrant, at this time, neither a full-blown national identity nor a coherent nationalist ideology. But the historical significance of these changes is beyond doubt.

Following in the steps of the Treaty of Kurdan, Article 7 of the second Erzurum Treaty codified the role of Qajar representatives in the Ottoman Empire to look after the interests of Qajar subjects. The wording of the article manifests the marks of combined

development

A Perso-Islamic term was employed for these officials, *shahbandar*, but that term was defined by the neologism of “consul” (*konsolos*), showing its conceptual origins in Western rather than Islamic diplomatic practice. The *shahbandar* was further affirmed to have the same rights (*imtiyazat*) as his European counterparts. Ottoman consuls abroad bore the same title. In this century of slow ideological modernization, a diplomat from a Muslim state could not yet have a European title even though he had similar rights and functions (Masters 1991:13–14).

These developments had not yet amounted to full-blown extraterritorial authority to the Iranian representatives. That came with an agreement between two parties in 1875 that granted Iranian consuls exclusive authority over Qajar subjects (Nakash 1994:17–18)

Several conclusions can be drawn from the legal and political developments in Iranian-Ottoman relations during the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. First, these novel legal and political steps were taken partly in response growing threats coming from European powers. The Ottoman Empire was in one sense adapting the legal framework of geopolitics relating to its Western borders to its relations with its Eastern neighbour. In that sense, it would be as wrong to detach these developments from the wider geopolitical environment in the name of making a case against Eurocentrism as to reduce every element of change to European impact. But we should also be mindful of the particular time the Treaty of Kurdan was signed. At that point, Ernest Tucker notes,

the Ottomans were not facing grave military threats in Europe...Thus, the Ottoman-Iranian rapprochement of 1746 was not simply a temporary expedient driven by European pressures on the Ottomans; it can be seen rather as the logical outgrowth of a process of fundamental redefinition of relations between Iran and the Ottoman Empire begun in 1736 (1996:34).

As such, increasing geopolitical pressures and the adaptation of imperial governance are not simply the isolated ends of a causal link, but coeval processes. Furthermore, transformation of international relations in the Islamic world was not simple substitution of one civilizational code (Islamic) with another (European). In the end one might rather see the process started with the Treaty of Kurdan as ‘a real departure from

traditional concepts of inter-Muslim relations' (Tucker 1996:36, 2006:98–99) that accommodated the sovereign existence of two states within the wider Islamic community by strategically retaining the Ottoman claim as the leader of the Islamic world. One might see this as a judicious move for both sides as they acclimatised to the changing geopolitical conditions by adapting them to the uneven power relationship between them in terms of 'international relations' of the Islamic world.

Thus, pushing the chronology of 'Middle Eastern modernity' back into the eighteenth century brings to the surface the existence of 'international relations' before European modernity come crushing in or international society expanded into the Middle East. The question of modern peoplehood, then, was not something forced upon the empires of the Islamic world. For international relations, or diplomacy, if we would like to expunge the anachronism, is not something originally invented in Europe. Diplomacy – 'in the broadest sense of the negotiated management of inter-societal relations (Rosenberg 2006:320) – is a generic property of the inter-societal co-existence of human collectivities.

This extant dynamic, operative between the Ottoman Empire and the changing dynasties ruling over the Iranian plateau, began to transform partly by absorbing the changing principles of inter-state conduct in Europe and adapting them to inter-state relations in the Islamic world. This process had elements of what anthropologists and archaeologists would call diffusion and simultaneous invention. This process involved an element of diffusion because European developments are adopted, initially by the Ottoman Empire and later by its neighbouring dynasties by way of European mediation. It is also simultaneous inventions, because – and I am resorting to the language of archaeology here – 'where necessary parts [i.e. diplomacy] [were] already invented and there [was] strong interest to create a desired product [i.e. to make peace with a stronger neighbour]' (Kehoe 2016:149).

These developments also help us to challenge a conventional trope in Ottoman historiography. By now serious students of the Ottoman Empire have thoroughly questioned, if not totally abandoned the traditional imperial decline thesis, which depicted the old empire as devoid of administrative flexibility and economic dynamism (Aksan 2014; Aymes 2013; Mikhail and Philliou 2012). The eighteenth century was not

a period of unstoppable imperial decay and decline, but one of adaptation to the changing geopolitical environment following the formal closure of the frontier (Abou-El-Haj 1969).

Finally, the Qajar-Ottoman relations and novel steps they took towards what might be termed proto-national identity challenge another conventional idea in historiography, namely the supposed incompatibility between Islam and modern nationalism (see critiques in Bromley 1993:90–94; Gerber 2007:209–10). Different arguments are proposed to this end. For one, Islam, as opposed to Christianity, was a nomadic but not a territorial culture (Armstrong 1982). Another commentator, Adrian Hastings, asserted that the socio-cultural impact [of Islam] is to draw people into a single, far more universalist, community whose sole language of direct encouragement is Arabic' (1997:159). Like Armstrong, Hastings also draws a contrast with Christianity, as if these are isolated cultures with no interaction or influence.⁴⁵

While the Islamic socio-political impact was thus in principle almost entirely anti-ethnic and anti-national, the Christian impact was more complex. Its willingness to translate brought with it, undoubtedly, a reduction in the number of ethnicities and vernaculars, but then a confirmation of the individual identity of those that remained: Christianity in fact helped turn ethnicities into nations (1997:179).

But as I argue in this section, the legal and political changes in the international relations of the Islamic world in the eighteenth century gives indications of modern peoplehood. The Islamic world in this view does not have to wait for the Third Estate to storm the Bastille and then import a fully-formed ideology of nationalism from them, which did not in any case, according to sceptics, take root in the Islamic world.

4.3 Istanbul: Qajar Reformists' "Open Window Onto Europe"⁴⁶

In this section I present a case of late modernisation that does not subscribe to the traditional unilinear historiography. Chronologically we move into the nineteenth

⁴⁵ See the critique of this view by Richard W. Bulliet who made an important case for Islamo-Christian civilization (2004)

⁴⁶ This phrase ('une fenêtre ouverte sur l'Europe') belongs to Zarcone and Zarinebaf (1993a:1).

century. It was during this troubled period that European geopolitical pressures came to be felt in full force. Even a cursory reading of the historical record leaves no doubt. The onset of the nineteenth century brought with it momentous geopolitical changes that engulfed Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire. One scholar, who provides a perceptive analysis of the texts written by early Qajar intellectuals and diplomats, notes ‘the sudden sense of having fallen behind’ (Ekhtiar 1996:58). Similarly the Ottoman elite ‘understood only too well that their world was exposed to mortal danger from within as from without’ (Deringil 2011:3).

Having lost the military edge – an essential quality for the political reproduction of any land based empire – against their rivals, Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire increasingly looked for methods and devices to cope with the imminent threat. Almost instinctively by the reform minded bureaucrat and intellectual alike, at least for those that did not attribute the visible powerlessness of their state *solely* to estrangement from the ‘old ways,’ it was recognised that the key to renewal and redemption was held by the hostile but superior European powers. This much of the historical script is by now familiar and I do not wish to repeat it here. The fact of European geopolitical pressures and the efforts of Ottoman and Qajar elites to cope with them constitute the master frame within which what I present should be understood. The twist to this otherwise well-known plot adds a third link to the chain, so to speak. Between Europe and Qajar Iran, one can picture the Ottoman Empire as a transmission belt and source for inspiration that for novel ideas, institutional configurations and, given the power disparity between these two late comers, a source of material wealth in the form of a commercial gateway to Europe.

In this framing the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran are not strictly equivalent and separate units of analysis that can be compared in their attempts at reform or their relative backwardness vis-à-vis their European foes. There was indeed a clear power disparity between these two entities and differential rates of success in their attempts to reform. For that reason it is not surprising to find in the relevant literature comparative remarks, though almost always in passing, that note the relative weakness of modernization in Qajar Iran vis-à-vis the Ottoman Empire and Egypt (Martin 2005:25). This is a striking and recurring, if only briefly stated, point that the Qajars failed to achieve a level of development/modernisation in comparison to the Ottoman Empire.

Sometimes an additional reference is also made to Egypt of the Muhammad Ali dynasty. Nikki Keddie states this plainly:

Compared to countries nearer the Mediterranean and having a greater western trade and presence, notably Egypt and the Ottoman Empire, Iran had only a few reform measures that lasted more than a decade, scant introduction of modern education, and, despite several army reforms, only one truly modern army unit (1999:15; see also Keddie and Amanat 1991:178 and 195).

According to this line of reasoning, Iran lacked not only political institutions and will, but also necessary attributes like natural resources and population. Its relative isolation from European developments, geographical obstacles to trade, nomadic nature of the population and comparatively smaller proportion of non-Muslims to its overall population disadvantaged Iran vis-à-vis its co-religionist neighbour to the West (Pistor-Hatam 1995:562–63).

According to one historian, having a strong neighbour to the West was both a blessing and a curse:

The major impediment [to reform in Iran] seems to have been geographical, namely the vast expanses of the Ottoman Empire which quite effectively shielded Iran from any blows that the European powers dealt the Ottoman Empire itself, their neighbour, but which at the same time equally isolated her from direct contact with the West (Karny 1973:12).

Abbas Amanat recently made a similar point. Ottoman consolidation in Anatolia following their victory over the Safavids in Chaldiran (1514) blocked any direct access to Black Sea and Mediterranean trade routes and political interaction (2017:58). The rulers of Iran, from the Safavids onwards, had a higher mountain to climb (Keddie and Amanat 1991:177; Mathee 2010:255).

But left in this way, these are plain comparative points with ostensibly quantitative valences – more attempt and success in one, less in the other. This *comparativist gradation* between the Ottoman Empire and Iran is not for everyone, however. In his

analysis of the historiography of the Iranian Constitutional Revolution, Ali Ansari picks this problem up in passing and turns it around to make sense of it:

In broad terms, the Tobacco Revolt occurred at a similar time and ‘era’ as the granting of the Ottoman Constitution (1876) and the Urabi Revolt in Egypt (1881-1882), and if anything conveniently took place after these events, thereby reinforcing the didactic position that this was a regional process in which each state proceeded according to its relative proximity to Western ideas and influence. If this particular model did not work particularly well for the events of 1906, it was nonetheless possible and again extremely useful to emphasize its revolutionary nature by situating it within the context of the failed Russian revolution of 1905. Neither of these comparative approaches were necessarily wrong, and they did much to convey the importance of events in Iran to an otherwise disinterested British public, but one of the inadvertent consequences was to situate Iran chronologically and culturally as the poor neighbour to the Ottomans and subsequently the Turks (2012:41–42).

Because his brief analysis falls short of a thorough engagement with comparativism, it ends up with, so I surmise from his wording, an empirical concession in the form of not ‘necessarily wrong’ and a criticism of gradation between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran.

While certainly right on his normative objection, Ali Ansari does not see this as a matter of politics of comparison. Surely, normative criticism of this kind has a resonance beyond the study of late modernisations in the Middle East, as comparativism is often found guilty of introducing a hierarchy between units under comparison. And one of the most pervasive forms of such hierarchy has been the one established between the cases of Euro-American modernity and the rest of the world (Mongia 2007:385; Shih 2013).

In this instance, Eurocentric hierarchy comes with an additional layer however. Not only Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire are subjected to hierarchical comparison with Europe, that very yardstick also serves to rank them. Such ranking, measured by the endogenous attainment of European modernity, arranges cases of late modernisation along a developmental arc (Pollock 2010:200). This reinforces the other enduring problem of comparative historical inquiry, namely internalism or methodological

nationalism (Martins 1974:273–80; Tenbruck 1994). For histories of late developing societies are measured and ranked individually (that is, ‘nationally’) and separately against the European norm.

Shadowed by the cogent criticisms of normative Eurocentrism and methodological internalism is a third problem that has received relatively less attention – one that this chapter is chiefly concerned with. By limiting the histories of late modernisations to the singular axis of European impact and non-European response, comparativism effaces any ‘lateral’ connections among societies outside the European core (Holdrege 2010). Comparative relevance of the histories of non-European modernisations are rendered meaningful only to the extent they are thought to have succeeded or failed to achieve the hallmarks of European modernity, as in the comparativist gradation between Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire highlighted above.

Such connections can be reinstated to their historical relevance by re-purposing comparison as a political vision and orientation or, as I stated earlier, by focusing on the politics of comparison. The contemporaries, in this sense, made this differential assessment of two late developing entities as well, which are generally overlooked in the literature. It was one of the earliest proponents of Iranian nationalism, Seyyed Hasan Taqizadeh, who noted the importance of Istanbul for reform movement in Iran. He stated with some literary flair that ‘the light... came from Istanbul to Iran, and especially Tabriz, and gradually influenced the awakening of minds and the political revolution’ (1960:459).

Here I look into the views of Qajar residents in Istanbul in official or unofficial capacity that made such assessments and came to the conclusion that there may be much to be learned from Ottoman efforts at reform. Carter Findley draws the broader implications of the Ottoman priority in late development:

The Ottoman reforms of the nineteenth century are...of pivotal importance not only for the history of the Ottoman Empire and the Turkish Republic, but also for the entire history of the administrative tradition of the Islamic world. These reforms are also significant in a larger sense, as well. If we except Russia, whose traditional culture had much in common with that of the West, the

Ottomans come to the fore as the first modernizing society of the non-Western world and one of the few such societies to retain any degree of independence during the nineteenth century age of imperialism. In view of the Ottomans' geographic position and the level of their interaction in all periods of their history with Europeans, theirs, too, is an exceptional situation. But their experiences during a century and a third of administrative reform must have implications for the study of the efforts of other peoples, the world over, who have launched comparable efforts only more recently-at times under even less promising circumstances, and often without any resource equal to the indigenous tradition that the Ottomans had behind them (1980:4).

The Persian community (Pistor-Hatam 2007), which clustered mostly in major commercial cities and towns, came in three waves. The first wave of migration arrived in the wake of the devastating Mongol invasions in the thirteenth century. The second one formed mostly by the persecuted Sunnis following the Safavid enforcement of Shi'ism as the religion of the land in the sixteenth century. This wave also included those from Azerbaijan after its occupation by the Ottomans, who deported many skilled workers to Anatolia. The final wave, 'the heyday of this community' (Chelkowski 2001:69), which is the subject of this section, arrived throughout the nineteenth and early twentieth century with the increased commercial ties between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran (Zarinebaf n.d.).

And of this final wave I am more interested in the Qajar subjects resident in the imperial capital, Istanbul. Mirza Mohammad Hosayn Farahani, a traveller and a pilgrim on his way to Mecca, visited the city in 1885 and put the number of Iranians around 16.000, most of whom were merchants and traders (1990:143). Other major Ottoman cities hosted Iranian émigrés, if in comparatively much smaller numbers: 5.700 Iranians lived in Anatolia at the end of nineteenth century, 2.714 lived in Adana, 995 in Izmir, 850 in Aleppo, 721 in Erzurum and 448 in Van (Lawrence 2015:28). For most of the nineteenth century, Valide Han, located in the European part of the city, served as the main trading post and communal centre for the Qajar subjects in Istanbul. A city *han* was 'the traditional Ottoman "office building" that provided, like an Arab caravanserai or the Italian *fondachi*, accommodation for travelling merchants at an affordable cost,

with the addition of workshops, offices, and storage space for craftsmen and tradesmen, usually specialising in a limited range of goods' (Duranti 2012:233).

Valide Han included a Shi'i mosque and hosted sacred Shi'i rituals of *taziya* and *ashura* (Glassen 1993). This evinces the increasing self-confidence and visibility of the Iranian community, released from the throes of religious persecution experienced by their 'compatriots' who arrived with the earlier waves of migration (Kiren 2017). In Farahani's account, the Iranians in Istanbul were enjoying the benefits of extraterritoriality, like other 'foreigners' towards the end of the century and their legal recourse was 'entirely through the embassy. They were never under the jurisdiction of the administration of Istanbul' (1990:143).

The community was mostly comprised of merchants of Azerbaijani origin. This was facilitated by the increasing trade incentivised by the safeguards implemented by the Erzurum Treaties. During the nineteenth century the earlier geographical isolation of Iran's fertile northern provinces was significantly overcome and a bustling trade route established from Tabriz to Istanbul by way of the port city of Trabzon on the coast of Black Sea (Issawi 1970; see also Sakamoto 1993). Through this trade route Iranians found a gateway into European trade. One contemporary Austrian observer, Rudolf Gödel, noted in 1849 that 'the bulk of the trading business between Europe and Persia [was] concentrated in Constantinople and Tabriz' which acted as the two poles of the commercial flow (Quoted in Chelkowski 2001:69; see also Issawi 1991:600–601).

The political leanings of the Iranian merchants became increasingly critical of Qajar rule, as their privileges were continually damaged by the concessions granted to European capital and the reform efforts petered out at home. As Andrea Duranti notes, if with a slight overdose of historical linearity, 'the history of the Persian merchants strictly merged with that of the modernisation of Iran and the spread of western political ideologies that eventually determined the birth of the Iranian constitutional movement' (2012:238). Their contribution as I try to show here was an instance of mediated modernisation through a structure of combined development.

4.4 Mirza Hoseyn Khan: The Reformist Ambassador in Istanbul

This section further concretises the argument of the previous one by focusing on the actions of a single individual. Mirza Hoseyn Khan was the Qajar ambassador in Istanbul during the Ottoman Empire's momentous reform period known as the Tanzimat. During his service he enthusiastically, though not uncritically, reported these reforms and their benefits to his home country. In a sense, he was a conduit between an early late developing state and another such country, which he thought, was laggard in reform.

Mirza Hoseyn Khan was not the first to recognise the Ottoman priority in late development. Possibly the earliest attempt in reform on European lines was put forth by Abbas Mirza (1789-1833), the governor of Azerbaijan and heir apparent to Fath Ali Shah (r. 1797-1834). And his efforts came in the face of patent military powerlessness. He took up his post in the north-western province in 1806 when the war was on-going with the Russian Empire, triggered by the latter's annexation of Georgia in 1801, for long considered to be part of Iran. He was a determined, but also equally unfortunate visionary. Much like his successors in reform efforts to have felt that something has gone terribly wrong, when he uttered the following lines to the French envoy Jaubert:

Stranger, do you see this army, this court and these instruments of power? Do not believe, however, that I am happy. Oh, but how can I be? It is like a troubled fleet in the sea that bangs itself against the immovable rocks; all the efforts of my courage have failed against the Russian armies. The people praise my achievements: I alone know my weakness. What should I do to gain the esteem of the Western warriors? What cities have I conquered? What revenge have I taken against those who have invaded our provinces? (Ekhtiar 1996:59)

His mood was in many ways similar to his reforming counterparts in the Ottoman Empire, from where it seems he drew some of his inspiration for change. For immediately after assuming his post he moved onto to modernise his army with the help of his minister Qayem Maqam, remarkably when the war with the Russian Empire was underway. They established a new army corps equipped with European style uniforms and trained in European methods. Abbas Mirza's army employed salaried officers trained by Russian deserters and later French and British military missions – the

employment of particular groups of experts was sensitive to the changing geopolitical dynamics in Europe, as by then Napoleon's overtures into Iran after his failure in Egypt alerted the British Empire to the risk involved its prized possessions in Indian subcontinent.

The naming and the method of justification for the new army, *Nezam-i Jadid* (New Order) seems to be directly influenced by similar efforts in the Ottoman Empire undertaken by the reformist Sultan Selim III (Cronin 2008:204). Although the veracity of this connection is disputed (Karny 1973:16), Hamid Algar opines that 'possibly the Ottoman envoys who came to Tehran to suggest the formation of a common front against Russian expansionism were one channel whereby the Ottoman example was communicated' (1980:77). But this was not just a straightforward imitation of the reform efforts of another Islamic dynasty. 'The European model was perceived through the lens of Ottoman example' (Algar 1973:103).

But the early death of Abbas Mirza and the execution of Qayem Maqam next year with the succession of Mohammad Shah (r. 1834-1848) significantly slowed down reform efforts in Qajar Iran until Naser al-Din Shah (r. 1848-1896) assumed the throne. The young shah's chief minister, Miza Taqi Khan (Amir Kabir), renewed reform efforts with an unprecedented zeal across the country, which unsettled vested interests. No more than three years later his downfall was brought about by court intrigue (Amanat 2008:102–17). For about two decades Qajar modernisation went into a hiatus inside the country, except for sporadic and perfunctory efforts by Naser al-Din Shah that were doomed not least by the shah's half-heartedness. But abroad, particularly in Istanbul, the reformist mind-set was kept aflame by the expatriate Qajar subjects. They found a government ally in their midst, when their new ambassador arrived in the Ottoman capital from his posts as consul in Bombay and Tbilisi. None other than Amir Kabir assigned him to Bombay in 1851 – a fact that gives us clues about his reformist leanings. And during his term in Tbilisi, notes Azriel Karny, he first encountered Ottoman officials which led him to learn at first hand about the early reforms in the Ottoman Empire (1973:96).

Mirza Hoseyn Khan was a man of humble origins, from Mazandaran in the Caspian region of Iran. It was his father, Mirza Nabi Khan, who was the first to take the

proverbial steps of the ladder up, thanks to the expanding bureaucracy in Qajar Iran. He made sure his sons were properly educated and galvanised family fortunes in the service of the state (Karny 1973:42–60). This education appears to have given him the political convictions of a European liberal. Although little is known about this period of his life, he was a student in Paris during the revolutionary days of 1848, the springtime of nations. His faith in progress was firm to the point of naïveté. He believed, notes Guity Nashat, that ‘change necessarily brought improvement’ (1982:35). And his years in Istanbul as the first resident Iranian ambassador (1859-1870) gave him more than enough chance to witness change first hand, as his mission coincided with the so-called second stage of Tanzimat reforms under the helm of Ali and Fuad Pashas.

This second stage was opened by the Reform Edict of 1856, which reaffirmed the principles of the Imperial Edict of Reorganisation of 1839: the abolition of tax farming, the reform of conscription, and security for life, property and honour of all subjects of the sultan. Both edicts declared all subjects, regardless of their religious affiliation, equal before the law in line with the idea of Ottomanism. A surge of legislation followed in the form of new land, penal and commercial codes. Despite a certain slowdown during the early years of the new Sultan Abdülaziz (r. 1861-1876), reform efforts gained further impetus under external pressure.

Mirza Hoseyn Khan watched these developments closely and reported them to Tehran with a certain enthusiasm. He seems to have been particularly impressed by the Sultan’s trip to Europe in 1867 under the guidance of Fuad Pasha, first ever in Ottoman history during peacetime. Astutely, he noticed the increasing pace of reform following this visit and put his energies to convince Naser al-Din Shah to do the same (Karny 1973:196). The Shah, however, had a different idea in mind. He wanted to take his first ever trip abroad to Ottoman Iraq in 1870. Mirza Hoseyn Khan was initially opposed to the idea, because the Shah’s wish to take a pilgrimage to Shi’i shrines in Ottoman lands was obviously a delicate matter. Having failed to dissuade the Shah, the capable ambassador managed to secure the permission from the Ottoman authorities, possibly thanks to the fact that he was on good terms with the grand vizier Ali Pasha. Baghdad province at the time was under the governorship of Midhat Pasha, who already made a name for himself during his tenure in the Danube province (Koç 2004). The Ottoman governor was one of the ablest of the Tanzimat reformers, whose acquaintance Mirza Hoseyn

made with enthusiasm (Hazrati 2015). In this sense the Shah's visit, Mirza Hoseyn would likely have thought, was a chance to familiarise him with the benefits of European reform carried by a fellow Muslim state (Keddie 1999:35).

The comparison Mirza Hoseyn Khan made was in the first instance a geographical one. He believed that due to its geographical location, 'Iran was not within the radius of European civilisation' (Chelkowski 2001:71). For that reason it was in its benefit to receive the help of European powers, even it comes in the form of imposition. This was indeed the case for the Ottomans, who despite initially resisting these pressures for change coming from outside, eventually did the right thing by welcoming it. It is clear that Mirza Hoseyn Khan's worldview was close to the Westernising bureaucrats of the Ottoman Empire (Karny 1973:172).

He seems to be particularly impressed by the early constitutional movement in the Ottoman Empire. In 1867 Mustafa Fazil Pasha, who held several high-ranking positions in the Ottoman bureaucracy previously, sent a letter to the Sultan from Paris. He was associated with the oppositional Young Ottomans movement (Çiçek 2010:38–39). The content of his letter was highly critical of the Ottoman administration and advocated the promulgation of a constitution and a representative assembly to act as an advisory body to the Sultan. Soon the letter was translated in Turkish and was distributed in Istanbul. Mirza Hoseyn Khan lost no time to urge on the Iranian foreign minister the benefits that would accrue from translating this letter into Persian. On the same day, he wrote sent another letter to Naser al-Din Shah to praise the benefits of constitutionalism. In this letter, however, the limits of the ambassador's progressive politics revealed themselves. His commendation of the Ottoman constitutional movement raised the issue of non-Muslims. If Ottomans were a single kind, a constitution and representative politics would be of great value. But given that a significant portion of the Ottoman population were Christians who would have a say in the assembly through their representatives, a great risk was involved. According to Azriel Karny, Mirza Hoseyn Khan reasoned that 'since in more than one respect the Christians are more advanced than the Muslim subjects, within a short period total power would fall into their hands' (Karny 1973:176).

Another comparison he drew between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran was with regards to the quality of newspapers. In a letter he wrote in 1865 to Mirza Yusuf Khan, then the Qajar consul-general in Tblisi, Mirza Hoseyn Khan expressed his views in no uncertain terms:

For some time now, I have abandoned the habit of reading newspapers that reach us from [Tehran]. They are sent very rarely, and whenever they are sent, I pass them on directly to the Embassy without reading them as when I study and compare these to the newspapers and press in Istanbul, the result is nothing but displeasure [...] I have repeatedly communicated to the state these newspaper's results [...] but have seen no good come of it. Therefore, all I can do is to abstain from reading any of these (Quoted in Lawrence 2015:45–46).

Mirza Hoseyn Khan's reports were not always received positively, however. His superior, the Foreign Minister Mirza Said Khan took exception to his ambassador's negative comparison between the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran and scolded him for continuously claiming that Iranian state failed to take the necessary steps towards progress and the implication that Iranian bureaucracy, including Mirza Said Khan, were composed of incompetent people, and not with visionary reformers (Karny 1973:181–82). Given that the Iranian ambassador was not content with mere reporting of events but installed himself as 'the unproclaimed apostle of change in Iran' (Karny 1973:170), the Foreign Minister's response conveys a sense of personal agitation. And he was not the only one in the Qajar bureaucracy to harbour ill feelings towards Mirza Hoseyn Khan. But he proved himself to be a gifted diplomat during his term in Istanbul and gained the Shah's praise more than once. When he secured the latter's visit to Ottoman Iraq, he was probably at the highest point of diplomatic achievements and in return the grateful Shah appointed him as the Minister of Justice. Once given this ministerial portfolio, Mirza Hoseyn lost no time to pursue his reform efforts. Seeing that justice system decentralised and lacked systematic written legislation (Farmayan 1968:131), he established *Majles-e Ahkam-e 'Adliye* (The Council of Judicial Regulations) on the Ottoman model of *Majles-Vala-ye Ahkam-e Adliye* (Supreme Council of Judicial Ordinances) (Karny 1973:236–37). Another one of his reforms was the re-institution of a consultative council, modelled on its Ottoman counterpart (Karny 1973:269–70).

Overzealous in his enthusiasm for reform, Mirza Hoseyn soon extended his ministerial purview into military and foreign affairs. He was certainly emboldened by the Shah's unwavering support. This was confirmed in November 1871 by his appointment as the chief minister (*Sadr-e Azam*) the highest possible rank in Qajar bureaucracy. Two things however brought his downfall. He convinced Shah to give a major concession to British banker Baron Julius de Reuter

the exclusive right to finance a state bank, farm out the entire customs, exploit all minerals (with the exception of gold, silver, and precious stones), build railways and tramways for seventy years, and establish all future canals, irrigation works, roads, telegraph lines, and industrial factories [in return for £40,000 and 60 percent of the profits] (Abrahamian 1982:55).

Mirza Hoseyn was deeply involved in the concession and Reuter bribed several officials to secure the concession. Although, Keddie and Amanat notes, 'there is no evidence that Mirza Husain Khan took a bribe' (Keddie and Amanat 1991:187). Regardless, whole thing was nothing short of scandalous. Even an arch-imperialist like Lord Curzon could not hide his amazement. The Reuter concession, he said, 'is the most complete and extraordinary surrender of the entire industrial resources of a kingdom into foreign hands that has probably ever been dreamed of, much less accomplished, in history' (Curzon 1892:480). In the face of domestic outrage, the Russian objections and the British unwillingness to support Reuter, the Shah canceled concession.

Not long after the dust settled on the Reuter concession, Mirza Hoseyn convinced Shah to take his first European trip. It is likely that Mirza Hoseyn presumably drawing inspiration from the earlier Ottoman example. While Shah's visit was success, though a very expensive one, Mirza Hoseyn enemies prepared well while he was away and pressured the Shah to discharge him as soon as they returned to the Qajar domains, which he did.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter attempted to do several things. First, rescaling non-European modernisation by introducing the Ottoman Empire as a mediating influence unsettles

Eurocentric historiography's civilisational bifurcation. By this move we get to conceive unevenness of historical development not a dyadic contrast between an advanced West and backward East, but unevenness itself as uneven. This multilinear conception of unevenness and non-European responses to it change our understanding of Middle Eastern history from a singular European impact to one where differential strategies (Eastern connections) no longer receive only passing references.

Second, rearranging the historiography of the 'modern' Middle East by moving back into eighteenth century allows us to interpret legal and political developments that have 'indigenous' origins and initiative, though not detached from the wider geopolitical master frame. A simple dichotomy between external and internal explanations of change should be avoided at all costs. International relations is not a realm of external or 'structural' determinants, but elemental to social change. This historiographical move aligns with the recent revival of interest in the eighteenth century Iran, which previously received the scantiest attention, an addendum of a few pages to the Safavid period (Morgan 2018).

In that vein, this chapter's historiographical engagement with the eighteenth century international relations of the Islamic world follows from the main premises of U&CD – that the inter-societal co-existence is constitutive of societies' historical development and transformation. And as such it is not an exclusive property of modern Europe, but of human social existence in general. By reaching at this deeper ontological level, this chapter aimed at avoiding the fruitless questioning of whether modernity is Western or can we locate native and internal resources of it. The very dynamics that led to the development of modern institutions, values and rules in different settings, their conceivable simultaneity or what Victor Lieberman shrewdly called 'the strange parallels' (1997), should neither be reduced to mere imitations of original European products or should be invented in the past of the nation.

The fact that the modernisation of the Middle Eastern states and societies came undeniably under the influence of the geopolitical and geopolitical impositions of the European 'surge ahead' is no warrant to reduce history to this singular dichotomy. It is at this intermediate or mid-range level where U&CD's attentiveness to unevenness of historical development proves to be vital. By utilising the concepts of politics of

comparison and mediated modernisation this chapter tried to argue that there is much more to the history of the Middle East (and to the history of the non-European world at large) than the timid historiography of mixing European developments with local cultural resources.

Finally, the emergence of nationalism proper in the early twentieth century Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran was not a sudden introduction of an alien ideology that was bound to fail, as some commentators have thought (Kedourie 1992; Vatikiotis 1987), but had precursors in the transformations of sovereignty and citizenship from the eighteenth century onwards. The onset of the twentieth century was to mark the acceleration of processes culminating in the last quarter of the previous one. The age of steam and print, as a recent collection of essays nicely put it, would transform the Islamic world with increased mobility of peoples, ideas and technologies (Gelvin and Green 2014). Two landmark developments of this era were the phenomenal burst of an Asian power, Japan into global politics to inspire profoundly the late developing societies of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, and the global wave of constitutional revolutions. These are the developments that I turn to in the next chapter.

Chapter 5

Transimperial Origins of Iranian and Turkish Nationalisms

5.1 Introduction

This chapter seeks to advance the mediated modernisation argument into the turn-of-the-century emergence of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms – a period during which the first programmatic statements of these ideologies are formulated. Still not the pioneers of the mass phenomena they will become in the later decades of the century, nationalist intellectuals started to articulate a hitherto unknown conception of political community. The very conditions within which these political visions of the nation were devised form the substance of this chapter. And while presenting that substance, I seek to address two problems in the previous treatments of late developing nationalisms.

The first one was already raised in Chapter 1. Critical histories of Middle Eastern nationalisms rightly challenge the putative antiquity of nations by exposing their modernity. This they do by demonstrating that nationalism is a European ideology of relatively recent invention and that nations are made by states and nationalism. Therefore, the European impact is empirically registered. But once this source does its job historically and acts as an ideological trigger, then the empirical analysis tends to turn inwards. What is introduced empirically (i.e. the intersocietal) is excluded theoretically, because the narrative structure retains the separation of external and internal that is connected with linear, not ontologically co-constitutive, causality. Rather paradoxically, social constructivists arguments that begins as a critical epistemological challenge to the nation, ends up tacitly assuming the national unit of analysis (Duara 2002:27–29).

This problem is recently taken up by the transnational histories of nationalism (Bayly 2004:199–243; Kostantaras 2013; Thiesse 2005). Within this group of historians, Selçuk Esenbel proposes a way out of the internalist paradox that I just mentioned through what she calls ‘the history of the international relations of nationalism’ (2004:1143) or ‘the transnational history of nationalism’ (Esenbel 2006:40). Esenbel

raises the crucial point that the only international history of nationalism that is available to us almost exclusively focuses on the relationship between Western countries as initiators and colonies as followers. This is the second key defect of Eurocentrism – one that also harms its critiques (i.e. postcolonial theory) (2006:41). More often than not, non-Western nationalisms are subjected to a comparative test with earlier – that is almost always West European – nationalisms and found to be theoretically irregular or abnormal (Bonakdarian 2015:77) and the source of this abnormality is sought internally.

Here we have once again the dual problems of internalism and Eurocentrism that seem to embody each other like matryoshka dolls (Anievas and Matin 2016b:4–6). Comparison with European models produces two types of responses/outcomes. First, it is often concluded that a specific late developing nationalism is not comparable, hence outside the purview of theory: return to step one above, provide an exceptionalist and internalist empirical narrative. Second, empirical complexity and multilinearity of development is truncated by making woolly claims that a specific late developing nationalism is a mixture of Western and Eastern elements – in other words, simplify the world historical proliferation of late modernisation to the singular axis of West and East.

To overcome these problems, this chapter recalibrates the empirical focus of the analysis and brings to the forefront a hitherto downplayed aspect of late modernisation. That downplayed aspect is the significance of transimperial, ‘Eastern’ connections and influences among late developing societies that had formative influence on the development of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms. Seeking these lateral connections is to make empirically good on the promise that the theory of uneven and combined development overcomes the limitations of unilinear historical explanation. A multilinear understanding of historical development removes the analytical restrictions that reduce the processes of political emulation as unidirectional phenomena running from the West to the East. Furthermore, by this move the analysis of late developing nationalism is released from the inchoate civilizational categories of East and West (Anievas and Matin 2016c:253).

The key aim of the chapter is to show that what are treated as separate histories of the formative periods of nationalisms in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire can be more

illuminatingly seen as entangled processes (Randeria 2002; Schiel 2009) played out across several imperial realms. This principle is not restricted to the study of nationalism. As one scholar notes, ‘we would do well to think of emulation as a multidirectional process within a global marketplace of ideas and practices’ (Garon 2017:69). Nationalism in the Middle East had such biographies of development, resourced from a Eurasian transimperial marketplace of ideas and practices.

The historical account presented here aims to develop these premises in three sections. The first section, like in the previous chapter, focuses on the general law of unevenness of historical development and outlines the geopolitical environment within which turn-of-the-century elites and intellectuals sought remedies for the backwardness of their states and societies. The *analytical* priority of this form of explanation (i.e. ‘international’) follows from the central ‘causal’ claim of this thesis laid out in the Introduction that late developing nationalism is a means to ward off geopolitical pressures and achieve or bolster sovereign independence. For that reason, an internalist theory that excludes this dimension of social reality cannot account for late developing nationalisms. That is why the ‘peculiarity’ of a late developing nationalism should not be explained away with reference to its theoretical incompatibility, but should be construed instead as a dynamic outcome of uneven and combined development formed *across* an inter-imperial geography responding to geopolitical pressures.

To understand the concrete content of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms, it is essential to make a note of two key differences of this period from the previous decades of the nineteenth century. First, a sustained closure of the Eurocentric international order behind civilizational boundaries and the predatory New Imperialism of the period strained the worldviews of reformist intellectuals and elites in the Muslim world (and in wider Asia), and profoundly impaired their belief in and enthusiasm towards the universality of European enlightenment. Exclusion incited recourse to varieties of nativist political projects such as nationalism, pan-Islamism and pan-Asianism (Aydın 2007b). Second, the varying impact of other late modernising societies, especially the meteoric rise of Japan, rearranged the real and perceived reality of European pressures and emboldened the elites of both countries towards the attainability of political modernisation. Essentially, after a century of defeats and humiliation at the hands of superior European powers, the rise of an Asian power modified geopolitics, or at the

least it made such modification a possibility in the minds of other Asian elites otherwise agonising over the backwardness of their societies.

The second section focuses on the wave of constitutional revolutions that swept across the late developing world during early twentieth century. As a truly trans-imperial phenomenon, containing constitutionalisms in their respective singular national narratives can only be counterproductive. Recent historiography has shown the degree and frequency of interactions and influences between different ‘national’ revolutionary situations (Atabaki 2010; Hart 1987:187–234; Kurzman 2010; Osterhammel 2014:558–71).

The third section of the chapter traces a diverse group of intellectuals and Muslim reformists, whose identities cannot be confined to the analytical or substantive boundaries of the nation-state. It was actually out of their activities the modern nation-states of Iran and Turkey constructed their political boundaries. Focusing on these peripatetic intellectuals and revolutionaries make possible to see societies as ‘mobile, spatially expansive, and interactive’ (Ho 2017:907) rather than endogenously developing.

5.2 The Rise of Japan and the Divergent Temporalities of Unevenness

This section picks up an earlier argument raised in Chapter 2. I argued that Nairn’s tidal waves imagery of nationalism’s spread, which he adapts from Gellner’s earlier work, is based on a mentally convenient but ultimately simplistic understanding of unevenness. Unevenness in human history is not also a cascade-like structure with several stages of waterfall corresponding to different levels of development among societies. Any such metaphor with neat spatial contours or singular temporal differentiation between the advanced West and the backward East is bound to be simplistic. While the most imposing and unavoidable vector of unevenness was indeed the European superiority in the nineteenth century, the efforts to cope with this fact, referred here generically as late development, cannot be reduced to this singular axis of the West and East distinction. Because successful cases of late development complicated that over-determining distinction and dislocated its singular dyadic temporal differentiation between the

advanced and the backward parts of the world. An instance of those successful cases is in point here: the Meiji Japan. If we were to use Nairn's Gellnerian metaphor, by the end of nineteenth century, Japan created another wave, from the East, sweeping across the world – simultaneously challenging and seeking admission into the club of 'civilised' nations. This could not but modify the strategic content and vision of late development and its 'politics of comparison.'

The significance of the rise of Japan is elaborated here on two registers. The first is how the Japanese model influenced and modified the categories within which, as well as against which, the politics of comparison in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire (and in the wider Asia) responded to its condition of backwardness vis-à-vis an increasingly aggressive and imperialistic European powers. The second is the momentous and global impact of the Japanese victory against the Russian Empire in 1905. The significance of this victory as an 'event' demonstrates the 'knock-on' effects that reverberated across regional constellations that we touched upon in the previous chapter (Type 1 combined development). It is important to note that the Japanese influence was not experienced uniformly among the late developing societies, due to their uneven access to then recently burgeoning global infrastructures of transportation and communications.

When Japan declared war on the Russian Empire on February 10, 1904, neither side thought that their scramble for the outer perimeter of Asia – most of the fighting took place in Korea and Manchuria – would be the global sensation it turned out to be. For nineteenth months, 'millions around the globe kept abreast of the news of the surprising victories of "little" Japan over the "mighty" Russian Empire' (Kowner 2007:2). The result of the Russo-Japanese War in 1905 was of course the highest point of Japanese prestige across the colonial and semi-colonial world. First time in modern times, an Asian state prevailed over a European power. It was an unprecedented blow to the turn-of-the-century racial classifications as the inferior 'yellow' race came out victorious against the 'white' for the first time in an all-out war.

But the fascination with this previously little known society started some decades earlier. More precisely, what made Japan initially a case for wonderment was the rate of its development within a compressed time frame, from the inauguration of the Meiji Restoration in 1868 to the Anglo-Japanese Alliance in 1902. In little over three decades,

an Asiatic state, placed in the lower rungs of pseudo-scientific racial-civilisational rankings of the age, managed to shake off the stymying weight of unequal treaties imposed on it, industrialised its economy at a considerable degree, made unequalled strides in public education and ascended to the league of great powers (Beasley 1999:188–228).⁴⁷

Although the meaning of the Japanese success was eagerly received across the Islamic world and intellectuals from Cairo to Bukhara were mesmerised by the Japanese feat of reconciling modernity with tradition, the availability of information was contingent upon several factors. And this provides us with pointers towards forming our narrative here. In Iran for instance most of what is known about Japan had to be filtered through port cities like Bombay, Cairo and Istanbul with notable expatriate merchant communities (Green 2011; Luesink 1993; Zarinebaf 1993). Direct knowledge was scant as the accounts of two travellers to Japan, one by Ibrahim Sahhafbashi in 1897 (Sugita 2007:18–27) and the other by Mahdi Qoli Hedayat in 1904 (Barzegar 1987) were not published until much later (1978 and 1945 respectively). Before 1905, Iranian knowledge on Japan, claims one researcher, amounted little more than ‘rumours’ (Rajabzadeh 1988:145).

While Japan was a common source of attraction thanks to its aptitude to modernise without shedding its traditional identity and acted in that sense as ‘a metaphor for Asian modernity’ (Aydın 2007a:224), knowledge of its history and achievements were not evenly distributed but marked by ‘the asymmetries of information gathering’ and ‘variable opportunities’ of access to social networks and new industrial transport and communication infrastructures (Green 2013:417). Even the information that was ‘delivered first hand’ by the Japanese themselves was uneven. Between 1870 and 1900, the Meiji governments dispatched about nine hundred government agents abroad to discover the secrets of what Japanese called ‘*bunmei kaika*’ (civilization and enlightenment) (Pistor-Hatam 1996:120). Of these most went to Europe and the US. Of the remainder, some arrived in the Middle East, presumably to inquire into the ways

⁴⁷ Japan’s ‘skipping of stages’ was noted by its Asian admirers. The Qajar courtier Mahdi Qoli Hedayat, who visited Japan in late 1903 and witnessed the war preparations, noted the rate of progress by making a comparative reference to Japan’s earlier feebleness in the face of Commodore Perry’s ‘a few ships’ in 1853 and how it was ‘now beating drums of war against Russia’ (Cited in Rajabzadeh 1988:152).

they dealt with the European challenge and/or to establish trade relationships. In Iran, these relationships were not strongly built, for ‘Japan seems to have preferred to develop Ottoman contacts’ instead (Haag-Higuchi 1996:73; see also Bieganiec 2007:445; Esenbel 2000; Worringer 2014:101–10).⁴⁸ The handful of Japanese representatives who arrived in the Qajar domains seemed to have returned with much enthusiasm for future contacts.⁴⁹

This unevenness of access found expression in the Iranian case with various mechanisms of mediation with the bulk of information about Japan reaching Iran via places with sizeable Iranian expatriate communities such as Bombay and Istanbul (Green 2013:432; Pistor-Hatam 1996). One important example of this is *Akhtar*, the Persian expatriate newspaper in Istanbul. Established by Muhammad Tahir Tabrizi, an Azeri merchant resident in Istanbul, *Akhtar* published its first issue on 13 January 1876 (Lawrence 2015:33). Initially, the Azeri merchant secured the blessing and the financial support of Naser al-Din Shah thanks primarily to the persuasive efforts of Muhsin Khan al-Mulk, the Qajar ambassador in Istanbul between 1873 and 1891. When the financial support from the Shah ceased, the émigré newspaper secured help from the Sublime Porte, which sharpened its critical attitude towards the Qajars. While its politics became more independent, its source material remained largely dependent on its host country and its connections beyond. *Akhtar* sourced its information on Japan from various European newspapers and the Ottoman journal *Vakit*, though not always with accuracy or depth (Pistor-Hatam 1996:114–15).

Yet, the hype around the Japanese victory in 1905 built up to such proportions that the newspapers carried daily reports of the war, making the Iranian public exceedingly familiar with their Asian brethren. *Hadid* thus reported in its January 15, 1905 issue:

⁴⁸ Yet, this difference should not be overstated. Although each side made numerous overtures towards one another for establishing full diplomatic ties, the relationship remained deadlocked on one thorny issue. Japan insisted on most favoured nation status, hence capitulations like those granted to the Western powers, which to both Abdülhamid II and the Unionist governments did not assent. Full diplomatic relations on equal footing were only established in 1924 with the new Turkish Republic.

⁴⁹ The head of the very first Japanese mission, Yoshida Masaharu lamented the low number of committed reformers within the government. A further cause of disappointment was the insecure position of those who were genuinely seeking reform. Arrived in Tehran in the autumn of 1880, one of Masaharu’s first courtesy calls was to none other than Mirza Hoseyn Khan, then the foreign minister of Naser al-Din Shah. Next day the Shah discharged him.

‘People of Iran do not have access to many newspapers. Reading papers has not grown into a habit. Nevertheless, the Russo-Japanese War attracted the attention of some people who followed its news closely, and such names as Korea, Manchuria, Kuropatkin, and Oyama became their habitual phrases’ (Quoted in Rajabzadeh 1988:88).

Notwithstanding the asymmetrical distribution of and access to information about it, the global impact of the war was momentous. First of all, its crushing victory over the Russian Empire catapulted Japan, above and over the racial barrier, onto the pedestal of world power. This was a feat that could not have been overlooked. The arch-imperialist Lord Curzon put it in no uncertain terms before the House of Lords in 1911: ‘the reverberations of that victory have gone like a thunderclap through the whispering galleries of the East’ (Marks 2005:626). Of those reverberations in Asia, he must have dreaded most those felt in British India (Stolte and Fischer-Tiné 2012:69–71). Lenin’s take was no less grandiose. This was a permanent blow, he observed, inflicted ‘by a progressive Asia against a reactionary Europe’ (Dickinson 2005:524).

The great Indian poet and educator, Rabindranath Tagore, overjoyed by the news of Japanese victory in the Battle of Tsushima, is said to have led his students in a victory march around his school in Santiniketan (Hay 1970:42). His compatriot Mohandas Gandhi, at the time practicing law in South Africa, sensed that ‘the people of the East seem to be waking up from their lethargy’ (Kowner 2007:2). A staff officer in training at the Ottoman Military College, Mustafa Kemal was closely following the war with fascination. The Japanese people were, he noted with all the romanticism he could muster, a ‘warrior nation’ (Gawrych 2013:14; Hanioglu 2011:66).

And the pride felt across the colonised and semi-colonised world was not restricted to literate classes. People from all walks of life were seized by the euphoria. ‘Returning by ship to China [from England] in late 1905, the Chinese nationalist Sun [Yat-Sen] was congratulated by Arab port workers at the Suez Canal who thought that he was Japanese’ (Mishra 2013:2; Jansen 2000:441). In Iran the celebrations irritated the Russian officials so much that the Qajars felt the need to send a mollifying mission to St. Petersburg (Matthee 2012:113; Clark 2002). Years after the war, one of its

celebrated commanders, General Nogi Maresuke, was given a hero's welcome by the masses in Istanbul (Worringer 2014:105).⁵⁰

Perhaps one of the best illustrations of the varied and entangled global impact of the Japanese victory and its 'synthetic and "combined" character' (Rosenberg 2006:326) is a Persian book published in Calcutta: Huseyn Ali Shirazi's *Mikadonama* (The Book of Mikado). Published in 1907, it contained 58 black and white illustrations of battle scenes depicting Japanese victory. These illustrations were adapted from their originals drawn by a Dutch artist. In Nile Green's words:

We are looking at a situation in which a Dutch artist from Amsterdam made illustrations of a war fought in the ports of the far side of Eurasia and sent these images for publication in a London newspaper, which itself circulated as far as Calcutta, where its illustrations were copied by a Bengali artist to be printed in a Persian book intended for export to Persia (2013:434).

But in terms of the ideological formation of nationalism, Japan's spectacular ascent onto great power status galvanised the self-definition of the Ottoman and Qajar elites as Asian. Needless to say, this was increasingly imposed by the racist imperialistic attitudes of Western powers that poured scorn on reform efforts in the non-European world and saw them as 'unsuited for constitutional form of government' (Kurzman 2010:281). In a way, the Japanese model provided the much-needed boost to the self-confidence of elites in the Islamic world, even if the only possible common denominator they could establish with Japan was the highly vague concept of Asia (Haag-Higuchi 1996) – itself a European construction no less (Mitani 2006; Subrahmanyam 2016). In that sense, the Young Turks accurately detected that Japan 'breathed new life into ancient nations of the world such as China and Iran' (Sohrabi 2002:60) as the latter drew – as the Ottomans would do as well – the crucial lesson that states that failed to establish constitutional rule were doomed.

For Islamists the rise of Japan proffered 'an alternative vision of modernity for solving the "Crisis of Islam" in the wake of the Western challenge' (Esenbel 2006:38–39). But

⁵⁰ The Ottoman military plenipotentiary to the Russo-Japanese War, Pertev Bey (Demirhan), was attached to the Third Army under the command of Maresuke (Demirhan 1953:92).

for all its anti-Western symbolism, the Japanese accomplishments drove home one unmistakable fact. No matter how Asian was Japan, its achievements were, in one degree or another, due its successful adaptation to the West (cf. Westney 1987). The implications of this cut across the debates surrounding the globalisation of Western modernity during the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. Was the example of Japanese modernisation appealing because it offered a peculiar and imitable Asian resolution to the question of modernisation or was it appealing because it offered mechanisms through which to import Western modernity? The difference between the two can be subtle but still profound.

In any case, both in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire knowledge on Japan was, in different degrees, secondary to the image. Aided by its geographical remoteness and scarcity of reliable information, ‘the real value of a name like Japan in the debate lies in its rhetorical reduction to the dichotomous presentation of simple oppositions, combined with a set of key words’ (Haag-Higuchi 1996:77) such as progress and backwardness. Thus, whenever its name was raised, it was almost always for comparative purposes with intended didactic effect. The downside was that as an Asian success story, Japan served as an unwelcome reminder for the Ottoman and Qajar reformers of the backwardness of their lands. Mahdi Qoli Hidayat made this comparison with a very familiar trope in the Middle Eastern political literature at the time: Japan, unlike Iran, was not numbed by negligence (*gaflet*) (Quoted in Rajabzadeh 1988:154).

And not everyone drew the same ‘lessons’ from the Japanese model. One implication of the increasing Japanese reputation across the Asian continent was that it posed a threat to the authority and reputation of the Caliph, the spiritual leader of all Muslims. The person who carried the mantle of that position, Sultan Abdülhamid II of the Ottoman Empire harboured ambivalent feelings towards Japan. Surely, he must have marvelled at the fact that the Russian defeat in 1905 allowed him much needed breathing space as much of the Tsarist forces had to be diverted to the eastern edge of the continent. Being not the most secure monarch in the world, as it happens, Abdülhamid had nurtured a keen oversensitivity towards detecting threats to his power. Given that there was ‘so much attention focusing on Japan as a leader of the East [this could] potentially elevat[e] the status of the Meiji Emperor beyond that of the Sultan in his role as Islamic spiritual leader and Caliph of Muslims in Asia’ (Worringer 2014:99).

Moreover, the atrocious record of Japanese imperialism across Asia in the following decades did much to reverse the earlier amazement. Asian memory replaced Tsushima with Nanking, Admiral Togo with Prince Asaka. Yet even then certain degree of its symbolism survived. Some later post-colonial leaders and intellectuals actively shored up the legacy of the Japanese victory in 1905 by weaving it into a narrative of ‘Eastern triumphs.’ This effectively rearranged or even displaced earlier, European points of historical reference for Asian nationalists in the twentieth century. Generations that came of age in the interwar period, seasoned in anti-colonial struggles, and who went on to become leading figures in their postcolonial nation-states, took less inspiration from the French Revolution or the varieties of republicanism in the Americas, but studied closely the culturally associable history of the Battle of Tsushima, the Indian National Congress or the Turkish Independence War (Esenbel 2006:45–46). In this vein, Pransejit Duara identifies the Japanese victory as the event that symbolises the beginning of decolonisation movement, which culminated in the Bandung Conference in 1955 (2004:2–3). In any case, it would perhaps not be a speculation to argue that the animosity towards imperialist Japan wore thin as one moved westward across the Asian continent, towards those parts that did not experience the brunt of Japanese colonialism.

To conclude, Japan’s attraction to the elites of backward and semi-colonial states of the Islamic world should be understood, in the last instance, at the intersection of geopolitics and internal structures of late developing societies. These can be gleaned from two things the Meiji restoration of 1868 ultimately aimed at. The first was to overcome the backwardness of Japan vis-à-vis Western powers, increasingly felt since the arrival of Commodore Perry’s fleet in 1853. The Tokugawa *shogunate*, then ruling Japan, gave in to the military intimidation, and soon assented to the signing of unequal treaties with the United States in 1854 and 1858, which turned out to be only first two of a series of similar treaties with other European powers. These treaties accorded trade privileges to the European merchants and gave legal immunities to European subjects resident in Japan. This was a condition both the Ottoman and Qajar elites also familiar with (Kayaoğlu 2010). Secondly, the Meiji drive for industrialisation, guided towards achieving military parity, retained the traditional outlook of political rule. The Japanese elite, who prevailed from the factional struggle during the final decades of the Tokugawa period, legitimised its radicalism by restoring the figure, though not the

power, of the emperor. In effect, the Meiji oligarchs successfully *combined* an industrialising economy and military organisation, which owed much to variety of European models with traditionalist political symbolism – combined development that very much resembled another successful case of late development: Germany united under the Prussian lead. It is then no coincidence that ‘the Meiji oligarchs...used the Second Reich as their model when they framed an authoritarian constitution and legal code for Japan’ (Anderson 1991:11). As such, Japanese combined development was geopolitically driven and its outcome offered a model that could be absorbed by the traditional-minded Ottoman and Qajar elites in the sense that in general they were not motivated by radical republican ideals. This point resonates specifically with the question of constitutionalism to which we turn in the next section.

5.3 The Entangled Histories of Constitutional Revolutions

What ‘spills over’ from the previous section is a point that is crucial. We should not, as Esenbel does, conflate the ‘international’ and the ‘transnational’ and certainly should not neglect the crucial fact that these transnational connections and influences cannot be detached from the absolutely crucial dynamics of geopolitics of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. It is equally imperative not to reduce the rise of Japan to a matter of high geopolitics and restrict it to a short chapter in the diplomatic history of long nineteenth century. For the consequences that followed from this geopolitical rearrangement had *direct* and *multiple* implications for the domestic politics of the ailing empires of the Middle East. Furthermore, the rise of Japan and its consequences tells us that the content of geopolitics is more far-reaching than conventional realist view of inter-state power struggle. Indeed, the methodological significance of Japan lies not only with its defiance of the West/East binary, but in its informative complication of the putative analytical clarity of the so-called levels of analysis (i.e. the individual, the state and the international). Because these hierarchically conceived analytical levels hide from the view the lateral connections and effects that cuts across and through the boundaries of units.

One such complication introduced by the rise of Japan was its example serving as ‘a desirable progressive regime of constitutionalism in an Asian setting of modernity,

blurring the lines between the East and the West' (Esenbel 2006:45). This more than implicated its influence on the wave of constitutional revolutions that swept across the world in the first decade of the twentieth century, most directly on the Asian instances. This wave included the revolutions in the Tsarist Russia (1905), Qajar Iran (1906), the Ottoman Empire (1908), Portugal (1910), Mexico (1910-11) and China (1911-12). And despite still largely historicised in specific national or regional contexts, the extraordinary and *multilinear* spread of constitutional movements and written constitutions defies any attempt to trace the historical process of diffusion back to a singular point of origin. In this vein, the global spread of constitutions runs in the face of Eurocentric historiography: 'while its early phase coincided with the quickening spread of a mineral-based industrial revolution, at no stage was this constitutional revolution [on the world scale] ever shaped exclusively or even overwhelmingly by developments in Europe' (Colley 2016:161; see also Goderis and Versteeg 2014; Go 2002).

Another key characteristic of constitutionalism at the turn of the century was that it ignited revolutionary fervour in very diverse settings. This diversity alone justifies Nader Sohrabi's point that 'the ideology of constitutionalism could not have emanated from their social structures' separately (1995:1384). This necessitates a historiography that brings forward the significance and density of the connections among the constitutionalist elements in the late developing world, who construed this legal achievement as one of the cornerstones of the advanced world including Japan. It was such an understating that gave urgency to the constitutionalist agitations. The urgency and speed of the diffusion of constitutionalist ideas is indeed attested by the expatriate Qajar community's transmission of the short lived Ottoman constitution: 'when on 23 December 1876 the first Ottoman constitution was proclaimed, *Akhtar*'s readers had access to a Persian translation only six weeks later' (Pistor-Hatam 1996:113). Unlike this expatriate newspaper, published in Istanbul between 1876 to 1896 (Lawrence 2015), newspapers published in the Qajar Empire made no mention of the Ottoman constitution. For as Anja-Pistor Hatam notes, 'apart from a handful of open-minded Persian liberals who wrote about the advantages of constitutional monarchy and even presented their aims to the shah, the question of working out a constitution did not occur in Iran during the 19th century' (1993:145).

Therefore, when we talk about constitutional movements in the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran, the political and geographical designators cannot be used as spatial categories of exclusion, as outer limits of separate and endogenously determined developments. For constitutionalist agitators shared much of the same urban settings and treaded much of the same routes of movement and exile (see, for example, Berberian 2012). One can easily identify the nodes of this geographic trail as Paris, Istanbul and Tabriz where the Young Turks and Iranian constitutionalists came in contact. But the usage of the concept of a wave requires a clear delineation of when to start surfing it historically. Surely, the string of constitutional revolutions that stormed the world from Mexico City to Lisbon, from Beijing to St. Petersburg in the early twentieth century were not evenly relevant or newsworthy for the reformists in the Middle East. It was the Russian Revolution of 1905 that had the most direct influence. It is also important to justly delineate its influence. As Ivar Spector rightly cautions, because the Revolution of 1905 broke out concurrently with the Japanese victory over Russia, there is a tendency to diminish its importance and attribute ‘the subsequent national and constitutional upsurge in Asian countries from Turkey to China’ to the impact of the latter (1962:30). This is counterproductive for several reasons.

First of all, there is a causal effect extending from the Japanese victory against the Tsarist regime at the eastern edge of the Asia to the success of the Russian constitutionalists at the western end of the continent. With a considerable portion of its military muscle dispatched to the Korean peninsula to fight a highly unpopular war, the Tsar’s government could not muster enough power to stem the rising tide of political agitation at home. If this was not the case, John Bushnell argues counterfactually, it was

most likely [that] civil disorders would have been suppressed within a few months. There would almost certainly have been no general strike, quite certainly no October Manifesto, and so nothing like the near-death experience the regime endured after the publication of the October Manifesto. These later events would have been foreclosed because, with a million regulars in hand and prepositioned to suppress revolution, the regime would have dealt with disorders with greater dispatch in the early part of the year, and with no reason to doubt its army’s reliability (2005:348).

Second, the Russian Revolution of 1905 was symbolic for its achievements against autocratic rule, which the Ottoman and Qajar reformers saw as an obstacle to national progress and parity with the West. This of course made Russia's humiliating defeat all the more amplified in the Middle East as for both the reformist Ottomans and the reformist Qajars the Tsarist empire constituted the most alarming threat (Sohrabi 2002:53) and they were quick to highlight that the Japanese victory was a victory of constitutional rule. Indeed, 'Japan's constitution was the secret of its strength' (Mishra 2013:4). In a sense, they envisioned the double defeat of Tsarist authoritarianism as an outcome of constitutionalism both in Japan and in Russia.

Thirdly, the chain reaction of the Japanese victory and the Russian Revolution was then *refracted* through the internal structures of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran. For the semi-colonial monarchies of the Middle East could not genuinely find solace in the fact that a mortal enemy of theirs lost the war, for the political inference from the result was clear as day. Charles Eliot, the British diplomat, reported on the mood of Sultan-Caliph.

When the Sultan's officers congratulated him on the defeat of his old enemy Russia, he replied that he did not by any means consider the result a matter of congratulation, because he and the Czar were the only autocratic monarchs in Europe, and the defeat of the Czar meant a blow to the principle of autocracy (Quoted in Deringil 2011:14)

Within the regional constellation of Western Asia, the Revolution of 1905 was closely followed by and provided inspiration and political guidelines to the constitutional agitators in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire (Yaşar 2014). A member of the British legation in Tehran chronicled the influence:

The Russian Revolution has had a most astounding effect here. Events in Russia have been watched with great attention, and a new spirit would seem to have come over the people. They are tired of their rulers, and, taking the example of Russia, have come to think that it is possible to have another and better form of government (Browne 1910:120).

The Young Turks were to draw similar inspiration. 'If we strive like Russians,' they believed, 'it won't be long before we see even the Sultan's aides-de-camp among our supporters' (Quoted in Sohrabi 2002:59)

It was not that the reformists learned about constitutions in 1905. After all, the Young Turks wanted the restoration of the 1876 constitution that was suspended by Abdülhamid II two years after its promulgation (Mardin 2000:74–78). Both the Ottoman and Qajar reformers had a good grasp of the benefits of constitutions and parliaments through Western sources (Sohrabi 1995). But it was the Revolution of 1905 that 'afforded a practical demonstration to them that a constitution could be won from an autocratic ruler in a country that was still agrarian rather than industrial, and where the masses were both heterogeneous in origin and largely illiterate' (Spector 1962:32). As with Japan of the past, a similar index of commonality could be compiled with Russia: Asian, autocratic, agrarian and backward. Still, notwithstanding its enthralling appeal, Japan, compared to the Tsarist enemy, was inconveniently far and peculiar. Russia, for better or worse, was close and familiar.

What of the influences running across the Ottoman and Qajar domains? Within the broader wave of constitutional revolutions we can also trace the cooperation between the Qajar and Ottoman constitutionalists and 'the construction of shared constitutional narratives.' It is imperative to see that for the Young Turks the Iranian Constitutional Revolution was not some political confusion occurring in a neighbouring country. As Farzin Vejdani notes,

the Iranian constitutional revolution expanded the horizon of possibilities for the Ottoman constitutionalists: just as the Japanese victory over the Russian Empire in 1905 had demonstrated how an Asian nation could defeat a European power, the Iranian revolution demonstrated how constitutionalism could take root in an Islamic nation, thus contributing to a hope among Ottoman constitutionalists that their country was next (2010:319).

Quite crucially, then, from the Young Turk point of view, the Iranian revolution mediated constitutionalism by its associable Islamic quality. The Iranian Constitution did this by *combining* the model of the Belgian constitution with what was called the

Supplementary Fundamental Law. The articles of this law, appended to the draft constitution of 1906 a year later, made it clear that defining quality of the nation was its Shi'i character and provided the legal basis for the establishment of a council of clerics with veto power over the parliament (Afary 2015:53–54).

As we have seen above, an earlier mediation was already provided by the Japanese example of combined development. What the co-religionist Iranians achieved was to refract it through an even more familiar lens of Islam. This was of course no novelty to the Young Turks, since they were successors to a native Ottoman tradition of constitutionalism. That earlier effort was spearheaded by the Young Ottoman intellectuals who 'had indigenized Western constitutionalism by rediscovering the purportedly forgotten constitutional, parliamentary lineage of Islamic politics, and by doing so "invented" an entire constitutional "tradition" for Islam' (Sohrabi 2002:52). But this Islamic mediation had another quality to it. Something that the Young Turks did not inherit from the Young Ottomans in any programmatic sense or form, even if one of the central figures of this earlier movement, Namık Kemal, provided earlier indications of this by his novel use of the concept of *vatan* (homeland) (Lewis 1991:530).

The other important lesson the Young Turks drew from the Iranian Revolution (and the Russian Revolution of 1905) was, against their misgivings, that the masses were capable of political consciousness and action. That the wider revolutionary tide corresponded with the tax rebellions of 1906-1907 in Anatolia emboldened the Young Turks that a mass based uprising was possible. These developments galvanised Turkish nationalism within the Young Turk ranks, which 'progressively defined [Anatolia] as the Turkish "heartland" (*kalb-i vatan*).' They also helped redefine the Turks, who rebelled against the 'tyranny' of the Sultan, as 'the only ethnic group whose loyalty to the integrity of the Ottoman state could not be questioned' (Sohrabi 2002:62). It was at the intersection of external influences and internal developments we could trace the early crystallisation of nationalism among the constitutionalist elite.

Thus, by the time of the constitutional revolutions, the language of nationalism did no longer sound unfamiliar, or, to put it differently, the ideas of Namık Kemal found concrete socio-political correspondence. Moreover, Iranian and Turkish nationalism

both had a distinct internationalist ring to them. When, in the aftermath of the Iranian constitutional revolution, Sultan Abdülhamid sent troops into Iranian province of Azerbaijan with the pretext of clarifying border issues, constitutionalists in either side of the border was quick enough to note that this was not a mere cartographic undertaking. In effect the Sultan, having sensed the shifting sands of politics, made an attempt to halt the potential spread of constitutionalism from Iran to his realm. The Young Turks assured their Iranian compatriots that this aggression was not endorsed by the Ottoman nation (*millet*), hence the Sultan and his government was not representing its will (Vejdani 2010:321).

The crystallising nationalist vision and the messages of solidarity between Iranian and Turkish constitutionalists made constant references to the inevitability of constitutional rule and framed this solidarity in civilizational terms as the mark of anti-imperialist feeling. In a letter to their Iranian counterparts, the expatriate Young Turks Prince Sabahaddin and Ahmed Rıza Bey were confident of the future developments: ‘after the establishment of a constitutional administration in the Ottoman government, the two neighbouring countries can strengthen their friendship and render service to Eastern civilization’ (Vejdani 2010:322). Thus, these transimperial (‘transnational’) influences and connections remained within the orbit of the over-determining fact of geopolitics (‘international’) – that is, determinations that arise from uneven relationships among societies understood in this period largely in civilisational terms. The constitutionalists both in Qajar Iran and the Ottoman Empire never lost sight of the singularly central goal of saving the state and elevating their nations to the rank of the ‘civilised.’

5.4 Transimperial Origins of Nationalism

This section addresses a problem identified in Chapter 1. I argued that critical literature on nationalism, which commendably exposes the fallacy of nationalist claims to antiquity and demonstrates its patent modernity, nevertheless commits an incapacitating epistemological error. Its internalism paradoxically retains theoretically what it seeks to question empirically: the national unit of analysis. One striking manifestation of this is to treat ‘external’ nationalists, the émigré intellectuals from Crimea, Azerbaijan and Central Asia, among others, as unproblematic contributors to the development of

nationalist ideology in the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran. But their ‘empirical value’ in historical analysis cannot be fully captured, if their intellectual trajectories are imagined as unidirectionally flowing into a specific nationalist movement – be that Iranian and Turkish. As our discussion of the constitutional revolutions above show, aligning the intellectual trajectories of these itinerant nationalists with later nation-states, actually leads to a nationally framed historiography. Transnational history seeks to avoid precisely this.

Let me illustrate the messiness of overlapping geographies of the empires in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries with a very representative anecdote.

In December 1908, telegraph reports of the opening of the Ottoman parliament in Istanbul reached Irkutsk, a town in eastern Siberia not far from the Mongolian and Chinese frontiers of the Russian empire. Commenting on the arrival of this news, the famous pan-Islamic thinker and activist Abdurreshid Ibrahim (1857-1944), who was traveling in the region, marveled at the outpouring of enthusiasm among the local Muslim inhabitants. They rejoiced, he recalled, at the restoration of the Ottoman constitution and gathered for prayers and speeches. Although these revelers were, like Ibrahim, subjects of the Russian tsar, they felt a close affinity with ‘all of their Ottoman Muslim brothers.’ They tried to reply with their own telegrams expressing solidarity with the Ottoman constitutionalists, only to be thwarted by the meddling of Russian officials. Still, Ibrahim lauded the emotional ties that linked these Siberian Muslims with their co-religionists in the Ottoman capital: ‘It was as if the wireless telegraph bound their hearts together’ (Crews 2014:35)

As with the example of Abdürreşid İbrahim reporting on the impact of the Young Turk Revolution of 1908, the internal crystallisation of nationalism should be seen at the criss-crossing of several distinct but interpenetrating movements and ideologies that cut across imperial boundaries. The Muslim literary renaissance that included but was not restricted to Jadidism in Central Asia (Khalid 1998), the social democratic and socialist trends that became formidable political forces in the oilfields of Russian Azerbaijan (Suny 1972), constitutional movements that cut across several imperial domains as documented in the previous section, pan-Islamists – like the Volga Tatar Abdürreşid İbrahim just mentioned – who would thread across vast swathes of the continent and

reach as far as Japan to build pan-Asianist connections (Esenbel 2004, 2017; Koyagi 2014; Ryad 2014). Without their own *nation*-states, many nationalist movements became politically matured within and in interaction with movements with ‘transnational’ aims and organisation. In many cases these movements were established by ‘diaspora actors forced to live in many countries and cities far from the homeland of the perceived territory of the nation’ (Esenbel 2004:1143–44).

It is crucial to understand that when we talk about the transimperial origins of nationalism, we are talking truly about, for want of a better word, a ‘transnational’ political vision and action that responded to geopolitical unevenness. In this sense, for example, the politics of constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire was intermixed with pan-Islamism and (pan)Turkic nationalism. The Young Turk journal, *Türk*, which represented the Turkish nationalist faction within the wider reformist movement, appealed to Muslims in the Tsarist empire to be pro-active and side with the forces of change in order not to be politically side-lined following the collapse of autocracy (Yaşar 2014:124).

Additionally, the same period witnessed major population movements caused by wars and political changes. Thus, given the rate of increasing of voluntary and involuntary mobility in this period, the significance of migration cannot be overlooked in the formation of nationalism. As Radhika Mongia notes, ‘certain migrations, at particular moments, come suddenly to provoke the framing of identity in national and nationalist terms...or to produce unforeseen eruptions of fervent nationalist claims’ (2014:204). Russian colonialism had a direct influence on the historical sequence of the emergence of nationalism in Central Asia and Azerbaijan then Qajar Iran. According to Mangol Bayat the intellectual life of northern Azerbaijan, under the Russian rule, was a generation ahead of their Iranian brethren (1991:80).

Perhaps no other ‘society’ represents the non-national sources of nationalism more than Azerbaijanis. Historically a diasporic people, much like their neighbouring Armenians, Azerbaijanis were active in all of the prominent events of the-turn-of-the-century. It was the Azerbaijani merchants and intellectuals in Istanbul as we saw in the previous chapter who acted as not only the enlightened messengers of modernity in their

oppositional newspaper like *Akhtar*, but also as financial sponsors of the constitutionalist cause in Iran (Zarinebaf 1993).⁵¹

The same Azerbaijanis, though their ancestral land was divided by state borders not of their own, migrated for work to northern Azerbaijan in the Russian Empire as labourers in oilfields and established ‘a red corridor across the Russo-Persian frontier’ (Yolaçan 2017:17) which relayed subversive ideas of socialism and constitutionalism first into Iranian Azerbaijan and then into Iran proper. Wealthy Azerbaijani families who traditionally sent their scions to the esteemed seminaries of Isfahan, Mashad, Qum or Najaf for religious training were noticing a disturbing trend. Now that Azerbaijan was split between two imperial realms, especially those young Azerbaijanis who ended up growing up in the Tsarist part of their country were showing a growing interest towards Western learning. This newfound fervour diverted their path, in the first instance, towards the schools in Tbilisi, the intellectual and political hub of the Russian Caucasus. In these schools, ‘the young Azerbaijanis, though small in numbers, would rub shoulders with a cosmopolitan crowd of Armenians, Georgians, and Russians, whose own intellectual networks extended to Europe via Istanbul and St. Petersburg’ (Yolaçan 2017:96).

And that familiarity found expression via a very crucial ‘agent’ in the history of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms and reformisms: the Russian Muslims of Central Asia and Caucasia. This is another key element for appreciating the significance of the Revolution of 1905. The experience of the Revolution of 1905 was one of the transnational interfaces *across* which the intellectual and practical foundations of Iranian and Turkish nationalisms were conceived. ‘The Russian Revolution of 1905 was as much a revolution of non-Russians against Russification,’ noted Hugh-Seton Watson, ‘as it was a revolution of workers, peasants and radical intellectuals against autocracy’ (1977:87). It was only ‘with the outbreak of the Russian Revolution in 1905,’ notes Mangol Bayat, that ‘national consciousness emerged as a viable force in the nascent political life of the urban Moslem bourgeoisie [in Russia]’ (1991:78). And it was the

⁵¹ Expressed in his characteristically over-combative idiom, Hamid Dabashi nevertheless makes a compelling point: ‘Those who have been pushing an entirely Eurocentric set of “modernization” theories that kept generations of American political scientists in business will find it a nightmare trying to account for Azerbaijan as the principal site of progressive ideas and liberating monuments in the region’ (2007:95).

members of this bourgeoisie, politically seasoned in their reaction to pan-Slavism and influenced by various Muslim reformism movements, who came to form the intellectual backbone of Iranian and Turkish nationalism initially (Uzer 2016:3). Besides the better-known cultural hubs of reform like Istanbul, Bombay and Cairo, it was in another ‘trans-imperial space,’ in Iranian Azerbaijan new-fangled or reformed ideologies of Iranian nationalism, pan-Turkism, socialism and pan-Islamism breathed life into new political visions.

5.5 Conclusion

The problem that inspired this chapter was introduced earlier in Chapter 1. It was that the general tendency among the historians of the Middle East remains a narrative history of nationalism drawn within the analytical boundaries of the nation-state. And for all their critical spirit, social constructivist analyses of nationalism continues to fall into the territorial trap (Agnew 1994). Later in Chapter 2 we saw that one eminent historian of nationalism, John Breuilly, pointed out this problem not only for the historical work on nationalism in general but for his earlier work as well. His proposed solution was to utilise the historiographical opening provided by the global or transnational history (2011). In our case, the paradoxical national framing of nationalism had led a treatment of the contribution of *émigré* intellectuals as an uncomplicated empirical matter. Neither the departure nor the arrival points of the migratory process is questioned. Nor is the fact of migration itself. It remained at best a noteworthy point to be raised that original nationalists were not actually nationals of the national community. My wording is intentionally circular here, so as to demonstrate circularity of the critical literature.

Actually, the ‘travelling itinerary’ of ideas matters. Turkish and Iranian nationalisms were born out of transimperial processes of ideational cross-fertilisation and political action. And arranging historical material in this way supplies us with what Mustafa Tuna edifyingly phrased as ‘an informed recognition of the complexity of imperial situations’ (2015:2). It would be a great disservice to history to try to undo these entanglements and analytically force transimperial complexities into distinctly coloured ‘national’ boundaries, even in the name of denaturalising nations.

This is the main reason why this chapter makes use of historical works with consciously transnational or transimperial focus – be that in the interactive paths of Japanese influence, the constitutional revolutions of the early twentieth century or pan-Islamic movements across Eurasia – is that they show us how influences among societies of the late developing world, previously conceived as bounded units, are consequential and non-negligible paths and channels of political action and inspiration. No longer we can write, for example, the histories of constitutional revolutions as separate instances of national modernisations, crucial, if not unavoidable, steps out of ailing pre-modern empires.

In that sense, the promises of a cross-fertilisation between U&CD and transnational history, or more inclusively with historical sociology and transnational history, is one currently under discussion with calls from both sides for a more fruitful engagement (Delanty 2016; Zimmerman 2017). According to one practitioner of transnational history, historical sociology can provide the tools to address the analytical deficit and ‘mobility bias’ in transnational history (Osterhammel 2016). The way in which this is attempted here, that is the way in which U&CD relates to transnational history can be explicated on one important count.

That is the distinction that should be drawn, and which is often overlooked, between the international and the transnational. The former concept denotes the relationship between states and refers to the causal consequences of unevenness as discussed in Chapter 3. The transnational connections and circulations of actors and ideas were attentive to the power differentials that obtained at this domain. Transnational history can at times conflate these two domains, as in the case of Selcuk Esenbel above. But there are also instances where this distinction is put to a better use. For example, Cemil Aydin’s important work on anti-Westernism in Asia in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries does a great job in relating the changing discourse and politics of transnational anti-Westernist movements such as pan-Asianism and pan-Islamism to the changing geopolitical setting – especially with regards to policies of European powers towards the late developing world (2007b).

Conclusion

The central problem this thesis tried to tackle was the problem of internalism that in its various forms has influenced the study of nationalism. In Chapter 1, I tried to demonstrate that nationalist historiographies commits to internalist fallacy by positing the perennial existence of the nation that does not require any historical explanation. The problem of internalism is also visible in critical histories of nationalism to the extent that they fall short of problematising inside/outside distinction. In Chapter 2, another variant of the same problem is discussed. But this time internal and endogenous development was that of Western Europe, from which the theories of nationalism draw their causal arguments. But the ‘causal relationship’ between modernity as the social and historical basis of the emergence of nationalism is ‘reversed’ in late developing world. From the start, late nationalisms have been burdened with the mission of modernising what they regarded as their nations reshuffling of the conditions of emergence and the consequences (or aspirations) of nationalism.

Uneven and combined development, I argued, provides a solution to this disconnection between theory and history by theoretically integrating the inter-societal dimension of social existence as a constitutive dimension of the internal structures of societies. This theoretical opening allowed me to conceptualise late nationalism as politics of comparison, which made possible to subsume into that concept not only the geopolitical dimension of late nationalism, but also its strategic transimperial origins. With this move, the emergence of nationalism in the late development is no longer a sociological question without an answer, as Reşat Kasaba provocatively reasoned. ‘Of all the ways in which people in the Ottoman Empire could think of themselves,’ he noted, ‘nationality would seem to make the least sense’ (2006:199). This could very well have been the case if the people of the Ottoman Empire and Qajar Iran were not part of extensive relations and connections of an uneven world. Nationalism was not so much of a choice, but an apt way to respond to necessities of an uneven world. There is nothing inherently paradoxical about late nationalisms. It is their temporal belatedness and the historically uneven conditions within which they emerged and to which they responded that escape our attention if we insist on internalist explanation.

There are further potentials in the use of U&CD. First, there is no real historical basis to treat the West as a uniform source of influence and pressure as it developed unevenly itself. This is evident, and can be exemplified historically, by the rise of Germany to a major power status. The German example became influential during the early decades of twentieth century in Qajar Iran and in the Ottoman Empire. It functioned not only as a geopolitical option to avert pressures from the British and Russian Empires by alliance politics, but also as a source of intellectual influence for modernisation, which was itself the result of uneven and combined development. The German contribution to mediated modernisation is often overlooked or submerged under the ‘higher story’ of geopolitics.

The relatively understudied ‘field’ of South-South connections, or what I here called Eastern Connections, can generate novel insights in combined development and mediated modernisation. This aspect of modern history is still largely overshadowed by the centrality of the West, to some degree understandably so I argued more than once throughout the thesis. But mediations within the South (of European ‘imports’) can yield new perspectives. At a minimum, it can put some distance between the histories of late developing societies and overwrought formulations of West-East hybrids, synthesis or combinations. The strategic dimension of political comparison was far richer than simplistic toggling between universal and particular, the West and the East.

Probably the single most important conclusion that should be drawn from the argument and solution presented here is that the problems of internalism and Eurocentrism are intimately related, but they still require distinct efforts. A sole assault on Eurocentrism, as it has been carried impressively by postcolonial theory, is not enough to expunge the problem of internalism. Without a simultaneous and integrated critique of internalism, we would always fall short of an alternative theorisation of the universal (Matin 2013b).

In so far as the relationship of U&CD to the history of late developing societies is concerned, two concluding passages are in order. They shall clarify my engagement in this thesis with two types of history writing: comparative and transnational. As the guiding problematic of the thesis also necessitates this: what is the relationship between theory and history.

But it must be added that these criticisms are in no way intended to dismiss the cognitive significance of comparison for historical research. As another critic puts it, ‘comparison is central, even indispensable, to any historical analysis’ (Mongia 2007:385). But its long-term association with Eurocentrism taints its own history and normative problems this introduces into historical analysis cannot be swept under the rug. The way in which I tried to ‘redeem’ comparison was to move away from comparison based on bounded units to comparison as a subjective category of actors.

What did this change in the status of comparison add to the study of late nationalism? Primarily, it releases the history of late nationalism from its dyadic analysis pegged to the West-East distinction. Politics of comparison and mediated modernisation, two mid-range concepts employed here, make it possible to integrate diverse orientations and visions of nationalist movements and individuals into the kernel of the theory. The study of late nationalism is no more an effort to adjudicate between whether late nationalism is an imitation from a European original or a native disposition – and how they are ‘mixed.’ Even more, can we compare to what degree one late developing society succeed in its mastery over that mixing in comparison to others (see, for example, Keyman and Yilmaz 2006). When we change comparison as a Eurocentric measuring device to an actual category of practice, we see that late nationalism has many and changing sources to aspire for. This variety is what is empirically provided to us by transnational history.

The relationship between U&CD and transnational history, unlike the one with comparative history, is phrased in much more diplomatic and amicable terms here. This could not have been in any other way. For U&CD and transnational history shares much of the same sentiments towards internalism and Eurocentrism. Their corrective impulses clearly demonstrate similar orientations, if by different analytical routes to achieve them. But such is no barrier to their co-operation, as it was stated several times over throughout the thesis.

It is, after all, through its use of the findings of transnational history, referred to mainly in Chapter 5, this thesis valorises that much overlooked argument of Leon Trotsky: ‘the unevenness is itself uneven.’ By sharing the same suspicion towards Eurocentrism,

U&CD and transnational history elevates Eastern connections to their warranted historical standing. They align on the argument that there is a history of international relations of the non-European world (broadly understood) on its own terms, though not disconnected from developments in Europe.

With a well-placed attention to transnational circulation of people and ideas, the study of late nationalism can be released from its national-boundedness – a paradoxical and quite possible unintended problem that besets even the critical accounts. But there are ample opportunities to push the horizons of cooperation between U&CD and transnational history further. To cite one example, except for the odd account, the historiography of the interwar period in Iran and Turkey is exclusively studies in hyper-national terms. There is no denying that this period seems to be a hard case for transnational inquiry as it was indeed a time when newly forged nation-states became increasingly inward-looking, not least by the geopolitical conjuncture of the time. But this did not mean that national history was all there was to them (see, for example, Houston 2014).

And one final point needs to be made. The thesis made occasional references to a seemingly elusive concept: semi-colonial. Due to its tangential nature to the overall argument, it is left underdeveloped. This reflects also the treatment of the concept in the historical literature on Ottoman Empire and Qajar Empire. The concept receives the occasional and fleeting references, but so far – and to my knowledge – it has not been discussed extensively. The only extended discussion remains to be the one offered by Jürgen Osterhammel more than thirty years ago for the Chinese context (1986). With its suggestive qualities and little ink spilt so far for its elucidation, the concept of the semi-colonial suggests a potential avenue of research – especially in its usability as a comparative concept that can be applied to a handful of non-European societies that escaped direct colonisation.

Bibliography

- Abbott, Andrew. 1995. "Things of Boundaries." *Social Research* 62(4):857–82.
- Abdel-Malek, Anouar. 1963. "Orientalism in Crisis." *Diogenes* 11(44):103–40.
- Abou-El-Haj, Rifa'at. 1969. "The Formal Closure of the Ottoman Frontier in Europe: 1699-1703." *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 89(3):467–75.
- Abrahamian, Ervand. 1982. *Iran Between Two Revolutions*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Adamiyat, Fereydoun. 1949. "The Diplomatic Relations of Persia with Britain, Turkey and Russia, 1815-1830." PhD Thesis, University of London, London.
- Adams, Julia, Elisabeth S. Clemens, and Ann Shola Orloff. 2005. "Introduction: Social Theory, Modernity, and the Three Waves of Historical Sociology." in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, edited by J. Adams, E. S. Clemens, and A. S. Orloff. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Afary, Janet. 2015. "The Place of Shi'i Clerics in the First Iranian Constitution." in *Iran in the Middle East: Transnational Encounters and Social History*, edited by H. E. Chehabi, P. Jafari, and M. Jafroudi. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Agathangelou, Anna M. and L. H. M. Ling. 2004. "The House of IR: From Family Power Politics to the Poisies of Worldism." *International Studies Review* 6(4):21–49.
- Aghaie, Kamran Scot and Afshin Marashi, eds. 2014. *Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Agnew, John A. 1994. "The Territorial Trap: The Geographical Assumptions of International Relations Theory." *Review of International Political Economy* 1(1):53–80.
- Ahmad, Refat Sayed. 2014. "Religion and the State in Turkey and Iran: A Comparative Overview." *Contemporary Arab Affairs* 7(1):36–53.
- Ahmadi, Hamid. 2005. "Unity within Diversity: Foundations and Dynamics of National Identity in Iran." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 14(1):127–47.
- Akkoyunlu, Feyzi Karabekir. 2014. "The Rise and Fall of the Hybrid Regime: Guardianship and Democracy in Iran and Turkey." PhD Thesis, LSE, London.
- Aksan, Virginia H. 2014. "What's Up in Ottoman Studies?" *Journal of the Ottoman and Turkish Studies Association* 1(1–2).
- Akyeampong, Emmanuel, Caroline Arni, Pamela Kyle Crossley, Mark Hewitson, and William H. Sewell Jr. 2015. "AHR Conversation: Explaining Historical Change;

- or, The Lost History of Causes.” *The American Historical Review* 120(4):1369–1423.
- Alatas, Syed Farid. 1993. “The Asiatic Mode of Production and the Formative Turkic and Iranian States in Modern Times.” *Central Asian Survey* 12(4):473–96.
- Alexander, Jeffrey. 1994. “Modern, Anti, Post and Neo: How Social Theories Have Tried to Understand the ‘New World’ of ‘Our Time.’” *Zeitschrift Für Soziologie* 23(3):165–97.
- Algar, Hamid. 1973. *Mīrzā Malkum Khān: A Study in the History of Iranian Modernism*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Algar, Hamid. 1980. *Religion and State in Iran, 1785-1906: The Role of the Ulama in the Qajar Period*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Ali, Tariq. 2015. “Benedict Anderson 1936-2015.” *Verso Books*. Retrieved December 15, 2015 (<http://www.versobooks.com/blogs/2393-benedict-anderson-1936-2015>).
- Allinson, Jamie C. and Alexander Anievas. 2009. “The Uses and Misuses of Uneven and Combined Development: An Anatomy of a Concept.” *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22(1):47–67.
- Amanat, Abbas. 2008. *Pivot of the Universe: Nasir Al-Din Shah Qajar and the Iranian Monarchy*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Amanat, Abbas. 2012. “Iranian Identity Boundaries: A Historical Overview.” in *Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective*, edited by A. Amanat and F. Vejdani. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Amanat, Abbas. 2017. *Iran: A Modern History*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.
- Anderson, Benedict. 1998. *The Spectre of Comparisons: Nationalism, Southeast Asia and the World*. London: Verso.
- Anderson, Benedict. 2006. *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism*. Third Edition. London: Verso.
- Anderson, James. 1986. “On Theories of Nationalism and the Size of States.” *Antipode* 18(2):218–32.
- Anderson, Kevin. 2010. *Marx at the Margins: On Nationalism, Ethnicity, and Non-Western Societies*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Anderson, Lisa. 1990. “Policy-Making and Theory Building: American Political Science and the Islamic Middle East.” in *Theory, Politics and the Arab World: Critical Responses*, edited by H. Sharabi. London: Routledge.
- Anderson, Lisa. 1999. “Politics in the Middle East: Opportunities and Limits in the Quest for Theory.” in *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for*

Understanding Middle East Politics, edited by M. Tessler, J. Nachtwey, and A. Banda. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Anderson, Perry. 1991. "The Prussia of the East?" *Boundary 2* 18(3):11–19.

Anderson, Perry. 1992. "Science, Politics, Enchantment." in *Transition to Modernity: Essays on Power, Wealth, and Belief*, edited by J. A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Anievas, Alexander and Kamran Matin, eds. 2016a. *Historical Sociology and World History: Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée*. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Anievas, Alexander and Kamran Matin. 2016b. "Introduction: Historical Sociology, World History and the 'Problematic of the International.'" in *Historical Sociology and World History: Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée*, edited by A. Anievas and K. Matin. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Anievas, Alexander and Kamran Matin. 2016c. "Rethinking Historical Sociology and World History: Beyond the Eurocentric Gaze." in *Historical Sociology and World History: Uneven and Combined Development over the Longue Durée*, edited by A. Anievas and K. Matin. London: Rowman & Littlefield.

Anievas, Alexander and Kerem Nişancıoğlu. 2015. *How the West Came to Rule: The Geopolitical Origins of Capitalism*. London: Pluto Press.

Ansari, Ali M. 2012. *The Politics of Nationalism in Modern Iran*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

Ansari, Ali M. 2015. "Iran without the Iranians: The Troubled History of Iranian Nationalism." *Bustan: The Middle East Book Review* 6(1–2):70–79.

Ansari, Ali M. 2017. "Iranian Nationalism and the Question of Race." in *Constructing Nationalism in Iran: From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic*, edited by M. Litvak. London: Routledge.

Arai, Masami. 1994. *Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği*. Istanbul: İletişim.

Araujo, Christopher. 2017. "On the Misappropriation of Marx's Late Writings on Russia: A Critique of Marx at the Margins." *Science & Society* 82(1):67–93.

Arjmand, Reza. 2008. *Inscription on Stone: Islam, State and Education in Iran and Turkey*. Stockholm: Stockholm University.

Arjomand, Saïd Amir. 2011. "Letter: What Happened to the 'Comparative' in Comparative and Historical Sociology?" *Trajectories: Newsletter of the ASA Comparative and Historical Sociology Section* 22(2):34–36.

Armstrong, John A. 1982. *Nations before Nationalism*. Chapel Hill, NC: University of North Carolina Press.

- Arnason, Johann P. 2006. "Nations and Nationalisms: Between General Theory and Comparative History." in *The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, edited by G. Delanty and K. Kumar. London: SAGE.
- Ashman, Sam. 2009. "Capitalism, Uneven and Combined Development and the Transhistoric." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22(1):29–46.
- Ashraf, Ahmad. 1993. "The Crisis of National and Ethnic Identities in Contemporary Iran." *Iranian Studies* 26(1–2):159–64.
- Atabaki, Touraj. 2003. *Beyond Essentialism: Who Writes Whose Past in the Middle East and Central Asia?* Amsterdam: Aksant.
- Atabaki, Touraj. 2007. "Time, Labour-Discipline and Modernization in Turkey and Iran: Some Comparative Remarks." in *The State and the Subaltern: Modernisation, Society and the State in Turkey and Iran.*, edited by T. Atabaki. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Atabaki, Touraj. 2010. "Constitutionalists Sans Frontieres: Iranian Constitutionalism and Its Asian Connections." in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, edited by H. E. Chehabi and V. Martin. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Atabaki, Touraj and Erik J. Zürcher, eds. 2004. *Men of Order: Authoritarian Modernization under Atatürk and Reza Shah*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Ateş, Sabri. 2013. *The Ottoman-Iranian Borderlands: Making a Boundary, 1843-1914*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Axworthy, Michael, ed. 2018a. *Crisis, Collapse, Militarism and Civil War: The History and Historiography of 18th Century Iran*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Axworthy, Michael. 2018b. "The Awkwardness of Nader Shah: History, Military History, and the Eighteenth-Century Iran." in *Crisis, Collapse, Militarism and Civil War: The History and Historiography of 18th Century Iran*, edited by M. Axworthy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Aya, Rod. 2006. "Theory, Fact, and Logic." in *The Oxford Handbook of Contextual Political Analysis*, edited by R. E. Goodin and C. Tilly. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Aydın, Cemil. 2007a. "A Global Anti-Western Moment? The Russo-Japanese War, Decolonization, and Asian Modernity." in *Competing Visions of World Order: Global Moments and Movements, 1880s-1930s*, edited by S. Conrad and D. Sachsenmaier. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Aydın, Cemil. 2007b. *The Politics of Anti-Westernism in Asia: Visions of World Order in Pan-Islamic and Pan-Asian Thought*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Aymes, Marc. 2013. "Many a Standard at a Time: The Ottomans' Leverage with Imperial Studies." *Contributions to the History of Concepts* 8(1).

- Baghoolizadeh, Beeta. 2012. "From Fellows to Foreigners: The Qajar Experience in the Ottoman Empire." Master's Thesis, The University of Texas, Austin, TX.
- Balaghi, Shiva. 2008. "Nationalism and Cultural Production in Iran, 1848-1906." PhD Thesis, University of Michigan, Ann Arbor, MI.
- Baldwin, Peter. 2004. "Comparing and Generalizing: Why All History Is Comparative, Yet No History Is Sociology." in *Comparison and History: Europe in Cross-National Perspective*, edited by D. Cohen and M. O'Connor. London: Routledge.
- Balibar, Etienne. 1991. "The Nation Form: History and Ideology." in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein. London: Verso.
- Ballantyne, Tony. 2003. "Rereading the Archive and Opening up the Nation State: Colonial Knowledge in South Asia (and Beyond)." in *After the Imperial Turn: Thinking with and through the Nation*, edited by A. Burton. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Barker, Colin. 2006. "Beyond Trotsky: Extending Combined and Uneven Development." in *100 Years of Permanent Revolution: Results and Prospects*, edited by B. Dunn and H. K. Radice. London: Pluto Press.
- Barzegar, Ali. 1987. "Mehdi Qoli Hedayat: A Conservative of the Late Qajar Era." *Iranian Studies* 20(1):55–76.
- Bates, Robert H. 1996. "Letter from the President: Area Studies and the Discipline." *Newsletter of the APSA Organized Section in Comparative Politics* 7(1).
- Bates, Robert H. 1997a. "Area Studies and Political Science: Rupture and Possible Synthesis." *Africa Today* 44(2):123–31.
- Bates, Robert H. 1997b. "Area Studies and the Discipline: A Useful Controversy?" *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30(2):166–69.
- Bayar, Yeşim. 2014. *Formation of the Turkish Nation-State, 1920-1938*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Bayat, Mangol. 1991. *Iran's First Revolution: Shi'ism and the Constitutional Revolution of 1905-1909*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Bayly, C. A. 2004. *The Birth of the Modern World, 1780-1914: Global Connections and Comparisons*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Bayly, C. A. et al. 2006. "AHR Conversation: On Transnational History." *The American Historical Review* 111(5):1441–64.
- Beasley, W. G. 1999. *The Japanese Experience: A Short History of Japan*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson.

- Behar, Moshe. 2005. "Do Comparative and Regional Studies of Nationalism Intersect?" *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 37(4):587–612.
- Beinin, Joel. 2003. "Middle East Studies After September 11, 2001." *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 37(1):2–18.
- Benner, Erica. 1995. *Really Existing Nationalisms: A Post-Communist View from Marx and Engels*. Oxford, UK: Clarendon Press.
- Berberian, Hourii. 2012. "Connected Revolutions: Armenians and the Russian, Ottoman, and Iranian Revolutions in the Early Twentieth Century." in *"L'ivresse de la Liberté": La Révolution de 1908 dans l'Empire Ottoman*, edited by F. Georgeon. Paris: Peeters.
- Berktaş, Halil. 1990. "The 'Other' Feudalism: A Critique of 20th Century Turkish Historiography and Its Particularisation of Ottoman Society." PhD Thesis, The University of Birmingham, Birmingham.
- Berman, Marshall. 1988. *All That Is Solid Melts Into Air: The Experience of Modernity*. London: Penguin.
- Bhabha, Homi K., ed. 1990. *Nation and Narration*. London: Routledge.
- Bieganiec, Rina. 2007. "Distant Echoes: The Reflection of the War in the Middle East." in *Rethinking the Russo-Japanese War, 1904 -05 (Volume 1: Centennial Perspectives)*, edited by R. Kowner. Folkestone, UK: Global Oriental.
- Bilgin, Pinar. 2006. "What Future for Middle Eastern Studies?" *Futures* 38(5):575–85.
- Bloch, Marc. 1967. "A Contribution towards a Comparative History of European Societies." in *Land and Work in Medieval Europe*. London: Routledge & Kegan Paul.
- Bonakdarian, Mansour. 2015. "Iranian Nationalism and Global Solidarity Networks 1906–18: Internationalism, Transnationalism, Globalization, and Nationalist Cosmopolitanism." in *Iran in the Middle East: Transnational Encounters and Social History*, edited by H. E. Chehabi, P. Jafari, and M. Jafroudi. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Bora, Tanıl. 2003. "Nationalist Discourses in Turkey." *The South Atlantic Quarterly* 102(2):433–51.
- Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. 1996. *Iranian Intellectuals and the West: The Tormented Triumph of Nativism*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Boroujerdi, Mehrzad. 1998. "Contesting Nationalist Constructions of Iranian Identity." *Critique: Critical Middle Eastern Studies* 7(12):43–55.
- Breuilly, John. 1993. *Nationalism and the State*. Second Edition. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

- Breuilly, John. 1996a. "Approaches to Nationalism." in *Mapping the Nation*, edited by G. Balakrishnan. London: Verso.
- Breuilly, John. 1996b. "Reflections on Nationalism." in *Nationalism in Europe, from 1815 to the Present: A Reader*, edited by S. Woolf. London: Routledge.
- Breuilly, John. 2000. "Nationalism and the History of Ideas." in *Proceedings of the British Academy (Volume 105: 1999 Lectures and Memoirs)*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Breuilly, John. 2005. "Dating the Nation: How Old Is an Old Nation?" in *When is the Nation?: Towards an Understanding of Theories of Nationalism*, edited by A. Ichijo and G. Uzelac. London: Routledge.
- Breuilly, John. 2006. "Introduction." in *Nations and Nationalism*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Breuilly, John. 2011. "Nationalism as Global History." in *Nationalism and Globalisation: Conflicting or Complementary?*, edited by D. Halikiopoulou and S. Vasilopoulou. London: Routledge.
- Breuilly, John et al. 2016. "Benedict Anderson's Imagined Communities: A Symposium." *Nations and Nationalism* 22(4):625–59.
- Bromley, Simon. 1993. *Rethinking Middle East Politics: State Formation and Development*. Cambridge, UK: Polity Press.
- Brophy, Susan Dianne. 2018. "The Explanatory Value of the Theory of Uneven and Combined Development." *Historical Materialism*. Retrieved (<http://www.historicalmaterialism.org/blog/explanatory-value-theory-uneven-and-combined-development>).
- Brown, Heather A. 2010. "Multilinearism, Contingency, and Resistance: Reevaluating Marx on Historical Development in Precapitalist Societies." *New Political Science* 32(3):345–66.
- Browne, Edward G. 1910. *The Persian Revolution of 1905-1909*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Bulliet, Richard W. 2004. *The Case for Islamo-Christian Civilization*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Burawoy, Michael. 1989. "Two Methods in Search of Science: Skocpol versus Trotsky." *Theory and Society* 18(6):759–805.
- Burbank, Jane and Frederick Cooper. 2010. *Empires in World History: Power and the Politics of Difference*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Burke, Peter. 1993. *History and Social Theory*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Burke, Peter. 2016. "Comparative History and Comparative Sociology." *Serendipities* 1(1):82–88.

- Bushnell, John. 2005. "The Specter of Mutinous Reserves: How the War Produced the October Manifesto." in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, edited by J. W. Steinberg, B. W. Menning, D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. Wolff, and S. Yokote. Leiden: Brill.
- Çağaptay, Soner. 2006. *Islam, Secularism, and Nationalism in Modern Turkey: Who Is a Turk?* London: Routledge.
- Calhoun, Craig. 1997. *Nationalism*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Callinicos, Alex and Justin Rosenberg. 2008. "Uneven and Combined Development: The Social-Relational Substratum of 'the International'? An Exchange of Letters." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 21(1):77–112.
- Canefe, Nergis. 2002. "Turkish Nationalism and Ethno-Symbolic Analysis: The Rules of Exception." *Nations and Nationalism* 8(2):133–155.
- Casale, Giancarlo. 2007. "The Ethnic Composition of Ottoman Ship Crews and the 'Rumi Challenge' to Portuguese Identity." *Medieval Encounters* 13(1):122–44.
- Castro-Klarén, Sara and John Charles Chasteen, eds. 2003. *Beyond Imagined Communities: Reading and Writing the Nation in Nineteenth-Century Latin America*. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Chakrabarty, Dipesh. 2011. "The Muddle of Modernity." *The American Historical Review* 116(3):663–75.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1991. "Whose Imagined Community?" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 20(3):521–25.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993a. *Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse*. Second Edition. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1993b. *The Nation and Its Fragments: Colonial and Postcolonial Histories*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 1999. "Anderson's Utopia." *Diacritics* 29(4):128–34.
- Chatterjee, Partha. 2003. "The Nation in Heterogeneous Time." in *Nationalism and its Futures*, edited by U. Özkırımlı. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Cheah, Pheng. 2008. "Universal Areas: Asian Studies in a World of Motion." in *The Post-Colonial and the Global*, edited by R. Krishnaswamy and J. C. Hawley. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
- Chelkowski, Peter. 2001. "The Iranian Colony in Istanbul: Some Aspects of Its Influence on the Homeland's Culture and Politics." in *Cultural Horizons (Volume 1: Festschrift in Honor of Talat S. Halman)*, edited by J. L. Warner. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Çiçek, Nazan. 2010. *The Young Ottomans: Turkish Critics of the Eastern Question in the Late Nineteenth Century*. London: Tauris Academic Studies.

- Ciddi, Sinan and Paul T. Levin. 2014. "Interdisciplinarity and Comparison in Turkish Studies." *Turkish Studies* 15(4):557–70.
- Clark, James. 2002. "Abd-Allah Mostawfi in Russia, 1904-1909." in *Society and Culture in Qajar Iran: Studies in Honor of Hafez Farmayan*, edited by E. L. Daniel. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers.
- Cocks, Joan. 2002. *Passion and Paradox: Intellectuals Confront the National Question*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cole, Juan R. I. 1996. "Marking Boundaries, Marking Time: The Iranian Past and the Construction of the Self by Qajar Thinkers." *Iranian Studies* 29(1–2):35–56.
- Colley, Linda. 2016. "Writing Constitutions and Writing World History." in *The Prospect of Global History*, edited by J. Belich, J. Darwin, M. Frenz, and C. Wickham. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Comaroff, John L. and Paul C. Stern. 1995. "New Perspectives on Nationalism and War." in *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, edited by J. L. Comaroff and P. C. Stern. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach.
- Conrad, Sebastian. 2016. *What Is Global History?* Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Cooper, Frederick. 2005. *Colonialism in Question: Theory, Knowledge, History*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Cooper, Luke. 2015. "The International Relations of the 'Imagined Community': Explaining the Late Nineteenth-Century Genesis of the Chinese Nation." *Review of International Studies* 41(3):477–501.
- Costa Lopez, Julia et al. 2018. "Forum: In the Beginning There Was No Word (for It): Terms, Concepts, and Early Sovereignty." *International Studies Review* 20(3):489–519.
- Cottam, Richard W. 1979. *Nationalism in Iran*. Second Edition. Pittsburgh: University of Pittsburgh Press.
- Crews, Robert D. 2014. "The Russian Worlds of Islam." in *Islam and the European Empires*, edited by D. Motadel. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Cronin, Stephanie. 2008. "Importing Modernity: European Military Missions to Qajar Iran." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 50(1):197–226.
- Cumings, Bruce. 1997. "Boundary Displacement: Area Studies and International Studies during and after the Cold War." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 29(1):6–26.
- Curzon, George N. 1892. *Persia and the Persian Question (Volume 1)*. London: Longmans, Green and Co.

- Czwaro, Monica. 2006. "Misjudging Islamic Terrorism: The Academic Community's Failure to Predict 9/11." *Studies in Conflict & Terrorism* 29(7):657–78.
- Dabashi, Hamid. 2007. *Iran: A People Interrupted*. New York: The New Press.
- Dale, Stephen Frederic. 2010. *The Muslim Empires of the Ottomans, Safavids, and Mughals*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Davidson, Lawrence. 2008. "The Attack on Middle East Studies: A Historical Perspective." *Middle East Policy* 15(1):149–60.
- Davidson, Neil. 2009. "Putting the Nation Back into 'the International.'" *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 22(1):9–28.
- Davidson, Neil. 2018. "The 'Law' of Uneven and Combined Development: Part 1." *East Central Europe* 45(1):13–38.
- Davison, Roderic H. 1986. "Nationalism as an Ottoman Problem and the Ottoman Response." in *Nationalism in a Non-national State: Dissolution of the Ottoman Empire*, edited by W. W. Haddad and W. Ochsenswald. Columbus, OH: Ohio State University Press.
- Delanty, Gerard. 2016. "A Transnational World? The Implications of Transnationalism For Comparative Historical Sociology." *Social Imaginaries* 2(2):17–33.
- Demirhan, Pertev. 1953. *Rus-Japon Harbi: 1904-1905 (Birinci Kısım: İstanbul'dan Ayrılışından Port Arthur Muhasarasına Kadar)*. Istanbul: Matbaa-i Ebüzziya.
- Deringil, Selim. 1998. "From Ottoman to Turk: Self-Image and Social Engineering in Turkey." in *Making Majorities: Constituting the Nation in Japan, Korea, China, Malaysia, Fiji, Turkey and the United States*, edited by D. C. Gladney. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Deringil, Selim. 2011. *The Well-Protected Domains: Ideology and the Legitimation of Power in the Ottoman Empire 1876-1909*. London: I.B.Tauris.
- Desai, Meghnad. 1986. "Review of Late Marx and the Russian Road by Theodor Shanin (Ed.)." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 13(3):151–57.
- Desai, Radhika. 2008. "Introduction: Nationalisms and Their Understandings in Historical Perspective." *Third World Quarterly* 29(3):397–428.
- Desai, Radhika. 2009. "The Inadvertence of Benedict Anderson: Engaging Imagined Communities." *The Asia-Pacific Journal*.
- Dickinson, Frederick R. 2005. "Commemorating the War in Post-Versailles Japan." in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, edited by J. W. Steinberg, B. W. Menning, D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. Wolff, and S. Yokote. Leiden: Brill.
- Dogan, Mattei. 2009. "Strategies in Comparative Sociology." in *New Frontiers in Comparative Sociology*, edited by M. Sasaki. Leiden: Brill.

- Dore, Ronald. 1972. "The Late Development Effect." *IDS Communication* (103):1–11.
- Dore, Ronald. 1973. *British Factory, Japanese Factory: The Origins of National Diversity in Industrial Relations*. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Doyle, Don H. and Eric Van Young. 2013. "Independence and Nationalism in the Americas." in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, edited by J. Breuilly. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Doyle, Michael W. 1986. *Empires*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Duara, Prasenjit. 2002. "Transnationalism and the Challenge to National Histories." in *Rethinking American History in a Global Age*, edited by T. Bender. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Duara, Prasenjit. 2004. "Introduction: The Decolonization of Asia and Africa in the Twentieth Century." in *Decolonization Perspectives from Now and Then*, edited by P. Duara. London: Routledge.
- Duranti, Andrea. 2012. "A Caravanserai on the Route to Modernity: The Case of the Valide Han of Istanbul." in *The Bazaar in the Islamic City: Design, Culture, and History*, edited by M. Gharipour. Cairo: The American University in Cairo Press.
- Durkheim, Emile. 2013. *The Rules of Sociological Method and Selected Texts on Sociology and Its Method*. Second Edition. edited by S. Lukes. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Ekhtiar, Maryam. 1996. "An Encounter with the Russian Czar: The Image of Peter the Great in Early Qajar Historical Writings." *Iranian Studies* 29(1–2):57–70.
- El Moudden, Abderrahmane. 1994. "Looking Eastward: Some Moroccan Tentative Military Reforms With Turkish Assistance (18th-Early 20th Centuries)." *Maghreb Review* 19(3–4):237–45.
- Eley, Geoff. 1984. "Review of Nationalism and the State by John Breuilly." *Social History* 9(3).
- Eley, Geoff. 1996. "Is All the World a Text? From Social History to the History of Society Two Decades Later." in *The Historic Turn in the Human Sciences*, edited by T. J. McDonald. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Eley, Geoff and Ronald Grigor Suny. 1996. "Introduction: From the Moment of Social History to the Work of Cultural Representation." in *Becoming National: A Reader*, edited by G. Eley and R. G. Suny. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Elias, Norbert. 1987. "The Retreat of Sociologists into the Present." *Theory, Culture & Society* 4(2):223–47.

- Elik, Suleyman. 2011. *Iran-Turkey Relations, 1979-2011: Conceptualising the Dynamics of Politics, Religion and Security in Middle-Power States*. London: Routledge.
- Elling, Rasmus Christian. 2013. *Minorities in Iran: Nationalism and Ethnicity after Khomeini*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Elster, Jon. 1986. "The Theory of Combined and Uneven Development: A Critique." in *Analytical Marxism*, edited by J. Roemer. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Emrence, Cem. 2007. "Three Waves of Late Ottoman Historiography, 1950-2007." *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 41(2):137–51.
- Engerman, David C. 2010. "Social Science in the Cold War." *Isis* 101(2):393–400.
- Ergül, F. Aslı. 2009. "The Formation of Turkish National Identity: The Role of the Greek 'Other.'" PhD Thesis, Middle East Technical University, Ankara.
- Ersanlı, Büşra. 2003. *İktidar ve Tarih: Türkiye’de “Resmi Tarih” Tezinin Oluşumu, 1929-1937*. Istanbul: İletişim.
- Esenbel, Selçuk. 2000. "Japanese Interest in the Ottoman Empire." in *The Japanese and Europe: Images and Perceptions*, edited by B. Edström. Richmond: Japan Library.
- Esenbel, Selçuk. 2004. "Japan’s Global Claim to Asia and the World of Islam: Transnational Nationalism and World Power, 1900-1945." *The American Historical Review* 109(4):1140–70.
- Esenbel, Selçuk. 2006. "A Transnational History of Revolution and Nationalism: Encounters Between Japanese Asianists, the Turkish Revolution, and the World of Islam." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 35:37–63.
- Esenbel, Selçuk. 2017. "Fukushima Yasumasa and Utsunomiya Tarō on the Edge of the Silk Road: Pan-Asian Visions and the Network of Military Intelligence from the Ottoman and Qajar Realms into Central Asia." in *Japan on the Silk Road: Encounters and Perspectives of Politics and Culture in Eurasia*, edited by S. Esenbel. Leiden: Brill.
- Farahani, Mirza Mohammad Hosayn. 1990. *A Shi’ite Pilgrimage to Mecca 1885-1886: The Safarnameh of Mirza Moḥammad Ḥosayn Farahani*. edited by H. F. Farmayan and D. L. Elton. London: Saqi Books.
- Farmayan, Hafez F. 1968. "The Forces of Modernization in Nineteenth Century Iran: A Historical Survey." in *Beginnings of Modernization in the Middle East: The Nineteenth Century*, edited by W. R. Polk and R. L. Chambers. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Faroghi, Suraiya. 2015. "The Ottoman Empire and the Islamic World." in *Empires and Encounters, 1350-1750*, edited by W. Reinhard. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.

- Felski, Rita and Susan Stanford Friedman. 2013. "Introduction." in *Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses*, edited by R. Felski and S. S. Friedman. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Findley, Carter V. 1980. *Bureaucratic Reform in the Ottoman Empire: The Sublime Porte, 1789-1922*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Findley, Carter V. 1989. *Ottoman Civil Officialdom: A Social History*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Francks, Penelope. 1999. *Japanese Economic Development: Theory and Practice*. Second Edition. London: Routledge.
- Friedman, Susan Stanford. 2013. "Why Not Compare?" in *Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses*, edited by R. Felski and S. S. Friedman. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Friedman, Thomas L. 2007. *The World Is Flat: A Brief History of the Twenty-First Century*. New York: Picador.
- Garon, Sheldon. 2017. "Transnational History and Japan's 'Comparative Advantage.'" *The Journal of Japanese Studies* 43(1):65–92.
- Gat, Azar. 2017. "Persian-Iranian National Identity: The Longue Durée, From Achaemenid Times Onward." in *Constructing Nationalism in Iran: From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic*, edited by M. Litvak. London: Routledge.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. 2002. "Who Lost Middle Eastern Studies? The Orientalists Strike Back." *Foreign Affairs* 81(2):164–68.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. 2011a. "The Middle East Academic Community and the 'Winter of Arab Discontent': Why Did We Miss It?" in *Seismic Shift: Understanding Change in the Middle East*, edited by E. Laipson. Washington, DC: Henry L. Stimson Center.
- Gause III, F. Gregory. 2011b. "Why Middle East Studies Missed the Arab Spring: The Myth of Authoritarian Stability." *Foreign Affairs* 90(4):81–90.
- Gawrych, George W. 2013. *The Young Atatürk: From Ottoman Soldier to Statesman of Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1964. *Thought and Change*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1983. *Nations and Nationalism*. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1989. *Plough, Sword, and Book: The Structure of Human History*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1994a. "An Alternative Vision." in *Encounters with Nationalism*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.

- Gellner, Ernest. 1994b. *Conditions of Liberty: Civil Society and Its Rivals*. London: Hamish Hamilton.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1994c. "Kemalism." in *Encounters with Nationalism*. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Gellner, Ernest. 1996. "Reply to Critics." in *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*, edited by J. A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Gelvin, James L. 1998. *Divided Loyalties: Nationalism and Mass Politics in Syria at the Close of Empire*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Gelvin, James L. 1999. "Modernity and Its Discontents: On the Durability of Nationalism in the Arab Middle East." *Nations and Nationalism* 5(1):71–89.
- Gelvin, James L. 2011. *The Modern Middle East: A History*. Third Edition. New York: Oxford University Press.
- Gelvin, James L. and Nile Green, eds. 2014. *Global Muslims in the Age of Steam and Print*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Georgeon, François. 2002. "Türk Milliyetçiliği Üzerine Düşünceler: Suyu Arayan Adam'ı Yeniden Okurken." in *Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (Cilt 4: Milliyetçilik)*, edited by T. Bora. Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları.
- Gerber, Haim. 2007. "The Muslim Umma and the Formation of Middle Eastern Nationalisms." in *Nationalism and Ethnosymbolism: History, Culture and Ethnicity in the Formation of Nations*, edited by A. S. Leoussi and S. Grosby. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Gilman, Nils. 2003. *Mandarins of the Future: Modernization Theory in Cold War America*. Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Glassen, Erika. 1993. "Muharram-Ceremonies ('Azadari) in Istanbul at the End of the XIXth and the Beginning of the XXth Century." in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, edited by T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.
- Go, Julian. 2002. "Modeling the State: Postcolonial Constitutions in Asia and Africa." *Southeast Asian Studies* 39(4):558–83.
- Göçek, Fatma Müge. 2013. "Parameters of a Postcolonial Sociology of the Ottoman Empire." in *Decentering Social Theory*. Vol. 25, *Political Power and Social Theory*, edited by J. Go. Bingley, UK: Emerald.
- Goderis, Benedikt and Mila Versteeg. 2014. "The Diffusion of Constitutional Rights." *International Review of Law and Economics* 39:1–19.
- Goss, Jon and Terence Wesley-Smith. 2010. "Introduction: Remaking Area Studies." in *Remaking Area Studies: Teaching and Learning across Asia and the Pacific*, edited by J. Goss and T. Wesley-Smith. Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press.

- Goswami, Manu. 2002. "Rethinking the Modular Nation Form: Toward a Sociohistorical Conception of Nationalism." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44(4):770–99.
- Goswami, Manu. 2013. "Interview with Partha Chatterjee." *Public Culture* 25(1):177–89.
- Gould, Eliga H. 2007. "Entangled Histories, Entangled Worlds: The English-Speaking Atlantic as a Spanish Periphery." *The American Historical Review* 112(3):764–86.
- Gowan, Peter. 2003. "Cooperation and Conflict in Transatlantic Relations after the Cold War." *Interventions* 5(2):218–32.
- Green, Jerrold D. 1994. "The Politics of Middle East Politics." *PS: Political Science & Politics* 27(3):517–518.
- Green, Nile. 2011. *Bombay Islam: The Religious Economy of the West Indian Ocean, 1840–1915*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Green, Nile. 2013. "Shared Infrastructures, Informational Asymmetries: Persians and Indians in Japan, c.1890–1930." *Journal of Global History* 8(3):414–435.
- Green, Nile. 2014. "Rethinking the 'Middle East' after the Oceanic Turn." *Comparative Studies of South Asia, Africa and the Middle East* 34(3):556–64.
- Greenfeld, Liah. 1992. *Nationalism: Five Roads to Modernity*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Grew, Raymond. 1980. "The Case for Comparing Histories." *The American Historical Review* 85(4):763–78.
- Grigoriadis, Ioannis N. and Ali M. Ansari. 2005. "Turkish and Iranian Nationalisms." in *A Companion to the History of the Middle East*, edited by Y. M. Choueiri. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Guha, Ranajit. 1985. "Nationalism Reduced to 'Official Nationalism.'" *Asian Studies Association of Australia. Review* 9(1):103–8.
- Gupta, Akhil. 2004. "Imagining Nations." in *A Companion to the Anthropology of Politics*, edited by D. Nugent and J. Vincent. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Haag-Higuchi, Roxane. 1996. "A Topos and Its Dissolution: Japan in Some 20th-century Iranian Texts." *Iranian Studies* 29(1–2):71–83.
- Haj, Samira. 1997. *The Making of Iraq, 1900–1963: Capital, Power, and Ideology*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Hall, John A. 1993. "Nationalisms: Classified and Explained." *Daedalus* 122(3):1–28.
- Hall, John A. 1998a. "Introduction." in *The State of the Nation*, edited by J. A. Hall. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Hall, John A., ed. 1998b. *The State of the Nation*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hall, John A. 2011. *Ernest Gellner: An Intellectual Biography*. London: Verso.
- Hall, John A. and Ian C. Jarvie, eds. 1996. *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Hall, Peter and Sidney Tarrow. 1998. "Globalization and Area Studies: When Is Too Broad Too Narrow?" *Chronicle of Higher Education*.
- Halliday, Fred. 1997. "The Formation of Yemeni Nationalism: Initial Reflections." in *Rethinking Nationalism in the Arab Middle East*, edited by J. Jankowski and I. Gershoni. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Halliday, Fred. 2000. *Nation and Religion in the Middle East*. London: Saqi Books.
- Halpern, Manfred. 1962. "Middle Eastern Studies: A Review of the State of the Field with a Few Examples." *World Politics* 15(1):108–22.
- Hanioğlu, M. Şükrü. 2011. *Atatürk: An Intellectual Biography*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Hanson, Stephen E. 2009. "The Contribution of Area Studies." in *The SAGE Handbook of Comparative Politics*, edited by T. Landman and N. Robinson. London: SAGE.
- Harootunian, Harry. 2005. "Some Thoughts on Comparability and the Space-Time Problem." *Boundary 2* 32(2):23–52.
- Harris, Erika. 2009. *Nationalism: Theories and Cases*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.
- Hart, John Mason. 1987. *Revolutionary Mexico: The Coming and Process of the Mexican Revolution*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Hastings, Adrian. 1997. *The Construction of Nationhood: Ethnicity, Religion and Nationalism*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Haupt, Heinz-Gerhard and Jürgen Kocka, eds. 2009. *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Hauptmann, Emily. 2005. "Defining 'Theory' in Postwar Political Science." in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Hay, Stephen. 1970. *Asian Ideas of East and West: Tagore and His Critics in Japan, China and India*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Hazır, Agah. 2015. "Comparing Turkey and Iran in Political Science and Historical Sociology: A Critical Review." *Türkiye Ortadoğu Çalışmaları Dergisi* 2(1).

- Hazrati, Hassan. 2015. "Reflections of Midhat Pasha's Modernist Thoughts and Practices among Iranian Political Elites." *Akademik Tarih ve Düşünce Dergisi* 2(7):31–41.
- Hearn, Jonathan. 2006. *Rethinking Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hewitson, Mark. 2014. *History and Causality*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Hill, Alette Olin and Boyd H. Hill. 1980. "Marc Bloch and Comparative History." *The American Historical Review* 85(4):828–46.
- Ho, Engseng. 2017. "Inter-Asian Concepts for Mobile Societies." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 76(4):907–28.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1977. "Some Reflections on 'the Break-up of Britain.'" *New Left Review* 105:3–23.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. 1992. *Nations and Nationalism since 1870: Programme, Myth, Reality*. Second Edition. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobsbawm, Eric J. and Terence Ranger, eds. 1983. *The Invention of Tradition*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, John M. 2004. *The Eastern Origins of Western Civilization*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hobson, John M. 2011. "What's at Stake in the Neo-Trotskyist Debate? Towards a Non-Eurocentric Historical Sociology of Uneven and Combined Development." *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 40(1):147–66.
- Holdrege, Barbara A. 2010. "The Politics of Comparison: Connecting Cultures Outside of and in Spite of the West." *International Journal of Hindu Studies* 14(2–3):147–75.
- Hourani, Albert. 1961. *A Vision of History: Near Eastern and Other Essays*. Beirut: Khayats.
- Houston, Christopher. 2014. "Ankara, Tehran, Baghdad: Three Varieties of Kemalist Urbanism." *Thesis Eleven* 121(1):57–75.
- Hoyo, Henio. 2010. "Transplant or Graft? Hroch and the Mexican Patriotic Movements." *Nationalities Papers* 38(6):793–812.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 1985. *Social Preconditions of National Revival in Europe: A Comparative Analysis of the Social Composition of Patriotic Groups among the Smaller European Nations*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 1996. "From National Movement to the Fully-Formed Nation: The Nation-Building Process in Europe." in *Mapping the Nation*, edited by G. Balakrishnan. London: Verso.

- Hroch, Miroslav. 1998. "Real and Constructed: The Nature of the Nation." in *The State of the Nation*, edited by J. A. Hall. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 2013. "National Movements in the Habsburg and Ottoman Empires." in *The Oxford Handbook of the History of Nationalism*, edited by J. Breuilly. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Hroch, Miroslav. 2015. *European Nations: Explaining Their Formation*. edited by G. Karolina. London: Verso.
- Hudson, Michael C. 2001. "The Middle East." *PS: Political Science & Politics* (4):801–804.
- Iriye, Akira. 1989. "The Internationalization of History." *The American Historical Review* 94(1):1–10.
- Iriye, Akira. 2013. *Global and Transnational History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- İslamoğlu-İnan, Huri, ed. 1987. *The Ottoman Empire and the World-Economy*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Issawi, Charles. 1970. "The Tabriz–Trabzon Trade, 1830–1900: Rise and Decline of a Route." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 1(1):18–27.
- Issawi, Charles. 1991. "European Economic Penetration, 1872–1921." in *The Cambridge History of Iran (Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic)*, edited by P. Avery, G. Hambly, and C. Melville. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- James, Paul. 1996. *Nation Formation: Towards a Theory of Abstract Community*. London: SAGE.
- Jansen, Marius B. 2000. *The Making of Modern Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Belknap Press.
- Johnson, Chalmers. 1997. "Preconception vs. Observation, or the Contributions of Rational Choice Theory and Area Studies to Contemporary Political Science." *PS: Political Science and Politics* 30(2):170–74.
- Johnson, Peter and Judith Tucker. 1975. "Middle East Studies Network in the United States." *MERIP Reports* (38):3–26.
- Jung, Dietrich. 2014. "The 'Ottoman-German Jihad': Lessons for the Contemporary 'Area Studies' Controversy." *British Journal of Middle Eastern Studies* 41(3):247–65.
- Jusdanis, Gregory. 2001. *The Necessary Nation*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kadıoğlu, Ayşe and E. Fuat Keyman. 2011. "Introduction: Understanding Nationalism through Family Resemblances." in *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing*

- Nationalisms in Turkey*, edited by A. Kadioğlu and E. F. Keyman. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Kafadar, Cemal. 1996. *Between Two Worlds: The Construction of the Ottoman State*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Kagan, Leigh. 1968. "A Statement of Directions." *Bulletin of Concerned Asian Scholars* 1(1).
- Kaiwar, Vasant. 2014. *The Postcolonial Orient: The Politics of Difference and the Project of Provincialising Europe*. Leiden: Brill.
- Kalberg, Stephen. 1994. *Max Weber's Comparative-Historical Sociology*. Cambridge, UK: Polity.
- Karny, Azriel. 1973. "Mirza Hosein Khan Moshir Od-Dowle and His Attempts at Reform in Iran, 1871-1873." PhD Thesis, University of California, Los Angeles.
- Karpat, Kemal H. 2004. "A Language in Search of a Nation: Turkish in the Nation-State." in *Studies on Turkish Politics and Society: Selected Articles and Essays*. Leiden: Brill.
- Kasaba, Reşat. 1988. *The Ottoman Empire and the World Economy: The Nineteenth Century*. Albany, NY: State University of New York Press.
- Kasaba, Reşat. 2006. "Dreams of Empire, Dreams of Nations." in *Empire to Nation: Historical Perspectives on the Making of the Modern World*, edited by J. Esherick, H. Kayalı, and E. Van Young. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 1999. *Frontier Fictions: Shaping the Iranian Nation, 1804-1946*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Kashani-Sabet, Firoozeh. 2002. "Cultures of Iranianness: The Evolving Polemic of Iranian Nationalism." in *Iran and the Surrounding World: Interactions in Culture and Cultural Politics*, edited by N. R. Keddie and R. Matthee. Seattle: University of Washington Press.
- Kayaoğlu, Turan. 2010. *Legal Imperialism: Sovereignty and Extraterritoriality in Japan, the Ottoman Empire, and China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Keddie, Nikki R. 1999. *Qajar Iran and the Rise of Reza Khan, 1796-1925*. Costa Mesa, CA: Mazda Publishers.
- Keddie, Nikki R. 2006. *Modern Iran: Roots and Results of Revolution*. Second Edition. New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Keddie, Nikki R. and Mehrdad Amanat. 1991. "Iran under the Late Qajars, 1848-1922." in *The Cambridge History of Iran (Volume 7: From Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic)*, edited by P. Avery, G. Hambly, and C. Melville. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Kedourie, Elie. 1961. *Nationalism*. Second Edition. London: Hutchinson.
- Kedourie, Elie. 1992. *Politics in the Middle East*. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Kehoe, Alice Beck. 2016. *Controversies in Archaeology*. London: Routledge.
- Kern, Karen M. 2011. *Imperial Citizen: Marriage and Citizenship in the Ottoman Frontier Provinces of Iraq*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Keyder, Çağlar. 1987. *State and Class in Turkey: A Study in Capitalist Development*. London: Verso.
- Keyder, Çağlar. 2005. "A History and Geography of Turkish Nationalism." in *Citizenship and the Nation-State in Greece and Turkey*, edited by T. Dragonas and F. Birtek. Routledge.
- Keyman, E. Fuat and Şuhnaz Yılmaz. 2006. "Modernity and Nationalism: Turkey and Iran in Comparative Perspective." in *The SAGE Handbook of Nations and Nationalism*, edited by G. Delanty and K. Kumar. London: SAGE.
- Khalid, Adeeb. 1998. *The Politics of Muslim Cultural Reform: Jadidism in Central Asia*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Khalidi, Rashid. 1995. "Is There a Future for Middle East Studies? (1994 MESA Presidential Address)." *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 29(1):1–6.
- Kieser, Hans-Lukas. 2006. "Introduction." in *Turkey beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*, edited by H.-L. Kieser. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Kiren, Akin. 2017. "Iranians in Istanbul and Their Oppositional Activities Against the Qajars." *Maydan*. Retrieved March 22, 2017 (<https://www.themaydan.com/2017/02/iranians-istanbul-oppositional-activities-qajars/>).
- Knei-Paz, Baruch. 1978. *The Social and Political Thought of Leon Trotsky*. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Koç, Bekir. 2004. "Midhat Paşa'nın Niş ve Tuna Vilayetlerindeki Yenilikçi Valiliği." *Kebikeç* (18):407–15.
- Kocka, Jürgen and Heinz-Gerhard Haupt. 2009. "Comparison and Beyond: Traditions, Scope, and Perspectives of Comparative History." in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, edited by H.-G. Haupt and J. Kocka. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Kohn, Hans. 1961. *The Idea of Nationalism: A Study in Its Origins and Background*. New York: The Macmillan Company.
- Kolluoğlu-Kırlı, Biray. 2003. "From Orientalism to Area Studies." *CR: The New Centennial Review* 3(3):93–111.

- Koohi-Kamali, Farideh. 2003. *The Political Development of the Kurds in Iran: Pastoral Nationalism*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Kosofsky Sedgwick, Eve. 1992. "Nationalism and Sexualities in the Age of Wilde." in *Nationalisms & Sexualities*, edited by A. Parker, M. Russo, D. Sommer, and P. Yaeger. London: Routledge.
- Kostantaras, Dean. 2013. "Culture, Structure and Reciprocity: Histoire Croisée and Its Uses for the Conceptualization of the Rise and Spread of National Movements in Europe and the Atlantic World during the Age of Revolutions." *European Review of History: Revue Européenne d'Histoire* 20(3):383–405.
- Kowner, Rotem. 2007. "Between a Colonial Clash and World War Zero: The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War in a Global Perspective." in *The Impact of the Russo-Japanese War*, edited by R. Kowner. London: Routledge.
- Koyagi, Mikiya. 2014. "The Hajj by Japanese Muslims in the Interwar Period: Japan's Pan-Asianism and Economic Interests in the Islamic World." *Journal of World History* 24(4):849–76.
- Kramer, Martin. 2001a. *Ivory Towers on Sand: The Failure of Middle Eastern Studies in America*. Washington, DC: Washington Institute for Near East Policy.
- Kramer, Martin. 2001b. "Terrorism? What Terrorism?!" *Wall Street Journal*, November 15, A.26.
- Kunt, Metin. 2005. "Ottomans and Safavids: States, Statecraft, and Societies, 1500–1800." in *A Companion to the History of the Middle East*, edited by Y. M. Choueiri. Malden, MA: Blackwell.
- Kunt, Metin. 2011. "Characterizing Ottoman Polity: 'Turco-Persia' and the Ottomans." in *Horizons of the World: Festschrift for İsenbike Togan*, edited by N. Kılıç-Schubel and İ. E. Binbaş. İstanbul: İthaki.
- Kurzman, Charles. 2010. "Mashrutiyyat, Meşrutiyyet, and Beyond: Intellectuals and the Constitutional Revolutions of 1905-12." in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, edited by H. E. Chehabi and V. Martin. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Kushner, David. 1977. *The Rise of Turkish Nationalism, 1876-1908*. London: Frank Cass.
- Lambton, Ann K. S. 1957. "The Impact of the West on Persia." *International Affairs* 33(1):12–25.
- Landau, Jacob M. 1992. "Main Trends of Turkish Nationalism in the Late Nineteenth and Early Twentieth Centuries." *History of European Ideas* 15(4–6):567–69.
- Langlois, Rosaire. 1994. "Coercion, Cognition, and Production: Gellner's Challenge to Historical Materialism and Postmodernism." *Canadian Journal of Sociology* 19(1):87–113.

- Lawrence, Tanya E. 2015. *Akhtar: A Persian Language Newspaper Published in Istanbul and the Iranian Community of the Ottoman Empire in the Late Nineteenth Century*. Istanbul: Libra Kitapçılık.
- Lazarus, Neil. 2002. "The Fetish of 'the West' in Postcolonial Theory." in *Marxism, Modernity, and Postcolonial Studies*, edited by C. Bartolovich and N. Lazarus. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Leerssen, Joep. 2011. "Viral Nationalism: Romantic Intellectuals on the Move in Nineteenth-Century Europe." *Nations and Nationalism* 17(2):257–71.
- Lerner, Daniel. 1958. *The Passing of Traditional Society: Modernizing the Middle East*. New York: The Free Press.
- Lessnoff, Michael. 2002. *Ernest Gellner and Modernity*. Cardiff: University of Wales Press.
- Levine, Philippa. 2014. "Is Comparative History Possible?" *History and Theory* 53(3):331–47.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1968. *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*. Second Edition. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Lewis, Bernard. 1991. "Watan." *Journal of Contemporary History* 26(3/4):523–33.
- Lieberman, Victor. 1997. "Transcending East—West Dichotomies: State and Culture Formation in Six Ostensibly Disparate Areas." *Modern Asian Studies* 31(3):463–546.
- Linden, Marcel van der. 2007. "The 'Law' of Uneven and Combined Development: Some Underdeveloped Thoughts." *Historical Materialism* 15(1):145–65.
- Litvak, Meir. 2017. "Introduction." in *Constructing Nationalism in Iran: From the Qajars to the Islamic Republic*, edited by M. Litvak. London: Routledge.
- Lockman, Zachary. 2004. "Behind the Battles Over Middle East Studies." *Middle East Report Online*. Retrieved (<http://www.merip.org/mero/interventions/behind-battles-over-middle-east-studies>).
- Lockman, Zachary. 2016. *Field Notes: A History of Middle East Studies in the United States*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- Lomnitz, Claudio. 2000. "Nationalism as a Practical System: Benedict Anderson's Theory of Nationalism from the Vantage Point of Spanish America." in *The Other Mirror: Grand Theory Through the Lens of Latin America*, edited by M. A. Centeno and F. Lopez-Alves. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Löwy, Michael. 1981. *The Politics of Combined and Uneven Development: The Theory of Permanent Revolution*. London: Verso.
- Löwy, Michael. 1998. *Fatherland or Mother Earth? Essays on the National Question*. London: Pluto Press.

- Ludden, David. 2002. *Reading Subaltern Studies: Critical History, Contested Meaning and the Globalization of South Asia*. London: Anthem Press.
- Luesink, Anja W. M. 1993. "The Iranian Community in Cairo at the Turn of the Century." in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, edited by T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.
- Lustick, Ian S. 2000. "The Quality of Theory and the Comparative Disadvantage of Area Studies." *Middle East Studies Association Bulletin* 34(2):189–92.
- Mac Laughlin, Jim. 2001. *Reimagining the Nation-State: The Contested Terrains of Nation-Building*. London: Pluto Press.
- MacKenzie, D. N. n.d. "Ērān, Ērānšahr." *Encyclopædia Iranica*.
- Magubane, Zine. 2005. "Overlapping Territories and Intertwined Histories: Historical Sociology's Global Imagination." in *Remaking Modernity: Politics, History, and Sociology*, edited by J. Adams, E. S. Clemens, and A. S. Orloff. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Mahoney, James. 2011. "Is Comparative Sociology Marginal within the Section?" *Trajectories: Newsletter of the ASA Comparative and Historical Sociology Section* 22(2):34–36.
- Mahoney, James and Dietrich Rueschemeyer. 2003. "Comparative Historical Analysis: Achievements and Agendas." in *Comparative Historical Analysis in the Social Sciences*, edited by J. Mahoney and D. Rueschemeyer. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Makki, Fouad. 2004. "The Empire of Capital and the Remaking of Centre–Periphery Relations." *Third World Quarterly* 25(1):149–68.
- Malcolm, John. 1815. *The History of Persia From The Most Early Period To The Present Time (Volume II)*. London: John Murray.
- Malešević, Siniša. 2014. "Review of Nationalism and Multiple Modernities by Atsuko Ichijo." *Nations and Nationalism* 20(2):376–78.
- Malešević, Siniša. 2015. "Ernest Gellner and Historical Sociology." *Thesis Eleven* 128(1):3–9.
- Malešević, Siniša and Mark Haugaard, eds. 2007. *Ernest Gellner and Contemporary Social Thought*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Mandel, Ernest. 1970. "The Laws of Uneven Development." *New Left Review* (59):19–38.
- Mandel, Ernest. 1975. *Late Capitalism*. London: New Left Books.
- Mandel, Ernest. 1995. *Trotsky as Alternative*. London: Verso.

- Mann, Michael. 1995. "A Political Theory of Nationalism and Its Excesses." in *Notions of Nationalism*, edited by S. Periwal. Budapest: Central European University Press.
- Marashi, Afshin. 2014. "Paradigms of Iranian Nationalism: History, Theory, and Historiography." in *Rethinking Iranian Nationalism and Modernity*, edited by K. S. Aghaie and A. Marashi. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Mardin, Şerif. 2000. *The Genesis of Young Ottoman Thought: A Study in the Modernization of Turkish Political Ideas*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Marks, Steven. 2005. "'Bravo, Brave Tiger of the East!' The War and the Rise of Nationalism in British Egypt and India." in *The Russo-Japanese War in Global Perspective: World War Zero*, edited by J. W. Steinberg, B. W. Menning, D. Schimmelpenninck van der Oye, D. Wolff, and S. Yokote. Leiden: Brill.
- Martin, Vanessa. 2005. *The Qajar Pact: Bargaining, Protest and the State in Nineteenth-Century Persia*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Martins, Herminio. 1974. "Time and Theory in Sociology." in *Approaches to Sociology: An Introduction to Major Trends in British Sociology*, edited by J. Rex. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul.
- Marx, Karl. 1976. *Capital: A Critique of Political Economy (Volume 1)*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Masters, Bruce. 1991. "The Treaties of Erzurum (1823 and 1848) and the Changing Status of Iranians in the Ottoman Empire." *Iranian Studies* 24(1-4):3-15.
- Matin, Kamran. 2007. "Uneven and Combined Development in World History: The International Relations of State-Formation in Premodern Iran." *European Journal of International Relations* 13(3):419-47.
- Matin, Kamran. 2013a. *Recasting Iranian Modernity: International Relations and Social Change*. London: Routledge.
- Matin, Kamran. 2013b. "Redeeming the Universal: Postcolonialism and the Inner Life of Eurocentrism." *European Journal of International Relations* 19(2):353-377.
- Matin-Asgari, Afshin. 2012. "The Academic Debate on Iranian Identity: Nation and Empire Entangled." in *Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective*, edited by A. Amanat and F. Vejdani. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Matossian, Mary. 1958. "Ideologies of Delayed Industrialization: Some Tensions and Ambiguities." *Economic Development and Cultural Change* 6(3):217-28.
- Matthee, Rudi. 2010. "Was Safavid Iran an Empire?" *Journal of the Economic and Social History of the Orient* 53(1):233-65.

- Matthee, Rudi. 2012. "Facing a Rude and Barbarous Neighbor: Iranian Perceptions of Russia and the Russians from the Safavids to the Qajars." in *Iran Facing Others: Identity Boundaries in a Historical Perspective*, edited by A. Amanat and F. Vejdani. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Maxwell, Alexander. 2010. "Typologies and Phases in Nationalism Studies: Hroch's A-B-C Schema as a Basis for Comparative Terminology." *Nationalities Papers* 38(6):865–80.
- McCrone, David. 1998. *The Sociology of Nationalism: Tomorrow's Ancestors*. London: Routledge.
- McMichael, Philip. 1990. "Incorporating Comparison within a World-Historical Perspective: An Alternative Comparative Method." *American Sociological Review* 55(3):385–97.
- Meadwell, Hudson. 2015. "Philosophic History and Common Culture in Gellner's Theory of Nationalism." *Nations and Nationalism* 21(2):270–88.
- Meskoob, Shahrokh. 1992. *Iranian Nationality and the Persian Language*. Washington, DC: Mage Publishers.
- Mikhail, Alan and Christine M. Philliou. 2012. "The Ottoman Empire and the Imperial Turn." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54(4):721–45.
- Miller, Nicola. 2006. "The Historiography of Nationalism and National Identity in Latin America." *Nations and Nationalism* 12(2):201–21.
- Mills, Amy. 2014. "Cultures of Assemblage, Resituating Urban Theory: A Response to the Papers on 'Assembling Istanbul.'" *City* 18(6):691–97.
- Mirsepassi, Ali. 1995. "Middle Eastern Studies and American Sociology." *Contemporary Sociology* 24(3):324–28.
- Mirsepassi, Ali, Amrita Basu, and Frederick Weaver. 2003. "Introduction: Knowledge, Power, and Culture." in *Localizing Knowledge in a Globalizing World: Recasting the Area Studies Debate*, edited by A. Mirsepassi, A. Basu, and F. Weaver. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Mishra, Pankaj. 2013. *From the Ruins of Empire: The Revolt Against the West and the Remaking of Asia*. London: Penguin.
- Mitani, Hiroshi. 2006. "The Concept of Asia: From Geography to Ideology." *New Perspectives on Turkey* 35:21–35.
- Mitchell, Timothy. 2004. "The Middle East in the Past and Future of Social Science." in *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, edited by D. Szanton. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Moazami, Behrooz. 2013. *State, Religion, and Revolution in Iran: 1796 to the Present*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Mongia, Radhika. 2007. "Historicizing State Sovereignty: Inequality and the Form of Equivalence." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49(2):384–411.
- Mongia, Radhika V. 2014. "Interrogating Critiques of Methodological Nationalism: Propositions for New Methodologies." in *Beyond Methodological Nationalism: Research Methodologies for Cross-Border Studies*, edited by A. Amelina, D. D. Nergiz, T. Faist, and N. Glick Schiller. London: Routledge.
- Moore, Barrington. 1973. *Social Origins of Dictatorship and Democracy*. Harmondsworth: Penguin.
- Morgan, David. 2018. "Preface." in *Crisis, Collapse, Militarism and Civil War: The History and Historiography of 18th Century Iran*, edited by M. Axworthy. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Mottahedeh, Roy. 1985. *Mantle of the Prophet: Religion and Politics in Iran*. London: Chatto&Windus.
- Nairn, Tom. 1981. *The Break-up of Britain: Crisis and Neo-Nationalism*. Second Edition. London: New Left Books.
- Nakash, Yitzhak. 1994. *The Shi'is of Iraq*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Nashat, Guity. 1982. *The Origins of Modern Reform in Iran, 1870-80*. Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press.
- Nişancıoğlu, Kerem. 2013. "Ottomans in Europe: Uneven and Combined Development and Eurocentrism." PhD Thesis, University of Sussex, Brighton.
- Nisbet, Robert. 1970. "Genealogy, Growth, and Other Metaphors." *New Literary History* 1(3):351–63.
- Novack, George. 1980. *Understanding History: Marxist Essays*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Novick, Peter. 1988. *That Noble Dream: The "Objectivity Question" and the American Historical Profession*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Leary, Brendan. 1997. "On the Nature of Nationalism: An Appraisal of Ernest Gellner's Writings on Nationalism." *British Journal of Political Science* 27(2):191–222.
- O'Leary, Brendan. 1998. "Ernest Gellner's Diagnoses of Nationalism: A Critical Overview, or, What Is Living and What Is Dead in Ernest Gellner's Philosophy of Nationalism?" in *The State of the Nation*, edited by J. A. Hall. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- O'Leary, Brendan. 2002. "In Praise of Empires Past." *New Left Review* (18):106–30.
- Onaka, Fumiya. 2015. "Max Weber and Comparison." *Comparative Sociology* 14(4):478–507.

- Orridge, A. W. 1981. "Uneven Development and Nationalism: 2." *Political Studies* 29(2):181–90.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. 1986. "Semi-Colonialism and Informal Empire in Twentieth-Century China: Towards a Framework of Analysis." in *Imperialism and After: Continuities and Discontinuities*, edited by W. J. Mommsen and J. Osterhammel. London: Allen & Unwin.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2009. "A 'Transnational' History of Society: Continuity or New Departure." in *Comparative and Transnational History: Central European Approaches and New Perspectives*, edited by J. Kocka and H.-G. Haupt. New York: Berghahn Books.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2014. *The Transformation of the World: A Global History of the Nineteenth Century*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Osterhammel, Jürgen. 2016. "Global History and Historical Sociology." in *The Prospect of Global History*, edited by J. Belich, J. Darwin, M. Frenz, and C. Wickham. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Özdoğan, Günay Göksu. 2010. "Turkish Nationalism Reconsidered: The 'Heaviness' of State-Patriotism in Nation-Building." in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, edited by A. Aktar, N. Kızılyürek, and U. Özkırmı. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Özkırmı, Umut. 2005. *Contemporary Debates on Nationalism: A Critical Engagement*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Özkırmı, Umut. 2008. *Milliyetçilik ve Türkiye-Avrupa Birliği İlişkileri*. Istanbul: TESEV.
- Özkırmı, Umut. 2010. *Theories of Nationalism: A Critical Introduction*. Second Edition. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Özkırmı, Umut. 2011. "The Changing Nature of Nationalism in Turkey: Actors, Discourses and the Struggle for Hegemony." in *Symbiotic Antagonisms: Competing Nationalisms in Turkey*, edited by A. Kadioğlu and E. F. Keyman. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Özkırmı, Umut and Spyros A. Sofos. 2008. *Tormented by History: Nationalism in Greece and Turkey*. London: Hurst & Company.
- Özkırmı, Umut and Spyros A. Sofos. 2010. "Nationalism in Greece and Turkey: Modernity, Enlightenment, Westernization." in *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, edited by A. Aktar, N. Kızılyürek, and U. Özkırmı. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Parker, Andrew. 1999. "Bogeyman: Benedict Anderson's 'Derivative' Discourse." *Diacritics* 29(4):40–57.
- Pascal, Blaise. 2005. *Pensées*. Indianapolis, IN: Hackett Publishing.

- Pfaff, Richard H. 1963. "Disengagement from Traditionalism in Turkey and Iran." *The Western Political Quarterly* 16(1):79–98.
- Pieterse, Jan Nederveen. 1991. "Dilemmas of Development Discourse: The Crisis of Developmentalism and the Comparative Method." *Development and Change* 22(1):5–29.
- Pistor-Hatam, Anja. 1993. "The Persian Newspaper Akhtar as a Transmitter of Ottoman Political Ideas." in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, edited by T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.
- Pistor-Hatam, Anja. 1995. "Iran and the Reform Movement in the Ottoman Empire: Persian Travellers, Exiles and Newsmen under the Impact of the Tanzimat." in *Proceedings of the Second European Conference of Iranian Studies*, edited by B. G. Fragner. Rome: Istituto italiano per il Medio ed Estremo Oriente.
- Pistor-Hatam, Anja. 1996. "Progress and Civilization in Nineteenth-Century Japan: The Far Eastern State as a Model for Modernization." *Iranian Studies* 29(1/2):111–26.
- Pistor-Hatam, Anja. 2007. "Merchants, Pilgrims and Refugees: Iranian Shiites in the Ottoman Empire." in *Religious Refugees in Europe, Asia and North America (6th - 21st Century)*, edited by S. Lachenicht. Hamburg: Lit Verlag.
- Pizzo, David. 2016. "Informal Empire." in *The Encyclopedia of Empire*, edited by N. Dalziel and J. M. MacKenzie. Oxford, UK: John Wiley & Sons.
- Poggi, Gianfranco. 1965. "A Main Theme of Contemporary Sociological Analysis: Its Achievements and Limitations." *The British Journal of Sociology* 16(4):283–94.
- Pollock, Sheldon. 2010. "Comparison without Hegemony." in *The Benefit of Broad Horizons: Intellectual and Institutional Preconditions for a Global Social Science*, edited by H. Joas and B. S. Klein. Leiden: Brill.
- Pye, Lucian W. 1975. "The Confrontation between Discipline and Area Studies." in *Political Science and Area Studies: Rivals or Partners*, edited by L. W. Pye. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Quataert, Donald and Sabri Sayarı. 2003. "Introduction." in *Turkish Studies in the United States*, edited by D. Quataert and S. Sayarı. Bloomington: Indiana University Ottoman and Modern Turkish Studies Publications.
- Rafael, Vicente L. 1994. "The Cultures of Area Studies in the United States." *Social Text* (41):91–111.
- Rajabzadeh, Hashem. 1988. "Russo-Japanese War as Told by Iranians." *Annals of Japan Association for Middle East Studies* 3(2):144–69.
- Ram, Haggay. 2000. "The Immemorial Iranian Nation? School Textbooks and Historical Memory in Post-Revolutionary Iran." *Nations and Nationalism* 6(1):67–90.

- Ramaswamy, Sumathi. 1994. "Review of Nationalist Thought and the Colonial World: A Derivative Discourse by Partha Chatterjee." *The Journal of Asian Studies* 53(3):960–61.
- Randeria, Shalini. 2002. "Entangled Histories of Uneven Modernities: Civil Society, Caste Solidarities and Legal Pluralism in Post-Colonial India." in *Unraveling Ties: From Social Cohesion to New Practices of Connectedness*, edited by Y. Elkana. Frankfurt: Campus Verlag.
- Riley, Dylan J. and Manali Desai. 2007. "The Passive Revolutionary Route to the Modern World: Italy and India in Comparative Perspective." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 49(4):815–847.
- Rockefeller, Stuart Alexander. 2011. "Flow." *Current Anthropology* 52(4):557–78.
- Romagnolo, David J. 1975. "The So-Called 'Law' of Uneven and Combined Development." *Latin American Perspectives* 2(1):7–31.
- Rosenberg, Justin. 2006. "Why Is There No International Historical Sociology?" *European Journal of International Relations* 12(3):307–40.
- Rosenberg, Justin. 2010. "Basic Problems in the Theory of Uneven and Combined Development, Part II: Unevenness and Political Multiplicity." *Cambridge Review of International Affairs* 23(1):165–89.
- Rosenberg, Justin. 2016. "International Relations in the Prison of Political Science." *International Relations* 30(2):127–53.
- Roth, Guenther. 1976. "History and Sociology in the Work of Max Weber." *The British Journal of Sociology* 27(3):306–18.
- Rüger, Jan. 2010. "OXO: Or, the Challenges of Transnational History." *European History Quarterly* 40(4):656–68.
- Ryad, Umar. 2014. "Anti-Imperialism and the Pan-Islamic Movement." in *Islam and the European Empires*, edited by D. Motadel. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.
- Said, Edward W. 1979. *Orientalism*. New York: Vintage Books.
- Sakamoto, Tsutomu. 1993. "Istanbul and the Carpet Trade of Iran since the 1870's." in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, edited by T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.
- Saleh, Alam and James Worrall. 2015. "Between Darius and Khomeini: Exploring Iran's National Identity Problematique." *National Identities* 17(1):73–97.
- Salzmann, Ariel. 2004. *Tocqueville in the Ottoman Empire: Rival Paths to the Modern State*. Leiden: Brill.
- Saunier, Pierre-Yves. 2013. *Transnational History*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

- Sayer, Derek. 1987. "In Defence of Marxology: A Reply to Meghnad Desai's Review of T. Shanin et Al., *Late Marx and the Russian Road*." *Journal of Peasant Studies* 14(3):406–10.
- Sayer, Derek. 1990. *Capitalism and Modernity: An Excursus on Marx and Weber*. London: Routledge.
- Schaar, Stuart. 1979. "Orientalism at the Service of Imperialism: A Review Article of Edward W. Said's *Orientalism*." *Race & Class* 21(1):67–80.
- Schiel, Juliane. 2009. "Crossing Paths between East and West: The Use of Counterfactual Thinking for the Concept of 'Entangled Histories.'" *Historical Social Research* 34(2 (128)):161–83.
- Seth, Sanjay. 1993. "Political Theory in the Age of Nationalism." *Ethics & International Affairs* 7(1):75–96.
- Seton-Watson, Hugh. 1977. *Nations and States: An Inquiry into the Origins of Nations and the Politics of Nationalism*. London: Methuen.
- Sewell Jr., William H. 1967. "Marc Bloch and the Logic of Comparative History." *History and Theory* 6(2):208–18.
- Sewell Jr., William H. 1996. "Three Temporalities: Toward an Eventful Sociology." in *The Historic Turn in Human Sciences*, edited by T. J. McDonald. Ann Arbor, MI: The University of Michigan Press.
- Sewell Jr., William H. 2004. "The French Revolution and the Emergence of the Nation Form." in *Revolutionary Currents: Nation Building in the Transatlantic World*, edited by M. A. Morrison and M. Zook. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.
- Shahbazi, A. Shapur. 2005. "The History of the Idea of Iran." in *The Idea of Iran (Volume 1: Birth of the Persian Empire)*, edited by V. S. Curtis and S. Stewart. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Shambayati, Hootan. 1994. "The Rentier State, Interest Groups, and the Paradox of Autonomy: State and Business in Turkey and Iran." *Comparative Politics* 26(3):307–31.
- Shambayati, Hootan. 2004. "A Tale of Two Mayors: Courts and Politics in Iran and Turkey." *International Journal of Middle East Studies* 36(2):253–75.
- Shanin, Teodor. 1983. "Late Marx: Gods and Craftsmen." in *Late Marx and the Russian Road: Marx and the Peripheries of Capitalism*, edited by T. Shanin. New York: Monthly Review Press.
- Sharifi, Majid. 2013. *Imagining Iran: The Tragedy of Subaltern Nationalism*. Lanham, MD: Lexington Books.
- Shaw, Stanford. 1991. "Iranian Relations with the Ottoman Empire in the Eighteenth and Nineteenth Centuries." in *The Cambridge History of Iran (Volume 7: From*

- Nadir Shah to the Islamic Republic*), edited by P. Avery, G. Hambly, and C. Melville. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Shea, Christopher. 1997. "Political Scientists Clash Over Value of Area Studies." *Chronicle of Higher Education*.
- Shih, Shu-Mei. 2013. "Comparison as Relation." in *Comparison: Theories, Approaches, Uses*, edited by R. Felski and S. S. Friedman. Baltimore, MD: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Shissler, A. Holly. 2003. *Between Two Empires: Ahmet Ağaoğlu and the New Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Sidaway, James D. 2013. "Geography, Globalization, and the Problematic of Area Studies." *Annals of the Association of American Geographers* 103(4):984–1002.
- Siddiqi, Farhan. 2010. "Nation-Formation and National Movement(s) in Pakistan: A Critical Estimation of Hroch's Stage Theory." *Nationalities Papers* 38(6):777–92.
- Skocpol, Theda. 1979. *States and Social Revolutions: A Comparative Analysis of France, Russia, and China*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1978. "The Diffusion of Nationalism: Some Historical and Sociological Perspectives." *The British Journal of Sociology* 29(2):234–48.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1986. *The Ethnic Origins of Nations*. Oxford, UK: Blackwell.
- Smith, Anthony D. 1998. *Nationalism and Modernism: A Critical Survey of Recent Theories of Nations and Nationalism*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, Anthony D. 2000. *The Nation in History: Historiographical Debates about Ethnicity and Nationalism*. Hanover, NH: University Press of New England.
- Smith, Anthony D. 2009. *Ethno-Symbolism and Nationalism: A Cultural Approach*. London: Routledge.
- Smith, Neil and Cindi Katz. 1993. "Grounding Metaphor: Towards a Spatilized Politics." in *Place and the Politics of Identity*, edited by M. Keith and S. Pile. London: Routledge.
- Sohrabi, Nader. 1995. "Historicizing Revolutions: Constitutional Revolutions in the Ottoman Empire, Iran, and Russia, 1905-1908." *American Journal of Sociology* 100(6):1383–1447.
- Sohrabi, Nader. 2002. "Global Waves, Local Actors: What the Young Turks Knew about Other Revolutions and Why It Mattered." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 44(1):45–79.
- Sohrabi, Nader. 2011. *Revolution and Constitutionalism in the Ottoman Empire and Iran*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.

- Somer, Murat. 2014. "Theory-Consuming or Theory-Producing?: Studying Turkey as a Theory-Developing Critical Case." *Turkish Studies* 15(4):571–88.
- Spector, Ivar. 1962. *The First Russian Revolution: Its Impact on Asia*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.
- Stagardt, Nicholas. 1996. "Gellner's Nationalism: The Spirit of Modernisation?" in *The Social Philosophy of Ernest Gellner*, edited by J. A. Hall and I. C. Jarvie. Amsterdam: Rodopi.
- Stedman Jones, Gareth. 1976. "From Historical Sociology to Theoretical History." *The British Journal of Sociology* 27(3):295–305.
- Steinmetz, George. 2005. "Introduction: Positivism and Its Others in the Social Sciences." in *The Politics of Method in the Human Sciences: Positivism and Its Epistemological Others*, edited by G. Steinmetz. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Steinmetz, George. 2014. "Comparative History and Its Critics: A Genealogy and a Possible Solution." in *A Companion to Global Historical Thought*, edited by P. Duara, V. Murthy, and A. Sartori. Malden, MA: Wiley-Blackwell.
- Stevens, Roger. 1971. *The Land of the Great Sophy*. London: Methuen & Co.
- Stoler, Ann Laura. 2001. "Tense and Tender Ties: The Politics of Comparison in North American History and (Post) Colonial Studies." *The Journal of American History* 88(3):829–65.
- Stolte, Carolien and Harald Fischer-Tiné. 2012. "Imagining Asia in India: Nationalism and Internationalism (ca. 1905–1940)." *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 54(1):65–92.
- Stutje, Jan Willem. 2007. "Concerning *Der Spätkapitalismus*: Mandel's Quest for a Synthesis of Late Capitalism." *Historical Materialism* 15(1):167–98.
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 1997. "Connected Histories: Notes towards a Reconfiguration of Early Modern Eurasia." *Modern Asian Studies* 31(3):735–62.
- Subrahmanyam, Sanjay. 2016. "One Asia, or Many? Reflections from Connected History." *Modern Asian Studies* 50(1):5–43.
- Sugita, Hideaki. 2007. "The First Contact between Japanese and Iranians as Seen through Travel Diaries." in *The Islamic Middle East and Japan: Perceptions, Aspirations, and the Birth of Intra-Asian Modernity*, edited by R. Worringer. Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers.
- Suny, Ronald Grigor. 1972. *The Baku Commune, 1917-1918: Class and Nationality in the Russian Revolution*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
- Sylvester, Christine. 1999. "Development Studies and Postcolonial Studies: Disparate Tales of the 'Third World.'" *Third World Quarterly* 20(4):703–21.

- Szanton, David. 2004. "Introduction: The Origin, Nature, and Challenges of Area Studies in the United States." in *The Politics of Knowledge: Area Studies and the Disciplines*, edited by D. Szanton. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Taqizadeh, Seyyed Hasan. 1960. "The Background of the Constitutional Movement in Azerbaijan." *Middle East Journal* 14(4):456–65.
- Tavakoli-Targhi, Mohamad. 2001. *Refashioning Iran: Orientalism, Occidentalism, and Historiography*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
- Tenbruck, Friedrich. 1994. "Internal History of Society or Universal History?" *Theory, Culture & Society* 11(1):75–93.
- Teschke, Benno. 2014. "IR Theory, Historical Materialism and the False Promise of International Historical Sociology." *Spectrum: Journal of Global Studies* 6(1).
- Tessler, Mark, Jodi Nachtwey, and Anne Banda. 1999. "Introduction: The Area Studies Controversy." in *Area Studies and Social Science: Strategies for Understanding Middle East Politics*, edited by M. Tessler, J. Nachtwey, and A. Banda. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
- Teti, Andrea. 2007. "Bridging the Gap: IR, Middle East Studies and the Disciplinary Politics of the Area Studies Controversy." *European Journal of International Relations* 13(1):117–45.
- Tezcan, Baki. 2012. *The Second Ottoman Empire: Political and Social Transformation in the Early Modern World*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tezcür, Güneş Murat. 2011. *Muslim Reformers in Iran and Turkey: The Paradox of Moderation*. Austin, TX: University of Texas Press.
- Thatcher, Ian D. 1991. "Uneven and Combined Development." *Revolutionary Russia* 4(2):235–58.
- Thiesse, Anne-Marie. 2005. "National Identities: A Transnational Paradigm." in *Revisiting Nationalism: Theories and Processes*, edited by A. Dieckhoff and C. Jaffrelot. New York: Palgrave Macmillan US.
- Tilly, Charles. 1991. "How (and What) Are Historians Doing?" in *Divided Knowledge: Across Disciplines, Across Cultures*, edited by D. Easton and C. S. Schelling. Newbury Park, CA: SAGE.
- Tilly, Charles. 1995. "States and Nationalism in Europe 1492-1992." in *Perspectives on Nationalism and War*, edited by J. L. Comaroff and P. C. Stern. Amsterdam: Gordon & Breach.
- Tilly, Charles. 1996. "The State of Nationalism." *Critical Review* 10(2):299–306.
- Todorova, Maria. 2005. "The Trap of Backwardness: Modernity, Temporality, and the Study of Eastern European Nationalism." *Slavic Review* 64(1):140–64.

- Trotsky, Leon. 1957. *The Third International After Lenin*. Second Edition. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, Leon. 1969. *The Permanent Revolution & Results and Prospects*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, Leon. 1972. *Writings of Leon Trotsky (1932-33)*. New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, Leon. 1983. *The Revolution Betrayed: What Is the Soviet Union and Where Is It Going?* New York: Pathfinder Press.
- Trotsky, Leon. 2007. *History of the Russian Revolution*. Chicago: Haymarket Books.
- Tucker, Ernest. 1996. "The Peace Negotiations of 1736: A Conceptual Turning Point In Ottoman-Iranian Relations." *Turkish Studies Association Bulletin* 20(1):16–37.
- Tucker, Ernest. 2006. *Nadir Shah's Quest for Legitimacy in Post-Safavid Iran*. Gainesville, FL: University Press of Florida.
- Tuna, Mustafa. 2015. *Imperial Russia's Muslims: Islam, Empire and European Modernity, 1788-1914*. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Tyrrell, Ian. 1991. "American Exceptionalism in an Age of International History." *The American Historical Review* 96(4):1031–55.
- Ullock, Christopher J. 1996. "Imagining Community: A Metaphysics of Being or Becoming?" *Millennium - Journal of International Studies* 25(2):425–41.
- Uzer, Umut. 2016. *An Intellectual History of Turkish Nationalism: Between Turkish Ethnicity and Islamic Identity*. Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press.
- Vardağlı, Emine Tutku. 2014. "International Tobacco Politics and the Question of Social Movements in the Middle East: A Comparative Analysis of Ottoman and Iranian Cases." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50(4):606–21.
- Vatikiotis, Panayiotis J. 1987. *Islam and the State*. London: Croom Helm.
- Vaziri, Mostafa. 1993. *Iran as Imagined Nation: The Construction of National Identity*. New York: Paragon House.
- Vejdani, Farzin. 2010. "Crafting Constitutional Narratives: Iranian and Young Turk Solidarity 1907-09." in *Iran's Constitutional Revolution: Popular Politics, Cultural Transformations and Transnational Connections*, edited by H. E. Chehabi and V. Martin. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Vejdani, Farzin. 2015. *Making History in Iran: Education, Nationalism, and Print Culture*. Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.
- de Vries, Jan. 2013. "Reflections on Doing Global History." in *Writing the History of the Global: Challenges for the 21st Century*, edited by M. Berg. Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press.

- Waldinger, Roger and David Fitzgerald. 2004. "Transnationalism in Question." *American Journal of Sociology* 109(5):1177–95.
- Wallerstein, Immanuel. 1991. "The Construction of Peoplehood: Racism, Nationalism, Ethnicity." in *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, edited by E. Balibar and I. Wallerstein. London: Verso.
- Weber, Max. 1978. *Economy and Society*. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press.
- Werner, Michael and Bénédicte Zimmermann. 2006. "Beyond Comparison: Histoire Croisée and the Challenge of Reflexivity." *History and Theory* 45(1):30–50.
- Westney, D. Eleanor. 1987. *Imitation and Innovation: The Transfer of Western Organizational Patterns to Meiji Japan*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
- Wimmer, Andreas and Yuval Feinstein. 2010. "The Rise of the Nation-State across the World, 1816 to 2001." *American Sociological Review* 75(5):764–90.
- Worringer, Renée. 2014. *Ottomans Imagining Japan: East, Middle East, and Non-Western Modernity at the Turn of the Twentieth Century*. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
- Yaghoubian, David N. 2014. *Ethnicity, Identity, and the Development of Nationalism in Iran*. Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press.
- Yapp, M. E. 1992. "Europe in the Turkish Mirror." *Past & Present* (137):134–55.
- Yarshater, Ehsan. 1983. "Iranian National History." in *The Cambridge History of Iran (Volume 3, Part 1: The Seleucid, Parthian and Sasanid Periods)*, edited by E. Yarshater. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Yarshater, Ehsan. 1993. "Persian Identity in Historical Perspective." *Iranian Studies* 26(1/2):141–42.
- Yaşar, Murat. 2014. "Learning the Ropes: The Young Turk Perception of the 1905 Russian Revolution." *Middle Eastern Studies* 50(1):114–28.
- Yengoyan, Aram A. 2006. "Introduction: On the Issue of Comparison." in *Modes of Comparison: Theory & Practice*, edited by A. A. Yengoyan. Ann Arbor, MI: University of Michigan Press.
- Yıldırım, Ender. 2009. *Türkiye-İran İlişkileri: 1918-1960*. Istanbul: Giza.
- Yolaçan, Serkan. 2017. "Order Beyond Borders: The Azerbaijani Triangle Across Iran, Turkey, and Russia." PhD Thesis, Duke University, Durham, NC.
- Zarcone, Thierry and Fariba Zarinebaf. 1993a. "Introduction." in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, edited by T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.

- Zarcone, Thierry and Fariba Zarinebaf, eds. 1993b. *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.
- Zarinebaf, Fariba. 1993. "The Iranian (Azeri) Merchant Community in the Ottoman Empire and the Constitutional Revolution." in *Les Iraniens d'Istanbul*, edited by T. Zarcone and F. Zarinebaf. Paris: Institut Français de Recherches en Iran.
- Zarinebaf, Fariba. n.d. "Diaspora -Iv. In Ottoman Turkey." *Encyclopædia Iranica*.
- Ze'evi, Dror. 2004. "Back to Napoleon? Thoughts on the Beginning of the Modern Era in the Middle East." *Mediterranean Historical Review* 19(1):73–94.
- Zia-Ebrahimi, Reza. 2011. "Self-Orientalization and Dislocation: The Uses and Abuses of the 'Aryan' Discourse in Iran." *Iranian Studies* 44(4):445–72.
- Zia-Ebrahimi, Reza. 2016. *The Emergence of Iranian Nationalism: Race and the Politics of Dislocation*. New York: Columbia University Press.
- Zimmerman, Andrew. 2017. "Conclusion: Global Historical Sociology and Transnational History - History and Theory Against Eurocentrism." in *Global Historical Sociology*, edited by J. Go and G. Lawson. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press.
- Zürcher, Erik J. 2004. *Turkey: A Modern History*. Third Edition. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Zürcher, Erik J. 2010. *The Young Turk Legacy and Nation Building: From the Ottoman Empire to Atatürk's Turkey*. London: I.B. Tauris.
- Zürcher, Erik J. 2014. "Monologue to Conversation: Comparative Approaches in Turkish Historiography." *Turkish Studies* 15(4):589–99.